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Advisory Circular Current Issued May 20, 2026 AIR-626 151 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 20-191 Airworthiness Approval of Airborne Systems used for Takeoff, Precision Approach, Landing and Rollout in low-visibility conditions

This advisory circular (AC) provides an acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness criteria for low visibility takeoff, final approach, landing, and rollout in Category (CAT) II and CAT III weather minima. While the airworthiness criteria for low visibility takeoff is generic in nature, the criteria for the precision approach, landing, and rollout are tailored to using Instrument Landing System (ILS), and Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and it is airplane centric. Applicants seeking airworthiness approval for rotorcraft can add appropriate guidance to tailor their application. This AC does not address Microwave Landing System (MLS).

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U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Airworthiness Approval of Airborne Date: AC No: 20-191 Systems used for Takeoff, Precision Initiated by: AIR-626 Change: Approach, Landing, and Rollout in lowvisibility conditions.

This advisory circular (AC) provides an acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness criteria for low visibility takeoff, final approach, landing, and rollout in Category (CAT) II and CAT III weather minima. While the airworthiness criteria for low visibility takeoff is generic in nature, the criteria for the precision approach, landing, and rollout are tailored to using Instrument Landing System (ILS), and Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and it is airplane centric. Applicants seeking airworthiness approval for rotorcraft can add appropriate guidance to tailor their application. This AC does not address Microwave Landing System (MLS).

This new AC is derived from the airworthiness criteria previously contained in AC 120-28D, Criteria for Approval of Category III Weather Minima for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout, and AC 120-29A, Criteria for Approval of Category I and Category II Weather Minima for Approach. This AC includes updated GBAS standards, issue paper findings from GBAS Landing System (GLS) and low visibility takeoff certification programs.

Daniel J. Elgas Aviation Safety Director, Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft Certification Service

05/20/2026

DANIEL J. ELGAS

Digitally signed by DANIEL J. ELGAS Date: 2026.05.20 12:56:38 -04'00'

Paragraph … Page

Chapter 1. General … 1-1

1.1 Purpose … 1-1

1.2 Audience … 1-1

1.3 Cancellation … 1-1

1.4 Where to Find This AC … 1-2

1.5 Related Materials … 1-2

1.6 Definitions of Key Terms … 1-2

Chapter 2. Scope … 2-1

2.1 Introduction … 2-1

2.2 Applicability. Explanation of Change … 2-1

2.3 Contents of this AC … 2-2

2.4 Related Regulations … 2-2

Chapter 3. Takeoff Guidance System … 3-1

3.1 Introduction … 3-1

3.2 Airworthiness Criteria … 3-1

3.3 Airborne Systems for Takeoff … 3-8

3.4 Takeoff Guidance Evaluation … 3-9

3.5 AFM … 3-13

Chapter 4. Category (CAT) II … 4-1

4.1 Introduction … 4-1

4.2 Airworthiness Criteria … 4-2

4.3 Airborne Systems for CAT II Operations … 4-12

4.4 Approach System Evaluation … 4-15

4.5 AFM … 4-18

Chapter 5. Category (CAT) III … 5-1

5.1 Introduction … 5-1

5.2 Airworthiness Criteria … 5-1

5.3 Airborne Systems for CAT III … 5-26

5.4 Landing and Rollout System Evaluation … 5-31

5.5 Aircraft Flight Manual … 5-46

ii

Appendix A. Definitions and Acronyms … A-1

A.2 Definitions of Terms … A-4

Appendix B. Wind model for approach and landing simulation … B-1

B.1 Wind Models … B-1

B.2 Wind Model A … B-1

B.3 Wind Model C … B-10

B.4 Wind Model B … B-10

B.5 Acronyms and Definitions for the Wind Models … B-13

Appendix C. GBAS Performance Model for Approach and Landing Simulation … C-1

C.1 GBAS Performance Analysis … C-1

C.2 Alternative Method for Calculating and Using NSE Model Scale Factors … C-15

C.3 References for GBAS Performance Model … C-22

C.4 Acronyms and Definitions for GBAS Performance Model … C-23

Appendix D. AFM Provisions and Example AFM Wording … D-1

D.1 Example Provision: AFM "Certificate Limitation" Section … D-1

D.2 Example Provision - AFM “Normal Procedures” or “Normal Operation” Section. ... D-2

D.3 Example Provision - AFM “Normal Procedures” or “Normal Operation” Section. ... D-4

FIGURES

Number Page

Figure 5-1 AFM Elevation Value From Flight Test And Validated Simulation … 5-38

Figure B-1 Headwind-Tailwind … B-4

Figure B-2 Crosswind … B-5

Figure B-3 Annual Percent Probability of Mean Wind Speed Equaling or Exceeding Given Values … B-6

Figure B-4 Wind Direction Relative to Runway Heading … B-7

Figure B-5 Selected Description for Variances of Horizontal Turbulence Components … B-8

Figure B-6 Selected Integral Scale Description … B-9

Figure B-7 Cumulative probability of reported Mean Wind, and Head Wind, Tail Wind Cross Wind Components when landing … B-12

Figure C-1 GBAS Signal Model … C-2

Figure C-2 GLS NSE Generator … C-2

iii

Figure C-3 NSE Step Generator … C-5

Figure C-4 Limit and/or Malfunction Generator … C-7

Figure C-5 Malfunction Transient … C-8

Figure C-6 Maximum Error (E) and Monitor Threshold (TBAC) as a function of Alert Limits for Various Numbers of Ground Reference Receivers (M) … C-10

Figure C-7 Example of the Satellite Ranging Source Pmd in the Range domain and Position Domain … C-12

Figure C-8 Example Assessment of Landing Short Performance … C-14

Figure C-9 Explicit Calculation of PUL for the Land Short Example Above … C-15

Figure C-10 Sigma Vertical Samples … C-16

Figure C-11 Worst Horizontal Sigma Samples … C-17

Figure C-12 Rise/set Sigma Step Vert. Error Samples … C-18

Figure C-13 Rise/set Worst Sigma Step-horizontal Error Samples … C-19

Figure C-14 Signal Loss- Sigma Step Vert Error Samples … C-20

Figure C-15 Signal loss worst sigma step hor. Samples … C-21

iv

TABLES

Number Page

Table 5-1: Example AFM Elevation Values … 5-39

Table C-1: GAST Dependent Parameters for Kvert … C-3

Table C-2: GAST Dependent Parameters for Kxtrk and Katrk … C-4

σ Table C-3: GAST Dependent Parameters for step _ vert … C-5

Table C-4: GAST Dependent Parameters for σ step _ xtrk or σ step _ atrk … C-6

Table C-5 Malfunction Transient Characteristics in the Vertical Direction … C-9

Table C-6 Malfunction Transient Characteristics in the Lateral Direction … C-9

Table C-7 Pmd_limit Parameters … C-11

Table C-8 Sigma_vert Values and Number of Occurences … C-16

Table C-9 Sigma_Worst_Horizontal Values and Number of Occurrences … C-18

Table C-10 Rise/Set Sigma_step_vert and Number of Occurrences … C-19

Table C-11 Rise/Set Worst Sigma_Step_Hor and Number of Occurrences … C-20

Table C-12 Signal loss Sigma_Step_Vert and number of occurrences … C-21

Table C-13 Signal Loss Worst Sigma_Step_Hor and number of occurrences … C-22

v

1.3 Cancellation. › 1.3.2 Aircraft types and systems approved previously to issuance of AC…

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL

1.1 Purpose.

1.1.1 This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance for the airworthiness approval of airborne systems used for takeoff, precision approach, landing, and rollout in low visibility conditions. You may use this guidance as a basis for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Parts 23, 25, 27, and 29.

1.1.2 This AC provides criteria for an acceptable means of compliance with performance, integrity and availability criteria for low visibility takeoff, approach, landing, and rollout systems to accomplish takeoff, landing, and rollout in low-visibility conditions. The contents of the document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is only intended to provide the public with information regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.

1.1.3 The applicant is responsible for regulatory compliance and should work closely with their applicable Certification Branch to ensure regulatory compliance. Mandatory terms such as “must” used in this AC are only applicable when following the compliance method outlined in this AC.

1.1.4 This is a guidance document. Its content is not legally binding in its own right and will not be relied upon by the Department as a separate basis for affirmative enforcement action or other administrative penalty. Conformity with the guidance document is voluntary only. Nonconformity will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations.

1.2 Audience.

This AC is for those applicants applying for an initial type certificate (TC), supplemental type certificate (STC), amended TC, or amended STC for the installation and airworthiness approval of airborne systems used for takeoff, precision approach, landing, and rollout in low visibility conditions.

1.3 Cancellation.

1.3.1 This AC updates and incorporates the airworthiness guidance formerly offered in AC 120-29A, Criteria for Approval of Category I and Category II Weather Minima for Approach, and AC 120-28D, Criteria for Approval of Category III Weather Minima for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout. This AC and AC 120-118, Criteria for Approval/Authorization of All Weather Operations (AWO) for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout, cancel both AC 120-29A and AC 120-28D.

1.3.2 Aircraft types and systems approved previously to issuance of AC 120-29A, AC 120- 28D, or equivalent criteria remain valid. Applicants may continue to produce, install,

Chapter 1. General › 1.6 Definitions of Key Terms

and retrofit those systems in existing aircraft, new production aircraft, variants, or future derivatives of those types or variants; however, applicants seeking any additional credit permitted in this AC must meet the provisions of the applicable section in this AC. New airworthiness demonstrations should use the criteria in this AC.

1.3.3 Airworthiness demonstrations may use equivalent European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) criteria as agreed upon by the FAA through the FAA/EASA criteria harmonization process.

1.4 Where to Find This AC.

You may find this AC at FAA Advisory Circulars or at Dynamic Regulatory System (DRS).

1.5 Related Materials See Chapter 2, section 2.4 for all materials related to this AC.

1.6 Definitions of Key Terms See Appendix A for terms and definitions that apply to this AC.

Chapter 2. Scope › 2.2 Applicability. Explanation of Change.

CHAPTER 2. SCOPE

2.1 Introduction.

2.1.1 This AC provides an acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness criteria for the approval of aircraft to conduct takeoff in low-visibility conditions, and final approach, landing, and rollout in CAT II and CAT III weather minima. It includes equipment such as Head Up Displays (HUD), Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS), Landing System (GLS), Instrument Landing System (ILS), and low-visibility takeoff guidance systems. This AC uses the generic term HUD to refer to HUD or any other equivalent display.

2.1.2 Criteria for operational approval for low-visibility takeoff and CAT II/III precision approach and landing as well as special authorization (SA) CAT 1 and SA CAT II are in AC 120-118.

Note: This AC does not provide airworthiness criteria for SA CAT I and SA CAT II.

2.2 Applicability. Explanation of Change.

This AC incorporates and revises the airworthiness criteria previously contained in AC 120-29A and AC 120-28D. This includes low-visibility takeoff and CAT II and CAT III precision approach, landing, and rollout using ILS and GBAS; and integrations that use multi-mode receivers supporting both ILS and GBAS.

2.4 Related Regulations. › 2.4.2 Advisory Circulars.

2.3 Contents of this AC.

2.3.1 Chapter 1 provides the purpose of this AC and other general information.

2.3.2 Chapter 2 provides general airworthiness criteria and references for low visibility takeoff, and CAT II and CAT III precision approach, landing, and rollout.

2.3.3 Chapter 3 provides airworthiness criteria for equipment used to conduct low-visibility takeoff operations.

2.3.4 Chapter 4 provides airworthiness criteria for equipment used to conduct CAT II precision approaches.

2.3.5 Chapter 5 provides airworthiness criteria for equipment used to conduct CAT III precision approaches.

2.3.6 Appendix A provides Acronyms and Definitions.

2.3.7 Appendix B provides Wind Models for Approach and Landing Simulation.

2.3.8 Appendix C provides a GBAS Performance Model for Approach and Landing Simulation.

2.3.9 Appendix D provides an Example Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM).

2.4 Related Regulations.

2.4.1 Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR).

Title 14 CFR parts and sections can be found at eCFR and on the DRS.

• Sections 21.3, 23.1529, 23.2135, 23.2220, 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2600, 23.2605, 23.2610, 23.2620, 25.143, 25.473, 25.479, 25.773, 25.1309, 25.1322, 25.1329, 25.1523, 25.1529, 25.1581, 27.143, 27.473, 27.479, 27.1309, 27.1322, 27.1523, 27.1529, 27.1581, 29.143, 29.473, 29.479, 29.1309, 29.1322, 29.1523, 29.1529, 29.1581, and 135.385,

• Parts 91, 121, 125, and 129.

2.4.2 Advisory Circulars.

Unless this AC makes a specific reference to a particular version of an AC, applicants should use the current editions of the following ACs. You can find the following ACs at FAA Advisory Circulars and on DRS.

• AC 23-8, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes.

• AC 23-17, Systems and Equipment Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes and Airships.

2.4 Related Regulations. › 2.4.4 Other Publications.

• AC 23.1309-1, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes.

• AC 23.1311-1, Installation of Electronic Display in Part 23 Airplanes.

• AC 23.1523, Minimum Flight Crew.

• AC 25-7, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes.

• AC 25-11, Electronic Flight Displays.

• AC 25.773-1, Pilot Compartment View Design Considerations.

• AC 25.1309-1, System Design and Analysis.

• AC 25.1322-1, Flightcrew Alerting.

• AC 25.1329-1, Approval of Flight Guidance Systems.

• AC 25.1523-1, Minimum Flightcrew.

• AC 27-1, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft.

• AC 29-2, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft.

• AC 120-40, Airplane Simulator Qualification.

• AC 120-118, Criteria for Approval/Authorization of All Weather Operations (AWO) for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout.

2.4.3 Technical Standard Orders.

The following TSOs are related to this AC; you can find them on DRS.

• TSO-C34e, ILS Glide Slope Receiving Equipment Operating within the Radio Frequency Range of 328.6-335.4 Megahertz (MHz), 1/15/88.

• TSO-36e, Airborne ILS Localizer Receiving Equipment Operating within the Radio Frequency Range of 108-112 Megahertz (MHz), 1/25/88.

• TSO-C161b, Ground Based Augmentation System Positioning and Navigation Equipment, 12/17/2019.

• TSO-C162b, Ground Based Augmentation System Very High Frequency Data Broadcast Equipment, 12/17/2019.

2.4.4 Other Publications.

The following documents are related to this AC.

• European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AMC AWO 231, Flight Demonstration (Acceptable Means of Compliance), available at EASA.

• RTCA DO-253D Change 1, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, June 27, 2019, available at RTCA.

3.2.3 The following sections identify the performance and workload… › 3.2.3.1 The FAA considers the entire takeoff operation, through…

CHAPTER 3. TAKEOFF GUIDANCE SYSTEM

3.1 Introduction.This chapter provides an acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness approval criteria to conduct takeoff in low-visibility weather conditions. This AC defines a low-visibility takeoff as a takeoff made when runway visibility is below the standard weather minima. Takeoff guidance equipment is required under this AC when visibility conditions alone are inadequate.

Note: Chapter 3 may not be applicable to 14 CFR Part 23 certificated airplanes operating under Part 91; applicants may apply Chapter 3 guidance during Part 23 certification.

3.1.2 Takeoff guidance systems include position sensors, cockpit displays, indicators, and controls as a minimum. The takeoff guidance system provides directional command display guidance to the pilot during takeoff and rejected takeoffs.

3.2 Airworthiness Criteria.

3.2.1 An approved takeoff guidance system must enable the pilot to track and maintain the runway centerline during takeoff from brake release to liftoff, or from brake release through deceleration to a stop for a rejected takeoff. In addition to enabling satisfactory centerline tracking during the takeoff roll, the system must enable the pilot to maintain ground track aligned with the runway heading through the transition to the appropriate mode for post takeoff climb. In addition to enabling satisfactory centerline tracking on the ground, the takeoff guidance system should also lead to a combination of the airplane’s position and track at the point of liftoff that would not result in significant deviations after liftoff. At the point of liftoff, the airplane track should neither be diverging from the runway centerline nor be at such an angle from the runway heading that would cause significant deviations during the climb. After liftoff, the takeoff guidance system must enable the pilot to detect divergence of the airplane’s track from the runway centerline, and at least to be able to arrest further deviation until the system transitions to the appropriate mode for post takeoff climb.

3.2.2 The applicant’s proposal for type certification approval for the equipment, system installations, and test methods should include factors such as the intended function of the installed system, its accuracy, reliability, and fail-safe features, as well as the operational concepts contained in AC 120-118.

3.2.3 The following sections identify the performance and workload provisions for the lowvisibility takeoff roll through liftoff or for a rejected takeoff.

3.2.3.1 The FAA considers the entire takeoff operation, through completion of the en route climb configuration, an intensive phase of flight from an airworthiness perspective. The use of the takeoff system must not require exceptional skill, workload or pilot compensation. The takeoff guidance system must provide an appropriate transition from lateral takeoff guidance

3.2.3.6 Takeoff guidance system. › 3.2.3.6.3 The system’s reference path is usually defined by the ILS…

to en route climb guidance for a takeoff. It must also provide lateral guidance from brake release through deceleration to a stop for a rejected takeoff. The pilot must be able to continue the use of the same primary display(s) for the airborne portion as well as for the runway portion. Changes in guidance modes and display formats must be automatic and apparent to the pilot regarding the guidance being utilized.

3.2.3.2 The applicant must show the relationship and interaction of the aircraft elements of the takeoff system with non-aircraft elements (e.g., ground station, satellites, etc.).

3.2.3.3 The applicant may establish the performance of the aircraft elements with reference to an approved flight path (e.g., localizer, GBAS lateral guidance) provided the budgeting between aircraft and non-aircraft elements does not compromise the overall performance.

3.2.3.4 When international standards exist for the performance and integrity aspects of any non-aircraft elements of the takeoff system, the applicant can assume member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) apply these standards.

3.2.3.5 When international standards do not exist for the performance and integrity aspects of any non-aircraft elements, the applicant must address these considerations as part of the airworthiness process. The applicant must provide a means to inform the operator of the limitations and assumptions necessary to ensure a safe operation.

3.2.3.6 Takeoff guidance system.

3.2.3.6.1 The applicant must evaluate the takeoff guidance system to ensure the performance is satisfactory for normal operations, aircraft failure cases (e.g., engine failure), and recovery from displacements from non-normal events. Guidance cues should be easy to follow and not increase workload significantly compared to the basic flight instruments. The applicant should not solicit any credit for performance improvements resulting from available visual cues.

3.2.3.6.2 The applicant must evaluate the takeoff guidance system displays to ensure that the pilot correctly interprets the display information to maintain the desired takeoff flight path. The applicant should evaluate the cockpit integration issues to ensure consistent operations and pilot response in all situations.

3.2.3.6.3 The system’s reference path is usually defined by the ILS localizer or other approved approach navigation aids (e.g., GBAS) that normally coincides with the runway centerline. As

3.2.3.6 Takeoff guidance system. › 3.2.3.6.5 The applicant should use the performance envelope and…

such, the applicant must demonstrate that the takeoff guidance system accounts for any differences, if any, between the runway centerline and the reference lateral path. The applicant should demonstrate compliance by flight test, or by a combination of flight test and simulation. Flight testing must cover those factors affecting the behavior of the aircraft (e.g., wind conditions, ILS characteristics, weight, center of gravity).

3.2.3.6.4 The applicant should demonstrate that when the airplane is displaced from the runway centerline at any point during the takeoff or rejected takeoff, including engine failure cases, the takeoff guidance system will allow the “pilot flying” (PF) to control the airplane smoothly back to the intended path in a controlled and predictable manner. Minor overshoot or oscillations around the centerline are permissible when not leading to unacceptable flight crew workload.

3.2.3.6.5 The applicant should use the performance envelope and conditions in Figure 3-1 for evaluating the takeoff guidance system.

• Takeoff with all engines operating,

• Engine failure at or slightly after V1- continued takeoff*,

• Engine failure just prior to V1- rejected takeoff *; and

• Engine failure at a speed prior to VMCG – rejected takeoff (VFAILURE< VMCG)*.

*Wind and runway conditions consistent with basic aircraft takeoff performance demonstrations.

3.2.3.6 Takeoff guidance system. › 3.2.3.6.6 The system should have no characteristic making it difficult…

Figure 3-1. Performance Envelope for Evaluating Takeoff System Command Guidance

V1 is takeoff decision speed VFAILURE – speed at which failure occurs VMCG is Ground Minimum Control Speed VLOF is Liftoff Speed

Note 1: When showing compliance, the pilot may adjust the lateral flight path after liftoff to account for wind and drift effects.

Note 2: The 14m lateral region addresses tracking on the runway surface.

Note 3: The FAA expects the pilot to position the aircraft on the runway centerline. Once on the runway, the takeoff guidance system should provide an indication to confirm proper operation.

Note 4: The lateral tracking criteria is referenced to the lateral offset of the aircraft’s centerline between the main landing gear (or aircraft center of gravity).

3.2.3.6.6 The system should have no characteristic making it difficult for a pilot to transition to a safe climb flight path, consistent

3.2.3.6 Takeoff guidance system. › 3.2.3.6.12 The applicant should demonstrate the workload associated…

with obstacle clearance for objects near the runway.

3.2.3.6.7 When demonstrating compliance, the applicant can take into consideration testing techniques such as normal pilot technique for responding to engine failure, application of rudder, maintaining safe bank angles, rotating to suitable pitch attitudes, and compensating for crosswind, as necessary.

3.2.3.6.8 When the rejected takeoff is the result of an engine failure, the actual performance should reflect the effects of a short-term increase in lateral deviation and then converge toward the centerline during the deceleration to a full stop.

3.2.3.6.9 During takeoff, the system must annunciate guidance signal loss to the flight crew.

3.2.3.6.10 The applicant should demonstrate the vertical axis guidance of the takeoff system during normal operation provides an appropriate pitch attitude and climb speed when considering the following factors.

• A normal rate of rotation to the commanded pitch attitude, at VR-10 knots for all engines operating and VR-5 knots for an engine-out condition, does not result in a tail-strike.

• Acquire a pitch attitude resulting in the capture and tracking of the All-Engine Takeoff Climb Speed, V2 + X, where X is the All-Engine Speed Additive from the AFM (normally 10 knots or higher).

3.2.3.6.11 For engine-out operations, the applicant should demonstrate the takeoff guidance system provides commands to acquire a pitch attitude resulting in the capture and tracking of the following reference airspeeds.

• V2, for engine failure at or below V2. (The aircraft should attain this speed after liftoff.)

• Airspeed at engine failure, for failures between V2 and V2 + X.

• V2 + X, for failures at or above V2 + X. Alternatively, the applicant may use the airspeed at engine failure provided the system can achieve the minimum takeoff climb gradient at that speed.

3.2.3.6.12 The applicant should demonstrate the workload associated with the use of the takeoff system complies with the Handling Quality Rating System (HQRS) criteria in AC 25-7, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes,

3.2.4.1 The applicant must evaluate the design of the onboard… › 3.2.4.1.3 The probability of the takeoff guidance system generating…

as amended, or equivalent criteria for the type of aircraft. The takeoff guidance system should provide required tracking performance with “satisfactory” workload and pilot compensation, under foreseeable normal conditions. The takeoff guidance system may provide reduced (i.e., HQRS Rating Adequate) path tracking performance (e.g., up to 14m lateral deviation on the ground, ref. Figure 3-1) with adequate workload (i.e., heightened pilot effort and attention) during takeoffs with engine failures.

3.2.4 Integrity.

The applicant must demonstrate the takeoff guidance system provides command information as lateral guidance, which will enable maintaining the aircraft on the runway during the takeoff roll through acceleration to liftoff or, during a deceleration to a stop during a rejected takeoff.

3.2.4.1 The applicant must evaluate the design of the onboard components of the low-visibility system, separately and in relation to other systems, pursuant to 14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 27, and 29; and sections 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, and 29.1309, respectively, as applicable. The following criteria is provided for the application of§ 25.1309 to the takeoff guidance system:

3.2.4.1.1 The takeoff guidance system design should not possess characteristics, in normal operation or when failed, that would degrade takeoff safety or lead to a hazardous condition.

3.2.4.1.2 The probability of the takeoff guidance system generating misleading information that could lead to an unsafe condition must be improbable when the flight crew is alerted to the condition by suitable fault annunciation or by information from other independent sources available within the pilot's primary field of view. For airworthiness, the applicant must demonstrate the effectiveness of the fault annunciation or information from other independent sources. Any single failure of the aircraft that could impact the takeoff path (e.g., engine failure, single electrical generator or bus failure, single Inertial Reference Unit (IRU) failure) must not cause loss of guidance information or give incorrect guidance information.

3.2.4.1.3 The probability of the takeoff guidance system generating misleading information that would be unsafe to follow, must be extremely improbable, if:

• No means are available for the takeoff system to detect and annunciate the failure, and

• No information is provided to the pilot to immediately

3.2.5 Information, Annunciation, and Alerting. › 3.2.5.3 Alerting.

detect the malfunction and take corrective action.

3.2.4.1.4 ILS. The applicant must establish the aircraft system response to loss of ILS localizer transmitter. The applicant must also establish the aircraft system response during a switchover from an active localizer or to an optional backup transmitter.

3.2.4.1.5 GLS. The applicant must establish the aircraft system response to loss of GLS guidance signals.

3.2.4.2 In the event of a probable failure (e.g., engine failure, electrical source failure), if the pilot follows the takeoff display and disregards external visual references, if applicable, the aircraft performance must meet the criteria illustrated in Figure 3-1.

In showing system compliance, the applicant may not factor the proportion of takeoffs made in low visibility into the probabilities of performance or failure effects.

3.2.5 Information, Annunciation, and Alerting.

This section identifies information, annunciations, and alerting criteria for the takeoff guidance system. The design of the controls, indicators, and alerts must minimize crew errors that could cause a hazard. The takeoff guidance system must present the mode and system malfunction indications in a manner compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flight crew. The takeoff guidance system must group the indications in a logical and consistent manner and ensure they are visible under all expected normal lighting conditions.

3.2.5.1 Compliance.The design of the Information, Annunciation, and Alerting HUD must comply with 14 CFR §§ 23.2605, 25.1322, 27.1322, or 29.1322 as applicable. Reference AC 23.1311-1, AC 25.1322-1, AC 27-1, or AC 29- 2 for additional guidance.

3.2.5.2 Annunciation.The applicant must demonstrate prior to initiating takeoff and during takeoff, the takeoff guidance system provides positive indications of the following information to the flight crew:

• System status,

• Modes of engagement and operation, and

• Guidance source.

If pitch or speed or both guidance is also provided, the takeoff guidance system must detect and promptly announce to the pilot failures that would result in rotation at an unsafe speed, or an unsafe pitch rate or pitch angle.

3.2.5.3 Alerting.

The takeoff guidance system must alert the flight crew whenever a failure or

Chapter 3. Takeoff Guidance System › 3.3 Airborne Systems for Takeoff.

condition prevents it from meeting the performance specified in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. The removal of guidance alone is not adequate annunciation. Alerts must be timely, unambiguous, readily evident to each flight crew member, and compatible with the alerting philosophy of the airplane. Annunciations must be located to ensure rapid recognition and must not distract the pilot making the takeoff or significantly degrade the forward view.

3.2.5.3.1 Annunciations.During takeoff, whenever the takeoff guidance system does not provide valid guidance appropriate for the takeoff operation, it must clearly annunciate the failure to the flight crew, and the invalid guidance must be removed. The location of the annunciation must be positioned to ensure rapid recognition without distracting the pilot or significantly degrading the forward view.

3.2.5.3.2 Warnings.The takeoff guidance system must provide warnings for conditions requiring immediate pilot awareness and action (e.g., failure of the guidance system).

3.2.5.3.3 Cautions.The takeoff guidance system must provide cautions for conditions requiring immediate pilot awareness and possible subsequent pilot action. These alerts need not generate a Master Caution light that would be contrary to the takeoff alert inhibit philosophy. Caution annunciations should not cause flight crew distraction during takeoff roll.

3.2.5.3.4 Advisories.The takeoff guidance system must provide advisories for conditions requiring pilot awareness in a timely manner. It should not generate advisories after takeoff commences.

3.2.5.3.5 System Status.

The takeoff guidance system should provide a system status (e.g., status of built-in test equipment (BITE)/self-test).

3.2.6 Availability.

The probability of loss of takeoff guidance system should be remote.

3.3 Airborne Systems for Takeoff.

This section covers the criteria for a HUD that is integrated with ILS localizer or GBAS signals. In all cases, this AC assumes the sensors used for approach and landing will guide the aircraft during takeoff.

3.4.1 Certification Plan. › 3.4.1.2 For a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) based system…

3.3.1 HUD for Takeoff Guidance.

The following criteria apply if an applicant employs a HUD to provide takeoff guidance:

3.3.1.1 The workload associated with use of the HUD must comply with 14 CFR §§ 23.2610, 25.1523, 27.1523, or 29.1523 as applicable. Reference AC 23.1523 and AC 23.1311-1; AC 25.1523-1 and AC 25-11, AC 27-1; or AC 29-2 as applicable for additional guidance.

3.3.1.2 The HUD installation and display presentation must meet 14 CFR §§ 23.2600(a), 25.773, 27.773, or 29.773 as applicable. Reference AC 23.1311- 1; or AC 25.773 and AC 25-11, appendix F; or AC 27-1; or AC 29-2 for additional guidance.

3.3.1.3 For the entire takeoff path and for all normal and non-normal conditions, except loss of the HUD itself, the HUD takeoff system must provide acceptable guidance and flight information to enable the PF to complete the takeoff or abort the takeoff. HUD takeoff system use should not require excessive workload, exceptional skill, or excessive reference to other cockpit displays.

3.3.2 GBAS.

An applicant may use the guidance in this chapter to obtain airworthiness approval of a GBAS receiver for low visibility takeoff guidance. In addition, the applicant must evaluate the effect of loss and signal reacquisition during takeoffs.

3.4 Takeoff Guidance Evaluation.

An applicant should submit performance data for components used for takeoff guidance.

3.4.1 Certification Plan.

The applicant should provide a certification plan that includes a description of the aircraft systems, the certification basis, the certification methods, and compliance documentation. The certification plan should describe how any non-aircraft elements relate to the operation of aircraft systems from a performance, integrity, and availability perspective.

3.4.1.1 For ILS-based system elements, the applicant can predicate satisfaction of these performance provisions upon compliance with the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), equivalent State standard, or by reference to an acceptable standard for performance of any navigation service.

3.4.1.2 For a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) based system such as GBAS, the applicant can predicate satisfaction of these performance

provisions upon compliance with either the ICAO SARPs, or equivalent State standards. The applicant should address any gaps or shortfalls in performance and how they relate to the aircraft system certification plan.

3.4.2 Performance Evaluation. › 3.4.2.5 The takeoff guidance system performance demonstration should…

3.4.1.3 The certification plan should describe any new or novel system concepts or operational philosophy as applicable. The FAA will determine the need for additional criteria and provisions beyond this AC.

3.4.2 Performance Evaluation.

For new systems and any significant changes to an existing system, the applicant should demonstrate the performance of the aircraft and its systems by flight tests. Flight tests should include those maneuvers that are reasonably representative of actual expected conditions and should cover the range of parameters affecting the behavior of the aircraft (e.g., wind speed, ILS, or GBAS characteristics, aircraft configurations, weight, center of gravity, and non-normal events).

3.4.2.1 The performance evaluation should verify the takeoff guidance system meets the centerline tracking performance guidance specified in section 3.2.3.6.

3.4.2.2 The applicant should demonstrate the system performance in non-visual conditions for:

• Normal operations,

• Engine failure cases, and

• Recovery from displacements from non-normal events.

3.4.2.3 The applicant should demonstrate this performance to have a satisfactory level of workload and pilot compensation. The methods defined in AC 25-7 or AC 23-8 are acceptable.

3.4.2.4 The applicant should show the takeoff guidance meets its stated performance criteria without the use of any outside visual references.

Note: The pilot may begin the takeoff using external visual reference, but from a speed no greater than 50% of V1, the pilot should follow the guidance commands as accurately as possible without using the external view. The applicant may need to safely integrate a view limiting means during the demonstration.

3.4.2.5 The takeoff guidance system performance demonstration should comprise a sufficient number of takeoffs to show the system meets its intended function under any foreseeable operating conditions. The number of takeoffs specified below is adequate for this compliance demonstration. Note, however, the FAA may require more demonstrations depending on aircraft characteristics and design, or difficulties encountered during testing.

• Twenty (20) normal, all-engine takeoffs,

• Ten (10) completed takeoffs, with simulated engine failure at or after the appropriate VFAILURE. The assessment must consider all critical cases, and

• Ten (10) rejected takeoffs, some with simulated engine failure just prior to V1, and at least one run with simulated engine failure at a speed less than VMCG.

3.4.2 Performance Evaluation. › 3.4.2.10 The applicant should demonstrate no display or failure…

Note 1: EASA’s AMC AWO 431 recommends a different number of takeoffs.

Note 2: An applicant may propose an alternate method of compliance in their certification plan or through issue paper. An example of an alternate method could be a reduced number of takeoffs for the takeoff guidance system performance demonstration with rationale for a reduction in flighttesting. Examples of rationale could include recognition for modeling and simulation testing done as part of the demonstration or a similar previously certified system with consistent flight test data.

3.4.2.6 The applicant may seek credit for an earlier demonstration of the takeoff guidance system. New testing of the aircraft may be necessary if the FAA deems credit for design similarity or performance is not appropriate. In cases where the aircraft’s performance dynamics associated with retarding the throttle to idle do not adequately simulate the dynamics of an engine failure, the FAA may require an actual engine shutdown.

3.4.2.7 The applicant should demonstrate the takeoff guidance system performance with headwinds for which credit is sought, and at least 150 percent of the tailwinds, and crosswinds for which credit is sought. Headwinds and crosswinds must be 15 knots or greater.

3.4.2.8 The applicant should demonstrate the operation does not exhibit any guidance or control characteristics that would cause the flight crew to react in an inappropriate or unsafe manner.

3.4.2.9 The demonstration aircraft should be configured with the appropriate instruments to record the time history of track with respect to the extended runway and the climb profile after liftoff to a reasonable point (e.g., departure end of the runway) as a means to show satisfactory performance.

3.4.2.10 The applicant should demonstrate no display or failure characteristics degrade the flight crew’s ability to adequately monitor takeoff performance. Examples of takeoff performance parameters to monitor include acceleration, engine performance, takeoff speed callouts, attitude, and airspeed. The demonstration should include the entire takeoff, and transition

3.4.3.2 The applicant’s documented safety analysis conclusions must include › 3.4.3.2.2 Information regarding “alleviating flight crew actions”…

to the enroute climb speed and configuration, for all normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

3.4.2.11 The performance evaluation must demonstrate that the takeoff guidance system provides command information as lateral guidance, which will enable maintaining the aircraft on the runway during the takeoff roll through acceleration to liftoff or, during a deceleration to a stop during a rejected takeoff. The evaluation must also demonstrate the failure annunciation criteria of section 3.2.5, as well as the crew’s ability to immediately detect and mitigate non-annunciated failures.

3.4.2.12 The applicant should demonstrate the aircraft system response to loss of the takeoff guidance signal and appropriate annunciation to the flight crew.

3.4.2.13 Pilot Experience Levels. The applicant must demonstrate the takeoff guidance system meets the performance provisions in this chapter with pilots of varying experience levels.

3.4.2.14 Failure cases should typically be spontaneous and unpredictable on the subject’s or evaluation pilot’s part.

3.4.3 Safety Assessment.

In addition to any specific safety-related criteria identified in this chapter, the applicant must conduct a safety assessment of all aircraft’s takeoff system and associated components, considered separately and in conjunction with other systems, to show compliance with §§ 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309 per the guidance contained in AC 23.1309-1, 25.1309-1, AC 27-1, or AC 29-2, respectively.

3.4.3.1 The applicant must consider the responses to failures of navigation facilities, taking into account pertinent criteria for navigation facilities.

3.4.3.2 The applicant’s documented safety analysis conclusions must include:

3.4.3.2.1 Pursuant to §§ 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309, a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) conducted in accordance with AC 23.1309-1, AC 25.1309-1, AC 27-1, or AC 29-2, respectively; results summary from the fault tree analysis, demonstrated compliance, and probability determinations for significant functional hazards.

3.4.3.2.2 Information regarding “alleviating flight crew actions” considered in the safety analysis. This information should list appropriate alleviating actions and be consistent with the test validation. If alleviating actions are identified, the applicant should describe the alleviating actions in a form suitable to aid in developing:

• Pertinent provisions of the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM)

3.5 AFM. › 3.5.6 All necessary performance, procedure, or configuration data to…

procedures section(s)

• Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) provisions, or equivalent

• Pilot qualification criteria (e.g., training requirements, Flight Standardization Board (FSB) provisions)

• Any other reference material necessary for an operator or flight crew to use the system safely.

3.4.3.2.3 Information to support preparation of any maintenance and preventive maintenance procedures necessary for safety, such as:

• Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR),

• Periodic checks, or

• Other checks, as necessary (e.g., return to service).

3.4.3.2.4 Information applicable to limitations, as necessary.

3.4.3.2.5 Information necessary for development of Non-normal Procedures.

3.5 AFM.

Pursuant to 14 CFR §§ 23.1581, 25.1581, 27.1581, or 29.1581, as applicable, an applicant must furnish AFM with each aircraft. The AFM should contain the following information:

3.5.1 The criteria and configurations used for the takeoff system demonstration.

3.5.2 Any constraints or limitations necessary for safe operation.

3.5.3 Acceptable normal and non-normal procedures.

3.5.4 The type of navigation facilities used as a basis for certification. This should not be taken as a limitation on the use of other facilities. The AFM may contain a statement regarding the type of facilities or conditions known to be unacceptable for use (e.g., ILS localizer or GLS).

3.5.5 Applicable atmospheric conditions under which the system was demonstrated (e.g., headwind, crosswind, tailwind).

3.5.6 All necessary performance, procedure, or configuration data to permit an operator to determine climb gradient and transition distances for safe obstacle clearance during a takeoff operation; Note that this information need not be specifically included in the AFM if it is available to the operator using some other method acceptable to the

3.5 AFM. › 3.5.7 For a takeoff system meeting the provisions of this chapter, the…

operator and manufacturer (e.g., Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM), supplementary performance information, separate AFM appendix).

3.5.7 For a takeoff system meeting the provisions of this chapter, the Normal Procedures, Normal Operations, or equivalent section, of the AFM should also contain the following statements:

• “The airborne system has been demonstrated to meet the airworthiness guidance of AC 20-191 (Chapter 3) for [specify the pertinent takeoff capability section(s) criteria met] when the following equipment is installed and operative:”

• “[list pertinent equipment]”

• “This AFM provision does not constitute operational approval for low visibility takeoff use of the system.”

4.1 Introduction. › 4.1.5 GBAS GAST C is the approved GBAS to support CAT I level of service.

CHAPTER 4. CATEGORY (CAT) II

4.1 Introduction.

4.1.1 This chapter contains airworthiness approval criteria for equipment used to conduct a CAT II weather minima approach using certain radio navigation aids (navaids) such as ILS or GBAS. This chapter does not provide criteria for each potential combination of aircraft and non-aircraft elements.

4.1.2 This chapter addresses the approach phase of flight, beginning at the Final Approach Fix (FAF) and ending at the CAT II Decision Height (DH).

4.1.3 ICAO Annex 10 includes standards for ILS, MLS, and GBAS intended to support CAT II operations. This chapter addresses approval of equipment for operations using either ILS class (II/D/2) or better performance or GBAS facility classification (D/G1/any/any1). This chapter addresses ILS avionics with Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C34e, TSO-C36e authorization, and GBAS avionics with the latest TSO- C161b and TSO-C162b authorization.

Note 1: While the airworthiness criteria for the guidance system for the approach and landing system applies from the FAF to the DH, guidance should be available down to half the DH.

Note 2: GBAS approach service volume is defined in ICAO Annex 10 Amendment 91.

4.1.4 The standards for GBAS (RTCA DO-253D Change 1 and ICAO Annex 10) define two general classes of GBAS service, Approach Services and the GBAS Positioning Service. The standards further differentiate GBAS approach services into multiple types referred to as GBAS Approach Service Types (GAST). A GAST is defined as the matched set of airborne and ground performance and functional requirements intended to be used in concert to provide approach guidance with quantifiable performance.

4.1.5 GBAS GAST C is the approved GBAS to support CAT I level of service. Applicants for CAT II airworthiness approvals typically seek approval through GBAS GAST D level of service using GBAS airborne equipment class (GAEC) D. Applicants seeking CAT II airworthiness approval using GAST C and GAEC C avionics with TSO- C161b and TSO-C162b authorization need to show equivalence to performance achieved with ILS II/D/2 with additional criteria, limitations, and exceptions as

1 RTCA DO-253D Change 1, appendix I, contains a detailed discussion of approach service types, facility classification and airborne equipment classification for GBAS.

4.2 Airworthiness Criteria. › 4.2.6 Approach System Accuracy Criteria.

determined by the FAA.

4.2 Airworthiness Criteria.

4.2.1 Airborne Equipment.

Airborne equipment meeting the airworthiness criteria contained in this chapter for the CAT II landing system satisfy the operational requirements of CAT II ILS found in AC 120-118. The basic airworthiness criteria rely on meeting the specific airworthiness performance provisions and are independent of the specific implementation in the aircraft or the type of approach system selected for the approach.

4.2.2 Applicant’s Proposal.

The applicant’s proposal for type certification approval for the equipment, system installations, and test methods should include factors such as the intended function of the installed system, its accuracy, reliability, and fail-safe features.

4.2.3 Intended Flight Path.

The applicant may establish the intended flight path in a number of ways, for example using a navigation aid (e.g., ILS, GBAS, etc.). Other methods may be acceptable if the applicant can show feasibility through other means (e.g., sensing of the runway environment such as surface, lighting or markings or both with a vision enhancement system).

4.2.4 Onboard Navigation Systems.

Onboard navigation systems may have various sensor elements by which to determine the aircraft’s position. The sensor elements may include ILS, GBAS, or inertial information. Each of these sensor elements must perform within its appropriate limitations with regard to accuracy, integrity, and availability.

4.2.5 Indications.

The system must provide indications of the aircraft position with respect to the intended flight path. A list of accepted means of providing these indications to the pilot includes:

• Deviation displays with reference to navigation source (e.g., ILS receiver, GLS receiver, etc.)

• Onboard navigation system computations with corresponding displays of position and reference path

• Vision enhancement system, if applicable.

4.2.6 Approach System Accuracy Criteria.

The criteria for acceptable approach performance are based upon acquiring and tracking the required flight path to the appropriate approach procedure’s minimum altitude. The acquisition should be accomplished in a manner compatible with instrument procedure requirements and flight crew requirements for the type of approach being conducted.

4.2.7 Approach System Integrity Criteria. › 4.2.7.1 ILS.

4.2.6.1 Approach Guidance System.

The approach guidance system must not generate sustained oscillatory command information (e.g., flight director, HUD, etc.) or require unusual effort by the pilot to control the flight path.

4.2.6.2 Lateral and Vertical Tracking Performance.

The applicant must show the system will meet the following performance.

4.2.6.2.1 Lateral tracking performance from 1000 ft. Height Above Touchdown (HAT) to 300 ft. HAT will be stable without large deviations (i.e., within ±50 microamps deviation or equivalent) from the indicated course or path.

4.2.6.2.2 Lateral tracking performance from 300 ft. (HAT) down to 100 ft. HAT will be stable without large deviations (i.e., within ±25 microamps deviation) from the indicated course, for 95% of the time.

4.2.6.2.3 Vertical tracking from 700 ft. HAT to 300 ft. HAT should be stable without large deviations (i.e., within ±75 microamps deviation or equivalent) from the indicated course or path.

4.2.6.2.4 Vertical tracking performance from 300 ft. HAT down to 100 ft. HAT will be stable without large deviations (i.e., within ±35 microamps deviation) from the indicated path or ±12 ft., whichever is greater, for 95% of the time. When applying this provision to path tracking in conjunction with CAT III, momentary excursions up to ±75 microamps during test demonstrations may be acceptable if the applicant shows satisfactory performance of the flight guidance system through touchdown and landing.

Note: The performance standards for ILS or GBAS GAST D signal in space contained in ICAO SARPs Annex 10, or an equivalent State standard, are acceptable standards for operations based on an ILS or GBAS, respectively.

4.2.7 Approach System Integrity Criteria.

Pursuant to §§ 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309, the onboard components of the landing system, when considered separately and in relation to other associated onboard systems, must consider all specific safety related criteria identified in this AC, or as identified in accordance with the operating rules. The applicant can use the following criteria as advisory material for the application of §§ 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309 to Approach and Landing Systems:

4.2.7.1 ILS.

The applicant must establish the aircraft system response to loss of ILS

4.2.10.1 Go-Around Safety. › 4.2.10.1.2 The system should have information indicating the…

guidance signals (localizer (LOC) or glideslope (GS)). The applicant must also establish the aircraft system response during a switchover from an active LOC or GS transmitter to an optional backup transmitter.

4.2.7.2 GLS.

The applicant must establish the aircraft system response to loss of GLS guidance signals.

4.2.7.2.1 When using GBAS, the required flight path is uplinked to the aircraft after the approach has been selected. This path will be used for flight guidance or the autopilot or both when required to conduct an approach, landing, and rollout.

4.2.7.2.2 Corruption of the information contained in the received VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) to define the reference path is hazardous. Failure resulting in undetected changes to the approach path definitions data must be extremely remote.

4.2.7.2.3 The flight crew must not be able to modify information that relates to the critical definition of required flight path.

4.2.8 Approach System Continuity Criteria.

The applicant should verify the continuity of navigation during normal aircraft maneuvering while in approach. For GLS, this includes verifying VDB signal reception at all angles relative to the airframe, as the GBAS facility could be located anywhere with respect to the approach path.

4.2.9 Approach System Availability Criteria.

While on approach below 500 ft., the demonstrated probability of a successful landing should be at least 95% (i.e., no more than 5% of the approaches result in a go-around due to the combination of failures in the landing system and the incidence of unsatisfactory performance).

4.2.10 Go-around.

4.2.10.1 Go-Around Safety.

An aircraft conducting a CAT II instrument approach must be capable of safely executing a go-around from any point in an approach prior to touchdown with the aircraft in a normal configuration or specified nonnormal configurations (e.g., engine out for multiengine aircraft).

4.2.10.1.1 A go-around should not require unusual pilot skill, alertness, or strength.

4.2.10.1.2 The system should have information indicating the availability of a safe go-around flight path.

4.2.11 Information, Annunciation, and Alerting. This section identifies the provisions for information, annunciations, and alerting.

4.2.11.1 Compliance.

The design of the Information, Annunciation, and Alerting must comply with §§ 23.2605, 25.1322, 27.1322, or 29.1322 as applicable. Reference AC 23.1311-1, AC 25.1322, AC 27-1, or AC 29-2 for additional guidance.

4.2.11 Information, Annunciation, and Alerting. › 4.2.11.3 Annunciation.

4.2.11.2 Information guidance.

This section identifies criteria for basic situational and guidance information.

4.2.11.2.1 The system must present the mode and system malfunction indications in a manner consistent with the human factors cockpit design philosophy. The indications must be grouped in a logical and consistent manner and be visible under all expected normal lighting conditions.

4.2.11.2.2 For manual control of approach flight path, the appropriate flight display(s), whether head down (HDD) or HUD, must provide sufficient information, without excessive reference to other cockpit displays, to enable a suitably trained pilot to:

• Maintain the approach path,

• Make the alignment with the runway, and if applicable, safely flare and roll out, or

• Go-around.

4.2.11.2.3 The information provided along with any additional information necessary to the design of the system must be sufficient to allow the pilots to monitor the progress and safety of the approach operation.

4.2.11.2.4 The system must have flight performance monitoring to include at least the following:

• Unambiguous identification of the intended path for the approach, and, if applicable, flare and roll-out, (e.g., ILS approach identifier/frequency, and selected navigation source, GBAS Runway Path Identifier (RPI), approach service type, etc.).

• Indication of the position of the aircraft with respect to the intended path (e.g., raw data localizer and glide path, deviation from FAS or equivalent).

4.2.11.3 Annunciation.

The system should provide a positive, continuous, and unambiguous

4.2.11.4 Alerting. › 4.2.11.4.6 System Status.

indication for the modes in operation, as well as those armed for engagement. In addition, where mode engagement is automatic (e.g., LOC and glide path acquisition), the system must provide a clear indication when the mode has been armed by either crew action, or automatically by the system itself (e.g., a pre-land test annunciating LAND 3).

4.2.11.4 Alerting.

Alerting is intended to address the need for warning, caution, and advisory information for the flight crew.

4.2.11.4.1 Warnings.

ACs 23-8, 23-17, 23.1309-1, 23.1311-1, 25.1309-1, 25-1322-1, 27.7, and 29-2 provides an acceptable means for the system to provide information to alert the flight crew to unsafe system operating conditions and to enable the flight crew to take appropriate corrective action. The system must provide a warning indication for any condition requiring the flight crew to take immediate corrective action. The system design should account for flight crew alerting cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults.

4.2.11.4.2 Cautions.

The system must provide a caution for any condition requiring immediate flight crew awareness and timely subsequent action. The system must provide a means to advise the flight crew of failed aircraft system elements affecting the decision to continue or discontinue the approach.

4.2.11.4.3 Advisories.

The system must provide a means to inform the flight crew when the aircraft has reached the Alert Height (AH) or DH, as applicable, requiring pilot awareness in a timely manner. It should not generate advisories after takeoff commences.

4.2.11.4.4 Excessive-Deviation Alerting.

The FAA does not require excessive-deviation alerting but will approve systems that meet appropriate criteria (e.g., EASA CS- AWO.B.CATII.115).

4.2.11.4.5 Excessive-Deviation Alerting Method of Compliance.

Meeting EASA CS-AWO.B.CATII.115 criteria are an acceptable means of compliance for airworthiness approval.

4.2.11.4.6 System Status.

The system should provide a means for the operator and flight crew to determine prior to departure and the flight crew to

4.2.12.4 Annunciations. › 4.2.12.4.3 The MMR should use a common set of mode ARM and ACTIVE…

determine after departure, the capability of the aircraft elements to accomplish the intended approach.

4.2.11.4.7 System Identification.

The system should identify system status indications by names that are different than operational authorization categories (e.g., do not use names such as “CAT I,” “CAT II,” “CAT III”).

4.2.12 Multiple Landing Systems and Multi-Mode Receivers (MMR) for CAT II.

Multiple landing systems typically consist of one or more MMRs that are capable of providing navigation information for ILS, GLS, or other combinations of landing sensor systems. The MMR characteristics should be consistent with applicable related ARINC characteristics for MMRs.

4.2.12.1 Approach Procedure.

From the pilot’s perspective, the approach procedure should be the same regardless of the navigation source being used.

4.2.12.2 MMR.

The MMR must provide a means to confirm that the intended approach aid(s) was correctly selected (e.g., the current ILS audio identification, GLS Reference Path Data Selector (RPDS)).

4.2.12.3 Indications.

The MMR must indicate the loss of deviation data on the display. It is acceptable to have a single failure indication for each axis common to all navigation sources.

4.2.12.4 Annunciations.

The following criteria apply to annunciations when using a multi-mode approach system:

4.2.12.4.1 The MMR must positively indicate the navigation source (e.g., ILS, GLS, FMS) selected for the approach in the primary field of view at each pilot station.

4.2.12.4.2 The MMR must indicate the data designating the approach (e.g., ILS frequency, GLS channel number) in a position readily accessible and visible to each pilot.

4.2.12.4.3 The MMR should use a common set of mode ARM and ACTIVE indications (e.g., LOC and GS) for ILS and GLS operations. ARM mode indicates the MMR is ready and waiting to capture the signal while ACTIVE mode indicates the MMR is currently operating in that specific navigation mode.

4.2.13.1 Retrofit Considerations. › 4.2.13.1.2 General certification considerations include:

4.2.12.4.4 The MMR must provide a means for the flight crew to determine a failure of the non-selected navigation receiver function, in addition to the selected navigation receiver function. When considering equipment failures, the failure indications must not mislead through incorrect association with the navigation source. For example, it would not be acceptable for the annunciation “ILS FAIL” to be displayed when the selected navigation source is GLS, and the failure actually affects the GLS receiver.

4.2.12.4.5 Outside the approach phase, the MMR should have the capability to indicate a failure of each element of a multimode approach and landing system as an advisory to the flight crew without pilot action.

4.2.12.4.6 During an approach, a failure of the active element of a multi-mode approach and landing system must be accompanied by a warning, caution, or advisory.

4.2.13 Multi-Mode Receivers

This section provides guidance for MMRs used for CAT II for retrofit certifications, and for certification of ILS installations with either new or modified receivers.

4.2.13.1 Retrofit Considerations.

4.2.13.1.1 Typical receiver configurations for retrofit applications include:

• An ILS receiver from a new supplier

• A modified ILS receiver from the same supplier (e.g., for purposes of providing improved Frequency Modulation (FM) Immunity)

• A re-packaged receiver from the same supplier (e.g., the ILS partition in an MMR, or the transition from ARINC 700 to 900 series equipment)

• A stand-alone GLS receiver

• A GLS partition in an MMR

4.2.13.1.2 General certification considerations include:

• Certification Process. An “impact assessment” should address all new receiver functionality considering:

o Differences between the current certification basis and that which is requested, if applicable.

o The functionality being added

4.2.13.2 Re-certification. › 4.2.13.2.1 New or Modified ILS Impact Assessment.

o Credit that can be taken for the existing approval

• Equipment Approval. The applicant must follow 14 CFR Part 21, subpart O, to obtain a TSO authorization where appropriate, including software qualification and receiver environmental qualification to the appropriate levels.

• Aircraft installation approval should consider the following:

o Impact on aircraft system safety assessments

o Equipment approval (e.g., antenna positions, range, polar diagrams, coverage, compatibility between receiver and antenna)

o Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing

o Functional integration aspects of the receiver with respect to other systems, controls, warnings, displays

o Electrical loading

o Flight data recorder requirements

o Suitable AFM provisions

o Certification means of compliance for the receiver installation (e.g., specification of ground or flight testing or both, as necessary)

4.2.13.2 Re-certification.

Re-certification of an ILS function following the Introduction of a new or modified ILS navigation receiver installation. The certification program should consider the differences between the new configuration and the pre-existing ILS receiver system. The applicant may use an impact assessment to establish a certification basis. The assessment will typically address the following:

4.2.13.2.1 New or Modified ILS Impact Assessment.

An impact assessment should consider the following aspects of the new or modified ILS receiver, or receiver function, for equivalence with the existing ILS receiver configuration:

• Hardware design

• Software design

• Signal processing and functional performance

• Failure analysis

• Receiver function, installation, and integration (e.g., with controls, indicators, and warnings)

4.2.13.2 Re-certification. › 4.2.13.2.5 New or Modified ILS Documentation.

The impact assessment should also identify any additional considerations such as:

• Future functionality provisions that have no impact on system operation

• Shared resources to support future functionality

• Based upon the assumption that the applicant can show the ILS receiver, or receiver function, to be equivalent to the current ILS configuration, the applicant may propose that the new installation be treated as a new ILS receiver (replacing the existing receiver) for installation on a given aircraft type

4.2.13.2.2 New or Modified ILS Failure Analysis.The failure characteristics of the new or modified installation should be shown to be equivalent to systems using ILS data. This ensures the failure characteristics are compatible and do not invalidate any original or previous safety assessments.

4.2.13.2.3 New or Modified ILS Autoland or HUD Guidance Landing Function Flight Testing (if necessary).

For systems using a new ILS, or combined MMR receiver, complete a minimum of eight (8) approaches terminating in a successful (automatic or HUD) landing, and rollout (if applicable) using the flight control/guidance system, including a minimum of two (2) ILS facilities. Approaches should include captures from both sides of the final approach course, at angles and distances representative of typical Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs), and, if applicable, from below and above the GS.

4.2.13.2.4 Approach and Landing Performance.

The applicant should show the approach and landing performance (flight path deviation, touchdown data, etc.) is equivalent to that achieved in the original ILS certification. The FAA may require recorded flight test data to support equivalency demonstration.

4.2.13.2.5 New or Modified ILS Documentation.

The applicant should provide the following documentation for certification:

• An impact assessment including effects on system safety assessments.

• A flight test report, if applicable.

• Revisions to the flight manual where appropriate.

4.2.13.3 Re-certification Following the Introduction of a GLS… › 4.2.13.3.5 GLS Introduction Flight Testing.

4.2.13.3 Re-certification Following the Introduction of a GLS Navigation Receiver Installation.

4.2.13.3.1 GLS Introduction Impact Assessment.

The impact assessment, if applicable, should assess equivalent aspects of the GLS receiver or receiver function to those for the existing ILS receiver configuration.

4.2.13.3.2 GLS Aircraft Integration/Installation Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.

The applicant should review the failure characteristics of the new or modified installation to ensure that the failure characteristics do not invalidate any original or previous safety assessments.

4.2.13.3.3 GLS Statistical Performance Assessment.

If the flight control/guidance system control algorithms are unchanged, or the applicant has already accounted for the effects of any changes (e.g., navigation reference point), the applicant may not have to re-assess the statistical performance of a currently certificated automatic landing system, HUD landing/takeoff system for the addition of GLS functionality.

4.2.13.3.4 GLS Antenna or Navigation Reference Point Location.

The applicant should assess the implication of differences in position of the GLS and ILS aircraft antennas or Navigation Reference Point considering:

• Wheel-to-threshold crossing height.

• Lateral and vertical antenna position or navigation reference point position effects on flight guidance system performance (including any alignment, flare, or rollout maneuvers).

4.2.13.3.5 GLS Introduction Flight Testing.

When installing a new GLS system to support CAT II operation, the applicant must accomplish a flight test program including a minimum of 10 approaches.

• The approaches must terminate in a landing (and rollout, if applicable) using the flight control/guidance system, and the approaches must include a minimum of two GLS facilities for each system.

• The approaches should include captures from both sides of the final approach course using representative angles and distances. Approaches should include captures from below

4.3.2 Autopilot. › 4.3.2.3 Regarding control of approach flight path, the autopilot must:

and above the glidepath if applicable, and representative wind conditions where antenna or navigation reference point positions may impact performance.

4.2.13.3.6 Approach and Landing Performance.

The applicant should show the approach and landing performance (flight path deviation, touchdown data, etc.) is equivalent to the original ILS certification. The FAA may require recorded flight test data to confirm equivalency.

4.2.13.3.7 New or Modified ILS Documentation.

The applicant should provide the following documentation for GLS:

• An impact assessment including effects on system safety assessments

• A flight test report, if applicable; and

• Revisions to the flight manual where appropriate.

4.3 Airborne Systems for CAT II Operations.

This section identifies criteria applicable to specific aircraft system architecture selected to conduct CAT II.

4.3.1 General.

Applicable aircraft systems should comply with the basic performance, integrity, and availability criteria as identified in section 4.2 of this Chapter.

4.3.2 Autopilot.

The following criteria apply to autopilot systems:

4.3.2.1 The suitability of pertinent autopilot modes or features applicable to conducting or monitoring an approach, landing, rollout, or go around, as applicable, should follow the principles/guidance contained in ACs 23-8, 23-17, 25.1329-1, 27-1 and 29-2 as applicable.

4.3.2.2 The autopilot must not cause undue flight crew concern and lead to disconnect (e.g., inappropriate response to ILS beam disturbances or turbulence, inappropriate response to temporary loss of VDB signals, unnecessarily abrupt flare or go-around attitude changes, unusual or inappropriate pitch or bank attitudes, or sideslip response).

4.3.2.3 Regarding control of approach flight path, the autopilot must:

• Maintain the approach path

• If applicable, make the alignment with the runway, flare, and land the

4.3.2 Autopilot. › 4.3.2.9 A fault must cause an autopilot advisory, caution, or warning,…

aircraft within the prescribed limits

• If applicable, promptly go-around, with minimum practical altitude loss

4.3.2.4 Autopilot performance must be compatible with either manual speed control, or, if applicable, autothrottle/autothrust speed control.

4.3.2.5 Mode definition and logic should be consistent with appropriate industry practice for mode identification and use (e.g., naming, mode arming, and engagement). Definition of new modes or features, not otherwise commonly used, should be consistent with their intended function, and the applicant should consider their potential for setting inappropriate or adverse precedent.

4.3.2.6 If the autopilot is used to control the flight path of the aircraft to intercept and establish the approach path, the pilot should be able to transition from automatic to manual flight at any time without undue effort, attention, or control forces, and with a minimum of disturbance of flight path.

4.3.2.7 A flight director system, or alternative form of guidance, if used, must be compatible with the autopilot.

4.3.2.8 The FAA recommends at least one autopilot and dual flight director systems with an independent display for each pilot. Dual guidance systems providing the same information to both pilots may be acceptable only if suitable comparison monitoring between the systems is available, and timely transfer to the standby system can be completed, and suitable annunciation to the flight crew is provided.

4.3.2.9 A fault must cause an autopilot advisory, caution, or warning, as necessary. If a warning is necessary, the pilot must be able to detect the warning with a normal level of attention and alertness expected during an approach or goaround.

4.3.6 Autothrottle/Autothrust. › 4.3.6.2 Use of the autothrottle/autothrust should not cause…

4.3.3 Head Down Guidance. The following criteria applies to Head Down Guidance systems:

4.3.3.1 A flight director system, or alternative form of guidance, must be designed so that the probability of display of incorrect guidance commands is remote.

4.3.3.2 Wherever practical, a fault must cause guidance information to be immediately removed from view. If a warning is given instead, it must be such that the pilot will observe the warning while using the guidance information.

4.3.4 Head Up Guidance.

If the system includes a HUD, the following criteria are applicable to Head Up Guidance systems:

4.3.4.1 The workload associated with use of the HUD must comply with 14 CFR §§ 23.2610, 25.1523, 27.1523, or 29.1523. Reference AC 23.1523, AC 25.1523-1 and AC 25-11, AC 27-1, or AC 29-2 as applicable for additional guidance.

4.3.4.2 The HUD installation and display presentation must meet 14 CFR §§ 23.2600(a), 25.773, 27.773, or 29.773, as applicable. Reference AC 23.1311-1, AC 25.773 and AC 25-11, appendix F; or AC 27-1 or AC 29-2 for additional guidance.

4.3.4.3 If the autopilot is used to control the flight path of the aircraft to intercept and establish the approach path, the point during the approach at which the transition from automatic to manual flight takes place must be identified and used for the performance demonstration.

4.3.4.4 A flight director system, or alternative form of guidance, must be designed so that the probability of display of incorrect guidance commands is remote.

4.3.5 HUD use to monitor autoflight systems.

The HUD must be compatible with the autoflight system and permit the pilot to detect unsuitable autopilot performance.

4.3.6 Autothrottle/Autothrust.

4.3.6.1 If autothrottle/autothrust capability is installed, the applicant should identify any necessary modes, conditions, procedures, or constraints that apply to its use.

4.3.6.2 Use of the autothrottle/autothrust should not cause unacceptable performance of any autopilot modes intended for use. And any autopilot

4.4.1 Certification Plan. › 4.4.1.4 The effect of the aircraft navigation reference point on the…

mode intended for use with autothrottle/autothrust should not cause unacceptable autothrottle/autothrust performance.

4.3.6.3 The autothrottle/autothrust should expeditiously capture any commanded speed adjustments and maintain speed. The autothrottle/autothrust should not cause any hazardous conditions with normal use or in any probable failure modes, considering pilot intervention using normal piloting skills.

4.3.6.4 The autothrottle/autothrust should hold speed within -5 to +10 knots of the intended speed except for momentary gusts, in typical environmental conditions expected for use.

4.3.6.5 The autothrottle/autothrust should provide appropriate status, advisory, caution, and warning information for failures.

4.3.6.6 The autothrottle/autothrust should provide timely application of go-around thrust if a go-around mode is available.

4.3.6.7 The autothrottle/autothrust should not require undue flight crew attention or skill to recognize and respond to an engine failure during approach or goaround.

4.4 Approach System Evaluation. The applicant should conduct an evaluation to verify that the pertinent systems as installed in the aircraft meet the airworthiness criteria of section 4.2 of this AC. The evaluation should include verification of approach system performance and a safety assessment for verification of the integrity and availability provisions. The applicant should demonstrate engine failure cases and other selected failure conditions identified by the safety assessment by simulator or flight test.

4.4.1 Certification Plan. An applicant should provide a certification plan(s) describing:

4.4.1.1 The means proposed to show compliance with the criteria of section 4.2 of this AC, with particular attention to methods that differ significantly from those described in this chapter.

4.4.1.2 How non-aircraft elements of the approach system relate to the aircraft system from a performance, integrity, and availability perspective (e.g., appropriate reference to ICAO Annex or U.S. Standard).

4.4.1.3 The assumptions on how the performance, integrity, and availability requirements of the non-aircraft elements of standard landing aids will be assured, if applicable.

4.4.1.4 The effect of the aircraft navigation reference point on the aircraft flight path and wheel-to-threshold crossing height.

Note › 4.4.3.3 The performance assessment must take into account at least the…

4.4.1.5 The system concepts and operational philosophy to allow the FAA to determine whether criteria and guidance in excess of that contained in this chapter are necessary.

4.4.1.6 The applicant should reach an early agreement with the FAA on his/her proposed certification plan.

4.4.2 Performance Evaluation. The applicant should demonstrate the airborne system performance meets provisions of this chapter using simulations and flight tests.

4.4.3 Airborne Performance System. The airborne system performance demonstration should include at least the following conditions taking into account manual/coupled autopilot, autothrottle/autothrust configurations for CAT II approaches:

4.4.3.1 Wind Conditions:

• 20 kts - Head wind component

• 10 kts - Crosswind component

• 10 kts - Tailwind component

Note: The FAA may accept lower limits if the applicant appropriately documents in the AFM and the certification plan.

4.4.3.2 The applicant must demonstrate performance by flight test, or analysis validated by flight test, using at least three different representative facilities for a minimum of 20 total approaches, with a representative range of environmental and system variables affecting overall performance. The applicant must achieve a minimum of 95% success in the number of attempted approaches.

4.4.3.3 The performance assessment must take into account at least the following variables with the variables being applied based upon their expected distribution:

• Configurations of the aircraft (e.g., flap settings),

• Center of gravity,

• Landing weight,

• Conditions of wind, turbulence, and wind shear,

• Characteristics of ground- and space-based systems and aids (i.e., ILS or GLS), and

• Any other parameter which may affect system performance (e.g., airport altitude, approach path slope, variations in approach speed).

4.4.4.2 Documented safety analysis conclusions must include: › 4.4.4.2.2 Information regarding "alleviating flightcrew actions" that…

4.4.3.4 The FAA will accept use of the Continuous Method and the Pass/Fail Method, both found in EASA AMC AWO 231, in lieu of the 95% probability of success tracking requirement described in section 4.2.6.2, and the minimum number of 20 approaches stated in section 4.4.3.2.

4.4.3.5 The FAA recommends wind model analysis to obtain approval of systems related to CAT II. If an applicant elects to use simulation with a wind model to support approval, the applicant should use the model specified in Appendix B.

4.4.3.6 For GLS, the applicant should assess fault free performance of GLS using simulations such as Monte-Carlo with the input variables distributed according to their performance characteristics and a model of the GLS guidance including fault free error characteristics defined by the GLS signal model as specified in 5.5.8 Appendix C.

Note: Applicants with approved airworthiness criteria for GAST D level of service meet all the airworthiness criteria of this chapter.

4.4.4 Safety Assessment.

In addition to any specific safety related criteria identified in this chapter, the applicant must conduct a safety assessment of the approach and landing system, considered separately and in conjunction with other systems, to show compliance with §§ 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309. The applicant can use the guidance contained in AC 23.1309-1, AC 25.1309-1, AC 27-1, or AC 29-2, as applicable.

4.4.4.1 The applicant must consider the responses to failures of navigation facilities, taking into account ICAO and other pertinent state criteria for navigation facilities.

4.4.4.2 Documented safety analysis conclusions must include:

4.4.4.2.1 Pursuant to §§ 23.2500, 23.2510, 23.2605, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309, an FHA conducted in accordance with the guidance provided by AC 23.1309-1, AC 25.1309-1, AC 27-1 or AC 29-2, respectively, as applicable; a summary of results from the fault tree analysis, demonstrated compliance, and probability determinations for significant functional hazards.

4.4.4.2.2 Information regarding "alleviating flightcrew actions" that were considered in the safety analysis. This information should list appropriate alleviating actions, if any, and should be consistent with the validation conducted during testing. If alleviating actions are identified, the applicant should describe those actions in a form suitable to aid in developing, as applicable:

• Pertinent provisions of the AFM procedures section(s)

4.5 AFM. › 4.5.1 Relevant conditions or constraints applicable to the approach and…

• Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) provisions, or equivalent

• Pilot qualification criteria (e.g., training requirements, FSB provisions)

• Any other reference material necessary for an operator or flight crew to safely use the system

4.4.4.2.3 Information to support preparation of any necessary maintenance and preventive maintenance such as:

• Certification maintenance requirements (CMR)

• Periodic checks

• Other checks, as necessary (e.g., return to service)

4.4.4.2.4 Information applicable to limitations, as necessary.

4.4.4.2.5 Identification of applicable systems, modes, or equipment necessary for use of the landing system. This information may be used, to aid in development of flight planning, dispatch criteria, or procedures or checklists for pilot selection of modes or assessment of system status, prior to initiation of approach or during approach.

4.4.4.2.6 Information necessary for development of non-normal procedures.

4.4.5 Continued Airworthiness.

4.4.5.1 Pursuant to 14 CFR §§ 23.1529, 25.1529, 27.1529, or 29.1529, an applicant must prepare an Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) for use by operators. The applicant must submit to the FAA a program showing how the applicant distributes changes made to the ICAs by the applicant or by the manufacturers of the ILS or GBAS avionics installed in the aircraft. ICAs established during the approval process form the basis for an operator’s maintenance program.

4.4.5.2 Pursuant to 14 CFR §§ 21.3, the applicant must report any failure, malfunction, or defect whose occurrences could impact the safety of the flight crew or the structural integrity of the aircraft itself.

4.5 AFM. Pursuant to 14 CFR §§ 23.2620, 25.1581, 27.1581, or 29.1581, as applicable, an applicant must furnish an AFM with each aircraft. The AFM should contain the following information:

4.5.1 Relevant conditions or constraints applicable to the approach and landing system use

4.5 AFM. › 4.5.8 For an approach and landing system meeting the provisions of this…

regarding the airport or runway conditions. For example:

• Runway elevation

• Ambient temperature

• Approach path slope

• Runway slope

• Ground profile under the approach path

4.5.2 The criteria and configurations used for the demonstration of the system.

4.5.3 Any constraints or limitations necessary for safe operation.

4.5.4 Acceptable normal and non-normal procedures.

4.5.5 The type of navigation facilities used as a basis for certification. This should not be taken as a limitation on the use of other facilities. The AFM may contain a statement regarding the type of facilities or condition known to be unacceptable for use (e.g., ILS or GLS). The AFM should indicate the operation is predicated upon the use of an ILS (or GLS) facility with performance and integrity equivalent to, or exceeding, a United States Type II or Type III ILS, GBAS GAST D, or equivalent ICAO Annex 10 Facility Performance CAT II facility.

4.5.6 Applicable atmospheric conditions under which the system was demonstrated (e.g., headwind, crosswind, tailwind).

4.5.7 Any necessary performance, procedure, or configuration data to permit an operator to determine climb gradient and transition distances for safe obstacle clearance during a missed approach, balked landing, or rejected landing. This information need not be specifically included in the AFM if it is available to the operator using some other method acceptable to the operator and manufacturer (e.g., FCOM, supplementary performance information, separate AFM appendix).

4.5.8 For an approach and landing system meeting the provisions of this chapter, the Normal Procedures, Normal Operations, or equivalent sections, of the AFM should also contain the following statements: “The airborne system has been demonstrated to meet the airworthiness provisions of AC 20-191 (Chapter 4) for [specify the pertinent approach capability section(s) criteria met] when the following equipment is installed and operative:

“[list pertinent equipment]”

“This AFM provision does not constitute operational approval for CAT II use of the system.”

5.2 Airworthiness Criteria. › 5.2.4 The low visibility landing system is intended to guide the…

CHAPTER 5. CATEGORY (CAT) III

5.1 Introduction.

5.1.1 This chapter contains airworthiness approval criteria for equipment used to conduct an approach, landing, and rollout in CAT III weather minima using an ILS or GBAS. Landing and rollout may combine various combinations of aircraft sensors and system architecture with various combinations of ground and space-based elements. This AC does not provide criteria for each potential combination of airborne and non-airborne elements.

5.1.2 This chapter addresses the approach, landing and rollout phase of flight, beginning at the FAF, through the CAT III DH, ending at the landing, and rollout phase.

5.1.3 ICAO Annex 10 includes standards for ILS and GBAS systems intended to support CAT III operations. This chapter addresses operations using either ILS or GBAS for approaches, using ILS avionics produced in accordance with TSO-C34e, TSO-C36e authorizations, and GBAS avionics with TSO-C161b and TSO-C162b authorizations.

5.1.4 The standards for GBAS (RTCA DO-253D Change 1 and ICAO Annex 10) define two general classes of GBAS services, Approach Service, and the GBAS Positioning Service. The standards further differentiate GAST. A GAST is defined as the matched set of airborne and ground performance and functional requirements intended to be used in concert in order to provide approach guidance with quantifiable performance. Applicants for CAT III airworthiness seek approval through GBAS GAST-D level of service.

5.2 Airworthiness Criteria.

5.2.1 The airworthiness criteria contained in this chapter for the CAT III landing and rollout system satisfy the operational requirements described in AC 120-118. The basic airworthiness criteria are independent of the specific implementation in the aircraft or the type of approach landing system and rollout selected for the approach.

5.2.2 Performance provisions for touchdown performance, landing sink rates, and attitudes, etc. (see section 5.4.2.4, below) are the same for landing systems with automatic flight control, and systems for manual flight control with command information as guidance.

5.2.3 The applicant’s type certification proposal should include criterion such as the system’s intended function, accuracy, reliability, and fail-safe features. The proposal should also address the operational concepts contained in AC 120-118.

5.2.4 The low visibility landing system is intended to guide the aircraft to a touchdown in the prescribed touchdown zone, with an appropriate sink rate and attitude without exceeding prescribed load limits of the aircraft. The rollout system is intended to guide the aircraft to converge on and track the runway centerline, from the point of

5.2.8 Accuracy. › 5.2.8.1 Acquisition Performance.

touchdown to a safe taxi speed.

5.2.5 The overall assurance of performance and safety of an operation can only be assessed when all elements of the system are considered.

5.2.6 The low-visibility landing system must be shown to be satisfactory with and without the use of any outside visual references, except that outside visual references will not be considered when assessing lateral tracking performance. The airworthiness evaluation will also determine whether the combination of guidance and outside visual references would unacceptably degrade task performance or require exceptional workload and pilot compensation. The evaluation should include normal operations and non-normal operations with system and aircraft failure conditions.

5.2.7 General Airworthiness Criteria.

5.2.7.1 The applicant establishes the intended flight path. The path may be established in a number of ways, including the use of navigation aids (e.g., ILS or GLS). Other methods may be acceptable if the applicant can show feasibility through other means, for example:

• Sensing of the runway environment (e.g., surface, lighting or markings or both) with a vision enhancement system, or

• By a vision enhancement system.

5.2.7.2 On-board navigation systems may have various sensor elements by which to determine aircraft position. The sensor elements may include ILS, Inertial information, GLS, or other GNSS elements. Each of these sensor elements should comply with their performance provisions within appropriate limitations.

5.2.7.3 The system should provide an indication of the aircraft position with respect to the intended lateral path using:

• Deviation displays with reference to a navigation source (e.g., ILS receiver, GLS receiver, etc.), or

• On-board navigation system computations with corresponding displays of position and reference path.

5.2.8 Accuracy.

5.2.8.1 Acquisition Performance.

The acquisition should be accomplished in a manner compatible with instrument procedure requirements and flight crew requirements for the type of approach being conducted. The approach guidance system must not generate sustained oscillating command information (e.g., flight director, HUD, etc.) or require unusual effort by the pilot to control the flight path.

5.2.9.1 Stable Approach. › 5.2.9.1.1 If the landing system is designed to perform an alignment…

5.2.8.2 Lateral and Vertical Tracking Performance.

The applicant must show the system will meet the following performance parameters:

5.2.8.2.1 Stable lateral tracking performance from 1000 ft. Height Above Touchdown (HAT) to 300 ft. HAT should be stable without large deviations (i.e., within ±50 microamps deviation or equivalent) from the indicated course or path.

5.2.8.2.2 Stable lateral tracking performance from 300 ft. HAT to touchdown without large deviations (i.e., within ±25 microamps deviation) from the indicated course, for 95% of the time.

5.2.8.2.3 Stable vertical tracking from 700 ft. HAT to 300 ft. HAT should be stable without large deviations (i.e., within ±75 microamps deviation or equivalent) from the indicated course or path.

5.2.8.2.4 Stable vertical tracking performance from 300 ft. HAT to until commencing the flare maneuver (e.g., 100 ft.) without large deviations (i.e., within ±35 microamps deviation) from the indicated path or ±12 ft., whichever is greater, for 95% of the time. Momentary excursions up to ±75 microamps during test demonstrations may be acceptable if the applicant shows satisfactory performance of the flight guidance system through touchdown and landing.

5.2.8.2.5 The FAA will accept use of the Continuous Method and the Pass/Fail Method, both found in EASA AMC AWO 231, in lieu of the 95% probability of success tracking requirement described in sections 5.2.8.2.1, 5.2.8.2.2, 5.2.8.2.3 and 5.2.8.2.4 using a minimum of 20 approaches.

5.2.9 Approach and Landing System Performance.

5.2.9.1 Stable Approach.

The applicant should conduct a stable approach (i.e., “normal maneuvering” without excessive attitudes, sink rates, path deviations, or speed deviations) to the point where a smooth transition is made to the landing.

5.2.9.1.1 If the landing system is designed to perform an alignment function prior to touchdown, to correct for crosswind effects, the system should operate in a manner consistent with the pilot's manual technique for crosswind landings. Typically, the pilot's manual technique includes the wing low, side slip procedure. Non-availability of the alignment mode, or failure of the alignment mode to perform its intended function must

5.2.9.4 Nominal Performance (ILS, GLS). › 5.2.9.4.4 Probability of sink rate at the structural limit load must…

be easily detectable, or be suitably annunciated, so that the flight crew can take appropriate action.

5.2.9.1.2 The "landing flare to touchdown" maneuver should reduce the aircraft sink rate to a value not exceeding the sink rate for landing as listed in the AFM.

5.2.9.2 Speed Control Performance.

Airspeed must be controllable to within +/- five knots of the approach speed*, except for momentary gusts, up to the point where the throttles are retarded to idle for landing. For operations flown with manual control of approach speed, the flight crew must be able to control speed to within +/- five knots of the approach speed.

*This criterion is not specific to low visibility systems but must be met by low visibility systems.

5.2.9.3 Landing System Performance.

All types of low visibility landing systems, including automatic flight control, guidance for manual control, and hybrid systems, must meet the performance specified in section 5.2.9.4. The performance values may vary where justified by the characteristics of the aircraft. Additional performance provisions apply for GLS systems. See sections 5.2.9.5 through 5.2.9.7.

5.2.9.4 Nominal Performance (ILS, GLS).

The nominal performance provisions establish compatibility of the aircraft system performance with basic navigation system accuracy in fault-free conditions and nominal environmental conditions. Nominal conditions include both normal and rare normal conditions. The variables affecting performance that an applicant must include in the assessment are discussed in section 5.2.9.9. The nominal performance criteria and probabilities are as follows:

5.2.9.4.1 Probability of longitudinal touchdown earlier than a point on the runway 200 ft. (60m) from the threshold must not exceed 10-6.

5.2.9.4.2 Probability of longitudinal touchdown beyond 2700 ft.(823m) from threshold must not exceed 10-6.

5.2.9.4.3 Probability of lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear more than 70 ft. (21.3m) from runway centerline must not exceed 10-6 (assuming a 150 ft runway width).

5.2.9.4.4 Probability of sink rate at the structural limit load must not exceed 10-6. An acceptable means of establishing that the structural limit load is within its specified limit is to show separately and independently that:

5.2.9 Approach and Landing System Performance. › 5.2.9.6 Compatibility with Rare Undetected Non-Aircraft System Error…

• The limit load that results from a sink rate at touchdown not greater than 10 fps or the limit rate of descent used for certification under 14 CFR Part 25 subpart C (see § 25.473), whichever is greater. For part 23, 27, and 29 aircraft, the limit load conditions specified in §§ 23.2220, 27.473, or 29.473 apply, respectively.

• The lateral side load does not exceed the limit value determined for the lateral drift landing condition defined in § 25.479(d)(2). For Part 23, 27, and 29 aircraft, the level landing conditions specified in §§ 23.2220, 27.479, or 29.479 apply, respectively.

5.2.9.4.5 Probability of bank angle resulting in hazard must not exceed 10-7. For example, a hazard to a fixed wing aircraft means a bank angle resulting in any part of the wing including the tip, high lift device, or engine nacelle touching the ground. For rotorcraft the hazard definition will be based on the rotorcraft’s unique capabilities. Reference AC 27-1 or AC 29- 2 for additional information on helicopters.

5.2.9.5 GLS.

The applicant must assess the effect of nominal GLS errors on landing system performance via simulation using the GLS Noise Model provided in 5.5.8 Appendix C or an approved equivalent model), including the fault-free elements, as described in sections C.1.2 through C.1.6.

5.2.9.5.1 When using GBAS, the required flight path is uplinked to the aircraft after the approach is selected. This path is used for flight guidance or the autopilot or both when required to conduct an approach, landing, and rollout.

5.2.9.5.2 Corruption of the information contained in the received VDB to define the reference path is considered a hazardous condition. Failure resulting in undetected changes to the approach path definitions data must be extremely remote.

5.2.9.5.3 The flight crew must not be able to modify information that relates to the critical definition of required flight path.

5.2.9.6 Compatibility with Rare Undetected Non-Aircraft System Error Conditions (e.g., satellite faults, ionospheric anomalies).

For any value of GLS navigation system error resulting from faults, in conjunction with nominal conditions:

• The probability of longitudinal touchdown earlier than a point on the runway 200 ft. (60 m) from the threshold must not exceed 10-5.

• The probability of longitudinal touchdown beyond a point on the runway 3000 ft. (900 m) from the threshold must not exceed 10-5.

5.2 Airworthiness Criteria. › Note 2

• The probability of lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear more than 70 ft. (21 m) from the runway centerline must not exceed 10-5 (assuming a 150 ft runway width).

• The probability of sink rate at the structural limit load, must not exceed 10-5.

• The probability of bank angle where the wing tip touches the ground prior to the landing gear must not exceed 10-6.

• The probability of lateral velocity (or sideslip angle) at the structural limit load must not exceed 10-5.

Note: For HUD landing systems, where total wind strength has been shown to be the most critical parameter affecting performance, an alternative means of compliance may be used.

5.2.9.6.1 Evaluation of landing probability.

The applicant cannot take credit for the probability of faults when evaluating the required landing probabilities. However, the applicant may take credit for the ground subsystem’s probability of detection for satellite faults and the aircraft’s probability of detection for single reference receiver faults. The GLS errors may be considered bias-like for the duration of an approach and landing as this is the worst-case scenario.

5.2.9.6.2 Non-GLS variable. When assessing the GLS performance, the applicant must account for other non-GLS variables affecting performance. These non-GLS variables must vary according to their expected distributions.

Note 1: The criteria ensures that undetected faults in conjunction with nominal conditions in the non-aircraft GBAS system, when combined with all other variables affecting landing performance, do not result in an unacceptably high probability of landing outside the limits that define a safe landing. See section 5.2.10.1.6 for the conditions that define a safe landing. These faults include only satellite faults and single ground reference receiver faults.

Note 2: Appendix C - GLS Signal Model section C.1.9 provides an example demonstration method for the performance specified in this section. The appendix also contains a list of references used to derive the signal model. These references describe undetected non-aircraft system error conditions, nominal performance, and faults as well as the ICAO standardized ground system monitoring requirements. The aircraft

Note 3 › 5.2.9.8 Rollout System Performance.

performance provisions in this section are intended to address non-aircraft system errors that are below the ground monitoring thresholds. Such errors are not considered a malfunction of the non-aircraft system.

Note 3: It is assumed that operations will be approved with knowledge of the runway specific glide path and TCH values and the aircraft’s capability. Therefore, it is not necessary to set the glide path or TCH or both values to the limits allowed for the aircraft.

5.2.9.7 Compatibility with Worst Case Undetected Guidance Errors.

5.2.9.7.1 Undetected errors that are not extremely improbable must be shown to not prevent a safe landing or go-around or both when all other variables affecting performance are at their nominal values. The definition of a safe landing is specified in section 5.2.10.1.6. The definition of a safe approach is an approach that does not penetrate the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces for Precision Approach Category II or III as defined by ICAO SARPs Annex 14 section 4.2.15 & Table 4-1.

5.2.9.7.2 The applicant must assess the effect of worst-case undetected errors on landing system performance via simulation using the GLS Noise Model provided in 5.5.8 Appendix C (or an approved equivalent model). The worst case undetected errors must be simulated by using the maximum range domain error given in Table C-5 and Table C-7 of Appendix C in conjunction with the appropriate geometry screening factors used by the aircraft. The certification plan should specify how the demonstration will be conducted, including the number of cases and variables with pass/fail criteria. The aircraft performance must be assessed in the presence of the full range of bias and ramp type failures produced by the Fault Mode Generator described in Appendix C. This demonstration must include the irregular terrain profile as defined in section 5.2.9.10.

Note: Rare ionosphere events and undetected satellite or ground station failures could result in significant vertical (and lateral) position errors. Under certain conditions, such errors may go undetected by the system and could result in erroneous guidance if unmitigated. The effect of such errors may not be observable by the flight crew.

5.2.9.8 Rollout System Performance.

The rollout system, if included, must control the aircraft, in the case of an automatic flight control system, or provide command information as guidance to the pilot, for manual control, from the point of landing to a safe

5.2.9.8 Rollout System Performance. › 5.2.9.8.6 The applicant should demonstrate that the rollout system:

taxi speed. The loss of rudder effectiveness, as the aircraft speed is reduced, could be a factor in the level of approval which is granted to a system. The applicant should describe the system concept for rollout control so that the absence of low-speed control, such as a nose wheel steering system, can be assessed.

5.2.9.8.1 The automatic flight control system should provide de-rotation for airplanes, consistent with a pilot’s manual technique. Systems which provide rollout guidance for manually controlled rollout are not required to provide de-rotation. Systems which provide de-rotation, automatically or with guidance for manual control, must avoid any objectionable oscillatory motion or nose wheel touchdowns, pitch up, or other adverse behavior as a result of ground spoiler deployment or reverse thrust operation.

5.2.9.8.2 Automatic control during the landing and rollout should not result in any aircraft maneuvers which would cause the flight crew to intervene unnecessarily.

5.2.9.8.3 Landing and rollout guidance should be consistent with a pilot’s manual technique, and not require excessive skill or flight crew workload to accomplish the operation.

5.2.9.8.4 Safe taxi speed is the speed at which the pilot can safely leave the runway or bring the aircraft to a safe stop. The safe taxi speed may vary with visibility conditions, aircraft characteristics, and means of lateral control. The performance criteria in this section assume a 150 ft. (45.7m) runway width. The rollout performance limit may be appropriately increased if operation is restricted to wider runways.

5.2.9.8.5 Rollout systems typically reference the runway centerline via ILS localizer or another approved approach navigation system. The intended path for the rollout system is to keep the aircraft on the runway, and usually on the runway centerline.

5.2.9.8.6 The applicant should demonstrate that the rollout system:

• Does not cause the outboard tire(s) to deviate from the runway centerline by more than 70 ft. (21.3m), starting from the point at which touchdown occurs and continuing to a point at which a safe taxi speed is reached, to a probability of 1 x 10-6.

Note 1: These values assume a 150 ft (45m) runway. The lateral touchdown performance limit may be appropriately increased if operation is restricted to wider runways.

Note 3 › 5.2.9.9 Variables Affecting Performance.

Note 2: 70 ft. (21.3m) deviation from centerline is equivalent to outboard tire(s) at 5 ft. (1.5m) within the edge of a 150 ft. (45.7m) wide runway.

• Captures the intended path or converges on the intended path (e.g., localizer centerline) in a smooth, timely, and predictable manner. While a critically damped response is desired, minor overshoots are acceptable. Sustained or divergent oscillations or unnecessarily aggressive responses are unsatisfactory.

• Promptly corrects any lateral movement away from the runway centerline in a positive manner.

• Following touchdown, if not already on a converging path, causes the aircraft to initially turn and track a path to intercept the runway centerline at a point far enough in front of the aircraft obvious to the flight crew that the rollout system is performing properly. Also, the rollout system should intercept the centerline sufficiently before the stop end of the runway, and before the point at which taxi speed is reached.

5.2.9.9 Variables Affecting Performance.

The performance assessment must take into account at least the following variables with the variables being applied based upon their expected distribution:

• Configurations of the aircraft (e.g., flap/slat settings)

• Center of gravity

• Landing gross weight

• Conditions of headwind, tailwind, crosswind, turbulence and wind shear (see Appendix B for acceptable wind models)

• Approach airspeed and variations in approach airspeed

• Airport conditions (elevation, runway slope, runway condition)

• Individual pilot performance, for systems with manual control

• Any other parameter which may affect system performance

• Characteristics of applicable navigation aids, including variations in flight path definitions (ILS or GLS, aircraft and space elements, etc.)

Note: 5.5.8 Appendix C provides one acceptable model for the assumed characteristics of GLS guidance errors. Applicants using an alternate model are responsible for documenting the alternate model, its basis (including a mapping to ICAO Annex 10 characteristics and any additional assumptions made), and its validity.

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