AC 25.1309-1B System Design and Analysis
This AC describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with 14 CFR 25.1309, Equipment, systems, and installations. These means are intended to provide guidance to supplement the engineering and operational judgment that form the basis of any showing of compliance. The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Advisory Circular
U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration
Subject: System Design and Analysis
This advisory circular (AC) describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1309, Equipment, systems, and installations. These means are intended to provide guidance to supplement the engineering and operational judgment that form the basis of any showing of compliance.
If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the Advisory Circular Feedback Form at the end of this AC.
Date: 08/30/2024 AC No: 25.1309-1B Initiated By: AIR-600
DANIEL J. ELGAS
Digitally signed by DANIEL J. ELGAS Date: 2024.08.30 14:57:01 -04'00'
Daniel Elgas Director, Policy and Standards Division Aircraft Certification Service
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
Chapter 1. General Information … 1-1
1.1 Purpose … 1-1
1.2 Applicability … 1-1
1.2.1 Applicability of this AC … 1-1
1.2.2 Applicability of § 25.1309 … 1-1
1.3 Cancellation … 1-4
1.4 Related Documents … 1-4
1.5 Definitions … 1-8
Chapter 2. Background … 2-1
2.1 General … 2-1
2.2 Fail-Safe Design Concept … 2-1
2.3 Highly Integrated Systems … 2-3
2.4 Use of Both Qualitative and Quantitative Methods … 2-3
Chapter 3. Failure Condition Classifications and Probability Terms … 3-1
3.1 Classifications … 3-1
3.2 Qualitative Probability Terms … 3-2
3.3 Quantitative Probability Terms … 3-4
Chapter 4. Safety Objective … 4-1
4.1 Objectives of § 25.1309(b) … 4-1
4.2 Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Conditions … 4-1
4.3 Safety Objectives for Catastrophic Failure Conditions … 4-2
Chapter 5. Compliance with § 25.1309 … 5-1
5.1 Overview … 5-1
5.2 Compliance with § 25.1309(a) … 5-1
5.3 Compliance with § 25.1309(b) … 5-2
5.3.1 General … 5-2
5.3.2 Planning … 5-3
5.3.3 Availability of Industry Standards and Guidance Materials … 5-3
ii
CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
Paragraph Page
5.3.4 Acceptable Application of Development Assurance Methods … 5-4
5.3.5 Crew and Maintenance Actions … 5-5
5.3.6 Failure Conditions involving Significant Latent Failures … 5-6
5.4 Compliance with § 25.1309(c) … 5-8
5.5 Compliance with § 25.1309(e) … 5-9
Chapter 6. Identification of Failure Conditions and Considerations when Assessing
their Effects … 6-1
6.1 Identification of Failure Conditions … 6-1
6.1.1 By Considering Failures of Functions at the Airplane Level … 6-1
6.1.2 By Considering Failures of Functions at the System Level … 6-1
6.1.3 By Considering Failures at the Equipment Level … 6-1
6.2 Identification of Failure Conditions Using a Functional Hazard Assessment … 6-2
6.3 Considerations when Assessing Failure Condition Effects … 6-3
Chapter 7. Assessment of Failure Condition Probabilities and Analysis Considerations … 7-1
7.1 General … 7-1
7.2 Assessment of Failure Condition Probabilities … 7-1
7.3 Single Failure Considerations … 7-1
7.4 Common Cause Failure Considerations … 7-2
7.5 Depth of Analysis … 7-3
7.5.1 No Safety Effect Failure Conditions … 7-3
7.5.2 Minor Failure Conditions … 7-3
7.5.3 Major Failure Conditions … 7-4
7.5.4 Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions … 7-4
7.6 Calculation of Average Probability per Flight Hour (Quantitative Analysis) … 7-5
7.7 Integrated Systems … 7-6
7.8 Operational or Environmental Conditions … 7-7
7.9 Justification of Assumptions, Data Sources, and Analytical Techniques … 7-8
iii
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
Chapter 8. Operational and Maintenance Considerations … 8-1
8.1 Overview … 8-1
8.2 Flightcrew Action … 8-1
8.3 Maintenance Action … 8-1
Chapter 9. Assessment of Modifications to Previously Certificated Airplanes … 9-1
9.1 Assessment of Modifications … 9-1
9.2 Reserved … 9-1
Appendix A. Historical Perspective on the Use of Statistical Probabilities in System
Safety Assessment … A-1
Appendix B. Assessment Methods for Failure Conditions … B-1
Appendix C. Overview of the Safety Assessment Process … C-1
Appendix D. Example of Limit Latency and Residual Risk Analysis for Compliance
with § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii) … D-1
Appendix E. Accepted Probabilities … E-1
Appendix F. Calculating the “Average Probability per Flight Hour” … F-1
Appendix G. Acronyms … G-1
Advisory Circular Feedback Form
iv
CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
FIGURES
Number Page
Figure 4-1. Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Condition Effects … 4-1
Figure C-1. Depth of Analysis Flowchart … C-3
Figure C-2. Overview of Safety Assessment Process … C-6
Figure D-1. Example Of Fault Tree For § 25.1309(b)(5) Compliance … D-2
TABLES
Number Page
Table 4-1. Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Conditions … 4-2
Table D-1. Example of CSL+1 Identification for § 25.1309(b)(5) Compliance … D-3
Table E-1. Environmental Factors … E-2
Table E-2. Airplane Configurations … E-3
Table E-3. Flight Conditions … E-3
Table E-4. Mission Dependencies … E-4
Table E-5. Other Events … E-4
v
Figure 4-1 · page 5Picture of the page from the copy saved here
1.2.2 Applicability of § 25.1309. › 1.2.2.1 Section 25.1309 is intended as a general requirement to be…
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1 Purpose.
1.1.1 This AC describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with 14 CFR 25.1309, Equipment, systems, and installations. These means are intended to provide guidance to supplement the engineering and operational judgment that form the basis of any showing of compliance. The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
1.1.2 Revision B of this AC contains guidance based on rule changes to § 25.1309. This revision also improves upon the materials published in AC 25.1309-1A by providing more substantive guidance on safety analysis methods. It also implements Congressional instruction1 to emphasize clear applicant documentation of certain technical details and failure modes, and pilot response times to them.
1.2 Applicability.
1.2.1 Applicability of this AC.
1.2.1.1 The guidance in this AC is for airplane manufacturers, modifiers, foreign
regulatory authorities, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aircraft Certification Service engineers and the Administrator’s designees.
1.2.1.2 Using this guidance as a means of compliance with § 25.1309 is voluntary
only and not using it will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations. The FAA will consider other methods of showing compliance that an applicant may elect to present. Terms such as “should,” “may,” and “must” are used only in the sense of ensuring applicability of this particular method of compliance when the acceptable method of compliance in this document is used. If the FAA becomes aware of circumstances in which following this AC would not result in compliance with the applicable regulations, the agency may require additional substantiation as the basis for finding compliance.
1.2.2 Applicability of § 25.1309.
1.2.2.1 Section 25.1309 is intended as a general requirement to be applied to any
equipment or system as installed on the airplane, be it for type certification, operating rules, or optional, in addition to specific systems requirements, except as indicated below.
1 Section 115 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020.
1.2.2.2 Although the applicant does not need to account for § 25.1309 when
1.2.2 Applicability of § 25.1309. › 1.2.2.6 The failure effects covered by §§ 25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812…
showing compliance with the performance and flight characteristics requirements of part 25, subpart B, and the structural requirements of part 25, subparts C and D, § 25.1309 does apply to any system on which compliance with any of those requirements is based. For example, § 25.1309 does not apply to an airplane’s inherent stall characteristics or their evaluation, but it does apply to a stall warning system used for compliance with § 25.207.
1.2.2.3 Some systems and functions already receive an evaluation to show
compliance with specific requirements for specific failure conditions. Such evaluations may also be used to show compliance with § 25.1309 without additional or duplicative analysis for those specific failure conditions. The applicant provides substantiation that the evaluation is an acceptable means of compliance to § 25.1309 and documents it in the certification plans for approval by the certification office.
1.2.2.4 Jams of flight control surfaces or pilot controls covered by § 25.671(c)(3)
are excepted from the requirements of § 25.1309(b).
1.2.2.5 Single failures covered by § 25.735(b)(1) are excepted from the
requirements of § 25.1309(b) because § 25.735(b)(1) limits the effect of a single failure in the brake system to doubling the brake roll stopping distance. This requirement provides a satisfactory level of safety without the need to analyze the particular circumstances and conditions under which the single failure occurs. In addition, the diverse circumstances under which such a failure could occur make any structured determination of its outcome or frequency indeterminate. However, § 25.1309(b) does apply to failures in the brake systems that are not related to the intended braked roll stopping distance or if the failures affect functions other than braking. For example, if a hydraulic brake line failure in the brake system also affects ground spoiler deployment, then § 25.1309(b) applies to that failure.
1.2.2.6 The failure effects covered by §§ 25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812 are excepted
from the requirements of § 25.1309(b). The failure conditions associated with these cabin safety equipment installations are associated with varied evacuation scenarios for which the probability cannot be determined due to the multitude of factors that can lead to an evacuation. For these types of equipment, the FAA has not been able to define appropriate scenarios under which an applicant could demonstrate compliance with § 25.1309(b). Therefore, the FAA considers it acceptable in terms of safety to require particular design features or specific reliability demonstrations for these types of equipment, and to exclude these equipment items from the requirements of § 25.1309(b). Traditionally, the FAA has found this approach acceptable.
1.2.2 Applicability of § 25.1309. › 1.2.2.11 Section 25.1309 requirements are applicable to the electrical…
1.2.2.7 The requirements of § 25.1309 are applicable to powerplant installations.
The specific applicability and exceptions are stated in § 25.901(c). Section 25.901(c) states that § 25.1309(b) does not apply to propeller debris release failures; those failures are addressed by § 25.905(d) and 14 CFR part 35. Section 25.1309(b) does not apply to uncontained engine rotor failure, engine case rupture, or engine case burn-through failures addressed by §§ 25.903(d)(1) and 25.1193 and 14 CFR part 33.
1.2.2.8 In accordance with § 25.901(d), the requirements of § 25.901(c) and hence
§ 25.1309 are applicable to auxiliary power unit installations.
1.2.2.9 The fuel system is part of the powerplant installation and therefore must
comply with § 25.1309. In addition, fuel systems must comply with § 25.954, Fuel system lightning protection, and § 25.981, Fuel tank explosion prevention. Section 25.954 provides a standard for lightning protection of both fuel tank structure and fuel tank systems. Refer to AC 25.954-1, Transport Airplane Fuel System Lightning Protection, for guidance on the safety assessment of fuel tank lightning protection. Section 25.981 provides standards for the prevention of ignition sources, other than lightning, within the fuel tanks of transport category airplanes. Refer to AC 25.981-1D, Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines, for guidance on the safety assessment of fuel system ignition sources, other than lightning.
1.2.2.10 Section 25.1309, including the no-single-failure requirement, applies to
structural elements in systems, even though those structural elements may also be required to meet the fatigue and damage tolerance criteria of § 25.571. For structural elements in systems, (with the exception of the main structural elements in landing gear, the horizontal stabilizer surface, and other control surfaces, including high lift surfaces), meeting the damage tolerance requirement of § 25.571 by itself is not sufficient to justify the assumption that a single failure will not occur. This is because single failure of structural elements can occur due to causes other than those addressed by § 25.571. For specific guidance related to structural elements in flight control systems, refer to Policy Statement No. PS- ANM-25-12 or the most recent FAA policy.
1.2.2.11 Section 25.1309 requirements are applicable to the electrical and
electronic systems covered under § 25.1316, Electrical and electronic system lightning protection, and § 25.1317, High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection. Sections 25.1316 and 25.1317 provide standards for those systems that are considered critical for continued safe flight and landing. Refer to AC 20-136, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic System Lightning Protection, and AC 20-158, The Certification of Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Systems for Operation in the HIRF Environment, for guidance on the safety assessment of electrical and electronic systems for lightning and HIRF environments, respectively.
1.4 Related Documents. › 1.4.1 Related Regulations.
However, these ACs may not provide complete guidance for compliance with § 25.1309.
1.2.2.12 Although § 25.1309 is always applicable to approved operating conditions
(on ground and in flight) of the airplane or system, it is only applicable to ground operating conditions when the airplane is in service. While ground operating conditions include conditions associated with line maintenance, dispatch determinations, embarkation and disembarkation, taxi, and the like, they do not include periods of shop maintenance, storage, or other out-of-service activities.
1.2.2.13 Where relevant, applicants should also account for risks to persons other
than airplane occupants, such as ground crew, when assessing systems failure conditions for compliance with § 25.1309. For this assessment, ground crew persons are aircraft handling, maintenance, or servicing personnel adjacent to the aircraft while it is in a ground operating condition. The risks include threats to people on the ground or adjacent to the airplane during ground operations, electric shock threats to mechanics, atmospheric threats to mechanics, unwanted door or thrust reverser movement, and other similar situations.
1.3 Cancellation. This AC cancels AC 25.1309-1A, dated June 21, 1988.
1.4 Related Documents. The following regulatory and advisory materials are related to this AC:
1.4.1 Related Regulations. The following 14 CFR part 25 regulations are related to this AC. You can download the full text of these regulations from the Federal Register website at Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, jointly administered by the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO). You can order a paper copy from the U.S. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Washington, D.C. 20401; at Government Publishing Office, by calling telephone number (202) 512-1800; or by sending a fax to (202) 512-2250.
• Section 25.4, Definitions.
• Section 25.302, Interaction of systems and structures.
• Section 25.305, Strength and deformation.
• Section 25.365, Pressurized compartment loads.
• Section 25.571, Damage-tolerance and fatigue evaluation of structure.
• Section 25.629, Aeroelastic stability requirements.
• Section 25.671, Control Systems—General.
• Section 25.735, Brakes and braking systems.
• Section 25.773, Pilot compartment view.
• Section 25.783, Fuselage doors.
• Section 25.810, Emergency egress assist means and escape routes.
• Section 25.812, Emergency lighting.
• Section 25.841, Pressurized cabins.
• Section 25.863, Flammable fluid fire protection.
• Section 25.901, Installation.
• Section 25.933, Reversing systems.
• Section 25.981, Fuel tank explosion prevention.
• Section 25.1301, Function and installation.
• Section 25.1302, Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew.
• Section 25.1322, Flightcrew alerting.
• Section 25.1329, Flight guidance system.
• Section 25.1333, Instrument systems.
• Section 25.1351, Electrical Systems and Equipment—General.
• Section 25.1365, Electrical appliances, motors, and transformers.
• Section 25.1431, Electronic equipment.
• Section 25.1447, Equipment standards for oxygen dispensing units.
• Section 25.1529, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
• Section 25.1585, Operating Procedures.
• Section 25.1709, System safety: EWIS.
• Section H25.4, Airworthiness limitations Section, of Appendix H, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
• Section I25.3, Performance and system reliability requirements, of Appendix I, Installation of an Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS).
• Section K25.1, Design requirements, of Appendix K, Extended Operations (ETOPS).
• Section M25.3, Reliability indications and maintenance access, of Appendix M, Fuel Tank System Flammability Reduction Means.
• Section M25.4, Airworthiness limitations and procedures, of Appendix M, Fuel Tank System Flammability Reduction Means.
1.4 Related Documents. › 1.4.2 Advisory Circulars.
1.4.2 Advisory Circulars. The following ACs are related to the guidance in this AC. Please see the latest version of each AC referenced in this document; they are available on the FAA website at FAA Regulations and Policies and in the Dynamic Regulatory System (DRS).
• AC 20-115D, Airborne Software Development Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-12 and RTCA DO-178.
• AC 20-136B, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic System Lightning Protection.
• AC 20-152A, RTCA, Inc., Document RTCA/DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware.
• AC 20-170, Integrated Modular Avionics Development.
• AC 20-174, Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems.
• AC 20-189, Management of Open Problem Reports (OPRs).
• AC 21-16G, RTCA Document DO-160 versions D, E and F, “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.”
• AC 25-11B, Electronic Flight Displays.
• AC 25-19A, Certification Maintenance Requirements.
• AC 25-22, Certification of Transport Airplane Mechanical Systems.
• AC 25-28, Compliance of Transport Category Airplanes with Certification Requirements for Flight in Icing Conditions.
• AC 25.671-1, Control Systems—General.
• AC 25.783-1A, Fuselage Doors and Hatches.
• AC 25.901-1, Safety Assessment of Powerplant Installations.
• AC 25.933-1, Unwanted In-flight Thrust Reversal of Turbojet Thrust Reversers.
• AC 25.954-1, Transport Airplane Fuel System Lightning Protection.
• AC 25.981-1D, Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines.
• AC 25.1302-1, Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew.
• AC 25.1322-1, Flightcrew Alerting.
• AC 25.1329-1C, Approval of Flight Guidance Systems.
• AC 25.1701-1, Certification of Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems on Transport Category Airplanes.
• AC 120-28D, Criteria for Approval of Category III Weather Minima for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout.
1.4 Related Documents. › 1.4.5 Industry Documents.
1.4.3 Policy Statements. The following policy statements are available on the FAA website at FAA Regulations and Policies and in the Dynamic Regulatory System (DRS).
• PS-ANM-25-11, Guidance for Hazard Classifications of Failure Conditions that Lead to Runway Excursions. • PS-ANM-25-12, Certification of Structural Elements in Flight Control Systems. • PS-AIR-21.15-01, Submission of Outline of New and Changed Systems at the Beginning of the Type Certificate Amendment Process for Transport Category Aircraft.
1.4.4 FAA-sponsored research Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) reports. These reports support AC 25.1309 accepted probabilities. Copies of the referenced Netherlands Aerospace Centre reports can be obtained by sending an email to: ‘[email protected]’.
• NLR-CR-2002-601, November 2002. Assessment of standard probabilities in support of FAA AC 25.1309, Phase one. • NLR-CR-2003-554, September 2003. Assessment of standard probabilities in support of FAA AC 25.1309, Phase two. • NLR-CR-2005-015, January 2005. Assessment of standard probabilities in support of FAA AC 25.1309, Phase three. • NLR-CR-2016-601, February 2017. Update of standard probabilities in support of FAA AC 25.1309.
1.4.5 Industry Documents. The following RTCA documents are available from RTCA Inc., 1150 18th Street NW, Suite 910, Washington, DC 20036; by completing the Document Order Form and faxing it to (202) 833-9434; or at RTCA. The following SAE International Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) documents are available from SAE Customer Service, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, 15096; or at SAE. Please use the latest version of the referenced document.
• RTCA, Inc., Document DO-160, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment. • RTCA, Inc., Document DO-178, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification. • RTCA, Inc., Document DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware. • RTCA, Inc., Document DO-297, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidance and Certification Considerations. • RTCA, Inc., Document DO-326, Airworthiness Security Process Specification. • RTCA, Inc., Document DO-355, Information Security Guidance for Continued Airworthiness Global Specification.
1.5 Definitions. › 1.5.5 Catastrophic Single Latent Failure Plus One (CSL+1).
• RTCA, Inc., Document DO-356, Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations. • SAE ARP 4754, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems. • SAE ARP 4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.
1.5 Definitions. The following definitions apply to the system design and analysis requirements of § 25.1309 and the guidance material in this AC. See also § 25.4 for common term definitions used in part 25. Some of the following definitions are specific to the system design and analysis requirements of § 25.1309 and the guidance material in this AC. Some of the following definitions may have a different meaning when they are used in other regulations or ACs. There are no defined terms within this section for which standard dictionary definitions apply.
1.5.1 Analysis. The terms “analysis” and “assessment” are used throughout this AC. The two terms are to some extent interchangeable. However, “analysis” generally implies a more specific, more detailed evaluation, while “assessment” may be a more general or broader evaluation but may include one or more types of analysis. In practice, the meaning of each term comes from the specific application, for example, fault tree analysis, Markov analysis, preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), and so forth.
1.5.2 At Risk Time. The period of time during which the aircraft may be subject to the failure effect under analysis.
1.5.3 Assessment. See the definition of “analysis” above.
1.5.4 Average Probability per Flight Hour. For the purpose of this AC, this term is the quotient of the number of times the subject failure condition is predicted to occur during the entire operating life of all airplanes of the type divided by the anticipated total operating hours of all airplanes of that type. Please note that the average probability per flight hour is normally calculated as the probability of a failure condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration divided by that mean duration.
1.5.5 Catastrophic Single Latent Failure Plus One (CSL+1). A catastrophic failure condition that results from a combination of two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight.
1.5 Definitions. › 1.5.15 Exposure Time.
1.5.6 Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR). A required scheduled maintenance task established during the design certification of the airplane systems as an airworthiness limitation of the type certificate or supplemental type certificate. This term is defined in § 25.4 Definitions.
Note: The CMRs are a subset of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) identified during the certification process.
1.5.7 Complex. A system is complex when its operation, failure modes, or failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods.
1.5.8 Conventional. A system is conventional if its functionality, the technological means used to implement its functionality, and its intended usage are all the same as, or closely similar to, that of previously approved systems that are commonly used.
1.5.9 Design Appraisal. A qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the system design.
1.5.10 Development Assurance. All planned and systematic actions used to substantiate, to an adequate level of confidence, that errors in requirements, design, and implementation have been identified and corrected so that the system satisfies the applicable safety objectives.
1.5.11 Equipment. A physical object that can be installed and removed from the aircraft and performs one or more specific functions. Equipment contains one or more items.
1.5.12 Error. An omission or incorrect action by a flightcrew member or maintenance personnel, or a development error (for example, a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation).
1.5.13 Event. An occurrence or condition that affects airplane safety.
1.5.14 External Event. An occurrence that has its origin distinct from the airplane, such as atmospheric conditions (e.g., gusts, temperature variations, icing, and lightning strikes); runway conditions; conditions of communication, navigation, and surveillance services; bird-strike; and cabin and baggage fires (not initiated by features installed on the airplane); etc. The term does not cover sabotage or other similar intentional acts.
1.5.15 Exposure Time. The time between when an item is known to be operating properly and when it will be known to be operating properly again.
1.5 Definitions. › 1.5.24 Redundancy.
1.5.16 Failure. An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or element such that it no longer functions as intended. This includes both loss of function and malfunction.
Note: Errors may cause failures or influence their effects but are not considered to be failures.
1.5.17 Failure Condition. A condition, caused or contributed to by one or more failures or errors, that has either a direct or consequential effect on the airplane, its occupants, or other persons, accounting for—
• Flight phase,
• Relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions, and
• External events.
1.5.18 Failure Mode. A specific way in which a system, equipment, hardware item, or piece-part may fail.
1.5.19 Ground Crew. For the purposes of a system safety assessment, ground crew includes aircraft handling, maintenance or servicing personnel operating in or within the vicinity of the aircraft while it is in a ground operating condition.
1.5.20 Installation Appraisal. This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the installation including the evaluation of any deviations from normal, industry-accepted installation practices, such as clearances or tolerances, especially in the case of modifications made after entry into service.
1.5.21 Latent Failure. A failure that is not detected or annunciated when it occurs.
1.5.22 Qualitative analytical process. Those analytical processes that assess system and airplane safety in a non-numerical manner. Engineering judgment or an acceptable rough-order estimate may be used in this process.
1.5.23 Quantitative analytical process. Those analytical processes that apply numerical methods and statistical analyses to assess system and airplane safety.
1.5.24 Redundancy. The presence of more than one independent means for accomplishing a given function or flight operation.
1.5 Definitions. › 1.5.28 System.
1.5.25 Safety Requirement. A requirement that is necessary to achieve either a safety objective or satisfy a constraint established by the system safety process.
1.5.26 Significant Latent Failure (SLF). A latent failure that, in combination with one or more specific failures or events, would result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. This term is defined in § 25.4 Definitions.
1.5.27 Single Failure. Any failure or set of failures that cannot be shown to be independent from each other (e.g., failures due to a common cause).
1.5.28 System. A defined combination of subsystems, equipment, items, or elements that perform one or more functions.
Chapter 2. Background › 2.2 Fail-Safe Design Concept.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.1 General.
2.1.1 The FAA is issuing this revision 1B concurrently with a number of rule changes that address system safety, such as §§ 25.302, 25.629, 25.671, 25.901, 25.933, 25.1309, and others. The agency developed these rule changes, and corresponding advisory material, based on recommendations from several working groups under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC).
2.1.2 In 2010, the ARAC Airplane-Level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG) provided recommendations for changes to §§ 25.1301 and 25.1309. The ASAWG also recommended changes to the corresponding advisory material, and the FAA used these recommendations to develop this AC.
2.1.3 In the early years of aviation, airplane systems were evaluated to specific requirements: to the “single fault” criterion or to the fail-safe design concept, which are explained below. As later-generation airplanes developed, their designers added more safety-critical functions, which generally resulted in an increase in the complexity of the systems designed to perform these functions. A safety-critical function was a function whose failure when required would result in a catastrophic condition. The potential hazards to the airplane and its occupants, in the event of failure of one or more functions provided by a system, had to be considered, as did the interaction between systems performing different functions. To assess the safety of a complex system—and the adequacy of system redundancy to meet the fail-safe criterion—the FAA began assigning statistical probabilities to system failures in AC 25.1309-1, dated September 7, 1982. The agency’s primary objective was to ensure that the proliferation of safety-critical systems would not increase the probability of a catastrophic accident. The FAA assigned numerical values to the qualitative probabilistic terms in the requirements, for use in those cases where the impact of system failures is examined by quantitative methods of analysis. However, numerical values were intended to supplement, not replace, qualitative methods based on engineering and operational judgment. See appendix A for a historical perspective of the use of statistical probabilities in system safety assessment.
2.2 Fail-Safe Design Concept. The part 25 airworthiness standards for installations of systems and equipment are based on, and incorporate, the objectives, principles, and techniques of the fail-safe design concept, which instructs the applicant to assume that single failures will happen, and to consider the effects of those failures and combinations of failures in defining an acceptable safe design.
2.2.2 The fail-safe design concept uses the following design principles… › 2.2.2.10 Margins or Factors of Safety to allow for any undefined or…
2.2.1 In fail-safe design, the following basic objectives pertaining to failures apply:
2.2.1.1 In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component,
or connection during any one flight must be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single failures must not be catastrophic. See definition of “catastrophic” in paragraph 3.1.5 of this AC.
2.2.1.2 Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or latent, and
combinations thereof, should also be considered.
2.2.2 The fail-safe design concept uses the following design principles or techniques in order to ensure an acceptable safe design. The use of only one of these principles or techniques is seldom adequate. A combination of two or more is usually needed to provide a fail-safe design, in other words, to ensure that major failure conditions are remote, hazardous failure conditions are extremely remote, and catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable.
2.2.2.1 Designed Integrity and Quality, including Life Limits, to ensure intended
function and prevent failures.
2.2.2.2 Redundancy or Backup Systems to enable continued function after any
single (or other defined number of) failure(s), for example, two or more engines, hydraulic systems, and so forth.
2.2.2.3 Isolation and/or Segregation of Systems, Components, and Elements so
that the failure of one does not cause the failure of another.
2.2.2.4 Proven Reliability so that multiple, independent failures are unlikely to
occur during the same flight.
2.2.2.5 Failure Annunciation or Indication to provide awareness in case of
detected failures.
2.2.2.6 Flightcrew Procedures specifying corrective action for use after failure
detection.
2.2.2.7 Checkability, which is the capability to check a component’s condition.
2.2.2.8 Designed Failure Effect Limits, including the capability to sustain damage
to limit the safety impact or effects of a failure.
2.2.2.9 Designed Failure Path to control and direct the effects of a failure in a way
that limits its safety impact.
2.2.2.10 Margins or Factors of Safety to allow for any undefined or unforeseeable
adverse conditions.
Chapter 2. Background › 2.4 Use of Both Qualitative and Quantitative Methods.
2.2.2.11 Error Tolerance that considers adverse effects of foreseeable errors during
the airplane’s design, test, manufacture, operation, and maintenance.
2.3 Highly Integrated Systems. In 1998, the ARAC System Design and Analysis Working Group raised a concern regarding the efficiency and coverage of the techniques used for assessing safety aspects of highly integrated systems that perform complex and interrelated functions, particularly through the use of electronic technology and software-based techniques. The concern was that design and analysis techniques applied to deterministic risks or to conventional, non-complex systems might not provide adequate safety coverage for more complex systems. Thus, other assurance techniques have also been applied by the FAA and applicants to these more complex systems. These techniques included development assurance using a combination of process assurance; validation and implementation verification techniques; and structured analysis or assessment techniques conducted at the airplane level if necessary or across integrated or interacting systems. The systematic use of these techniques increases confidence that errors in requirements, designs, or implementation, and integration or interaction effects have been adequately identified and corrected. Applicants should continue to emphasize the fail-safe design concept discussed in paragraph 2.2 of this AC in the development and assurance of highly integrated systems.
2.4 Use of Both Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. Considering the above developments, as well as revisions made to § 25.1309, this AC includes additional approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, which may be used to assist applicants in their 14 CFR 21.20 obligations to show compliance with system safety regulations, considering the whole airplane and its systems. This AC also provides guidance to assist applicants in determining when, or if, particular analyses or development assurance activities should be conducted in the frame of the development and safety assessment processes. See AC 20-174 and the industry documents listed in paragraph 1.4.5 of this AC for additional guidance. In summary, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used in practice, and both may be necessary to some degree to support a compliance finding. The analytical tools used in determining numerical values are intended to complement, but not replace, qualitative methods based on engineering and operational judgment. See appendix B of this AC for guidance on available qualitative and quantitative methods for assessment of failure conditions.
3.1 Classifications. › 3.1.4 Hazardous.
CHAPTER 3. FAILURE CONDITION CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROBABILITY TERMS
3.1 Classifications. The FAA classifies failure conditions according to the severity of their effects as defined in paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.5 below.
Note: The description of the terms provided for major, hazardous, and catastrophic failure conditions are the same as those found in § 25.4.
3.1.1 No Safety Effect. Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety. For example, failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the airplane or increase flightcrew workload but may cause inconvenience to passengers or cabin crew.
3.1.2 Minor. A failure condition that would not significantly reduce airplane safety and would only involve flightcrew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may result in, for example—
• A slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,
• A slight increase in flightcrew workload, such as routine flight plan changes,
• Some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew, or
• An effect of similar severity.
3.1.3 Major. A failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions, to the extent that there would be:
• A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,
• A physical discomfort or significant increase in flightcrew workload or in conditions impairing the efficiency of the flightcrew,
• Physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including injuries, or
• An effect of similar severity.
3.1.4 Hazardous. A failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions, to the extent that there would be:
• A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,
• Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flightcrew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely, or
• Serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of persons other than the flightcrew.
3.2 Qualitative Probability Terms. › 3.2.4 Extremely Improbable Failure Condition.
3.1.5 Catastrophic. A failure condition that would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the airplane.
Note 1: A failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing should be classified as catastrophic unless otherwise defined in other specific ACs.
Note 2: For the purpose of performing a safety assessment, “multiple fatalities” means two or more fatalities.
3.2 Qualitative Probability Terms. The probability terms used in § 25.1309 and in this AC are defined in paragraphs 3.2.1 through 3.2.4 below. These terms and definitions have become commonly accepted as aids to engineering judgment when using qualitative analyses to determine compliance with § 25.1309(b).
Note: The definitions provided for probable, remote, extremely remote, and extremely improbable failure conditions are the same as those found in § 25.4.
3.2.1 Probable Failure Condition. A failure condition that is anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire operational life of each airplane of a given type.
3.2.2 Remote Failure Condition. A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane of a given type during its entire operational life, but which may occur several times during the total operational life of a number of airplanes of a given type.
3.2.3 Extremely Remote Failure Condition. A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane of a given type during its entire operational life, but which may occur a few times during the total operational life of all airplanes of a given type.
3.2.4 Extremely Improbable Failure Condition. A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur during the total operational life of all airplanes of a given type.
3.2.4.1 Intent of the Term “Extremely Improbable.” › 3.2.4.1.3 Wherever part 25 requires that a condition be extremely…
3.2.4.1 Intent of the Term “Extremely Improbable.”
3.2.4.1.1 The FAA’s objective of using this term in the system safety regulations has been to describe a condition (usually a failure condition) that has a probability of occurrence so low that it is not anticipated to occur in service on any transport category airplane to which the standard applies. However, while a rule sets a minimum standard for all the airplanes to which it applies, the FAA’s compliance determinations are limited to applications for individual type certificates. Consequently, in practice, the applicant should provide a sufficiently conservative showing that a condition is not anticipated to occur in service during the entire operational life of all airplanes under a type certificate application being assessed.
3.2.4.1.2 The means of showing that the occurrence of a failure condition is extremely improbable varies widely, depending on the type of system, component, or element that must be assessed. The FAA does not consider failure conditions arising from a single failure to be extremely improbable, unless the operational or environmental conditions under which the failure must occur to produce a catastrophic event are in and of themselves extremely remote, or the physics of a theoretical failure is so implausible that the FAA can agree it is not anticipated to ever actually occur. (See paragraph 7.3.2.) Thus, probability assessments for catastrophic outcomes normally involve conditions arising from multiple failures. Both qualitative and quantitative assessments are used in practice, and both are often necessary, to some degree, to support a conclusion that a failure condition is extremely improbable. Generally, performing only a quantitative analysis to show that a failure condition is extremely improbable is insufficient, due to the variability and uncertainty in the analytical process. Any analysis used as evidence that a failure condition is extremely improbable should include justification of any assumptions made, data sources, and analytical techniques to account for the variability and uncertainty in the analytical process.
3.2.4.1.3 Wherever part 25 requires that a condition be extremely improbable, the compliance method—whether qualitative, quantitative, or a combination of the two—along with engineering judgment, should provide convincing evidence that the condition is not anticipated to occur in service when the airplane is produced in accordance with the approved type design, is operated in accordance with approved operating procedures, and is maintained in accordance with approved maintenance procedures.
3.3 Quantitative Probability Terms. › 3.3.2 The above numerical values associated with the probabilistic…
3.3 Quantitative Probability Terms.
3.3.1 When using quantitative analyses to help determine compliance with § 25.1309(b), the following descriptions of the probability terms used in this requirement and AC have become commonly accepted as aids to engineering judgment. They are expressed in terms of acceptable ranges for the average probability per flight hour. Those probability terms and ranges are as follows:
3.3.1.1 Probable Failure Condition. A failure condition having an average probability per flight hour on the order of 1 x 10-3 or less, but greater than the order of 1 x 10-5.
3.3.1.2 Remote Failure Condition. A failure condition having an average probability per flight hour on the order of 1 x 10-5 or less, but greater than the order of 1 x 10-7.
3.3.1.3 Extremely Remote Failure Condition. A failure condition having an average probability per flight hour on the order of 1 x 10-7 or less, but greater than the order of 1 x 10-9.
3.3.1.4 Extremely Improbable Failure Condition. A failure condition having an average probability per flight hour on the order of 1 x 10-9 or less.
In a quantitative assessment of a remote failure condition a factor of two could be considered as ‘on the order of’ to show compliance. For an extremely remote or extremely improbable failure condition, a factor of three could be considered as ‘on the order of’ to show compliance. Note that at the low end of the probability value, there may be many factors in the analysis methods that influence the top undesired event probability calculations, therefore a higher factor may be acceptable on a case-by-case basis. (See paragraph 7.6.4 of this AC.)
Note: When using quantitative analysis to show compliance with § 25.1309(b), a calculated probability lower than the specified range in this section is considered as compliant.
3.3.2 The above numerical values associated with the probabilistic terms in § 25.1309(b) are guidelines for acceptable risk when applicants use quantitative probability methods of analysis to examine the effect of system failures. A design that meets these guidelines provides some, but not necessarily sufficient, evidence to support a finding by the FAA as to whether the design complies with the rule.
Chapter 4. Safety Objective › 4.2 Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Conditions.
CHAPTER 4. SAFETY OBJECTIVE
4.1 Objectives of § 25.1309(b). The objective of § 25.1309(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) is graphically presented in figure 4-1 as an inverse relationship between the probability and the severity of failure condition effects, such that:
4.1.1 Failure conditions with no safety effect have no probability requirement.
4.1.2 Minor failure conditions may be probable.
4.1.3 Major failure conditions must be no more frequent than remote.
4.1.4 Hazardous failure conditions must be no more frequent than extremely remote.
4.1.5 Catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable.
Figure 4-1. Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Condition Effects
Unacceptable
Acceptable
Probable
Remote
Extremely
Remote
Extremely Improbable
Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Severity of Failure Condition Effects
Probability of Failure Condition
4.2 Relationship between Probability and Severity of Failure Conditions. The relationship between probability and severity of the effects associated with failure conditions are described in table 4-1.
TABLE 4-1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF
FAILURE CONDITIONS
Classification
of Failure Conditions
No Safety
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Effect on Airplane
No effect on operational capabilities or safety
Slight reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins
Significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
Large reduction in functional capabilities or safety margins
Normally with hull loss
Effect on Occupants or Other Persons Excluding Flightcrew
Inconvenience Physical discomfort
Physical distress, possibly including injuries
Serious or fatal injury to a small number of persons other than the flightcrew
Multiple fatalities
Effect on Flightcrew
No effect on flightcrew workload
Slight increase in workload
A physical discomfort or significant increase in workload or in conditions impairing the efficiency of the flightcrew
Physical distress or excessive workload such that flightcrew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely
Fatalities or incapacitation
Allowable Qualitative Probability
No Probability Requirement
Probable Remote Extremely remote
Extremely improbable
Allowable Quantitative Probability range:
Values shown are Average Probability per Flight Hour:
No Probability Requirement
On the order of 10-3 or less, but greater than the order of 10-5 *
On the order of 10-5 or less, but greater than the order of 10-7
On the order of 10-7 or less, but greater than the order of 10-9
On the order of 10-9 or less
* An allowable probability range is provided here as a reference. The applicant is not required to perform a quantitative analysis, nor substantiate by such analysis that this numerical criterion has been met for minor failure conditions. Current transport category airplane products are regarded as meeting this standard simply by using current commonly-accepted industry practice.
4.3 Safety Objectives for Catastrophic Failure Conditions. › 4.3.3 Significant latent failures are addressed in accordance with §…
4.3 Safety Objectives for Catastrophic Failure Conditions. The safety objectives associated with catastrophic failure conditions are satisfied by showing that:
4.3.1 No single failure results in a catastrophic failure condition;
4.3.2 Each catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable; and
4.3.3 Significant latent failures are addressed in accordance with § 25.1309(b)(4) and § 25.1309(b)(5).
5.2 Compliance with § 25.1309(a). › 5.2.4 The equipment, systems, and installations addressed by §…
CHAPTER 5. COMPLIANCE WITH § 25.1309
5.1 Overview. This chapter describes specific means of compliance with § 25.1309. The applicant would benefit from obtaining early agreement from the FAA on its chosen means of compliance.
5.2 Compliance with § 25.1309(a).
5.2.1 Equipment, systems, and installations regulated by § 25.1309(a)(1) must be shown to function properly when installed. The “airplane operating and environmental conditions” that must be considered under that regulation include the full normal operating envelope of the airplane found in the airplane flight manual (AFM) together with any modification to that envelope associated with abnormal or emergency procedures. External environmental conditions that the airplane is reasonably expected to encounter should be considered, such as atmospheric turbulence, high-intensity radiated fields, lightning, and precipitation. The severity of the external environmental conditions that should be considered is limited to those established by certification standards and precedence.
5.2.2 In addition to the external operating and environmental conditions, the effect of the operating and environmental conditions within the airplane should be considered. Examples of these effects include the following: vibration and acceleration loads, variations in fluid pressure and electrical power, fluid or vapor contamination due to either the normal environment or accidental leaks or spillage and handling by personnel, heat radiated from nearby equipment, and electromagnetic emission from installed equipment. AC 21-16 recognizes RTCA Document DO-160, which defines a series of standard environmental test conditions and procedures that may be used to support compliance. Environmental test procedures contained in technical standard orders (TSOs), or other environmental test standards approved for equipment qualifications, can be used to support compliance. The conditions under which the installed equipment will be operated should be equal to or less severe than the environment for which the equipment is qualified.
5.2.3 The applicant may substantiate the proper functioning of equipment, systems, and installations under the operating and environmental conditions approved for the airplane by test and/or analysis, or reference to comparable service experience on other airplanes if shown to be valid for the proposed installation. For the equipment, systems, and installations covered by § 25.1309(a)(1), the compliance demonstration should also confirm that their normal functioning does not adversely affect the proper functioning of other equipment, systems, or installations covered by § 25.1309(a)(1).
5.2.4 The equipment, systems, and installations addressed by § 25.1309(a)(2) are not required to meet § 25.1309(a)(1). These equipment, systems, and installations are those associated with miscellaneous systems intended for convenience, such as passenger
5.3 Compliance with § 25.1309(b). › 5.3.1 General.
amenities, passenger entertainment systems, in-flight telephones, and so forth, whose failure or improper functioning should not affect the safety of the airplane. In other words, the types of systems addressed by § 25.1309(a)(2) should be designed so that the severity of their functional failures has “no safety effect.” (See paragraph 3.1.1 of this AC for the definition of “no safety effect.”) Therefore, the qualification requirements for such equipment, systems, and installations can be reduced to the necessary tests for showing that their normal or abnormal functioning does not adversely affect the proper functioning of the equipment, systems, or installations covered by § 25.1309(a)(1), or the safety of the airplane or its occupants. Examples of adverse effects include fire, explosion, exposing passengers to high voltages, and so forth. The FAA expects normal installation practices to result in sufficiently obvious isolation of the impacts of such equipment on safety that substantiation can be based on a relatively simple qualitative installation evaluation. If the possible failure effects and their evaluation are questionable, or isolation between systems is provided by complex means, then more formal structured evaluation methods or a design change may be necessary.
5.3 Compliance with § 25.1309(b). Section 25.1309(b)(1) requires that the airplane’s systems and associated components, as installed, and considered both separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that any catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable and does not result from a single failure. Section 25.1309(b)(2) requires that any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote, and § 25.1309(b)(3) requires that any major failure condition is remote. An analysis should consider the application of the fail-safe design concept described in paragraph 2.2 of this AC. The analysis should give special attention to ensuring the effective use of design techniques that would prevent single failures or other events from damaging or otherwise adversely affecting more than one redundant system channel or more than one system performing operationally similar functions. Additionally, § 25.1309(b)(4) requires the applicant to eliminate significant latent failures (SLFs) (see definition in paragraph 1.5.26 of this AC) to the extent practical, and provides criteria for accepting those SLFs that cannot be practically eliminated. Section 25.1309(b)(5) applies to the catastrophic failure conditions that result from two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight. The failure conditions addressed by § 25.1309(b)(5) are a subset of the failure conditions addressed in § 25.1309(b)(4).
5.3.1 General. Appendix C of this AC provides an overview of the typical safety assessment process. Compliance with the requirements of § 25.1309(b) should be shown by safety analyses. Where necessary, the failure effects should be substantiated by appropriate ground, flight, or simulator tests. Failure conditions should be identified, and their effects assessed. The maximum allowable probability of the occurrence of each failure condition is determined from the failure condition’s effects. When assessing failure conditions, appropriate analysis considerations should be accounted for. Any analysis should consider the following:
5.3 Compliance with § 25.1309(b). › 5.3.3 Availability of Industry Standards and Guidance Materials.
5.3.1.1 Possible failure conditions and their causes, modes of failure, and damage
from sources external to the system.
5.3.1.2 The possibility of multiple failures due to a common cause, multiple
independent failures, and undetected failures.
5.3.1.3 The possibility of requirement, design, and implementation errors.
5.3.1.4 The effect of flightcrew errors reasonably expected in service after the
occurrence of a failure or failure condition. (See AC 25.1302-1.)
5.3.1.5 The effect of reasonably anticipated errors when performing maintenance
actions.
5.3.1.6 The flightcrew alerting cues, corrective action required, and the flightcrew
capability of detecting faults.
5.3.1.7 The resulting effects on the airplane and its occupants, or other persons
(such as ground crew or maintenance personnel), considering the stage of flight, the operational sequences (sequence of system responses or expected flightcrew actions following a failure(s)), and operating and environmental conditions.
5.3.2 Planning. This AC provides guidance on methods of accomplishing the safety objective. The detailed methodology needed to achieve this safety objective depends on many factors, particularly, the degree of system complexity and integration. For proposed airplane designs that will contain many complex or integrated systems, it is likely that the applicant will need to propose and develop a plan to describe the intended process. In general, the extent and structure of the analyses to show compliance with § 25.1309 will be greater when the system is more complex, and the effects of the failure conditions are more severe. Industry standards such as those listed in paragraph 1.4.5 of this AC provide further information on the planning activity. This plan should include consideration of all of the following aspects:
5.3.2.1 Functional and physical interrelationships of systems.
5.3.2.2 Determination of detailed means of compliance, which may include the
use of development assurance techniques.
5.3.2.3 Means for establishing the accomplishment of the plan, including how the
plan is followed throughout the project to ensure completion.
5.3.3 Availability of Industry Standards and Guidance Materials. There are a variety of acceptable techniques used currently in industry, some of which are reflected in SAE ARP 4754 and ARP 4761. This AC is not intended to constrain the applicant to the use of these documents in defining their particular methods for
5.3.4 Acceptable Application of Development Assurance Methods. › 5.3.4.3 Development assurance activities should define and identify all…
satisfying the objectives of this AC. However, these documents contain material and methods that an applicant may choose to use for performing the safety assessment. The FAA recognizes these methods, when correctly applied, as valid for showing compliance with § 25.1309(b). In addition, SAE ARP 4761 contains tutorial information on applying specific engineering methods (for example, Markov analysis and fault tree analysis) that an applicant may wish to use in whole or in part.
5.3.4 Acceptable Application of Development Assurance Methods.
5.3.4.1 Paragraph 5.3.1.3 of this AC states that any analysis necessary to show
compliance with § 25.1309(b) should consider the possibility of errors in requirement, design, and implementation. Errors made during the design and development of systems have traditionally been detected and corrected by exhaustive tests conducted on the system and its components, by direct inspection, and by other direct verification methods capable of completely characterizing the performance of the system. These direct techniques may still be appropriate for simple systems, which perform a limited number of functions and are not highly integrated with other airplane systems.
5.3.4.2 For integrated systems, or systems that perform complex functions,
exhaustive testing might be either impossible because all of the system states (within a particular system and within the interfacing systems) cannot be determined, or impractical because of the number of tests that must be accomplished. For these types of systems, the applicant may use development assurance techniques to minimize errors. The rigor of development assurance should be determined by the severity of potential effects on the airplane in case of system malfunctions or loss of functions. Acceptable guidelines for development assurance are described in—
• AC 20-174, which recognizes SAE ARP 4754 for aircraft and systems,
• AC 20-115D, which addresses the software aspects of certification, including the use of RTCA Document DO-178, supplements to DO- 178, and tool qualification, and
• AC 20-152A, which addresses airborne electronic hardware aspects of certification, including the use of RTCA Document DO-254.
5.3.4.3 Development assurance activities should define and identify all
requirements, including any derived safety requirements needed to manage the many interactions between the systems. The activities should also validate that these requirements are complete and correct and verify that the system design meets those requirements. The development assurance activities should verify that the design provides for fault containment, so that the integrated systems are shown to be fail-safe.
5.3.5 Crew and Maintenance Actions. › 5.3.5.3 In complex situations, the results of the review by specialists…
5.3.5 Crew and Maintenance Actions.
5.3.5.1 Where the applicant’s analysis identifies recognition and response, and/or
action by the flightcrew, cabin crew, or maintenance personnel that is necessary to show that the design complies with § 25.1309(b), the applicant should accomplish all of the activities in paragraphs 5.3.5.1.1 through 5.3.5.1.3. For these verification activities, it is acceptable to assume a fully available indication function (except for the system failures being indicated).
5.3.5.1.1 Verify that any identified indications are actually provided by the system. This includes verification that the sensor coverage and logic that detects the situations and triggers the indicator are sufficient to always detect the situations considering various causes, flight phases, operating conditions, operational sequences, and environments.
5.3.5.1.2 Verify that any identified indications will, in fact, be recognized.
5.3.5.1.3 Verify that any actions required have a reasonable expectation of being accomplished successfully and in a timely manner.
5.3.5.2 The applicant should accomplish the verification activities described in
paragraph 5.3.5.1 by consulting with engineers, pilots, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and human factors specialists, as appropriate, taking due consideration of any relevant service experience and the consequences if the assumed action is performed improperly or not performed. In the case where the flightcrew may not recognize and respond as expected within constraints on the time available, consider the impacts at the system and aircraft level, accounting for circumstances, the phase of flight, and the complexity of the situation, to determine the tasks and/or the systems that need to be modified.
5.3.5.3 In complex situations, the results of the review by specialists may need to
be confirmed by inspection, simulator, ground tests, or flight tests. However, quantitative assessments of the probabilities of crew or maintenance errors are not currently considered feasible. If the failure indications are considered to be recognizable and the required actions do not cause an excessive workload, then for the purposes of the analysis, such corrective actions can be considered to be satisfactorily accomplished. If the necessary actions cannot be satisfactorily accomplished, the tasks and/or the systems need to be modified.
5.3.6 Failure Conditions involving Significant Latent Failures. › 5.3.6.5 There can be situations where it is not practical to meet the…
5.3.6 Failure Conditions involving Significant Latent Failures.
5.3.6.1 Eliminating all significant latent failures may be impractical in some
designs, as it is not always possible to detect any and all failures that may occur during flight. Paragraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) of § 25.1309 are intended to ensure the minimization of SLFs where it is not possible to completely eliminate them.
5.3.6.2 The elimination and minimization requirement of § 25.1309(b)(4) does not
apply to SLFs where the system failure condition meets the safety objectives of § 25.1309(b)(1) or (b)(2) with the assumption that the latent failure has occurred.
5.3.6.3 Where § 25.1309(b)(4) does apply, a hierarchy of safety objectives for
managing exposure to SLFs needs to be shown.
1. To meet § 25.1309(b)(4), limiting exposure to SLFs should be an integral part of the applicants' normal design practice. The applicant must first eliminate SLFs to the maximum practical extent. To do so, the applicant should utilize the current state-of-the-art technology, e.g., by implementing practical and reliable failure monitoring and flight crew indication systems to detect failures that would otherwise be latent.
2. For each significant latent failure that cannot reasonably be eliminated, the applicant must minimize the exposure time by design. To do so, the applicant should utilize current state-of-the-art technology rather than relying on scheduled maintenance tasks at lengthy intervals, i.e., implementing pilot-initiated checks, or self-initiated checks (e.g., first flight of the day check, power-up built-in tests, or other system automated checks).
5.3.6.4 An acceptable means of compliance to minimization is to limit the latency
of the SLF by minimizing the time the failure is allowed to be present such that the product of this exposure time and the average failure rate of the SLF does not exceed 1/1000. Another acceptable means of compliance to minimization is to show that the failure would not be latent for more than one flight.
5.3.6.5 There can be situations where it is not practical to meet the 1/1000
criterion. For example, if meeting it would result in performing complex or invasive maintenance tasks on the flight line, thereby increasing the risk of incorrect maintenance and associated cost. In such situations, safety is better served when the latent failure is serviced at a suitable maintenance facility. In cases where the applicant can demonstrate that meeting the 1/1000 criterion is not practical, the applicant must minimize the time the failure is expected to be present.
5.3.6 Failure Conditions involving Significant Latent Failures. › 5.3.6.10 Although exposure to latency time is normally expressed in…
5.3.6.6 In those situations where the significant latent failure is assumed to be
latent for the life of the airplane, the applicant should include a qualitative assessment to determine whether a periodic maintenance task is necessary to avoid undue risk due to the exposure to catastrophic or hazardous failure conditions.
5.3.6.7 For a catastrophic failure condition that involves two failures, either of
which could be latent for more than one flight, compliance with § 25.1309(b)(5) is required. These failure conditions are denoted as CSL+1. The applicant must first show that it is impractical to design the system with additional fault tolerance, such as adding failure monitors. The assessment should explain why avoidance is not practical and provide supporting rationale for the acceptability. The rationale should be based on the proposed design being state-of-the-art, experience, sound engineering judgment, or other arguments, which led to the decision not to implement additional fault tolerance (e.g., adding failure monitors to eliminate the significant latent failure or adding redundancy to avoid the CSL+1 condition).
5.3.6.8 Once an applicant has shown that CSL+1 conditions are eliminated to the
extent practical, the applicant must then apply the criteria in § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii) to limit the residual risk in the presence of a latent failure and limit the probability of occurrence of the latent failure itself. These requirements are applied in addition to the requirement of § 25.1309(b)(1) where catastrophic failure conditions must be shown to be extremely improbable and do not result from a single failure.
5.3.6.9 Compliance with § 25.1309(b)(1), (b)(4), and (b)(5) together achieves a
balance between the residual risk and latency exposure. For example, in a simple CSL+1 condition, the residual risk would need to be on the order of 1 x 10-6 per flight hour (or better) when the latency is 1/1000 to satisfy the requirement is extremely improbable (1 x 10-9 per flight hour). Conversely, if the failure rate of the residual component is 1 x 10-5 per flight hour, then latency is limited to a probability of 1 x 10-4. Appendix D of this AC gives a more comprehensive example of how an applicant may conduct limit latency and residual risk analysis to show compliance with § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii).
5.3.6.10 Although exposure to latency time is normally expressed in terms of flight
hours, if the relevant failures depend on flight cycles, then their exposure times should be evaluated in terms of flight cycles when showing compliance. (See paragraph 7.6.1.4.)
5.4 Compliance with § 25.1309(c). › 5.4.3 In the case of airplane conditions requiring immediate flightcrew…
5.4 Compliance with § 25.1309(c).
5.4.1 Section 25.1309(c) requires that information concerning unsafe system operating conditions be provided to the flightcrew to enable them to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner, thereby mitigating the effects of the condition to an acceptable level. Any system operating condition that, if not detected and properly accommodated by flightcrew action, would significantly contribute to, or result in, a hazardous or catastrophic condition, should be considered an unsafe system operating condition. Compliance with this requirement usually relies on the analysis identified in paragraph 5.3.1 of this AC, which also includes consideration of crew alerting cues, required corrective action, and the capability of detecting faults. Section 25.1309(c) further requires that the applicant design the systems and controls, including indication and annunciation, to minimize crew errors that could create additional hazards (in compliance with § 25.1302). The required information may be provided by an indication and/or annunciation whose forms and functions meet the requirements of § 25.1322 or may be provided by other dedicated means of information,2 or may be made apparent by the inherent airplane responses. The required information also depends on the degree of urgency for recognition and corrective action by the crew.
5.4.2 When a system provides failure monitoring and indication, the system reliability should be compatible with the safety objectives associated with the system function for which it provides that indication. For example, if the effects of having a system failure and not annunciating that failure are catastrophic, the combination of the system failure with the failure of its annunciation must be extremely improbable. The loss of annunciation should be considered a failure condition in and of itself, due to its impact on the ability of the flightcrew to cope with the subject failure. The subject failure condition should be classified as major unless the applicant can show otherwise. In addition, the applicant should assess unwanted operation (for example, nuisance alerts). The failure monitoring and indication should be reliable, technologically feasible, and economically practicable. Reliable failure monitoring and indication should use current state-of-the-art technology to maximize the probability of detecting and indicating genuine failures, while minimizing the probability of falsely detecting and indicating non-existent failures. Any indication to the flightcrew should be timely, obvious, clear, and unambiguous.
5.4.3 In the case of airplane conditions requiring immediate flightcrew action, a suitable warning indication must be provided to the flightcrew in accordance with § 25.1322, if not provided by inherent airplane characteristics (for example, buffeting). In either case, any warning should be rousing and should occur at a point in a potentially catastrophic sequence where the airplane’s capability and the flightcrew’s ability still remain sufficient for effective crew action to prevent the catastrophic outcome. For
2 The terms alert, annunciation and indication are used interchangeably throughout this AC. These terms have been defined and used in different ways, and their definitions may change in the future. Refer to AC 25.1322 and other relevant ACs for the definitions of these terms and their specific application.
Chapter 5. Compliance with § 25.1309 › 5.5 Compliance with § 25.1309(e).
other cases that require a flight crew alert, refer to § 25.1322 and other applicable system regulations.
5.4.4 Procedures for the flightcrew to follow after the occurrence of failures must be described in the FAA-approved AFM in accordance with §§ 25.1581 and 25.1585, or AFM revision or supplement.
5.4.5 To meet § 25.1309(c), even if operation or performance is unaffected or insignificantly affected at the time of failure, the applicant should ensure that the design provides any information necessary for the flightcrew to take any action or observe any precautions. Examples include reconfiguring a system, flightcrew awareness of a reduction in safety margins if flightcrew action is necessary, changing the flight plan or regime, making an unscheduled landing to reduce exposure to a more severe failure condition that would result from subsequent failures, or operational or environmental conditions. The applicant should also ensure that the design provides any information concerning unsafe system operating conditions if a failure must be corrected before a subsequent flight. Information and alerting indications may be inhibited during specific phases of flight where awareness or corrective action by the crew is considered more hazardous than no awareness or corrective action; for example, during critical flight phases like takeoff, or if operation or performance is unaffected or insignificantly affected.
5.4.6 The use of periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks to detect SLFs after they occur is undesirable and should not be used in place of practical and reliable failure monitoring and indications. Where such monitoring and indications cannot be accomplished, see paragraph 5.3.6 of this AC for guidance. Chapter 8 of this AC provides further guidance on the use of periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks. Comparison with similar, previously approved systems is sometimes helpful. However, if a new design solution allows practical and reliable failure monitoring and indications, this should be preferred in lieu of periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks.
5.4.7 Applicants should give particular attention to the placement of switches or other control devices, relative to one another, to minimize the potential for inadvertent incorrect flightcrew action, especially during emergencies or periods of high workload. Extra protection, such as the use of guarded switches, may sometimes be needed. See AC 25.1302-1 and other relevant ACs for additional guidance on these and other design attributes related to the avoidance and management of flightcrew error.
5.5 Compliance with § 25.1309(e). Section 25.1309(e) requires that certification maintenance requirements be established, as necessary, to prevent development of failure conditions described in § 25.1309(b), and that these requirements be included in the Airworthiness Limitations section (ALS) of the ICA required by § 25.1529. See chapter 8 of this AC for detailed guidance on establishing the required scheduled maintenance tasks. Once these tasks are established, they must be included in the ALS in accordance with paragraph (a)(6) of section H25.4 to appendix H, part 25.
6.1 Identification of Failure Conditions. › 6.1.3 By Considering Failures at the Equipment Level.
CHAPTER 6. IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE CONDITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
WHEN ASSESSING THEIR EFFECTS
6.1 Identification of Failure Conditions. In order to identify the failure conditions regulated by § 25.1309, applicants should consider the potential effects of failures on the airplane and occupants. The applicant may also need to consider failure conditions that could present threats to persons on the ground, such as ground crew, or adjacent to the airplane during ground operations. Threats include electric shock threats to mechanics, atmospheric events, unwanted door or thrust reverser movement, and other similar situations. These should be considered from the following perspectives:
6.1.1 By Considering Failures of Functions at the Airplane Level. Failure conditions identified at this level are not dependent on the way the functions are implemented and the systems’ architectures.
6.1.2 By Considering Failures of Functions at the System Level. These failure conditions are identified through examination of the way the functions are implemented and the systems’ architectures. Part of this examination is a systematic method, such as failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), to look for failures within the systems’ architectures that could result in their loss or partial loss, or malfunctions that are not limited by the failure condition evaluations (for example, to discover system behaviors that have unintended safety consequences when those systems fail).
Note: The analysis of complex, highly integrated systems, in particular, should be conducted in a methodical and structured manner to ensure all significant failure conditions that arise from multiple failures and combinations of failure conditions are properly identified and accounted for. The relevant combinations of failures and failure conditions should be determined by the whole safety assessment process that encompasses the airplane and system-level functional hazard assessments (FHAs), Particular Risk (PRA), Zonal Safety (ZSA), and Common Mode (CMA) analyses. The overall effect on the airplane due to a combination of individual system failure conditions occurring as a result of a common or cascade failure may be more severe than the effect of each individual system failure. For example, failure conditions classified individually as minor or major may have hazardous or catastrophic effects at the airplane level when considered in combination.
6.1.3 By Considering Failures at the Equipment Level. These failures may not affect a system’s functionality, but they could compromise safe operations or injure persons. These may include individual equipment with intrinsic hazards such as energy supply devices, chemical storage containers, or pressure storage bottles that are part of a system. The analysis should address the equipment’s normal operating conditions and failure conditions that could endanger the airplane or its occupants. Examples of intrinsic hazards to be evaluated include, but are not limited to, fires; explosions; release of toxic gases or fluids corrosive to surrounding structures;
6.2 Identification of Failure Conditions Using a Functional Hazard… › 6.2.4 Depending on the relationship between functions and the systems…
and thermal runaway or excessive temperatures that could damage adjacent structures or systems.
Note: Identify any necessary mitigation means including, but not limited to, containment of resultant effects; pressure and temperature relief including venting provisions, if present; and indication or fault annunciation, where applicable. The testing necessary to verify the mitigation effectiveness is equally significant and should also be determined.
6.2 Identification of Failure Conditions Using a Functional Hazard Assessment.
6.2.1 Before an applicant proceeds with a detailed safety assessment, an FHA of the airplane and system functions to determine the need for, and scope of, subsequent analysis should be prepared. This assessment may be conducted using service experience; engineering and operational judgment; and/or a top-down deductive qualitative examination of each function. An FHA is a systematic, comprehensive examination of airplane and system functions to identify potential no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic failure conditions that may arise as a result of malfunctions or failures to function as intended. The assessment should take into consideration normal system responses to unusual and abnormal external factors. The assessment involves the operational vulnerabilities of systems rather than a detailed analysis of the actual implementation.
6.2.2 Each system function should be examined with respect to the other functions performed by the system, because the loss or malfunction of multiple functions performed by the system could result in a more severe failure condition than the failure of a single function. In addition, each system function should be examined with respect to functions performed by other airplane systems because the loss or malfunction of different but related functions, provided by separate systems, may affect the severity of failure conditions postulated for a particular system.
6.2.3 The FHA should be performed early in the design of the project and updated as necessary as the design develops. It is used to define the airplane-level or system-level safety objectives that must be considered in the proposed airplane or system architectures. Some systems may need only a simple review of the system design to determine the hazard classification. The FHA should also be used to determine the function development assurance levels. An FHA requires experienced engineering judgment to ensure completeness of failure condition identification, and early coordination between the applicant and certification authority.
6.2.4 Depending on the relationship between functions and the systems that perform them, different approaches to an FHA may be taken. Where there is a clear correlation between functions and systems, and where interactions are relatively simple, it may be feasible to conduct separate FHAs for each system, provided that any interface aspects are properly considered and are easily understood. However, where systems and functional relationships are complex or integrated, a top-down approach, from an airplane-level perspective, should be considered when planning and conducting FHAs.
6.3.2 The applicant should evaluate the severity of failure conditions… › 6.3.2.4 Risks to persons other than airplane occupants (such as ground…
With increasing integrated system architectures, this traditional top-down approach should be performed in conjunction with common-cause considerations (e.g., common resources) in order to adequately address the cases where one system contributes to multiple airplane-level functions.
6.3 Considerations when Assessing Failure Condition Effects.
6.3.1 The requirements of § 25.1309(b) are intended to ensure an orderly and thorough evaluation of the effects on safety of foreseeable failures or other external events, separately or in combination, involving one or more system functions. The interactions of these factors within a system and among relevant systems should be considered. In assessing the effects of a failure condition, factors that might alleviate or intensify the direct effects of the initial failure condition should be considered. Some of these factors include consequent or related conditions existing within the airplane that might affect the flightcrew’s ability to deal with direct effects, such as the presence of smoke, acceleration effects, interruption of communication, interference with cabin pressurization, and so forth. When assessing the consequences of a given failure condition, the applicant should consider the failure information provided, the complexity of the flightcrew action, and the relevant crew training. The number of overall failure conditions may influence the expected flightcrew performance. Training recommendations may need to be identified in some cases.
6.3.2 The applicant should evaluate the severity of failure conditions according to the following:
6.3.2.1 Effects on the airplane, such as reductions in safety margins, degradation
in performance, loss of capability to conduct certain flight operations, reduction in environmental protection, or potential or consequential effects on structural integrity. When the effects of a failure condition are complex, the hazard classification may need to be validated by tests, simulation, or other appropriate analytical techniques.
6.3.2.2 Effects on the flightcrew, such as increases above their normal workload
that would affect their ability to cope with adverse operational or environmental conditions or subsequent failures. Consider any other human factors assumptions made about the flightcrew’s ability to detect, diagnose, and respond appropriately to the failure.
6.3.2.3 Effects on the occupants (passengers and cabin crew).
6.3.2.4 Risks to persons other than airplane occupants (such as ground crew or
maintenance personnel) should be taken into account when assessing systems failure conditions in compliance with § 25.1309. See also the discussion in paragraph 1.2.2.13 of this AC.
6.3.3 The applicant should classify the severity of each effect as no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, or catastrophic. These terms are defined in chapter 3 of this AC (and in § 25.4).
6.3.3 The applicant should classify the severity of each effect as no… › 6.3.3.2 Regardless of the types of assessment used, the classification…
6.3.3.1 The classification of failure conditions does not depend on whether a
system or function is the subject of a specific requirement or regulation. Some required systems, such as transponders, position lights, and public address systems, may have the potential for only minor failure conditions. Conversely, other systems that are not required, such as autoflight systems, may have the potential for major, hazardous, or catastrophic failure conditions.
6.3.3.2 Regardless of the types of assessment used, the classification of failure
conditions should always be accomplished with consideration of all relevant factors, internal and external; for example, system, crew, performance, operational, and environmental. It is particularly important to consider factors that would alleviate or intensify the severity of a failure condition. Where flight duration, flight phase, or maximum length diversion time can adversely affect the FHA outcome, they must be considered as intensifying factors. Other intensifying factors include conditions (not related to the failure, such as weather or adverse operational or environmental conditions), which reduce the capability of the airplane, or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with a failure condition. An example of an alleviating factor is the continued performance of identical or operationally similar functions by other systems not affected by the failure condition. Another example of an alleviating factor is the flightcrew’s ability to recognize the failure condition and take action to temper its effects.
(Note that such flightcrew action can in some cases be used to alleviate a failure condition, but it should not be used in lieu of appropriate system design, integrity, and availability requirements. Whenever this is taken into account, attention to the detection means should be given to ensure the flightcrew’s ability (including physical and timeliness) to detect and take corrective action is sufficient. To correlate with the flightcrew’s annunciation requirements in § 25.1309(c), consider the case of the flightcrew taking action and also the effects if they do not act or their response is delayed. If their inaction or delayed response results in a severe effect, it may be considered an unsafe system operating condition that carries certain considerations for flightcrew annunciations and evaluation of flightcrew responses. If flightcrew action is used to alleviate the effects of a failure condition, the associated information provided to the flightcrew should comply with § 25.1309(c). See paragraph 5.4 of this AC for more detailed guidance on those considerations.
Combinations of intensifying or alleviating factors only need to be considered if they are anticipated to occur together.
6.3.3.3 For hazardous conditions that result in a large reduction in safety margins
or functional capabilities, or excessive flightcrew workload, the applicant should show that the remaining capabilities of the airplane and flightcrew will be sufficient to ensure the condition does not become catastrophic.
7.3 Single Failure Considerations. › 7.3.1 According to the requirements of § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii), a…
CHAPTER 7. ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITION PROBABILITIES AND
ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
7.1 General. After the applicant has identified the failure conditions and assessed the severity of the effects of failure conditions, it is the applicant’s responsibility to determine how to show compliance with § 25.1309(b) and obtain a finding of compliance from the FAA. An applicant may use appropriate combinations of one or more of the following methods to show compliance: design and installation reviews, analyses, flight tests, ground tests, simulator tests, or other approved means.
7.2 Assessment of Failure Condition Probabilities.
7.2.1 The probability that a failure condition would occur may be assessed as probable, remote, extremely remote, or extremely improbable. These terms are defined in chapter 3 of this AC (and in § 25.4). Each failure condition should have a probability that is inversely related to the severity of its effects as described in chapter 4 of this AC.
7.2.2 When a system provides protection from events (for example, cargo compartment fire, gusts), its reliability should be compatible with the safety objectives necessary for the failure condition and be associated with the failure of the protection system and the probability of the events. (See additional guidance in paragraph 7.8 and appendix E of this AC.)
7.2.3 An assessment to identify and classify failure conditions is necessarily qualitative. On the other hand, an assessment of the probability of a failure condition may be either qualitative or quantitative. An analysis may range from a report that interprets applicable service data or compares two similar systems to a detailed analysis that may or may not include estimated numerical probabilities. The depth and scope of an analysis depends on the types of functions performed by the system, the severity of failure conditions, and whether the system is complex. Paragraph 7.5, Depth of Analysis, provides more guidance on using a combination of qualitative and quantitative probability assessments of failure conditions.
7.3 Single Failure Considerations.
7.3.1 According to the requirements of § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii), a catastrophic failure condition must not result from the failure of a single component, part, or element of a system. To preclude catastrophic failure conditions, the system design should provide failure containment that limits the propagation of the effects of any single failure. In addition, there must be no common cause failure that could affect both the single component, part, or element, and its failure containment provisions. A single failure includes any set of failures that cannot be shown to be independent from each other. Because errors may cause failures, the implications of errors in requirement specification, design, implementation, installation, flightcrew or ground crew operations, maintenance, and
Chapter 7. › 7.4 Common Cause Failure Considerations.
manufacturing that could result in common mode failures should be assessed. Appendix B of this AC and SAE ARP 4761 describe types of analysis methods that may be conducted to identify and minimize common mode failures and document that adequate independence exists between multiple failures. Failure containment techniques available to establish independence may include partitioning, separation, and isolation. It should be noted that only the dominant modes of failure are typically identified and evaluated in a bottom-up component FMEA. For example, the dominant mode “loss of command signal” may be caused by one or more failures of components that produce, process, or transmit the command signal. However, identifying only the dominant failure modes may not be sufficient. To show that no failure mode is anticipated to cause a catastrophic event, consideration of less-obvious failure modes may be required. The information available from top-down analyses, such as the fault tree analysis, can help focus the single failure analysis onto areas of the design where an obscure failure mode might be able to violate an otherwise fail-safe design. (One example of an obscure failure mode is intermittent shorting in the monitored signal’s path that allows it to defeat the monitor coverage.)
7.3.2 While single failures must normally be assumed to occur, there are cases where it is obvious that, from a realistic and practical viewpoint, any knowledgeable, experienced person would unequivocally conclude that a failure mode simply would not occur, unless it is associated with a wholly unrelated failure condition that would itself be catastrophic. These types of failures may be considered as not foreseeable. Once identified and accepted, such cases need not be considered failures in the context of § 25.1309. Probabilistic methods may not be used in making this assessment.
7.4 Common Cause Failure Considerations. An analysis should consider the application of the fail-safe design concept described in paragraph 2.2 of this AC. The analysis should also give special attention to ensuring the effective use of design and installation techniques that would prevent single failures or other events from damaging or otherwise adversely affecting more than one redundant system channel, more than one system performing operationally similar functions, or any system and an associated safeguard.
When considering such common cause failures or other events, consequential or cascading effects should be taken into account. Cascading effects are the set of effects resulting from the propagation of an initiating condition (e.g., a failure or initiating event).
Some examples of potential sources of common cause failures or other events would include the following:
• Rapid release of energy from concentrated sources, such as uncontained failures of rotating parts (other than engines and propellers) or pressure vessels,
• Pressure differentials,
• Non-catastrophic structural failures,
• Loss of environmental conditioning,
• Disconnection of more than one subsystem or component by overtemperature protection devices,
• Contamination by fluids,
• Damage from localized fires,
• Loss of power supply or return (for example, mechanical damage or deterioration of connections),
7.5 Depth of Analysis. › 7.5.2 Minor Failure Conditions.
• Failure of sensors that provide data to multiple systems,
• Excessive voltage,
• Physical or environmental interactions among parts,
• Requirements, design, implementation, installation, flightcrew or ground crew operations, maintenance, and manufacturing errors, or
• Events external to the system or to the airplane.
7.5 Depth of Analysis. The following identifies the depth of analysis expected based on the classification of a failure condition. In all cases discussed below, the applicant should consider the combinations of failure condition effects, as noted in chapter 6 of this AC.
7.5.1 No Safety Effect Failure Conditions. An FHA with a design and installation appraisal to establish independence from other functions is necessary for the safety assessment of these failure conditions. If it is apparent that an FHA is not necessary for a simple function (for example, the loss of an in-flight entertainment function) and the applicant chooses not to do an FHA, then the safety effects may be derived from the design and installation appraisal performed by the applicant.
7.5.2 Minor Failure Conditions. An FHA with a design and installation appraisal to establish independence from other functions is necessary for the safety assessment of these failure conditions. If the applicant chooses not to do an FHA, then the safety effects may be derived from the design and installation appraisal performed by the applicant. The applicant should document the result of the appraisal. If system complexity or integration is such that a design or installation appraisal alone cannot establish such isolation or functional independence, then more formal methods as described in SAE ARP 4754/4761 should be applied.
7.5.4 Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions. › 7.5.4.2 For very simple and conventional installations—that is, low…
7.5.3 Major Failure Conditions. Major failure conditions must be remote, per § 25.1309(b)(3).
7.5.3.1 If the system is similar in its relevant attributes to those used in other
airplanes and the effects of failure would be the same, then design and installation appraisals (as described in Appendix B of this AC) and satisfactory service history of the equipment being analyzed, or of similar design, is usually acceptable for showing compliance. The applicant should substantiate similarity claims by identifying the differences between the system/equipment being certified and other system/equipment to which similarity is claimed. The applicant should also provide the rationale for why the service history of the other system/equipment is applicable.
7.5.3.2 For systems that are not complex, where similarity cannot be used as the
basis for compliance, then compliance may be shown with a qualitative assessment showing that the system-level major failure conditions of the system, as installed, are consistent with the FHA and are remote (for example, redundant systems).
7.5.3.3 For complex systems without redundancy, compliance may be shown as in
paragraph 7.5.3.2 above. To show that malfunctions are remote in systems of high complexity without redundancy (for example, a system with a self-monitoring microprocessor), it is sometimes necessary to conduct a qualitative functional FMEA supported by failure rate data and fault detection coverage analysis.
7.5.3.4 An analysis of a redundant system is usually complete if it shows isolation
between redundant system channels and satisfactory reliability for each channel. For complex systems where functional redundancy is required, a qualitative FMEA and qualitative fault tree analysis may be necessary to determine whether redundancy actually exists (for example, no single failure affects all functional channels).
7.5.4 Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions. Hazardous failure conditions must be extremely remote, per § 25.1309(b)(2), and catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable, per § 25.1309(b)(1).
7.5.4.1 Except as specified in paragraph 7.5.4.2 below, a detailed safety analysis
is necessary for each hazardous and catastrophic failure condition identified by the FHA. The analysis is usually a combination of qualitative and quantitative assessment of the design.
7.5.4.2 For very simple and conventional installations—that is, low complexity
and similarity in relevant attributes—it may be possible to assess a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition as extremely remote or
7.6.1 The average probability per flight hour is the probability of… › 7.6.1.5 The total exposure time if the failure can persist for multiple…
extremely improbable, respectively, based on experienced engineering judgment using only qualitative analysis. The basis for the assessment is the degree of redundancy, the established independence, isolation of the channels, and the reliability record of the technology involved. Satisfactory service experience on similar systems commonly used in many airplanes may be sufficient when a close similarity is established in respect to both the system design and operating conditions.
7.5.4.3 For complex systems where true similarity in all relevant attributes,
including installation attributes, can be rigorously established, it may also be possible to assess a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition as extremely remote or extremely improbable, respectively, based on experienced engineering judgment using only qualitative analysis. A high degree of similarity in both design and application is required to be substantiated. Further, the applicant must be able to demonstrate that the baseline design complies. This typically requires that the applicant has access to all the type design data for the baseline against which the comparison is being made.
7.6 Calculation of Average Probability per Flight Hour (Quantitative Analysis).
7.6.1 The average probability per flight hour is the probability of occurrence, normalized by the flight time, of a failure condition during a flight representing the average “at risk” time of the overall possible flights of the airplane fleet to be certified. The calculation of the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition should consider all of the following:
7.6.1.1 The average flight duration and average flight profile for the airplane type
to be certified. Note that this assumption may be affected when showing compliance with section K25.1 ETOPS requirements.
7.6.1.2 All combinations of failures and events that contribute to the failure
condition.
7.6.1.3 The conditional probability if a sequence of events is necessary to produce
the failure condition.
7.6.1.4 The relevant “at risk” time if a failure condition or event is only relevant
during certain flight phases. If the failure condition occurs during specific flight operations or certain flight phases, it should meet the average risk criteria under those specific conditions rather than allowing the risk to be averaged out over a flight of mean duration. In these cases, the probability requirement is applied as a probability per flight or per flight cycle. To convert to per flight hour, divide the per flight probability by one hour.
7.6.1.5 The total exposure time if the failure can persist for multiple flights.
7.7.1 Both physical and functional interconnections between systems… › 7.7.1.3 The potential for common cause failures and cascading failure…
7.6.2 The details of how to calculate the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition are given in appendix F of this AC and in SAE ARP 4761.
7.6.3 If the probability of a subject failure condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration for the airplane type divided by the flight’s mean duration in hours is likely to be significantly different from the predicted average rate of occurrence of that failure condition during the entire operational life of all airplanes of that type, then a better model of the flight of average risk must be used. For example, the loss of consumable material (for example, fluid leakage) may become a critical failure condition for a flight that is longer than the flight of mean duration.
7.6.4 For various reasons, component failure rate data are not typically precise enough to enable accurate estimates of the probabilities of failure conditions. This results in some degree of uncertainty, as indicated by the wide line in figure 4-1 of this AC, and the expression “on the order of” in the descriptions of the quantitative probability terms that are provided above. (See paragraph 3.3 of this AC.) When calculating the estimated probability of each failure condition, this uncertainty should be accounted for in a conservative way that does not compromise safety.
7.7 Integrated Systems.
7.7.1 Both physical and functional interconnections between systems have been a feature of airplane design for many years. Section 25.1309(b) accounts for this in requiring systems to be considered in relation to other systems. Provided the interfaces between systems are relatively few and simple, and hence readily understandable, compliance may often be shown through a series of system safety assessments (SSA). Each SSA deals with a particular failure condition (or more likely a group of failure conditions) associated with a system and, where necessary, accounts for failures arising at the interface with other systems. However, where the systems and their interfaces become more complex and extensive, the task of showing compliance may become more complex. It is therefore essential that the means of compliance are considered early in the design phase to ensure that the design can be supported by a viable safety assessment strategy. Aspects of the guidance material that should be given particular consideration are as follows:
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