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Advisory Circular Current Issued Nov 17, 2011 ACE-100 370 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 23-17C Systems and Equipment Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes and Airships

This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means of showing compliance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), part 23, for the certification of systems and equipment in normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes and airships. The policy in this AC is considered applicable for airship projects; however, the certifying office should only use specific applicability and requirements if they are determined to be reasonable, applicable and relevant to the airship project. This AC applies to Subpart D from § 23.671 and Subpart F. This AC both consolidates existing policy documents, and certain ACs that cover specific paragraphs of the regulations, into a single document and adds new guidance. This document is intended to provide guidance for the original issue of part 23 and the various amendments through Amendment 23-62. This version of the AC covers policy available through December 31, 2007, Policy that became available after December 31, 2007, will be consolidated in future revisions to the AC.

Official source ↗ Open PDF

0 Advisory U.S. Department of Transportation Circular Federal Aviation

Administration

Subject: SYSTEMS AND Date: 11/.17/2011 AC No: 23-17C EQUIPMENT GUIDE FOR Initiated by: ACE-100 CERTIFICATION OF PART 23 AIRPLANES AND AIRSIDPS

This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means of showing compliance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), part 23, for the certification of systems and equipment in normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes and airships. The policy in this AC is considered applicable for airship projects; however, the certifying office should only use specific applicability and requirements if they are determined to be reasonable, applicable and relevant to the airship project. This AC applies to Subpart D from§ 23.671 and Subpart F. This AC both consolidates existing policy documents, and certain A Cs that cover specific paragraphs of the regulations, into a single document and adds new guidance.

This document is intended to provide guidance for the original issue ofpart 23 and the various amendments through Amendment 23-62,. This version of the AC covers policy available through December 31, 2007. Policy that became available after December 31, 2007, will be consolidated in future revisions to the AC.

fo{2..Earl Lawrence

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraph Page No.

Introduction … 1

1. Purpose … 1

2. Applicability … 1

3. Cancellation or Superseding … 1

4. Background … 2

5. Paragraphs Keyed To Part 23 … 2

6. Related Publications … 2

7. Related 14 CFR, Part 23 Regulations … 7

Chapter 1 – Subpart D-Design and Construction … 11

Section 1. Control Systems … 11

23.671 General … 11

23.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems … 12

23.673 Primary flight controls … 13

23.675 Stops … 14

23.677 Trim systems … 15

23.679 Control system locks … 18

23.681 Limit load static tests … 20

23.683 Operation tests … 21

23.685 Control system details … 29

23.687 Spring devices … 30

23.689 Cable systems … 31

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paragraph Page No.

23.691 Artificial stall barrier system … 32

23.693 Joints … 34

23.697 Wing flap controls … 35

23.699 Wing flap position indicator … 36

23.701 Flap interconnection … 37

23.703 Takeoff warning system … 42

Section 2. Landing Gear … 43

23.721 General … 43

23.723 Shock absorption tests … 44

23.725 Limit drop tests … 45

23.726 Ground load dynamic tests … 46

23.727 Reserve energy absorption drop test … 47

23.729 Landing gear extension and retraction system … 48

23.731 Wheels … 52

23.733 Tires … 53

23.735 Brakes … 64

23.737 Skis … 81

23.745 Nose/tail wheel steering … 82

Section 3. Floats and Hulls … 83

23.751 Main float buoyancy … 83

23.753 Main float design … 84

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paragraph Page No.

23.755 Hulls … 85

23.757 Auxiliary floats … 86

Section 4. Personnel and Cargo Accommodations … 87

23.771 Pilot compartment … 87

23.773 Pilot compartment view … 88

23.775 Windshields and windows … 90

23.777 Cockpit controls … 93

23.779 Motion and effect of cockpit controls … 96

23.781 Cockpit control knob shape … 97

23.783 Doors … 98

23.785 Seats, berths, litters, safety belts, and shoulder harnesses … 101

23.787 Baggage and cargo compartments … 113

23.791 Passenger information signs … 117

23.803 Emergency evacuation … 118

23.805 Flight crew emergency exits … 119

23.807 Emergency exits … 120

23.811 Emergency exit marking … 130

23.812 Emergency lighting … 132

23.813 Emergency exit access … 133

23.815 Width of aisle … 134

23.831 Ventilation … 135

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paragraph Page No.

Section 5. Pressurization … 139

23.841 Pressurized cabins … 139

23.843 Pressurization tests … 146

Section 6. Fire Protection … 147

23.851 Fire extinguishers … 147

23.853 Passenger and crew compartment interiors … 148

23.855 Cargo and baggage compartment fire protection … 155

23.856 Thermal/Acoustic insulation materials … 157

23.859 Combustion heater fire protection … 159

23.863 Flammable fluid fire protection … 160

23.865 Fire protection of flight controls, engine mounts, and other flight structure … 161

Section 7. Electrical Bonding and Lightning Protection … 164

23.867 Electrical bonding and protection against lightning and static electricity … 164

Section 8. Miscellaneous … 167

23.871 Leveling means … 167

Chapter 2 – Subpart F—Equipment … 168

Section 1. General … 168

23.1301 Function and installation … 168

23.1303 Flight and navigation instruments … 179

23.1305 Powerplant instruments … 186

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paragraph Page No.

23.1307 Miscellaneous equipment … 201

23.1308 High-intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection … 202

23.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations … 206

23.1310 Power source capacity and distribution … 223

Section 2. Instruments: Installation … 224

23.1311 Electronic display instrument systems … 224

23.1321 Arrangement and visibility … 230

23.1322 Warning, caution, and advisory lights … 233

23.1323 Airspeed indicating system … 235

23.1325 Static pressure system … 239

23.1326 Pitot heat indication systems … 244

23.1327 Magnetic direction indicator … 247

23.1329 Automatic pilot system … 250

23.1331 Instruments using a power source … 263

23.1335 Flight director systems … 268

23.1337 Powerplant instruments installation … 269

Section 3. Electrical Systems And Equipment … 272

23.1351 General … 272

23.1353 Storage battery design and installation … 276

23.1357 Circuit protective devices … 282

23.1359 Electrical system fire protection … 287

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paragraph Page No.

23.1361 Master switch arrangement … 288

23.1365 Electric cables and equipment … 290

23.1367 Switches … 292

Section 4. Lights … 293

23.1381 Instrument lights … 293

23.1383 Taxi and landing lights … 294

23.1385 Position light system installation … 299

23.1387 Position light system dihedral angles … 301

23.1389 Position light distribution and intensities … 303

23.1391 Minimum intensities in the horizontal plane of position lights … 304

23.1393 Minimum intensities in any vertical plane of position lights … 305

23.1395 Maximum intensities in overlapping beams of position lights … 306

23.1397 Color specifications … 307

23.1399 Riding light … 308

23.1401 Anticollision light system … 309

Section 5. Safety Equipment … 313

23.1411 General … 313

23.1413 Safety Belts and Harnesses [Removed] … 314

23.1415 Ditching equipment … 315

23.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system … 316

23.1419 Ice protection … 317

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paragraph Page No.

Section 6. Miscellaneous Equipment … 318

23.1431 Electronic equipment … 318

23.1435 Hydraulic systems … 322

23.1437 Accessories for multiengine airplanes … 324

23.1438 Pressurization and pneumatic systems … 325

23.1441 Oxygen equipment and supply … 327

23.1443 Minimum mass flow of supplemental oxygen … 331

23.1445 Oxygen distribution system … 334

23.1447 Equipment standards for oxygen dispensing units … 335

23.1449 Means for determining use of oxygen … 339

23.1450 Chemical oxygen generators … 340

23.1451 Fire protection for oxygen equipment … 341

23.1453 Protection of oxygen equipment from rupture … 342

23.1457 Cockpit voice recorders … 343

23.1459 Flight recorders … 354

23.1461 Equipment containing high energy rotors … 361

viii

Introduction

1. Purpose. This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means, but not the only means, of showing compliance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), part 23, for the certification of systems and equipment in normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes and airships. The policy in this AC is considered applicable for airship projects; however, the certifying office should only use specific applicability and requirements if they are determined to be reasonable, applicable and relevant to the airship project. This AC applies to Subpart D from § 23.671 and Subpart F. This AC both consolidates existing policy documents, and certain ACs that cover specific paragraphs of the regulations, into a single document and adds new guidance. Material in this AC is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. Preamble materials are excerpts from Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs) and final rules. The relevant NPRMs and final rules are the official sources.

2. Applicability. This AC is applicable only to the original applicant seeking issuance of a type certificate (TC), an amended type certificate (ATC), a supplemental type certificate (STC), or a parts manufacturer approval (PMA) for the initial approval of the new type design or a change in the approved type design. This material is not to be construed as having any legal status and should be treated accordingly. This version of the AC covers policy available through December 31, 2007. Policy that became available after then will be covered in future revisions to the AC.

3. Cancellation. The following AC is canceled and the policy statements are superseded as follows:

a. AC 23-17B, “Systems and Equipment Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes and Airships,” April 12, 2005.

b. PS-ACE100-2002-005, “Circuit Breakers and Fuses,” February 23, 2004.

c. PS-ACE100-2002-007, “Pitot Heat Indication Systems,” August 5, 2004.

d. PS-ACE100-2004-10023, “Flammability of Electrical Wire Used in Part 23 Aircraft per 14 CFR, part 23, §§ 23.853 and 23.1359,” July 9, 2004.

e. PS-ACE100-2005-10039, “Standardization and Clarification of Application of 14 CFR Part 23, §§ 23.1301 and 23.1309, Regarding Environmental Qualification,” February 16, 2006.

f. PS-ACE100-2006-001, “14 CFR Part 23 §§ 23.1383 through 23.1395, and 23.1401, Installation of Non-Required Lights in Part 23 Aircraft and Airships,” July 24, 2007.

g. PS-ACE100-2007-002; “14 CFR Part 23, §§ 23.853, 23.855, 23.863 and 23.1359, Flammability of MIL-C-17/60, /93, /94, /113, /127, and /128 Coaxial Cable,” October 15, 2007.

4. Background. In 1968, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began an extensive review of the airworthiness standards of part 23. Since then, the regulations have been amended

through amendment 23-62. These amendments have changed most of the sections of part 23. This document is intended to provide guidance for the original issue of part 23 and the various amendments.

NOTE: Amendment 23-56 refers to an NPRM for Cockpit Voice Recorders and Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) that has not been issued as a final rule (Docket Number FAA­ 2005- 20245). This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was issued as a final rule as Amendment 23-58.

5. Paragraphs Keyed To Part 23. Each paragraph has the applicable part 23 amendments shown in the title. As part 23 changes occur, the appropriate revisions will be made to the affected paragraphs of this AC.

6. Related Publications. These documents are provided as a quick reference source of documents that are acceptable for use in 14 CFR, part 23 certification programs/projects.

a. Copies of the latest versions of the following publications of the following are also available on http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/ in addition to http://rgl.faa.gov/.

(1) PS-ACE100-2001-004, “Guidance for Reviewing Certification Plans to Address Human Factors for Certification of Part 23 Small Airplanes”, August 29, 2002.

(2) PS-ACE100-2002-004, “Diesel Engine Installation,” May 22, 2003.

(3) PS-ANM100-2001-00078, “Guidance on Use of Previously Approved Compliance Data from Foreign Sources,” September 13, 2001.

(4) FAA Order 8110.4C, Change 3, “Type Certification,” March 15, 2010.

(5) FAA Order 8100.5A, “Aircraft Certification Service Mission, Responsibilities, Relationship and Programs,” September 30, 2003.

(6) FAA Order 8110.42C, “Parts Manufacturer Approval Procedures,” June 30, 2008.

(7) AC 20-30B, “Aircraft Position Light and Anticollision Light Installations,” July 20, 1981.

(8) AC 20-41A, “Substitute Technical Standard Order (TSO) Aircraft Equipment,” April 5, 1977.

(9) AC 20-42D, “Hand Fire Extinguishers for Use in Aircraft,” January 14, 2011.

(10) AC 20-67B, “Airborne VHF Communications Equipment Installations,” January 16, 1986. (11) AC 20-73A, “Aircraft Ice Protection,” August 16, 2006.

(12) AC 20-112, “Airworthiness and Operational Approval of Airborne Systems to be Used in Lieu of a Ground Proximity Warning System(s) (GPWS),” February 19, 1981.

(13) AC 20-115B, “Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautic, Inc., Document RTCA/DO-178B,” January 11, 1993.

(14) AC 20-118A, “Emergency Evacuation Demonstration,” March 9, 1989.

(15) AC 20-124, “Water Ingestion Testing for Turbine Powered Airplanes,” September 30, 1985.

(14) AC 20-128A, “Design Considerations for Minimizing Hazards Caused by Uncontained Turbine Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit Rotor Failure,” March 25, 1997.

(15) AC 20-131A, “Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) and Mode S Transponders,” March 29, 1993.

(16) AC 20-136A, “Protection of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems Against the Indirect Effects of Lightning,” December 21, 2006.

(17) AC 20-138B, “Airworthiness Approval of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Equipment,” September 27, 2010.

(18) AC 20-146, “Methodology for Dynamic Seat Certification by Analysis for Use in Part 23, 25, 27, and 29 Airplanes and Rotorcraft,” May 19, 2003.

(19) AC 20-155, “SAE Documents to Support Aircraft Lightning Protection Certification,” April 28, 2006.

(20) AC 20-156, “Aviation Databus Assurance,” August 4, 2006.

(21) AC 20-158, “The Certification of Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Systems for Operation in the High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Environment,” July 30, 2007.

(22) AC 21-4B, “Special Flight Permits for Operation of Overweight Aircraft,” July 30, 1969.

(23) AC 21-25A, “Approval of Modified Seating Systems Initially Approved Under a Technical Standard Order,” June 3, 1997.

(24) AC 21-34, “Shoulder Harness-Safety Belt Installations,” June 4, 1993.

(25) AC 23-2A, “Flammability Tests,” May 11, 2007.

(26) AC 23-18, “Installation of Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Approved for Part 23 Airplanes,” April 30, 2007.

(27) AC 23-19A, “Airframe Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes,” April 30, 2007. (28) AC 23-22, “Guidance for Approved Model List (AML) Supplemental Type Certificated (STC) Approval of Part 23 Airplane Avionics Installations,” January 27, 2005.

(29) AC 23-23, “Standardization Guide for Integrated Cockpits in Part 23 Airplanes,” September 30, 2004.

(30) AC 23-24, “Airworthiness Compliance Checklists for Common Part 23 Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Projects,” August 24, 2005.

(31) AC 23-26, “Synthetic Vision and Pathway Depictions on the Primary Flight Display,” December 22, 2005.

(32) AC 23.562-1, “Dynamic Testing of Part 23 Airplane Seat/Restraint Systems and Occupant Protection,” June 22, 1989.

(33) AC 23.1309-1E, “System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes,” November 17, 2011.

(34) AC 23.1311-1C, “Installation of Electronic Display in Part 23 Airplanes,” November 17, 2011.

(35) AC 23.1419-2D, Change 1, “Certification of Part 23 Airplanes for Flight in Icing Conditions,” June 28, 2007.

(36) AC 25-11A, “Electronic Flight Deck Displays,” June 21, 2007.

(37) AC 90-79, “Recommended Practices and Procedures for the Use of Electronic Long-Range Navigation,” July 14, 1980.

(38) AC 121-13, Change 2, “Self-Contained Navigation Systems (Long Range),” December 21, 1970.

b. Copies of current publications of the following are available on http://rgl.faa.gov/.

(1) AC 20-88A, “Guidelines on the Marking of Aircraft Powerplant Instruments (Displays),” September 30, 1985.

(2) AC 23-16A, “Powerplant Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes and Airships,” February 23, 2004.

(3) AC 23-8C, “Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes,” November 16, 2011.

(4) AC 43.13-1B, Change 1, “Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and PracticesAircraft Inspection and Repair,” September 27, 2001.

(5) AC 43.13-2B, “Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and PracticesAircraft Alterations,” March 3, 2008.

(6) FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2, “Airship Design Criteria,” February 6, 1995.

NOTE: Republishing these documents, as a part of this AC, was not considered to be the best utilization of FAA resources.

c. Obtain a copy of the Technical Standard Order (TSO)s from the internet at http://rgl/faa/gov/.

(1) TSO-C9c, “Automatic Pilots,” September 16, 1960.

(2) TSO-C62e, “Aircraft Tires,” September 29, 2006.

(3) TSO-C22g, “Safety Belts,” March 5, 1993.

(4) TSO-C26d, “Aircraft Wheels, Brakes and Wheel/Brake Assemblies for Parts 23, 27 and 29 Aircraft,” October 14, 2004.

(5) TSO-C39b, “Aircraft Seats and Berths,” April 17, 1989.

(6) TSO-C55a, “Fuel and Oil Quantity Instruments,” June 8, 2007.

(7) TSO-C114, “Torso Restraint Systems,” March 27, 1987.

(8) TSO-C127a, “Rotorcraft, Transport Airplane, and Normal and Utility Airplane Seating Systems,” August 21, 1998.

(9) TSO-C151b, “Terrain Awareness and Warning System,” December 17, 2002.

d. Industry Documents

(1) The RTCA documents listed below are available from RTCA, Inc., Suite 805, 1828 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036:

(a) RTCA/DO-160F, “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment,” December 6, 2007.

(b) RTCA/DO-178B, “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,” December 1, 1992.

(2) The documents listed as follows are available from the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Inc., 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096:

(a) SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP), ARP 597D, “Wheels and Brakes, Supplementary Criteria for Design EnduranceCivil Transport Aircraft,” February 7, 2008. (b) SAE ARP 813B, “Maintainability Recommendations for Aircraft Wheel and Brake Design,” February 1, 1995.

(c) SAE ARP 1619A, “Replacement and Modified Brakes and Wheels,” March 1, 2001.

(d) SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) 1064D, “Braking System Dynamics,” September 26, 2007.

(e) SAE Aerospace Standard AS1145B, “Aircraft Brake Temperature Monitor System (BTMS),” February 1, 1998.

(f) SAE J384, “Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Anchorages-Test Procedure,” June 9, 1994. (g) SAE Recommended Practice, June 2004 SAE Handbook, Volume 2, pages 33.08-33.09.

(h) SAE ARP 5412A, “Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms,” February 21, 2005.

(i) SAE ARP 5414A, “Aircraft Lightning Zoning,” February 16, 2005.

(j) SAE ARP 5415A “Users Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning,” May 14, 2002.

(k) SAE ARP 5416, “Aircraft Lightning Test Methods, “March 17, 2005.”

(l) SAE ARP 5475, “Abuse Load Testing for In-Seat Deployable-Video Systems,” March 1, 2001.

(m) SAE ARP 5577, “Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects Certification,” September 30, 2002.

(3) The Underwriters Laboratories (UL), Inc., document listed below can be obtained from Global Engineering Documents, 15 Inverness Way East, Englewood, CO 80112:

UL 61965, “Mechanical Safety for Cathode Ray Tubes,” August 26, 2009.

(4) General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA). GAMA publication can be purchased from the GAMA web site, http://www.gama.aero/pub:

GAMA publication No. 10, “Recommended Practices and Guidelines for Part 23 Cockpit/Flight Deck Design,” dated September 2000.

(5) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Manual 36, “Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems: Handbook for Design, Operation, and Maintenance”,:Second Edition, January 2007, may be purchased from ASTM online at http://www.astm.org/BOOKSTORE/PUBS/1373.htm.

e. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Documents. EASA Certification Specifications (CS-23/Amdt 1) and guidance materials, Acceptable Means of Compliance, (AMC) Effective February 12, 2009, are available from the EASA website at www.easa.europa.eu/agency-measures/certification-specifications.php.

7. RELATED 14 CFR, PART 23 REGULATIONS.

§ 23.75, Landing distance

§ 23.141, Flight Characteristics-General

§ 23.143, Controllability and Maneuverability-General

§ 23.145, Longitudinal control

§ 23.201, Wings level stall

§ 23.231, Ground and Water Handling Characteristics- Longitudinal stability and control

§ 23.233, Directional stability and control

§ 23.253, High speed characteristics

§ 23.303, Factor of safety

§ 23.305, Strength and deformation

§ 23.307, Proof of structure

§ 23.335, Design airspeeds

§ 23.345, High lift devices

§ 23.351, Yawing conditions

§ 23.365, Pressurized cabin loads

§ 23.395, Control system loads

11/17/2011

§ 23.397, Limit control forces and torques

§ 23.405, Secondary control system

§ 23.473, Ground load conditions and assumptions

§ 23.477, Landing gear arrangement

§ 23.479, Level landing conditions

§ 23.481, Tail down landing conditions

§ 23.483, One-wheel landing conditions

§ 23.485, Side load conditions

§ 23.493, Braked roll conditions

§ 23.505, Supplementary conditions for ski-planes

§ 23.521, Water load conditions

§ 23.561 Emergency Landing Conditions- General

§ 23.562, Emergency landing dynamic conditions

§ 23.601, Design and Construction- General

§ 23.603, Materials and workmanship

§ 23.613, Material strength properties and design values

§ 23.655, Control Surfaces- Installation

§ 23.955, Fuel flow

§ 23.959, Unusable fuel supply

§ 23.961, Fuel system hot weather operation

§ 23.991, Fuel pumps

§ 23.993, Fuel system lines and fittings

§ 23.995, Fuel valves and controls

AC 23-17C

11/17/2011

§ 23.997, Fuel strainer or filter

§ 23.1019, Oil strainer or filter

§ 23.1121, Exhaust System- General

§ 23.1123, Exhaust system

§ 23.1182, Nacelle areas behind firewalls

§ 23.1183, Lines, fittings, and components

§ 23.1191, Firewalls

§ 23.1203, Fire detector system

§ 23.1505, Airspeed limitations

§ 23.1525, Kinds of operation

§ 23.1527, Maximum operating altitude

§ 23.1529, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

§ 23.1541, Markings and Placards- General

§ 23.1543, Instrument markings: General

§ 23.1545, Airspeed indicator

§ 23.1547, Magnetic direction indicator

§ 23.1549, Powerplant and auxiliary power unit instruments

§ 23.1551, Oil quantity indicator

§ 23.1553, Fuel quantity indicator

§ 23.1555, Control markings

§ 23.1557, Miscellaneous markings and placards

§ 23.1559, Operating limitations placard

§ 23.1581, Airplane Flight Manual and Approved Manual material- General

AC 23-17C

§ 23.1583, Operating limitations

§ 23.1585, Operating procedures

Appendix F to Part 23, Test Procedure (Flammability)

23.671 General

Chapter 1 – Subpart D-Design and Construction

Section 1. Control Systems

No FAA policy is available as of December 31, 2007. EASA AMC effective November 13, 2003, AMC 23.671 is acceptable for FAA certification.

This rule was adopted on February 1, 1965 as a recodification of Civil Air Regulations (CAR), CAR 3.335.

23.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems

There are no corresponding rule or airworthiness criteria in CAR 3 or the Airship Design Criteria.

Amendment 23-45 and Subsequent

This rule is applicable only if the system is required to show compliance with the flight characteristic requirements of part 23.

This amendment adopted a proposed revision in NPRM 90-18 that stated: “This proposal would provide criteria for approval of those stability augmentation, automatic, and poweroperated systems whose performance is essential to flight safety. The proposed § 23.672 is similar to § 5.672 and, as part 25, the warning system requirement relating to control system activation is not intended to preclude installing tactile warning devices, such as control system shakers activated independently for other purposes.”

NOTE: Section 5.672 in above quote is incorrect. It should be § 25.672.

This requirement would not apply to a simple downspring or a bobweight stability device as affirmed by Final Rule, Docket 26269.

23.673 Primary flight controls

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.336.

23.675 Stops

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.340.

23.677 Trim Systems

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.337.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.16, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue and Subsequent

The trim system should prevent inadvertent, improper or abrupt trim operation. The direction of trim movement and its relation to its range of adjustment should be designed to prevent confusion.

Trim devices should be designed to continue normal operation with one failure of any connecting or transmitting element in the primary flight control system for (1) longitudinal trim in a single-engine airplane, and (2) longitudinal and directional trim in multiengine airplanes.

Amendment 23-7 and Subsequent

The amendment requires there be adequate control for safe flight and landing (rather than to “continue normal operation”) using the trim devices following the failure of a connecting/transmitting element in the primary controls. Thus, the control system element failure must not cause a failure of the trim system.

Failures of the trim system must not prevent safe flight and landing.

This amendment is clarified by Final Rule, Docket 8083 as follows: “The notice proposed to amend § 23.677 to make it clear that operation of the trim system may not be dependent upon the primary control system and that failures of the primary control system may not prevent safe flight and landing. Comments were received objecting to the proposal on the ground that it exceeded the part 25 requirements for transport category airplanes, and that it would improperly and undesirably change trim response and make compliance tests extremely hazardous. The FAA does not agree. The trim requirement is merely one of a number of control system requirements that must be considered as a total requirement. There is, therefore, no comparison between individual provisions in parts 23 and 25. Service experience with existing airplanes does not indicate that the proposal will improperly and undesirably change trim response or that compliance testing will be hazardous. Furthermore, trim response equal to primary flight control response will not necessarily be needed to comply with the proposal. All that is required is that there be adequate control for safe flight and landing.”

Amendment 23-34 and Subsequent

Section 23.677(d) was added by Amendment 23-34 which was only applicable to commuter category airplanes.

Probable powered trim runaways should be demonstrated for all part 23 airplanes so equipped. See AC 23-8C, “Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes,” for the procedure.

Even if trim runaways have been determined to be unlikely using the guidance in AC 23.1309-1E, “System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes,” appropriate trim runaway demonstrations in all axes are required to demonstrate the airplane has no unsafe features. The FAA has accepted demonstration of control-restrained trim runaways during malfunction testing for systems without a monitor/limiter regardless of the reliability and those with a monitor/limiter whose reliability is greater than probable. However, the FAA has determined this procedure is not acceptable in itself for failure conditions shown to be greater than major. To allow expansion of the 0 to 2g envelope, as specified in AC 23-8C, the FAA suggests a test procedure that incorporates both control restrained and unrestrained errors. The following test matrix considers the probability of trim runaways, high airframe limit loads, control stick/wheel configuration and absence of an autopilot system. Because rudder trim can be adjusted without the pilot directly in the control loop (that is, feet on the floor), restrained runaways for rudder trim are not considered acceptable. (See Table 1).

TABLE 1. TRIM SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS

Axis Time Load (g) (unrestrained)

Maximum Attitude Change (unrestrained)

Maximum Force (restrained and Unstrained)

Maximum Rate of Force Change (restrained)

Pitch recognition

+3 seconds

Structural limits NTE 3.5g

+/-45 degrees 60 pounds 20 pounds/sec

Roll recognition +3 seconds

Structural Limits

+/-90 degrees 30 pounds 10 pounds/sec

Yaw recognition +3 seconds

Structural Limits

+/-30 degrees 150 pounds

(unrestrained only)

N/A

NOTE:

1. Restrained means the pilot is in the control loop (hands on) and unrestrained means the pilot is not in the control loop (hands off).

2. Trim systems with a monitor/limiter will be tested at a magnitude just below that required for monitor/limiter trip.

3. NTE is Not to Exceed.

Amendment 23-42 and Subsequent

This section was changed by Docket 25811, Amendment 23-42, as follows: This amendment extended the current requirements of Sec. 23.677 for powered trim system runaways to all categories of part 23 airplanes.

Amendment 23-49 and Subsequent

Final Rule 28506, Amendment 23-49, revised § 23.677(a) as follows:

NPRM 94-21 stated: “Proposed revised Sec. 23.677(a) would clarify the need to mark the lateral and directional trim indicators with the neutral trim position. Since trim indicators on most airplanes are currently marked with the neutral position of the trimming device, this proposal would standardize the cockpit markings for all airplanes.

Revised paragraph (a) would also add a requirement for the pitch trim indicator to be marked with the proper pitch trim range for the takeoff of the airplane. Some takeoff accidents, including some involving fatalities, have occurred because the pitch trim was not set to the proper range needed for the airplane takeoff. Because of this accident experience, most of the current airplane manufacturers mark the pitch trim indicator with the pitch trim range for takeoff. Therefore, the proposed marking requirement would not have a significant impact on future airplane designs and would ensure that the markings needed for a safe takeoff are provided for the pilots use.”

23.679 Control system locks

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.341.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.17, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue and Subsequent

Section 23.679(a) of part 23 and § 3.341(a) of the CAR require that if there is a device to lock the control system, there should be a means to give obvious warning to the pilot when the lock is engaged. Several accidents have occurred because the pilot did not remove the control system lock before takeoff. Many such accidents relate to internally applied locks, mostly pins installed at the control wheel column. Misuse and alteration of these installed locking devices, and neglect by the pilot to perform a control freedom check before takeoff, contributed to such accidents.

When evaluating a control lock system, the following factors should be considered in finding compliance with the applicable regulation:

a. The warning should be easily observable during both day and night operations. Color,

location, shape, and accessibility of the device, ease of removal with the pilot seated in the flying position, and legibility of any placards, etc., should be considered.

b. The system operation should be obvious. It should be possible to apply the lock only in

such a manner that the required warning is provided.

c. When engaged, the lock should, by design, limit the operation of the airplane so the pilot

receives unmistakable warning in the cockpit before or at the start of takeoff by an effective means, such as one of the following:

(1) Preventing the application of sufficient engine power to attempt a takeoff.

(2) Displacement of primary pilot controls, such as the control wheel full forward.

(3) An aural warning device that cannot be disengaged.

For airplanes with separate locks for throttle and control column, where one lock (for example, throttle) can be removed independently of the other, each lock should independently meet the criteria of § 23.679(c) above.

Amendment 23-45 and Subsequent

This amendment, changed by Final Rule, Docket 26269, states as follows: “The FAA is aware that an automatically released control lock system would be costly. The proposal did

not mandate the installation of an automatic system, but would add an optional provision that would show the acceptance of such systems.

The JAA stated its assumption that the proposed requirement would not be applicable to external locks. Based on the comments received, the FAA has re-examined the proposal. Since the proposal would have eliminated the current Section 23.679(a), external systems that use the red warning ribbons as a means of warning the pilot that the locks are in place would no longer be acceptable. The FAA has determined that there is a need to retain the provision of current Section 23.679(a), so that presently used locks and their warning systems remain acceptable. The added provision of Section 23.679(a)(2) will make it clear that systems that automatically disengage the locks are also acceptable but not mandatory.

The proposal to limit the operation of the airplane when the locks are engaged is being restated since control locks and their warnings can be overlooked and automatic disengage systems will fail. The FAA believes an additional safeguard is required. By requiring a system that will ensure that airplane operation is limited, the pilot will receive a pre-takeoff warning and thus a hazardous takeoff will not be attempted.

23.681 Limit load static tests

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.342.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.18, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

23.683 Operation tests

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.343.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.19, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue and Subsequent

The 1.25 factor of part 23, § 23.395(a)(1) does not apply to the control system operational test of this section.

Compliance with this section is required whether or not the airplane has a significant flight test history. Proof of structure is accomplished by ground tests because required flight tests may not subject the airplane to limit loads for all possible flight conditions.

Amendment 23-7 and Subsequent

This amendment adopted a proposed revision in NPRM 67-14 that stated:

“This proposal would preserve consistency with Sec. 23.397 which provides that the airloads on the surfaces need not exceed those that would result from application of the forces in Sec. 23.397 (b).”

Part 23, § 23.683, and CAR Section 3.343 require showing by operation tests, when the controls are operated from the pilot compartment with the system loaded, the system is free from jamming, excessive friction, and excessive deflection. This section has not been uniformly applied. Some airplanes were certified using 50 percent of the control surface travel with no load as criteria for meeting the excessive deflection requirements for the operation tests. Other airplanes were not required to meet any specific travel as long as the airplane had adequate flight characteristics.

Requiring a specific large travel while under limit load could result in control system authority that is greater than desired or needed. However, some travel of the control surface should exist when the system is loaded to limit load. No travel could indicate there was a possible fault, such as a jammed system. Second, with little or no travel, operation of the controls would have such a limited effect on the maneuverability of the airplane that it could have questionable flight characteristics.

Acceptable Means of Compliance

One method, but not the only method, for showing compliance with the control system operation test requirements of § 23.683 and CAR § 3.343 is as follows:

a. This method may be used when clearances around control surfaces are no less than 3/16

inch.

Alternate Means of Compliance

b. Conduct the control system operation tests by operating the controls from the pilots’

compartment with the entire system loaded so as to correspond to the limit control forces established by the regulations for the control system being tested. The following conditions should be met:

(1) Under limit load, check each control surface for travel and detail parts for deflection.

This may be accomplished as follows:

(a) Support the control surface being tested while positioned at the neutral position.

(b) Load the surface using loads corresponding to the limit control forces established

in the regulations.

(c) Load the pilots control until the control surface is just off the support.

(d) Determine the available travel, which is the amount of movement of the surface

from neutral when the control is moved to the system stop.

(e) The above procedure should be repeated in the opposite direction.

(f) Minimum control surface travel from the neutral position in each direction being

measured should be 10 percent of the control surface travel with no load on the surface.

Regardless of the amount of travel of the surface when under limit load, the airplane should have adequate flight characteristics, as specified in § 23.141. Any derivative airplane of a previous type certificated airplane need not exceed the control surface travel of the original airplane; however, the flight characteristics should be flight tested to ensure compliance.

(2) Under limit load, no signs of jamming or of any permanent set of any connection,

bracket, attachment, etc., may be present.

(3) Friction should be minimized so that the limit control forces and torques specified by

the regulations may be met.

Alternate Means of Compliance

NOTE: Recently, airplanes have been built with smaller gaps between control surfaces and structure than has been done in the past. If the gap is less than 3/16 inches, this alternate means of compliance should be considered.

Applicants and FAA aircraft certification offices (ACOs) involved with certification of small airplanes should follow this policy. Applicants should expect the ACO would consider this information when making findings of compliance. However, in determining compliance with certification standards, each ACO has the discretion to coordinate deviations from these guidelines with the Small Airplane Directorate when the applicant demonstrates a suitable

need. To assure standardization, the ACO should coordinate deviation from this policy with the Small Airplane Directorate. In this case, this alternate means of compliance is appropriate. This method also can have the added advantage of showing compliance with several regulations in a single test series.

Regardless of the amount of travel of a control surface when tested as, the airplane must have adequate flight characteristics as specified in § 23.141. Any airplane that is a close derivative of a previous type certificated airplane need not exceed the control surface travel of the original airplane; however, the flight characteristics should be tested to assure compliance.

The method of showing compliance with § 23.683 presented in AC 23-17, § 23.683, Operation Tests, discusses only the control system. It does not specify loading on adjacent structures and elements. This revision is consistent with the wording in § 23.683 of the regulations. Testing, not analysis must be used to show compliance with § 23.683. There are five other regulations, the control system, the control surfaces, and the adjacent fixed aerodynamic surfaces related to both the control system and the control surfaces, which must also be met. These include:

a. Section 23.305(a), [Subpart C - Structure, General] Strength and Deformation. It requires

that "At any load up to limit loads, the deformation may not interfere with safe operation."

b. Section 23.307, [Subpart C - Structure, General] Proof of Structure, states, "Compliance

with the strength and deformation requirements of § 23.305 must be shown for each critical load condition. Structural analysis may be used only if the structure conforms to those for which experience has shown this method to be reliable. In other cases, substantiating load tests must be made."

c. Section 23.655(a), [Subpart D - Design and Construction, Control Surfaces] Installation,

requires that "Moveable surfaces must be installed so that there is no interference between surfaces, their bracing, or adjacent fixed structure, when one surface is held in its most critical clearance positions and the others are operated through their full movement."

d. Section 23.681(a), [Subpart D - Design and Construction, Control Surfaces] Limit Load

Static Tests, requires that "Compliance with the limit load requirements of this part must be shown by tests as follows:

(1) The direction of the test loads produces the most severe loading in the control

system; and

(2) Each fitting, pulley, and bracket used in attaching the system to the main structure is

included."

e. Section 23.141, [Subpart B--Flight, Flight Characteristics] General, states that "The

airplane must meet the requirements of §§ 23.143 through 23.253 at all practical loading conditions and operating altitudes for which certification has been requested,

not exceeding the maximum operating altitude established under § 23.1527, and without requiring exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength."

To assure that these requirements will be satisfied in the conduct of the control system operation test, inclusion of loads on the adjacent structures or elements in the testing setup may be required.

While testing is required for demonstration of compliance to § 23.683, sometimes analysis may be acceptable for showing compliance with § 23.305(a). Section 23.307(a), provides the criterion for when analysis is not acceptable and testing must be performed.

It is not appropriate to define specific quantitative criterion to determine when testing is required to demonstrate compliance with § 23.305(a), in accordance with § 23.307(a). One specific criterion will not work for all possible airplane designs. It is better that such determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, in which the appropriate details of a particular design can be considered.

However, this policy describes some of the factors that should be considered when determining if tests are required to show that clearance between controls and adjacent structure (under load) meets § 23.305(a). These factors include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) The clearance between control surfaces and adjacent structure, when at rest.

Suppose an applicant has experience with other airplanes that have a half-inch of clearance between controls and adjacent structure at rest. However, a new design is similar except it now has only a tenth of an inch clearance when at rest. Tests to show compliance with § 23.305(a), may be required because the new structure may not conform to those for which experience has shown this method to be reliable in the past. The accuracy of past methods may not be suitable for the smaller clearances. Critical conditions assessed in past analysis may not have included a condition that is critical for the new smaller clearance.

(2) Deformation (under limit loads) in the control surface or adjacent structure.

If analysis had been shown to be reliable in the past for a wing that had much smaller deflections than a current design, the current structure may not conform to those for which experience has shown this method to be reliable, and testing may be required. Previous analytical methods may no longer be reliable because the new design behaves in a more non-linear manner. It may types of deflection that were neglected in past analysis may now become critical.

(3) New control surface attachment configurations or other local design changes could

create new types of deformation that are critical for the new design but were not considered in past analysis.

If the FAA requires (or if an applicant voluntarily chooses) compliance with § 23.305(a), to be shown by tests, the following test procedure is one means to simultaneously show compliance with both § 23.305(a), and § 23.683. It also shows compliance with § 23.681(a). These tests may be conducted as follows:

Except where otherwise mentioned, the tests described below in sections (1), (2), and (3) should be conducted within the following parameters (1 through 8).

PARAMETERS:

1. Conduct the control system operation tests by operating the controls from the pilots' compartment.

2. All the control surfaces must be installed to their adjacent fixed surface on the airframe (according to the type design).

3. The entire control system and adjacent fixed structure should be loaded.

4. The adjacent fixed surfaces (wings, horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizers, and so forth) should be loaded to provide deflections equivalent to critical limit load flight conditions.

5. The structural deflections should correspond to the limit flight conditions that represent the worst case conditions for increased cable tension, decreased cable tension, and control/fixed surface proximity for each control system as appropriate.

6. The entire control system must be loaded to either the limit airloads or the limit pilot forces; whichever is less (§ 23.683(b)(1)). For § 23.397, the automatic pilot effort must be used instead of limit pilot forces if it alone can produce higher control surface loads than the human pilot.

7. Minimum clearances around control surfaces and minimum tensions in cable systems should be defined and incorporated in the airplanes instructions for continued airworthiness. The test article should incorporate these minimum clearances and tensions, unless you otherwise account for them.

8. If reductions in the minimum clearances described in parameter 7 above are possible because of environmental conditions expected in service, you must account for this. This can be accomplished through analysis or during testing by adjusting the test article clearances to encompass these effects.

SECTION (1):

Consider all airplane maneuver and gust loads, and inertial loads, represented by the airplane flight envelope (V-n diagram); consider unsymmetrical load cases.

a. The tests described in this section support the demonstration that the control system is

free from jamming, excessive friction, and excessive deflection as required by § 23.683(a)(1), (2), and (3). They also support the demonstration that structural deformations not interfere with safe operation as required by § 23.305(a). Accomplish the following:

(1) Load the adjacent fixed aerodynamic surface (wing, horizontal tail, or vertical tail)

in accordance with one of the conditions of parameters d, e, and f above.

(2) Support the control surface being tested while it is found in the neutral position.

(3) Load the control surfaces to the critical limit loads, as described in parameter 6

above, and evaluate their proximity to the fixed adjacent structure for interference (contact).

(4) Load the pilots control until the control surface is just off the support.

(5) Determine the available control surface travel, which is the amount of movement of

the surface from neutral when the cockpit control is moved through the limits of its travel.

(6) The control surface under loads described in parameter 6 above must have adequate

flight characteristics as specified in § 23.141.

(7) To address the possibility of a critical intermediate control surface loading,

gradually remove load from the control surface (while maintaining the load on the adjacent fixed surface) until maximum control surface travel is achieved.

(8) The procedure should be repeated in the opposite direction.

(9) With limit load applied to the adjacent fixed surface and limit or intermediate load

applied to the control surface, no signs of jamming, or of any permanent set of any connection, bracket, attachment, and so forth, may be present.

(10) The control system should operate freely without excessive friction. Excessive

friction is any increase under limit loads that results in exceeding the limit control forces and torques specified by the regulations.

(11) Cable systems should be checked with the loads applied to ensure that excessive

slack does not develop in the system. Excessive slack is any change in cables or cable hardware that results in reduced airplane control surface movement.

(12) Repeat this process for each of the critical loading conditions as defined by

paragraphs (4) and (6) above.

SECTION (2):

b. The tests described in this section support the demonstration that structural deformations

not interfere with safe operation as required by § 23.305(a). Accomplish the following:

(1) Load the adjacent fixed aerodynamic surface (wing, horizontal tail, or vertical tail) in accordance with one of the conditions of paragraphs (4) and (5) above.

(2) Operate the unloaded control system from stop to stop.

(3) No signs of interference (contact) may be present.

(4) The control system should operate freely without excessive friction.

(5) Repeat this process for each of the critical adjacent fixed surface loading conditions as defined by paragraphs (4) and (5) above.

NOTE: An alternate procedure may be used to accommodate the testing described in sections (1) and (2) above during structural tests of a partial airplane. This method requires that all control system components that are attached to or enclosed by the loaded test structure be installed for type design. A sufficiently representative mockup of remaining control system components must be used to assure the full lengths of any cables, which extend from the loaded test structure, are included. This is necessary to make a reasonable assessment that slack that could develop in control cables is not excessive enough to cause an entanglement or jam. The control surface activation may be input at any convenient location between the mockup terminus and the cockpit.

SECTION (3):

c. The tests described in this section will show the control system is free from excessive

deflection as required by § 23.683(a)(3). These tests complete this means of compliance that the control system is free from jamming and excessive friction as required by § 23.683(a)(1) and (2). They also show that structural deformations do not interfere with safe operation as required by § 23.305(a). These tests meet the limit load static test requirements of § 23.681(a). Accomplish the following:

(1) With the adjacent fixed surface (wing, horizontal tail, or vertical tail) unloaded,

support the control surface being tested while it is found in the neutral position.

(2) Load the control surfaces to the critical limit loads, as described in parameter 6

above, and evaluate their proximity to the fixed adjacent structure for jamming or contact.

(3) Load the pilots control until the control surface is just off the support.

(4) Operate the cockpit control in the direction opposite the load to the extent of its

travel.

(5) The above procedure should be repeated in the opposite direction.

(6) The minimum loaded control surface travel must have adequate flight

characteristics as specified in § 23.141.

(7) Under limit load, no signs of jamming, or of any permanent set of any connection,

bracket, attachment, and so forth, may be present.

(8) The control system should operate freely without excessive friction.

NOTE: The tests described in section c. above are normally performed using a complete airplane. As a minimum, they must be completed using an airframe/control system that represents the final product from the cockpit controls to the control surface.

Regardless of the amount of travel of a control surface when tested, the airplane must have adequate flight characteristics as specified in § 23.141. Any airplane that is a close derivative of a previous type certificated airplane need not exceed the control surface travel of the original airplane; however, the flight characteristics should be tested to assure compliance.

EASA AMC effective February 12, 2009, AMC 23.683 is acceptable for FAA certification.

23.685 Control system details

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.344.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.20, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

23.687 Spring devices

This rule was adopted on February 1, 1965 as a recodification of CAR 3.347.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.21, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Compliance may be shown by flight tests with the spring disconnected to show that failure of the spring will not cause flutter or unsafe flight characteristics, or by performing a reliability analysis.

The flight test is preferred since this approach clearly addresses the safety issue and is historically a minimal test burden.

An applicant who chooses reliability analysis must accept that a failure of the spring could create unsafe flight characteristics and, therefore, meet the corresponding level of reliability. This may involve the use of redundant design such as dual springs and demonstration of flight characteristics with one removed.

A positive determination of spring reliability requires that an applicant show the spring will perform its intended function for a specified interval under operational and environmental conditions appropriate for the proposed airplane. Although not normally used for structural substantiation, the reliability assessment methods for § 23.1309 may contain some concepts that would be helpful in showing the reliability of the spring device. The reliability assessment should consider, but not necessarily be limited to, fatigue failures, failures because of corrosive environments, and any in-service changes in the spring characteristics, the spring constant. The reliability assessment of a spring device used in any airplane flight control system must consider airworthiness standards other than § 23.687. These include, but are not limited to, flutter characteristics and handling qualities.

In addition, § 23.687 is clear in that the applicant must show reliability of the spring with tests that simulate service conditions. Tests are the required substantiation method; however, an applicant may show compliance with tests supported by analysis. Also the spring device testing requirement, 14 CFR, part 23, § 23.601, General, requires testing for any design detail or part that has an important bearing on safety of flight. An applicant should also show compliance with 14 CFR, part 23, § 23.305 (a) and (b). Finally, when a single spring is required for flutter, handling qualities, or any other regulatory reason, the spring should be considered a single path critical structure and meet the A-Basis requirements of § 23.613(b)(1).

23.689 Cable systems

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.345.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.22, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue and Subsequent

If tabs are installed with cable less than 1/8th-inch diameter, the airplane should be safely controllable with the tabs in the most adverse position as if from a failed cable. Using emergency procedures, the pilot should be able to return and land safely. Airplane configurations, such as flaps, landing gear, and power are permissible devices to use in relieving control forces. The temporary control forces of part 23, § 23.143, are applicable until the force reduction procedures are completed.

Smaller diameter cables (no less than 1/16-inch diameter) may be used for rudder pedal interconnections (used for pulling one pedal back when the other is pushed forward. They are not used to drive the control surface), if the failure of this interconnection will not affect rudder operation.

This rule was put in the original issue of part 23 from CAR 3.345, and it was intended to apply to airframe control cables not engine controls cables, which are certified under part 23, Subpart E.

Final Rule 8083 revised this section by Amendment 23-7. NPRM 67-14 stated as follows: “Pulley specifications (Sec. 23.689). Section 23.689(b) was amended by striking out the words "as specified in the pulley specifications" after the words "is used. Explanation. Correspondence of pulley and cable is prescribed in the first sentence of Sec. 23.689(b). Correspondence may be verified in several ways. The reference to pulley specifications adds nothing.”

23.691 Artificial stall barrier system

There are no corresponding rule or airworthiness criteria in CAR 3 or the Airship Design Criteria.

Amendment 23-49 and Subsequent

This amendment adopted a proposed revision in NPRM 94-21 that stated: “This proposed new section would provide standards for stall barrier systems if a stall barrier is necessary to show compliance with Sec. 23.201(c).

The requirements of Sec. 23.201(c) provide criteria for the in-flight demonstration of wings level stall. The requirements also specify the means of identifying when a stall has occurred. Amendment No. 23-45 (58 FR 42136, August 6, 1993) revised Sec. 23.201(c) by adding the activation of an artificial stall barrier as an acceptable means of identifying when a stall has occurred.

As the technology of airplane designs improved and engines with increased power became available, airplanes were developed that did not meet the older wings level stall requirement of Sec. 23.201. Consequently, these airplanes were equipped with an artificial stall barrier that moved the airplane elevator controls and caused a nose down pitching motion similar to the pitching motion of airplanes that meet the wings level stall requirement of Sec. 23.201. The manufacturer selected the airspeed where this pitching motion occurred and flight testing established compliance with the other flight regulations at airspeeds above the speed selected for the push. These stall barrier systems are commonly called "stick pushers." Such systems have been accepted for compliance with Sec. 23.201 under the equivalent safety provisions of Sec. 21.21(b)(1), since they provide a pitch motion that is equivalent to that experienced during stalls of airplanes that meet the stall requirements of Sec. 23.201. Appropriate compliance with other applicable requirements of part 23 has been established by other design characteristics of the stall barrier system.

The provisions of the proposed new section are based on system design characteristics necessary to ensure the safe operation of previously approved stall barrier systems. The proposed section also requires such systems to include provisions to prevent unwanted activation of the stall barrier systems. This is necessary to ensure that such systems do not cause downward pitching motions at higher airspeeds when such pitching could be unsafe.

The proposed sections would basically codify those provisions that have been found necessary for approving stick pusher systems under the equivalent safety requirements of Sec. 21.21(b)(1). Therefore, in effect, no new requirements would be added by this proposed amendment. The proposed new section would be applicable only to airplanes with flight characteristics that need an artificial stall barrier system to ensure safe operation of that airplane. Including provision for the installation of an optional stick pusher system would relieve the manufacturer of the financial burden that would be needed to redesign the airplane so that it would meet the wings level stall requirements.”

The proposed rule was changed by Final Rule, Docket 27806 as follows: “In the course of the FAAs review, however, the FAA noted that the word "necessary" in the introductory paragraph of Sec. 23.691 should be changed to "used," to make it clear that the equipment requirements of this section are applicable if a stick pusher system is used in the airplane to show compliance with Sec. 23.201(c).”

Section 23.201(b), Amendment 23-45, added the activation of an artificial stall barrier as an acceptable means of identifying when a stall has occurred. A stall barrier is a device that prevents an actual stall (that is, a stick pusher) while a stall warning is a device that alerts a pilot of an impending stall (that is, a stick shaker). Of course, the stall should not occur before activation of the stall barrier. This amendment provided the standards for an artificial stall barrier system when it is used to show compliance with § 23.201(b).

For § 23.201, a stick shaker is a "stall avoidance" device. In the NPRM for Amendment 23­ 45, an applicant may identify a stall as the speed at which a stick shaker activates. This is an acceptable means of compliance to the rules. Stick shaker activation is then identified as a stall for a pilot by Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM.) However, from an engineering perspective and considering the "stall avoidance" in § 23.201, this is an acceptable means of compliance not an aerodynamic stall. The difference is important in certification since the aerodynamic stall determines whether a stick shaker is required equipment.

A stick pusher system would be a critical system for an airplane with stall recovery that is undetermined, marginal, or unacceptable. Failure of the system is then required to be unlikely. The FAA does not consider the chance of entering a stall environment as a factor in developing system reliability. The exception would be developing specific system component reliability where that component would be active only when the airplane is in a stall environment. The FAA does not give credit toward developing reliability for the use of a “Go/No Go” preflight system check, although the FAA does recommend that preflight procedures for all essential/critical systems be provided for pilot use. (Service experience has shown that some part 23 airplane pilots do not have the discipline to conduct the prescribed preflight checks.) To develop normal/abnormal/emergency procedures is not a factor in determining system reliability; however, such procedures are desirable, as well as required by § 23.1581. These factors may be considered when exercising engineering judgment in approval of the overall system. Stall can be identified by stick shaker/pusher operation, uncontrollable downward pitching, or the elevator control reaching the stop (see AC 23-8C) ­ whichever occurs first in any particular flight regime is acceptable. An airplane may be approved if it has stick shaker/pusher operation in one configuration, such as power on, and it has acceptable stall characteristics for the remaining configurations.

Inadvertent stick pusher operation should be investigated and shown not to be hazardous and to be recoverable, or that inadvertent operation is extremely unlikely.

23.693 Joints

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

This rule was adopted on February 1, 1965 as a recodification of CAR 3.346.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.23, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

23.697 Wing flap controls

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.338.

There is no corresponding airworthiness criteria in the Airship Design Criteria.

Amendment 23-49 and Subsequent

A revision in NPRM 94-21 proposed § 23.697(c) as follows: “Proposed new Sec. 23.697(c) would provide safety standards for the wing flap control lever designs installed in airplanes that use wing flap settings other than fully retracted when showing compliance with Sec. 23.145. This revision is needed to ensure that the flap settings, which establish the safe operation of the airplane, can be positively selected.”

23.699 Wing flap position indicator

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

This rule was adopted on February 1, 1965 as a recodification of CAR 3.338.

There is no corresponding airworthiness criteria in the Airship Design Criteria.

23.701 Flap interconnection

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.339.

There is no corresponding airworthiness criteria in the Airship Design Criteria.

Original Issue

The flaps should be synchronized by a mechanical interconnection unless the airplane has safe flight characteristics with the flaps retracted on one side and fully extended on the other side. The safe flight demonstration with asymmetry should be shown throughout the airspeed range allowed for flap extension. The control forces should not exceed those shown for temporary application in the table in § 23.143(c). However, they may not exceed the force that can be shown as safe with one hand on the control wheel/stick (other hand needed to retrim, pull circuit breaker, operate flap control). If the forces of asymmetry cannot be alleviated in a reasonable period of time, the remaining forces should not exceed those specified for prolonged application in § 23.143(c).

After showing the airplane has safe flight characteristics with the flaps in their most adverse position, it is permissible to readjust the remaining flap surfaces after a malfunction occurs.

Amendment 23-42

This amendment adopted a proposed revision in NPRM 89-5 that stated: “This proposal would update the regulations to include provisions for airplanes with a flap configuration other than one flap on each wing. It would also address the failure of any single element in the flap control system and allow for an alternate equivalent means to the mechanical interconnection required by the present rule. Airplanes are currently being manufactured with two flaps on each side of the airplane and are being designed with flaps on canards and tandem wings. On an airplane with four flaps, there is a possibility that only one flap may be asymmetric with respect to the other three and this issue needs to be addressed in the airworthiness standards, as proposed in paragraphs (a) and (b).”

Amendment 23-42 was not intended to change the requirement that “The main wing flaps and related movable surfaces as a system must be synchronized by mechanical connection.” The main purpose of this change was to add the following requirement that would maintain synchronization so the event of an unsafe condition has been shown to be unlikely. This requirement includes provisions for synchronization of the flaps other than by mechanical interconnection of the flap. These reliability requirements by numerical probability analysis for other synchronization methods should not be applied to mechanical interconnection. It is difficult to assess the reliability of mechanical interconnections by examples of different types of mechanisms. The complete system needs to be analyzed and tested.

Section 23.701, as amended by Amendment 23-42, in part, states the following:

a. The main wing flaps and related movable surfaces, as a system must:

(1) Be synchronized by mechanical connection; or

(2) Maintain synchronization so the event of an unsafe condition has been shown to be

unlikely; or

b. The airplane should be shown to have safe flight characteristics with any combination of

extreme positions of individual movable surfaces (mechanically interconnected surfaces are to be considered as a single surface).

During a recent review of this new requirement, it was noted the new § 23.701(b), particularly the parenthetical portion of that paragraph, could be improperly interpreted and applied. It could be possible that this misinterpretation could result in the use of differing terminology (that is, "mechanical interconnection" and "mechanically interconnected") in § 23.701(a)(1) and (b). These terms mean the same thing; direct positive mechanical interconnection between separate flap surfaces that are isolated from the flap control or actuation system.

Novel and unusual design features, such as an interconnection of the leading and trailing edge flap systems or an interconnection of flaps and ailerons, would require special conditions.

Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) Findings

Several findings have been accepted for the mechanical interconnection requirement.

a. Synchronized by a Mechanical Interconnection

These words appeared in 14 CFR, parts 23 and 25, and in CAR 03 and 04b since they were first issued. The synchronization requirement for the motion of the flaps by a mechanical interconnection is applicable to airplanes not having safe flight characteristics under asymmetrical flap operations. For these cases, there would be a hazardous condition when the flaps are retracted on one side and extended on the other side.

b. Mechanical Interconnection Requirement of § 23.70l(a)(l)

This requirement is to assure against hazardous asymmetrical operation of the flaps after any probable single or probable combination of failures of the flap actuating system. A probable combination of failures should be considered when the first failure would not be detected during normal operation of the system, including periodic checks, or when the first failure would inevitably lead to other failures (systems where a probable combination of failures may occur include the electrical and hydraulic systems). The airplane also should be shown to be capable of continued safe flight and landing without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength following these failures. To show the airplane is safe under these conditions, tests should be conducted with the flaps being retracted on one side and extended on the other during takeoffs, approaches, and landing. If there is a probable hazardous condition, a separate positive connection that is not part of the flap actuation system is required.

Amendment 23-49 and Subsequent

This amendment adopted a proposed revision in NPRM 94-21 that revised this section as follows: “Section 23.701 (a)(1) and (a)(2) would be revised to clarify the requirements for flap systems installed on part 23 airplanes. Following the revision of Sec. 23.701, as adopted by Amendment No. 23-42 (56 FR 353, January 3, 1991), the FAA discovered that the new requirements could be interpreted in a way that was not intended and that this interpretation could result in approval of airplanes with unsafe flight characteristics in the event of flap failure. To clarify the intent of the requirements, the FAA issued on March 14, 1991, a policy letter to all aircraft certification offices that provided guidance for the correct application of the requirements.

Since then, the FAA has reexamined the requirements and determined that Sec. 23.701(a)(1) and (a)(2) need to be revised to ensure that a failure of the flap system would not create an asymmetric flap configuration that could result in an unsafe flight condition. Therefore, Sec. 23.701 (a)(1) and (a)(2) would be revised to clarify that one of the following would apply:

(1) The moveable flap surfaces must be synchronized by a mechanical interconnection or

by an approved equivalent means that is independent of the flap drive system.

(2) The wing flap system must be designed so that any failures of the flap system that would

result in an unsafe flight characteristic of the airplane, such as flap asymmetry, are extremely improbable.

These revisions would ensure that a failure of the flap drive systems will not result in a flap asymmetry configuration.”

Acceptable Means of Compliance

An acceptable means of compliance with the airworthiness requirements for the flaps mechanical interconnections of § 23.701(a)(1) is described as follows:

a. Reliability

Reliability of the mechanical interconnections is shown either by load analysis or load tests, or both, not by numerical probabilistic analysis. The mechanical interconnection should be designed for the loads resulting when interconnected flap surfaces on one side of the plane of symmetry are jammed and immovable, while the surfaces on the other side are free to move and the full power of the surface actuating system is applied. It should also be designed to account for the asymmetrical loads resulting from flight with the engines on one side of the plane of symmetry inoperative and the remaining engines at takeoff power. For single engine airplanes and multiengine airplanes with no slipstream effects on the flaps, it may be assumed that 100 percent of the critical air loads acts on one side and 70 percent on the other. The flight loads from § 23.345 acting on the surfaces should be considered in combination with the actuating system loads (including system inertia loads). Critical air load conditions should consider flap retraction and flap extension, including go-around. These conditions are considered limit loads. If there are

no hazardous conditions when the flaps are asymmetrical, the jam or maximum load conditions could be considered an ultimate load.

b. Friction Loads

It may be necessary to consider friction loads in the actuating system that may be reasonably expected to occur in service. Each design should be evaluated to determine its susceptibility to friction in the mechanism and any loads with such resistance.

c. Equivalent Means by Use of the Mechanical Actuation System

The mechanical actuating system for the flaps may be considered the mechanical interconnection, if all elements are mechanically interconnected from the actuator source to the flaps. These mechanical elements may include structures, interconnection linkages, and drive system components. When the mechanical interconnection is through the actuating system, and it is the only means to prevent an unsafe asymmetrical condition, the loads associated with the jam conditions are considered limit loads. A 1.5 factor of safety is required if a failure because the jam condition would cause a hazardous flap asymmetrical operation. A mechanical actuating system having a 1.5 factor of safety may not need to be evaluated for probable failure conditions. Also, if the drive system is designed so a hazardous flap asymmetrical operation would not occur after a jam condition, the 1.5 factor of safety should not be required.

d. Equivalent Means by Use of a Warning and Prevention System

A second equivalent means is the use of a warning and prevention system. This system monitors the symmetrical condition of the flaps and warns the pilot when an unsymmetrical flap condition occurs, but the asymmetry is still kept within safe limits. It prevents further movement of the flaps from exceeding safe limits. The warning and prevention system should be independent for each functionally related set of surfaces (that is, a set of flaps on each side of a plane of symmetry that is driven by a common actuator). Again, the airplane should be shown to have safe flight characteristics without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength at the extreme limits of the asymmetrical condition where the flaps are stopped. Tests should be conducted to simulate flap malfunctioning at the most severe case in the static asymmetrical condition of the flaps during takeoffs, approaches, and landings. The warning and prevention system should provide a pilot with a selectable or automatic test mode that exercises the system to an appropriate depth, so the pilot can determine proper operation of this system.

e. Electrical/Electronic Flap Interconnection System

When Amendment 23-42 was adopted, § 23.701 was amended to include provisions for airplanes with a flap configuration other than a mechanical interconnection. This amendment added the following requirement in § 23.701(a)(2): “Maintain synchronization so that the occurrence of an unsafe condition has been shown to be extremely improbable." This requirement is applicable for electrical/electronic flap interconnection systems, such as airplanes that have additional flaps and tandem wings.

Guidelines for performing a design safety assessment by application of § 23.1309(b), as adopted by Amendment 23-41, are given in AC 23.1309-lE. This AC also provides guidance on design safety assessments, environmental and atmospheric conditions, and software assessment.

23.703 Takeoff warning system

There are no corresponding rule or airworthiness criteria in CAR 3 or the Airship Design Criteria.

Amendment 23-49 and Subsequent

This amendment adopted a proposed revision in NPRM 94-21 that stated: “This proposed new section would require a takeoff warning system on some commuter category airplanes. The requirement would be applicable if the flight evaluation showed that an unsafe takeoff condition would result if lift devices or longitudinal trim devices are set to any position outside the approved takeoff range. If the evaluation shows that no unsafe condition would result at any setting of these devices, a takeoff warning system would not be required. For those airplanes on which a warning system must be installed, the proposal would provide requirements for the installation of the system.”

Amendment 23-62 and Subsequent

In Docket No. FAA-2009-0738, the Discussion of the Regulatory Amendments stated: FAA revised the language in the introductory text and § 23.703(b) to add takeoff warning system requirements to all airplanes over 6,000 pounds and all jet airplanes. The definition of an unsafe condition is the inability to rotate or the inability to prevent an immediate stall after rotation. High temporary control forces that can be quickly trimmed out would not necessarily be considered unsafe.

This amendment has three effects:

1. Maintains the requirement for a takeoff warning only if no unsafe condition results from any setting of lift and longitudinal trim devices outside the approved takeoff range.

2. Changes the applicability from only commuter category airplanes to all jets and any reciprocating or turbopropeller engine airplane over 6,000 pounds,

3. Defines an unsafe takeoff configuration as the inability to rotate or the inability to prevent an immediate stall after rotation.

The Final Rule added the prior § 23.703(b), which was deleted by mistake in the NPRM. Section 23.703 is modified to correct the error that deleted § 23.703(b).

Section 2. Landing Gear

23.721 General

The Small Airplane Directorate has no criteria or policy for taxi over rough surfaces for small airplane landing gear design. Manufacturers are free to develop and substantiate their own criteria.

There are no corresponding rule or airworthiness criteria in CAR 3 or the Airship Design Criteria.

23.723 Shock absorption tests

The corresponding rules in CAR 3 are CAR 3.351 and 3.352.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.24, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue

This regulation requires shock absorption tests be performed for certification.

Amendment 23-23 and Subsequent

This amendment allows an analysis rather than a shock absorption test, but to do so the applicant should have a landing gear system with identical (similar is not acceptable) energy absorption characteristics. The energy absorption characteristics of the landing gear system (for example, structure, wheel tire, and shock absorber) should be included in determining the response of the landing gear system. The tests should cover a range of energy absorption characteristics and weights over which the analysis is shown to be valid. If these conditions are not met, drop tests will be required to substantiate maximum takeoff and landing weight increases. It is acceptable to modify individual gear drop test data by adapting the results to the complete aircraft analytically, accounting for the aircraft flexibility.

23.725 Limit drop tests

The corresponding rules in CAR 3 are CAR 3.353 and 3.354.

There is no corresponding airworthiness criteria in the Airship Design Criteria.

Original Issue

This rule gives requirements for limit load drop tests if the applicant uses free drop tests to meet the requirements of § 23.723(a). The applicant should make ten drops from limit height for each basic design condition. The applicant should make one drop from the height (maximum is 2.25 times the limit drop height) needed to develop 1.5 times the limit load using the limit drop weight. It is acceptable to modify individual gear drop test data by adapting the results to the complete aircraft analytically, accounting for the aircraft flexibility.

Amendment 23-7 and Subsequent

This amendment requires the limit inertial load factor be determined in a rational and conservative manner during the drop test using a landing gear unit attitude and applied drag loads that represent the landing conditions. It is acceptable to modify individual gear drop test data by adapting the results to the complete aircraft analytically, accounting for the aircraft flexibility.

23.726 Ground load dynamic tests

No policy available as of December 31, 2007.

There are no corresponding rule or airworthiness criteria in CAR 3 or the Airship Design Criteria.

23.727 Reserve energy absorption drop test

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.355.

There is no corresponding airworthiness criteria in the Airship Design Criteria.

Amendment 23-7 and Subsequent

Section 23.727(b) requires the effect of wing lift be provided for in reserve energy drop tests. You should also use the applicable drag loads, as specified in § 23.725(c).

23.729 Landing gear extension and retraction system

The corresponding rules in CAR 3 are CAR 3.356, 3.357, 3.358 and 3.359.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.25, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue

14 CFR, part 23, does not define landplanes, seaplanes and amphibians. These terms passed unchanged from CARs 3 and 4. As FAA uses them, landplanes can only land on the ground, seaplanes (both boat and float types) can only land on water, and amphibians can land on both water and on the ground.

Therefore, where a rule such as § 23.729(c) states "landplanes" it does not apply to seaplanes or amphibians. When the rule states "airplanes" such as § 23.729(a) it applies to any aircraft that incorporates that equipment. Thus, § 23.729(a) can apply to landplanes and amphibians, but not seaplanes since they don't have retractable land gear.

Amendment 23-7 and Subsequent

A warning device with no manual shutoff is required when the flaps are “to or beyond” the approach flap setting if the landing gear is not down and locked. The “to or beyond” phrase in using a normal landing procedure is intended to provide for differences in design, as follows:

a. For airplanes whose normal procedures only prescribe landings with flaps extended past

the approach setting, only the “beyond” aspect of this rule is appropriate. Operating information for these airplanes should suggest that landings with approach flaps, or less, are not normal and will not activate the flap/landing gear aural warning.

b. For airplanes whose normal procedures include landings with a flap setting at the

approach setting, the “to and beyond” aspect of this rule is appropriate. Designers may choose to include additional logic in the flap/landing gear warning system, such as airspeed, thrust/throttle position. This logic may minimize nuisance warnings and may provide the equivalent safety intended by the rule.

Because part 23 is not specific about flap positions used, we cannot specify the flap position that actuates the warning device. This rule provides a basis for the FAA and the applicant to agree on the set point for the warning device.

Although not defined in part 23, most airplanes do have a “normal landing procedure” and an “approach flap position.” The flap position will vary among models, but it is this position that should be used to show compliance. For Amendment 23-21, NPRM 75-25, changed this section. The NPRM explanation stated as follows: “The present rule requires that a manual shutoff for the aural landing gear warning device be installed so that reopening the throttle

will reset the device. However, when an engine has been shut down in flight, its throttle may not be reopened before landing. The proposal would require the aural warning to be activated when any throttle is subsequently retarded to or beyond the position for a normal landing approach, thus requiring the warning intended by § 23.729(e)(2) regardless of the position of any other throttle and the prior deactivation.”

Amendment 23-45 adopted NPRM 90-18, which changed this section again. The NPRM states as follows: “This proposal revises § 23.729(f)(1) and (2) by changing the power and flap settings necessary to activate the device that warns the pilot that the landing gear is not fully extended and locked. The power setting necessary to activate the warning device is changed from when one or more "throttles are closed" to when one or more "throttle are closed beyond the power settings normally used for landing approach." The flap setting necessary to activate the warning device is changed from "flaps are extended to or beyond the approach flap position" to "flaps are extended beyond the approach flap position."

This information is applicable to the structural substantiation to the loads resulting only from all yawing conditions for the landing gear doors and retraction mechanism of small airplanes for part 23, § 23.729(a)(2).

Section 23.729(a)(2) requires the landing gear doors and retraction mechanism to be substantiated for the loads resulting from all yawing conditions. Attempts have been made to meet these requirements by flight testing to dive speed with some yaw or by flight testing at full yaw at a lower speed. These procedures normally do not result in a test that substantiates a 1.5 factor of safety. If substantiation by flight testing is desired, the landing gear doors and retraction mechanism should be subjected to 1.5 times the limit "q" loading. The limit “q” loading is the “q” at VLE or VLO whichever is greater.

The higher of the above speeds at which Vq is to be computed is designated as VLG.

Acceptable Means of Compliance

One method, but not the only method, for showing compliance with the structural requirements of § 23.729(a) (2) for the loads resulting from all yawing conditions for the landing gear doors and retraction mechanism is as follows:

a. Substantiation may be accomplished by flight testing at a speed of Vq and the yaw angle

determined in paragraph a (3) below, unless this will exceed the structural limitation as determined by analysis, static test, or a combination of both, where:

(1) Vq = square root of (VLG squared times 1.5).

(2) VLG = The greater of VLO or VLE.

(3) For the yawed condition, the limit “q” load will be at VLG with the airplane at the yaw angle determined by § 23.441. This angle need not exceed 15 degrees. Substantiation should be to 1.5 “q”.

(4) If Vq is equal to or less than VA, substantiation by flight test may be accomplished.

(5) If Vq is greater than VA, the yaw necessary to produce 1.5 “q” could result in overloading other airplane structures, and the maneuver should not be performed.

(6) VLG may be reduced by imposing limitations on the airplane so that Vq is less than

VA.

(7) The definitions of the terms used above are equivalent airspeeds, as follows:

VA = Design maneuvering speed

VD = Design diving speed

VLG = Landing gear speed used in the calculation of Vq

VLE = Maximum landing gear extended speed

VLO = Maximum landing gear operating speed

Vq = Speed which results in 1.5 times limit "q" loading

b. If the condition of Item a (5) above exists, substantiation of the landing gear doors and

retraction mechanism may be accomplished by static tests, analyses, or a combination of both.

Amendment 23-49 and Subsequent

This guidance provides clarification of the requirements for tire burst as related to landing gear and 14 CFR, part 23, §§ 23.729(g) and 23.1309 compliance. The intent of the proposed revision to NPRM 94-21 is given as follows: “This proposal would also add a new Sec. 23.729(g) requiring that if the landing gear bay is used as the location for equipment other than landing gear, the equipment must be designed and installed to minimize damage. On larger airplanes, such as the commuter category, a primary cause of damage to such equipment would be tire-burst. In addition, service history has shown that rocks, water, and slush enter the landing gear bay and cause damage. The equipment on any size airplane should be protected from damage by such external sources.”

The requirement in § 23.729(g) states: “If the landing gear bay is used as the location for equipment other than the landing gear . . .“ ”As used within this requirement, the term landing gear applies to all parts and systems contained in the “LANDING GEAR” section in Subpart D (§§ 23.721 through 23.745) that are specific to the landing gear. For example, wheels, brakes, wheel steering mechanism, and structural portions of the landing gear that are within the gear are all considered part of the “landing gear” for § 23.729(g) compliance. Systems that act on the landing gear, for example, extension and retraction systems, hydraulic systems, are not considered part of the landing gear itself and should be addressed in § 23.729(g) compliance. Compliance to this section can be by isolation of non-landing gear

equipment from the landing gear bay or by protection/shielding of this equipment from the effects of tire burst/loose tread and external forces. Using either of these means of compliance to § 23.729(g) also shows compliance to the § 23.1309 Particular Risk Analysis for non-landing gear equipment.

The effects of tire burst must still be evaluated for § 23.1309 compliance. When showing compliance with § 23.1309 for tire burst, in accordance with § 23.1309(f) (2) and AC 23.1309-1E, only the structural portions of the landing gear are exempt from the § 23.1309 requirements. Addressing external effects as part of the airplane safety analysis is consistent with the FAA advisory material for parts 23, 25, and 29, ARP 4761, and “Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.”

When showing compliance with § 23.1309 for tire burst, it is not appropriate to address compliance by assuming a probability of tire burst occurring. Rather tire burst must be assumed to have occurred(assuming a tire burst probability is inconsistent with the advisory material and accepted industry guidelines). Therefore, an acceptable means of compliance with the tire burst requirements § 23.1309 would be to account for all systems and equipment in the tire burst tests and analysis performed under § 23.729(g). These tests and analyses must be conducted on a conformed test article that includes all systems and components as defined in the type design data. Items identified by either analysis or tire burst tests, or both, as capable of causing hazards to the airplane must be protected or relocated. Therefore, we provide answers to the questions raised as follows:

1. “Do hydraulic, mechanical, and electrical components utilized in any way for retraction/extension of the landing gear doors or control of same need to be protected from the tire burst requirements of § 23.729(g)?”

Yes, unless the § 23.1309 safety assessment shows that damage from tire burst cannot cause a hazard(s) to the airplane. The minimization requirements of § 23.729(g) apply.

2. “If the above items are exempt from § 23.729(g), are they exempt from the Particular Risk Analysis required by § 23.1309.”

While § 23.729(g) applies to the item 1 equipment, tire burst effects should be considered for all landing gear and non-landing gear systems and equipment, except flight structure, as part of § 23.1309 compliance.

EASA AMC effective February 12, 2009, AMC 23.729(g) is acceptable for FAA certification.

23.731 Wheels

See 23.735, Brakes.

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.361.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.26, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

23.733 Tires

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.362.

The corresponding airworthiness criteria is section 4.27, Airship Design Criteria, FAA-P-8110-2, Change 2.

Original Issue and Subsequent (see the following NOTE)

The following is a recommended test procedure for installing tires on a part 23 airplane:

1. Inflate an inboard main tire to the minimum allowable inflation pressure for the airplane weight.

2. Inflate the outboard main tire on that same landing gear to the maximum allowable inflation pressure for the airplane weight.

3. Using white shoe polish or equivalent, mark a two-inch wide stripe on the brake (inboard) side of the outboard tire sidewall adjacent to the wheel rim.

4. Conduct at least two maximum efforts; non-skidding taxi turns into the minimum inflation side of the airplane.

5. Check for evidence of brake wheel housing abrasion contact on the tire sidewall.

NOTE: Above applies to a dual tire installation for landing gear. For a single tire per gear, inflate either side to the minimum pressure and the opposite side to maximum, and turn into the minimum pressure side.

In a revision to Amendment 23-17, the final rule adopted the proposed change in NPRM 75­ 10, that added § 23.733(c) with the following explanation: “The proposed rule would require that the selection of tires for installation on retractable landing gear mechanisms take into account the tire production tolerance and size increases that would be expected to result from service. The FAA believes compliance with the proposed rule could prevent accidents that might result from jamming of landing gear mechanisms by oversize tires.”

Tundra Tires

1. PURPOSE. This guidance serves several purposes. First, it summarizes the results of flight tests recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and conducted by the FAA to examine the effects of tundra tires installed on a Piper PA-18. Second, it provides information on possible hazards associated with the type of operations common for tundra tire users and potential adverse effects of untested installations. Third, it provides general information about the certification process for oversized "tundra" tires, as well as an example "compliance checklist" for the installation of such tires on light airplanes that have CAR, part 3 for a certification basis.

2. RELATED READING MATERIAL

a. Part 23, CAR part 3, and CAR part 03.

b. “National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation

A-95-13,” dated February 7, 1995.

c. Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C62e, “Aircraft Tires,” September 24, 2006.

d. AC 43.13-1B, Change 1, “Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices—Aircraft

Inspection and Repair,” September 27, 2001.

3. BACKGROUND. In Safety Recommendation A-95-13, dated February 7, 1995, the NTSB shared some of their safety concerns about tundra tires with the FAA and requested the possibility of problems with tundra tires be investigated.

The NTSB stated the following:

“Since the early 1960s, hundreds of airplanes operating in Alaska have been equipped with tundra tires, and dozens of versions of tundra tires—some exceeding 35 inches in diameter—have been marketed. The Safety Board is concerned that field approvals and STCs have been granted for use of these tires without flight test or other data on the aerodynamic effects of the tires and wheels. The Piper PA-18 is the airplane most frequently equipped with tundra tires. The Safety Board believes that the FAA should conduct a demonstration flight test to determine the effects of tundra tires on the PA-18s flight characteristics—including cruise, climb, takeoff, and landing performance—and, in both straight and turning flight, stall warning and aircraft stability at or near the critical angle of attack. Further, if the tests of the PA-18 indicate the need, the FAA should take corrective action and expand testing to other airplane types equipped with oversized tires.”

4 SUMMARY OF FLIGHT TEST RESULTS FOR PIPER PA-18 EQUIPPED WITH TUNDRA TIRES

The FAA's flight tests of tundra tires and their results are detailed in Appendix 1 following this guidance. As can be seen in the report, the tundra tire installations on the Piper PA-18 “150” caused no observable adverse effects on stall or stall characteristics during the FAA tests. Although there was some degradation of handling qualities associated with increasing the tire size, the effect was not significant for safety. Rate of climb and cruise speed was degraded with the larger tire sizes; however, the aircraft still met certification requirements. Added tests conducted by an independent Designated Engineering Representative (DER) flight test pilot showed the same lack of effect on stall characteristics with the main landing gear fabric covering removed. It should be remembered that these results are valid only for the Piper PA-18 “150” and for tires no larger than those tested. It should also be noted that, although tundra tires did not cause a safety problem, the stall characteristics of the basic Super Cub (and most other airplanes) make low altitude turning stalls hazardous, especially in uncoordinated flight. Also

although washout was not varied during these flight tests, previous FAA experience has shown that stall characteristics are further aggravated when operators of the PA-18 remove the 2.5 degrees of washout at the wing tip, which is not an approved change. This condition will result in a rapid roll when the airplane is stalled during turning flight.

5. POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF TUNDRA TIRE INSTALLATIONS ON AIRPLANES

a. Performance

Tundra tire installations on airplanes may produce one or more of the following effects on performance characteristics:

(1) Increased stall speed.

(2) Reduced stall warning margin.

(3) Reduced rate of climb.

(4) Reduced maximum angle of climb.

(5) Reduced maximum level flight speed.

(6) Reduced cruise speed.

(7) Reduced range.

Tundra tires reduce climb, cruise, and range performance more when installed on relatively “clean,” well streamlined airplanes than they do when installed on less streamlined airplanes.

b. Flight and Ground Handling Characteristics

Tundra tire installations on airplanes may produce one or more of the following effects on handling characteristics:

(1) Reduced ability of brakes to hold against takeoff power.

(2 Reduced brake effectiveness during rejected takeoff and braked landing.

(3) Reduced stability and controllability during rejected or balked landing and go

around.

(4) Change in either trim range or trim authority, or both.

(5) Reduced directional stability and control during takeoff and landing ground

rolls, with consequent increased tendency to ground loop.

(6) Increased tendency to nose over during landing.

(7) Reduced stall warning margin, change in either aerodynamic stall warning

characteristics (warning buffet) or reduced effectiveness of stall warning system, or both, in both level and turning flight with power either on or off, or both.

(8) Changes in stalling and stall recovery behavior in both level and turning flight

with power either on or off, or both. Stalls may become more abrupt and altitude loss before recovery may increase.

(9) Increased tendency to enter an inadvertent spin and reduced ability to recover

from the spin.

(10) Reduced longitudinal, lateral, and directional stability.

(11) Increased airframe vibration and buffet.

Tundra tires: 1) reduce the airplane's directional stability and controllability during takeoff and landing ground rolls, 2) increase its tendency to ground loop during takeoff and landing ground rolls, and 3) increase its tendency to nose over during landings on paved surfaces more than during landings on gravel, grass, or other surfaces that allow the tires to skid more easily.

c. Potential Propulsion Systems Effects

(1) Fuel flow may be affected by changes in normal flying attitude.

(2) Unusable fuel may be affected by changes in normal flying attitude.

(3) The fuel tank sump may be affected by change in ground attitude.

(4) Fuel drains may be affected by change in ground attitude.

(5) Engine cooling may be affected by performance or flying attitude changes.

(6) Changes in tires may affect the air induction system certification for operation

on wet runways.

(7) Changes in tires that change ground attitude may affect the induction system

icing protection.

6. CERTIFICATION OF TUNDRA TIRES FOR USE ON LIGHT AIRPLANES

The certification process for tundra tires is the same as for any other tire to be used in aviation.

a. A manufacturer may obtain a technical standard order authorization (TSOA) for the

tire using the requirements in TSO-C62e. TSO-C62e contains minimum performance

standards for aircraft tires. The TSOA, which covers design and manufacturing of the tire only, is not an installation approval. The tire should be approved for installation on a specific airplane model either by TC, STC, or FAA field approval in accordance with HBAW 97-01B, “Flight Standards Handbook Bulletin for Airworthiness” or later revision. The applicable requirements for installation of a tire on a given airplane should be determined based on the original certification basis specified in that airplane's type certificate data sheet (TCDS). Developing a compliance checklist, as described in item 7 below, should be accomplished by the applicant and the FAA engineer.

b. An alternative certification method exists for a tire that does not have a TSOA. The

tire design approval may be obtained concurrently with the installation approval for specific airplane models by TC or STC. The requirements of the TSO can be used for a determination of acceptable tire performance in such a project. The applicable requirements for installation of a tire on a given airplane should be determined based on the original certification basis specified in that airplane's TCDS. Developing a compliance checklist, as described in item 7, should be accomplished by the applicant and the FAA engineer. Before offering tires approved by this method for sale, the tire manufacturer would need a parts manufacturing approval (PMA).

7. COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST

See Appendix 2 for an example of the "Compliance Checklist," to CAR part 3 as amended to November 1, 1949. This checklist is intended to show all aircraft certification requirements that could be affected by a tundra tire installation. Many of these requirements may be unaffected by a given installation. The compliance checklist for a specific installation should be determined at the start of a project. (See Appendix 2 in this section, which is applicable to § 23.733 Tundra Tires.)

APPENDIX 1

FAA TEST RESULTS/EFFECTS OF TUNDRA TIRES

ON THE HANDLING QUALITIES/STALLS/STALL

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PIPER PA-18

1. Tests

Recent accidents in Alaska involving airplanes equipped with tundra tires prompted the NTSB to recommend to the FAA that they conduct flight tests to determine the effects of tundra tires on aircraft performance, stalls, and handling qualities. The following five tires were evaluated at various combinations of Center of Gravity (CG)/weight:

a. Factory installed (8.00-6).

b. McCreary Tundra Tires (8.50-10).

c. McCreary Tundra Tires (29x11.0-10).

d. Schneider Racing Slicks (14.0x32.0x15).

e. Goodyear Airwheels (35x15.0-6).

2. Results

Quantitative/qualitative data obtained from testing the four tundra tires were compared to the data obtained from testing the factory-installed tire. The following is a summary of the findings:

a. Ground Handling

Forward field of view during taxi is inversely related to tire size. As the tire size increases, the ability to see over the nose decreases requiring the pilot make “S” turns with the airplane. Ground handling during takeoff from a gravel runway is satisfactory for all configurations. Ground handling during landing on a gravel runway is also satisfactory for all configurations tested, although there is a noticeable nose down pitching moment when the tire(s) contact the ground. This is most obvious when making a main wheel only landing. Crosswind landings on runway 13 at Lake Hood Strip, a 2,200 feet x 80 feet gravel runway next to Lake Hood three miles southwest of Anchorage, Alaska, were demonstrated for tire configurations items 1a, 1b, and 1c in winds from 180 degrees (from ahead and to the right of the airplane at an angle of 50 degrees to its flight path) at 14 knots gusting to 16 knots. The wind thus had a crosswind component of approximately 10.7 knots gusting to approximately 12.3 knots and a head wind component of approximately 9.0 knots gusting to approximately 10.3 knots. No crosswinds were available during tests for configurations d and e. No tests for ground handling were accomplished on paved runways. The ground handling characteristics of airplanes equipped with tundra tires

are known to be substantially poorer on pavement than on gravel, grass, and other surfaces that allow the tires to skid easily.

b. Performance

Tundra tires adversely affect airplane performance. For example, the uncorrected average rate of climb (tested at 1.05 times maximum gross weight) for the standard tire was 526-feet per minute. The uncorrected average rate of climb for configurations items 1d and 1e (tested at 1.05 times maximum gross weight) was 449 and 464-feet per minute.

3. Stalls/Stall Characteristics

a. The purpose of the stall tests was to determine whether there are any differences

between the stalling speed and stall characteristics of a PA-18 “150” airplane equipped with tundra tires and the stalling speed and stall characteristics of the same airplane equipped with standard tires. The data obtained from the stall tests do not confirm the theory that tundra tires increase the PA-18 “150” stalling speed.

b. Stall characteristics (all configurations) are normal when the airplane is stalled in

balanced flight. In a turning stall, the airplane rolls slowly to a near wings level attitude. In maneuvering flight, the tendency is for the nose to drop as the bank angle is increased. If the pilot uses top rudder (right rudder in a left turn) to compensate for this and then stalls the airplane, the airplane may roll rapidly over the top. This could result in a departure or the incipient phase of spin. If the airplane is maneuvering at low altitude when this sequence of events occurs (for example, while circling to spot moose), the airplane may impact the ground before recovery. Also, although washout was not varied during these flight tests, previous FAA experience has shown that stall characteristics are further aggravated when operators of the PA-18 remove the 2.5 degrees of washout at the wing tip, which is not an approved change. This condition will result in a rapid roll when the airplane is stalled during turning flight.

4. Handling Qualities

For any given CG/weight, the lateral and directional stability deteriorates as tire size is increased.

5. Stall Warning

Installation of the artificial stall warning system on the PA-18 is optional. Most of the PA-18s in Alaska do not have the system installed. The airplane tested did have the artificial stall warning system, and several test points were obtained with the system deactivated. The airplane as tested does not have an aerodynamic stall warning.

APPENDIX 2

A "COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST" TO CAR PART 3, AS AMENDED TO NOVEMBER 1, 1949

Subpart B—Flight Requirements Weight Range and Center of Gravity

Section Subject

3.71 Weight and balance 3.72 Use of ballast 3.73 Empty weight 3.74 Maximum weight 3.75 Minimum weight 3.76 CG position

Performance Requirements—General

3.81 Performance* 3.82 Definition of stalling speeds* 3.83 Stalling speed*

Takeoff

3.84 Takeoff*

Climb

3.85 Climb*

Landing

3.86 Landing*

Flight Characteristics

3.105 Requirements* (exclude § 3.117)

Ground and Water Characteristics

3.143 Requirements*

Flutter and Vibration

Section Subject

3.159 Flutter and vibration (vibration only)

* Indicates topics identified by NTSB Safety Recommendation A-95-13

Subpart C—Strength Requirements Symmetrical Flight Conditions (Flaps Retracted)

3.189 Airplane equilibrium

Flaps Extended Flight Conditions

3.190 Flaps extended flight conditions

Unsymmetrical Flight Conditions

3.191 Unsymmetrical flight conditions

Control Surface Loads

3.211 General 3.212 Pilot effort 3.213 Trim tab effects

Horizontal Tail Surfaces

3.214 Horizontal tail surfaces

Vertical Tail Surfaces

3.219 Maneuvering loads

Control System Loads

3.231 Primary flight controls and systems

Ground Loads

3.241 Ground loads 3.242 Design weight 3.243 Load factor for landing conditions

Landing Cases and Attitudes

Section Subject

3.244 Landing cases and attitudes

Ground Roll Conditions

3.248 Braked roll 3.249 Side load

Subpart D—Design and Construction

Control Systems

3.342 Proof of strength

Landing Gear

3.351 Tests 3.352 Shock absorption tests 3.353 Limit drop tests 3.354 Limit load factor determination 3.355 Reserve energy absorption drop tests

Wheels and Tires

3.361 Wheels 3.362 Tires

Brakes

3.363 Brakes

Subpart E- Propulsion Systems

3.429 Fuel System General 3.437 Unusable Fuel 3.444 Fuel Tank Sump 3.553 Fuel Tank Drains 3.583 Cooling Tests 3.605 Induction System General 3.606 Induction Systems de-icing and anti-icing provisions

Subpart F—EQUIPMENT

Landing Lights

3.699 Landing light installation

Subpart G—OPERATING LIMITATIONS AND INFORMATION

3.735 General

Limitations

3.737.1.1 Limitations

23.735 Brakes

The corresponding rule in CAR 3 is CAR 3.363.

There is no corresponding airworthiness criteria in the Airship Design Criteria.

Original Issue and Subsequent

Brake Replacement and Modified Parts

1. Related regulations and documents are:

a. Regulations

Acceptable means of compliance are found in 14 CFR, part 23. Additional specific information is listed below, including other regulatory material and advisory information. Part 23 sections may be used in showing compliance with the corresponding sections of the former CAR for airplanes where the CAR regulations are applicable. For convenience, the former CAR section reference is also shown in parenthesis following the part 23 section reference:

Part 21, § 21.15 Application for type certificate

Part 21, § 21.93 Classification of changes in type design (TC)

Part 21, § 21.113 Requirement of supplemental type certificate

Part 21, § 21.303 Replacement and modification parts

Part 23, § 23.55 Accelerate-stop distance

Part 23, § 23.75 (3.86) Landing

Part 23, § 23.143 (3.106) Controllability and maneuverability: General

Part 23, § 23.231 (3.144) Longitudinal stability and control

Part 23, § 23.233 (3.145) Directional stability and control

Part 23, § 23.493 (3.248) Braked roll conditions

Part 23, § 23.731 (3.361) Wheels

Part 23, § 23.735 (3.363) Brakes

Part 23, § 23.1301 (3.652) Function and installations

Part 23, § 23.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations

Part 23, Appendix D Wheel spin-up and spring back loads

Part 23, § 23.1529 and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Appendix G to Part 23

Part 135, Appendix A Additional airworthiness standards for 10 or more passenger airplanes

Part 45, § 45.14 Identification of critical components

Part 45, § 45.15 Replacement and modification parts

b. Advisory Circulars (AC's)

AC 23-8C “Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes.”

c. Technical Standard Order (TSO)

TSO-C26d “Aircraft Wheels, Brakes and Wheel/Brake Assemblies for Parts 23, 27 and 29 Aircraft, with Addendum 1,” October 14, 2004.

d. Industry Documents

SAE ARP 597D “Wheels and Brakes, Supplementary Criteria for Design for Endurance-Civil Transport Aircraft,” February 7, 2008.

SAE ARP 813B “Maintainability Recommendations for Aircraft Wheels and Brake Design,” February 1, 1995.

SAE AIR 1064D “Braking System Dynamics,” September 26, 2007.

SAE AS 1145B “Aircraft Brake Temperature Monitor System (BTMS),” February 1, 1998.

SAE ARP 1619A “Replacement and Modified Brakes and Wheels,” March 1, 2001.

2. Background

A review of recent replacement and modification wheel/brake system and installation approvals on part 23 airplanes has resulted in the need to provide FAA guidelines that clearly describe the changes and associated substantiation procedures involved. As contained herein, these guidelines will reflect on issues that have been identified by industry under ARP 1619A, which, in part, concerns the variance in compliance provisions associated with original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and non-OEM applicants. The guidelines will include: 1) a description of replacement or modified wheel, 2) wheel/brake parts or assembly changes, 3) a description and examples of associated "major" and "minor" changes, and 4) a description of corresponding laboratory and airplane flight tests needed to ensure that requested changes will result in a continued level of airplane safety and performance.

3. Classification of replacement and Modified Wheel/Brake Changes

a. Replacement of Wheel, Wheel/Brake Parts, or Assembly Changes

A replacement wheel, wheel/brake part, or an assembly change is classified as one in which either the included parts or assemblies that are being changed are of equivalent design. This will result in an equivalent level of certified type performance and safety to that shown by either the originally approved parts or assemblies. The change may be approved under a PMA by the provisions of part 21. Under part 21, § 21.303, an applicant may be eligible for approval of either PMA replacement parts or assemblies, or both, by showing compliance in accordance with the following methods, as applicable:

(1) Licensing Agreement

Applicant should provide evidence of a licensing agreement or equivalent with the holder of a TSOA, TC, or an STC with the submission of any design data covered by the licensing agreement, as determined by the FAA. See Order 8120.2G for procedure.

(2) Identicality

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