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Advisory Circular Current Issued Oct 27, 2014 AIR-626 123 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 25.1329-1C Approval of Flight Guidance Systems, Including Change 2

This advisory circular (AC) describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with certain requirements of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 25.1329, Flight guidance system. While part 25 contains the airworthiness standards applicable to transport category airplanes, the guidance in this AC pertains to the functions of autopilots, flight directors (FDs), and automatic thrust control as well as any interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions.

Official source ↗ Open PDF

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Approval of Flight Guidance Systems Date: AC No: 25.1329-1C Initiated By: AIR-626 Change: 2

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with certain requirements of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 25.1329, Flight guidance system. While part 25 contains the airworthiness standards applicable to transport category airplanes, the guidance in this AC pertains to the functions of autopilots, flight directors (FDs), and automatic thrust control as well as any interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions.

2. PRINCIPAL CHANGES. Change 2 provides clarification on the autopilot disengagement aural alert. Change 2 also provides clarification about potential hazards for systems without automatic disengagement to address the automatic trim response to an override of the autopilot. Change 2 also provides clarification about potential hazards caused by incompatible mode engagement. Change 2 updates references to related ACs and industry documents.

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3. WEBSITE AVAILABILITY. To access this AC electronically, you can go to either of the following sites:

a. http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/

b. https://drs.faa.gov/browse

Daniel J. Elgas Aviation Safety Director, Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft Certification Service

DANIEL J. ELGAS

Digitally signed by DANIEL J. ELGAS Date: 2026.02.13 09:19:22 -05'00'

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Approval of Flight Guidance Date: 5/24/16 AC No: 25.1329-1C Systems Initiated By: AFS-400 Change: 1

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with certain requirements of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1329, Flight guidance systems. While part 25 contains the airworthiness standards applicable to transport category airplanes, the guidance in this AC pertains to the functions of autopilots, flight directors, and automatic thrust control as well as any interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions.

2. PRINCIPLE CHANGES. Microwave landing systems (MLS) are no longer used in the U.S. National Airspace System. This change removes the terms “MLS” and “microwave landing system” from the AC. This change replaces pilot-not-flying (PNF) with pilot monitoring (PM).

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/s/

John S. Duncan Director, Flight Standards Service

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Approval of Flight Guidance Systems Date: 10/27/14 AC No: 25.1329-1C Initiated By: ANM-110

This advisory circular (AC) describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with certain requirements of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1329, Flight guidance systems. While part 25 contains the airworthiness standards applicable to transport category airplanes, the guidance in this AC pertains to the functions of autopilots, flight directors, and automatic thrust control as well as any interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions. This revision incorporates minor changes associated with issuance of the final rule for Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop, Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions.

If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the feedback form at the end of this AC.

/s/

Michael Kaszycki Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service

Paragraph Page

INTRODUCTION … 1

1. Purpose … 1

2. Applicability … 1

3. Cancellation … 1

4. Related Regulations, ACs, and Industry Documents … 1

a. Regulations … 1

b. Advisory Circulars … 2

c. Related Industry Standards … 4

d. Other FAA documents … 4

5—10 [RESERVED] … 5

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND … 6

11. General … 6

a. AC 25.1329-1C … 6

b. Scope … 6

12. Evolution of FGS … 6

a. Complexity … 6

b. Guidance considerations … 6

13—16 [RESERVED] … 6

CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEMS … 7

17. Purpose of FGS … 7

18. Components … 7

a. Included in definition … 7

b. Excluded from definition … 7

19. FGS Functions … 7

a. Elements of FGS … 7

b. Approach and landing system … 7

c. Flight management system (FMS) … 7

d. Design philosophy … 8

e. Description of FGS behavior and operation … 8

ii

CONTENTS

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

20. Compliance with § 25.1329 … 8

a. General … 8

b. Relevant paragraphs … 8

21—26 [RESERVED] … 8

CHAPTER 3. FGS ENGAGEMENT, DISENGAGEMENT, INDICATIONS, AND OVERRIDE .. 14

27. Autopilot Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications … 14

a. Autopilot engagement … 14

(1) Single switch action … 14

(2) Engagement status of autopilot … 14

(3) Multiple autopilots … 14

(4) Acceptable transients … 14

(5) FD not engaged … 14

(6) FD engaged … 14

b. Autopilot disengagement … 15

(1) General … 15

(2) Autopilot disengagement alerts … 16

(3) Quick disengagement control … 16

(4) Alternative means of autopilot disengagement … 17

(5) Flightcrew pitch trim input … 17

28. FD Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications … 18

a. FD engagement … 18

(1) General … 18

(2) Guidance cue(s) … 19

(3) Reactive windshear guidance system … 19

b. FD disengagement … 19

29. Autothrust Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications … 19

a. Autothrust engagement … 19

(1) Indication … 19

(2) Accessibility of controls … 19

iii

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

(3) Inadvertent engagement/disengagement … 19

(4) Automatic engagement … 19

b. Autothrust disengagement … 20

(1) Indication of disengagement … 20

(2) Inadvertent disengagement … 20

(3) Consequence of disengagement … 20

(4) Autothrust quick disengagement control … 20

30. Override of the FGS … 21

a. General … 21

b. Autopilot override … 21

(1) With automatic disengagement … 21

(2) Without automatic disengagement … 22

c. Autothrust override … 22

(1) Force required … 22

(2) Response to override … 22

(3) Engagement status with override … 23

31. FGS Engagement Mode Compatibility … 23

a. FGS mode engagement philosophy … 23

b. Engagement mode compatibility … 23

32—41 [RESERVED] … 23

CHAPTER 4. CONTROLS, INDICATIONS, AND ALERTS … 24

42. General … 24

a. Human-machine interface (HMI) … 24

b. Design of controls, indications, and alerts … 24

c. Evaluation of information provided by FGS … 24

43. FGS Controls … 24

a. General … 24

b. Design considerations … 24

(1) Differentiation of knob shape and position … 24

iv

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

(2) Design to support correct selection of target values … 24

(3) Commonality across aircraft types … 25

(4) Positioning of controls and related indications … 25

(5) Inadvertent operation … 25

44. FGS Mode Selection, Annunciation, and Indication … 25

a. Annunciation of engagement of the FGS … 25

b. Description of FGS modes … 25

c. FGS mode annunciations … 25

(1) Active and armed modes … 25

(2) Location … 25

(3) Discriminators … 26

(4) Color … 26

d. Mode changes … 26

(1) Operationally relevant mode changes … 26

(2) Attention-getting features … 26

(3) Use of alerts … 26

e. Failure to engage or arm … 26

f. FGS mode display and indications … 26

45. FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, Advisory, and Status … 27

a. General … 27

(1) Alerting provisions … 27

(2) Determination of FGS capability … 27

b. Speed protection alerts … 27

(1) Alerts to crew … 27

(2) Alert specifications … 27

(3) Consistency … 27

(4) Nuisance alerts … 27

c. Loss of autopilot approach mode … 27

d. Awareness of potential significant transient condition (“bark before bite”) … 28

(1) General … 28

v

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

(2) Flightcrew alert(s) … 28

(3) Situations to consider for an alert … 28

46. FGS Considerations for HUDs … 29

a. General … 29

b. Characteristics of HUD guidance … 29

(1) Supplemental use display system … 29

(2) External visual references … 29

(3) Interference and occlusion … 30

(4) Display criteria … 30

(5) Conformal symbology … 30

(6) Low-visibility approach … 30

(7) Clutter … 30

c. HUD/HDD compatibility … 30

(1) General … 30

(2) Consistency and compatibility … 30

d. Alerting issues … 31

(1) Alerts displayed on HUDs … 31

(2) Monochrome HUDs … 32

(3) Multi-color HUDs … 32

(4) Single HUD installation … 32

(5) Dual HUD installations … 32

(6) GPWS/TCAS on HUD … 32

e. Upset/unusual attitude recovery guidance … 33

(1) Guidance cues … 33

(2) Orientation cues … 33

47—51 [RESERVED] … 33

CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTION … 34

52. General … 34

a. Intended function … 34

vi

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

b. Effect of system tolerances … 34

53. Normal Performance … 34

a. General … 34

b. Conditions to consider … 34

c. Level of performance … 36

(1) Significant characteristics … 36

(2) Configuration changes … 36

(3) Compliance evaluation … 36

(4) Prescribed levels of performance … 36

(5) Equivalence of performance … 36

(6) Autopilot … 36

(7) Flight director … 36

(8) Autothrust … 36

(9) Automatic trim … 36

54. Performance in Rare Normal Conditions … 37

a. General … 37

(1) Range of conditions … 37

(2) Effect on performance … 37

b. Conditions to consider … 37

c. Level of performance … 38

(1) Performance standard … 38

(2) Autopilot authority limit … 39

(3) Masking of potential hazard … 39

55. Icing Considerations in Normal and Rare Normal Conditions … 39

a. Effect on performance … 39

b. Alerts … 39

c. Effect on speed protection … 39

56. Performance in Non-Normal Conditions … 39

a. General … 39

b. Conditions to consider … 39

vii

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

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c. Level of performance … 40

(1) Performance standard … 40

(2) Autopilot authority limit … 40

(3) Masking of potential hazard … 41

57. Speed Protection … 41

a. General … 41

(1) Speed excursions … 41

(2) Compliance with § 25.1329(h) … 41

(3) Design standard … 42

b. Low-speed protection … 42

(1) General … 42

(2) Factors to consider … 42

(3) Low-speed protection during approach operations … 43

(4) Windshear recovery guidance … 44

c. High-speed protection … 44

(1) General … 44

(2) Factors to consider … 44

58—61 [RESERVED] … 45

CHAPTER 6. CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIFIC MODES … 46

62. General … 46

63. Lateral Modes … 46

a. Heading or track hold … 46

b. Heading or track select … 46

c. LNAV mode … 46

(1) Lateral flight path … 46

(2) Automatic mode transitions … 46

(3) Takeoff or go-around (TOGA) … 46

64. Vertical Modes … 47

a. Target altitude selection … 47

viii

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

b. Vertical speed … 47

c. Flight path angle … 47

d. Indicated Airspeed/Mach Hold (speed on elevator) … 47

e. Indicated Airspeed/Mach Select (speed on elevator) … 47

f. Flight level change (speed on elevator) … 47

g. Altitude capture … 47

(1) Mode transition … 47

(2) Guidelines for Altitude Capture mode … 48

h. Altitude hold … 49

(1) Entering mode … 49

(2) Mode transition annunciation … 49

(3) Barometric pressure adjustment … 49

i. VNAV … 49

(1) FMS path … 49

(2) Climb or descent … 49

65. Multi-Axis Modes … 50

a. Takeoff mode … 50

(1) Vertical guidance … 50

(2) Lateral guidance … 50

(3) Rotation guidance … 50

(4) Autothrust … 50

(5) Operation and performance … 50

b. Go-around mode … 51

(1) Vertical elements … 51

(2) Speed … 51

(3) Autothrust … 51

(4) Engagement … 52

(5) All engine and engine out capability … 52

c. Approach mode … 52

(1) Final approach path … 52

ix

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

(2) Mode annunciations … 52

(3) Sub-modes … 52

(4) Mode engagement sequence … 52

66. Autothrust Modes … 52

a. Thrust mode … 52

b. Speed mode … 53

c. Retard mode … 53

67. Special Considerations for VNAV Approach Operations Related to Selecting a Target Altitude … 53

a. Approach operations … 53

b. VNAV path operations … 53

68. Control Wheel Steering (Control Steering through the Autopilot) … 53

a. General … 53

b. Design … 53

(1) Control forces … 53

(2) Bank and pitch attitudes … 53

(3) Control behavior … 54

(4) Stall and stall recovery … 54

(5) Adjustments to trim … 54

(6) Takeoff and landing … 54

(7) Automatic reversion to CWS mode … 54

c. Terminology and application of advisory material … 54

(1) Touch control steering … 55

(2) Supervisory override … 55

69. Special Considerations for the Integration of Fly-by-Wire Flight Control Systems and FGS … 55

a. Speed protection … 55

b. System degradation … 55

70—74 [RESERVED] … 55

x

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

CHAPTER 7. FGS INTEGRATION … 56

75. General … 56

76. System Integration Issues … 56

a. Common and cascading failure modes … 56

b. Risk of error … 56

c. System safety analysis … 56

77. Functional Interfaces … 56

a. Interfacing sensors … 56

b. Potential inconsistencies between systems … 57

c. Function and performance … 57

78—82 [RESERVED] … 57

CHAPTER 8. SAFETY ASSESSMENT … 58

83. General … 58

a. Basic safety requirements … 58

b. Safety assessment … 58

c. Validation of safety assessment … 58

d. Coordination with the FAA … 58

84. FGS Failure Conditions … 58

a. Functionality … 58

b. Effect of failure condition … 59

85. Type and Severity of Failure Conditions … 59

a. Types of failure conditions … 59

(1) Loss of function … 59

(2) Malfunction … 59

b. Cause … 59

c. Severity … 60

d. Assessment of failure conditions … 60

(1) Functional failures … 60

(2) Airframe loads … 60

(3) Assessing total effect of failure … 60

xi

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

86. Mitigation of Failure Conditions … 60

a. General … 60

b. Identification of methods … 61

c. FGS de-selection … 61

87. Validation of Failure Conditions … 61

a. General … 61

b. Validation options … 61

c. Validation methodology … 61

88. Specific Considerations … 62

a. FGS action during ground operations … 62

b. FGS operations in close proximity to the ground … 62

(1) Takeoff … 62

(2) Approach … 63

c. Cruise operations … 64

d. Asymmetric thrust during autothrust operation … 64

89. Failure to Disengage the FGS … 65

90—97 [RESERVED] … 65

CHAPTER 9. COMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATION USING FLIGHT TEST AND SIMULATION 66

98. General … 66

a. Methods of compliance demonstration … 66

b. Criteria for establishing compliance … 66

c. Elements of certification flight test … 66

d. Pilot-in-the-loop evaluation … 66

e. Other applicable guidance material for FGS takeoff and/or approach modes … 66

(1) Criteria to consider … 66

(2) Procedures to show compliance … 67

f. Relationship of AC chapters … 67

99. Performance Demonstration (Fault Free): § 25.1301 … 67

a. General … 67

xii

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

(1) Certification plan … 67

(2) Evaluating performance … 68

(3) Evaluating compatibility of mode controls, indications, and alerts … 68

b. Normal performance … 68

(1) Demonstration … 68

(2) Evaluation … 68

(3) Expected errors … 68

c. Performance in “other than normal” conditions … 68

(1) Test program … 68

(2) Evaluation of FGS … 69

(3) Additional guidance for windshear … 69

d. Specific performance conditions … 69

(1) Icing considerations … 69

(2) Low-speed protection … 70

(3) High-speed protection … 70

(4) Go-around … 70

(5) Steep approach (special authorization) … 71

(6) Indication of and response to an out-of-trim condition … 72

e. Flight director/head up display … 72

(1) General … 72

(2) Specific demonstrations for HUD … 73

(3) Simulator demonstration for HUD … 74

f. Flightcrew override of the FGS … 75

(1) Autopilot override … 75

(2) Autothrust override … 75

(3) Pitch trim system evaluation during autopilot override … 75

100. Failure Conditions Requiring Validation: § 25.1309 … 76

a. General … 76

(1) Safety assessment … 76

(2) Evaluation of failure conditions … 76

xiii

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

b. Validation elements … 76

(1) Assessment … 76

(2) Failure condition … 76

(3) Pilot recognition … 77

(4) Pilot reaction time … 78

(5) Pilot recovery … 79

c. Takeoff … 79

(1) Worst-case failure condition … 79

(2) Failures to be evaluated … 79

(3) On runway guidance … 79

d. Climb, cruise, descent, and holding … 79

e. Maneuvering … 79

f. Approach … 79

(1) Approach with vertical path reference … 80

(2) Approach without vertical path reference … 81

(3) Steep approach … 81

g. Specific conditions … 81

(1) Failure conditions to be evaluated … 81

(2) Failure to disengage … 81

101. Criteria Supporting Operational Use of Autopilot … 81

a. Typical flight operations … 81

b. Operations in close proximity to the ground … 82

(1) General … 82

(2) Considerations … 82

(3) Autopilot engagement altitude/height after takeoff … 82

(4) Autopilot engagement during approach … 83

(5) Circling approach … 85

c. Climb, cruise, descent, and holding … 85

d. Maneuvering … 85

102. Automatic Disengagement of the Autopilot … 85

xiv

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Paragraph Page

103. Assessment of Human Factors … 85

a. General … 85

b. Flight evaluations … 86

(1) During certification … 86

(2) Prior to certification … 86

(3) Credit to establish FGS compliance … 86

(4) Simulation versus flight tests … 86

c. Structured subjective evaluations … 87

d. Pilot training and experience … 87

e. Evaluating new or unique design features … 87

f. Certification planning documentation … 87

104—108 [RESERVED] … 87

CHAPTER 10. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL … 88

109. General … 88

a. AFM terminology … 88

b. Low-visibility operations … 88

110. Information Supporting Operational Use of Autopilot … 88

a. General … 88

b. Specifying a MUH … 88

c. Maximum displacement deviation … 88

111. Limitations … 89

112. Non-Normal/Emergency Procedures … 89

113. Normal Procedures … 89

a. Documentation of normal procedures … 89

b. Maximum displacement deviation … 89

c. Procedures for use of FGS in icing conditions … 89

d. Aircraft with published FCOMs … 89

e. Aircraft without published FCOMs … 89

xv

CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

APPENDICES

Number Page

A Safety Assessment … A-1

1. General … A-1

2. Identification of Failure Conditions … A-1

3. Considerations when Assessing the Severity of Failure Condition Effects .... A-2

4. Failure Condition Classification … A-3

B Definitions … B-1

C Acronyms … C-1

D Advisory Circular Feedback … D-1

TABLES

Number Page

1-1-1 Related 14 CFR Sections … 2

1-1-2 Related Advisory Circulars … 3

1-1-3 Related SAE Documents … 4

1-1-4 Related RTCA Documents … 4

2-1 Cross-References for § 25.1329 Paragraphs to AC Chapters … 8

5-1 Examples of Normal Conditions … 35

5-2 Examples of Rare Normal Conditions … 38

5-3 Examples of Non-Normal Conditions … 40

B-1 Terms and Definitions … B-1

C-1 Acronyms and Definitions … C-1

FIGURES

Number Page

9-1 Relationship between AC Chapters … 67

xvi

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This AC describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with certain requirements of 14 CFR 25.1329, Flight guidance systems. While part 25 contains the airworthiness standards applicable to transport category airplanes, the guidance in this AC pertains to the functions of autopilots, flight directors (FDs), and automatic thrust control, as well as any interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions.

2. Applicability.

a. The guidance provided in this document is directed to airplane manufacturers, modifiers, operators of certain transport category airplanes, foreign regulatory authorities, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) transport airplane type certificate engineers, and FAA designees.

b. This is a guidance document. Its content is not legally binding in its own right and will not be relied upon by the Department as a separate basis for affirmative enforcement action or other administrative penalty. Conformance with this guidance document is voluntary only. Nonconformity will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations. This document is intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. The guidance in this AC is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. It describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations. We will consider other methods of showing compliance that an applicant may elect to present. If the FAA becomes aware of circumstances in which following this AC would not result in compliance with the applicable regulations, the FAA may require additional substantiation or design changes as a basis for finding compliance.

3. Cancellation. This AC cancels AC 25.1329-1C Change 1, dated May 24, 2016.

4. Related Regulations, ACs, and Industry Documents. The following related documents are provided for information purposes and are not necessarily directly referenced in this AC.

a. Regulations. Table 1-1 identifies the related 14 CFR regulations that are referenced in this AC. The full text of these regulations can be downloaded from the U.S. Government Publishing Office e-CFR. A paper copy may be ordered from the U.S. Government Bookstore website.

Table 1-1. Related 14 CFR Sections

Controllability and Maneuverability—General

Control Systems—General

Trim systems

Motion and effect of cockpit controls

Installation

Function and installation

Equipment, systems, and installations

Supercooled large drop icing conditions

Airplane Flight Manual—Operating limitations

Title Section

Loads

Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems

§ 25.143

§ 25.301

§ 25.671

§ 25.672

§ 25.677

§ 25.777

§ 25.779

§ 25.781

§ 25.901

§ 25.903

§ 25.1301

§ 25.1303

§ 25.1309

§ 25.1322

§ 25.1420

§ 25.1581

§ 25.1583

§ 25.1585

Cockpit controls

Cockpit control knob shape

Engines

Flight and navigations instruments

Flightcrew alerting

Airplane Flight Manual—General

Airplane Flight Manual—Operating procedures

b. Advisory Circulars. Table 1-2 identifies the ACs that are related to the guidance in this AC. The table lists the latest version of each AC at the time of publication. If any AC is revised after publication of this AC, you should refer to the latest version for guidance. You can find the latest version at the FAA website.

Table 1-2. Related Advisory Circulars

AC 20-115D Airborne Software Development Assurance Using July 21, 2017 EUROCAE ED-12( ) and RTCA DO-178( )

AC 20-152A RTCA, Inc., Document RTCA/DO-254, Design October 7, 2022 Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware

AC 20-191 Airworthiness Approval of Airborne Systems used TBD for Takeoff, Precision Approach, Landing, and Rollout in Low-Visibility Conditions

AC 25-7D Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport May 4, 2018 Category Airplanes

AC 25-12 Airworthiness Criteria for the Approval of Airborne November 2, 1987 Windshear Warning Systems in Transport Category Airplanes

AC 25.1322-1 Flightcrew Alerting December 13, 2010

AC 120-118 Criteria for Approval/Authorization of All Weather July 2, 2018 Operations (AWO) for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout

Number Title Date

AC 20-138D Airworthiness Approval of Positioning and April 7, 2016 Change 2 Navigation Systems

AC 20-174 Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems September 30, 2011

AC 21-16G RTCA Document DO-160 versions D, E, F, and G, June 22, 2011 “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment”

AC 25-11B Electronic Flight Displays October 7, 2014

AC 25.1309-1B System Design and Analysis August 30, 2024

AC 25.1581-1 Airplane Flight Manual July 14, 1997 Change 1

AC 120-41 Criteria for Operational Approval of Airborne Wind November 11, 1983 Shear Alerting and Flight Guidance Systems (cancelled)

Note: This table identifies the latest version of each AC at the time of publication. If any AC is revised after publication of this AC, you should refer to the latest version for guidance.

c. Related Industry Standards.

(1) The following documents are available from the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). You can purchase these documents by mail from SAE Customer Service, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, 15096; by faxing your order information to (724) 776-0790; or from the SAE website.

Table 1-3. Related SAE Documents

SAE ARP4761A Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment

SAE ARP5366 Autopilot, Flight Director, and Autothrust Systems

Number Title

SAE ARP5288 Transport Category Airplane Head Up Display (HUD) Systems

SAE AS8055A Minimum Performance Standard for Airborne Head Up Display (HUD)

(2) The following documents are available from RTCA, Inc. (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics). You can purchase these documents from the RTCA website.

Table 1-4. Related RTCA Documents

RTCA DO-178C/ Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and EUROCAE ED-12C Equipment Certification

RTCA DO-254/ Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic EUROCAE ED-80 Hardware

Number Title

RTCA DO-160G/ Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for EUROCAE ED-14G Airborne Equipment

d. Other FAA Documents.

(1) Federal Aviation Administration Human Factors Team Report on: The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems, dated June 18, 1996, is available at the FAA website.

(2) FAA Order 8260.3D, United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS), dated February 16, 2018, is available at the FAA website.

5—10 [RESERVED]

Chapter 1. Background

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND

11. General.

a. AC 25.1329-1C. This revision incorporates minor changes associated with issuance of the final rule for Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop, Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions (79 FR 65508, November 4, 2014). Specifically, in this AC, the FAA added a reference to § 25.1420, Supercooled large drop icing conditions, in table 1-1; excepted “large drop icing” as an icing normal condition in table 5-1; and added “large drop icing” as a rare normal condition in table 5-2.

b. Scope. This advisory material provides information for flight guidance systems (FGS), which include any autopilot functions, FD functions, and automatic thrust control functions, as well as any interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions.

12. Evolution of FGS.

a. Complexity. There have been dramatic changes in technology and system design, which have resulted in much higher levels of integration, automation, and complexity. These changes have also redefined the allocation of functions and interfaces between systems. Relatively simple, dedicated systems have been replaced with digital multi-function systems with more modes and automatic changes in modes of operation. The introduction of fly-by-wire flight control systems has created new interface considerations for the FGS.

b. Guidance considerations. These new systems are capable of providing better performance, increased safety, and decreased workload. But, if designed without consideration for the criteria in this AC, these systems could also be confusing and not immediately intuitive for the flightcrew.

13—16 [RESERVED]

Chapter 2. Overview of Flight Guidance Systems

CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEMS

17. Purpose of FGS. The FGS is primarily intended to assist the flightcrew in the basic control and tactical guidance of the airplane. The system may also provide workload relief to the pilots and provide a means to fly a flight path more accurately to support specific operational requirements, such as reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) or required navigation performance (RNP).

18. Components.

a. Included in definition. For the purpose of this AC, the term “FGS” includes all the equipment necessary to accomplish the FGS function, including the sensors, computers, power supplies, servo-motors/actuators, and associated wiring. It includes any indications and controllers necessary for the pilot to manage and supervise the system.

b. Excluded from definition. Any equipment or component that remains mechanically connected to the primary flight controls or propulsion controls when the FGS is not in use is regarded as a part of the primary flight controls and propulsion system, and the provisions for such systems are applicable.

19. FGS Functions.

a. Elements of FGS.

(1) Flight guidance and control (for example, autopilot, FD displayed head down or head up).

(2) Autothrottle/autothrust systems. The term “autothrust” is generic in nature and includes power control systems for propeller driven airplanes.

(3) Interactions with stability augmentation and trim systems.

(4) Alerting, status, mode annunciation, and situation information associated with flight guidance and control functions.

b. Approach and landing system. The FGS includes those functions necessary to provide guidance and control in conjunction with an approach and landing system, such as the following:

(1) Instrument landing system (ILS).

(2) Ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) landing system (GLS).

c. Flight management system (FMS). The FGS also includes those functions necessary to provide guidance and control in conjunction with an FMS. The FGS does not include the flight planning and the generation of flight path and speed profiles tied to

waypoints and other flight planning aspects of the FMS. However, it does include the interface between the FMS and FGS necessary for the execution of flight path and speed commands.

d. Design philosophy. The applicant should establish, document, and follow a design philosophy that supports the intended operational use regarding FGS behavior, modes of operation, and the pilot interface with controls, indications, alerts, and mode functionality.

e. Description of FGS behavior and operation. A description of the FGS behavior and operation should be addressed from flightcrew and maintenance perspectives in appropriate documentation and training material.

20. Compliance with § 25.1329.

a. General. Subsequent chapters of this advisory material provide acceptable means of compliance with § 25.1329 and the applicability of other part 25 rules to FGS (for example, §§ 25.1301 and 25.1309). The demonstrated means of compliance may include a combination of analysis, laboratory testing, flight testing, and simulator testing. The applicant should coordinate with the FAA early in the certification program via a certification plan to reach agreement on the methods to be used to demonstrate compliance.

Note 1: This AC uses the terminology “should” and “should not” when discussing compliance to the AC itself, as the AC represents one, but not the only, method of complying with § 25.1329.

Note 2: This AC uses the terminology “must” and “may not” when discussing compliance to § 25.1329 and other specific rules, as compliance to a rule is not optional. In these cases, the AC text supplies a reference to the specific rule being discussed.

b. Relevant paragraphs. Table 2-1 lists the relevant paragraphs of § 25.1329 and indicates where acceptable means of compliance with each paragraph can be found within this AC.

Table 2-1. Cross-References for § 25.1329 Paragraphs to AC Chapters

14 CFR Section

§ 25.1329(a) Chapter 3

Quick disengagement controls for the autopilot FGS Engagement, Disengagement, and autothrust functions must be provided for Indications, and Override each pilot. The autopilot quick disengagement Paragraph 27, controls must be located on both control wheels Autopilot Engagement, (or equivalent). The autothrust quick Disengagement, and Indications disengagement controls must be located on the thrust control levers. Quick disengagement Paragraph 29, controls must be readily accessible to each pilot Autothrust Engagement, while operating the control wheel (or Disengagement, and Indications equivalent) and thrust control levers.

AC Chapter/Paragraph Reference

§ 25.1329(b) Chapter 3

The effects of a failure of the system to FGS Engagement, Disengagement, disengage the autopilot or autothrust functions Indications, and Override when manually commanded by the pilot must Paragraph 27, be assessed in accordance with the requirements Autopilot Engagement, of § 25.1309. Disengagement, and Indications

Paragraph 29,

Autothrust Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications

Paragraph 30,

Override of the FGS

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

Paragraph 89,

Failure to Disengage the FGS

§ 25.1329(c) Chapter 3

Engagement or switching of the flight guidance FGS Engagement, Disengagement, system, a mode, or a sensor may not cause a Indications, and Override transient response of the airplane’s flight path Chapter 8 any greater than a minor transient, as defined in paragraph (n)(1) of this section. Safety Assessment

§ 25.1329(d) Chapter 3

Under normal conditions, the disengagement of FGS Engagement, Disengagement, any automatic control function of a flight Indications, and Override guidance system may not cause a transient Chapter 4 response of the airplane’s flight path any greater than a minor transient. Controls, Indications, and Alerts

Paragraph 45,

FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, Advisory, and Status

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

14 CFR Section AC Chapter/Paragraph Reference

§ 25.1329(e) Chapter 3

Under rare normal and non-normal conditions, FGS Engagement, Disengagement, disengagement of any automatic control Indications, and Override function of a flight guidance system may not Chapter 4 result in a transient any greater than a significant transient, as defined in Controls, Indications, and Alerts paragraph (n)(2) of this section. Paragraph 45,

FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, Advisory, and Status

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

§ 25.1329(f) Chapter 4

The function and direction of motion of each Controls, Indications, and Alerts command reference control, such as heading Paragraph 43, select or vertical speed, must be plainly FGS Controls indicated on, or adjacent to, each control if necessary to prevent inappropriate use or confusion.

§ 25.1329(g) Chapter 4

Under any condition of flight appropriate to its Controls, Indications, and Alerts use, the flight guidance system may not produce Paragraph 45, hazardous loads on the airplane, nor create FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, hazardous deviations in the flight path. This Advisory, and Status applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a malfunction, and assumes that the Chapter 5 pilot begins corrective action within a Performance of Function reasonable period of time.

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

Chapter 9

Compliance Demonstration Using Flight Test and Simulation

14 CFR Section AC Chapter/Paragraph Reference

§ 25.1329(h) Chapter 5

When the flight guidance system is in use, a Performance of Function means must be provided to avoid excursions Paragraph 57, beyond an acceptable margin from the speed Speed Protection range of the normal flight envelope. If the airplane experiences an excursion outside this range, a means must be provided to prevent the flight guidance system from providing guidance or control to an unsafe speed.

§ 25.1329(i) Chapter 4

The flight guidance system functions, controls, Controls, Indications, and Alerts indications, and alerts must be designed to minimize flightcrew errors and confusion concerning the behavior and operation of the flight guidance system. Means must be provided to indicate the current mode of operation, including any armed modes, transitions, and reversions. Selector switch position is not an acceptable means of indication. The controls and indications must be grouped and presented in a logical and consistent manner. The indications must be visible to each pilot under all expected lighting conditions.

§ 25.1329(j) Chapter 3

Following disengagement of the autopilot, a FGS Engagement, Disengagement, warning (visual and auditory) must be provided Indications, and Override to each pilot and be timely and distinct from all Paragraph 27, other cockpit warnings. Autopilot Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

14 CFR Section AC Chapter/Paragraph Reference

14 CFR Section

§ 25.1329(k) Chapter 3

Following disengagement of the autothrust FGS Engagement, Disengagement, function, a caution must be provided to each Indications, and Override pilot. Paragraph 27,

Autopilot Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

§ 25.1329(l) Chapter 3

The autopilot may not create a potential hazard FGS Engagement, Disengagement, when the flightcrew applies an override force to Indications, and Override the flight controls. Paragraph 30,

Override of the FGS

Chapter 4

Controls, Indications, and Alerts

Paragraph 45,

FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, Advisory, and Status

Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

§ 25.1329(m) Chapter 3

During autothrust operation, it must be possible FGS Engagement, Disengagement, for the flightcrew to move the thrust levers Indications, and Override without requiring excessive force. The Paragraph 30, autothrust may not create a potential hazard Override of the FGS when the flightcrew applies an override force to the thrust levers. Chapter 8

Safety Assessment

AC Chapter/Paragraph Reference

§ 25.1329(n) Appendix B—Definitions

For purposes of this section, a transient is a disturbance in the control or flight path of the airplane that is not consistent with response to flightcrew inputs or environmental conditions.

(1) A minor transient would not significantly reduce safety margins and would involve flightcrew actions that are well within their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase in flightcrew workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.

(2) A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction in safety margins, an increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort to the flightcrew, or physical distress to the passengers or cabin crew, possibly including non-fatal injuries. Significant transients do not require, in order to remain within or recover to the normal flight envelope, any of the following:

(i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength.

(ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are greater than those specified in § 25.143(c).

(iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might result in further hazard to secured or non-secured occupants.

14 CFR Section AC Chapter/Paragraph Reference

Note 1: The text for each paragraph in § 25.1329 is included in this AC for reference only. Please refer to the actual text in part 25.

Note 2: § 25.143(d) is the appropriate paragraph of the regulation for a certification basis later than amendment 121.

21—26 [RESERVED]

Chapter 3. FGS Engagement, Disengagement, Indications, and Override

CHAPTER 3. FGS ENGAGEMENT, DISENGAGEMENT, INDICATIONS, AND OVERRIDE

27. Autopilot Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications. Autopilot engagement and disengagement should be accomplished in a manner consistent with other flightcrew procedures and tasks and should not require undue attention.

a. Autopilot engagement.

(1) Single switch action. Each pilot should be able to select the autopilot function of the FGS with a single switch action. The single switch action should engage both the pitch and roll axes.

(2) Engagement status of autopilot. The autopilot system should provide positive indication to the flightcrew that the system has been engaged. The selector switch position is not acceptable as a means of indication. See § 25.1329(i). Regardless of the method used, the engagement status (and changes in status) of the autopilot(s) should be clearly indicated and should not require undue attention or recall.

Note: If an operational need is identified for split-axis engagement, then annunciation or indication should be provided for each axis.

(3) Multiple autopilots. If a single autopilot within a multiple autopilot installation can be individually selected by the flightcrew, the engagement annunciation should reflect the flightcrew selection. It should not be possible for multiple autopilots to be engaged in different modes. For modes that use multiple autopilots, the additional autopilots may engage automatically at selection of the mode or after arming the mode. A means should be provided to determine that adequate autopilot capability exists to support the intended operation (for example, “Land 2” and “Land 3” are used in some aircraft).

(4) Acceptable transients. The engagement of the autopilot should be free of perceptible transients. Under dynamic conditions, including maneuvering flight, minor transients are acceptable. However, with normal operating conditions, significant transients may not occur. See § 25.1329(d).

(5) FD not engaged. Without a FD engaged, the initial lateral and vertical modes should be consistent with minimal disturbance from the flight path. For example, the lateral mode at engagement may roll the airplane to wings level, and then hold the airplane heading/track or maintain the existing bank angle (if in a normal range). A heading/track pre-select at engagement function may be provided, if precautions are taken to ensure that selection reflects the current intent of the flightcrew. The modes at engagement should be annunciated, and any associated selected target values should be displayed.

(6) FD engaged. With a FD engaged, the autopilot should engage in a mode consistent with (that is, the same as, or if that is not possible, then compatible with) the active FD mode of operation. Consideration should be given to the mode in which the autopilot will engage when large commands are present on either or both FDs. The following examples list some of these considerations:

(a) Should the autopilot retain the active FD mode or should it engage in the basic default mode?

(b) Are there any implications for current flight path references and targets?

(c) Is there any potential for flightcrew confusion and unintended changes in flight path or modes?

Note: The design should consider the possibility that the pilot may attempt to engage the autopilot outside of the normal flight envelope. It is not required that the autopilot compensate for unusual attitudes or other situations outside the normal flight envelope, unless that is part of the autopilot’s intended function.

b. Autopilot disengagement.

(1) General.

(a) Normal conditions. Under normal conditions, automatic or manual disengagement of the autopilot should be free of perceptible transients or out-of-trim forces that are not consistent with the maneuvers being conducted by the airplane at the time of disengagement. A disengagement in normal conditions may not result in a transient any greater than a minor transient. If multiple autopilots are engaged, any disengagement of an individual autopilot may not result in a transient any greater than a minor transient. See § 25.1329(d). The disengagement of an individual autopilot should not adversely affect the operation of the remaining engaged autopilot(s).

(b) Other than normal conditions. Under other than normal conditions (that is, rare normal or non-normal conditions), disengagement of the autopilot may not result in a transient any greater than a significant transient. See § 25.1329(e). (For a discussion of rare normal and non-normal conditions, see Chapter 5, Performance of Function, paragraph 54, Performance in Rare Normal Conditions, and paragraph 56, Performance in Non-Normal Conditions, of this AC.) The flightcrew should be able to respond to a significant transient without using any of the following:

1 Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength,

2 Forces greater than those given in § 25.143(d), or

3 Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might result in a hazard to secured or non-secured occupants.

(c) Potential for significant transient. The flightcrew should be made aware (via a suitable alerting or other indication) of conditions or situations (for example, continued out-of-trim) that could result in a significant transient at disengagement. (See Chapter 4, Controls, Indications, and Alerts, paragraph 45.d, Awareness of Potential Significant Transient Condition (“Bark before Bite”).)

Note: See appendix B for definitions of significant transient and minor transient. For a discussion of normal conditions, rare normal conditions, and non-normal conditions, see Chapter 5, paragraphs 53, 54, and 56, respectively, of this AC.

(2) Autopilot disengagement alerts.

(a) Alert type. Since it is necessary for a pilot to immediately assume manual control following disengagement (manual or automatic) of the autopilot, a warning (both visual and aural) must be given. See § 25.1329(j).

(b) Visual warning specifications. A timely visual warning, distinct from all other cockpit warnings, must be provided and must be located in the primary field of view for both pilots. See § 25.1329(j).

(c) Aural warning specifications. A timely aural warning must be provided and must be distinct from all other cockpit warnings. See § 25.1329(j). Even when the autopilot is disengaged by a pilot, it should sound long enough to ensure that it is heard and recognized by the pilot and other flightcrew members (at least a single cycle), but not so long that it adversely affects communication between crewmembers or is a distraction. The aural warning should continue until silenced by one of the following means:

1 Activation of the autopilot quick disengagement control.

2 Re-engagement of the autopilot.

3 Another acceptable means.

(d) Multiple autopilot system.

1 Disengagement of an autopilot channel within a multiple-channel autopilot system, downgraded system capability, or a reduction in the level of system redundancy that requires immediate flightcrew awareness and possible timely action should cause a caution alert to be issued to the flightcrew.

2 Disengagement of an autopilot channel within a multiple-channel autopilot system that requires only flightcrew awareness should cause a suitable advisory alert to be issued to the flightcrew.

(3) Quick disengagement control.

(a) Purpose. The purpose of the quick disengagement control is to ensure the capability for each pilot to manually disengage the autopilot quickly with a minimum of pilot hand/limb movement.

(b) Location. The quick disengagement control must be located on each control wheel or equivalent. See § 25.1329(a). It should be within easy reach of one or more fingers/thumb of the pilot’s hand when the hand is in a position for normal use on the control wheel or equivalent.

(c) Criteria. The quick disengagement control:

1 Must be operable with one hand on the control wheel or equivalent and the other hand on the thrust levers. See § 25.1329(a).

2 Should be accessible and operable from a normal hands-on position without requiring a shift in hand position or grip on the control wheel or equivalent.

3 Should be easily locatable by the pilot without having to first locate the control visually.

4 Should be designed so that any action to operate the quick disengagement control should not cause an unintended input to the control wheel (or equivalent).

5 Should be designed to minimize inadvertent operation and interference from other nearby control wheel (or equivalent) switches/devices, such as radio control or trim.

Note: When establishing location of the quick disengagement control, consideration should be given to its accessibility with large displacements of or forces on the control wheel (or equivalent) and the possible need to operate the quick disengagement control with the other hand.

(4) Alternative means of autopilot disengagement.

(a) Factors to consider. When a § 25.1309 assessment shows a need for an alternative means of disengagement, the following factors should be addressed:

1 Independence from primary quick disengagement control.

2 Whether alternative means are readily accessible to each pilot.

3 Reliability and the possibility of latent failure of those alternative means.

(b) Acceptable means. The following means of providing an alternative disengagement have been found to be acceptable:

1 Selecting the engagement control to the “off” position.

2 Disengaging the bar on mode select panel (MSP).

3 Activating the trim switch on the yoke.

Note: Use of circuit breakers as a means of disengagement is not considered acceptable.

(5) Flightcrew pitch trim input. If the autopilot is engaged and the pilot applies manual pitch trim input, and the autopilot is designed to disengage because of that flightcrew action, the autopilot must disengage with no more than a minor transient. See § 25.1329(c). Alternatively, pitch trim changes may be inhibited, such that the potential for a transient is removed.

28. FD Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications. Engagement and disengagement of the FD should be accomplished consistent with other flightcrew procedures and tasks and should not require undue attention.

a. FD engagement.

(1) General.

(a) Selection. A means may be provided for each pilot to select (that is, turn on) and de-select (that is, turn off) the FD for display on his or her primary flight display (PFD).

(b) Engagement. A FD is considered “engaged” if it is selected and displaying guidance cues.

Note: The distinction is made between “engaged” and “selected” because the FD might be selected but not displaying guidance cue(s) (for example, the cue(s) are biased out of view).

(c) Engagement status of FD. The selection status of the FD and the source of FD guidance should be clear and unambiguous. Failure of a selected FD should be clearly annunciated.

(d) Multiple FDs. If there are multiple FDs and if necessary for crew awareness, indications should be provided to denote which FD is engaged (for example, FD1, FD2, HUD). For airplanes with multiple FDs installed, all engaged FDs should always be in the same armed and active FGS modes. The selection status of each FD should be clear and unambiguous for each pilot. In addition, indications should be provided to denote loss of FD independence (for example, first officer selection of captain’s FD).

(e) Autopilot engaged. A FD should engage into the current modes and targets of an already engaged autopilot or FD, if any. With no autopilot engaged, the basic modes at engagement of the FD functions should be established consistent with typical flight operations.

Note: The engagement of the pitch axis in Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle and engagement of the lateral axis in Heading Hold, Heading Select, or Bank Angle Hold have been found to be acceptable.

(f) HUD. Since the head up display (HUD) can display flight guidance, the HUD guidance mode should be indicated to both pilots and should be compatible with the active head down FD mode.

(g) Maneuvering flight. Engagement during maneuvering flight should be considered.

Note: The design should consider the safety consequences if it is possible for the FD to engage outside of the normal flight envelope. It is not required that the FD should compensate for unusual attitudes or other situations outside the normal flight envelope, unless that is part of the FD’s intended function.

(2) Guidance cue(s).

(a) Display. The FD command guidance cue(s) will typically be displayed under the following conditions:

1 When the FD is selected and valid command guidance is available, or

2 When the FD is automatically providing guidance. (See paragraph 28.a(3) below.)

(b) Engagement indication. The display of guidance cue(s) (for example, FD bars) is sufficient indication that the FD is engaged.

(c) Invalid guidance. The FD guidance cue(s) should be removed when guidance is determined to be invalid.

(3) Reactive windshear guidance system. For airplanes equipped with a FD windshear guidance system, FD engagement should be provided consistent with the criteria in the current editions of AC 25-12 and AC 120-41.

b. FD disengagement. There should be a means for each pilot to readily de-select his or her on-side FD function. Flightcrew awareness of disengagement and de-selection is important. Removal of guidance cue(s) alone is not sufficient indication of de-selection because the guidance cue(s) may be removed from view for a number of reasons, including invalid guidance or autopilot engagement. Therefore, the FD function should provide clear and unambiguous indication to the flightcrew that the function has been de-selected.

29. Autothrust Engagement, Disengagement, and Indications. Engagement and disengagement should be accomplished in a manner consistent with other flightcrew procedures and tasks and should not require undue attention.

a. Autothrust engagement.

(1) Indication. The autothrust function must provide the flightcrew positive indication that the system has been engaged. See § 25.1329(i).

(2) Accessibility of controls. The autothrust engagement controls should be accessible to each pilot.

(3) Inadvertent engagement/disengagement. The autothrust function should normally be designed to prevent inadvertent engagement and inadvertent application of thrust for both on-ground and in-air operations. For example, separate arm and engage functions may be provided.

(4) Automatic engagement. Intended automatic engagement, such as a “wake up” mode to protect for unsafe speeds, may be acceptable. (See Chapter 5, paragraph 57.b, Low-Speed Protection, of this AC.) If such automatic engagement occurs, it should be clear to the flightcrew that automatic engagement has occurred. The automatic engagement may not

cause a transient larger than a minor transient. See § 25.1329(c). The transition to the engaged state should be smooth, and should not cause large, unexpected changes in pitch attitudes or pitching moments. The reason for automatic engagement should be clear and obvious to the flightcrew.

Note: The design should consider the possibility that the pilot may attempt to engage the autothrust function outside of the normal flight envelope or at excessive or too low engine thrust. It is not expected that the autothrust feature should compensate for situations outside the normal flight envelope or normal engine operation range, unless that is part of the intended function of the autothrust system.

b. Autothrust disengagement.

(1) Indication of disengagement. Positive indication of disengagement of the autothrust function must result in a caution alert to the flightcrew. See § 25.1329(k). The autothrust “engage” status annunciations should be removed.

(a) Visual indication.

1 Following automatic disengagement: Visual indication of disengagement should persist until canceled by flightcrew action.

2 Following manual disengagement: If an aural alert is provided, visual indication of disengagement should persist for some minimum period. If an aural alert is not provided, visual indication of disengagement should persist until canceled by flightcrew action.

(b) Aural alert. If provided, the aural disengagement alert should be of sufficient duration and volume to assure that the flightcrew has been alerted that disengagement has occurred. However, an extended cycle of an aural alert is not acceptable following disengagement, if such an alert can significantly interfere with flightcrew coordination or radio communication.

(2) Inadvertent disengagement. The autothrust normally should be designed to preclude inadvertent disengagement during activation of autothrust modes of operation.

(3) Consequence of disengagement. Under normal conditions, autothrust disengagement may not cause a transient any greater than a minor transient. See § 25.1329(d). The transition to the disengaged state should be smooth and not cause unexpected changes in pitch attitude or pitching moment or a significant thrust transient. The disengagement should not preclude, inhibit, or interfere with timely thrust changes for go-around, landing, or other maneuvers requiring manual thrust changes.

(4) Autothrust quick disengagement control. Autothrust quick disengagement controls must be provided for each pilot on the respective thrust control (thrust lever or equivalent). A single-action, quick disengagement switch must be incorporated on the thrust control, so that switch activation can be executed when the pilot’s other hand is on the control wheel (or equivalent). See § 25.1329(a). The disengagement control should be positioned such

that inadvertent disengagement of the autothrust function is unlikely. Positioning the control on the outboard side has been shown to be acceptable for multi-engine aircraft. Thrust lever knob, end-mounted disengagement controls available on both sides to facilitate use by either pilot have been shown to be preferable to those positioned to be accessible by the pilot’s palm.

30. Override of the FGS.

a. General. An override of an engaged FGS function is defined as an action taken by the flightcrew intended to prevent, oppose, or alter an operation being conducted by the FGS function without first disengaging that function.

b. Autopilot override.

(1) With automatic disengagement.

(a) Override force. The autopilot should disengage when the flightcrew applies a significant override force to the controls. The applicant should interpret “significant” as a force that is consistent with an intention to overpower the autopilot by either or both pilots. The autopilot should not disengage by minor application of force to the controls, such as a pilot gently bumping the control column while entering or exiting a pilot seat during cruise.

Note: Twenty-five pounds (25 lbs) of force at the control column or wheel has been determined to be a significant override force level for other than approach operations on some aircraft types. To reduce nuisance disengagement, higher forces have been found acceptable for certain approach, landing, and go-around operations on some aircraft. The force to disengage an autopilot is not necessarily the force required at the column to oppose autopilot control, that is, to cause elevator movement. The corresponding forces for a sidestick controller may be different.

(b) Transients resulting from override. In normal operating conditions, a transient larger than a minor transient may not result from autopilot disengagement when the flightcrew applies an override force to the controls. See § 25.1329(d). Mitigation may be accomplished through provision of an appropriate alert and flightcrew procedure.

(c) Sustained override force below level required for automatic disconnect. Sustained application of force below the disengagement threshold may not result in a potential hazard. See § 25.1329(l). For example, the automatic trim should not run to oppose the override of the autopilot by the flightcrew that would result in unacceptable airplane motion, if the autopilot were to automatically disengage or be manually disengaged.

(2) Without automatic disengagement.

(a) Potential hazard. If the FGS is not designed to disengage in response to any override force, then the response to an override may not result in a potential hazard. Sustained application of an override force may not result in a potential hazard, such as when the flightcrew abruptly releases the force on the controls. See § 25.1329(l). Mitigation of the potential hazard may be accomplished through provision of an appropriate alert and flightcrew procedure. During sustained application of an override force, the automatic trim should not run to oppose the flightcrew commands in any manner that would result in unacceptable airplane motion.

Note: The term “sustained application of override force” is intended to describe a force that is applied to the controls, which may be small, slow, and sustained for some period of time. This may be due to an inadvertent crew action or may be an intentional crew action meant to “assist” the autopilot in a particular maneuver. (See Chapter 9, Compliance Demonstration Using Flight Test and Simulation, paragraph 99.f, Flightcrew Override of the FGS, of this AC for more information.)

(b) Transients resulting from override. In normal operating conditions, a transient larger than a minor transient may not result from manual autopilot disengagement after the flightcrew has applied an override force to the controls. See § 25.1329(d). Mitigation may be accomplished through provision of an appropriate alert and flightcrew procedure.

Note 1: The term “override force” is intended to describe a pilot action that is intended to prevent, oppose, or alter an operation being conducted by a flight guidance function without first disengaging that function. One possible reason for this action could be an avoidance maneuver, such as responding to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisory that requires immediate action by the flightcrew and would typically involve a rapid and forceful input from the flightcrew.

Note 2: For control wheel steering considerations, see Chapter 6, Characteristics of Specific Modes, paragraph 68, Control Wheel Steering (Control Steering through the Autopilot), of this AC.

c. Autothrust override.

(1) Force required. It should be possible for the pilot to readily override the autothrust function and set thrust by moving the thrust levers (or equivalent) with one hand.

(2) Response to override. The autothrust response to a flightcrew override may not create a potential hazard. See § 25.1329(m). The autothrust response to the flightcrew override should not result in an abrupt change of pitch attitude, an abrupt pitching moment, or an uncontrolled change of thrust.

(3) Engagement status with override. Autothrust functions may be designed to remain safely engaged during pilot override. Alternatively, autothrust functions may disengage as a result of pilot override, provided that the design prevents unintentional autothrust disengagement and adequately alerts the flightcrew to ensure pilot awareness.

31. FGS Engagement Mode Compatibility.

a. FGS mode engagement philosophy. A description of the philosophy used for the mode at engagement of the autopilot, FD, and autothrust functions should be provided in flightcrew training material.

b. Engagement mode compatibility. It should not be possible to select incompatible FGS command or guidance functions, such as commanding speed through elevator and autothrust at the same time. The FGS command or guidance functions should also not allow engagement by flightcrew selection, or automatic transition during a failure, into incompatible or unintended modes of operation, or a mode inappropriate for the phase of flight that may result in a potential hazard (ex., ALT pitch mode for takeoff). The hazard resulting from unintended mode transitions due to failures should be assessed in accordance with the requirements of § 25.1309.

32—41 [RESERVED]

Chapter 4. Controls, Indications, and Alerts

CHAPTER 4. CONTROLS, INDICATIONS, AND ALERTS

42. General.

a. Human-machine interface (HMI). The HMI with the FGS is crucial to ensuring safe, effective, and consistent FGS operation. The manner in which FGS information is depicted to the flightcrew is vital to flightcrew awareness and, therefore, to safe operation of the FGS.

b. Design of controls, indications, and alerts. These features must be designed to minimize flightcrew errors and confusion. See § 25.1329(i). Indications and alerts should be presented in a manner compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flightcrew and provide the necessary information to perform those tasks. The indications must be grouped and presented in a logical and consistent manner and must be visible from each pilot’s station under all expected lighting conditions. See § 25.1329(i). The choice of colors, fonts, font size, location, orientation, movement, graphical layout, and other characteristics—such as steady or flashing— should all contribute to the effectiveness of the system. Controls, indications, and alerts should be implemented in a consistent manner.

c. Evaluation of information provided by FGS. It is recommended that the applicant evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the information provided by the FGS interface—that is, the controls, indications, alerts, and displays—to ensure flightcrew awareness of FGS behavior and operation. See Chapter 9 of this AC for more discussion of appropriate analyses, which may include, for example, cognitive task analysis as a basis for evaluation.

43. FGS Controls.

a. General. The FGS controls must be designed and located to prevent crew errors, confusion, and inadvertent operation. See § 25.1329(i). They should be designed to provide convenience of operation to each crewmember. The function and direction of motion of each control must be readily apparent or plainly indicated on or adjacent to each control, if needed to prevent inappropriate use or confusion. See § 25.1329(f). Sections 25.777(b) and 25.779(a) provide requirements regarding direction of motion of flight deck controls. These requirements apply for FGS command reference controls that select target values, such as heading select or vertical speed. Section 25.781 also provides requirements for the shapes of the knobs.

b. Design considerations. The design of the FGS should address the following specific considerations:

(1) Differentiation of knob shape and position. Errors by the flightcrew have included confusing speed and heading knobs on the MSP.

(2) Design to support correct selection of target values. Use of a single control, such as concentric controls, for selecting multiple command reference targets has resulted in erroneous target value selection.

(3) Commonality across aircraft types. Use of uniform control design in different aircraft prevents negative transfer of learning with respect to operation of the controls. Using knowledge about the operation of the controls on one type of airplane has resulted in activation of the incorrect control when pilots moved from that type of airplane to another type of airplane. An example of this is confusion between the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) button and the autothrust disengagement button when transitioning between aircraft types with differing designs and locations for these controls.

(4) Positioning of controls and related indications. Individual FGS controls, flight mode annunciator (FMA), and related PFD information should be positioned so that, as much as reasonably practical, items of related function have similarly related positions. Misinterpretation and confusion have occurred due to the inconsistent arrangement of FGS controls with the annunciations on the FMA.

(5) Inadvertent operation. The FGS controls must be located to discourage or avoid inadvertent operation, such as inadvertent engagement or disengagement. See § 25.777(a). Further design aspects of the FGS controls, other than location of the controls, should also be used to discourage or avoid inadvertent operation. Examples include the shape of the control and the force required for operation.

44. FGS Mode Selection, Annunciation, and Indication.

a. Annunciation of engagement of the FGS. Engagement of the FGS functions must be suitably annunciated to each pilot. See § 25.1329(i). Guidance is provided in Chapter 3, FGS Engagement, Disengagement, Indications, and Override, of this AC.

b. Description of FGS modes. The operator should be provided with appropriate descriptions of the FGS modes and their behaviors.

c. FGS mode annunciations. Mode annunciation must indicate the state of the system. See § 25.1329(i). Mode annunciation should be presented in a manner compatible with flightcrew procedures/tasks and be consistent with the mode annunciation design for the specific aircraft type. That is, the mode annunciation should be compatible with other flight deck systems mode annunciations. Mode selector switch position or status is not acceptable as the sole means of mode annunciation. See § 25.1329(i). Modes and mode changes should be depicted in a manner that achieves flightcrew attention and awareness.

(1) Active and armed modes. The FGS mode annunciations must effectively and unambiguously indicate the active and armed modes of operation. See § 25.1329(i). The mode annunciation should convey explicitly, and as simply as possible, what the FGS is doing (for active modes), what it will be doing (for armed modes), and target information (such as selected speed, heading, and altitude) for satisfactory flightcrew awareness.

(2) Location. Mode annunciations should be located in the forward field of view. For example, a suitable location is on the PFD. Engaged modes should be annunciated at different locations than armed modes to assist in mode recognition.

(3) Discriminators. Color, font type, font size, location, highlighting, and symbol flashing have historical precedent as good discriminators, when implemented appropriately. The fonts and font size should be chosen so that annunciation of FGS mode and status information is readable and understandable without eyestrain when viewed by the pilot seated at the design eye position. The use of graphical or symbolic (that is, non-textual) indications is acceptable. Implementation of such discriminators should follow accepted guidelines, as described in applicable international standards (such as AC 25-11B, Electronic Flight Displays), and should be evaluated for their consistency and integration with the flight deck design.

(4) Color. Color should be used in a consistent manner and assure compatibility with the overall use of color on the flight deck. Specific colors should be used such that the FGS displays are consistent with other flight deck systems, such as a FMS. The use of monochrome displays is not precluded, provided that the aspects of flightcrew attention and awareness are satisfied. Engaged modes should be annunciated with different colors than armed modes to assist in mode recognition.

d. Mode changes.

(1) Operationally relevant mode changes. Mode changes that are operationally relevant—especially mode reversions and sustained speed protection—should be clearly and positively annunciated to ensure flightcrew awareness. Altitude Capture is an example of an operationally relevant mode that should be annunciated because pilot actions during that brief time the mode is operational may have different effects on the airplane. Annunciation of sustained speed protection should be clear and distinct to ensure flightcrew awareness. The FGS sub-modes that are not operationally relevant (for example, sub-modes as the FGS transitions from instrument landing system Localizer (LOC) Capture to Localizer Track) need not be annunciated.

(2) Attention-getting features. The transition from an armed mode to an engaged mode should provide an additional attention-getting feature, such as boxing and flashing on an electronic display (see AC 25-11B) for a suitable, but brief, period (for example, 10 seconds) to assist in flightcrew awareness. Aural notification of mode changes should be limited to special considerations.

(3) Use of alerts. In-service experience has shown that mode annunciation alone may be insufficient—unclear or not compelling enough—to communicate mode changes to the flightcrew, especially in high workload situations. Therefore, the safety consequences of the flightcrew not recognizing mode changes should be considered. If necessary, an appropriate alert should be used.

e. Failure to engage or arm. The failure of a mode to engage or arm when selected by the pilot should be apparent.

f. FGS mode display and indications. Mode information provided to the flightcrew should be sufficiently detailed, so that the consequences of the interaction between the FGS and the flightcrew can be determined unambiguously. The FGS interface should provide timely and

positive indication when the FGS deviates from the pilot’s direct commands (for example, a target altitude or speed setting) or from the pilot’s pre-programmed set of commands (for example, waypoint crossing). The interface should also provide clear indication when there is a difference or conflict between pilot-initiated commands. An example would be when a pilot engages positive vertical speed and then selects an altitude that is lower than the aircraft altitude. The default action taken by the FGS should be made apparent.

45. FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, Advisory, and Status.

a. General.

(1) Alerting provisions. Alerting information must follow the provisions of § 25.1322. The advisory material associated with § 25.1322 should be consulted. Alerts for FGS engagement and disengagement are described in Chapter 3 of this AC.

(2) Determination of FGS capability. There should be some method for the flightcrew to determine and monitor the availability or capability of the FGS (for example, prior to dispatch), where the intended operation is predicated on the use of the FGS. The method of monitoring provided should take into account the hazard resulting from the loss of the autopilot function for the intended operation.

b. Speed protection alerts.

(1) Alerts to crew. To assure crew awareness, an alert should be provided when a sustained speed protection condition is detected. This is in addition to any annunciations associated with mode reversions that occur as a consequence of invoking speed protection. (See Chapter 5, paragraph 57, Speed Protection, of this AC).

(2) Alert specifications.

(a) Low-speed protection. Low-speed protection alerts should include both an aural and a visual component.

(b) High-speed protection. High-speed protection alerts need include only a visual alert component because of existing high-speed aural alert requirements. However, giving an alert prior to that required aural alert is not precluded. See § 25.1303(c)(1) for overspeed alerting regulations.

(3) Consistency. Alerts for speed protection should be consistent with the protection provided and with the other alerts in the flight deck.

(4) Nuisance alerts. Care should be taken to set appropriate values for indicating speed protection that would not be considered a nuisance for the flightcrew.

c. Loss of autopilot Approach mode. The loss of the Approach mode requires immediate flightcrew awareness. This may be accomplished through autopilot disengagement described in this AC and AC 20-191. If the autopilot remains engaged and reverts to a non-approach mode, an appropriate aural and/or visual alert should be provided.

d. Awareness of potential significant transient condition (“bark before bite”).

(1) General. There have been situations where an autopilot was engaged, operating normally, and controlling up to the limit of its authority for an extended period of time, and the flightcrew was unaware of the potential hazard. This service experience has shown that, without timely flightcrew awareness and action, such a situation can progress to a loss of control after autopilot disengagement, particularly in rare normal or non-normal conditions. However, with adequate flightcrew awareness and pilot action, loss of control may be prevented.

(2) Flightcrew alert(s). To help ensure flightcrew awareness and timely action, appropriate alert(s)—normally a caution or warning—should be provided to the flightcrew for conditions that could require exceptional piloting skill or alertness for manual control following autopilot disengagement (for example, significantly out-of-trim conditions). The number and type of alerts required should be determined by the unique situations that are being detected and by the crew procedures required to address those situations. Any alert should be clear and unambiguous and should be consistent and compatible with other flight deck alerts. Care should be taken to set appropriate thresholds for these alerts so that they are not considered a nuisance for the flightcrew.

(3) Situations to consider for an alert.

(a) Sustained lateral control command. If the autopilot is holding a sustained lateral control command, it could be indicative of an unusual operating condition for which the autopilot is compensating. Examples of such unusual operating conditions are asymmetric lift and/or drag due to asymmetric icing, fuel imbalance, or asymmetric thrust. In the worst case, the autopilot may be operating at or near its full authority in one direction. If the autopilot were to disengage while holding this lateral trim, the result would be that the airplane could undergo a rolling moment that could possibly take the pilot by surprise. Therefore, a timely alert should be considered to permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot and take control prior to any automatic disengagement that might result from the condition.

(b) Sustained pitch command. If the autopilot is holding sustained pitch command, it could be indicative of an unusual operating condition (for example, inoperative automatic horizontal trim) for which the autopilot is compensating. If the autopilot were to disengage while holding this pitch command, the result would be that the airplane could undergo an abrupt change in pitch that could possibly take the pilot by surprise. Therefore, a timely alert should be considered to permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot and take control prior to any automatic disengagement that might result from the condition.

(c) Bank and pitch angles. Most autopilots are designed with operational limits in both the pitch and roll axes, such that those predetermined limits will not be purposely exceeded. If the airplane exceeds those limits, it could be indicative of a situation that requires the pilot to intervene. Such a situation may not be covered by paragraphs 45.d(3)(a) or 45.d(3)(b) above. Therefore, a timely alert should bring this condition to the attention of the flightcrew and permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot and take control prior to any automatic disengagement that might result.

(4) Automatic disengagement. It is preferable that the autopilot remains engaged during out-of-trim conditions. However, if there is an automatic disengagement feature due to excessive out-of-trim, an alert should be generated and should precede any automatic disengagement with sufficient margin to permit timely flightcrew recognition and manual disengagement. See also Chapter 3, paragraph 30, Override of the FGS, of this AC for related material.

Note 1: This paragraph is not intended to require alerting for all instances of automatic autopilot disengagement. It is intended only for conditions that would, if not addressed, lead to disengagement that could result in a significant transient (or greater) for which the pilot may be unprepared. The intent is to provide crew awareness that would allow the flightcrew to be prepared with hands on controls and take appropriate corrective action before the condition results in a potentially hazardous airplane configuration or state.

Note 2: This paragraph describes alerting requirements for conditions resulting in unintended out-of-trim operation. There are FGS functions that can intentionally produce out-of-trim conditions. Examples would be parallel rudder operation in align or engine failure compensation modes, pitch trim operation during the approach/landing to provide trim up/flare spring bias, and pitch trim operation for certain types of speed/Mach trim systems. It is not the intent of this paragraph to require alerts for functions producing intentional out-of-trim conditions. Other system indications (for example, mode and status annunciations) should be provided to make the crew aware of the operation of these functions, where appropriate.

46. FGS Considerations for HUDs.

a. General. HUDs have unique characteristics compared to flight displays installed on the instrument panel. Most of these HUD differences are addressed during HUD certification, whether or not the HUD provides flight guidance functions. The intent of this chapter is to address how such HUD differences may affect FGS functions. (See SAE ARP5288 for further information on this subject. See paragraph 4.c of this AC for information on how to obtain SAE documents.)

b. Characteristics of HUD guidance.

(1) Supplemental use display system. If the HUD is designed as a supplemental use display system, it does not replace the requirement for standard head down display (HDD) of flight instrument data. The HUD is intended for use during takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing under day, night, visual meteorological conditions (VMC), and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). When it can be reasonably expected that the pilot will operate primarily by reference to the HUD, it should be shown that the HUD is satisfactory for manually controlling the airplane and for monitoring the performance of the FGS.

(2) External visual references. During takeoff and landing in certain light and visibility conditions, HUD symbology can be extremely dominant in comparison to external

visual references. When visual references are relatively dim, extremely active symbology dynamics and guidance cue gains can lead the pilot to make excessively strong corrections. It should be shown that—if HUD guidance cues are followed regardless of the appearance of external visual references—they do not cause the pilot to take unsafe actions.

(3) Interference and occlusion. It should be shown that there is no interference between the indications of primary flight information and the flight guidance cues. In takeoff, approach, and landing FGS modes, the flight guidance symbology should have occlusion priority. That is, the flight guidance symbology should not be obscured or covered by the primary flight information. The HUD guidance symbology should not excessively interfere with pilots’ forward view, ability to visually maneuver the airplane, acquire opposing traffic, and see the runway environment.

(4) Display criteria. Generally, the criteria for the mechanization of guidance displayed on the HUD should be no different than for guidance displayed on the HDD. See Chapter 5 of this AC.

(5) Conformal symbology. Unlike HDDs, HUDs are capable of displaying certain symbology conformal to the outside scene, including guidance cues. Consequently, the range of motion of this conformal symbology, including the guidance cues, can present certain challenges in rapidly changing and high crosswind conditions. In certain cases, the motion of the guidance and the primary reference cue may be limited by the field of view. It should be shown that, in such cases, the guidance remains usable and that there is a positive indication that it is no longer conformal with the outside scene.

(6) Low-visibility approach. The HUD guidance is often used in cases, like the lowvisibility approach, where the pilot will need to reference both the information displayed on the HUD and outside references. Consequently, it should be shown that the location and presentation of the HUD information does not distract the pilot or obscure the pilot’s outside view. For example, it would be necessary for the pilot to track the guidance to the runway without having the view of runway references or hazards along the flight path obscured by the HUD symbology.

(7) Clutter. The HUD display should present flight guidance information in a clear and unambiguous manner. Display clutter should be minimized. Some flight guidance data elements are essential or critical and should not be removed by any de-clutter function.

c. HUD/HDD compatibility.

(1) General. The HUD FGS symbology should be compatible and consistent with symbology on other FGS displays such as head down electronic flight instruments. The FGS-related display parameters should be consistent to avoid misinterpretation of similar information, but the display presentations need not be identical. The HUD and head down PFD formats and data sources need to be compatible to ensure that the same FGS-related information presented on both displays have the same intended meaning.

(2) Consistency and compatibility. While not all information displayed on the HUD is directly related to the FGS, the pilot is likely to use most of the displayed information while using the HUD-displayed guidance and FGS annunciations. Therefore, when applicable, the

guidelines below for the presentation of FGS-related display information should be followed as much as possible. Certain deviations from these guidelines may be appropriate due to conflict with other information display characteristics or requirements unique to HUDs. These may include minimization of display clutter, minimization of excessive symbol flashing, and the presentation of certain information conformal to the outside scene.

(a) Symbology. Symbols should be the same format. For example, a triangle-shaped pointer head down should appear as a triangle pointer head up. However, some differences in HUD symbology, such as the FD “circle” versus head down FD “bars” or “wedge,” have been found acceptable.

(b) Location. Information (symbols) should appear in the same general location relative to other information.

(c) Alphanumeric data. Alphanumeric readouts should have the same resolution, units, and labeling. For example, the command reference indication for “vertical speed” should be displayed in the same foot-per-minute increments and be labeled with the same characters as the HDDs.

(d) Analog scales. Analog scales or dials should have the same range and dynamic operation. For example, a glideslope deviation scale displayed head up should have the same displayed range as the glideslope deviation scale displayed head down, and the direction of movement should be consistent.

(e) Display of FGS modes. The FGS modes and status state transitions should be displayed on the HUD using consistent methods, except for the use of color. That is, the method used head down to indicate a FD mode transitioning from armed to captured should also be used head up.

(f) Information sources. Information sources should be consistent between the HUDs and the HDDs used by the same pilot.

(g) Display of FGS command information. When FGS command information (for example, a FD command) is displayed on the HUD in addition to the HDDs, the HUD depiction and guidance cue deviation “scaling” needs to be consistent with that used on the HDDs. This is intended to provide comparable pilot performance and workload when using either HUDs or HDDs.

(h) Display for pilot monitoring (PM). The same information concerning current HUD system mode, reference data, status state transitions, and alert information that is displayed to the pilot flying (PF) on the HUD should also be displayed to the PM on the HDDs. Consistent nomenclature should be used to ensure unambiguous awareness of the HUD operation.

d. Alerting issues.

(1) Alerts displayed on HUDs. Although HUDs are typically not intended to be classified as integrated caution and warning systems, they may display cautions, warnings, and

advisories as part of their FGS function. In this regard, HUDs should provide the equivalent alerting functionality as the head down PFD(s). Warnings that require continued flightcrew attention on the PFD also should be presented on the HUD (for example, TCAS, windshear, and ground proximity warning (GPWS) annunciations). If master alerting indications are not provided within the peripheral field of view of the pilot while using the HUD, the HUD should provide annunciations that inform the pilot of caution and/or warning conditions.

(2) Monochrome HUDs. For monochrome HUDs, appropriate use of attention-getting properties, such as flashing, outline boxes, brightness, size, and/or location, is necessary to adequately compensate for the lack of color normally assigned to distinguish and call attention to cautions and warnings.

(3) Multi-color HUDs. For multi-color HUDs, the use of red, amber, or yellow for symbols not related to caution and warning functions should be avoided, so that the effectiveness of distinguishing characteristics of true cautions and warnings is not reduced.

(4) Single HUD installation. Single HUD installations rely on the fact that the pilotnot-flying (PNF) will monitor the head down instruments and alerting systems for failures of systems, modes, and functions not associated with PFDs.

(5) Dual HUD installations. Dual HUD installations require special consideration for alerting systems. It should be assumed that both pilots will be head up simultaneously (full or part-time), especially when the HUD is being used as the primary flight reference or when the HUD is required equipment for the operation being conducted. If master alerting indications are not provided within the peripheral field of view of each pilot while using the HUD, then each HUD should provide annunciations that direct the pilot’s attention to head down alerting displays. The types of information that should trigger the HUD master alerting display are any cautions or warnings not already duplicated on the HUD from head down primary display, as well as any caution level or warning level engine indications or system alerts.

Note: The objective is to avoid redirecting attention of the pilot flying to another display when an immediate maneuver is required (for example, TCAS resolution advisory, windshear).

(6) GPWS/TCAS on HUD. If a GPWS, windshear detection system, windshear escape guidance system, or a TCAS is installed, then the guidance, warnings, and annunciations required to be a part of these systems and normally required to be in the pilot’s primary field of view should be displayed on the HUD.

Note: See AC 25-11B, appendix F, for guidance on time-critical alerts displayed on the HUD. If it is not practical to provide time-critical alerts on the HUD, the applicant should provide compensating design features and pilot procedures to ensure that the pilot has equivalent and effective information for immediate awareness and response to the respective alerts.

e. Upset/unusual attitude recovery guidance.

(1) Guidance cues. Upsets due to wake turbulence or other environmental conditions may result in near instantaneous excursions in pitch and bank angles and a subsequent unusual attitude. If the HUD is designed to provide guidance for recovery from upsets or unusual attitudes, recovery steering guidance commands should be distinct from and not confused with orientation symbology such as horizon “pointers.” For example, a cue for left control wheel/stick input should not be confused with a cue indicating direction to the nearest horizon. Guidance should be removed if cues become invalid at extreme attitudes, such as zenith, nadir, overbanked (for example, greater than 90 degrees bank angle), or inverted. For extreme attitudes, it is acceptable for the pilot to transition to the HDD, provided that the cues to transition from the HUD are clear and unambiguous.

(2) Orientation cues. If the HUD is designed to provide only orientation during upsets or unusual attitudes (that is, no guidance cues are provided), those orientation cues should be designed to prevent them from being mistaken as flight control input commands.

47—51 [RESERVED]

CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTION

Chapter 5. Performance of Function

52. General.

a. Intended function. The FGS should provide guidance or control, as appropriate, for the intended function of the active mode(s) in a safe and predictable manner within the airplane’s normal flight envelope. There are special considerations when the FGS is operating at the limits of its performance capabilities or under significant environmental conditions. The following paragraphs provide criteria for acceptable means of compliance and interpretive material pertaining to these considerations.

b. Effect of system tolerances. Where system tolerances have a significant effect on autopilot authority limits, consideration should be given to the effect on autopilot performance. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, tolerances of servo authority, servo clutch setting, “cam-out” settings, control friction, and sensor tolerances.

53. Normal Performance.

a. General. The FGS should be designed to provide guidance or control, as appropriate, for the intended function of the active mode(s) in a safe and predictable manner within the airplane’s normal flight envelope.

b. Conditions to consider. The design of the FGS should consider the normal conditions listed in table 5-1 of this AC. This table does not fully define every condition that may be encountered during an airplane’s life and unequivocally categorize what can be considered to be a “normal condition.” Rather, the table is intended to give examples to be used during system development and testing. By the very nature of the phenomena involved, there will always be some subjectivity to these categorizations. Also, the same conditions may affect different airplane models in very different ways. These differences should be considered in determining how to characterize the severity of the conditions discussed in the table.

Table 5-1. Examples of Normal Conditions

No failure All airplane systems that are associated with airplane conditions performance are fully operational. Failures of those systems could impair the FGS’s ability to perform its functions.

Light to Variation in wind velocity—as a function of altitude, moderate wind position, or time—that may cause slight erratic or gradients unpredictable changes in intended flight path.

Light Turbulence that momentarily causes slight, erratic turbulence changes in altitude and/or attitude (pitch, roll, or yaw).

Light chop Turbulence that causes slight, rapid, and somewhat rhythmic bumpiness without appreciable changes in altitude or attitude.

Icing All icing conditions covered by part 25, appendix C, with the exception of “asymmetric icing” and “large drop icing” discussed under “Rare Normal Conditions” in table 5-2 of this AC.

Condition Example

Light to moderate winds

Constant wind in a specific direction that may cause a slight deviation in the intended flight path or a small difference between airspeed and groundspeed.

Light to moderate gusts

Non-repetitive momentary changes in wind velocity that can cause changes in altitude and/or attitude to occur, but the aircraft remains in positive control at all times.

Moderate turbulence

Similar to light turbulence but of greater intensity. Changes in altitude and/or attitude occur, but the aircraft remains in positive control at all times.

Moderate chop Similar to light chop but of greater intensity. It causes rapid bumps or jolts without appreciable changes in aircraft altitude or attitude.

Note: Representative levels of the environmental effects should be established consistent with the airplane’s intended operation.

c. Level of performance.

(1) Significant characteristics. Any performance characteristics that are operationally significant or operationally limiting must be identified with an appropriate statement or limitation in the airplane flight manual (AFM). See § 25.1581.

(2) Configuration changes. The FGS should perform its intended function during routine airplane configuration or power changes, including the operation of secondary flight controls and landing gear.

(3) Compliance evaluation. Evaluation of FGS performance for compliance should be based on the minimum level of performance needed for its intended functions. Subjective judgment may be applied to account for experience acquired from similar equipment and levels that have been established as operationally acceptable by the end-user.

(4) Prescribed levels of performance. There are certain operations that dictate a prescribed level of performance. When the FGS is intended for operations that require specific levels of performance, the use of FGS should be shown to meet those specific levels of performance (for example, low-visibility operations—Category II and III operations, RVSM, RNP).

(5) Equivalence of performance. The FGS performance of intended functions should at least be equivalent to that expected of a pilot for a similar task. AC 25-7D and SAE ARP5366, Autopilot, Flight Director, and Autothrust Systems, may prove useful for establishing the general behavior of the FGS. When integrated with navigation (NAV) sensors or the FMS, the FGS should satisfy the flight technical error tolerances expected for the use of those systems in performing their intended functions.

(6) Autopilot. The autopilot should provide smooth and accurate control without divergent or perceptible sustained nuisance oscillation.

(7) Flight director. The FD, in each available display presentation (for example, single cue, cross-pointer, flight path director), should provide smooth and accurate guidance and be appropriately damped, to achieve satisfactory control task performance without pilot compensation or excessive workload.

(8) Autothrust. The autothrust function should provide smooth and accurate control of thrust without significant or sustained oscillatory power changes or excessive overshoot of the required power setting.

(9) Automatic trim. The automatic pitch trim function should operate at a rate sufficient to mitigate excessive control surface deflections or limitations of control authority without introducing adverse interactions with automatic control of the aircraft. Automatic roll and yaw trim functions, if installed, should operate without introducing adverse interactions with automatic control of the aircraft.

54. Performance in Rare Normal Conditions.

a. General.

(1) Range of conditions. The FGS will encounter a wide range of conditions in normal operations, some of which may be infrequent but levy a greater than average demand on the FGS capabilities. Certain environmental conditions, as discussed in paragraph 54.b below, are prime examples. The FGS performance during such rare normal conditions should be assessed.

(2) Effect on performance. Rare normal conditions may degrade the performance of the FGS, but should be safe for operation of the FGS. The relative infrequency of such conditions may also be a factor in the flightcrew’s ability to detect and mitigate in a timely manner any limited capability of the FGS to cope with them.

b. Conditions to consider. The design of the FGS should consider the rare normal conditions listed in the table 5-2 of this AC. This table does not fully define every condition that may be encountered during an airplane’s life and unequivocally categorize what can be considered to be a “rare normal condition.” Rather, the table is intended to give examples to be used during system development and testing. By the very nature of the phenomena involved, there will always be some subjectivity to these categorizations. Also, the same conditions may affect different airplane models in very different ways. These differences should be considered in determining how to characterize the severity of the conditions discussed in the table.

Table 5-2. Examples of Rare Normal Conditions

Significant winds Constant wind in a specific direction that may cause a large change in intended flight path or groundspeed or cause a large difference between airspeed and groundspeed.

Windshear/ A wind gradient of such magnitude that it may cause microburst damage to the aircraft.

Severe turbulence Turbulence that causes large, abrupt changes in altitude or attitude. It usually causes large variations in indicated airspeed. Aircraft may be momentarily out of control.

Asymmetric icing Icing conditions that result in ice accumulations that cause the FGS, if engaged, to counter the aerodynamic effect of the icing conditions with a sustained pitch, roll, or yaw command that approaches its maximum authority.

Condition Example

Significant wind gradients

Variation in wind velocity—as a function of altitude, position, or time—that may cause large changes in intended flight path.

Large gusts Non-repetitive momentary changes in wind velocity that can cause large changes in altitude and/or attitude to occur. Aircraft may be momentarily out of control.

Large drop icing Applicable icing conditions covered by 14 CFR part 25, appendix O.

Note: Airplanes intended to meet 14 CFR 121.358 for windshear warning and guidance need FD windshear guidance. The FGS may also provide suitable autopilot control during windshear. See AC 25-12 and AC 120-41 for windshear guidance system requirements.

c. Level of performance.

(1) Performance standard. For rare normal conditions, the FGS should be designed to provide guidance or control, as appropriate, for the intended function of the active mode(s) in a safe and predictable manner, both within the normal flight envelope and for momentary excursions outside the normal flight envelope. If a determination is made that there are environmental conditions in which the FGS cannot be safely operated, appropriate operational limitations should be placed in the AFM.

(2) Autopilot authority limit. Operations in rare normal conditions may result in automatic or pilot-initiated autopilot disengagement close to the limit of autopilot authority. Autopilot disengagement in rare normal conditions should meet the safety criteria for autopilot disengagement found in Chapter 3, paragraph 27.b, Autopilot Disengagement, and the criteria for flight guidance alerting in Chapter 4, paragraph 45.d of this AC.

(3) Masking of potential hazard. It is not necessary that the FGS always be disengaged when rare normal conditions that may degrade its performance or capability are encountered. The FGS may significantly help the flightcrew during such conditions. However, the design should address the potential for the FGS to mask a condition from the flightcrew or otherwise delay appropriate flightcrew action. For discussion of alerting under such conditions, see Chapter 4, paragraph 45, FGS Alerting, Warning, Caution, Advisory, and Status, of this AC.

55. Icing Considerations in Normal and Rare Normal Conditions.

a. Effect on performance. The FGS will typically be designed to provide acceptable performance in all standard airplane configurations. Operating an airplane in icing conditions can have significant implications on the aerodynamic characteristics of the airplane (for example, ice accretion on wings, tail, and engines) and, consequently, on FGS performance. Ice accretion may be slow, rapid, symmetric, or asymmetric. During autopilot operation, the flightcrew may not be aware of the gradual onset of icing conditions or the effect that the accumulation of ice is having on the handling qualities of the airplane.

b. Alerts. Means should be provided to alert the flightcrew when icing conditions begin to have an effect upon FGS performance, as described in Chapter 4, paragraph 45 of this AC.

c. Effect on speed protection. The implication of icing conditions on speed protection should be assessed. If the threshold of the stall warning system is adjusted due to icing conditions, appropriate adjustments should also be made to the FGS low-speed protection threshold, which is discussed in paragraph 57.b of this chapter.

56. Performance in Non-Normal Conditions.

a. General. The FGS will occasionally be operating when the airplane transitions outside of its normal flight envelope, due to failures or non-standard ferry configurations. Under such circumstances, the FGS characteristics and flightcrew interaction with the FGS should be shown to be safe.

b. Conditions to consider. Table 5-3 of this AC shows examples of non-normal conditions. The table does not fully define every condition that may be encountered during an airplane’s life and unequivocally categorize what can be considered to be a “non-normal condition.” Rather, the table is intended to give examples to be used during system development and testing. By the very nature of the phenomena involved, there will always be some subjectivity to these categorizations. Also, the same conditions may affect different airplane models in very different ways. These differences should be considered in determining how to characterize the severity of the conditions discussed in the following table.

Table 5-3. Examples of Non-Normal Conditions

Significant fuel Large variation of the amount of fuel between the two imbalance wing tanks (and center and tail tanks, if so equipped) that causes the FGS, if engaged, to counter the aerodynamic effect of the fuel imbalance with a pitch, roll, or yaw command that is approaching maximum system authority.

Inoperative Loss of one or more engines that causes the FGS, if engine(s) engaged, to counter the aerodynamic effect of the difference in thrust with a pitch, roll, or yaw command that is approaching maximum system authority.

Inoperative ice Loss of ice detection/protection system on an airplane detection/protection so equipped where the FGS is certified for operation system in icing conditions with that failure present.

Condition

Non-standard ferry Possible aerodynamic drag (both symmetrical and flight configurations unsymmetrical) caused by non-standard airplane ferry

Term

flight conditions such as locked high lift devices, landing gear locked in the deployed position, or an extra engine carried underneath one wing in an inoperative position.

Loss of one or more hydraulic systems

Loss of one or more hydraulic systems down to the minimum amount of remaining operational systems that the FGS is certified to operate.

c. Level of performance.

(1) Performance standard. For non-normal conditions, the FGS should be designed to provide guidance or control, as appropriate, for the intended function of the active mode(s) in a safe and predictable manner, both within the normal flight envelope and for momentary excursions outside the normal flight envelope. If a determination is made that there are non-normal conditions in which the FGS cannot be safely operated, appropriate operational limitations should be placed in the AFM.

(2) Autopilot authority limit. Operations in non-normal conditions may result in automatic or pilot-initiated autopilot disengagement close to the limit of autopilot authority. Autopilot disengagement in non-normal conditions should meet the safety criteria for autopilot disengagement found in Chapter 3, paragraph 27.b, and the criteria for flight guidance alerting in Chapter 4, paragraph 45.d of this AC.

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