84 FR 15296 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements
This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.
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B. Policy Review and Approval
B. Policy Review and Approval
The FAA currently reviews a launch and reentry license application to determine whether it presents any issues affecting national security interests, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. As part of its review and in accordance with section 50918 of the Act, the FAA consults with the Department of State, Department of Defense, and other executive agencies, as appropriate. The Department of Defense assesses the effect of the launch on U.S. national security, and the Department of State assesses its effect on foreign policy interests and international obligations of the United States. For good practice, the FAA also consults with NASA, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for counsel on those U.S. interests related to the primary responsibilities of each agency. As such, the FAA coordinates with the FCC and NOAA over matters related to frequency licensing and Earth imaging, respectively, and with NASA for matters particularly related to its assets in space.
Section 415.25 currently contains application requirements for a policy review of the launch of a vehicle other than an RLV, § 431.25 for the launch and reentry of an RLV, and § 435.23 for the launch of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV.\181\ To date, these informational requirements have served their purpose well. However, the FAA believes that the current informational requirements should be modified to relieve the applicant of unnecessary burden and to improve the utility of the information requested for a policy review. Currently, Sec. § 415.25(b) and 431.25(b) both require an applicant to identify structural, pneumatic, propellant, propulsion, electrical and avionics systems. Section 431.25(b) also requires an applicant to identify thermal and guidance systems used in the launch vehicle, and all propellants. Although identifying the aforementioned systems is important for a safety review, the FAA believes that this information is not critical for a policy review, which addresses whether the launch or reentry presents issues affecting national security interests, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States.
\181\ These sections require an applicant to provide basic information about the launch or reentry vehicle, its ownership, launch site, flight azimuths, trajectories, associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points, sequence of planned events or maneuvers during flight, range of nominal impact areas for all spent motors and other discarded mission hardware, and for each orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits of each vehicle upper stage, and their estimated orbital lifetimes.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the policy review requirements contained in Sec. § 415.25 and 431.25 under proposed § 450.41 (Policy Review and Approval). In doing so, the FAA would retain the substance of the current requirements while further tailoring the informational requirements toward a policy review. Also, the FAA would replace the launch or reentry vehicle description requirements with vehicle description requirements that are more appropriate for a policy review. Finally, the FAA would require the applicant to provide flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points, and contingency abort \182\ profiles, if any, for the duration of the licensed activity.
\182\ The FAA proposes to revise the definition in § 401.5 of "contingency abort" to mean a flight abort with a landing at a planned location that has been designated in advance of vehicle flight. The proposed definition is discussed later in this preamble.
Specifically, proposed § 450.41(e)(2) would replace the current requirement to identify structural, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, thermal, guidance and avionics systems with a requirement to describe the launch or reentry vehicle and any stages, including their dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. As previously mentioned, currently required information is not critical for a policy review because policy determinations do not require the same level of technical detail as a safety review and do not need to delve into vehicle design specifics. Instead, the information required by proposed § 450.41(e)(2) would provide the FAA and its interagency partners with the scope of the proposed activity that is more pertinent to a policy review. Moreover, the FAA anticipates that the proposed changes would be significantly less burdensome for an applicant, as the information is readily available and requires minimal effort to provide. In contrast, the currently required information, while also readily available, might be extensive and require more effort to compile.
Additionally, it is unclear that the requirements to supply flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points, currently found in Sec. § 415.25(d)(2) and 431.25(d)(2), apply for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e., from lift-off to the end of licensed activities). For example, applicants previously have interpreted the requirement to supply flight azimuths and trajectories to end at orbital insertion because that is when ground tracks and instantaneous impact points vanish. However, during interagency coordination for policy reviews of orbital missions, NASA and the Department of Defense have repeatedly, and specifically, requested information from the FAA concerning the trajectories of upper stages after orbital insertion in order to determine the potential for the proposed mission to jeopardize the safety of government property in outer space or national security.
Therefore, in addition to consolidating Sec. § 415.25(d)(2) and 431.25(d)(2) into proposed § 450.41(e)(4)(ii), the FAA would add language to clarify that the requirement to supply flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points applies for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e., lift off to the end of launch). This clarification would eliminate the need for the FAA to request additional information from an applicant to satisfy inquiries from NASA and the Department of Defense during policy reviews and prevent any unnecessary delays to the policy review process.
C. Payload Review and Determination
C. Payload Review and Determination
The FAA proposes to consolidate the payload review requirements. The agency would also remove the requirement to identify the method of securing the payload on an RLV, add application requirements to assist the interagency review, such as the identification of approximate transit time to final orbit and any encryption, clarify the FAA's relationship with other federal agencies for payload reviews, and modify the 60-day notification requirement currently found in Sec. § 415.55 and 431.53.
While speaking of payload reviews, it is important to keep in mind the definitions of launch vehicle and payload as defined in FAA regulations. The FAA is not proposing to amend these definitions. A launch vehicle is a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket. A payload is an object that a person undertakes to place in outer space by means of a launch vehicle, including components of the vehicle specifically designed or adapted for that object. Thus, a payload can become a reentry vehicle. For example, the Dragon is a payload when it is launched on the Falcon 9 and a reentry vehicle when it reenters from Earth orbit. The FAA believes that any component attached to, or part of, a launch or reentry vehicle that has an intended use in space other than transporting itself or a payload, is in fact a payload. For example, the FAA has treated canisters of cremains attached to a stage left in orbit as payloads.
Pursuant to § 415.51, unless the payload is exempt from review under § 415.53, the FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to determine whether an applicant, payload owner, or operator has obtained all the required licenses, authorization, and permits. The FAA further determines whether a payload's launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. Similarly, both § 431.51 for launch and reentry of an RLV and § 435.41 for reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV, require the FAA to review a payload to examine the policy and safety issues related to the proposed reentry of a payload.
Current Sec. § 415.59 and 431.57 also require the applicant to submit basic payload information to allow the FAA to conduct a payload review. While the information requirements for payload review in Sec. § 415.59 and 431.57 are similar, they are not identical. Both sections require that an applicant provide the payload's physical dimensions and weight; owner and operator; orbital parameters for parking, transfer, and final orbits; and hazardous materials, as defined in § 401.5, and radioactive materials, and the amounts of each. However, § 415.59 requires an applicant to provide the name and class of the payload, the intended payload operations during the life of the payload, and the delivery point in flight at which the payload will no longer be under the licensee's control. Whereas, § 431.57 requires an applicant to provide either the payload name or payload class and function; the physical characteristics of the payload in addition to the payload's dimensions and weight; the explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials found on the payload or RLV during reentry; and the method of securing the payload on the reusable launch vehicle. It also replaces delivery point with designated reentry site(s); and requires the identification of intended payload operations during the life of the payload. With respect to hazardous materials, § 431.57 also requires the applicant to identify the container of the hazardous materials, in addition to the type and amount, because how the hazardous materials are contained is important for reentry.
The FAA believes that the current payload review informational requirements necessitate modification to improve the utility and efficiency of payload review. During interagency review, other agencies have requested information from the FAA for the amount of time a payload will take to reach its final orbital destination. This information allows the agencies to assess the payload's potential to impact their operations. However, current regulations do not contain an informational requirement that the applicant provide this information. As a result, the FAA often must make additional requests to the applicant in order to provide the requesting agencies with the information.
In the past, most non-government payloads were telecommunications or remote sensing satellites for which there were well-established regulatory regimes. Operators are now proposing payloads with new intended uses such as servicing other satellites and mapping frequency use. The capabilities of payloads continue to grow; for example, cubesats are appearing in great numbers with unique capabilities. As a result, it is possible that these new uses may pose threats to national security, such as the resolution of on-board cameras that might be used to survey national security space assets. Consequently, payload reviews increasingly need to address the threat that these new uses and capabilities might pose to U.S. national security, either unintentional or malicious.
Additionally, § 415.53 provides that the FAA does not review payloads regulated by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. Section 431.51 provides that the FAA does not review payloads subject to regulation by other federal agencies. However, neither of these regulations reflect current practice. In practice, the FAA includes payload information in its interagency reviews for all payloads, with the exception of certain U.S. Government payloads for which information is unavailable due to national security concerns, because § 415.51 provides that the safety requirements apply to all payloads, regardless of whether the payload is otherwise exempt. Even though the FAA conducts a review of all payloads, the FAA does not impinge on the authority of the FCC or the Department of Commerce, nor question the decision of the FCC or NOAA to approve communications or remote sensing satellites. It does not question the decision of another federal agency concerning its payloads. More accurately, while the FAA may conduct a review of all payloads, the FAA does not make a payload determination on what it considers an "exempt" payload.
Changes in the types of payloads that are being launched or proposed have also complicated the scope of FAA payload reviews and demonstrated that the language exempting certain payloads from review is overly restrictive. The FAA has made payload determinations for payloads that will undoubtedly require FCC or NOAA licensing, but the proposed payload missions were beyond the scope of communications or remote sensing. These payloads were examined in the interagency process and neither the FCC nor NOAA took exception to the FAA's approach.
Section 50918 of Title 51 of the U.S. Code mandates that the Secretary of Transportation consult with the Secretary of Defense on matters affecting national security, the Secretary of State on matters affecting foreign policy, and the heads of other agencies when appropriate. Section 50919(b) states that chapter 509 of Title 51 does not affect the authority of the FCC or Department of Commerce. The language of FAA regulations exempting from review those payloads subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC, NOAA, and other agencies, is more restrictive regarding the FAA's authority than what is required in the statutory mandate of 51 U.S.C. 50918 and 50919. The genesis of this more-limited role by the FAA came from the Report of House of Representatives, May 31, 1984, that accompanied H.R. 3942. Specifically, the report stated: "[t]he Committee intends that the Secretary not review or otherwise evaluate the merits of communications satellites licensed and approved by the FCC, other than to assure the proper integration of such payload with the launch vehicle and its launch into orbit." At that time, almost all non-government payloads were communications or remote sensing satellites, regulated by the FCC and NOAA, respectively.
When DOT published the initial licensing regulations in 1988, the preamble noted that the payloads subject to existing payload regulation included only telecommunications satellites licensed by the FCC and remote sensing satellites licensed by NOAA. It went on to state that payloads that were not subject to review by DOT included all domestic payloads not presently regulated by the FCC or NOAA and all foreign payloads. Almost any domestic payload, even if it is not a telecommunications satellite, however, requires FCC licensing because it will invariably have a U.S.-owned or -operated transmitter for telemetry purposes. Therefore, it appears that the intention of the rule was only to exclude from FAA regulation telecommunications satellites licensed by the FCC and likewise, remote sensing satellites licensed by NOAA, and not any satellite with a transmitter licensed by the FCC or with some incidental remote sensing capability.
In recent years, there have been proposals for commercial payloads where the primary purpose might be scientific or exploratory or even artistic. Despite their primary purpose, these payloads almost always require an FCC license because they have transmitters for telemetry. Similarly, some payloads also require approval by NOAA even though remote sensing may be ancillary to the main purpose. Without an interagency review, the FAA has no direct means of knowing whether a payload is exempt from review and, as a result, has initiated interagency reviews. These reviews also serve the purpose of alerting the other agencies to launches of payloads that might jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States, even if they are exempt from an FAA payload review. Although the FAA has not to date been faced with the Department of Defense or the Department of State raising concerns through the interagency review regarding national security or foreign policy for an "exempt" payload, the FAA believes that it would be its responsibility to convey those concerns to the appropriate agencies for resolution.
The ARC asserts that the payload reviews being conducted are more detailed than necessary to assure the protection of "public health and safety." The ARC recommended that payloads that stay within the vehicle, have non-hazardous materials, or those that have previously been approved for flight, should not require reviews. It recommended that safety goals can be met by only requiring reviews for hazardous payloads that could impact "public health and safety." The ARC also stated that it would be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous payloads ejected from the launch vehicle in reportable quantities using the existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101. It believes such an approach would reduce unnecessary paperwork and subsequent FAA review for "benign payloads," and the reduction of burden on the FAA to review "non-safety related payloads" would support industry's increased flight tempo and reduce FAA review times.
The FAA does not agree with the ARC recommendation that payloads that stay within the vehicle, payloads that are non-hazardous materials, or those that have previously been approved for flight should not require reviews. The fact that a payload remains on or within the launch or reentry vehicle does not change the function of the payload. The payload's intended use in space or changes in the orbit of the vehicle to accommodate the payload operation might present issues because it could affect NASA or Department of Defense assets either due to its orbit or function. For example, the Department of Defense has concerns regarding payloads that may pass close enough to its assets to photograph them. The FAA recognizes that some payloads, such as canisters of cremains, attached to an upper stage, might have little or no safety or policy implications. However, a review is still necessary to make that determination. Obviously, the absence of hazardous materials also removes some safety concerns; however, as previously discussed, hazardous materials are not the only concern addressed in the payload review.
While payloads that stay within a vehicle, do not contain hazardous materials, or have previously been approved may require less scrutiny, a payload review is still required because the FAA is statutorily mandated under 51 U.S.C. 50904(c) to determine whether a license applicant or payload owner or operator has obtained all required licenses, authorization, and permits. If no license or authorization or permit is required by another federal agency, the FAA must determine whether a launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. Similarly, while potentially it might be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous payloads ejected from a launch vehicle in reportable quantities using existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101, the FAA must still comply with the statutory requirements imposed on it by 51 U.S.C. 50904(c). Both the FAA's current and proposed regulations reflect this statutory requirement.
As for payloads that have previously been approved for launch, the FAA already authorizes classes of payloads under Sec. § 431.53 and 415.55, but it still requires identification of the specific payload at least 60 days prior to the launch in order to confirm that the payload fits within the authorized class and to coordinate with other federal agencies. The FAA currently does not make a new payload determination if a payload fits within a class of payloads authorized under a particular license, but the review is still necessary to confirm there are no issues that affect public health and safety, the safety of property, or national security. The more defined the payload class, the less the likelihood of any issues once the specific payload is identified. For series of virtually identical payloads, the FAA has authorized the entire series. A payload or launch operator can work with the FAA to facilitate and expedite payload approvals by defining payload classes to accommodate possible payloads. Also, payload classes authorized for one operator will usually be authorized for another operator. The FAA acknowledges that the current 60-day notification requirement might be unnecessary for certain well-defined payload classes and proposes to modify this requirement to permit a shorter notification on a case-by-case basis. The FAA anticipates that the notification requirement would be specified either in the separate payload determination or in a vehicle operator license.
The ARC recommended that payloads that contain hazardous materials in Federally-reportable quantities be reviewed in 15 days. The FAA does not agree with the ARC's recommendation because there are other considerations regarding intended operations in space that might affect national security or the safety of property. For example, a payload may have the capability of observing or interfering with U.S. national security assets or violate a provision of a treaty.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for a payload review currently contained in subparts D of parts 415, 431, and 435 in proposed § 450.43 (Payload Review and Determination). The proposed consolidation would retain most of the current payload review requirements. The limited changes the FAA proposes to the payload requirements are discussed in this section.
The FAA proposes to modify the relationship with other agencies by removing the misleading statement that the FAA does not review payloads that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. Specifically, the FAA proposes to modify the regulation to reflect that while it does not review those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce, it still reviews the payloads to determine their effect on the safety of launch. The FAA also consults with other agencies to determine whether their launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. Proposed § 450.43(b) would provide that the FAA would not make a payload determination over those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. The FAA does not intend to interfere with any requirement that these agencies might impose or with approvals or denials. This clarification is merely a recognition of current practice regarding payloads that do not easily fit into the existing regulatory rubric.
The FAA also proposes not to retain the specific reference to NOAA in § 415.53(a). Although commercial remote sensing is currently licensed by NOAA's Office of Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA), the Secretary of Commerce recently proposed merging CRSRA with NOAA's Office of Space Commerce and moving them directly under the Office of the Secretary of Commerce. As a result, proposed § 450.43(b) would revise the description of which payloads are exempt, to clarify that a payload planning to conduct remote sensing operations would be exempt if licensed by any office within the Department of Commerce.
In consolidating the informational requirements in parts 415, 431, and 435, the FAA proposes to eliminate information requirements concerning the method of securing a payload that was a requirement under § 431.57(g) for RLVs because that information is not relevant to a payload review. The FAA considered replacing that informational requirement with a more general one to provide the potential of the payload to affect the dynamics of the vehicle. However, the FAA determined such information was more pertinent to the vehicle operator and should instead be included in systems safety analysis for the launch or reentry, if appropriate.
Proposed § 450.43(i)(1) also would require an applicant to provide an expanded description for the payload that would include its composition and any hosted payloads in addition to the current requirements of physical dimensions and weight. The FAA proposes to ask for any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator. In addition, the FAA would add the approximate transit times to final orbit for the payload. The FAA proposes to elaborate what it means by intended payload operations during the life of the payload by adding its anticipated life span and any planned disposal. Further, it proposes a requirement to describe any encryption associated with data storage on the payload and transmissions to or from the payload. Encryption helps ensure against cyber intrusion, loss of spacecraft control, and potential debris-causing events. The FAA is proposing these additions to the information requirements for launches to assist other federal agencies because NASA and the Department of Defense frequently have requested this information in response to the FAA's interagency review in order to determine whether the proposed payload would jeopardize the safety of government property in outer space, or U.S. national security.
The FAA also proposes to add a general requirement that it may request any other information necessary to make a determination based on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA believes that it would rarely invoke this provision but believes that it is crucial to address unique payloads.
The FAA anticipates that for payload classes--as distinguished from specific payloads--the applicant might only be able to provide a range of expected transit times and would find this acceptable. Similarly, for classes of payloads the FAA would find it appropriate to provide ranges for information related to size of the payload and quantities of hazardous materials. It also proposes to add the explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials on the payload for launches, as it already does for reentries because the information is equally relevant to the safety of a launch as for a reentry.
The FAA anticipates that these additional data requirements would impose minimal burden, if any, on the applicant. For example, the payload operator should already have detailed plans for moving its payload to its final destination, and the explosive equivalent for most materials is easily calculated using readily-available information. As another example, in requesting information about what encryption, if any, is used, the FAA is not asking for a detailed account of encryption methodology. Many operators are already using 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard encryption (AES-256) to protect commercial telemetry, tracking, and control data links and mission data transmission or storage. In this case, an operator would only need to state that it uses AES-256. These additional data requirements help inform the overall evaluation of a payload.
By specifying in its regulations what is required to expedite the FAA's payload review process without the need to make supplemental requests to an applicant to address interagency concerns, and the applicant would avoid having to respond to such requests. The FAA seeks comment on this proposed approach.
D. Safety Review and Approval
D. Safety Review and Approval
As part of its current licensing process under parts 415 and 431, the FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether a proposed launch or reentry will jeopardize public health and safety and safety of property. The FAA would not change the philosophy or purpose of a safety review in this rulemaking. As with the current regulations, an applicant would have to satisfy the safety requirements in order to obtain a license to conduct a launch or reentry. Only a vehicle operator license applicant would be eligible to apply for a safety approval, and may apply for a safety approval separately and incrementally. As with current regulations, the FAA would advise an applicant, in writing, of any issues raised during a safety review that would impede issuance of a license, and the applicant may respond in writing, or amend its license application in accordance with § 413.17. This proposal would also not change the process by which the FAA denies a license, and the recourse afforded an applicant if a license is denied.
For launches and reentries from, or to, a Federal launch range or any launch or reentry site where a Federal launch range provides safety-related launch or reentry services or property by contract, the FAA would accept the service or property as meeting the relevant requirements of proposed part 450, as long as the FAA determines that the Federal launch range's safety requirements for the launch or reentry services or property provided satisfy those requirements. Note that a Federal launch range could, at the direction of the operator, provide FSA products such a debris risk analyses or flight safety limits analyses, directly to the FAA on behalf of an operator.
While the FAA is not proposing to change the philosophy and purpose of a safety review and approval, the FAA is proposing changes to the requirements to obtain a safety approval. The FAA proposes to locate the application requirements for a safety approval in proposed § 450.45 (Safety Review and Approval), in paragraph (e), and throughout proposed subpart C.
The application requirements in proposed § 450.45(e) are general and not specific to any safety requirement, and would include information not covered explicitly in proposed subpart C. Proposed § 450.45(e)(1) would address basic requirements for an application, such as the inclusion of a glossary of terms and a listing of referenced material. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.107, although the proposed regulation would not include the requirement for an application to be logically organized, with a clear and consistent page numbering system, and topics cross-referenced. The FAA expects an applicant to ensure its application meets these basic organizational standards without explicitly requiring them.
In proposed § 450.45(e)(2), the FAA would require an applicant to submit information about its launch or reentry site. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.109(a), with the addition of references to a reentry site.
In proposed § 450.45(e)(3), the FAA would require an applicant to submit information about its launch or reentry vehicle, including safety critical systems. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.109(b), but would include reentry vehicles in addition to launch vehicles.
In proposed § 450.45(e)(4), the FAA would require an applicant to submit a generic launch or reentry processing schedule that identifies any readiness activities, such as reviews and rehearsals, each safety-critical preflight operation, and day of flight activities. Although the proposed regulations do not necessarily require reviews or rehearsals, should the applicant propose them to meet readiness requirements, they should be included in the schedule. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.119, but with the addition of reentry vehicles.
Proposed § 450.45(e)(5) would apply to any proposed launch or reentry with a human being on board the vehicle, and would require an applicant to demonstrate compliance with certain safety requirements in part 460. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.8, except that it would include reentry vehicles.
Proposed § 450.45(e)(6) would address the potential launch or reentry of radionuclides, similar to current § 415.115(b) but with the addition of reentries. Because such proposals are rare, it is the current practice of the FAA to address the public safety issues on a case-by-case basis. This proposed rule would not change this approach.
Lastly, in proposed § 450.45(e)(7), the FAA would reserve the right to request additional information if necessary. This request would include information incorporated by reference in the license application, such as a previous application submittal. The FAA could also request additional products that would allow the FAA to conduct an independent safety analysis. The FAA periodically conducts independent system safety and flight safety analyses in order to gain a deeper understanding of the safety issues associated with a launch or reentry proposal. This independent analysis is particularly important for novel systems or operations. The FAA proposes to continue this practice with this rulemaking.
Proposed subpart C would contain the remainder of the application requirements for a safety approval. With some exceptions, discussed later, each safety requirement in proposed subpart C has application requirements articulated at the end of each section. Under current regulations for ELVs, application requirements are contained in part 415, while safety requirements are contained in part 417. Under current regulations for RLVs contained in part 431, application requirements and safety requirements are not distinguished so clearly. The proposed approach is designed to clearly separate safety requirements from application requirements.
However, the following proposed sections do not include application requirements, either because they introduce other sections or because the FAA would not require a demonstration of compliance to obtain a license:
1. § 450.101: This section would address the core public safety criteria for launching a launch vehicle or reentering a reentry vehicle. An applicant would demonstrate that it can meet these criteria in other parts of proposed subpart C.
2. § 450.113 (Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and Applicability): This section would address the scope and applicability of the FSA requirements contained in Sec. § 450.113 through 450.141.
3. § 450.157: This section would include requirements for communication procedures, but an applicant would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license.
4. § 450.159: This section would include requirements for preflight procedures. Similar to proposed § 450.157, an applicant would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license.
5. § 450.169: This section would include requirements for launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis. An applicant would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license, but it would have to provide certain information to the FAA prior to a launch or reentry.
6. § 450.179 (Ground Safety--General): This section would address the scope and applicability of the ground safety requirements contained in Sec. § 450.181 (Coordination with a Site Operator) through 450.189.
E. Environmental Review
The FAA proposes to consolidate environmental review requirements for launch and reentry operators in a single section, as proposed § 450.47 (Environmental Review). Currently, these requirements are set forth in Sec. § 415.201, 415.203, 431.91, 431.93, and 435.61. In addition, the FAA proposes to revise current Sec. § 420.15, 433.7, 433.9, and 437.21 to conform to the changes in proposed § 450.47. Apart from consolidation, these proposed revisions would not alter the current environmental review process.
E. Environmental Review
The FAA is responsible for complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive Orders prior to issuing a launch or reentry license. To comply with NEPA, the FAA must first determine whether the licensing action requires a Categorical Exclusion (CATEX), an Environmental Assessment (EA), or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). A CATEX is appropriate when actions, individually or cumulatively, do not have a significant effect on the human environment. An EA broadly documents evidence and analysis necessary to determine whether a proposed action may significantly affect the human environment requiring the preparation of an EIS or results in a finding of no significant impact (FONSI). If the action may significantly affect the human environment, NEPA requires preparation of an EIS. An EIS is a thorough analysis of a proposed action's impacts on the environment, including a public involvement process.
Under current FAA practice, the issuance of a new launch or reentry license does not fall within the scope of a CATEX. However, an applicant may provide data and analysis to assist the FAA in determining whether a CATEX could apply (including whether an extraordinary circumstance exists) to a license modification. Examples include modifications that are administrative in nature or involve minor facility siting, construction, or maintenance actions. If a CATEX does not apply to the proposed action, but it is not anticipated to have significant environmental effects, then NEPA requires the preparation of an EA instead. The FAA may prepare an EA using applicant-provided information. In the alternative, an applicant may prepare an EA with FAA oversight. When NEPA requires an EIS for commercial space actions, the FAA uses third-party contracting to prepare the document. That is, the FAA selects a contractor to prepare the EIS, and the license applicant pays the contractor. Finally, if an EA or EIS was previously developed, the FAA may require a written re-evaluation of the environmental document to ensure the document's continued adequacy, accuracy and validity.\183\
\183\ FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures, provides a more detailed description of the FAA's policies and procedures for NEPA and CEQ compliance.
This proposed rule would not alter the current environmental review requirements. However, the consolidation of the launch and reentry regulations would require a consolidation of the environmental review requirements.
F. Additional License Terms and Conditions, Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License, Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License
F. Additional License Terms and Conditions, Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License, Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License
As discussed earlier in this preamble, the FAA proposes to consolidate, under proposed part 450, the differing types of launch and reentry licenses, currently in parts 415, 431, and 435, into a single vehicle operator license. As part of this consolidation, the FAA would combine specified sections of parts 415, 431, and 435 into proposed sections of part 450, such that the consolidated requirements would apply to a single vehicle operator license. Except for these changes, the current requirements would remain the same. The specific proposed changes are identified below. 1. Additional Terms and Conditions
The FAA proposes to consolidate the current additional terms and conditions requirements in Sec. § 415.11, 431.11, and 435.11 into proposed § 450.9 (Additional License Terms and Conditions) without substantive change. Therefore, the proposed requirement would state that the FAA may amend a vehicle operator license at any time by modifying or adding terms and conditions to the license to ensure compliance with the Act and regulations. 2. Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements to transfer a license in current Sec. § 415.13, 431.13, and 435.13 into proposed § 450.11 (Transfer of a Vehicle Operator License). Although the location of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not substantively change.
The proposed requirements would continue to provide that only the FAA may transfer a vehicle operator license; and, that an applicant must submit a license application to transfer a license according to the provisions of part 413 and the requirements of proposed part 450. Also, like the current requirements, the proposal would require an applicant to satisfy all of the approvals and determinations required under part 450 before the FAA would transfer a license to an applicant, and the FAA would retain the ability to incorporate by reference any findings made part of the record to support the initial licensing determination and to modify a license to reflect any changes necessary because of a license transfer. 3. Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License
The FAA proposes to consolidate in proposed § 450.13 (Rights Not Conferred by a Vehicle Operator License) the requirements in current Sec. § 415.15, 431.15, and 435.15 regarding the rights that are not conferred by issuance of a license. Although the location of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not substantively change.
The proposed requirements would continue to state that issuance of a vehicle operator license does not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to its activities. In addition, the proposal would state the issuance of a license does not confer any proprietary, property or exclusive right in the use of any Federal launch range or related facilities, airspace, or outer space.
G. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements, and Practices
G. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements, and Practices
Proposed § 450.177 (Unique Policies, Requirements and Practices) would require an operator to review operations, system designs, analysis, and testing, and to identify any unique launch or reentry hazards not otherwise addressed by proposed part 450, consistent with current regulations and practice. An operator would be required to implement any unique safety policy, requirement, or practice needed to protect the public from the unique hazard. In its application, an operator would have to identify any unique safety policy, requirement, or practice, and demonstrate that each it protects public health and safety and the safety of property.
Proposed § 450.177 would also provide that the FAA may identify and impose a unique policy, requirement, or practice, as needed, to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In its application, an operator would need to demonstrate that each unique safety policy, requirement, or practice imposed by the FAA protects public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
Proposed § 450.177 is largely the same as § 417.127 with two differences. Section 417.127 requires an applicant to file a request for license modification for any change to a unique safety policy, requirement, or practice. The FAA would not incorporate this requirement in proposed part 450 because it is duplicative given the general license modification requirement in proposed § 450.177. Also, § 417.127 applies only when necessary to protect the public, whereas proposed § 450.177(b) would also apply to national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. This is necessary to cover the full scope of FAA's licensing authority.
The purpose for this proposed section is the same as for current § 417.127. As the space transportation industry continues to grow, advances in technology and implementation of innovations by launch and reentry operators will likely introduce new and unforeseen safety challenges. These unique challenges will require FAA officials and operators to collaborate on a case-by-case basis to identify and mitigate those unique hazards to public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States not specifically addressed by proposed part 450.
H. Compliance Monitoring
H. Compliance Monitoring
The FAA proposes to combine the compliance monitoring requirements of parts 417 and 431 into § 450.209 (Compliance Monitoring). In combining the requirements, the FAA would adopt § 417.23. The FAA currently conducts safety inspections to ensure a licensee complies with applicable regulations, the terms and conditions of its license, and representations the licensee made in its application.
Compliance monitoring requirements are codified in Sec. § 417.23, 431.83, and 435.51. Section 417.23 requires that a launch operator cooperate with and allow Federal officers or employees access to observe any of its activities associated with the conduct of a licensed launch, and provide the FAA with a console for monitoring the countdown's progress, and the communication on all channels of the countdown communication network. The requirements of Sec. § 417.23(a) and 431.83 are nearly identical in that both require a licensee to cooperate with and to allow Federal officers or employees access to observe any of its activities associated with the conduct of a licensed RLV mission. However, unlike § 417.23, § 431.83 does not require a licensee to provide a console to the FAA for monitoring all the channels on the countdown communication network.
Monitoring the communications channels--including countdown, anomaly, range coordination, surveillance, and weather--is a vital part of compliance monitoring and safety inspection operations, regardless of operation type. Under part 417, a licensee cooperates with the FAA and provides its inspectors with access and consoles to observe the activities associated with the licensed launch. As a result, the FAA is able to monitor all communication channels, and has access to the safety official and the mission director through the communications panel and through a phone line. FAA inspectors regularly monitor an operator's communications channels. In doing so, an inspector can become aware of issues that arise during a countdown. These issues may include vehicle health, ground operations, FSS health, range readiness, clearance of surveillance and hazard areas, weather, and countdown procedures. Additionally, listening to the communications channels also gives an inspector a sense of an operator's safety culture, rigor, and readiness. In addition, inspectors can communicate face-to-face with the safety official and the mission director, if necessary, because they are typically collocated.
Although there is a requirement in part 431, and incorporated by reference in part 435, that an operator cooperate with safety inspectors, there is no specific requirement for the licensee to provide access to all communication channels. The FAA has had to discuss with the operator what channels will be available for monitoring during these operations. Some operators have contended that their employees will not be as forthcoming with information if they know FAA inspectors are listening. However, being able to hear how the operator communicates during critical operations is necessary for inspectors to determine compliance and to address problems before they occur. Since inspectors cannot physically listen to all channels concurrently, an inspector will listen to one or more channels that can provide situational awareness and information used to determine compliance. The necessary discussions require additional time and may cause a delay, consume man-hours, and is a cost to both the government and the operator during the license application phase, or potentially during a launch countdown.
Regarding the contention that personnel are less likely to discuss problems if inspectors are monitoring their conversation, the FAA strives to be as unobtrusive as possible so as not to affect operations. Additionally, the purpose of compliance monitoring is not to punish operators. Rather, channel monitoring and on-site inspection allows inspectors to identify potential licensing issues and alert the operator, so it can take action to maintain or return to compliance. This approach ensures safety while minimizing impacts to the operator. There have been many instances where inspectors noticed incorrect test setups for FSS checks, for example, or other issues during compliance monitoring that would affect public safety, and informed the operator so they could be corrected before safety was impacted.
Compliance monitoring is important for ensuring public safety and requires that FAA safety inspectors be exposed to actual operations in order to be trained, qualified, and capable of performing their safety-critical role. Because safety inspectors are trained to detect non-compliances, they need to have access to, and the discretion to see and hear, as much of the operation as they deem necessary. Observing activities for training and familiarization purposes benefits both the inspectors and the operator because the more familiar an inspector is with an operation, the better he or she can perform the inspection. Knowledgeable inspectors cause less operational impacts because they ask fewer questions and are less likely to incorrectly identify a non-compliance.
The FAA proposes to combine the compliance monitoring requirements of Sec. § 417.23 and 431.83 in proposed § 450.209. The proposed regulation would primarily adopt those requirements in § 417.23, but "launch operator" would be replaced by "licensee", and "licensed launch" would be replaced by "licensed launch or reentry." Additionally, the FAA proposes to allow an operator the option to provide the FAA with means other than a console for monitoring the communication and countdown channels. For example, a smaller company may operate without consoles, in which case the operator may provide the FAA with radio monitoring and a location in close proximity to the necessary data to monitor launch. As a result, the compliance monitoring requirements of proposed § 450.209 would apply to all launch and reentry operations, thereby capturing licensed launch operations under current part 417 and licensed RLV operations under current part 431. Proposed § 450.209 also codifies current FAA practice for conducting compliance monitoring of part 435 operations.
Proposed § 450.209(b) would require the licensee to provide the FAA with a console or other means for monitoring the countdown and communication network. This proposed requirement would alleviate the issues that result from extended negotiations. The option for "other means" would provide the operator with some flexibility, as the FAA recognizes that operations may occur with temporary infrastructure and a console may be an unrealistic request. In this case, the operator would be expected to provide the FAA with an alternative method to monitor communications that is approved by the FAA prior to operations.
I. Registration of Space Objects
I. Registration of Space Objects
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for the registration of space objects in proposed § 450.217 (Registration of Space Objects). These requirements currently reside in Sec. § 417.19 and 431.85 and are largely identical. This proposal would not change the substantive requirements of either section, except to add a registration requirement for objects owned by a foreign entity.
The 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention), to which the United States is a signatory, requires details about the orbit of each space object. To that end, current regulations require an applicant to provide information on space objects that the FAA forwards to the Department of State. The Department of State then registers the objects with the United Nations as required by the Registration Convention. Since enacting these current regulations, the Department of State has requested that the FAA also provide this information for objects possibly owned by foreign entities.
Current registration of space objects requirements is codified in § 417.19, applicable to ELVs, and § 431.85, applicable to RLVs. The two provisions are substantively identical in all respects but one. That is, they both require the registration of any object placed in space by a licensed mission, unless the object is owned and registered by the U.S. Government or owned by a foreign entity. Similarly, both sections require the licensee to submit information about the space object's international designator, the date and location of the mission, the general function of the space object, and the final orbital parameters. The sole substantive distinction is that § 431.85 also requires an operator to notify the FAA when it removes a space object.
Proposed § 450.217 would deviate from current Sec. § 417.19 and 431.85 by requiring the registration of foreign-owned space objects. The FAA would not require the licensee to determine the owner's nationality. The Department of State would use this information to ensure that other nations meet their obligations by registering their foreign objects. Proper registration of all objects owned by foreign entities would allow for the protection of the United States from liability associated with these objects.
Otherwise, the FAA would retain the same informational requirements. It would continue to require a licensee to submit information about the space object's international designator, the date and location of the mission, the general function of the space object, and the final orbital parameters. Additionally, proposed § 450.217 would retain current § 431.85's requirement that an operator notify the FAA when it removes a space object.
J. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Records, Financial Responsibility, and Human Spaceflight Requirements
J. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Records, Financial Responsibility, and Human Spaceflight Requirements
The FAA is not proposing any substantive changes to the requirements specified below. However, the agency is proposing to consolidate these requirements into the new, proposed part 450; clarify that the consolidated requirements apply to any licensed launch or reentry; and make other minor, clarifying edits. The following is a summary of the proposed changes: 1. Public Safety Responsibility and Compliance With License
The FAA would consolidate the public safety responsibility requirements in current Sec. § 417.7 and 431.71(a) into proposed § 450.201 (Public Safety Responsibility). Also, the FAA would move the compliance requirement in current § 431.71(b) to its own section, proposed § 450.203, Compliance with License. Although the location of these requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not change.
Therefore, proposed § 450.201 would provide that a licensee is responsible for ensuring public safety and safety of property during the conduct of a licensed launch or reentry. Proposed § 450.203 (Compliance with License) would require that a licensee conduct a licensed launch or reentry in accordance with representations made in its license application, the requirements of proposed part 450, subparts C and D, and the terms and conditions contained in the license.
The proposed requirement for a licensee to conduct a licensed launch or reentry in accordance with representations made in its license application is the same, in substance, to Sec. § 417.11(a) and 431.71(b). Section 417.11(a) states that a launch operator must conduct a licensed launch and carry out launch safety procedures in accordance with its application. Section 431.71(b) states that a licensee must conduct a licensed RLV mission and perform RLV safety procedures in accordance with representations made in its license application. The fact that representations made in a license application become binding on a licensee is discussed earlier in this preamble.
The proposed requirement for a licensee to conduct a licensed launch or reentry in accordance with the requirements of proposed part 450, subparts C and D, is the same, in substance, to § 417.1(b)(2)'s treatment of part 417 requirements. Section 417.1(b)(2) states that the safety requirements of part 417, subparts B through E, apply to all licensed launches of expendable launch vehicles. Part 431 does not have a similar requirement because application requirements and safety requirements are interlinked, leaving uncertain the actual safety requirements under a license. Note that in subpart C, the application requirement paragraphs do not apply once a license is issued, unless a licensee applies for a modification.
The proposed requirement for a licensee to conduct a licensed launch or reentry in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the license is the same, in substance, to Sec. § 415.9(b) and 431.71(b). Section 415.9(b) states that a launch license authorizes a licensee to conduct a launch or launches subject to the licensee's compliance with terms and conditions contained in license orders accompanying the license. Section 431.71(b) states that a licensee's failure to comply with any license condition is sufficient basis for the revocation of a license or other appropriate enforcement action. The FAA includes terms and conditions in a license to address license-specific requirements. Under the proposal, a licensee's failure to act in accordance with these items would be sufficient basis to revoke a license, or some other appropriate enforcement action. 2. Financial Responsibility
The FAA would consolidate the current financial responsibility requirements in Sec. § 417.21 and 431.81 into proposed § 450.205 (Financial Responsibility Requirements). Although the location of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not change.
As such, the proposed regulation would require a licensee to comply with financial responsible requirements as required by part 440, and as specified in a license or license order. 3. Human Spaceflight
The FAA would consolidate the human spaceflight requirements in current Sec. § 415.8, 431.8, and 435.8 into proposed § 450.207 (Human Spaceflight Requirements). The proposal would require a licensee conducting a launch or reentry with a human being on board the vehicle to comply with human spaceflight requirements as required by part 460 of this chapter and as specified in a license or license order. Although the location of the requirements would change, the requirements themselves would not change. 4. Records
The FAA would consolidate the current record requirements in Sec. § 417.15(a) and (b) and 431.77(a) and (b) into proposed § 450.219(a) and (b). However, the FAA would replace the terms "launch accident" and "launch incident" in § 417.15(b) and the terms "launch accident," "reentry accident," "launch incident," and "reentry incident" in § 431.77(b) with "class 1 or class 2 mishap." As discussed in more detail earlier in this preamble, the FAA proposes to replace current part 401 definitions involving "accident," "incident," and "mishap" with specified mishap classes.
The proposed regulation would require an operator to maintain, for 3 years, all records, data, and other material necessary to verify that a launch or reentry is conducted in accordance with representations contained in the operator's application, the requirements of subparts C and D, and the terms and conditions contained in the license. To satisfy this requirement, the FAA expects an operator to keep a record of the actual conditions at the time of flight and any deviations outside of the flight commit criteria as specified in the current § 417.113(c). Similar to current requirements, in the event of a class 1 or class 2 mishap, an operator would be required to preserve all records related to the event until the completion of any Federal investigation (which could be greater than 3 years) and the FAA has notified the operator that the records need no longer be retained. The operator would need to make all records required to be maintained under the regulations available to Federal officials for inspection and copying.
K. Applicability
K. Applicability
1. General
Proposed § 450.1 (Applicability) would state that part 450 prescribes requirements for obtaining and maintaining a license to launch, reenter, or both launch and reenter, a launch or reentry vehicle. As discussed previously, proposed part 450 would consolidate licensing requirements currently covered in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. 2. Grandfathering
1. General
Under proposed § 450.1(b), proposed part 450 would not apply to any launch or reentry that an operator elects to conduct pursuant to a license issued by the FAA or an application accepted by the FAA prior to the effective date of proposed part 450, with two exceptions. The proposed requirements for collision avoidance analysis (COLA) and asset protection would apply to all operators subject to the FAA's authority under 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 who are conducting launches after the effective date of the new regulations. The FAA would determine the applicability of proposed part 450 to an application for a license modification submitted after the effective date of the part on a case-by-case basis.
The proposed regulations are more performance based, and many of the current requirements would serve as a means of compliance to meet the proposed regulations. As a result, activities authorized under the existing regulations would be authorized under the proposed regulations. The FAA proposes to allow an operator to operate under the current regulations (specifically, parts 401, 415, 417, 431, and 435) when conducting a launch after the effective date of new part 450 provided it holds a license or has had a license application accepted prior to the effective date of this regulation. Pursuant to Space Policy Directive-3 \184\ (SPD-3), proposed § 450.169 and proposed appendix A to part 450 would align the COLA criteria with current common practice and provide better protection for inhabitable and active orbiting objects. Additionally, § 450.101 would require that the probability of loss of functionality for each critical asset must not exceed 1 x 10-\3\ to protect national assets. For that reason, the FAA is proposing that all operators would be required to comply with these two provisions on this rule's effective date.
\184\ Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, 83 FR 28969 (June 21, 2018).
Because many of the current regulations would serve as a means of compliance for the proposed regulations, the FAA would review license modifications that applied the current regulations as means of demonstrating compliance with the proposed regulations. Additionally, an operator could use a means of compliance other than the current regulations to demonstrate compliance in a license modification request. The FAA would determine the applicability of proposed part 450 to an application for a license modification submitted after the effective date of the part on a case-by-case basis. The FAA does not anticipate that a vehicle operator would have any greater difficulty meeting the requirements under the proposed regulations than under the existing regulations. In fact, the FAA believes that the proposed regulations are more flexible because most allow for many different means of compliance.
An applicant for a renewal would be required to meet all the requirements of proposed part 450. The FAA anticipates that this would not be burdensome for operators seeking license renewals because there would be few, if any, additional application requirements that could not be fulfilled by reference to previously submitted information.
L. Equivalent Level of Safety
L. Equivalent Level of Safety
In addition to developing performance-based requirements, this proposal would preserve the equivalent-level-of-safety flexibility by relocating the provision to proposed § 450.37. Unlike using a means of compliance, which requires demonstration of compliance with a performance-based regulation, the ELOS provision would continue to allow an applicant to propose an alternative method to meet the safety intent of a current regulatory requirement. For example, § 450.117(d)(3) would require representative normal flight trajectory analysis outputs for each one second of flight. An applicant may wish to request an ELOS determination to the one-second interval, and the FAA would likely accept it if an alternative interval provides smooth and continuous individual PC contours.
To demonstrate equivalent level of safety, an operator would provide a clear and convincing demonstration, through technical rationale, that the proposed alternative approach provided a level of safety equivalent to the requirement it would replace. An ELOS determination means an approximately equal level of safety as determined by qualitative or quantitative means. Under § 450.37(b), an operator would not be able to use an ELOS determination to replace the public risk criteria set forth in § 450.101.
In 2018, the FAA issued a final rule that expanded the option to satisfy commercial space transportation requirements by demonstrating an equivalent level of safety in order to provide more choice to operators and reduce the number of waivers that must be prepared by industry and processed by the government.\185\ To utilize the option, operators are required to demonstrate that they are achieving a level of safety equivalent to any safety parameters specified in the regulations. The FAA evaluates every request for an alternative means of regulatory compliance under the ELOS provisions to ensure that the safety of the public, property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the United States is maintained to be consistent with the requirements in 14 CFR chapter III. The FAA would preserve the process established in the 2018 rulemaking, and would include its ELOS determination as part of any license issued applying this provision.
\185\ Updates to Rulemaking and Waiver Procedures and Expansion of the Equivalent Level of Safety Option, Final Rule, 83 FR 28528 (June 20, 2018).
The FAA requests comment on the potential use of "safety cases" when demonstrating an equivalent level of safety under proposed § 450.37. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensive, and valid case that a system is safe, for a given application in a given environment.\186\ The ARC report (at p. 25) suggested that FAA review time could be minimize if applicant submittals were "structured as a reasonable safety case that the proposed actions are safe under all plausible scenarios." In fact, the ARC suggested "safety cases" could be useful options several times. With respect to the proposed regulation, a safety case would potentially show that certain requirements identified by the applicant, excluding the requirements of § 450.101, need not be complied with per se in order to demonstrate that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety to the requirements identified by the applicant.
\186\ This Safety Case definition is from the U.K. Ministry of Defence (MOD) Standard 00-56, "Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems."
A-P-T Research, Inc., under contract to the FAA, recommended the use of a safety case approach as an alternate path to securing a license.\187\ The FAA considered proposing a safety case approach to demonstrating an equivalent level of safety under proposed § 450.37 that would include a formal proposal process that must use a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator, unless the Administrator determines otherwise based on predicted public risks and consequences, or demonstrated reliability.
The formal proposal process would: (1) Facilitate an FAA audit of all risk management methods proposed for use, including a demonstration of how the proposed methods can demonstrate compliance with § 450.101; (2) implement all the recommended improvements from the audit or justify all deviations from the recommended improvements; (3) document the risk management methods used and the verification evidence to demonstrate compliance with § 450.101; (4) facilitate an audit by an FAA-approved third party of the risk management methods used and the verification evidence to demonstrate compliance with § 450.101; and (5) submit the results of the third party audit for FAA review and approval.
An applicant that sought to use this safety case approach would need to submit: (1) A description of their plan to facilitate an FAA audit of all risk management methods proposed for use, including a demonstration of how the proposed methods can demonstrate compliance with § 450.101; (2) a description of the improvements implemented based on the FAA audit and detailed justifications for any deviations from the FAA recommended improvements; (3) a description of the risk management methods used and the verification evidence to demonstrate compliance with § 450.101; (4) an agreement to facilitate an audit by an FAA-approved third party of the risk management methods used and the verification evidence to demonstrate compliance with § 450.101; and (5) a description of the results of the third party audit. The safety case approach recommended by APT included the use of a third party to review. The FAA sees potential complications, including liability considerations, when involving a third party in the licensing process.
The FAA seeks comments on the potential usefulness and challenges associated with a safety case approach, whether or not a third party would be involved.
\187\ A-P-T Research, Inc. "A New Path to Launch Licenses," Doc. No. CDSP-FL004-18-00402 (October 16, 2018).
Additional Technical Justification and Rationale
Additional Technical Justification and Rationale
The sections below provide detailed discussions of flight safety analyses and software safety. Additionally, this section discusses the numerous conforming changes the FAA proposes to the existing regulations in order to implement the proposed regulations.
A. Flight Safety Analyses
A. Flight Safety Analyses
As discussed earlier, for purposes of this proposed rule, an FSA consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to determine flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard areas, and other mitigation measures, and to verify compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. The FAA proposes 15 sections for flight safety analysis, as discussed below. 1. Scope and Applicability
Proposed § 450.113 establishes the portions of flight for which an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA, and would describe the analyses required for each type of operation. The portion of flight governed by the public safety criteria is central to the scope of the FSA.
The current scope of FSA regulations is laid out in Sec. § 417.201 and 417.107(b) for ELVs. Specifically, § 417.107(b)(1) currently requires that FSAs quantify the collective risks from lift-off through orbital insertion for orbital launches and from lift-off to final impact for suborbital launches. Unfortunately, § 417.107(b)(2) does not clearly specify the portion of flight for which an FSA must quantify the individual risks. In practice, the FAA has reconciled this vagueness by requiring the same scope for both collective and individual risks: From lift-off through orbital insertion for orbital launches and from lift-off to final impact for suborbital launches.
It is also unclear in current regulations what portions of flight the FSA needs to cover for RLVs. Section 431.35(b)(1) simply states that the collective public risk limit applies to each proposed reentry, but does not speak specifically to beginning and end of the period of flight that an FSA must analyze. Reentry means to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle from earth orbit or from outer space to Earth.\188\ Reentry includes activities conducted in Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness and that are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry flight. The definition also includes activities conducted on the ground after vehicle landing on Earth to ensure the vehicle does not pose a threat to public health and safety or the safety of property. In practice, the FAA has required public risk assessments to begin at the final health check prior to initiation of de-orbit burn and ending when flight stops, such as splashdown for a capsule.
\188\ 14 CFR 401.5.
Further, for both ELVs and RLVs, the current regulations do not expressly address the potential public safety hazards caused by the disposal of a launch vehicle stage or component from orbit. That is, Sec. § 417.107(b) and 431.35(b)(1), in addressing the public risk criteria, do not specifically address the disposal of launch vehicle stages or components. As discussed earlier, such vehicle disposals have become more common in recent years, reflecting the elevated priority put on orbital debris mitigation. The FAA explained in the 2016 final rule \189\ that when the FAA requires that the quantitative risk analysis account for the planned impact of a first stage (or any stage) jettisoned prior to orbital insertion, it includes accounting for stage impacts regardless of whether the actual impact occurs before or after orbital insertion.
\189\ Changing the Collective Risk Limits for Launches and Reentries and Clarifying the Risk Limit Used to Establish Hazard Areas for Ships and Aircraft, Final Rule. 81 FR 47017 (July 20, 2016).
For reentry, proposed Sec. § 450.101(b) and 450.113(a)(4) would clarify and reduce the period FSAs must analyze when quantifying the public risks posed by reentry operations. The proposal would clarify that post-flight operations are not included in the safety analyses necessary to quantify the public risks posed by reentry operations. In § 401.5, the FAA proposes to include a definition for deorbit that clarifies that deorbit begins with the final command to commit the vehicle to a perigee below 70 nautical miles, approximately 130 km, and ends when all vehicle components come to rest on the Earth.
Proposed § 450.113 replaces § 417.201 to clarify the scope and applicability of FSAs. In proposed § 450.113(a)(1), an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA for orbital launch, from lift-off through orbital insertion,\190\ including any component or stage landings. In proposed § 450.113(a)(2), an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA for suborbital launch, from lift-off through final impact. In proposed § 450.113(a)(3), the FAA clarifies the scope of disposal FSA that would be necessary to demonstrate compliance with the disposal safety criteria in proposed § 450.101(d). Specifically, for disposal, an FSA would span from the beginning of the deorbit burn through final impact.
\190\ The FAA proposes orbital insertion to mean the point at which a vehicle achieves a minimum 70-nautical mile perigee based on a computation that accounts for drag. This adopts the definition of orbital insertion in RCC 321-17 Standard.
Proposed § 450.113(a)(4) would require an operator to perform and document an FSA for reentry, from the beginning of the deorbit burn through landing. The proposal is consistent with current practice, but would clarify that post-landing activities are not included in the FSA.
Proposed § 450.113(a)(5) would explicitly address hybrid vehicles, which include air-launch rockets released from carrier aircraft such as the Pegasus rocket carried by a modified L-1011 airliner. The proposal would clarify that FSAs generally apply to hybrid vehicles, for all phases of flight unless the Administrator determines otherwise based on demonstrated reliability. Thus, the proposal would enable an operator of a hybrid vehicle with a high level of demonstrated reliability for the entire flight or for a phase of flight, to be exempt from performing some FSAs without seeking a waiver for the flight or phase of flight. Demonstrated reliability refers to statistically valid probability of failure estimates based on the outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or stage. For example, if an applicant seeks to operate a hybrid vehicle that features an air-launch rocket released from a carrier aircraft with minimal modification from the original design certified as a commercial transport aircraft, the FAA would find certain FSAs not applicable if empirical data sufficiently showed that the demonstrated reliability and estimated public risks of the system are equivalent to general aviation aircraft during a given phase of flight. Specifically, the FAA foresees that such an applicant could be exempt from some of the normal flight trajectory analysis requirements during the captive carry phases of flight if the applicant could demonstrate compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101 without the benefit of some of the normal flight trajectory analysis outputs.
Proposed § 450.113(b) would identify the specific FSA actions applicable to all launch and reentry vehicles (in paragraph (b)(1)), a launch or reentry vehicle that relies on an FSS to comply with proposed § 450.101 (in paragraph (b)(2)), and launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle (in paragraph (b)(3)). 2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods
Proposed § 450.115 (Flight Safety Analysis Methods) would set the methodology requirements for FSAs. This section would replace the prescriptive requirements currently in § 417.203 and appendices A, B, C and I to part 417. Currently, § 417.203(a) requires that FSAs meet the requirements for methods of analysis contained in appendices A (section A417) and B (section B417) to part 417 for a launch vehicle flown with an FSS, and appendices B and C (section C417) for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind-weighting safety system. Specifically, section A417 provides prescriptive requirements on the FSA methodologies and products for a launch vehicle flown with an FSS. Section B417 provides prescriptive requirements on the FSA for hazard area analyses for ship and aircraft protection. Section C417 provides prescriptive requirements on the FSA methodologies and products for a launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.
Section 417.203(b) specifically lists the broad categories of approved methods of analysis while § 417.203(c) addresses requirements for alternate analysis methods. Section 417.203(c) currently requires that an alternate FSA method be based on accurate data and scientific principles, and is statistically valid. In practice, the FAA has evaluated the validity of an applicant's proposed methods by comparing the results to valid benchmarks such as data from mishaps, test, or validated high-fidelity methods. Section 417.203(e) requires that a launch operator demonstrate to the FAA compliance with the requirements of part 417, subpart C. In its application, a launch operator must include the analysis products required by parts 415, subpart F, 417, subpart A, and appendices A, B, C, and I, depending on whether the launch vehicle uses an FSS or a wind-weighting safety system.
Pursuant to § 431.35(c), the FSA for an RLV is required to account for any reasonably foreseeable hazardous event and safety-critical system failures during launch flight or reentry that could result in a casualty to the public. However, part 431 does not include requirements for the methods used to provide an FSA, thus providing no standards for evaluating an FSA's validity or level of fidelity. The part 431 license applications approved by the FAA included FSA methodologies and products comparable to those in 417 license applications.
Proposed § 450.115(a) sets the scope for FSA methods. This section would not materially change the scope of the FSA methods under current parts 417 and 431, which account for the risk to the public from hazards associated with normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight in accordance to § 417.205(a). However, proposed § 450.115(a) would add language currently not expressly provided in § 417.205(a) that would require an operator's FSA method to account for all reasonably foreseeable events and failure of safety-critical systems. This language is consistent with the current requirement in § 431.35(c) to account for any reasonably foreseeable hazardous event, and safety-critical system failures during launch flight or reentry that could result in a casualty to the public.
Proposed § 450.115(b) would establish the level of fidelity for FSAs. Specifically, it would require a level of fidelity sufficient to demonstrate that any risk to the public would satisfy the public risk criteria of proposed § 450.101, including the use of mitigations, accounting for all known sources of uncertainty, using a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator. It would also require that the analysis identify the dominant source of each type of public risk with a criterion in proposed § 450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase of flight, source of hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or explosive debris), and vehicle response mode. Thus, this proposed rule would provide performance targets instead of the current part 417 approach that mandates a single level of fidelity equivalent to methods that comply with the extensive requirements given in the appendices of part 417.
The requirements in proposed § 450.115(b) would account for all known sources of uncertainty and identify the dominant sources of risk. The proposal would be consistent with the best practices of other regulatory agencies that use quantitative risk analyses as part of a risk management approach to ensure public safety. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which has a long history of performance-based regulations with quantitative risk analyses to ensure public safety, has a long-standing policy to ensure that the quantitative techniques used for regulatory decision-making take into account the potential uncertainties that exist so that an estimate can be made on the confidence level to be ascribed to the quantitative results.\191\ The NRC has also found that, through use of quantitative techniques, important uncertainties have been, and continue to be, brought into better focus and may even be reduced as compared to those that would remain with sole reliance on deterministic decision-making. The NRC found that direct lack of severe accident experience makes it necessary that proper attention be given not only to the range of uncertainty surrounding probabilistic estimates, but also to the phenomenology that most influences the uncertainties. In other words, the NRC found the need to identify the dominant sources of public risks and their uncertainties when using quantitative risk analyses to ensure public safety.\192\
\191\ Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Safety Policy Goals. 51 FR 28044 (August 21, 1986).
\192\ The Department of the Interior (DOI), Bureau of Reclamation, uses risk criteria for achieving public protection in dam safety decision-making in a manner consistent with this proposed rule. Specifically, the DOI uses mean values calculated from Monte Carlo or similar analyses that include explicit treatment of input uncertainty.
The FAA would require that operators use a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator for FSA methods. The FAA plans to publish a draft version of that AC concurrently with this NPRM. An important aspect of that AC is the use of approaches generally consistent with the consensus U.S. Government standards on launch and reentry risk assessments (e.g., RCC 321). The RCC 321 Standard (paragraph 2.4) recognizes that there is significant uncertainty in the computed risks of rocket launches and notes that confidence bounds of 90 percent describing the uncertainty in the computed risk can span multiple orders of magnitude. Thus, the consensus U.S. Government standards on launch and reentry risk assessments contains a policy statement that uncertainty cannot be ignored. The RCC 321 Supplement further concurred with several statements originally made by the NRC, including the following three: (1) The use of mean estimates does not, however, resolve the need to quantify (to the extent reasonable) and understand those important uncertainties involved in risk predictions; (2) sensitivity studies should be performed to determine those uncertainties most important to the probabilistic estimates; and (3) the results of sensitivity studies should be displayed showing, for example, the range of variation together with the underlying science or engineering assumptions that dominate this variation. Even so, the RCC went on to conclude that a formal uncertainty analysis may not be necessary under conditions where the best mean estimate of the public risk is low relative to the collective risk criterion.
For this rulemaking, the FAA considered adopting an approach to the treatment of uncertainty following RCC 321 Standard and Supplement. The FAA requests comment on whether this treatment of uncertainty is reasonable. Specifically, the FAA solicits input on the process whereby the uncertainty does not have to be considered if the computed risk is less than one-third of the primary aggregated collective risk criterion.\193\ Current Air Force practice is to include implementation of measures to improve risk analyses to reduce the level of uncertainty when the predicted risks exceed 3 x 10-5 EC. Examples of that could include refined input data or a higher-fidelity method for the risk computations.
\193\ The choice of one-third was consistent with the recommendation in AFSPCMAN 91-710 Vol.1, 1 July 2004. Attachment 5 states that if risk to all individuals from a single hazard exceeds an EC of 30 x 10-6, a range user may have to take additional measures to protect personnel and resources. Examples include to fix, correct, or improve existing non-compliances, improve risk analyses to reduce the level of uncertainty, require a day-of-launch risk analysis, or establish disaster aversion criteria.
Similarly, if the estimated risk level exceeds 3 x 10-5 EC, the RCC 321 Standard states that the range should compute the uncertainty to ensure that a launch is not allowed that would violate the criterion based on best estimates that account for uncertainty. There are published examples of uncertainty analyses for launch risks that explicitly account for uncertainties associated with the input data (e.g., the probability of failure associated with a given break-up state vector), and biases and uncertainties in key sub-models (e.g., the sub-model used to compute the PC given an impact with a given piece of debris on a specific structure type). However, the end effect of the RCC 321 Standard approach to uncertainty treatment is that a range or range user could continue operating under current practice, using their current tools without formal uncertainty quantification for missions with a collective risk no greater than 3 x 10-5 EC. Under the RCC approach, only missions that pose collective risks above 3 x 10-5 EC based on point estimates would be required to perform formal uncertainty quantification. The FAA requests comment on whether the current approaches to uncertainty treatment employed by the RCC or the Air Force are viable in the FAA's regulatory framework. The FAA further requests comments on any currently available approaches to address uncertainties in public risk assessments, including the approach identified in the draft means of compliance on uncertainty and level of fidelity in FSA methods.
Proposed § 450.115(b) would require that an operator account for all known sources of uncertainty in various FSAs. The FAA intends to ensure that FSA methods account for known sources of aleatory (random) uncertainties that are the result of inherently random processes. An example of aleatory uncertainty is the influence of prevailing weather conditions on the results of collective and individual risk analyses for launch or reentry. The true EC is often highly influenced by the prevailing weather conditions during the proposed operation. The uncertainty in the true EC due to weather conditions is substantial for a typical baseline risk analysis that accounts for the foreseeable weather conditions in a given month based upon historical data and assumes that an operation is equally feasible under any of those likely weather conditions given all the safety and mission assurance constraints.
For example, most vehicles would not attempt to fly through certain wind conditions due to the potential for the vehicle to break up or veer off-course, leading to a violation of safety or mission assurance constraints. The uncertainty in the true EC for a day-of-launch risk analysis is much smaller, but the uncertainty in any forecast or measured weather input data will still produce some uncertainty in the EC due to measurement errors and variability in the weather measurements and forecasts. There are several other potentially important sources of aleatory uncertainty in an EC analysis, and there are various valid approaches to account for these aleatory uncertainties. This proposed rule would require that aleatory uncertainties are accounted for, including known sources of randomness in critical input data.
These would include normal and malfunction trajectories, weather conditions, population and sheltering characteristics (e.g., between day and night), velocities induced during break-up, aerodynamic properties of the vehicle and debris, any yield from an explosive impact, and the amount of debris that burns up due to aero-thermal heating during re-entry.
Proposed § 450.115(c) would establish application requirements for methods of analysis. Specifically, the proposed rule would require that an applicant submit a description of the FSA methodology for each launch or reentry approved by the FAA, including identification of the scientific principles and statistical methods used, and all assumptions and their justifications. However, if the FAA determines that the range's FSA methods meets FAA safety requirements, then the operator would not be required to provide the FAA with a description of the FSA methodology. Also, an applicant would be required to include the rationale for the level of fidelity, the evidence for validation and verification required by proposed § 450.101(g), the extent that the benchmark conditions are comparable to the foreseeable conditions of the intended operations, and the extent the analyses accounted for risk mitigations. The FAA intends for assumptions to be justified using logic, historical flight experience data, relevant test data, and the results from physics-based simulations. 3. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight
The FAA proposes a single regulation governing an FSA for normal trajectories, applicable to all launch and reentry vehicles, in proposed § 450.117 (Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight). The provision would distinguish between variability in the intended trajectory and uncertainties due to random sources of dispersion such as winds and vehicle performance. It would also clarify application requirements.
All the FSAs depend on some form of analysis of the trajectory under normal conditions, otherwise known as a normal trajectory. That is, one must first understand a vehicle's trajectory when it performs as intended and under normal conditions before one can determine the effects of malfunctions along its flight path.
Current regulations for normal trajectory analyses are found in Sec. § 417.207 and 431.35(d) and appendix A to part 417. Section 417.207 sets the current trajectory analysis requirements for ELVs. Section 417.207(a)(1) requires an analysis that establishes the limits of a launch vehicle's normal flight, as defined by the normal trajectory and potential three-sigma trajectory dispersions about the normal trajectory for any time after lift-off. Although this requirement is generally clear, the uncertainties the analysis must consider could be clearer. For example, the current requirement does not distinguish between inherently random uncertainties that could cause the actual trajectory to differ from the nominal trajectory, and variability in the known conditions immediately prior to the initiation of the operation (e.g., weather conditions at the time of the launch or the time into a launch window that the launch occurs for a rendezvous mission).
In terms of current RLV regulations in part 431, they describe flight trajectory analyses requirements in a single paragraph in § 431.35(d)(8). Specifically, the FAA requires that applicants provide flight trajectory analyses covering launch or ascent of the vehicle through orbital insertion and reentry or descent of the vehicle through landing, including its three-sigma dispersion. This regulation is silent as to the specific uncertainties for which the analysis must account. In practice, part 431 license applicants have provided normal trajectory data consistent with the part 417 regulations.
Proposed § 450.117 would retain the substantive normal trajectory analysis requirements currently in § 417.207 and the definitions of key terms such as "normal flight" and "normal trajectory." Proposed § 450.117(a)(1) would require a trajectory analysis that establishes the limits of a vehicles normal flight. The proposal would retain the requirement in § 417.207(a)(1) to establish a nominal trajectory where the vehicle performs as designed without any deviation due to winds, propulsion performance, or mass properties but would add clarity about the sources of uncertainty that a trajectory analysis must account for by distinguishing between variability and random uncertainty.
Specifically, the proposal would expressly require a trajectory analysis to establish two separate sets of trajectories to characterize distinct sources of uncertainty, including variability and random uncertainty. One set of normal trajectories in § 450.117(a)(1)(ii) would characterize the uncertainty during normal flight due to random deviations from ideal conditions, such as wind conditions, vehicle mass, and performance characteristics. Another set of normal trajectories in § 450.117(a)(1)(i) would characterize how the intended trajectory could vary due to conditions known prior to initiation of flight. An example of variability is how the intended trajectory would change due to different times for lift-off within a launch window that lasts several minutes for a mission with an orbital rendezvous as the primary objective. Another example of variability is how the intended trajectory would change due to wind conditions. In such cases, the nominal trajectory represents the most likely lift-off time. An FSA must distinguish between variability and random uncertainty in the normal trajectory in order to demonstrate that the criteria in proposed § 450.101 would be satisfied at any time the operator intends to initiate launch or re-entry flight.
Section 450.117(a)(2) would require a fuel exhaustion trajectory that produces instantaneous impact points with the greatest range for any given time after liftoff for any stage that has the potential to impact the Earth and does not burn to propellant depletion before a programmed thrust termination. This is the same as current § 417.207(a)(2). The FAA is unaware of any challenges with the current regulation regarding a fuel exhaustion trajectory.
For vehicles with an FSS, proposed § 450.117(a)(3) would establish a new requirement for trajectory data or parameters that describe the limits of a useful mission. The FAA proposes in § 401.5 to define the "limits of a useful mission" as the trajectory data or other parameters that describes the limits of a mission that can attain the primary objective, including but not limited to flight azimuth limits. Thus, the proposal would require an operator to establish the limits of a useful mission based on the values of trajectory parameters necessary to attain the primary mission objective, including flight azimuth limits. Note that the azimuth limit data is currently required by the Air Force in Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710 Vol. 2. The limits of a useful mission are essential input data for the flight safety limits analysis, and for an evaluation of whether a vehicle should be allowed to pass through a gate, as discussed later in this preamble.
Proposed § 450.117(b) would require a final trajectory analysis to use a six-degree of freedom trajectory model, and proposed § 450.117(c) would require a trajectory analysis to account for all wind effects, including profiles of winds that are no less severe than the worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and for uncertainty in the wind conditions. These are similar to § 417.207(b) and (c), respectively.
Proposed § 450.117(d) would provide application requirements for trajectory analyses that address the proposed methodology, input data, and output data. In paragraph (d)(1), an applicant would be required to describe the methodology used to characterize normal flight and the limits of a useful mission, including the scientific principles and statistical methods used, all assumptions and their justifications, the rationale for the level of fidelity of the methods, and the evidence for validation and verification that would be required by proposed § 450.101(g). In paragraph (d)(2), the FAA proposes to require that the applicant describe the input data used in normal trajectory analyses and provides a list of the minimum input data an applicant must describe. In paragraph (d)(3), the FAA proposes to require that an applicant describe a representative normal trajectory analysis outputs (e.g., position, velocity, and vacuum instantaneous impact point) for each second of flight for (1) the nominal trajectory, (2) a fuel exhaustion trajectory under otherwise nominal conditions, (3) a set of trajectories that characterize variability in the intended trajectory based on conditions known prior to initiation of flight, (4) a set of trajectories that characterize how the actual trajectory could differ from the intended trajectory due to random uncertainties, and (5) a set of trajectories that characterize the limits of a useful mission as described in proposed § 450.117(a). The proposed application requirements provide regulatory clarity regarding the normal trajectory characterization necessary to ensure compliance with proposed § 450.101.
Note that in this proposed section, and other proposed flight safety analysis application requirements, the FAA requires representative data. This allows the FAA to evaluate an applicant's methodologies. Representative data should be the best, meaning the most realistic, data available given the intended flight parameters.
The applicant would also be required to submit additional products that allow the FAA to conduct an independent analysis, if requested by the Administrator. This same application requirement would also be in proposed Sec. § 450.119 through 450.141. At times, the FAA conducts independent flight safety analyses which usually require additional information than is normally required of an applicant. Instead of attempting to list out what is needed for every independent analysis, which is usually case-specific, the FAA proposes to simply state that more information may be necessary. The FAA's conduct of an independent analysis is usually reserved for new vehicle concepts, new analysis methods, or proposals that involve unique public safety issues. 4. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight
Proposed § 450.119 (Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight) would consolidate trajectory analysis requirements for all launch and reentry vehicles. In consolidating, the FAA would also update its requirements to reflect advancements in trajectory analysis capabilities and clarify application requirements. A malfunction trajectory analysis is necessary to determine how far a vehicle can deviate from its normal flight path in case of a malfunction. This analysis helps determine impact points in case of a malfunction and is therefore a vital input for the analyses needed to demonstrate compliance with risk criteria. The FAA's current regulations covering trajectory analyses in case of malfunction are in § 417.209 (Malfunction turn analysis), appendix A to part 417, and § 431.35(d)(8).
Current § 417.209 sets forth the trajectory analysis requirements in case of a malfunction applicable to ELVs. Section 417.209(a)(1) requires a trajectory analysis to establish the launch vehicle's turning capability in the event of a malfunction during flight using a set of turn curves. Appendix A to part 417 (section A417.9) also provides more detailed and prescriptive requirements for analyzing "turn curves." Turn curve data offered a reasonable way to simulate failures that produce trajectory departures, particularly in response to thrust offsets when computational limitations made it impractical to perform six degrees of freedom (6-DOF) simulations of malfunction trajectories.
In the past, turn curves produced a reasonable way to model the classic cornus spiral behavior associated with a constant thrust offset or nozzle burn-through. Thus, § 417.209(b) requires a set of turn curves to establish the launch vehicle velocity vector turn angle from the nominal launch vehicle velocity vector, and to establish the vehicle velocity turn magnitude from the nominal velocity magnitude. There are two fundamental types of malfunction turn curves: (1) One that shows how the magnitude velocity changes during the turn; and (2) the other for the direction of the velocity. Given advancements in computational capabilities, the use of turn curves as mandated by the current regulations constitutes an outdated and unnecessarily simplified analysis technique. For instance, through current computational capabilities, particularly the prevalence of 6-DOF trajectory models, it is generally more efficient and more accurate for an applicant to provide sets of Monte Carlo trajectories that characterize a given type of malfunction, even for the thrust vector offsets and nozzle burn-through, than to provide turn curve data.
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