84 FR 15296 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements
This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.
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A. Flight Safety Analyses
Only § 417.223 and associated appendices provide specific direction on conducting flight hazard area analyses. In § 417.223(a), the FAA requires launch operators to perform a flight hazard area analysis that identifies any regions of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to control the risk to the public from debris impact hazards. In addition, the current regulation notes that the risk management requirements of § 417.205(a) apply to the flight hazard area analyses. Lastly, § 417. 223(a) paragraph lists factors that the analysis must account for.
Regarding aircraft hazard areas, the preamble to part 431 stated that the FAA also reserves discretion to impose measures deemed necessary by that office to protect public safety.\202\ This deference to regional offices for aircraft protection resulted in a lack of clarity and potential unevenness to the aircraft protection requirements potentially imposed on RLV operators.
\202\ 65 FR 56618 (September 19, 2000), at 56646.
Proposed § 450.133 would establish general requirements for the flight hazard area analysis as well as requirements specific to waterborne vessel hazard areas, land hazard areas, airspace hazard volumes, and the license application. The proposal would make uniform to launch and reentry the requirement in current § 417.223(a) that operators must identify any regions of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated to the extent necessary to ensure acceptable individual and collective risks. However, as discussed later in this section, the proposed regulations would allow operators to reduce, or otherwise optimize, the size of the warning regions for hazards resulting from normal flight events.
The proposal would add a definition of "flight hazard area" to § 405.1 to mean any region of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect the public health and safety, and safety of property. This definition is consistent with the current requirement in § 417.223(a). Note that the proposed definition would allow for the fact that it may be appropriate to issue a public warning for a flight hazard area, but unnecessary to survey or evacuate the area to ensure the public risks are within the criteria given in proposed § 450.101, as explained in the discussion of hazard area surveillance and publication.
Proposed § 450.133(a) would also revise the technical factors for which the hazard area analysis must account to remove language limiting those factors to launch activity alone, thus making consistent the regulations for all types of commercial space transportation operations. The proposal would merge current § 417.223(a)(2), (3), and (4) with slight changes into § 450.133(a)(1) to require an operator to account for the "regions of land, sea, and air potentially exposed to debris impact resulting from normal flight events and from debris hazards resulting from any potential malfunction. Proposed § 450.133(a)(5) would also clarify that the analysis must account for all foreseeable sources of debris dispersion during freefall, including wind effects, guidance and control, velocity imparted by break-up or jettison, lift, and drag forces with winds that are no less severe than the worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and uncertainty in the wind conditions.
In § 417.223(a)(4), the current regulation implies that the analysis only needed to account for some exposed populations in the vicinity of the launch site. The proposed § 450.133(a) would further clarify that all sources of debris dispersion must be accounted for by removing any ambiguity associated with what constitutes "in the vicinity of the launch site;" by eliminating that phrase, and thus ensuring equal protection for all public exposures. Finally, the proposal would clarify that valid flight hazard area analyses would be required to treat all planned debris hazards, planned impacts, and planned landings as a virtual certainty, consistent with current practice and the regulations in sections A417.23 and B417.13. Again, part 431 does not address flight hazard areas, but current practice for RLVs is generally consistent with the ELV regulations.
Proposed § 450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) would align FAA regulations with practices at the Federal launch ranges by allowing operators to reduce or otherwise optimize the size of the regions for warnings of potential hazardous debris resulting from normal flight events. Specifically, in § 417.223(b), the FAA currently requires hazard area analyses to establish ship and aircraft hazard area warnings in regions that encompass the three-sigma impact dispersion area for each planned debris impact. Similar language appears in § 431.43(b), and the FAA previously took the position that "three-sigma" in this context referred to 99.7 percent probability of containment (as explained earlier). However, the current regulations do not specify if the confidence of containment applies to all planned debris or only debris capable of causing a casualty. In any case, current practice includes the establishment of flight hazard areas sufficient for 97 percent probability of containment of debris capable of causing a casualty. Thus, the proposed requirements in § 450.133 (b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1) would be revised to include language reflecting that the provision applies to debris capable of causing a casualty to any person located on land, sea, or air.
Finally, proposed § 450.133(e) would list flight hazard area application requirements. An applicant would need to submit a description of the methodology to be used in the flight hazard area analysis, including all assumptions and justifications for the assumptions, vulnerability models, analysis methods, and input data. This information would include the worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted accounting for uncertainty in the wind conditions, the classes of waterborne vessels and vulnerability criteria employed, and the classes of aircraft and vulnerability criteria employed. Section 450.133(e)(2) would require an applicant to submit representative hazard area analysis outputs to include tabular data and graphs of the results of the flight hazard area analysis.
Note that the proposal would require hazard area results to identify the regions of land, sea, and air considered hazardous, regardless of location or ownership.\203\ The proposed requirement to show contours of probability of impact (PI) and PC that are an order of magnitude lower than those used to define the flight hazard areas is necessary to demonstrate sufficient computational resolution and analysis fidelity for the results that are critical to public safety. Furthermore, the FAA Air Traffic Organization currently requires identification of regions of air where the PI exceeds 1 x 10-7 for all debris capable of causing a casualty to persons on an aircraft, in order to facilitate safe and efficient integration of launch and reentry operations into the NAS. Proposed § 450.133(e)(3) would specifically provide that applicants must provide additional products if requested by the FAA to conduct an independent analysis.
\203\ However, as provided in proposed § 450.161(c), an operator would only be required to publicize warnings for flight hazard areas that exclude any regions of land, sea, or air under the control of the vehicle or site operator or other entity by agreement.
12. Debris Risk Analysis
12. Debris Risk Analysis
The FAA proposes to streamline, clarify, and make consistent its regulations on debris risk analysis used to evaluate compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. The proposal would require launch and reentry operators to conduct a debris risk analysis that demonstrates compliance with proposed § 450.101 either prior to the day of the operation, accounting for all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria, or during the countdown using the best available input data.
A debris risk analysis determines the expected average number of casualties to the public, individually and collectively, due to inert and explosive debris hazards. This analysis includes an evaluation of risk to populations on land, including areas following passage through any gate in a flight safety limit boundary. The current FAA regulations require a debris risk analysis, but only part 417 provides any specificity about what constitutes a valid analysis including prescriptive requirements in section A417.25 of appendix A. Part 431 provides no requirements to clarify what constitutes a valid debris risk analysis. In practice though, RLV license applicants often abided by debris risk performance requirements set in part 417, such as the need to use trajectory time intervals sufficient to produce smooth and continuous individual risk contours.
Section A417.1 states that the appendix applies to the methods for performing analysis required by Sec. § 417.107 and 417.225, and provides (1) an acceptable means of compliance, and (2) a standard and a measure of fidelity against which the FAA will measure any proposed alternative analysis approach. However, in some cases the 417 appendices are overly prescriptive and unduly burdensome. For example, section A417.25(c) requires an operator to file with the FAA a debris risk analysis report that includes all populated areas included in the debris risk analysis, which typically translates into many thousands of population centers for an orbital launch, as well as the values of probability of impact and expected casualty for each populated area. In other cases, the part 417 appendices mistakenly neglected to direct an applicant to account for important phenomena, such as the influence of uncertainties in atmospheric conditions on the propagation of debris from each predicted breakup location to impact.
The FAA proposes to streamline, clarify, and make consistent its regulations regarding debris risk analyses to determine if public risks posed by a proposed launch or reentry can comply with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. The proposal would provide performance-based regulations regarding the level of fidelity required for key elements of a valid debris risk analysis, including analyses for the propagation of debris, public exposure and critical assets model, and casualty areas. The proposed debris risk analysis requirements in § 450.135 would supplement the more generic requirements for flight safety methods proposed in § 450.115. The proposal would also align FAA regulations with practices at the Federal launch ranges.
Proposed § 450.135(a) provides applicants an option to perform a debris risk analysis that demonstrates compliance with public safety criteria in § 450.101, either prior to the day of the operation, by accounting for all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria, or during the countdown using the best available input data. Thus, the proposal provides flexibility that was lacking in both parts 417 and 431.
Proposed § 450.135(b) would include performance-based requirements to clarify the phenomena the propagation-of-debris portion of the analysis must consider. The propagation of debris is a physics-based analysis that predicts where debris impacts are likely to occur in the case of a debris event while the vehicle is in flight, such as jettison of a vehicle stage or an explosion. As mentioned previously, section A417 provides some requirements regarding the sources of debris impact dispersions that must be accounted for, but in some cases that was either overly prescriptive or incomplete. A debris risk analysis must compute statistically-valid debris impact probability distributions using the input data produced by FSAs required in proposed Sec. § 450.117 through 450.133. The propagation of debris from each predicted breakup location to impact would be required to account for all foreseeable forces that can influence any debris impact location, and all foreseeable sources of impact dispersion. At a minimum, the foreseeable sources of impact dispersion must include the uncertainties in atmospheric conditions, debris aerodynamic parameters, pre-breakup position and velocity, and breakup-imparted velocities.\204\
\204\ The level of fidelity of the analysis would be subject to the requirements in proposed § 450.101(g) which, as proposed, requires an operator's flight safety analysis method to use accurate data and scientific principles and be statistically valid. The method must produce results consistent with or more conservative than the results available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.
Proposed § 450.135(c) would provide performance-based regulations that specify features of a valid exposure model. An exposure model provides critical input data on the geographical location of people and critical assets at various times when the launch or reentry operation could occur. A debris risk analysis must use an exposure model that accounts for the distribution of people and critical assets. The exposure input data would be required to include the entire region where there is a significant probability of impact of hazardous debris, to characterize the distribution and vulnerability of people and critical assets both geographically and temporally, and to account for the distribution of people in various structure and vehicle types with a resolution consistent with the characteristic size of the impact probability distributions for relevant fragment groups. It would be required to have sufficient temporal and spatial resolution that a uniform distribution of people within each defined region can be treated as a single average set of characteristics without degrading the accuracy of any debris analysis output, and to use accurate source data from demographic sources, physical surveys, or other methods. As well, the exposure input data would be required to be regularly updated to account for recent land-use changes, population growth, migration, and construction. Finally, it would be required to account for uncertainty in the source data and modeling approach.
In § 450.135(d), the proposal would provide performance-based regulations that set forth the features of a valid casualty area and consequence analysis. The proposal would include a definition of casualty area in § 401.5. "Casualty area" would mean the area surrounding each potential debris or vehicle impact point where serious injuries, or worse, can occur. A debris risk analysis would be required to model the casualty area and compute the predicted consequences of each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in terms of conditional expected casualties. The casualty area and consequence analysis would be required to account for all relevant debris fragment characteristics and the characteristics of a representative person exposed to any potential debris hazard; any direct impacts of debris fragments, intact impact, or indirect impact effects; and vulnerability of people and critical assets to debris impacts.
The vulnerability of people and critical assets to debris impacts would be required to account for the effects of buildings, ground vehicles, waterborne vessel, and aircraft upon the vulnerability of any occupants; for all hazard sources, such as the potential for any toxic or explosive energy releases; and for indirect or secondary effects such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide or ricochet, including accounting for terrain. It would also be required to account for the effect of wind on debris impact vector and toxic releases, and for impact speed and angle (also accounting for motion of vehicles). Finally, it would be required to account for uncertainty in fragment impact parameters, and uncertainty in modeling methodology. These broad performance-based items would replace the unduly narrow and prescriptive requirements in appendix A which would give operators more flexibility in demonstrating that public risk criteria have been met.
In order to provide adequate protection from public safety risks such as the risk of casualties, it is important that analyses used to protect public safety account for all known influences on the vulnerability of people and critical assets. At the same time, the proposal recognizes in § 450.101(g) that a valid method must produce results consistent with or more conservative than the results available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid benchmarks. Hence, the proposal would not require a vulnerability model to account explicitly for each known influence on the empirical results per se, but the proposal would require that a valid vulnerability model produce results that are either consistent with the standard in proposed § 450.101(g).
Proposed § 450.135(e) would list application requirements, which are designed to be more balanced and less prescriptive and ambiguous than current requirements in appendix A to part 417, section A417. The proposal would require an application to describe the methods used to compute debris impact distributions, population exposure data, atmospheric data, as well as how the operator proposes to account for the conditions immediately prior to enabling the launch or reentry flight, per § 450.135(e)(1) through (5).
Proposed § 450.135(e)(6) and (7) would require an applicant to submit sample debris risk analysis outputs, including the effective unsheltered casualty area for all fragment classes, assuming a representative impact vector; and the effective casualty area for all fragments classes for a representative type of building, ground vehicle, waterborne vessel, and aircraft, assuming a representative impact vector. This is not a new requirement because the effective casualty area was always necessary for computing the EC. The proposal would define effective casualty area in § 401.5 as the aggregate casualty area of each piece of debris created by a vehicle failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty area for each piece of debris is a modeling construct in which the area within which 100 percent of the population are assumed to be a casualty, and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to be a casualty.
In proposed § 450.135(e)(8), an applicant would be required to submit sample collective and individual outputs under representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions, including the total collective casualty expectation for the proposed operation; a list of the collective risk contribution for at least the top ten population centers and all centers with collective risk exceeding 1 percent of the collective risk criterion in proposed § 450.101; a list of the maximum individual PC for the top ten population centers and all centers that exceed 10 percent of the individual risk criterion in proposed § 450.101. The applicant would also be required to submit a list of the probability of loss of functionality of any critical asset that exceeds 1 percent of the critical asset criterion in proposed § 450.101. Proposed § 450.135(e)(9) would require an operator to submit a list of the conditional collective casualty expectation for each vehicle response mode for each one-second interval of flight under representative conditions and the worst foreseeable conditions. Finally, in all FSAs, the applicant must also submit additional products that allow an independent analysis, if requested by the FAA, in order to assure that the public risk criteria are satisfied. 13. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects
The FAA proposes to consolidate its regulations on far-field overpressure blast effects analyses in proposed § 450.137 (Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis), used to demonstrate compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. This analysis looks at the potential public hazard from broken windows as a result of impacting explosive debris, including impact of an intact launch vehicle.
The near-field effects of explosions are covered under debris risk analysis, where meteorological conditions do not significantly influence the attenuation of overpressure. However, the FAA would require a far-field blast effect analysis for peak incident overpressures below 1 pound per square inch (psi,) the point where meteorological conditions can significantly influence the attenuation of explosive overpressures. A launch and reentry operator would be required to conduct a far-field overpressure blast effects analysis (also known as distance focusing overpressure, or DFO) that demonstrates compliance with public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. An operator would need to complete the analysis either prior to the day of the operation accounting for all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria or during the countdown using the best available input data. An applicant would be required to describe the critical input data, such as the meteorological measurements, and develop flight commit criteria to include any hazard controls derived from this FSA in accordance with proposed § 450.165(b)(6).
Impacting explosive materials, both liquid and solid, have the potential to explode. Given the appropriate combination of atmospheric pressure and temperature gradients, the impact explosion can produce distant focus overpressure at significant distance from the original blast point. Overpressures from as low as 0.1 psi may cause windows to break. However, other forms of overpressure, such as multiple pulses, may also prove hazardous depending on the size and thickness of windows and the number of windowpanes. Moreover, levels of overpressure will change depending on distance, atmospherics, and a vehicle's explosive yield.
Multiple historical events involving large explosions, including rocket failures, have shown that under unfavorable atmospheric conditions, a shock wave may focus to produce significant peak overpressures at communities beyond the boundaries of the launch site, potentially causing window breakage and injuries. In light of the historical evidence of blast damage due to overpressure focusing, and building on the legacy of U.S. agency efforts to protect against the potential public risks associated with rocket explosions, the FAA adopted regulations to protect the public from the DFO phenomena in § 417.229 (Far-field overpressure blast effect analysis) and appendix A to part 417 (section A417.29.) In § 417.229, the FAA requires an FSA to establish flight commit criteria that protect the public from any hazard associated with DFO effects and demonstrate compliance with the public risk criterion. Section 417.229(b) currently lists appropriate constraints on the analysis and section A417.29 provides an acceptable means of compliance. Section A417.29 includes hazard controls based on ANSI S2.20-183 Standard,\205\ as well as a standard and a measure of fidelity used to assess any proposed alternative analytic approach. Section A417.29 also lists the products of a valid DFO analysis.
\205\ ANSI S2.20-1983, Estimating Air Blast Characteristics for Single Point Explosions in Air, with a Guide to Evaluation of Atmospheric Propagation and Effects, Acoustical Society of America, New York (1983).
However, current regulations lack clarity on when a day-of-launch DFO analysis is necessary. Specifically, section A417.29(c) requires that an operator conduct a risk analysis that accounts for "current meteorological conditions," unless the operator complies with the prescriptive requirements in § 417.229(b) that include the extremely conservative method prescribed by the ANSI S2.20-183 Standard. These requirements have led to situations where an operator was technically required to perform a day-of-launch risk analysis to protect against the DFO hazard, when in fact the public risks due to the DFO phenomena were insignificant based on every weather condition measured over a period of many years.
Part 431 does not explicitly address the potential public hazard posed by DFO. However, since 2016, § 431.35(b)(1)(i) has required an applicant to demonstrate that the total collective risk does not exceed 1 x 10-\4\ EC, where the total risk consists of risk posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far-field blast overpressure. Because the RLVs licensed to date under part 431 have relatively low potential explosive yields (compared to large ELVs), some part 431 license applicants were able to perform hazard analyses based on the extremely conservative method prescribed by the ANSI S2.20-183 Standard to demonstrate that the public risks due to the DFO phenomena were insignificant.
The FAA proposes to streamline and clarify its regulations on DFO analyses. Whereas part 417 regulations and relevant appendices contain prescriptive methodology requirements in Appendix A, the proposal would distill these sections into performance requirements applicable to both launch and reentry flight operations.
Proposed § 450.137(a) would provide applicants an option to perform a DFO risk analysis that demonstrates compliance with public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101, either prior to the day of the operation, by accounting for all foreseeable conditions within the flight commit criteria, or during the countdown using the best available input data. If an operator could satisfy § 450.137(a)(1), then it would not be required to satisfy § 450.137(a)(2). There are at least two different screening analyses that would demonstrate compliance with § 450.137(a)(1). Method one would be a very simple deterministic window breakage screening analysis. Method two would be a simplified risk-based screening analysis. If either screening analysis indicates no potential hazards or insignificant risks, with or without mitigations, then an operator would not be required to comply with § 450.137(a)(2). Conversely, an operator would be required to satisfy proposed § 450.137(a)(2) if it could not demonstrate compliance with § 450.137(a)(1). Thus, the proposal would provide clarity regarding how to determine if a day-of-operations risk analysis is necessary, and flexibility to establish flight commit criteria to limit the contribution of DFO public risks based on analysis done prior to the day of the operation. This clarity and flexibility were lacking in both parts 417 and 431.
Proposed § 450.137(b) would set required performance outcomes and the specific factors that a DFO FSA must consider. Substantively, § 450.137(b) would contain the same requirements as those currently in § 417.229(b). Note that the level of fidelity of the DFO analysis would be subject to the requirements in proposed § 450.101(g), so that the analysis methods used must produce results consistent with, or more conservative than, the results available from valid benchmarks.
Proposed § 450.137(c) would clarify the materials an operator must submit with its license application, which are generally consistent with those currently required to comply with part 417. This paragraph would clarify the level of fidelity required for the products of a DFO analysis by specifying the key input data and critical model elements that an application would be required to describe.
The proposal would require an application to include: (1) A description of the population centers, terrain, building types, and window characteristics used as input to the far-field overpressure analysis; (2) a description of the methods used to compute the foreseeable explosive yield probability pairs, and the complete set of yield-probability pairs, used as input to the far-field overpressure analysis; (3) a description of the methods used to compute peak incident overpressures as a function of distance from the explosion and prevailing meteorological conditions, including sample calculations for a representative range of the foreseeable meteorological conditions, yields, and population center locations; (4) a description of the methods used to compute the probability of window breakage, including tabular data and graphs for the probability of breakage as a function of the peak incident overpressure for a representative range of window types, building types, and yields accounted for; (5) a description of the methods used to compute the PC for a representative individual, including
tabular data and graphs for the PC, as a function of location relative to the window and the peak incident overpressure for a representative range of window types, building types, and yields accounted for; (6) tabular data and graphs showing the hypothetical location of any member of the public that could be exposed to a PC of 1 x 10-\5\ or greater for neighboring operations personnel, and 1 x 10-\6\ or greater for other members of the public, given foreseeable meteorological conditions, yields, and population exposures; (7) the maximum expected casualties that could result from far-field overpressure hazards greater given foreseeable meteorological conditions, yields, and population exposures; and (8) a description of the meteorological measurements used as input to any real-time far-field overpressure analysis. It would also require the submission of any additional products that allow an independent analysis, as requested by the Administrator. 14. Toxic Hazards for Flight
The FAA proposes to replace current § 417.227 and appendix I to part 417 with the following two performance-based regulations: § 450.139 for toxic hazard analyses for flight operations and § 450.187 for toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations.
Currently, the requirements for a toxic release hazard analysis are specified in § 417.227. Section 417.277 requires that an FSA establish flight commit criteria that protect the public from any hazard associated with toxic release and demonstrate compliance with the public risk criteria of § 417.107(b). This analysis must account for any toxic release that will occur during the proposed flight of a launch vehicle or that would occur in the event of a flight mishap, and for all members of the public that may be exposed to toxic release. Additionally, § 417.405 sets forth the requirements for a ground safety analysis, and, although toxic release is not explicitly enumerated, a launch operator must identify each potential hazard including the sudden release of a hazardous material. Appendix I to part 417 provides methodologies for performing toxic release hazard analysis for the flight of a launch vehicle and for launch processing at a launch site in the U.S. as required by § 417.407(f).
Similarly, § 431.35 requires that for a reusable launch vehicle mission, an applicant must demonstrate that the proposed mission does not exceed the acceptable risk defined in § 417.107(b)(1) that includes the risk associated with toxic release. Further, § 431.35(c) requires that an applicant employ a system safety process to identify the hazards and assess the risks to public health and safety of property associated with the mission. Although parts 431 and 435 have the same risk criteria for toxic release as are contained in part 417, unlike part 417, they have no explicit requirements for establishing toxic thresholds. Instead, toxic hazards are addressed as part of the systems safety process. The lack of definitive requirements in parts 431 and 435 has created a lack of clarity as to the requirements for toxic release hazard analysis during the system safety process.
The current toxic hazard requirements have a number of shortcomings. The requirements of § 417.227 are not sufficiently definitive for an operator to establish the toxic concentration and exposure duration threshold for a toxic propellant, to evaluate toxic hazards for flight or for ground operations, to determine a toxic hazard area in the event of a release during flight or from a ground operations mishap, or to require toxic containment or evacuation of the public from a toxic hazard area.
Conversely, the existing appendix I to part 417 is overly prescriptive in defining permissible values for assumptions and data inputs to analyses but, as discussed later, lacks important items. In many instances, appendix I requires specific methods, formulas, acceptable sources, specific conditions, and assumptions. However, often these are not the only ways in which the requirements or required demonstrations can be made.
There are numerous examples of the prescriptive nature of appendix I to part 417. For example, section I417.3(c)(1) identifies only three agencies of the U.S. Government, namely, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Transportation, that the launch operator is permitted to use as sources of toxicant levels of concern (LOC). There are no common standards in toxicological dose-response data. The data bases of concentration thresholds are different from agency to agency. Specific toxic chemicals that are released may not be included in some or many lists, and some databases account for exposure durations where others do not. Additionally, some databases account for differences in the age and vulnerability of populations exposed, while others do not. Furthermore, some databases account for differences in the severity of physiological responses to exposure, when others do not. Therefore, excluding available dose-response databases limits the capability of the operator to select the most appropriate LOC. Other U.S Government agencies that have established airborne toxic concentration thresholds of exposure, including the National Research Council (NRC), the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the U.S. National Institute of Medicine, and the U.S. National Library of Medicine.
Other prescriptive examples in Appendix I include section I417.3(c)(3) which requires the launch operator to use only one formulation to determine the toxic concentration threshold for mixtures of two or more toxicants, and section I417.5(c)(2), which prescribes a set of single-valued worst-case conditions that a launch operator must apply in an analysis of toxic hazard conditions for uncommon or unique propellants. Other sections of the appendix mandate specific assumptions.\206\
\206\ For example, section I417.7(e)(2), the worst-case release scenario for toxic liquids, requires an assumption that liquid spreads to one centimeter deep, and that the volatilization rate must account for the highest daily maximum temperature occurring the past 3 years precluding more severe or more realistic worst-case conditions, such as assuming the liquid spreads to a lesser depth, exposing a greater surface area for evaporation. This may not be conservative enough to provide acceptable public safety in some cases.
In addition to being overly prescriptive, Appendix I also contains inaccuracies and out of date information. For example, section I417.7(b) (Process hazards analysis) provides that an analysis that complies with 29 CFR 1910.119(e) satisfies section I417.7(b)(1) and (2). However, the specific requirements of 29 CFR 1910.119(e) are not completely congruent with the specific requirements of section I417.7(b)(1) and (2). In particular, the following requirements of section I417.7(b)(2) do not have counterparts in § 1910.119(e): location of the source of the release; each opportunity for equipment malfunction or human error that can cause an accidental release; and each safeguard used or needed to control each hazard or prevent equipment malfunctions or human error. Thus, if an operator chooses to satisfy § 1910.119(e), important parts of section I417.7(b)(2) may not be addressed, such as the location of the source of the release which is needed to determine the toxic hazard area necessary to achieve toxic containment.
The tables in appendix I are also problematic and in many cases omit important information. For example, Table I417-1, Commonly Used Non-Toxic Propellants, contains only three propellants, designated as commonly used non-toxic propellants. However, this list leaves other non-toxic liquid propellants such as liquid methane or liquefied natural gas without an explicit exemption from performing a toxic release hazard analysis.
The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for toxic release analysis for the launch of an ELV currently contained in parts 415 and 417, the launch and reentry of an RLV in part 431, and the launch of a reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch vehicle in part 435. Specifically, the FAA proposes to replace current § 417.227 and appendix I to part 417, with two performance-based regulations--proposed Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187. The proposed requirements would apply to all launches and reentries, and would provide more definitive application requirements for the toxic release hazard analysis.
Both proposed Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187 would apply to launch and reentry vehicles, including all components and payloads that have toxic propellants or other toxic chemicals, making it explicitly clear that reentry operations require a toxic hazard release analysis where the requirement was not previously explicit in parts 431 and 435. The FAA decided to split the toxic release analysis regulations into two sections, one for flight and the other for ground operations, because ground operations and flight operations have different criteria available to establish an acceptable level of public safety. Specifically, the FAA proposes to apply a quantitative public risk acceptability criteria for flight consistent with the risk criteria in § 450.101 and to apply a qualitative hazard acceptability criterion for ground hazards that is consistent with the standard in § 450.109(a)(3).\207\
\207\ Section 450.109(a)(3) would require that the risk associated with each hazard meets the following criteria: (i) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote and (ii) the likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major damage to public property or critical assets must be remote.
Proposed § 450.139(b)(1) would require an operator to conduct a toxic release hazard analysis. Additionally, under paragraph (b)(2) an operator would be required to manage the risk of casualties that could arise from exposure to toxic release either through containing hazards in accordance with proposed § 450.139(d) or performing a toxic risk assessment under proposed paragraph (e) that protects the public in compliance with proposed § 450.101, including toxic release. Furthermore, under proposed § 450.139(b)(3) an operator would be required to establish flight commit criteria based on the results of its toxic release hazard analysis, containment analysis, or toxic risk assessment for any necessary evacuation of the public from any toxic hazard area.
Section 450.139(c) would contain the requirements for a toxic release hazard analysis, which are currently lacking in § 417.227. Specifically, under proposed § 450.139(c) the toxic release hazard analysis would require an operator to account for any toxic releases that could occur during nominal or non-nominal launch or reentry for flight operation. Furthermore, an operator's toxic release hazard analysis would be required to include a worst-case release scenario analysis or a maximum-credible release scenario analysis for each process that involves a toxic propellant or other chemical; determine if toxic release can occur based on an evaluation of the chemical compositions and quantities of propellants, other chemicals, vehicle materials, and projected combustion products, and the possible toxic release scenarios; account for both normal combustion products and any unreacted propellants and phase change or molecular derivatives of released chemicals; and account for any operational constraints and emergency procedures that provide protection from toxic release. While the proposed § 450.139(c) would contain more definitive requirements than current regulations, it would also provide the operator more flexibility in the analysis because unlike the current regulations it would not require an operator to make specific assumptions when performing a worst-case release scenario analysis to determine worst-case released quantities of toxic propellants, toxic liquids, or toxic gases from ground operations.
Proposed § 450.139(b)(2) would require an operator to manage the risk of casualties arising from toxic release either by containing the hazards in accordance with paragraph (d) or by performing a toxic risk assessment in accordance with paragraph (e) that protects the public in compliance with the risk criteria of § 450.101. If an operator chose toxic containment to comply with proposed § 450.139(b)(2), the operator would be required to manage the risk of casualties by either (1) evacuating, or being prepared to evacuate, the public from a toxic hazard area, where an average member of the public would be exposed to greater than one percent conditional individual PC in the case of worst-case release or maximum credible release scenario, or (2) by employing meteorological constraints to limit a launch operation to times when the prevailing winds would transport a toxic release away from populated areas otherwise at risk. The conditional individual PC would be computed assuming that (1) a maximum credible release event occurs, and (2) average members of the public are present along the boundary of the toxic hazard area.
If an operator chose to comply with proposed § 450.139(b)(2) by conducting a toxic risk assessment that protects the public in compliance with proposed § 450.101, in accordance with § 450.139(e), the toxic risk assessment would require the operator to account for airborne concentration and duration thresholds of toxic propellants or other chemicals. For any toxic propellant, other chemicals, or combustion product, an operator would be required to use airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds identified in a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator. Currently, the thresholds set by the Acute Exposure Guideline Level 2 (AEGL-2), the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines Level 2 (ERPG-2), or the Short-term Public Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL) \208\ would be accepted means of compliance for proposed § 450.139(e)(1) (and § 450.187(d)(1)). These are thresholds designed to anticipate casualty-causing health effects from exposure to certain airborne chemical concentrations. The FAA anticipates, as discussed earlier, that additional agencies' threshold values could satisfy the requirements and would identify any additional accepted thresholds. By requiring an operator to use airborne toxic concentration thresholds identified in a means of compliance accepted by the Administrator under proposed § 450.35, the FAA anticipates that operators would be provided with some flexibility to utilize toxic concentration thresholds identified by agencies other than the three currently identified in appendix I to part 417 thereby enhancing the capability of the operator to select the most appropriate LOC for its operation.
\208\ AEGLs are used by EPA, the American Industrial Hygiene Association's ERPGs are used by NOAA, and the National Research Council's SPEGL is used by the DOD.
An operator also would be required under § 450.139(e)(2) to account for physical phenomena (such as meteorological conditions and characterization of the terrain) expected to influence any toxic concentration and duration in the area surrounding the potential release site instead of prescribing a set of single-valued wind speed and atmospheric stability classes and dictating how an operator must derive the variance of the mean wind directions. Hence, under proposed § 450.139(e)(2) the toxic assessment would likely be more appropriate for the actual situation. Proposed § 450.139(e)(3) would require an operator to determine a toxic hazard area for the launch or reentry, surrounding the potential release site for each toxic propellant or other chemical based on the amount and toxicity of the propellant or other chemical, the exposure duration, and the meteorological conditions involved. Finally, under proposed § 450.139(e)(4) and (5) the toxic assessment would be required to account for all members of the public that may be exposed to the toxic release, including all members of the public on land and on any waterborne vessels, populated offshore structures, and aircraft that are not operated in direct support of the launch or reentry, and for any risk mitigation measures applied in the risk assessment.
In many respects, proposed Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187 are nearly identical, and the rationale behind the revisions proposed in § 450.139 would be the same for proposed § 450.187. As discussed previously, proposed § 450.187 would apply to any launch or reentry vehicle, including all vehicle components and payloads, that uses toxic propellants or other toxic chemicals. Like § 450.139, § 450.187(b) would require a toxic hazard analysis.
Under the proposed rule an operator would be required to manage risk from a toxic release hazard or demonstrate compliance with proposed § 450.109(a)(3) \209\ with a toxic risk assessment. The requirements for a toxic risk assessment under proposed § 450.187(e) are substantially similar to those of proposed § 450.139, except that ground operations use a qualitative acceptability criteria and flight operations can use quantitative risk criteria. FAA has not proposed quantitative criteria for ground operations because there are no commonly accepted criteria.
\209\ As discussed earlier, § 450.109(a)(3) would require that the risk associated with each hazard meets the following criteria: (i) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote and (ii) the likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major damage to public property or critical assets must be remote.
The proposed application requirements under § 450.139(f) toxic hazards for flight and under § 450.187(e) for ground operations would be similar. The FAA believes that the proposed approach will provide applicants with a clear understanding of what the FAA requires in order to avoid repeated requests for clarifications and additional information.
Both would require the applicant to submit: (1) The identity of the toxic propellant, chemical, or toxic combustion products or derivatives in the possible toxic release; (2) its selected airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds; (3) meteorological conditions for the atmospheric transport, and buoyant cloud rise of any toxic release from its source to downwind receptor locations; (4) characterization of the terrain; (5) the identity of the toxic dispersion model used, and any other input data; (6) representative results of toxic dispersion modeling to predict concentrations and durations at selected downwind receptor locations; (7) a description of the failure modes and associated relative probabilities for potential toxic release scenarios used in the risk evaluation; (8) the methodology and representative results of the worst-case or maximum-credible quantity of any toxic release; (9) a demonstration that the public will not be exposed to airborne concentrations above the toxic concentration and duration thresholds; (10) the population density in receptor locations
that are identified by toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas; and (11) a description of any risk mitigations applied in the toxic risk assessment; and (12) the identity of the population database used. Like other risk analyses, the FAA may request additional products that allow the FAA to conduct an independent analysis. 15. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle
The FAA proposes to consolidate three current part 417 provisions expressly regulating unguided suborbital launch vehicle operations into § 450.141. The proposed rule would retain the performance requirements and remove the prescriptive provisions in Sec. § 417.125 and 417.233. The FAA also proposes to incorporate the overarching safety performance requirements in appendix C to part 417 related to wind weighting analysis products. This proposal applies specifically to the flight of unguided suborbital launch vehicles using wind weighting to meet the public safety criteria of proposed § 450.101.
An unguided suborbital launch vehicle is a suborbital rocket that does not contain active guidance or a directional control system. Unlike the launch of a guided launch vehicle, an unguided suborbital launch vehicle may safely fly by adjusting the launcher azimuth and elevation (aiming the rocket) shortly before launch to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight. This process limits impact locations to those that minimize public exposure. The FAA refers to this safety process as "wind weighting," which involves unique organizational and operational safety requirements.
Section 417.125 provides the broad requirements for launching an unguided suborbital launch vehicle. Specifically, it lays out provisions for a flight safety system, a wind weighting safety system, public risk criteria, stability, tracking, and post launch review. Section 417.125(b) requires an applicant to use an FSS if the vehicle can reach a populated area and the applicant does not use an effective wind weighting system. Section 417.125(c) sets requirements for a wind weighting system if that system is used in place of an FSS. It provides that the vehicle must not contain a guidance or directional control system. It also requires the launcher azimuth and elevation setting to be wind weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight in compliance with § 417.233's FSA requirements, and requires specific nominal launcher elevation angle for proven (85°, and 86° with wind correction) and unproven (80°, and 84° with wind correction) unguided suborbital launch vehicles. These prescriptive launch elevation angles are used so that the vehicle does not fly uprange. In other words, the rocket should not be angled so vertically that winds could force the rocket uprange instead of the intended downrange direction. Section 417.125(d) expressly requires unguided suborbital launch vehicles to fly in accordance with the public risk criteria required for all launch vehicles under part 417.
In addition, the current rule has stability, tracking, and post-launch review requirements that are specific to unguided suborbital launch vehicles. Section § 417.125(e) requires specific stability requirements measured in calibers to ensure that the unguided suborbital launch vehicle is stable throughout flight. The tracking requirements in § 417.125(f) require that a launch operator track impact locations after launch to verify that the preflight wind weighting analysis was accurate. Section 417.125(g) is related to post-launch review and states that the launch operator must provide these impact locations, a comparison of actual to predicted nominal performance, and investigation results of any launch anomaly.
Current § 417.233 describes the FSA requirements particular to unguided suborbital launch vehicles with wind weighting systems. The analyses must establish flight commit criteria, wind constraints under which launch may occur, and launcher azimuth and elevation settings that correct for wind effects on the launch vehicle. This last requirement is known as the wind weighting analysis.
Appendix C to part 417 contains flight safety methodologies and products for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. These includes methodologies and products for a trajectory analysis, a wind weighting analysis, a debris analysis, a risk analysis, and a collision avoidance analysis. Section C417.3 requires the launch operator perform a six-degrees-of-freedom trajectory simulation in order to determine a nominal trajectory, impact point, and potential three-sigma dispersions about the nominal impact point. Section C417.5 is related to wind weighting and describes the methodology an applicant must use to measure winds and incorporate them into the trajectory simulation in order to determine launch elevation angle and azimuth settings. The debris (section C417.7) and risk (section C417.9) analyses describe methodologies and analysis products applicable to all launch vehicles for calculating EC. The parts of appendix C that are covered elsewhere in the proposed rule because they are applicable to all vehicles have not been transferred to proposed § 450.141. This includes the debris, risk, and collision avoidance analyses.
Proposed § 450.141 would consolidate the requirements of Sec. § 417.125 and 417.233 and appendix C, but would not carry over the detailed methodological and prescriptive requirements. Proposed § 450.141(a) would explain that the section applies to the flight of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle using a wind weighting safety system to meet the public safety criteria of proposed § 450.101. The FAA proposes to define a wind weighting safety system as equipment, procedures, analysis, and personnel functions used to determine the launcher elevation and azimuth setting that correct for wind effects that an unguided suborbital launch vehicle will experience during flight. The FAA proposes the wind weighting safety system be a means to satisfy the safety requirements in proposed § 450.101.
Proposed § 450.141(b) would set the requirements for the wind weighting safety system. It would require that the launcher azimuth and elevation angle settings (1) be wind weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide a safe impact location, and (2) ensure the rocket will not fly in an unintended direction given wind uncertainties. This section would replace current § 417.125(b), which requires a flight safety system unless the vehicle uses wind weighting or does not have sufficient energy to reach a populated area. Rather than the blanket FSS requirement in current § 417.125(b), the consequence analysis in proposed § 450.135(d) would determine the need for an FSS. This section also eliminates the requirement in § 417.125(c)(3) regarding specific nominal launcher elevation angle for proven (85° and 86° with wind correction) and unproven (80° and 84° with wind correction) vehicles to prevent the vehicle from flying uprange. Rather than requiring specific launcher elevation angles to prevent a vehicle from flying uprange, the FAA would require an operator to determine what angles would ensure the rocket not fly in unintended direction given wind uncertainties. This flexibility would allow a licensee to determine the best angle to both maximize mission objectives given the particularities of their operation while simultaneously ensuring safety.
Proposed § 450.141(c) would contain FSA performance requirements that apply only to the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. It is necessary to establish the flight commit criteria and other flight safety rules to control risk to the public and satisfies the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. Proposed § 450.141(c) would require an operator to establish any wind constraints under which launch could occur, and conduct a wind weighting analysis that establishes the launcher azimuth and elevation settings. Proposed § 450.141(c) is, in essence, the same as § 417.233.
Proposed § 450.141(d) would require an unguided suborbital launch vehicle to remain stable in all configurations throughout each stage of powered flight. This performance outcome would eliminate the need for the specific prescriptive stability requirements of current § 417.125(e), which requires a suborbital launch vehicle be stable in flexible body to 1.5 calibers and rigid body to 2.0 calibers throughout each stage of powered flight.
Finally, proposed § 450.141(e) would establish the agency's application requirements specific to unguided suborbital launch vehicles. The FAA would require a description of wind weighting analysis methods, description of wind weighting system and equipment, and a sample wind weighting analysis, all derived from part 417, appendix C, section C417.5(d). The remainder of appendix C was not included in the proposal because these are all prescriptive methodologies, or are requirements applying to all launch vehicles covered in other sections of the proposal. For instance, the Trajectory Analysis of section C417.3 would be covered by proposed Sec. § 450.117 and 450.119. Except for section C417.5(d) as described earlier, section C417.5 was not included in the proposal since this is a prescriptive methodology. The methodologies for debris analysis from section C417.7 are not in the proposal and the debris analysis proposal would now be in proposed § 450.121. Similarly, section C417.9 would be covered by proposed § 450.135 without the prescribed methodologies. Lastly, the collision avoidance section of the appendix, section C417.11 would be covered by proposed § 450.169.
B. Software
B. Software
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes software safety requirements in § 450.111. The risk mitigation measures that result from this rule are meant to be minimums, and software development processes tend to benefit from consistency across projects, so an applicant may apply the requirements from its most critical software to all of its software, but the FAA does not require that an applicant do so.
Software can contribute to accidents or losses in several ways. Software may contain errors that, in certain system conditions, cause unintended behaviors or prevent intended behaviors. Software may also perform actions that while correct and intended in isolation, cause hazards when interacting with other components or the system as a whole. Software may provide accurate information to an operator in a manner that confuses the operator, leading to a software-human interaction error. Software safety therefore typically requires separate analyses of the software, software and computing system interaction, and the integration of software, hardware, and humans into the entire system.
Software becomes safety-critical when the applicant uses its outputs in safety decisions. The development, validation, and evaluation of safety-critical software requires a level of rigor commensurate with the severity of the potential hazards and the software's degree of control over those hazards. Reliance on software differs among operators. For example, some launch systems employ Autonomous Flight Safety Systems (AFSS) that rely on rigorously-developed and thoroughly-tested software to make safety decisions to protect the public without human intervention. Other systems require human intervention to make safety decisions, such as when a pilot or ground transmitter operator must make decisions for launch systems.
Current FAA licensing regulations segregate software safety requirements by type of vehicle (ELV, RLV, or reentry vehicle) in three separate sections.\210\ Current software safety regulations in parts 415, 417, and 431 are flexible. With this flexibility comes uncertainty. For example, § 415.123(b) requires that a launch operator provide all plans for software development, the results of software hazard analyses, and plans and results of software validation and verification, but does not give guidance on the minimum-acceptable levels of rigor for those products or guidance on their contents. The FAA and the operator must determine the appropriate level of rigor, scope, and content of each plan and result for each operation. This process can be labor-intensive, requiring multiple meetings over a period of weeks or months.
\210\ Part 415 covers launch license application procedures for ELVs; part 417 addresses launch safety requirements for ELVs, and part 431 sets launch license and safety requirements for RLVs.
Also, § 417.123(c), applicable to ELVs, requires that a launch operator conduct computing system and software hazard analyses for the integrated system. This requirement does not specify the requisite forms of the analyses, the scope and contents of the analyses, or the application data required to demonstrate compliance with the requirement. The FAA and the applicant must negotiate the specifics for each of those items for every application. Similarly, § 417.123(d) requires that a launch operator develop and implement computing system and software validation and verification plans, but is silent regarding the contents of the plans. This again requires that the FAA and the applicant discuss, often at length, the software test plans for every operation.
Unlike Sec. § 415.123 and 417.123, § 431.35 does not contain any explicit references to software safety. However, in practice, the FAA has set software safety requirements under the current system safety process requirements in § 431.35(c). Pursuant to § 431.35(c), the FAA has required applicants satisfy § 417.123 or demonstrate an equivalent level of safety, in order to meet § 431.35 for software safety. This lack of detail forces the FAA and applicant to work collaboratively to develop the system safety process criteria on a case-by-case basis.
Operators have offered consistent feedback on the FAA's software safety requirements. Applicants frequently asked whether Sec. § 417.123(b) and 431.35(c)'s verification and validation plan requirement included a requirement for independent verification and validation. Independent verification and validation is a common and effective method of mitigating software hazards for high-criticality software, one for which there is no known substitute. Thus, although not explicitly stated in the regulations, the FAA has required independent verification and validation as part of the verification and validation requirements in Sec. § 417.123(b) and 431.35(c). The FAA considers software testers independent when the test organization is independent of the development organization up to the senior-executive level. Generally, an in-house software testing team can be sufficiently independent to perform a credible independent verification and validation function when rigorously insulated from software development authorities and incentives. Still more independence may be required for highly safety-critical autonomous software, such as an independent contractor, depending on the risks and the other mitigation measures implemented by the applicant. The FAA has required at least independence up to the senior-management level and expected an applicant to show evidence of this independence in its application.
Applicants have also often asked whether the FAA requires submissions of software code. The FAA has not historically required executable code submissions and does not plan to do so in this proposal. Instead, the FAA's requirements focus on the software development and testing processes, combined with analysis of the software's use in the context of the system as a whole. Firstly, the FAA seeks to understand the software development processes used for the design, production, verification, and qualification of software to determine the code quality. Proposed § 450.111(a), (b), and (c) would provide these general software process requirements that are independent of the degree of control exercised by a given software component. Secondly, the FAA must understand the impacts of the software on the system as a whole. It is important to understand design risks, which are those risks inherent to the software design and architecture; and also process risks, which arise from the software development processes and standards of the applicant. The FAA uses these two components, process and implementation, to evaluate software components and processes for the appropriate level of rigor.
The FAA must also understand the relationship between software actions and system risks to set the appropriate level of rigor. Establishing the required level of rigor and understanding its implementation form the basis of software safety determinations. Configuration management, including version control, then ensures the operator uses the intended processes and functionality for the correct software in the system's operation.
Applicants have often sought help in determining whether software is safety-critical in accordance with Sec. § 417.123(b) and 415.123(a). For instance, operators sometimes use software to generate information used in safety-critical decisions, such as initiating a deorbit burn. The FAA has consistently found software that generates information used in safety-critical decisions to be safety-critical software, albeit with a low degree of control over the system.
Applicants have also asked whether the FAA requires redundant processing such as running a second instance of a software component on a second independent computer, and if so, the required level of risk. The FAA has made such determinations based on the hazards involved and on the software's degree of control over those hazards. The FAA has chosen not to prescribe a requirement for redundant processing because such a requirement is best derived from the applicant's individual approach to hazard mitigation at the system level. Redundant copies of identical software contain identical software faults, so redundant processing is best described as a mitigation for hardware failures. The proposal would allow for software without redundant processing whenever processing redundancy is not necessary to achieve acceptable risk. For example, the FAA may not require redundant processing in fail-safe systems, low-criticality systems, or where hardware ensures software processing integrity by using hardware features such as watchdog timers or error-correcting memory.
In light of the range of design strategies between commercial space operators, the FAA realized that a one-size-fits-all approach to software safety would not be practical. Instead, in proposed § 450.111(d) through (g) the FAA would establish requirements for each safety category of software. The safety categories, commonly known in the software safety industry as "levels of rigor" or "software criticality indexes," would range from autonomous software with catastrophic hazards to software with no safety impact.
Applicants may rely upon Federal launch range standards to show compliance with the proposed rule, provided the standards meet the regulations. The FAA maintains awareness of the Federal launch range safety standards through the CSWG. The FAA currently incorporates the known and coordinated standards maintained by the Federal launch ranges into FAA licensing in order to avoid duplication of effort. The Federal launch ranges have an extensive launch safety history, and their standards meet or exceed the level of safety required by the FAA. The FAA intends to retain the ability to apply Federal launch range safety standards toward license evaluation and issuance.
In developing this proposed rule, the FAA has tried to remain consistent with prevalent industry standards related to the "level of rigor" approach to software safety. Specifically, the FAA has used the level of rigor approaches applied by the Department of Defense and NASA to inform the FAA's proposed level of rigor approach to software safety regulation.
The FAA proposes to use the Department of Defense's MIL-STD-882E concept of "level of rigor" to categorize software according to the amount of risk it presents to the operation and use its "level of rigor tasks" to derive appropriate regulatory requirements for each level of rigor. MIL-STD-882E uses a software hazard severity category with a software control category to assign level of rigor tasks to software. This method has proven successful in achieving an acceptable level of safety for space operations.
The FAA also used RCC 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard, to develop the requirements for autonomous software in proposed § 450.111(d). RCC 319-14 provides detailed software requirements for autonomous flight safety systems, which have been extensively reviewed by the space community. RCC 319-14 creates software categories that combine hazard severity and degree of control in a single step, and provides deep detail on the appropriate risk reduction tasks for each category. AFSPCMAN 91-712 (draft) is the source of RCC 319-14's software categories and risk reduction tasks.
The FAA also reviewed NASA's Software Safety Standard (NASA-STD-8719.13C), which provides standards applicable to defining the requirements for implementing a systematic approach to software safety. Like RCC 319-14, NASA-STD-8719.13C combines software hazard's severity with the software's degree of control to assign analysis and testing tasks. However, NASA expands its software control category definitions to include software autonomy, software complexity, time-criticality, and degree of hazard control. The FAA also considered NASA's Software Assurance Standard (NASA-STD-8739.8), which provides criticality, risk, resource investment, and financial impact categorizations and correlates these to levels of software assurance effort. These two NASA documents provided the FAA with a wealth of potential software safety requirements and methods to determine the requirements that would be most appropriate for a variety of space systems. These documents also provided a checklist of key aspects of software projects that enable software safety. The FAA has drawn from these documents the minimum set of requirements that would enable space operators to protect the public, and the minimum set of data that would enable the FAA to verify that space operators will protect the public in the course of their innovations.
Finally, the FAA reviewed the Air Force Space Command's draft 91-712, Launch Safety Software and Computing System Requirements. The Air Force has successfully used 91-712 for military space projects and it is the source of many RCC 319-14 requirements. 91-712, and the standards discussed earlier, all prescribe increasing the effort devoted to software safety in proportion to the severity of the hazards that software can create and in proportion to the degree of control that software exercises over those hazards.
The proposed software safety regulations would categorize software and computing functions into the following degrees of control as defined in proposed § 450.111(d) through (g): Autonomous software, semi-autonomous software, redundant fault-tolerant software, influential software, and no safety impact.
This proposal for software safety would address the causes of software faults and software failures. Software faults are design flaws in software that cause unintended behaviors or prevent intended behaviors. Software faults include errors in syntax, definitions, steps, or processes that can cause a program to produce an unintended or unanticipated result. The presence of software faults might not always result in an observable software failure that is evident to the user because it may appear to be behaving properly. A software failure, in contrast, is an unintended or undesirable event caused by, or unintentionally allowed by, one or more software faults. A software fault is a defect or vulnerability in software while a software failure results from the execution of faulty software.\211\
\211\ An example of a software failure is the "blue screen of death," which causes a computer to end all processing. An example of software fault is a fault in requirements for measurement units and a fault in test procedures. The Mars Climate Orbiter was lost as a result of these two faults when one function was written in English units while the rest were written in metric.
This proposal would address faults in software requirements by analytical means in proposed § 450.111. Specifically, the proposal would require an applicant to describe the functions and features, including interfaces, of the software. The FAA has interpreted the need to describe software to include providing the software requirements for each safety-critical software component even though not explicitly required by § 431.35 or § 417.123. The proposal therefore codifies current practice.
Software requirements are an excellent, even indispensable, means of understanding any software component's safety implications. Software requirements, both documented and implied, are the basis of the software design and constitute a key part of § 417.123(a) through (e) requirement for software designs. The FAA proposes to clarify the necessity and scope of software requirements that would be required to be included in an application in proposed § 450.111(h). Software requirements would need to be documented and analyzed whenever safety-critical software is present.\212\ Software requirements are frequently inherited from system requirements, and both must be internally and mutually consistent and valid for the resulting software to work safely. A system-level hazard analysis finds out what hazards software presents to the system. The software analyses can use the system-level analyses as initial assessments of software's criticality when starting software safety analyses. If software requirements are flawed, the software written to those software requirements will be flawed as well. This causal path, where software faults originate in software requirements, is the reason for the proposal's focus on identification, documentation, validation, and verification of software requirements.
\212\ Implied or undocumented software requirements are common sources of software faults.
This proposal addresses faults in implementation by requiring specific types of software verification and validation testing in proposed § 450.111(d)(4), (e)(4), (f)(3), and (g)(2). This proposal would clarify the required types of software verification and validation testing that are required under current Sec. § 417.123(d) and 415.123(b)(8).\213\ Verification and validation are standard aspects of a software development cycle and are used together to determine that software meets its intended purpose. In this context, verification refers to ensuring software meets the software requirements and design specifications. Validation ensures that the software achieves its intended purpose.\214\ While testing does not ensure the absence of software faults, it helps detect and therefore reduce their presence.
\213\ Examples of testing include unit testing to verify some of the smallest units of code, such as functions, and acceptance testing to validate high-level software requirements.
\214\ Verification takes place while the software is under development while validation is performed after completing software development and implementation.
The proposal would address faults in configuration with explicit requirements to establish and verify software configuration management processes. Configuration management is the set of processes that ensure that the flight components, including software components, are the correct components with the appropriate development and test heritage. Faults in configuration management can lead to unsuitable or incompatible components in a system, resulting in an increased potential for unintended and unsafe system actions.
Proposed § 450.111(a) would require operators to document a process that identifies the risks to the public health and safety and the safety of property arising from computing systems and software. This is consistent with the § 417.123(a) requirement for a description of the computing system and software system safety process. It adds no more requirements than part 415 because § 415.123(b)(6) requires an applicant to describe the computing system and software system safety process as required by § 417.123(a). Unlike § 431.35(c), proposed § 450.111(a) specifically mentions computing systems and software as items to be included in the system safety process.
Proposed § 450.111(b) would require an operator to identify all safety-critical functions associated with its computing systems and software. The 10 listed functions are a minimum set of items to include whenever they are present in a system, because they represent the most common safety-critical roles in which software can be employed. For example, software used to control or monitor safety-critical systems is capable of hazardous actions by definition. Similarly, software that accesses safety-critical data is safety-critical because it may alter safety-critical data or prevent other components from accessing safety-critical data at required times. The software safety process must then demonstrate that the software that accesses safety-critical data cannot cause a hazard by doing so. These requirements are the same as in the current § 417.123(b), with the addition of one new criterion for software that displays safety-critical information. Proposed § 450.111 would retain the requirement of § 417.123(b) for the identification of safety-critical functions.
The proposal would add detail and clarity to this requirement, specifying that the identified functions must be accompanied by assessments of the criticality of each software function. This is normally done by assessing the consequences of a functional failure or error and assessing the degree of control that the software can exercise to implement the function. The proposal would retain the examples of software that may have safety-critical functions, with the expectation that the full list of safety-critical functions is not limited to the examples. It differs from § 415.123(b), which describes the documents and materials that the applicant must provide, whereas proposed § 450.111(b) would list the safety-critical computing system and software functions that must be identified and would not list the application requirements in the same section.
The proposal would depart from § 431.35(d)(3) by specifically requiring the applicant to identify all safety-critical functions associated with its computing systems and software instead of implicitly requiring the identification of safety-critical software as part of the process of identifying safety-critical systems.
Proposed § 450.111(c) would require the identification of safety-critical software functions by consequence and degree of control. It would elaborate on the requirements of Sec. § 415.123(a) and 417.123(a), which require the identification and assessment of the software risks to public safety by specifying that the assessments must include the public safety consequences of each safety-critical software function and the degree of control that software exercises over the performance of that function. Proposed § 450.111(c) would provide the classification for the applicants to use while the application requirements are contained in proposed § 450.111(h). Requiring software degree of control would allow the FAA to request less information for software components with reduced or no influence on public safety. The proposal would differ from § 431.35 by explicitly requiring identification of software hazards by function and specifying the documentation requirements related to computing systems and software in proposed § 450.111(h). Even though this language is different from § 431.35, this is not a new requirement.
The requirements in the proposal vary based on the software degree of control and degree of hazard presented. The first and highest degree of control is autonomous software. Autonomous software would mean software that exercises autonomous control over safety-critical systems, subsystems, or components such that a control entity cannot detect or intervene to prevent a hazard that may impact public health and safety or the safety of property. It is any software that can act without an opportunity for meaningful human intervention. The FAA would impose the most stringent requirements for autonomous software with potential catastrophic public safety consequences. Proposed § 450.111(d) would set forth five criteria specific to autonomous software.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(1), the software component would be required to undergo full path coverage testing and any inaccessible code must be documented and addressed. Full path coverage testing is a systematic technique for ensuring that all routes through the code have been tested. Path coverage testing includes decision, statement, and entry and exit coverage. Proposed § 450.111(d)(1) would retain and clarify the current requirements in § 431.35(d). Full path coverage testing and documentation of inaccessible code would be required for autonomous components because the presence of inaccessible code segments presents a potential for the execution of untested instructions, which is obviously deleterious for an autonomous system that, by definition, depends on the correctness of its instructions for safe operation.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(2), the software component's functions would be required to be tested on flight-like hardware. Testing would be required also to include nominal operation and fault responses for all functions. The proposal would retain and clarify the current requirements in Sec. § 431.35(d) and 415.123(b)(8). Testing software components on flight-like hardware, including nominal operation and fault responses, is an industry standard for ensuring that the software interfaces with the hardware as designed. All autonomous safety-critical components require this testing.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(3), an operator would be required to conduct hazard analyses of computing systems and software for the integrated system and for each autonomous, safety-critical software component. A software hazard analysis identifies those hazards associated with safety-critical computer system functions, assesses their risk, identifies methods for mitigating them, and specifies evidence of the implementation of those mitigation measures. This requirement is currently in Sec. § 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All software components, regardless of degree of control, require this analysis for the integrated system. This analysis is also required for each autonomous, safety-critical software component. Hazard analyses provide the essential foundation for risk assessment and management of any system. This analysis is necessary throughout the lifecycle of the system, from development to disposal. As a system is modified during design, operation, and maintenance, changes to any part of the system can lead to unexpected consequences that may incur new hazards to public safety. It is important to consider risks that result from software and computing errors as a class or subsystem, as well as those resulting from the operation and interaction of software with all other components of the system.
Proposed § 450.111(d)(4) would require an operator to validate and verify any computing systems and software. Current Sec. § 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d) already require verification and validation although this proposed rule would add the requirement that testing be conducted by testers who are independent from the software developers. Independence is essential because it enables testing of cases and conditions that the software developers may not have considered or may have inadvertently omitted.
Under proposed § 450.111(d)(5), an operator would be required to develop and implement software development plans as currently required in Sec. § 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). A software development plan is a means to consolidate and standardize the management of a software development process. These plans would include descriptions of coding standards used, configuration control, programmable logic controllers, and policies on use of commercial-off-the-shelf software and software reuse. It would be updated as necessary throughout the lifecycle of the project, and may be comprised of one or several documents.
The configuration control of a software development project is particularly important to ensure and facilitate an efficient and accurate development process. Therefore, the proposal would retain the existing, if implicit, requirements of § 417.123(e)(2) to limit faults in configuration by requiring robust configuration management. Proper configuration management ensures consistency and accuracy throughout a system's design, development, operation, and maintenance. In software engineering terms, it is a fundamental aspect of a disciplined approach to the software lifecycle that provides a continuously current baseline for the system. The FAA would set configuration management requirements for all safety-critical documentation and code, including but not limited to software requirements, hazard analysis, test plans, test results, change requests, and development plans. Tools, processes, and procedures for configuration management are employed throughout the software industry.
Proposed § 450.111(e) would apply to semi-autonomous software, with a definition nearly identical to that stated in MIL-STD-882E. The FAA regards semi-autonomous software as software that exercises control over safety-critical hardware systems, subsystems, or components, allowing time for safe detection and intervention by a control entity. The software safety requirements for semi-autonomous software are a subset of those required for autonomous software as described in proposed § 450.111(d).
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(1), the software component's safety-critical functions, as categorized by the process in proposed § 450.111(a), (b), and (c), would be required to be subjected to full path coverage testing and any inaccessible code must be documented and addressed. Proposed § 450.111(e)(1) would retain and clarify current § 431.35(d) as described in proposed § 450.111(d)(1). The rationale for proposed § 450.111(e)(1) and (d)(1) are identical.
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(2), the semi-autonomous software component's safety-critical functions would be required to be tested on flight-like hardware, including testing of nominal operation and fault responses for all safety-critical functions. Proposed § 450.111(e)(2) would also retain and clarify the current requirements in § 431.35(d) as described in proposed § 450.111(d)(2).
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(3), an operator would be required to conduct computing system and software hazard analyses for the integrated system. The proposal would retain the requirement of conducting computing system and software hazard analyses that exists in current Sec. § 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All software components, regardless of level of control, would require this analysis for the integrated system. The rationale for proposed § 450.111(e)(3) and (d)(3) are identical.
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(4), an operator would need to verify and validate any computing systems and software related to semi-autonomous software as described earlier, with the associated rationale, for autonomous software relative to proposed § 450.111(d)(4). This verification and validation would be required to include testing by a test team independent of the software development division or organization. This would retain the requirement for verification and validation of computing systems and software, including testing by an independent test team, as currently required in Sec. § 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d).
Under proposed § 450.111(e)(5), an operator would be required to develop and implement software development plans as currently required in Sec. § 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). The rationale for proposed § 450.111(e)(5) and (d)(5) are identical.
Proposed § 450.111(f) would apply to redundant fault-tolerant software, which is defined as software that exercises control over safety-critical hardware systems, subsystems, or components, for which a non-software component must also fail in order to impact public health and safety or the safety of property.\215\ There are redundant sources of safety-significant information, and mitigating functionality can respond within any time-critical period. The proposal would include four criteria for redundant fault-tolerant software.
\215\ MIL-STD-882E elaborates that the definition of redundant fault-tolerant assumes that there is adequate fault detection, annunciation, tolerance, and system recovery to prevent the hazard occurrence if software fails, malfunctions, or degrades.
Proposed § 450.111(f)(1) is consistent with the second criteria for autonomous and semi-autonomous software in proposed § 450.111(d)(2) and (e)(2), in that the software component's safety-critical functions would be required to be tested on flight-like hardware, including testing of nominal operation and fault responses for all safety-critical functions. The proposal would retain and clarify the current requirements in § 431.35(d).
Proposed § 450.111(f)(2) would repeat the third criteria for autonomous and semi-autonomous software as described in proposed § 450.111(d)(3) and (e)(3). It would require that an operator conduct computing system and software hazard analyses for the integrated system. The proposal would retain the requirement of conducting computing system and software hazard analyses that exists in the current Sec. § 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All software components, regardless of level of control, would require this analysis for the integrated system. The rationale for this part is the same as that for proposed § 450.111(d)(3).
Under proposed § 450.111(f)(3), an operator would be required to verify and validate any computing systems and software related to redundant fault-tolerant software as described earlier, with associated rationale, for autonomous software related to proposed § 450.111(d)(4) and semi-autonomous software in proposed § 450.111(e)(4). This verification and validation would be required to include testing by a test team independent of the software development division or organization. This would retain the requirement for verification and validation of computing systems and software, including testing by an independent test team, as currently required under Sec. § 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d).
Under proposed § 450.111(f)(4), an operator would be required to develop and implement software development plans as currently required under Sec. § 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). The same rationale applies here as for proposed § 450.111(d)(5) and (e)(5).
Proposed § 450.111(g) would apply to software that provides information to a person who uses the information to take actions or make decisions that can impact public health and safety or the safety of property, but does not require operator action to avoid a mishap. Influential software provides information that is used in safety-critical decisions, but cannot cause a hazard on its own. The proposal would include three criteria for influential software.
Proposed § 450.111(g)(1) would require an operator to conduct computing system and software hazard analyses for the integrated system. The proposed rule would retain the requirement of conducting computing system and software hazard analyses that exists in the current Sec. § 415.123(b)(7), 417.123(c), and 431.35(d)(4). All software components, regardless of level of control, would require this analysis for the integrated system. The rationale for this proposed section is the same as that for proposed § 450.111(d)(3).
Proposed § 450.111(g)(2) would require an operator to verify and validate any computing systems and software related to influential software. This verification and validation would be required to include testing by a test team independent of the software development division or organization. This would retain the requirement for verification and validation of computing systems and software, including testing by an independent test team, as currently required under Sec. § 415.123(b)(8) and 417.123(d). The rationale for this proposed section is the same as that for proposed § 450.111(d)(4).
Proposed § 450.111(g)(3) would require an operator to develop and implement software development plans as required in existing Sec. § 415.123(b)(9) and 417.123(e)(1) through (5). The same rationale applies here as for proposed § 450.111(d)(5), (e)(5), and (f)(4).
Proposed § 450.111(h) would retain the application requirements of Sec. § 415.123 and 417.123, but would vary in the required amount of detail according to the level of control of the software. The amount of application materials would depend on the software component's risk to safety. The proposal would differ from § 431.35 by expressly requiring documentation related to computing systems and software. This requirement was implicit in § 431.35 and the FAA has requested these documents in practice. The FAA would require descriptions of software components with no safety impact but would not impose process requirements. This information would be required to supplement the vehicle description requirements contained elsewhere in this proposal. It would also lead to a shared understanding of the systems and components that do not have known safety significance allowing the FAA only cursorily to review those systems during the license application evaluation without undue concern over undocumented systems, functions, or features.
C. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 437, 440
C. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 437, 440
1. Part 401--Definitions
The FAA proposes to modify definitions in parts 401, 414, 417, 420, 437, and 440. This would include adding new definitions to or modifying current definitions in § 401.5 (Definitions) to align with the new proposed regulations. The FAA also proposes to clarify and move some of the definitions that are currently in part 417 to proposed part 450. Also, the proposal would not retain some of the definitions currently in part 417. Finally, the FAA proposes to remove various current definitions from Sec. § 401.5 and 420.5.
1. Part 401--Definitions
The FAA proposes to add new definitions to § 401.5. These definitions would be necessary additions to accompany the proposed part 450 requirements, especially in the area of flight safety analysis. Proposed Sec. § 450.113 through 450.139 would require the addition of "Casualty Area," "Critical Asset," "Deorbit," "Dose-Response Relationship," "Disposal," "Effective Casualty Area," "Expected Casualty," "Flight Abort," "Flight Abort Rules," "Flight Hazard Area," "Liftoff," "Limits of a Useful Mission," "Orbital Insertion," and "Probability of Casualty." Most important within that group are "Critical Asset," which is driven by proposed protection criteria for assets that are essential to the national interests of the United States, and "Disposal," which is driven by proposed upper stage disposal risk criteria. The other terms and associated definitions that would be added to support proposed Sec. § 450.113 through 450.139 are referenced in the proposed FSA requirements.
The proposed system safety regulations would require the addition of the following terms and associated definitions: "Hazard Control" and "Launch or Reentry System." Proposed § 450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1) would require a definition for "Neighboring Operations Personnel"; proposed § 450.107(b) would require a clear definition of "Physical Containment"; proposed § 450.111 would require a definition for "Control Entity" and "Software Function"; proposed Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187 would require a definition for "Toxic Hazard Area." Proposed § 450.101(c) would require the addition of "Vehicle Response Mode." The collision avoidance requirements in proposed § 450.169 would require the addition of "Reentry Window" and "Window Closure" to § 401.5, while the unguided suborbital requirements in proposed § 450.141 would require the addition of "Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle" and "Wind Weighting Safety System."
These new definitions are discussed in detail in corresponding sections of this preamble, including the proposed meaning and usage.
Current § 401.5 definitions that would be modified by this rule are as follows: "Contingency Abort," which would be simplified; "Flight Safety System," which would be simplified to incorporate the new term "Flight Abort;" and "Instantaneous Impact Point," which would remove drag effects and clarify that this term means a predicted impact point. "Mishap" would be defined as having four classes or categories, from most to least severe, based on lessons learned as discussed earlier in this preamble. The current definition of "Public Safety" would be removed from § 401.5 and the definition of "Public" would be removed from § 420.5, and a new definition for "Public" would be added to § 401.5. "Launch" and "Reenter; Reentry" would be modified to remove language that further scopes what aspects of space transportation are licensed, as discussed earlier. Scoping language would be transferred to proposed § 450.3. "Safety Critical" would be modified to remove the last sentence because it is unnecessary. The definition for "State and United States" would fix a minor printing error.
Section 417.3 contains the definitions for part 417, only some of which would be preserved and added to § 401.5 by this proposed rulemaking. These are "Command Control System," "Countdown," "Crossrange," "Data Loss Flight Time," "Downrange," "Explosive Debris," "Flight Abort Crew," "Flight Safety Limit," "Gate," "Launch Window," "Normal Flight," "Normal Trajectory," "Operating Environment," "Operation Hazard," "Service Life," "System Hazard," "Sub-Vehicle Point," "Tracking Icon," and "Uprange." A number of changes have been made as follows:
• "Command Control System" would be modified to take out unnecessary detail.
• "Countdown," "Downrange," "Explosive Debris," and "Normal Flight" would be modified to add reentry.
• "Crossrange," "Launch Window," "Normal Trajectory," "Service Life," and "System Hazard" would be unchanged.
• The term "Flight Abort Crew" would be changed from "Flight Safety Crew," and would be simplified.
• "Operating Environment" would be changed to add reentry, and would use the term "lifecycle" within the definition instead of the limiting reference to acceptance testing, launch countdown, and flight.
• "Operation Hazard" would be modified to clarify that a system hazard is not an operation hazard.
• The term "Protected Area" would be removed, and the term "Uncontrolled Area" would be added to § 401.5 but with the inclusion of a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator, or other entity by agreement who can control an area of land.
• The term "Service life" would be changed to replace reference to a flight termination system component with any safety-critical system component.
• The last sentence in "Sub-Vehicle Point" and "Uprange" would be removed because these sentences are unnecessary.
• "Tracking Icon" would be modified to include autonomous flight safety systems.
• "Data Loss Flight Time," "Flight Safety Limit," and "Gate" would be changed as discussed earlier in this preamble.
In part 414, "Safety Approval" would be changed to "Safety Element Approval," so that a part 414 approval is not confused with a proposed part 450 safety approval. Its meaning, however, would remain the same as discussed earlier in this preamble.
The definition of "Maximum Probable Loss (MPL)" in § 440.3 would be modified to include Neighboring Operations Personnel.
The definition of "Anomaly" would be removed from part 437 and added to § 401.5 with a revised meaning.
Definitions that would not be retained from part 417 are "Command Destruct Systems," "Conjunction on Launch," "Destruct," "Drag Impact Point," "Dwell Time," "Fail-Over," "Family Performance Data," "Flight Safety System," "Flight Termination System," "Inadvertent Separation Destruct System," "In-Family," "Launch Azimuth," "Launch Crew," "Launch Wait," "Meets Intent Certification," "Non-Operating Environment," "Operating Life," "Out-of-Family," "Passive Component," "Performance Specifications," "Safe-Critical Computer System Function," "Storage Life," and "Waiver." These would no longer be a part of commercial space regulations because they have been replaced with different terms (i.e., "Conjunction on Launch" and "Launch Wait"), are already defined in § 401.5 (i.e., "Flight Safety System"), or are simply not used (all others).
This proposed rule would also remove from § 401.5, "Human Space Flight Incident," "Launch Accident," "Launch Incident," "Reentry Accident," and "Reentry Incident." In addition, it would remove "Launch Site Accident" from § 420.5. These definitions would be removed because of the proposed changes in definitions related to mishaps. The proposed rule would also remove from § 401.5 "Emergency Abort," because it is no longer in use, and "Vehicle Safety Operations Personnel," because those personnel are referred to as "Safety Critical Personnel" in proposed part 450.
The FAA also proposes to remove the definition of "Instantaneous Impact Point" from § 420.5. This definition would be removed because a new definition with a modified meaning would be added to § 401.5. 2. Part 413--Application Procedures i. § 413.1 Clarification of the Term "Application"
The FAA proposes to modify § 413.1 to clarify the term "application." Specifically, the FAA would add to § 413.1 that the term application means either an application in its entirety, or a portion of an application for incremental review and determination in accordance with § 450.33. This change is necessary to enable incremental review as discussed earlier. ii. § 413.21 Denial of a License or Permit Application
The FAA proposes to correct the section heading of § 413.21 to reflect the content of the section, and also correct paragraph (c) of this section to reference both license and permit applications.
Section 413.21 applies to a license or permit application. However, the section heading and paragraph (c) of this section only reference "license." To correct this oversight, the FAA proposes to revise the section heading to read, "Denial of a license or permit application." In addition, the FAA proposes to remove the reference to "license" from paragraph (c) so that it would apply to both license and permit applications. iii. "Complete Enough" and "Sufficiently Complete"
The FAA proposes to change the term "sufficiently complete" in part 414 to "complete enough," as used in § 413.11, because the two terms mean the same thing. That is, they both describe the point at which the FAA has determined it has sufficient information to accept an application and begin its evaluation to make findings regarding issuing a license or permit.
Section 413.11 uses "complete enough" to describe when the FAA will accept an application and begin its review for a launch license or permit. The original intent was to use the same term in other chapter III sections. However, the term "sufficiently complete" in Sec. § 414.15(a), 415.107(a), and 417.203(c) was never changed to "complete enough."
Therefore, the agency proposes to change the term "sufficiently complete" to "complete enough" for consistency and clarity. The proposed change would be made in part 414 and in proposed part 450, since parts 415 and 417 would be consolidated under this new part. iv. Electronic Submission
This rule proposes to amend § 413.7(a)(3) to allow an applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to a secure server, and remove the requirement that an application be in a format that cannot be altered.
In 2015, the FAA published the "Electronic Applications for Licenses, Permits, and Safety Approvals" rule.\216\ In that rule, the FAA made the application process more flexible and efficient by providing an applicant with the option to submit applications to the FAA electronically, either via email or on an electronic storage device, rather than submitting a paper application. Specifically, § 413.7(a)(3) requires that an application made via email be submitted as an email attachment to [email protected] in a format that cannot be altered. The FAA's intent was to allow applicants to transact with the agency electronically, in accordance with the Government Paperwork Elimination Act. However, since the rule published, the FAA has found that many of the files containing the necessary application materials are too large to be transmitted successfully by email. When this occurs, applicants have transmitted an email message with a File Transfer Program (FTP) link or a link to a digital repository where the materials can be downloaded by the FAA. The FAA has found this to be an acceptable means of submitting an application. Because the FAA proposes to amend application procedures in this rulemaking, the FAA also proposes to align the regulations with the current acceptable practice of allowing this form of electronic application submission. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to amend § 413.7(a)(3) to allow an applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to a secure server.
\216\ Electronic Applications for Licenses, Permits, and Safety Approvals, Direct Final Rule. 80 FR 30147 (May 27, 2015).
Additionally, the 2015 rulemaking identified that in requiring a file format that could not be altered, the FAA would accept a PDF document or a read-only Word file. Because both of these file types can actually be modified, the FAA has found it is impossible to comply with the requirement in § 413.7(a)(3)(ii). However, the need for document and version control of applications still exists for accurate record keeping and to ensure that the application materials the FAA evaluates and enforces represent the final and accurate submission from the applicant and have not been altered in any way. As nearly every form of electronic file submitted could be altered in some way or another, the FAA proposes to replace the current § 413.7(a)(3)(ii) with a new requirement that an applicant's email submission would be required to identify each document appended to the email, including any that are included as an attachment or that are stored on a secure server. The FAA further proposes to include a new § 413.7(a)(3)(iii) which would require all electronic files be date stamped and include version control documentation. The replacement of § 413.7(a)(3)(ii) and the addition of § 413.7(a)(3)(iii) would further the FAA's intent to prevent any unrecognized alteration.
The proposed amendments to § 414.13(a)(3) would mirror the proposed text of § 413.7(a)(3). The FAA also proposes to remove § 414.11(a)(3) because those requirements would be addressed in the proposed text of § 414.13(a)(3). These changes would remove unactionable application requirements and replace them with regulations that align with current practice and practicable compliance.
The FAA also proposes to change the heading of part 413 from "License Application Procedures" to "Application Procedures." The proposed heading change reflects the multiple application procedures under part 413, which includes launch and reentry licenses, launch and reentry site licenses, and experimental permits. The FAA proposes this title change to improve the regulatory clarity for future experimental permit applicants. 3. Part 414--Safety Element Approvals
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to change the part 414 term from "safety approval" to "safety element approval" to distinguish it from "safety approval" as used in parts 415, 431, and 435, and proposed part 450. Also, the FAA proposes to modify part 414 to enable applicants to request a safety element approval in conjunction with a license application as provided in proposed part 450.\217\
\217\ Discussion on safety element approval changes to part 414 can be found in the Process Improvements section A portion of this preamble.
4. Part 420--License To Operate a Launch Site
4. Part 420--License To Operate a Launch Site
As discussed earlier, the proposal would modify the environmental requirements in § 420.15 to match the environmental requirements in proposed § 450.47. Also, the proposal would remove the definitions of "instantaneous impact point," "launch site accident," and "public" from § 420.5, and allow alternate time frames in § 420.57. In addition, it would change the heading of § 420.59 from "Launch Site Accident Investigation Plan" to "Mishap Plan," and modify the section as discussed earlier. Further, it would make a minor edit in § 420.51. 5. Part 433--License To Operate a Reentry Site
As discussed earlier, the proposal would modify the environmental requirements in Sec. § 433.7 and 433.9 to align them with the environmental requirements in proposed § 450.47. 6. Part 437--Experimental Permits
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to modify part 437 (Experimental Permits) in six ways. First, the proposal would remove the definition of "anomaly" from § 437.3 and include a modified version in § 401.5. Second, the proposal would modify the environmental requirements in § 437.21(b)(1) to match the environmental requirements proposed in § 450.47. Third, it would change the name of "safety approval" to "safety element approval" in § 437.21. Fourth, it would modify the mishap plan requirements in Sec. § 437.41 and 437.75. Fifth, it would change the requirements for collision avoidance to match proposed § 450.169. Sixth, it would allow for alternate time frames in § 437.89. 7. Part 440--Financial Responsibility
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to modify § 440.15 to allow for alternate time frames, and modify the definition of "maximum probable loss" in § 440.3 to align it with the new, proposed definition of "neighboring operations personnel."
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct that each federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39 as amended) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). The FAA has provided a more detailed Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis of the benefits and costs of this proposed rule in the docket of this rulemaking. This portion of the preamble summarizes this analysis.
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