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Proposed Rule Proposed Issued Apr 15, 2019 149 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

84 FR 15296 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements

This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.

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C. National Space Council

On June 30, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 13803, which reestablished the National Space Council to provide a coordinated process for developing and monitoring the implementation of national space policy and strategy. The newly-reinstituted body met for the first time on October 5, 2017. As Chair of the Council, the Vice President directed the Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to conduct a review of the U.S. regulatory framework for commercial space activities and report back within 45 days with a plan to remove barriers to commercial space enterprises. The assigned reports and recommendations for regulatory streamlining were presented at the second convening of the National Space Council on February 21, 2018. The Council approved four recommendations, including DOT's recommendation that the launch and reentry regulations should be reformed into a consolidated, performance-based licensing regime.

On May 24, 2018, the Council memorialized its recommendations in SPD-2. SPD-2 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to publish for notice and comment proposed rules rescinding or revising the launch and reentry licensing regulations, no later than February 1, 2019. SPD-2 charged the Department with revising the regulations such that they would require a single license for all types of commercial space flight operations and replace prescriptive requirements with performance-based criteria. SPD-2 further commended the Secretary to coordinate with the members of the National Space Council, especially the Secretary of Defense and the NASA Administrator, to minimize requirements associated with commercial space flight launch and reentry operations from Federal launch ranges as appropriate.

D. Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee

D. Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee

On March 8, 2018, the FAA chartered the Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to provide a forum to discuss regulations to set forth procedures and requirements for commercial space transportation launch and reentry licensing. The FAA tasked the ARC to develop recommendations for a performance-based regulatory approach in which the regulations set forth the safety objectives to be achieved while providing the applicant with the flexibility to produce tailored and innovative means of compliance.

The ARC's membership represented a broad range of stakeholder perspectives, including members from aviation and space communities. The ARC was supported by the FAA and other federal agency subject matter experts. The following table identifies ARC participants from the private sector:

Aerospace industries association. Airlines for America. Alaska Aerospace Corporation. Astra Space. Blue Origin. Boeing. Coalition for Deep Space Exploration. Commercial Spaceflight Federation. Exos Aerospace Systems & Technologies, Inc. Generation Orbit. Lockheed Martin Corporation. MLA Space, LLC. Mojave air and spaceport. Orbital ATK. RocketLab. Sierra Nevada Corp. Spaceport America. SpaceX. Space Florida. Stratolaunch. United Launch Alliance. Vector Launch, Inc. Virgin Galactic/Virgin Orbit. World View Enterprises.

On April 30, 2018, the ARC produced its final recommendation report, which has been placed in the docket to this rulemaking.\11\ The ARC recommended that the proposed regulations should--

\11\ Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements ARC, Recommendations Final Report (April 30, 2008). The ARC Report is available for reference in the docket for this proposed rule.

1. Be performance-based, primarily based upon the ability of the applicant to comply with expected casualty limits.

2. Be flexible.

i. Adopt a single license structure to accommodate a variety of vehicle types and operations and launch or reentry sites.

ii. Allow for coordinated determination of applicable regulations prior to the application submission.

iii. Develop regulations that can be met without waivers.

iv. Use guidance documents to facilitate frequent updates.

3. Reform the pre-application consultation process and requirements.

i. Use "complete enough" as the real criterion for entering application evaluation and remove the requirement for pre-application consultation.

ii. Use a level-of-rigor approach to scope an applicant-requested pre-application consultation process as the basis for a "complete enough" determination, considering both an applicant's prior experience and whether the subject vehicle is known or unknown.

4. Contain defined review timelines.

i. Support significantly-reduced timelines and more efficient review.

ii. Increase predictability for industry.

iii. Create reduced review timelines for both new and continuing accuracy submissions.

5. Contain continuing accuracy requirements. Continuing accuracy submissions should be based upon impact to public safety as measured by the Expected Casualty (EC).

6. Limit FAA jurisdiction.

i. Limit FAA jurisdiction to activities so publicly hazardous as to warrant FAA-oversight.

ii. Identify well-defined inspection criteria.

7. Eliminate duplicative jurisdiction on Federal launch ranges.

The FAA will address these recommendations in more detail throughout the remainder of this document.

During the course of the ARC, volunteer industry members formed a Task Group to provide draft regulatory text reflecting proposed revisions to the commercial space transportation regulations. The volunteer industry members of the Task Group were Blue Origin, Sierra Nevada Corporation, Space Florida, and SpaceX. The majority of the ARC opposed the formation of this Task Group and disagreed with including the proposed regulatory text into the ARC's recommendation report. The FAA will not specifically address the proposed regulatory text in this document because it did not receive broad consensus within the ARC.

III. Discussion of the Proposal

III. Discussion of the Proposal

A. The FAA's Approach To Updating and Streamlining Launch and Reentry Regulations

The FAA's approach to meeting SPD-2's mandate is to consolidate, update, and streamline all launch and reentry regulations into a single performance-based part. Pursuant to SPD-2, and in the interest of updating the FAA's regulations to reflect the current commercial space industry, the FAA proposes to consolidate requirements for the launch and reentry of ELVs, RLVs, and reentry vehicles other than an RLV.\12\ The FAA would also update a number of safety provisions, including areas such as software safety and flight safety analyses (FSA), to reflect recent advancements. Finally, the FAA proposes to streamline its regulations by designing them to be flexible and scalable, to reduce timelines, to remove or minimize duplicative jurisdiction, and to limit FAA jurisdiction over ground safety to operations that are hazardous to the public. This streamlining was the focus of the ARC.

A. The FAA's Approach To Updating and Streamlining Launch and Reentry Regulations

\12\ These requirements currently appear in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435.

The FAA proposal would follow the ARC recommendations to enable greater regulatory flexibility. First, the proposed rule would be primarily performance-based, codifying performance standards and relying on FAA guidance or other standards to provide acceptable means of compliance. This would allow the regulations to better adapt to advancements in the industry. Second, the FAA proposes to change the structure of its launch and reentry license to be more flexible in the number and types of launches and reentries one license can accommodate. Third, as the ARC suggested, system safety principles would be prominent. All applicants would need to comply with core system safety management principles and conduct a preliminary safety assessment. Some applicants may also be required to use a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls particular to their operation. Lastly, for any particular requirement, the FAA would maintain the ability for an applicant or operator to propose an alternative approach for compliance, and then clearly demonstrate that the alternative approach would provide an equivalent level of safety to the requirement.

The ARC recommended that the level of rigor of an applicant's safety demonstration vary based on vehicle history, company history, and the relative risk of the launch or reentry. It also recommended that the FAA not always require a flight safety system. The FAA recognizes that different operations require different levels of rigor, and is proposing a more scalable regulatory regime. Given performance-based regulations are inherently scalable, the FAA proposal is consistent with the ARC recommendation, even though it does not explicitly account for vehicle or operator history as a means of scaling requirements. In addition to performance-based requirements, this proposal would implement a specific level-of-rigor approach to ensure safety requirements are proportionate to the public safety risk in the need for a flight safety system and its required reliability, in flight safety analysis,\13\ and in software safety. These are all discussed in greater detail later in this preamble.

\13\ For flight safety analyses, various levels of rigor would be outlined in ACs.

Because the rulemaking process is time-consuming and labor intensive, the FAA seeks to minimize the need for regulatory updates to proposed part 450 through the proposed performance-based regulations which would allow for a variety of FAA-approved means of compliance. Approving new means of compliance creates flexibility for operators without reducing safety. Additionally, approving new means of compliance is easier to accomplish than updating regulatory standards through the rulemaking process. Thus, the proposed regulatory scheme would be more adaptable to the fast-evolving commercial space industry.

The ARC recommended that the FAA should design a modular approach to application submittal and evaluation and significantly reduce FAA review timelines. This proposal would allow an applicant to apply for a license in an incremental manner,\14\ to be developed on a case-by-case basis during pre-application consultation. Most timelines in the proposal would have a default value, followed by an option for the FAA to agree to a different time frame, taking into account the complexity of the request and whether it would allow sufficient time for the FAA to conduct its review and make its requisite findings. Lastly, the FAA proposes to make it easier for a launch or reentry operator to obtain a safety element approval, which would reduce the time and effort of an experienced operator in a future license application. Although these provisions should reduce the time for experienced operators, the FAA does not propose to reduce by regulation the statutory review period of 180 days to make a decision on a license application.

\14\ In this rulemaking, the term "incremental" would be synonymous with the ARC's proposed term of "modular."

It might be useful to provide some perspective concerning the time the FAA actually takes to make license determinations. The average of the last ten new license determinations through calendar year 2018 was 141 days; the median was 167 days. The FAA strives to expedite determinations when possible to accommodate launch schedules. In three of these ten, the FAA made determinations in 54, 73, and 77 days, all without tolling. Three determinations were tolled for 73, 77, and 171 days. The lengthy tolling was the result of a software issue concerning a flight safety system that the applicant needed to resolve. To our knowledge, a launch has never been delayed as a result of the time it took the FAA to make a license determinations.

The ARC recommended that the FAA propose rules that eliminate duplicative U.S. Government requirements when an operator conducts operations at a Federal launch range. The FAA's proposal would allow for varying levels of Federal launch range involvement, including a single FAA authorization. It would also minimize duplicative work by a launch or reentry operator. This issue is discussed in more detail later in this preamble.

Also, the ARC recommended that the FAA limit its jurisdiction over ground operations to activities so publicly hazardous as to warrant the FAA's oversight. This proposal would scope ground activities overseen by FAA to each operation. It would also permit neighboring operations personnel to be present during launch activities in certain circumstances.

The ARC also recommended that the FAA require the pre-application process only for new operators or new vehicle programs, and that pre-application occur at the operator's discretion for all other operations.\15\ The FAA proposes to retain the requirement for pre-application consultation because of the various flexibilities proposed in this rule. These include incremental review, timelines, and the performance-based nature of many of the regulatory requirements. Pre-application consultation would assist operators with the licensing process and accommodate all operators, including those that choose to avail themselves of the flexibilities provided in this proposal. The FAA acknowledges, however, that pre-application consultation can be minimal for operators experienced with FAA requirements. In such cases, consultation may consist of a telephone conversation.

\15\ ARC Report at p. 23.

B. Single Vehicle Operator License

B. Single Vehicle Operator License

As part of its streamlining effort, the FAA proposes in § 450.3 (Scope of Vehicle Operator License) to establish one license, a vehicle operator license, for commercial launch and reentry activity. A vehicle operator license would authorize a licensee to conduct one or more launches or reentries using the same vehicle or family of vehicles and would specify whether it covers launch, reentry, or launch and reentry. The FAA would eliminate the current limitation in § 415.3 specifying a launch license covers only one launch site, and would eliminate the designations of launch-specific license and launch operator license, mission-specific license and operator license, and reentry-specific license and reentry-operator license. The proposal would also allow the FAA to scope the duration of the license to the operation.

Although the FAA has not defined a "family of vehicles," launch operators often do so themselves. Usually, the vehicles share a common core, i.e., the booster and upper stage. Sometimes multiple boosters are attached together to form a larger booster. Historically, solid rocket motors have been attached to core boosters to enhance capability. There has never been an issue concerning what operators and the FAA consider to be members of the same family. It is merely a convenient way to structure licenses.

SPD-2 directed the DOT to revise the current launch and reentry licensing regulations with special consideration to requiring a single license for all types of commercial launch and reentry operations. Similarly, the ARC recommended that the FAA adopt a single license structure to accommodate a variety of vehicle types, operations, and launch and reentry sites. In accordance with these recommendations, the FAA proposes a single vehicle operator license that could be scoped to the operation. In order to accommodate the increasingly similar characteristics of some ELVs and RLVs, as well as future concepts, these proposed regulations would no longer distinguish between ELVs and RLVs. Rather, this proposal would consolidate the licensing requirements for all commercial launch and reentry activities under one part, and applicants would apply for the same type of license.

In addition to accommodating different vehicles and types of operations, this proposal would allow launches or reentries under a single vehicle operator license from or to multiple sites. Under the current regulations, in order for an operator to benefit from using multiple sites for launches authorized by a part 415 license, the operator must apply for a new license.\16\ This process is unnecessarily burdensome. This proposed change would facilitate the application process because an operator would no longer be required to apply for a separate license to launch or reenter from a launch site other than that specified by the license.

\16\ For example, in 2018, a launch operator held a launch license under part 415 that authorized it to launch from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida; however, the operator contemplated launching from a nearby launch site, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS). Under current part 415, in order to launch from CCAFS instead of KSC, the operator has to file a separate application for a license to launch from CCAFS.

In order to apply for a license that includes multiple sites, an applicant would need to provide the FAA with application materials that would allow the FAA to conduct separate reviews for each site to determine, for example: Maximum probable loss required by part 440; public risk to populated areas, aircraft, and waterborne vessels; and the environmental impacts associated with proposed launches or reentries. The FAA foresees that a license that authorizes launches or reentries at more than one site would make it administratively easier for an operator to change sites for a particular operation. For example, an operator could move a launch from one site to another due to launch facility availability. A launch might move from CCAFS to KSC. Additionally, FAA foresees multiple sites will be utilized by operators of hybrid vehicles at launch sites with runways as well as vehicles supporting operationally responsive space missions such as DARPA Launch Challenge.

Under this proposed licensing regime, an applicant should be prepared to discuss its intent to conduct activity from multiple sites during pre-application consultation. This discussion would give both the applicant and the agency an opportunity to scope the application and identify any potential issues early on when changes to the application or proposed licensed activities would be less likely to cause additional issues or significant delays. The launch operator would not need to specify the specific launches that would be planned for each site. The FAA would continue its current practice for operator licenses of requiring a demonstration that a proposed range of activities, not every trajectory variation within that range, can be safely conducted in order to scope the license. The license would not need to be modified unless the proposed operation fell outside the authorized range.

The FAA further notes that under § 413.11, after an initial screening the FAA determines whether an application is complete enough to begin its review. If an application that includes multiple launch sites is complete enough for the FAA to accept it and begin its review, the 180-day review period under § 413.15(a) would begin. However, if during the FAA's initial review it determines that an application is sufficiently complete to make a license determination for at least one launch site but not all launch sites included in the application, the FAA would have the option to toll the review period, as provided in § 413.15(b). Alternatively, the FAA could continue its review of the part of the application with complete enough information and toll the portion involving any launch site with insufficient information to make a licensing determination. In either case, the FAA would notify the applicant as required by § 413.15(c).

Finally, the FAA proposes a more flexible approach to the duration of a vehicle operator license under § 450.7 (Duration of a Vehicle Operator License). Specifically, the FAA would determine, based on information received from an applicant, the appropriate duration of the license, not to exceed five years. In making this determination, the FAA would continue its current practice of setting the duration of a license for specified launches to be approximately one year after the expected date of the activity. Currently, a launch-specific license expires upon completion of all launches authorized by the license or the expiration date stated in the license, whichever occurs first. An operator license remains in effect for two years for an RLV and five years for an ELV from the date of issuance. The FAA considered setting all license durations to five years, but rejected this option to allow an applicant to obtain a license for a limited specific activity rather than for a more general range of activities.

An applicant may prefer a shorter license duration for a specific activity because a licensee has obligations under an FAA license, such as the requirements to demonstrate financial responsibility and allow access to FAA safety inspectors, and a shorter license duration would relieve an applicant of compliance with these requirements after the activity has ended. Unless an operator requests an operator license, currently good for either two or five years, the operator does not typically request a license duration. The FAA initially sets the duration to encompass the authorized activity. The FAA plans to continue its current practice of extending licenses through renewals or modifications to accommodate delays in authorized launches or reentries.

C. Performance-Based Requirements and Means of Compliance

C. Performance-Based Requirements and Means of Compliance

SPD-2 directs the FAA to consider replacing prescriptive requirements in the commercial space flight launch and reentry licensing process with performance-based criteria. The ARC echoed the SPD-2 recommendation for performance-based requirements that allowed varying means of compliance proposed by the operator.\17\ In response to SPD-2 and the ARC recommendations, the FAA is proposing to replace many of the prescriptive licensing requirements with performance-based requirements. These performance-based requirements would provide flexibility, scalability, and adaptability as discussed in the introduction. An operator would be able to use an acceptable means of compliance to demonstrate compliance with the requirements.

\17\ ARC Report, at p. 7.

Currently, the FAA uses both prescriptive and performance-based requirements for launches and reentries respectively.\18\ Parts 415 and 417 provide detailed prescriptive requirements for ELVs. Although these requirements provide regulatory certainty, they have proven inflexible. As the industry grows and innovates, ELV operators have identified alternate ways of operating safely that do not comply with the regulations as written. This has forced operators to request waivers or equivalent-level-of safety-determinations (ELOS determinations), often close to scheduled launch dates. On the other hand, the performance-based regulations in parts 431 and 435 lack the detail to efficiently guide operators through the FAA's regulatory regime. Indeed, the FAA often fills these regulatory gaps by adopting part 417 requirements in practice. The process of adding regulatory certainty to these performance-based regulations by adopting part 417 requirements has been frustrating and contentious for both operators and the FAA.

\18\ Parts 415 and 417, and their associated appendices, provide primarily prescriptive requirements for licensing and launch of an ELV. Part 431 provides primarily performance- and process-based requirements for a launch and reentry of a reusable launch vehicle. Part 435 provides similar requirements to part 431 for the reentry of a reentry vehicle other than a reusable launch vehicle. Parts 431 and 435 rely on a system safety process performed by an operator in order to demonstrate adequate safety of the operation.

Adopting performance-based requirements that allow operators to use an acceptable means of compliance would decrease the need for waivers or ELOS determinations to address new technology advancements. An acceptable means of compliance is one means, but not the only means, by which a requirement could be met. The FAA would set the safety standard in regulations and identify any acceptable means of compliance currently available. The FAA would provide public notice of each means of compliance that the Administrator has accepted by publishing the acceptance on its website, for example. This notification would communicate to the public and the industry that the FAA has accepted a means of compliance or any revision to an existing means of compliance. A consensus standards body, any individual, or any organization would be able to submit means of compliance documentation to the FAA for consideration and potential acceptance.

An operator could also develop its own means of compliance to demonstrate it met the safety standard. Once the Administrator has accepted a means of compliance for that operator, the operator could use it in future license applications. The FAA would not provide public notice of individual operator-developed means of compliance. If any information submitted to the FAA as part of a means of compliance for acceptance is proprietary, it would be afforded the same protections as are applied today to license applications submitted under § 413.9.

For five of the proposed requirements, an operator would have to demonstrate compliance using a means of compliance that has been approved by the FAA before an operator could use it in a license application. These five requirements are flight safety systems (proposed § 450.145), FSA methods (proposed § 450.115), lightning flight commit criteria (proposed § 450.163(a)), and airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds (proposed Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187). The FAA has developed Advisory Circulars (ACs) or identified government standards that discuss an acceptable means of compliance for each of these requirements, and has placed these documents in the docket for the public's review and comment. If an operator wishes to use a means of compliance not previously accepted by the FAA to demonstrate compliance with one of the five requirements, the FAA would have to review and accept it prior to an operator using that means of compliance to satisfy a licensing requirement.

If an operator is interested in applying for the acceptance of a unique means of compliance, it should submit any data or documentation to the FAA necessary to demonstrate that the means of compliance satisfies the safety requirements established in the regulation. An operator should note that the FAA will take into account such factors as complexity of the means of compliance; whether the means of compliance is an industry, government, or voluntary consensus standard; and whether the means of compliance has been peer-reviewed during its review and determination. These factors may affect how quickly the FAA is able to review and make a determination. The time could range from a few days to many weeks.

Although applying for the acceptance of a new means of compliance may take time, once an operator's unique means of compliance is accepted by the FAA, the operator can use it in future license applications. The FAA also anticipates that this process will result in flexibility for industry and will encourage innovation as industry and consensus standards bodies \19\ develop multiple ways for an operator to meet the requisite safety standards. The FAA believes this is the best approach to enabling new ways of achieving acceptable levels of safety through industry innovation, and seeks public comment on whether this approach may induce additional innovation through industry-developed consensus standards.

\19\ The FAA intends to rely increasingly on voluntary consensus standards as means of compliance. Section 12(d) of the National Technology Advancement Act (Pub. L. 104-113; 15 U.S.C. 3701, et seq.) directs federal agencies to use voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical. Because voluntary consensus bodies are made up of a wide selection of industry participants, and often also include FAA participation, the FAA expects its review of a means of compliance developed by a voluntary consensus standards body would be more expeditious than a custom means of compliance. Unlike means of compliance developed by a voluntary consensus standards body, a custom means of compliance would not be subject to peer review or independent review of the viability of the technical approach.

D. Launch From a Federal Launch Range

D. Launch From a Federal Launch Range

Both industry and the National Space Council have urged government agencies involved in the launch and reentry of vehicles by commercial operators to work towards common standards and to remove duplicative oversight. The ARC recommended an end goal of either exclusive FAA jurisdiction over commercial launches at a range, or a range adopting the same flight safety regulations used by the FAA. SPD-2 directed the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, and the NASA Administrator to coordinate to examine all existing U.S. Government requirements, standards, and policies associated with commercial space flight launch and reentry operations from Federal launch ranges and minimize those requirements, except those necessary to protect public safety and national security, that would conflict with the efforts of the Secretary of Transportation in implementing the Secretary's responsibilities to review and revise its launch and reentry regulations.\20\ Most recently, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 includes a provision stating that the Secretary of Defense may not impose any requirement on a licensee or transferee that is duplicative of, or overlaps in intent with, any requirement imposed by the Secretary of Transportation under 51 U.S.C. chapter 509, unless imposing such a requirement is necessary to avoid negative consequences for the national security space program.\21\

\20\ SPD-2; May 24, 2018 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-2-streamlining-regulations-commercial-use-space).

\21\ Section 1606(2)(A), John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232 (amending 51 U.S.C. 50918 note).

Currently, the FAA issues a safety approval to a license applicant proposing to launch from a Federal launch range if the applicant satisfies the requirements of part 415, subpart C, and has contracted with the range for the provision of safety-related launch services and property, as long as an FAA Launch Site Safety Assessment (LSSA) \22\ shows that the range's launch services and launch property satisfy part 417. The FAA assesses each range and determines if the range meets FAA safety requirements. If the FAA assessed a range, through its LSSA, and found that an applicable range safety-related launch service or property satisfies FAA requirements, then the FAA treats the range's launch service or property as that of a launch operator's, and there is no need for further demonstration of compliance to the FAA. The FAA reassesses a range's practices only when the range chooses to change its practice.

\22\ LSSA is an FAA evaluation of Federal range services and launch property.

The ARC recommended that ranges and the FAA have common flight safety regulations and guidance documents. To address this recommendation, the FAA proposes performance-based requirements for both ground and flight safety that an operator could meet using Air Force and NASA practices as a means of compliance. The FAA expects that there will be few, if any, instances where Air Force or NASA practices do not satisfy the proposed performance-based requirements. Additionally, the proposed requirements should provide enough flexibility to accommodate changes in Air Force and NASA practices in the future. The FAA expects that range services that a range applies to U.S. Government launches and reentries will almost invariably satisfy the FAA's proposed requirements. The FAA currently accepts flight safety analyses performed by Air Force on behalf of an operator without additional analysis and anticipates that it would give similar deference to other analyses by federal agencies once it established that they meet FAA requirements.

The FAA developed this approach to reduce operator burden to the largest extent possible. The FAA is bound to execute its statutory mandates and may do so only to the extent authorized by those statutes. Although federal entities often have complimentary mandates and statutory authorities, they are rarely identical. That is, each federal department or agency has been given separate mission. Federal entities establish interagency processes to manage closely related functions in as smoothly and least burdensome manner possible. Coordinating FAA requirements, range practices, and those practices implemented at other Federal facilities is largely an interagency issue, this proposal does not include language to eliminate duplicative approvals. Instead, the FAA will continue to work with the appropriate agencies to streamline commercial launch and reentry requirements at ranges and Federal facilities by leveraging the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG).\23\

\23\ The CSWG consists of range safety personnel from the Air Force and NASA, and was chartered in the early 2000's to develop and maintain common launch safety standards among agencies.

E. Safety Framework

In addition to proposing a single vehicle operator license and replacing prescriptive requirements with performance-based requirements, this rule would rely on a safety framework that provides the flexibility needed to accommodate current and future operations and the regulatory certainty lacking in some of the current regulations.

E. Safety Framework

This proposal would consolidate the launch and reentry safety requirements in subpart C. Figure 2 depicts the safety framework on which the FAA relied in developing its proposed safety requirements. In developing this framework, the FAA considered following the approach taken in parts 431 and 435 and relying almost exclusively on a robust systems safety approach. As noted earlier, experience has shown that part 431 does not offer enough specificity and, as a result, it has been unclear to operators what safety measures the FAA requires to achieve an acceptable level of safety. In particular, there are no explicit requirements for ground safety, flight safety analysis, or flight safety systems. On the other hand, part 417 is too prescriptive, particularly regarding design and detailed procedural requirements for ground safety, detailed design and test requirements for flight safety systems, and numerous plans that placed needless burden on operators and impeded innovation. Thus, the framework described below is designed to strike a balance between these two parts. The proposed regulations clearly lay out FAA expectations, but should provide a launch or reentry operator with flexibility on how it achieves acceptable public safety. The framework also seeks to allow operators that wish to conduct operations using proven hazard control strategies to do so.

System Safety Program. All operators would be required to have a system safety program that would establish system safety management principles for both ground and flight safety throughout the operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The system safety program would include a safety organization, procedures, configuration control, and post-flight data review.

Preliminary Flight Safety Assessment. For flight safety, an operator would conduct a preliminary flight safety assessment to identify public hazards and determine the appropriate hazard control strategy for a phase of flight or an entire flight. An operator could use traditional hazard controls such as physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort to mitigate hazards. Physical containment is when a launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach the public or critical assets.

Wind weighting is when the operator of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle adjusts launcher azimuth and elevation settings to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide a safe impact location for the launch vehicle or its components. Flight Abort is the process to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight. Flight abort as a hazard control strategy would be required for a phase of flight that is shown by a consequence analysis to potentially have significant public safety impacts. Otherwise, an operator would be able to bypass these traditional hazard control strategies and conduct a flight hazard analysis.

Flight Hazard Analysis. As an alternative to traditional hazard control measures, an operator would be able to conduct a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls. Hazard analysis is a proven engineering discipline that, when applied during system development and throughout the system's lifecycle, identifies and mitigates hazards and, in so doing, eliminates or reduces the risk of potential mishaps and accidents. In addition, a separate hazard analysis methodology is outlined for computing systems and software.

Flight Safety Analysis. Regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated, an operator would be required to conduct a number of flight safety analyses. At a minimum, these analyses would quantitatively demonstrate that a launch or reentry meets the public safety criteria for debris, far-field overpressure, and toxic hazards. Other analyses support flight abort and wind weighting hazard control strategies and determine flight hazard areas.\24\ For a detailed discussion, please see the "Additional Technical Justification and Rationale" discussion later in the preamble.

\24\ Note that flight hazard analysis and flight safety analysis are interdependent in that each can help inform the other. Flight safety analysis quantifies the risks posed by hazards, which are typically identified and mitigated during the flight hazard analysis, by using physics to model how the vehicle will respond to specific failure modes. The FSA is also useful to define when operational restrictions are necessary to meet quantitative risk requirements.

Derived Hazard Controls. An operator would derive a number of hazard controls through its conduct of a flight hazard analysis and flight safety analyses.

Prescribed Hazard Controls. Regardless of the hazard controls derived from a flight hazard analysis and flight safety analyses, the FAA would require a number of other hazard controls that have historically been necessary to achieve acceptable public safety. These include requirements for flight safety and other safety critical systems, agreements, safety-critical personnel qualifications, crew rest, radio frequency management, readiness, communications, preflight procedures, surveillance and publication of hazard areas, lightning hazard mitigation, flight safety rules, tracking, collision avoidance, safety at the end of launch, and mishap planning.

Acceptable Flight Safety. All elements of the safety framework combine to provide acceptable public safety during flight. In proposed § 450.101 (Public Safety Criteria), the FAA would outline specific public safety criteria to clearly define how safe is safe enough. Section 450.101 is discussed in detail later in this preamble.

Ground Safety. With respect to ground safety, an operator would conduct a ground hazard analysis to derive ground hazard controls. Those, along with prescribed hazard controls, would provide acceptable public safety during ground operations.

Flight Safety

Flight Safety

A. Public Safety Criteria

Proposed § 450.101 would consolidate all public safety criteria for flight into one section. It would contain the core performance-based safety requirements to protect people and property on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. All other flight safety requirements in proposed part 450 subpart C would support the achievement of these criteria. The § 450.101 requirements would define how safe is safe enough for the flight of a commercial launch or reentry vehicle.

A. Public Safety Criteria

Proposed § 450.101(a) contains launch risk criteria, or the risk thresholds an operator may not exceed during flight. An operator would be permitted to initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if the collective, individual, aircraft, and critical asset risk satisfy the proposed criteria. The criteria would apply to every launch from liftoff through orbital insertion for an orbital launch, and through final impact or landing for a suborbital launch, which is the same scope used for current launch risk criteria in parts 417 and 431. Each measure of risk serves a different purpose. Collective risk addresses the risk to a population as a whole, whereas individual risk addresses the risk to each person within a population. The measure of aircraft risk is unique, due to the difficulty of modeling collective and individual risk for aircraft in flight. Lastly, critical asset risk addresses the loss of functionality of an asset that is essential to the national interests of the United States. Critical assets include property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense, or assured access to space for national priority missions.

Proposed § 450.101(a)(1) would establish the collective risk criteria for flight, measured by expected casualties (EC). The proposal would define EC as the mean number of casualties predicted to occur per flight operation if the operation were repeated many times. The term casualties refers to serious injuries or worse, including fatalities. It would require the risk to all members of the public, excluding persons in aircraft and neighboring operations personnel, to not exceed an expected number of 1 x 10-\4\ casualties, posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure.\25\ With two exceptions, this is the same criteria currently used in Sec. § 417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i). The first exception applies to people on waterborne vessels, who would now be included in the collective risk criteria to all members of the public. The second exception applies to neighboring operations personnel. This proposal would require the risk to all neighboring operations personnel not exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-\4\ casualties. Both of these topics are discussed separately later in this preamble.

\25\ Far field blast overpressure is a phenomenon resulting from the air blast effects of large explosions that may be focused by certain conditions in the atmosphere through which the blast waves propagate. Population may be at risk from broken window glass shards.

Proposed § 450.101(a)(2) would establish the individual risk criteria for flight, measured by probability of casualty (PC). The proposal would define PC as the likelihood that a person will suffer a serious injury or worse, including a fatal injury, due to all hazards from an operation at a specific location. It would require the risk to any individual member of the public, excluding neighboring operations personnel, to not exceed a PC of 1 x 10-\6\ per launch, posed by impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure. With one exception, this is the same criteria currently in Sec. § 417.107(b)(2) and 431.35(b)(1)(iii). The exception is neighboring operations personnel would have separate individual risk criteria, which is discussed later in this preamble.

Proposed § 450.101(a)(3) would set aircraft risk criteria for flight. It would require a launch operator to establish any aircraft hazard areas necessary to ensure the probability of impact with debris capable of causing a casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 x 10-6. This is the same requirement as current § 417.107(b)(4). Part 431 does not have aircraft risk criteria, although the FAA's current practice is to use the part 417 criteria for launches licensed under part 431. With this proposal, the FAA would expressly apply this criterion to all launches. The FAA does not propose any other changes for the protection of aircraft at this time. The FAA has an ongoing Airspace Access ARC, composed of commercial space transportation and aviation industry representatives, whose recommendations may inform a future rulemaking on protection of aircraft.

Proposed § 450.101(a)(4) would set the launch risk criteria for critical assets. It would require the probability of loss of functionality for each critical asset to not exceed 1 x 10-\3\, or some other more stringent probability if deemed necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States. This would be a new requirement and is discussed separately later in this preamble.

Proposed § 450.101(b) would define risk criteria for reentry. These would be the same as the risk criteria for launch, except that the proposed criteria would apply to each reentry, from the final health check prior to the deorbit burn through final impact or landing. The same discussion earlier regarding collective risk, individual risk, aircraft risk, and risk to critical assets would apply to the reentry risk criteria.

Proposed § 450.101(c) would set the flight abort criteria for both launch and reentry. It represents the most significant change to public safety criteria in this proposed rule. It would require that an operator use flight abort as a hazard control strategy if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode,\26\ in any one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-3 conditional expected casualties (CEC) for uncontrolled areas.\27\ CEC is the consequence, measured in terms of EC, without regard to the probability of failure, and will be discussed in the Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight Safety System section. Flight abort with the use of an FSS and applying the CEC criteria in proposed part 450 is discussed later in this preamble. Proposed § 450.101(c) would apply to all phases of flight, unless otherwise agreed to by the FAA based on the demonstrated reliability of the launch or reentry vehicle during that phase of flight. The flight of a certificated aircraft that is carrying a rocket to a drop point is an example of when the use of an FSS would likely not be necessary even though the CEC could be above the threshold, because the aircraft would have a demonstrated high reliability.

\26\ Vehicle response mode means a mutually exclusive scenario that characterizes foreseeable combinations of vehicle trajectory and debris generation.

\27\ Uncontrolled Area is an area of land not controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator, or other entity by agreement.

Proposed § 450.101(d) would establish disposal \28\ safety criteria. It would require that an operator conducting a disposal of a vehicle stage or component from Earth orbit either meet the criteria of § 450.101(b)(1), (2), and (3), or target a broad ocean area. Because a launch vehicle stage or component will not survive a disposal substantially intact, disposal is not considered a reentry.\29\ Disposal is an effective method of orbital debris prevention because it eliminates the vehicle stage or component as a piece of orbital debris and as a risk for future debris creation through collision. The FAA is not proposing to require that a launch operator dispose of any upper stage or component in this rulemaking. The current proposal would only apply if a launch operator chooses to dispose of its upper stage or other launch vehicle component.

Although an operator could choose to demonstrate that the proposed collective and individual risk criteria are met for a disposal, the FAA expects most, if not all, disposals to target a broad ocean area.\30\ This is consistent with current practice and NASA Technical Standards.\31\ Because the broad ocean area has such a low density of people that are exposed almost exclusively in large waterborne vessels, objects that survive reentry to impact in these areas produce an insignificant PC. Therefore, operators disposing a vehicle stage or component into a broad ocean area would not need to demonstrate compliance with the collective, individual, or aircraft risk criteria. For purposes of this proposal, the FAA considers "broad ocean" as an area 200 nautical miles (nm) from land. Two hundred nm is also the recognized limit of exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which are zones prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea \32\ over which the owning state has exclusive exploitation rights over all natural resources.

Disposal beyond an EEZ further reduces the chance of disrupting economic operations such as commercial fishing.

\28\ The FAA proposes to define "disposal" in § 401.5 to mean the return or attempt to return, purposefully, a launch vehicle stage or component, not including a reentry vehicle, from Earth orbit to Earth, in a controlled manner. The proposed definition is discussed later in this preamble.

\29\ A "reentry" is defined in 51 U.S.C. 50902, as "to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload or human beings, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth." A "reentry vehicle" is defined as "a vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, or a reusable launch vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, substantially intact."

\30\ A disposal that "targets a broad ocean area" would wholly contain the disposal hazard area within a broad ocean area.

\31\ NASA-STD-8715.14A, paragraph 4.7.2.1.b, states, "For controlled reentry, the selected trajectory shall ensure that no surviving debris impact with a kinetic energy greater than 15 joules is closer than 370 km from foreign landmasses, or is within 50 km from the continental U.S., territories of the U.S., and the permanent ice pack of Antarctica."

\32\ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, its comprehensive legal framework codifies customary international law governing uses of the ocean.

Proposed § 450.101(e) would address the protection of people and property on-orbit, through collision avoidance requirements during launch or reentry and through requirements aimed at preventing explosions of launch vehicle stages or components on-orbit. Specifically, proposed § 450.101(e)(1) would require a launch or reentry operator to prevent the collision between a launch or reentry vehicle stage or component, and people or property on-orbit, in accordance with the requirements in proposed § 450.169(a) (Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements). Proposed § 450.101(e)(2) would require that a launch operator prevent the creation of debris through the conversion of energy sources into energy that fragments the stage or component, in accordance with the requirements in proposed § 450.171 (Safety at End of Launch). Proposed § 450.171 would contain the same requirements as in Sec. § 417.129 and 431.43(c)(3). Both Sec. § 450.169(a) and 450.171 are addressed in greater detail later in the preamble.

Proposed § 450.101(f) would require that an operator for any launch, reentry, or disposal notify the public of any region of land, sea, or air that contains, with 97 percent probability of containment, all debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a casualty. The requirement to notify the public of planned impacts is currently in Sec. § 417.111(i)(5) and 431.75(b). The calculation of such hazard areas is discussed later in this preamble in the discussion of proposed § 450.133 (Flight Hazard Areas). Notification of planned impacts would be included in proposed § 450.101 because it is not tied to risk and is therefore not covered by the other public safety criteria of proposed § 450.101.

In proposed § 450.101(g), the FAA would establish performance level requirements for the validity of analysis methods. Specifically, consistent with the existing language in § 417.203(c) and current practice for launch and reentry assessments, an operator's analysis method would have to use accurate data and scientific principles and be statistically valid. "Accurate data" would continue to refer to completeness, exactness, and fidelity to the maximum extent practicable. In this context, "scientific principles" would continue to refer to knowledge based on the scientific method, such as that established in the fields of physics, chemistry, and engineering. An analysis based on non-scientific principles, such as astrology, would not be consistent with this standard. A "statistically valid" analysis would be the result of a sound application of mathematics and would account for the uncertainty in any statistical inference due to sample size limits, the degree of applicability of data to a particular system, and the degree of homogeneity of the data. 1. Neighboring Operations Personnel

Two of the proposed requirements in § 450.101 that do not exist in the current regulations carve out separate individual and collective risk criteria for neighboring operations personnel. With the increase in operations and launch rate, the Air Force, NASA, and the industry have expressed concerns about the FAA's public risk criteria because in certain circumstances they force an operator to clear or evacuate any other launch operator and its personnel not involved with a specific FAA-licensed operation from a hazard area or safety clear zone during certain licensed activities.\33\ The clearing or evacuation of other launch operator personnel, which can range from a handful of workers to over a thousand for a significant portion of a day, results in potential schedule impacts and lost productivity costs to other range users. These impacts will increase as the launch tempo increases and similar operations are conducted at other sites.

\33\ To illustrate the problematic nature of the current risk requirements as they are applied to the public, flybacks and landings of reusable boosters at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station conducted under an FAA license are causing operational impacts to other range users due to FAA requirements to clear the public, including range users not involved with the launch, to meet public safety criteria.

The Air Force, NASA, and industry have recommended that the FAA treat certain personnel of other launch operators, referred to in this proposed rulemaking as "neighboring operations personnel," differently than the rest of the public who are typically visitors, tourists, or people who are located outside a launch site and are not aware of the hazards nor trained and prepared to respond to them. Specifically, they recommend that the FAA characterize neighboring operations personnel who work at a launch site as either non-public or subject to a higher level of risk than the rest of the public, to minimize the need to evacuate them during certain licensed operations.\34\

\34\ The Air Force requested that the FAA propose an approach that allows certain neighboring operations personnel during an FAA-licensed launch to be assessed at the Air Force's higher launch essential risk criteria of 10 x 10-6 individual probability of casualty. Also, Air Force and NASA members of the CSWG have asked for increased flexibility with the collective risk EC for flight to accommodate neighboring operations personnel. As one of its recommendations to the National Space Council in November 2017, NASA suggested a change to operational requirements to clear employees from hazard areas during commercial operations under an FAA license.

The ARC recommended: (1) Excluding permanently badged personnel and neighboring launch operations from the definition of "public"; (2) revising the definition of "public safety" because the current definition is overly broad, ambiguous, and inconsistent with other federal agencies, including the Air Force; (3) distinguishing between "public" (i.e., those uninvolved individuals located outside the controlled-access boundaries of a launch or reentry site or clustered sites within a defined Federal or private spaceport) and people who work regularly within the controlled-access boundaries of a Federal or private spaceport or an operator's dedicated launch or reentry site; \35\ and (4) employing mitigation measures for uninvolved neighboring operations personnel when a hazardous operation or launch is scheduled.\36\

\35\ According to the ARC, these individuals who work regularly within the boundaries of a federal range or private spaceport are industry workers who know and accept the risks associated with the hazardous environment in which they work.

\36\ These mitigations might include: facility separation distances (e.g., separation between launch points on a multi-user spaceport) that anticipate and allow for safe concurrent operations; terms in site and use agreements with the Federal or non-Federal property owner that indemnify and hold harmless the government or other landlord; and potential reciprocal waivers (not required by regulation) that may be entered into among neighboring operations to share risks of hazards to each other's property and personnel.

i. FAA Proposed Definitions of Public and Neighboring Operations Personnel in § 401.5

i. FAA Proposed Definitions of Public and Neighboring Operations Personnel in § 401.5

To address these concerns, the FAA proposes to add two definitions to § 401.5. The first is "public," which the FAA would define in § 401.5, for a particular licensed or permitted launch or reentry, as people and property that are not involved in supporting the launch or reentry. This would include those people and property that may be located within the launch or reentry site, such as visitors, individuals providing goods or services not related to launch or reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and its personnel. This language is similar to the current definition of "public safety" in § 401.5, which the FAA proposes to delete, except that the FAA has included reentry and permitted activities in the definition.\37\

\37\ The FAA would also delete the definition of "public" in § 420.5 for launch sites, which means people and property that are not involved in supporting a licensed or permitted launch. The new definition of public in § 401.5 will apply to all parts, including part 420.

The second is the definition of "neighboring operations personnel," which the FAA would define in § 401.5 as those members of the public located within a launch or reentry site, as determined by the Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator,\38\ or an adjacent launch or reentry site, who are not associated with a specific hazardous licensed or permitted operation currently being conducted but are required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the site and are notified of the hazardous operation. While neighboring operations personnel would still fall under the proposed definition of public, this proposal would apply different individual and collective risk criteria to them. The FAA seeks comment on this approach.

\38\ Since neighboring operations personnel, as defined in this proposal, work at a launch or reentry site, the FAA expects that the site operator (i.e., an operator of a Federal site or FAA-licensed launch or reentry site), not the launch operator, would identify these personnel.

In developing its proposal, the FAA looked to NASA and Air Force requirements, which treat a portion of the public differently than the FAA regulations by allowing some other launch operators and their personnel, referred to as "neighboring operations personnel" by the Air Force \39\ and "critical operations personnel" by NASA,\40\ to be subjected to a higher level of risk than the rest of the public. This approach lessens the impact to multiple users and enables concurrent operations at a site. The FAA's proposed definition more closely aligns with the definitions of neighboring operations personnel and critical operations personnel adopted by the Air Force and NASA, respectively, because it distinguishes neighboring operations personnel as personnel required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks and who are notified of neighboring hazardous operations. Critical tasks may include maintaining the security of a site or facility or performing critical launch processing tasks such as monitoring pressure vessels or testing safety critical systems of a launch vehicle for an upcoming mission.

\39\ The Air Force has two sub-categories of public: Neighboring operations personnel and the general public. For a specific launch, the general public includes all visitors, media, and other non-essential personnel at the launch site, as well as persons located outside the boundaries of the launch site. For the Air Force, neighboring operations personnel are individuals, not associated with the specific operation or launch currently being conducted, required to perform safety, security, or critical tasks at the launch base, and who are notified of a neighboring hazardous operation and are either trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by a properly trained escort. In accordance with guidance information in AFSPCMAN 91-710V1, neighboring operations personnel may include individuals performing launch processing tasks for another launch, but do not include individuals in training for any job or individuals performing routine activities such as administrative, maintenance, support, or janitorial. AFSPCMAN 91-710V1 can be found at https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/afspc/publication/afspcman91-710v1/afspcman91-710v1.pdf. The Air Force may allow neighboring operations personnel to be within safety clearance zones and hazardous launch areas, and neighboring operations personnel would not be evacuated with the general public. The Air Force includes neighboring operations personnel in the same risk category as launch-essential personnel. The allowable collective aggregated risk for launch essential personnel is 300 x 10-6 and the allowable individual risk for launch essential personnel is 10 x 10-6.

\40\ NASA, for the purposes of range safety risk management, defines public as visitors and personnel inside and outside NASA-controlled locations who are not critical operations personnel or mission essential personnel and who may be on land, on waterborne vessels, or in aircraft. Similar to the Air Force's definition of neighboring operations personnel, NASA considers critical operations personnel to include persons not essential to the specific operation (launch, reentry, flight) being conducted, but who are required to perform safety, security, or other critical tasks at the launch, landing, or flight facility; are notified of the hazardous operation and either trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by a properly trained escort; are not in training for any job or individuals performing routine activities such as administrative, maintenance, or janitorial activities; and may occupy safety clearance zones and hazardous areas, and are not evacuated with the public. NASA includes critical operations personnel in the same risk category as mission essential personnel. For flight, the allowable collective aggregated risk for the combination of mission essential personnel and critical operations personnel is 300 x 10-6 and the allowable individual risk for mission essential or critical operations personnel is 10 x 10-6.

Because of these specific duties, neighboring operations personnel are more likely than the rest of the public to be specially trained and prepared to respond to hazards present at a launch or reentry site. Those hazards include exposure to debris, overpressure, toxics, and fire. The Air Force and NASA definitions specify that these personnel are either trained in mitigation techniques or accompanied by a properly trained escort. Note, however, that the FAA would not require that neighboring operations personnel be trained or accompanied by a trained escort. It would be burdensome to require a licensee to ensure neighboring operations personnel are trained, and training is not necessary to justify the slight increase in risk allowed for workers performing safety, security, or critical tasks.

The FAA proposal would not include all permanently badged personnel on a launch or reentry site as neighboring operations personnel. While neighboring operations personnel are permanently-badged personnel, including all permanently-badged personnel as neighboring operations personnel could then include individuals performing routine activities such as administrative, maintenance, or janitorial duties. These individuals are not necessary for critical tasks. Unlike for neighboring operations personnel, the disruption to routine activities does not sufficiently justify allowing these individuals to remain on site during hazardous operations. ii. Individual Risk Level for Neighboring Operations Personnel

Currently, for ELVs, the individual risk criterion for the public in § 417.107(b)(2) allows a launch operator to initiate flight only if the risk to any individual member of the public does not exceed 1 x 10-6 per launch for each hazard. Part 431 is similar for an RLV mission. Thus, any person not involved in supporting a launch or reentry, whether within or outside the bounds of the launch or reentry site, are required to have a risk of casualty no higher than 1 x 10-6 per launch or reentry for each hazard.

The FAA proposes in § 450.101(a)(2) a higher individual risk criterion of 1 x 10-5 for neighboring operations personnel compared to 1 x 10-6 for the rest of the public for launch and reentry. Although neighboring operations personnel would still fall under the FAA's definition of public, this proposal would establish a higher risk threshold for neighboring operations personnel as compared to other members of the public. This proposal would permit neighboring operations personnel to remain on site because--unlike other members of the public such as visitors or tourists--the presence of these personnel at a launch or reentry site is necessary for security or to avoid the disruption of launch or reentry activities at neighboring sites. In addition, the proposed increased risk to which these personnel would be exposed is minimal. iii. Collective Risk Level for Neighboring Operations Personnel

Sections 417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i) and (ii) currently require that for each proposed launch or reentry, the risk level to the collective members of the public, which would include neighboring operations personnel but exclude persons in water-borne vessels and aircraft, must not exceed an expected number of 1 x 10-4 casualties from impacting inert and explosive debris and toxic release associated with the launch or reentry.

Similar to individual risk, the FAA proposes a separate collective risk criterion for neighboring operations personnel in § 450.101(a)(1). This proposal would permit a launch operator to initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if the total risk associated with the launch to all members of the public, excluding neighboring operations personnel and persons in aircraft, does not exceed an expected number of 1 x 10-4 casualties. Additionally, a launch operator would be permitted to initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if the total risk associated with the launch to neighboring operations personnel did not exceed an expected number of 2 x 10-4 casualties. These risk criteria would also apply to reentry.

These proposed requirements would enable neighboring operations personnel to remain within safety clear zones and hazardous launch areas during flight. Additionally, neighboring operations personnel would not be required to evacuate with the rest of the public as long as their collective risk does not exceed 2 x 10-4. The rationale is the same as that for individual risk. While the FAA proposal would add a separate collective risk limit for neighboring operations personnel, the collective risk limit for the public other than neighboring operations personnel would not be able to exceed 1 x 10-4 for flight. iv. Maximum Probably Loss (MPL) Thresholds for Neighboring Operations Personnel

Under a license, an operator must obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility to compensate for the maximum probable loss from claims by a third party for death, bodily injury, or property damage or loss.\41\ For financial responsibility purposes under 14 CFR part 440, neighboring operations personnel qualify as third parties.\42\ Thus, allowing neighboring operations personnel to remain within hazard areas has the potential to increase the maximum probable loss, and therefore the amount of third party liability insurance that a licensee would be required to obtain. However, this would be fully or partially mitigated by changing the threshold value used to determine MPL for neighboring operations personnel.

\41\ An operator must also obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility to compensate the U.S. Government for damage or loss to government property, but this is not affected by the neighboring operations personnel proposal.

\42\ Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines third party as a person except the U.S. Government or its contractors or subcontractors involved in the launch or reentry services; a licensee or transferee under Chapter 509 and its contractors, subcontractors or customers involved in launch or reentry services; the customer's contractors or subcontractors involved in launch or reentry services; or crew, government astronauts, or space fight participants. Section 440.3 incorporates this definition into the regulations.

The MPL is the greatest dollar amount of loss that is reasonably expected to result from a launch or reentry. Current regulations define what is reasonable by establishing probability thresholds:

• Losses to third parties that are reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity are those that have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in ten million.

• Losses to government property and government personnel involved in licensed or permitted activities that are reasonably expected to result from licensed or permitted activities are those that have a probability of occurrence of no less than one in one hundred thousand.

Therefore, for any launch or reentry, there should only be a 1 in 10,000,000 (1 x 10-\7\) chance that claims from third parties would exceed the MPL value, and a 1 in 100,000 (1 x 10-\5\) chance that claims from the government for government property loss would exceed the MPL value. Because it is much less likely that claims from third parties would exceed the MPL value, the FAA's calculation of MPL takes into account a larger number of rare events that could result in a third party claim than could result in a government property claim. And, because the MPL calculation for third party liability involves consideration of more events related to non-government personnel third party losses than events related to government personnel losses, non-government third party losses are more likely to influence the MPL calculation. The difference in thresholds reflects the government's acceptance of greater risk in supporting launch and reentry activities than that accepted by the uninvolved public.\43\

\43\ Subject to congressional appropriation, the Federal Government indemnifies a launch or reentry operator for claims above the insured amount up to $1.5 billion, adjusted for inflation from January 1989 (approximately $3 billion as of 2016). The lower the threshold used for calculating MPL, the greater chance that the Federal Government may need to indemnify a licensee.

The FAA proposes, for the purpose of determining MPL, that the threshold for neighboring operations personnel be the same as the threshold for losses to government property and involved government personnel, such that losses to neighboring operations personnel would have a probability of occurrence of no less than 1 x 10-\5\. This approach would be appropriate because unlike other third parties, except for involved government personnel, the presence of neighboring operations personnel at a launch or reentry site is necessary for security or to avoid the disruption of launch or reentry activities at neighboring sites. The presence of neighboring operations personnel during licensed activities would not influence the MPL value for third-party liability in most cases because, as discussed above, the 1 x 10-\5\ threshold would capture fewer events and therefore have less of an influence on MPL. The FAA seeks comment on this approach. v. Ground Operations Pertinent to Neighboring Operations Personnel

For ground operations, the FAA currently does not have, nor is it proposing at this time, quantitative public risk criteria for neighboring operations personnel or the rest of the public. As will be discussed in greater detail later, an operator would conduct a ground hazard analysis to derive ground hazard controls. This analysis would be a qualitative, not quantitative. Thus, there would be no quantitative criteria to treat neighboring operations personnel differently than other members of the public during ground operations. An operator would be expected to use hazard controls to contain hazards within defined areas and to control public access to those areas. An operator may use industry or government standards to determine proper mitigations to protect the public, including neighboring operations personnel, from hazards. The impact on neighboring operations personnel during ground activities should be minimal.

Additionally and as discussed later, the FAA is proposing that launch would begin at the start of preflight ground operations that pose a threat to the public, which could be when a launch vehicle or its major components arrive at a U.S. launch site, or at a later point as agreed to by the Administrator.\44\ Scoping preflight ground operations to only those that require FAA oversight would alleviate many of the previously-discussed issues associated with neighboring operations personnel.

\44\ The clause "as agreed to by the Administrator" is used throughout the proposed regulations, particularly in relation to timeframes discussed in detail later in this preamble. Where the clause is used, it means that an operator may submit an alternative to the proposed requirement to the FAA for review. The FAA must agree to the operator's proposal in order for the operator to use the alternative. By whatever means the FAA's agreement to an alternative is communicated to the operator, the agreement means that the alternative does not jeopardize public health and safety and the FAA has no objection to the submitted alternative. Unless the context of the situation clearly provides otherwise, "as agreed to by the Administrator" does not simply mean receipt by the FAA (i.e., that the item was given to a representative of the FAA and that person received it on behalf of the FAA).

2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)

2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)

Another proposed requirement in § 450.101 that does not exist in the current regulations is the proposal to adopt a critical asset protection criterion in proposed § 450.101. To better inform this proposed requirement, the FAA would also amend § 401.5 to add a definition of critical asset. Specifically, the probability of loss of functionality for each critical asset would not be able to exceed 1 x 10-\3\, or a more stringent probability if the FAA determines, in consultation with relevant federal agencies, it is necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States. This requirement is necessary to ensure a high probability of the continuing functionality of critical assets. A critical asset would be defined as an asset that is essential to the national interests of the United States, as determined in consultation with relevant federal agencies. Critical assets would include property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense, or assured access to space for national priority missions. Critical assets would also include certain military, intelligence, and civil payloads, including essential infrastructure when directly supporting the payload at the launch site. Under this proposal, the FAA anticipates that it would work with relevant authorities, including a launch or reentry site operator or Federal property owner, to identify each "critical asset" and its potential vulnerability to launch and reentry hazards.

The FAA's existing risk criteria, currently found in Sec. § 417.107(b) and 431.35(b), do not explicitly set any limit on the probability of loss of functionality for any assets on the surface of the Earth due to launch or reentry operations. An example of loss of functionality would be if a launch vehicle crashed on a nearby launch complex and resulted in damage that prevented the use of the launch complex until repaired. Currently, FAA requirements provide some protection for the safety of property during launch or reentry by limiting individual and collective risks because people are generally co-located with property. However, no protection is afforded for assets within areas that are evacuated.

The proposed property protection criteria would be consistent with current practice at Federal launch ranges. Launch operations from NASA-operated ranges are subject to requirements that limit the probability of debris impact to less than or equal to 1 x 10-\3\ for designated assets. While the Air Force does not have a formal requirement, in practice, launch operations from Air Force-operated ranges have adopted the NASA standard. In the past, Federal launch ranges have, on occasion, applied a more stringent requirement limiting the probability of debris impact caused by launch or reentry hazards to less than or equal to 1 x 10-\4\ for national security payloads, including essential infrastructure when directly supporting the payload at the launch site. The FAA is looking to extend the protection of critical assets to non-Federal launch or reentry sites. The Pacific Spaceport (located on Kodiak Island, Alaska) is an example of a non-Federal launch or reentry site that is a dual-use commercial and military spaceport (meaning that commercial missions have been conducted there, as well as missions for the Department of Defense), which has no regulatory assurance of protection from loss of functionality of critical assets.

For these reasons, the FAA has determined that a requirement to maintain a high probability of continuing functionality of critical assets at a launch site is necessary to ensure the safety of property and national security interests of the United States. Launch and reentry infrastructure used for commercial operations are increasingly in close proximity to critical assets, such as infrastructure used to support the national interests of the United States. The national interests of the U.S. relevant to this proposal go beyond national security interests, and include infrastructure used to serve high priority NASA missions as well. For example, the FAA considers launch and reentry services to deliver cargo to and from the International Space Station as national priority missions. As another example, the launch infrastructure used by SpaceX to launch the Falcon 9 from Kennedy Space Center is within 2 nm of the launch infrastructure used by ULA to launch the Atlas V, which are both used to support commercial operations and operations that serve the national interests of the United States. The FAA coordinated the development of this proposed critical asset protection requirement with NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community.

Furthermore, the proposed property protection requirement would also help achieve the goal of common standards for launches from any U.S. launch site, Federal or non-Federal. Common standards are public safety related requirements and practices that are consistently employed by the Air Force, the FAA, and NASA during launch and reentry activities. Common standards would provide launch and reentry operators certainty in planning and enable a body of expertise to support those standards.

Finally, the proposed property protection standards would apply to all FAA-licensed launches, whether to or from a Federal launch range or a non-Federal launch or reentry site. Applying the provision to non-Federal sites would ensure continuity in the protection of critical assets and that the probability of loss of functionality of critical assets is the same for all commercial launch and reentry operations. The FAA sees no reason for imposing different standards of safety for critical assets based on whether a launch takes place from a non-Federal launch site or from a Federal launch range, especially in light of the fact that some non-Federal sites are dual use, supporting both commercial and military operations.

During the interagency review process, the Department of Defense requested and the FAA considered specifying a more stringent criterion for certain critical assets of utmost importance. This subcategory of critical assets would be known as critical payloads. Specifically, the FAA considered requiring the probability of loss of functionality for critical payloads, including essential infrastructure when directly supporting the payload at the launch site, not exceed 1 x 10-\4\. The FAA considered defining a critical payload as a critical asset that (1) is so costly or unique that it cannot be readily replaced, or (2) the time frame for its replacement would adversely affect the national interests of the United States. Critical payloads may include vital national security payloads, and high-priority NASA and NOAA payloads. For example, a payload such as NASA's Curiosity rover would likely be afforded this protection. The higher protection criterion would have safeguarded those payloads of utmost importance to the United States meriting a greater degree of protection than other critical assets. The specific 1 x 10-\4\ criterion would apply to those national priority payloads at a launch or reentry site, including essential infrastructure when directly supporting the payload. A federal agency would identify payloads meeting the definition of "critical payload" as warranting protection at the 1 x 10-\4\ level. These may include commercial payloads that meet the national interest described above.

The FAA opted to not include this higher protection criterion due to uncertainty about its impact on future launch or reentry operations. Therefore, in order to properly analyze this request, the FAA requests comment on the following:

(1) If the FAA adopted the more-stringent 1 x 10-\4\ criterion for critical payloads, what impacts would it have on your operation?

(2) Should FAA consider applying this more-stringent criterion to any commercial payload? Please provide specific examples and rationale.

(3) If this criterion is applied to commercial space launch and reentry operations, what would be the additional, incremental costs and benefits on your current and future operations compared to the proposed 1 x 10-\3\ criterion? Specifically, the FAA requests information and data to quantify additional costs and benefits of this criterion compared to the proposed 1 x 10-\3\ criterion. Please provide sources for information and data provided. 3. Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight Safety System

This proposal would expand the FAA's use of consequence criteria to protect the public from an unlikely but catastrophic event. Proposed § 450.101(c) would require that operators quantify the consequence of a catastrophic event by calculating CEC for any one-second period of flight. Unlike EC that determines the expected casualties factoring in the probability that a dangerous event will occur, CEC determines the expected casualties assuming the dangerous event will occur. In essence, it represents the consequence of the worst foreseeable events during a launch or reentry. The FAA proposes to use CEC to determine the need for flight abort with a reliable FSS as a hazard control strategy, to set reliability standards for any required FSS, and to determine when to initiate a flight abort. In other words, the more severe the potential consequences from an unplanned event, the more stringent the flight abort requirements.

The current ELV flight abort regulations are essentially a one-size-fits-all approach. In practice, the current requirement in § 417.107(a) requires an FSS for any orbital launch vehicle to prevent hazards from reaching protected areas at all times during flight. Regardless of the individual and collective risks, or the consequences in the case of a catastrophic event, all FSSs must satisfy part 417, subparts D and E, requirements.\45\ These include reliability requirements (0.999 reliable at 95 percent confidence) \46\ and extensive testing requirements. Besides requiring a potentially expensive FSS, the part 417 hazard control approach also has the potential to limit vehicle flight paths unnecessarily, even when those flight paths would produce low public risks and consequences. This preamble will discuss these areas in further detail later.

\45\ Part 417 sets specific FSS requirements covering general command control system requirements, command control system testing, FSS support systems, FSS analysis, and flight safety crew roles and qualifications.

\46\ Section 417.309 requires that each onboard flight termination system and each command control system must have a predicted reliability of 0.999 at the 95 percent confidence level when operating, as well as predicted reliability of 0.999 at the 95 percent confidence for multiple component systems such as the ordnance train to propagate a charge, any safe-and-arm device, and ordinance interrupters and initiators. As these component systems define the reliability of the FSS and approximate the design reliability of the entire flight safety system, for the purpose of the preamble the current requirements are discussed as requiring an FSS to have predicted reliability of 0.999 at a 95 percent confidence level. This will be discussed later in the preamble in further detail.

The FAA also recognizes shortcomings in its current part 431 hazard control approach. Part 431 does not expressly require the use of an FSS to manage hazards. Rather, § 431.35(c) requires a system safety process to identify hazards and assess the risk to public health and safety and the safety of property. The system safety approach has consistently resulted in the use of an FSS as a hazard control strategy. In practice, the FAA has applied part 417 FSS requirements to part 431 to ensure proper reliability and flight abort rules.

Part 417 FSS requirements have proven difficult to scale to different operations. Indeed, the FAA has had to issue numerous waivers to these requirements to accommodate the fast-evolving commercial space industry. The need for waivers has been partially driven by changes to Air Force requirements, which diverged from FAA regulations beginning in 2013.\47\ For example, the FAA has repeatedly waived its requirement to activate an FSS to ensure no debris greater than 3 pounds per square foot (psf) ballistic coefficient \48\ reaches protected areas.\49\ In granting these waivers, the FAA has adopted the conditional risk management approach, noting that the predicted consequence was below a threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ CEC. The FAA has concluded that measuring the consequence from reasonably foreseeable, albeit unlikely, failures is an appropriate metric to assess prudent mitigations of risks to public health and safety and the safety of property.\50\

\47\ The FAA regulations and Air Force requirements regarding flight abort were virtually identical from the time part 417 was promulgated in 2006 until 2013 when the Air Force provided permanent relief from the requirement for impact limit lines to bound where debris with a ballistic coefficient greater than 3 pounds per square foot can impact if the FSS works properly. The Air Force cited an ELOS determination when it issued the permanent relief, stating that the public risk criteria would still apply.

\48\ Ballistic coefficient is a measure of an object's ability to overcome air resistance, and it is defined as the gross weight in pounds divided by the frontal area of the vehicle (in square feet) times the coefficient of drag.

\49\ Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 81 FR 1470, 1470-1472 (January 12, 2016).

\50\ Using consequence as safety criteria in FAA commercial space regulations is not without precedent. Section 431.43(d) sets a limit for foreseeable public consequences in terms of CEC, but only for an unproven RLV. Section 431.43(d) provides that an unproven RLV may only be operated so that during any portion of flight, the expected number of casualties does not exceed 1 x 10-\4\ given assuming a vehicle failure will occur at any time the instantaneous impact point is over a populated area.

The ARC also made recommendations with respect to flight abort and FSS requirements. It recommended the FAA tier the level of rigor for FSSs into three risk categories. In relevant part, ARC members proposed that the lowest risk category not require an FSS, that the medium risk category require streamlined FSS test requirements (e.g., reduce from three to one qualification units) and not require configuration and risk management, and the highest risk category require a Range Commanders Council (RCC) \51\ 319-compliant FSS. It also suggested the highest risk category could use another operational or design approach proven to address concerns of low probability/high consequence event. The ARC only identified risk as a means of scaling FSS requirements and did not recommend specific risk thresholds.\52\

\51\ The Range Commanders Council addresses the common concerns and needs of operational ranges within the United States. It works with other government departments and agencies to establish various technical standards to assist range users.

\52\ ARC Report at p. 12.

In light of the shortcomings identified by the FAA and ARC recommendations, the FAA agrees that the FAA's FSS requirements should be scaled. For that reason, the FAA proposes to use consequence to determine the need for an FSS, the required FSS reliability, and when to activate an FSS.

To determine whether or not an FSS is needed, an operator would be required to calculate CEC in any one second period of flight. The calculation of CEC can range from a straightforward product of the effective casualty area and the population density to a high fidelity analysis.\53\ Proposed § 450.101(c) would require, at a minimum, that an operator compute the effective casualty area and identify the population density that would be impacted for each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in any one-second period of flight in terms of CEC. The casualty area, population density, and predicted consequence for each vehicle response mode are intermediate quantities that are necessary to demonstrate compliance with the individual and collective risk criteria currently, thus these new requirements would not necessarily impart significant additional burden on operators.

\53\ The FAA referenced the need to prevent a high consequence event in its evaluation of a 2016 waiver request, which enabled the first Return to Launch Site (RTLS) mission (Orbcomm-2). Specifically, the FAA noted that the 3 psf ballistic coefficient requirement of § 417.213(d) was intended to (1) capture the current practice of the U.S. Air Force, (2) provide a clear and consistent basis to establish impact limit lines to determine the occurrence of an accident as defined by § 401.5, and (3) help prevent a high consequence to the public given FSS activation. As part of the waiver rationale, the FAA cited the longstanding governing principle applied to launch safety: "to provide for the public safety, the Ranges, using a Range Safety Program, shall ensure that the launch and flight of launch vehicles and payloads present no greater risk to the general public than that imposed by the over-flight of conventional aircraft." (Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range Safety Requirements, Oct. 31, 1997) The waiver rationale also cited an analysis of 30 years of empirical evidence provided by the NTSB that showed that the public safety consequence associated with general aviation accidents is 1 x 10-\2\ expected fatalities. The FAA's analysis demonstrated that the consequence of events that could produce debris outside of the impact limit lines was consistent with the threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ CEC, even with input data corresponding to the worst-case weather conditions. Thus, the FAA concluded that the waiver would not jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of property.

The FAA is proposing to rely on CEC rather than EC to determine whether or not an FSS is needed because FAA believes it is the best approach to implement the ARC's recommendation that the FAA treat high consequence events differently than lower consequence events. As noted earlier, the ARC recommended a three tiered approach--high risk would require a highly reliable FSS, medium risk would require an FSS with more streamlined requirements, and low risk would require no FSS. The FAA's approach of using a consequence analysis instead of a risk analysis would use the same factors as used in a risk analysis, such as casualty area, population density, and predicted consequence for each vehicle response.

Proposed § 450.145 (Flight Safety System), in paragraph (a), would require an operator to employ an FSS with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing if the consequence of any vehicle response mode is 1 x 10-\2\ CEC or greater, consistent with the current FSS requirements in part 417.\54\ If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ CEC, the required design reliability would be relaxed to no lower than 0.975 at 95 percent confidence \55\ with commensurate design, analysis, and testing requirements necessary to support this reliability. If the CEC is less than 1 x 10-\3\, and the individual and collective risk criteria are met, an operator would not be required to have an FSS. The FAA coordinated with NASA and the Department of Defense in the Common Standards Working Group to arrive at this proposal.

\54\ Sections 417.303 and 417.309.

\55\ In statistics, a confidence interval is the range of values that includes the true value at a specified confidence level. A confidence level of 95% is commonly used which means that there is a 95% chance that the true value is encompassed in the interval.

An RCC 319-compliant FSS would only be required for any phase of flight in which the CEC exceeds 1 x 10-\2\. This threshold is consistent with past precedent, FAA waivers, and U.S. Government consensus standards. Other government entities use a consequence threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ to protect against explosive hazards.\56\ This threshold is also rooted in the longstanding and often cited principle that launch and reentry should present no greater risk to the public than that imposed by the over-flight of conventional aircraft. The Air Force, the RCC, and an American National Standard (ANSI/AIAA S-061-1998) 57 58 have identified the public risks posed by conventional aircraft as an important benchmark for the acceptable risks posed by launch vehicles. Like commercial space operations, civil aviation poses an involuntary hazard to the public on the ground. Therefore, the FAA looked to this risk to the public on the ground to derive consequence limits for commercial space activities. The FAA analyzed National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aviation accident data and determined that the average consequences on the ground from all fatal civil aviation accidents are 0.06 casualties and 0.02 fatalities. The average ground fatality of an airline crash is 1, and of a general aviation crash is 0.01.\59\ The proposed threshold appears reasonable given this range of aviation related accident consequences.

\56\ The Department of Defense, NASA, and the FAA use quantity-distance limits originally designed to limit conditional individual risk of fatality to 1 x 10-\2\ from inert debris fragment impacts. They define minimum separation distances between potential sources of high speed fragments (propelled by accidental explosions) and areas with exposed personnel to ensure no more than one hazardous fragment impact per 600 sqft, with the assumption that any exposed person has a vulnerable area of 6 sqft. NASA only permits inhabited buildings at closer distances if proved sufficient to limit hazardous debris to 1/600 sqft, and thus enforces a consequence limit of no more than 1 x 10-\2\ conditional expected fatalities (NASA-STD-8719.12A--2018-05-23, p. 63).

\57\ Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 81 FR 1470 (January 12, 2016), at 1470-1472.

\58\ According to ANSI/AIAA S-061-1998, "during the launch and flight phase of commercial space vehicle operations, the safety risk for the general public should be no more hazardous than that caused by other hazardous human activities (e.g., general aviation over flight)."

\59\ The FAA looked at NTSB data on injuries and fatalities of people on the ground from fatal civil aviation accidents (where an occupant of the aircraft died) for the 30-year period between 1984 and 2013.

The FAA proposes a threshold of 1 x 10-\3\ CEC as a metric for determining the need for any FSS. This is an order of magnitude less than the threshold that determines the need for a highly-reliable FSS, and which is scaled to the reliability of the required FSS. Combined with the individual risk and cumulative risk thresholds, the FAA believes that this proposed threshold would ensure public safety.

The use of a consequence metric is consistent with the ARC comments. The ARC suggested that an FSS with a reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence is appropriate for high consequence, low probability events and a lower reliability could be acceptable under the right circumstances. The FAA notes that the ARC did not identify any threshold values to define "high consequence"; however, the proposal does identify specific quantitative consequence thresholds in terms of CEC. The FAA invites comments on this approach in general, as well as the specific thresholds proposed.

Lastly, proposed § 450.125 (Gate Analysis), in paragraph (c), would limit the predicted average consequence from flight abort resulting from a failure in any one-second period of flight to 1 x 10-\2\ CEC. Flight abort will be discussed in more detail later in the preamble.

B. System Safety Program

B. System Safety Program

Proposed § 450.103 (System Safety Program) would require an operator to implement and document a system safety program throughout the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system that includes at least the following: (1) Safety organization, including a mission director and safety official; (2) procedures to evaluate the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry system to maintain current preliminary safety assessments and any flight hazard analyses; (3) configuration management and control; and (4) post-flight data review. Due to the complexity and variety of vehicle concepts and operations, a system safety program would be necessary to ensure that an operator considers and addresses all risks to public safety.

Currently, parts 415 and 417 have a more prescriptive philosophy of flight safety hazard mitigation. While the requirements ensure safety, they neither provide the flexibility needed to address the diverse and dynamic nature of today's commercial space transportation industry nor address the unique aspects of non-traditional launch and reentry vehicles. For example, except for unguided suborbital launch vehicles, it is virtually impossible for operations that can reach populated areas but that do not use an FSS to comply with parts 415 and 417.

Regulations applicable to reentry and RLVs in part 431 expressly established system safety requirements as a flexible approach to approving a safety process that encompasses design and operation. Section 431.33 sets the requirements for the maintenance and documentation of a safety organization. Specifically, it requires: (1) The identification of lines of communication and approval authority for all mission decisions possibly affecting public safety including internal and external lines of communication with the launch or reentry site to ensure compliance with required plans and procedures; (2) the designation of a person responsible for conducting all licensed RLV mission activities; and (3) designation of a qualified safety official by name, title, and qualifications.

Section 431.35(c) specifically requires the use of a system safety process to identify hazards and assess the risks to public health and safety and the safety of property and to demonstrate compliance with the acceptable risk criteria.\60\ It also incorporates core components of a hazard analysis.

\60\ Section 431.35(c) also fails to provide a detailed description of the composition of a compliant system safety process. This lack of detail has often led to the submission of deficient applications because the applicant failed to demonstrate that the system safety process was adequate to meet public safety requirements and therefore the FAA did not find the application to be complete enough for acceptance. The ARC noted the confusion around the FAA's evaluation of an application's system safety submission and recommended changing the regulation to increase regulatory certainty.

Section 431.35(d) requires several deliverables to demonstrate compliance with acceptable risk criteria and a compliant system safety process. Despite the explicit deliverables, the structure of the regulation has proved to be confusing for applicants. For instance, some system safety analysis element requirements are intermixed with vehicle design element requirements. Similarly, general information requirements such as the identification of hazardous material can be found listed with unrelated requirements such as the description of the RLV. The inclusion of these elements in the section governing system safety has led applicants to produce application deliverables that were scattered and not easily understood by the FAA. Also, some less experienced applicants did not understand that the regulation required a system safety analysis and provided general information and an informal assessment of how that general information may have affected public safety.

The ARC made specific suggestions on the role of system safety in the FAA's safety regulatory scheme. It recommended the FAA use a system safety process at the core of its safety requirements to identify hazards and develop hazard control strategies that are verified by means of an FSA, relevant operational constraints, and means of meeting those constraints. It noted the FAA could provide better detail on its safety requirements. For instance, § 431.35(c) could be expanded to include risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management requirements. It further suggested the FAA incorporate varying levels of rigor that would scale required verification requirements, like test plans and performance results, by vehicle, operator category, and relative risk as a means of scoping requirements to vehicle hazards and potential population exposure. The FAA agrees that the system safety process should form the core of its safety requirements as a means of making the safety requirements more flexible for novel operations and processes.

Proposed § 450.103 lists the minimum components all operators would be required to have in their system safety programs to protect public health and safety and the safety of property. Part 431 established a process-based requirement for a system safety program but did not define its components or a safety standard. This lack of definition has led to many operators establishing system safety programs that are missing components necessary for public safety. This lengthened some applicants' pre-application consultation and the license application evaluation process. The FAA intends to further define the system safety program to lessen the potential for misunderstandings between applicants and the FAA. This proposal should allow potential operators to design system safety programs that better address public safety concerns prior to license application submittal. 1. Safety Organization

Proposed § 450.103(a) would require an operator to maintain and document a safety organization with clearly defined lines of communication and approval authority for all public safety decisions. This safety organization would include at least two positions, referred to as a mission director and a safety official. The mission director would be responsible for the safe conduct of all licensed activities and authorized to provide final approval to proceed with licensed activities. The safety official \61\ would be required to communicate potential safety and non-compliance matters to the mission director during flight and ground operations. The safety official would also be authorized to examine all aspects of an operator's ground safety and flight safety operations. It is common practice in any safety organization, including those within the commercial space industry, to establish who will be responsible for ensuring safety and to have clear processes for communicating safety concerns effectively throughout the organization.

\61\ In 1999, the FAA added the requirement for a safety official possessing authority to examine launch safety operations and to monitor independently personnel compliance with safety policies and procedures. The FAA stated in the preamble to the final rule that the person responsible for safety should have the ability to perform independently of those parts of the applicant's organization responsible for mission assurance. 64 FR 19604 (April 21, 1999).

This proposal would allow for one person, or several, to perform the safety official's functions. Unlike current regulations, an operator would not have to name a specific safety official in its license application. Instead, an operator would be required to designate a position to accomplish the necessary tasks of a safety official. The FAA seeks comment on this approach, and whether it provides an appropriate level of flexibility to industry.

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