Radar Vectors
Proposed Rule Proposed Issued Apr 15, 2019 149 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

84 FR 15296 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements

This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.

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2. Property Protection (Critical Assets)

\50\ Using consequence as safety criteria in FAA commercial space regulations is not without precedent. Section 431.43(d) sets a limit for foreseeable public consequences in terms of CEC, but only for an unproven RLV. Section 431.43(d) provides that an unproven RLV may only be operated so that during any portion of flight, the expected number of casualties does not exceed 1 x 10-\4\ given assuming a vehicle failure will occur at any time the instantaneous impact point is over a populated area.

The ARC also made recommendations with respect to flight abort and FSS requirements. It recommended the FAA tier the level of rigor for FSSs into three risk categories. In relevant part, ARC members proposed that the lowest risk category not require an FSS, that the medium risk category require streamlined FSS test requirements (e.g., reduce from three to one qualification units) and not require configuration and risk management, and the highest risk category require a Range Commanders Council (RCC) \51\ 319-compliant FSS. It also suggested the highest risk category could use another operational or design approach proven to address concerns of low probability/high consequence event. The ARC only identified risk as a means of scaling FSS requirements and did not recommend specific risk thresholds.\52\

\51\ The Range Commanders Council addresses the common concerns and needs of operational ranges within the United States. It works with other government departments and agencies to establish various technical standards to assist range users.

\52\ ARC Report at p. 12.

In light of the shortcomings identified by the FAA and ARC recommendations, the FAA agrees that the FAA's FSS requirements should be scaled. For that reason, the FAA proposes to use consequence to determine the need for an FSS, the required FSS reliability, and when to activate an FSS.

To determine whether or not an FSS is needed, an operator would be required to calculate CEC in any one second period of flight. The calculation of CEC can range from a straightforward product of the effective casualty area and the population density to a high fidelity analysis.\53\ Proposed § 450.101(c) would require, at a minimum, that an operator compute the effective casualty area and identify the population density that would be impacted for each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in any one-second period of flight in terms of CEC. The casualty area, population density, and predicted consequence for each vehicle response mode are intermediate quantities that are necessary to demonstrate compliance with the individual and collective risk criteria currently, thus these new requirements would not necessarily impart significant additional burden on operators.

\53\ The FAA referenced the need to prevent a high consequence event in its evaluation of a 2016 waiver request, which enabled the first Return to Launch Site (RTLS) mission (Orbcomm-2). Specifically, the FAA noted that the 3 psf ballistic coefficient requirement of § 417.213(d) was intended to (1) capture the current practice of the U.S. Air Force, (2) provide a clear and consistent basis to establish impact limit lines to determine the occurrence of an accident as defined by § 401.5, and (3) help prevent a high consequence to the public given FSS activation. As part of the waiver rationale, the FAA cited the longstanding governing principle applied to launch safety: "to provide for the public safety, the Ranges, using a Range Safety Program, shall ensure that the launch and flight of launch vehicles and payloads present no greater risk to the general public than that imposed by the over-flight of conventional aircraft." (Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range Safety Requirements, Oct. 31, 1997) The waiver rationale also cited an analysis of 30 years of empirical evidence provided by the NTSB that showed that the public safety consequence associated with general aviation accidents is 1 x 10-\2\ expected fatalities. The FAA's analysis demonstrated that the consequence of events that could produce debris outside of the impact limit lines was consistent with the threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ CEC, even with input data corresponding to the worst-case weather conditions. Thus, the FAA concluded that the waiver would not jeopardize public health and safety or the safety of property.

The FAA is proposing to rely on CEC rather than EC to determine whether or not an FSS is needed because FAA believes it is the best approach to implement the ARC's recommendation that the FAA treat high consequence events differently than lower consequence events. As noted earlier, the ARC recommended a three tiered approach--high risk would require a highly reliable FSS, medium risk would require an FSS with more streamlined requirements, and low risk would require no FSS. The FAA's approach of using a consequence analysis instead of a risk analysis would use the same factors as used in a risk analysis, such as casualty area, population density, and predicted consequence for each vehicle response.

Proposed § 450.145 (Flight Safety System), in paragraph (a), would require an operator to employ an FSS with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing if the consequence of any vehicle response mode is 1 x 10-\2\ CEC or greater, consistent with the current FSS requirements in part 417.\54\ If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ CEC, the required design reliability would be relaxed to no lower than 0.975 at 95 percent confidence \55\ with commensurate design, analysis, and testing requirements necessary to support this reliability. If the CEC is less than 1 x 10-\3\, and the individual and collective risk criteria are met, an operator would not be required to have an FSS. The FAA coordinated with NASA and the Department of Defense in the Common Standards Working Group to arrive at this proposal.

\54\ Sections 417.303 and 417.309.

\55\ In statistics, a confidence interval is the range of values that includes the true value at a specified confidence level. A confidence level of 95% is commonly used which means that there is a 95% chance that the true value is encompassed in the interval.

An RCC 319-compliant FSS would only be required for any phase of flight in which the CEC exceeds 1 x 10-\2\. This threshold is consistent with past precedent, FAA waivers, and U.S. Government consensus standards. Other government entities use a consequence threshold of 1 x 10-\2\ to protect against explosive hazards.\56\ This threshold is also rooted in the longstanding and often cited principle that launch and reentry should present no greater risk to the public than that imposed by the over-flight of conventional aircraft. The Air Force, the RCC, and an American National Standard (ANSI/AIAA S-061-1998) 57 58 have identified the public risks posed by conventional aircraft as an important benchmark for the acceptable risks posed by launch vehicles. Like commercial space operations, civil aviation poses an involuntary hazard to the public on the ground. Therefore, the FAA looked to this risk to the public on the ground to derive consequence limits for commercial space activities. The FAA analyzed National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aviation accident data and determined that the average consequences on the ground from all fatal civil aviation accidents are 0.06 casualties and 0.02 fatalities. The average ground fatality of an airline crash is 1, and of a general aviation crash is 0.01.\59\ The proposed threshold appears reasonable given this range of aviation related accident consequences.

\56\ The Department of Defense, NASA, and the FAA use quantity-distance limits originally designed to limit conditional individual risk of fatality to 1 x 10-\2\ from inert debris fragment impacts. They define minimum separation distances between potential sources of high speed fragments (propelled by accidental explosions) and areas with exposed personnel to ensure no more than one hazardous fragment impact per 600 sqft, with the assumption that any exposed person has a vulnerable area of 6 sqft. NASA only permits inhabited buildings at closer distances if proved sufficient to limit hazardous debris to 1/600 sqft, and thus enforces a consequence limit of no more than 1 x 10-\2\ conditional expected fatalities (NASA-STD-8719.12A--2018-05-23, p. 63).

\57\ Waiver of Debris Containment Requirements for Launch. 81 FR 1470 (January 12, 2016), at 1470-1472.

\58\ According to ANSI/AIAA S-061-1998, "during the launch and flight phase of commercial space vehicle operations, the safety risk for the general public should be no more hazardous than that caused by other hazardous human activities (e.g., general aviation over flight)."

\59\ The FAA looked at NTSB data on injuries and fatalities of people on the ground from fatal civil aviation accidents (where an occupant of the aircraft died) for the 30-year period between 1984 and 2013.

The FAA proposes a threshold of 1 x 10-\3\ CEC as a metric for determining the need for any FSS. This is an order of magnitude less than the threshold that determines the need for a highly-reliable FSS, and which is scaled to the reliability of the required FSS. Combined with the individual risk and cumulative risk thresholds, the FAA believes that this proposed threshold would ensure public safety.

The use of a consequence metric is consistent with the ARC comments. The ARC suggested that an FSS with a reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence is appropriate for high consequence, low probability events and a lower reliability could be acceptable under the right circumstances. The FAA notes that the ARC did not identify any threshold values to define "high consequence"; however, the proposal does identify specific quantitative consequence thresholds in terms of CEC. The FAA invites comments on this approach in general, as well as the specific thresholds proposed.

Lastly, proposed § 450.125 (Gate Analysis), in paragraph (c), would limit the predicted average consequence from flight abort resulting from a failure in any one-second period of flight to 1 x 10-\2\ CEC. Flight abort will be discussed in more detail later in the preamble.

B. System Safety Program

B. System Safety Program

Proposed § 450.103 (System Safety Program) would require an operator to implement and document a system safety program throughout the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system that includes at least the following: (1) Safety organization, including a mission director and safety official; (2) procedures to evaluate the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry system to maintain current preliminary safety assessments and any flight hazard analyses; (3) configuration management and control; and (4) post-flight data review. Due to the complexity and variety of vehicle concepts and operations, a system safety program would be necessary to ensure that an operator considers and addresses all risks to public safety.

Currently, parts 415 and 417 have a more prescriptive philosophy of flight safety hazard mitigation. While the requirements ensure safety, they neither provide the flexibility needed to address the diverse and dynamic nature of today's commercial space transportation industry nor address the unique aspects of non-traditional launch and reentry vehicles. For example, except for unguided suborbital launch vehicles, it is virtually impossible for operations that can reach populated areas but that do not use an FSS to comply with parts 415 and 417.

Regulations applicable to reentry and RLVs in part 431 expressly established system safety requirements as a flexible approach to approving a safety process that encompasses design and operation. Section 431.33 sets the requirements for the maintenance and documentation of a safety organization. Specifically, it requires: (1) The identification of lines of communication and approval authority for all mission decisions possibly affecting public safety including internal and external lines of communication with the launch or reentry site to ensure compliance with required plans and procedures; (2) the designation of a person responsible for conducting all licensed RLV mission activities; and (3) designation of a qualified safety official by name, title, and qualifications.

Section 431.35(c) specifically requires the use of a system safety process to identify hazards and assess the risks to public health and safety and the safety of property and to demonstrate compliance with the acceptable risk criteria.\60\ It also incorporates core components of a hazard analysis.

\60\ Section 431.35(c) also fails to provide a detailed description of the composition of a compliant system safety process. This lack of detail has often led to the submission of deficient applications because the applicant failed to demonstrate that the system safety process was adequate to meet public safety requirements and therefore the FAA did not find the application to be complete enough for acceptance. The ARC noted the confusion around the FAA's evaluation of an application's system safety submission and recommended changing the regulation to increase regulatory certainty.

Section 431.35(d) requires several deliverables to demonstrate compliance with acceptable risk criteria and a compliant system safety process. Despite the explicit deliverables, the structure of the regulation has proved to be confusing for applicants. For instance, some system safety analysis element requirements are intermixed with vehicle design element requirements. Similarly, general information requirements such as the identification of hazardous material can be found listed with unrelated requirements such as the description of the RLV. The inclusion of these elements in the section governing system safety has led applicants to produce application deliverables that were scattered and not easily understood by the FAA. Also, some less experienced applicants did not understand that the regulation required a system safety analysis and provided general information and an informal assessment of how that general information may have affected public safety.

The ARC made specific suggestions on the role of system safety in the FAA's safety regulatory scheme. It recommended the FAA use a system safety process at the core of its safety requirements to identify hazards and develop hazard control strategies that are verified by means of an FSA, relevant operational constraints, and means of meeting those constraints. It noted the FAA could provide better detail on its safety requirements. For instance, § 431.35(c) could be expanded to include risk-informed decision making and continuous risk management requirements. It further suggested the FAA incorporate varying levels of rigor that would scale required verification requirements, like test plans and performance results, by vehicle, operator category, and relative risk as a means of scoping requirements to vehicle hazards and potential population exposure. The FAA agrees that the system safety process should form the core of its safety requirements as a means of making the safety requirements more flexible for novel operations and processes.

Proposed § 450.103 lists the minimum components all operators would be required to have in their system safety programs to protect public health and safety and the safety of property. Part 431 established a process-based requirement for a system safety program but did not define its components or a safety standard. This lack of definition has led to many operators establishing system safety programs that are missing components necessary for public safety. This lengthened some applicants' pre-application consultation and the license application evaluation process. The FAA intends to further define the system safety program to lessen the potential for misunderstandings between applicants and the FAA. This proposal should allow potential operators to design system safety programs that better address public safety concerns prior to license application submittal. 1. Safety Organization

Proposed § 450.103(a) would require an operator to maintain and document a safety organization with clearly defined lines of communication and approval authority for all public safety decisions. This safety organization would include at least two positions, referred to as a mission director and a safety official. The mission director would be responsible for the safe conduct of all licensed activities and authorized to provide final approval to proceed with licensed activities. The safety official \61\ would be required to communicate potential safety and non-compliance matters to the mission director during flight and ground operations. The safety official would also be authorized to examine all aspects of an operator's ground safety and flight safety operations. It is common practice in any safety organization, including those within the commercial space industry, to establish who will be responsible for ensuring safety and to have clear processes for communicating safety concerns effectively throughout the organization.

\61\ In 1999, the FAA added the requirement for a safety official possessing authority to examine launch safety operations and to monitor independently personnel compliance with safety policies and procedures. The FAA stated in the preamble to the final rule that the person responsible for safety should have the ability to perform independently of those parts of the applicant's organization responsible for mission assurance. 64 FR 19604 (April 21, 1999).

This proposal would allow for one person, or several, to perform the safety official's functions. Unlike current regulations, an operator would not have to name a specific safety official in its license application. Instead, an operator would be required to designate a position to accomplish the necessary tasks of a safety official. The FAA seeks comment on this approach, and whether it provides an appropriate level of flexibility to industry.

Many operators have complained about the burden of naming a specific safety official in a license application. One challenge is that, in many cases, an operator applies for a license before selecting a safety official. As such, many operators must submit a modification of their application once they have chosen a safety official. Another issue is that operators that conduct activities at a frequent rate must employ several persons that serve as safety officials to keep pace with their operations. These persons may serve as safety officials on several different types of operations on multiple licenses. Therefore, the operator must frequently submit license application modifications every time it selects a new person to serve in that capacity. An operator is further burdened when safety officials leave the launch operator's organization or assume a new role within the organization that would prohibit them from serving as a safety official. The FAA believes a safety organization that includes a safety official is essential to public safety; however, identifying that individual by name is not necessary.

Under the proposal, the operator would still be required to designate a safety official for any licensed activity prior to the start of that activity. The FAA has previously noted that licensed ground operations have commenced without designating a safety official. Many applicants mistakenly assumed the safety official was only necessary for flight operations. These operators conducted preflight ground operations in advance of flight without a safety official monitoring the operation. This proposal would require a safety official for all licensed operations to independently monitor licensed activity to ensure compliance with the operator's safety policies. Additionally, the safety official would report directly to the mission director. The absence of a safety official could result in a lack of independent safety oversight and a potential for a break down in communications of important safety-related information. The FAA would continue to inspect licensed operations to ensure that a safety official is in place throughout the course of the licensed activity. 2. Procedures

Proposed § 450.103(b) would require that an operator establish procedures to evaluate hazards throughout the complete operational lifecycle of a program. This is important because design and operational changes to a system can have an impact on public safety. This proposed requirement was implied in § 431.35(c) but was not explicitly stated. Specifically, § 450.103(b) would require the operator to implement a process to update the preliminary safety assessment and any flight hazard analysis to reflect the knowledge gained during the lifecycle of the system. To accomplish this, an operator would be required to establish methods to review and assess the validity of the preliminary safety assessment and any flight hazard analysis throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. An operator would also need to have methods for updating the assessment or analysis, and to communicate the updates throughout its organization. For any flight hazard analysis, an operator would also have to have a process for tracking hazards, risks, mitigation and hazard control measures, and verification activities. 3. Configuration Management and Control

Proposed § 450.103(c) would lay out configuration management and control requirements. The FAA has chosen to consolidate configuration management and control requirements within the system safety program requirements. Requirements addressing configuration control were previously scattered throughout the regulations, including in Sec. § 417.111(e), 417.123(e)(2), 417.303(e), and 417.407(c). Operators frequently make changes to their vehicles, such as new manufacturing techniques for a component or changes to the materials on key structures. Operators may also make operational changes such as new analysis techniques, automating processes that were previously conducted by personnel, or changing the surveillance techniques in hazard areas. These types of changes can have significant impacts on public safety.

This proposal would require an operator to track configurations of all safety-critical systems and documentation, ensure the correct and appropriate versions of the systems and documentation are used, and maintain records of system configurations and versions used for each licensed activity. The FAA expects that an operator would design configuration management and control into its operations. The FAA also expects that an operator would provide the capability to both alert responsible individuals when key documentation must be updated and ensure that all stakeholders--internal and external to the launch operator's organization--are using current and accurate information. 4. Post-Flight Data Review

Proposed § 450.103(d) would require that an applicant conduct a post-flight data review. The proposed requirements in § 450.103(d) are not explicitly contained in part 415, 417 or 431. However, it is industry practice to review post-flight data to address vehicle reliability and mission success, so any added burden from proposed § 450.103(d) would be minimal. Operator review of post-flight data provides valuable safety information on future operations, particularly the identification of anomalies. At a minimum, proposed § 450.103(d)(1) would require that an operator employ a process for evaluating post-flight data to ensure consistency between the assumptions used for the preliminary safety assessment, any flight hazard or flight safety analysis, and associated mitigation and hazard control measures.

Proposed § 450.103(d)(2) would require that an operator resolve any inconsistencies identified in proposed § 450.103(d)(1) prior to the next flight of the vehicle. The FAA expects that the operator would address any inconsistencies by updating analyses using the best available data for the upcoming mission, or documenting the rationale explaining how changes to the data inputs would not have an impact on the results of the analysis for a proposed mission. The FAA would add this requirement to ensure that the operator makes all appropriate updates to the analysis identifying all public safety impacts in order to avoid inconsistencies in future missions that could jeopardize public safety.

Proposed § 450.103(d)(3) would require that an operator identify any anomaly that may impact the flight hazard analysis, flight safety analysis, safety critical system, or is otherwise material to public safety and safety of property. An examination and understanding of launch or reentry vehicle system and subsystem anomalies throughout the lifecycle of the vehicle system can alert an operator of an impending mishap. An operator should review post-flight data to identify unexpected issues or critical systems that are operating outside of predicted limits. Flight safety systems are examples of safety-critical systems that could jeopardize public safety if they do not perform nominally.

Proposed § 450.103(d)(4) would require an operator to address any anomaly identified in proposed § 450.103(d)(3). Prior to the next flight, an operator would be required to address each anomaly by, at a minimum, updating any flight hazard analysis, flight safety analysis, or safety critical system.

The FAA seeks comment on whether proposed § 450.103(d) would change an operator's approach to reviewing post-flight data. 5. Application Requirements

Proposed § 450.103(e) would set the system safety program application requirements. An applicant would be required to provide a summary of how it plans to satisfy the system safety program requirements. It is currently common practice for applicants to provide the FAA with a system safety program plan or documents containing the necessary information to determine compliance with the system safety program requirements in § 431.35(c). A system safety program plan that covers the elements in § 450.103(e) would satisfy the proposed application requirements. The FAA also recommends an applicant consult with the FAA during the development of its system safety program prior to implementation.

With respect to the safety organization, an applicant would be required to describe the applicant's safety organization, identifying the applicant's lines of communication and approval authority, both internally and externally, for all public safety decisions and the provision of public safety services. In the past, many applicants have chosen to provide an organization chart depicting the safety organization. The FAA encourages the continuation of this practice. However, the applicant would be required to provide a sufficient narrative describing the organization, particularly the lines of communication. For example, if an engineer in the safety organization becomes aware of a hazard, the applicant should describe how that engineer would communicate that hazard to the safety official.

An applicant would also be required to provide a summary of the processes and products identified in the system safety program requirements. The FAA expects that processes would be scalable based on the size of the operation or the potential public safety impacts of the proposed operation. For example, an applicant with a dozen employees and a relatively small launch or reentry vehicle may use meetings or less formal ways to develop its preliminary hazard list. However, an applicant with a larger vehicle operating from multiple sites and hundreds of employees would need a more formal means of tracking information and developing the required analyses.

C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight

C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight

Under proposed § 450.105 (Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight), every operator would be required to conduct and document a preliminary safety assessment (PSA) for the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. The PSA would identify operation-specific information relevant to public safety and would help the operator scope the analyses that must be conducted to ensure that the operation satisfies the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. An operator could use the knowledge obtained from the PSA to identify the effect of design and operational decisions on public safety and thus determine potential hazard control strategies. The products of the PSA are consistent with products that are currently produced for preliminary flight safety analyses and preliminary system safety analyses. The PSA will allow operators to quickly identify and demonstrate the hazard control strategy appropriate for their proposed operation.

The FAA intends the PSA to be a top-level assessment of the potential public safety impacts identifiable early in the design process. This assessment should be broad enough that minor changes in vehicle design or operations would not have a significant impact on, or invalidate the products produced by, the PSA. At the same time, the PSA should be detailed enough to identify the public safety and hazard control implications associated with key design trade studies. The FAA recommends that an operator perform an initial PSA at the outset of the design phase of a proposed operation. Thereafter, the operator should update the assessment as needed in accordance with the launch operator's established procedures to evaluate the complete operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The results of the PSA would provide the operator with an appropriate hazard control strategy for its proposed operation.\62\

\62\ As mentioned previously and discussed in greater detail in the next section, traditional hazard controls include physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort.

Under proposed § 450.105(a), an acceptable PSA would identify at least the following key elements: (1) The vehicle response modes; (2) the types of hazards associated with the vehicle response modes; (3) the geographical area where the public may be exposed to a hazard; (4) the population of the public exposed to the hazard; (5) the CEC; (6) a preliminary hazard list which documents all causes of vehicle response modes that, excluding mitigation, have the capability to create a hazard to the public; (7) safety-critical systems; and (8) the timeline identifying all safety critical events. The FAA expects that an operator would use many of these PSA elements in subsequent analyses. For instance, population data, vehicle response modes, and the associated effects are part of a valid quantitative risk analysis. These items could also be useful for a flight hazard analysis.

A vehicle response mode is a mutually exclusive scenario that characterizes foreseeable combinations of vehicle trajectory and debris generation. Examples include on-trajectory explosion, on-trajectory loss of thrust, and tumble turns. The types of hazards associated with any vehicle response mode can include inert and explosive debris, overpressure, and toxics. By understanding the potential vehicle response modes and the hazards associated with those vehicle response modes, an operator can then determine the geographical areas where the public may be exposed to a hazard. This information, along with the population of the public exposed to the hazard, would allow an operator to begin to characterize the potential risk during any particular phase of flight. Calculating CEC as discussed earlier, is important to understand the need for an FSS and its required reliability. All of these elements, which comprise § 450.105(a)(1) through (5), are important to develop hazard control strategies.

Proposed § 450.105(a)(6) would require an operator to produce a preliminary hazard list. The operator would be required to review the operation to determine what hazards exist in order to generate the preliminary hazard list. This assessment is different from the quantitative risk analysis and is meant to give an operator an understanding of how public safety is affected at the subsystem or component level of the operation. An operator should use common system safety tools such as Fault Trees, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA), safety panels, and engineering judgement to develop the preliminary hazard list.

An operator should describe hazards in terms that identify each potential source of harm, the mechanism by which the harm may be caused, and the potential outcome if the harm were to remain unaddressed.\63\ The operator should ensure that the hazard is described in enough detail so that the safety critical personnel within the operator's organization would be able to review the hazard and easily ascertain the source, mechanism, and the public safety-related outcome of the hazard. In developing the preliminary hazard list, an operator would not be required to assess the risk associated with each hazard or potential mitigation measures. These items would be determined in the flight hazard analysis, if required, as discussed in the "Flight Hazard Analysis" section of this preamble.

\63\ For example, a potential source of harm could be a leak in a rocket engine fuel system line caused by a manufacturing defect, overpressure, or improper installation. The mechanism for harm could be a fire resulting from that leak. The outcome could be loss of the vehicle with impact on population.

When developing the preliminary hazard list, the operator would also be required to address items that are not specific to the vehicle hardware but necessary for the launch or reentry system. These items would include things like human factors, training, and other operational concerns.

The FAA believes the preliminary hazard list is critical as the regulatory approach changes from narrowly prescribed methods to performance-based standards that focus on the applicant demonstrating safety through system safety management and engineering. As the industry moves toward to a more performance-based regime, there is a growing need for operators to produce the analyses specific to their unique operations in order to ensure public safety and detail the appropriate hazard mitigation strategies for their proposed operation. Additionally, an operator that makes changes to its operation could potentially move from a regulatory pathway that does not require a hazard analysis to one that does. The existence of a preliminary hazard list should alleviate some of the existing burdens on operators by requiring only those analyses necessary to ensure the safety of a particular operation.

It would also more quickly facilitate analyses demonstrating public safety, thus creating the potential for operational changes closer to flight of the vehicle. For example, consider an operation where a flight hazard analysis was unnecessary because of the use of an FSS under proposed § 450.145(a)(1). In that case, a change in FSS design, testing or qualification, or disabling the abort system during some phases of flight, could result in the need for a flight hazard analysis. Because the operator would be required to generate a preliminary hazard list, it would already have the initial step of the flight hazard analysis completed, excluding any impacts of the change. The operator would then be required to complete the final steps of the hazard analysis to complete its safety documentation.

Proposed § 450.105(a)(7) would require an operator to identify safety-critical systems. A safety critical system would be a system that is essential to safe performance or operation. A safety-critical system, subsystem, component, condition, event, operation, process, or item, is one whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance, is essential to ensuring public safety. It is important for an operator to clearly identify safety critical systems because many requirements in proposed part 450 relate to these systems.

Proposed § 450.105(a)(8) would require an operator to identify a timeline identifying all safety critical events. This timeline is important to identify the potential public safety consequences during any particular phase of flight.

Proposed § 450.105(b) would set the PSA application requirements. The applicant would be required to provide the results of the preliminary safety assessment in its application. The applicant would be required to provide information for every requirement listed under § 450.105(a). These application requirements are consistent with those currently in part 431. Although these specific system safety requirements would be new for ELV operators, the FAA does not expect they would add a substantial burden given that part 417 operators were performing similar work, albeit not under the system management umbrella. ELV operators must already identify vehicle failure modes; debris, toxics, distant-focusing overpressure, and other hazards; geographical containment and overflight trajectories; consequences that determine flight limits; and all safety critical systems and events. The PSA codifies these concerns as primary to safety and the development of hazard control strategies and requires all vehicle operators to document such considerations.

Development of the PSA would allow the operator to determine whether they must perform a flight hazard analysis. The operator would be required to assess each phase of flight to determine how public safety hazards are mitigated. If there is a phase of flight where all identified public safety hazards are not mitigated using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, the operator would be required to perform a flight hazard analysis, discussed later in this preamble, for that particular phase of flight.

D. Hazard Control Strategy

D. Hazard Control Strategy

Proposed § 450.107 (Hazard Control Strategies) would provide options for hazard control strategies that an operator could use to meet the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101 for each phase of a launch or reentry vehicle's flight. An operator could use physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort and would not be required to conduct a flight hazard analysis. Alternatively, an operator could conduct a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls. As part of its application, an operator would be required to identify the selected hazard control strategy for each phase of flight.

The use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls provides the most flexibility of any of the hazard control strategies. The ARC recommended this approach and stated that the system safety process should be used to identify hazards and develop control strategies, which would then be verified by means of flight safety analysis and relevant operational constraints and means of meeting those constraints.\64\ In certain circumstances, however, historical methods may also provide an acceptable level of safety. If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment can be mitigated adequately to meet the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort with a highly reliable FSS, an operator would not need to conduct a flight hazard analysis for that phase of flight. This proposal is different than current regulations, where the option of conducting a hazard analysis to derive hazard controls is only available to reusable launch vehicles. Under proposed part 450, the option to use a flight hazard analysis would not rest on whether a vehicle is expendable or reusable.

\64\ ARC Report at p. 10.

Under proposed § 450.107(b), an operator could use physical containment to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 when an operator's launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach an area where it exposes the public or critical assets to a hazard. These launches can take place from any launch site, depending on the size of the launch vehicle, the expected trajectory, and other factors. The more remote a launch site is, the greater its capacity to accommodate a launch using physical containment.

This approach is consistent with current practice because the FAA has always accepted a demonstration of physical containment as a means of satisfying risk requirements. The use of physical containment as a hazard control strategy is the easiest way to meet the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 and may, in a remote location, involve a simple showing that the maximum distance vehicle hazards can reach defines an area that is unpopulated and does not contain any critical assets. Because physical containment precludes the need for an FSS, an operator would not be required to meet any requirements relevant to an FSS. If an operator shows its vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any of its associated hazards to reach outside the flight hazard area, the operator would not have to perform a flight hazard analysis. Further, many other requirements would be either not applicable or easily met. Because physical containment may also involve visitor control, wind constraints, real-time toxic analysis, and other mitigation measures, the FAA would require an operator to apply other mitigation measures to ensure no public exposure to hazards, as agreed to by the Administrator on a case-by-case basis.

Under proposed § 450.107(c), an operator could use wind weighting to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 when an operator uses launcher elevation and azimuth settings to correct for wind effects that an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, typically called a sounding rocket, would experience during flight. Due to its relative simplicity and effectiveness, wind weighting has historically been used by NASA, the Department of Defense, and commercial operators as the primary method to ensure public safety for the launch of a sounding rocket. This approach is currently codified in part 417. Under part 431, an operator can use wind weighting as an acceptable hazard mitigation measure determined through the system safety process. Under proposed part 450, an operator launching a sounding rocket could use wind weighting or it could propose other hazard controls in its application through a flight hazard analysis. The specific wind weighting requirements are discussed in the "Additional Technical Justification and Rationale" section.

Under proposed § 450.107(d), an operator could use flight abort to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 when an operator limits or restricts the hazards to the public or critical assets presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight, when necessary. This is discussed in more detail in the "Flight Abort" section.

If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment cannot be mitigated adequately to meet the public risk criteria of proposed § 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, an operator would be required to conduct a flight hazard analysis in accordance with proposed § 450.109 (Flight Hazard Analysis) to derive hazard controls for that phase of flight. The use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls is the primary approach used in current parts 431, 435, and 437. The FAA has previously required the use of a flight hazard analysis for reentry, for the captive carry portion of an air-launched vehicle, and for piloted suborbital vehicles. A detailed discussion of flight hazard analysis is included later in this preamble.

In its application, an applicant would be required to describe its hazard control strategy for each phase of flight. An applicant may elect to use different hazard control strategies for different phases of flight, depending on risks associated with those phases. For example, an applicant using an air-launched system might use a flight hazard analysis during the captive carry phase of flight, and flight abort during the rocket-powered phase of flight. Additionally, if using physical containment as a hazard control strategy, an applicant would be required to demonstrate that the launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach outside the flight hazard area. The applicant would also be required to describe the methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas are cleared of the public and critical assets.

E. Flight Abort

E. Flight Abort

As discussed earlier, flight abort is a hazard control strategy to limit or restrict the hazards to the public or critical assets presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight. Flight abort is a controlled ending to vehicle flight and is initiated by an operator when ending flight poses less risk to public safety and the safety of property than continued flight without a safety intervention. Flight abort is the primary hazard control strategy used today for orbital expendable launch vehicles under part 417, and under Air Force and NASA launch range requirements.

The FAA proposes to require this approach, with a reliable FSS, only when certain conditional risks are present. Specifically, proposed § 450.101(c) would require an operator to use flight abort with an FSS that meets the requirements of § 450.145 as a hazard control strategy if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-3 conditional expected casualties for uncontrolled areas.\65\ The basis for this number is discussed in the "Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight Safety System" section. Under this test, a typical orbital launch from the Air Force Eastern and Western ranges would require an FSS capable of initiating flight abort. Small orbital launch vehicles launched from more remote locations, however, would not normally be required to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy. The FAA seeks comment on this approach.

\65\ The proposed requirement to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy is less restrictive than § 417.107(a), which requires a launch operator to use an FSS in the vicinity of the launch site if any hazard from a launch vehicle, vehicle component, or payload can reach any protected area at any time during flight, or if a failure of the launch vehicle would have a high consequence to the public.

To implement flight abort as a hazard control strategy, an operator would establish flight safety limits and gates in accordance with proposed Sec. § 450.123 (Flight Safety Limits Analysis) and 450.125, establish flight abort rules in accordance with § 450.165 (Flight Safety Rules), and employ an FSS in accordance with § 450.145 and software in accordance with § 450.111.

Flight abort as a hazard control strategy can be used by an operator, even if it is not required under § 450.101(c), as a hazard mitigation measure derived from the flight hazard analysis. For example, a piloted vehicle with low conditional expected casualty during powered flight may use an FSS in combination with other measures, such as propellant dumping, to keep vehicle hazards from reaching a populated area. 1. Flight Safety Limits and Uncontrolled Areas

An operator would have to identify the location of uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define when an operator must initiate flight abort to:

• Prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission, and

• Ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of § 450.101.

The FAA would define debris capable of causing a casualty with kinetic energy or other thresholds as will be discussed later. The public safety criteria that would go into determining flight safety limits would be collective risk, individual risk, risk to critical assets, and conditional risk. An uncontrolled area would be an area of land not controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator, or other entity by agreement. Under current regulations, these areas are referred to as "protected areas." Importantly, as discussed earlier, the conditional risk criteria would not apply to controlled areas, which are areas that are controlled by any of the entities listed earlier, because by exercising control over these areas the entity would have a greater ability to ensure that catastrophic risk is mitigated by other means.

In addition to establishing flight safety limits, an operator would establish gates, if the vehicle would need to overfly a landmass during its flight. A gate is an opening in a flight safety limit through which a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined conditions such that the vehicle performance indicates an ability to continue safe flight. If the vehicle fails to meet the required conditions to pass a gate, then flight abort would occur at the flight safety limit. In other words, the gate would be closed.

Flight safety limits and gates are discussed in greater detail later in this preamble. 2. Flight Abort Rules

An operator would identify the conditions under which the FSS, including the functions of any flight abort crew, must abort the flight to ensure compliance with § 450.101. An operator would be required to abort a flight if a flight safety limit is violated, or if some condition exists that could lead to a violation, such as a compromised FSS or loss of data.

Flight abort rules are discussed in greater detail later in this preamble. 3. Flight Safety System

To enable flight abort, an operator must use an FSS. An FSS is an integral part of positive control of a launch or reentry vehicle because it allows an operator to destroy the vehicle, terminate thrust, or otherwise achieve flight abort to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property presented by a vehicle while in flight. Traditional FSSs are comprised of an onboard flight termination system, a ground-based command and control system, and tracking and telemetry systems. Historically, the flight safety crew monitoring the course of a vehicle would send a command to the vehicle to terminate flight if the vehicle violated a flight abort rule. Recently, operators are favoring autonomous FSSs, negating the need for a ground-based command and control system or flight abort crew.

As discussed earlier, the CEC would establish whether an FSS is required, and if so, its reliability.

• If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is 1 x 10-2 conditional expected casualties or greater for uncontrolled areas, an operator would be required to employ an FSS with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing; or

• If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is between 1 x 10-2 and 1 x 10-3, an operator would be required to employ an FSS with a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing.

Note that if the consequence of any vehicle response mode is less than 1 x 10-3, the FAA would not require an FSS or mandate its reliability if an operator chooses to use one.

Unlike part 417, the FAA would not propose specific design or testing requirements for an FSS. Instead, the FAA would accept specified government or industry standards as meeting the FSS reliability requirements. At this time, only one government standard would meet the requirement for a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing, and that is RCC 319.\66\

\66\ RCC 319 can be found at http://www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Documents/319-14_Flight_Termination_Systems_Commonality_Standard/RCC_319-14_FTS_Commonality.pdf.

The FSS requirements codified in part 417, including component performance requirements and acceptance and qualification testing, were originally written to align FAA launch licensing requirements with the Federal launch range standards in RCC 319. Like part 417, RCC 319 requires qualification tests to demonstrate reliable operation in environments exceeding the expected operating environment for the system components, acceptance tests to demonstrate that the selected batch of components meets the requirements of the design specifications, and other preflight testing at the system or subsystem level to demonstrate functionality after installation.

In the short term, the FAA expects individual applicants to create their own FSS requirements based on RCC 319 and have them approved as an accepted means of compliance by the FAA prior to application submittal. This would be akin to "tailoring" RCC 319, which is current practice at the Federal launch ranges. In the long run, the FAA expects the industry to develop voluntary consensus standards for FSSs, particularly for those FSSs that are only required to have a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence. By removing detailed design and testing requirements from FAA regulations and relying on standards to meet reliability thresholds, the FAA would encourage innovation in flight abort. The FAA seeks comment on whether this approach would encourage innovation and more rapid evolution of FSS designs.

F. Flight Hazard Analysis

F. Flight Hazard Analysis

Proposed § 450.109 would require that an operator conduct and document a flight hazard analysis and continue to maintain the flight hazard analysis throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system unless an operator uses proven hazard control strategies such as physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort. At its most basic, a flight hazard analysis identifies all reasonably foreseeable hazards and the necessary measures to eliminate or mitigate that risk. A flight hazard analysis would be required only for those phases of flight for which the operator does not employ a traditional hazard control (e.g., physical containment). As noted earlier, the use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls would provide flexibility that does not currently exist under the prescriptive requirements in part 417 \67\ and is broadly consistent with the practice in parts 431 and 435.\68\

\67\ The current ELV regulatory scheme in parts 415 and 417 mitigates flight hazards for all launches by requiring a reliable FSS and prescriptive flight abort requirements.

\68\ Current RLV and reentry vehicle regulations in parts 431 and 435 do not specifically require a flight hazard analysis. However, § 431.35(c) and (d) require a system safety process to identify hazards, assess the risks, and the elimination or mitigation of the risk. In practice, the FAA has interpreted this broad section to require a flight hazard analysis.

Proposed § 450.109(a) would require that an operator further refine the flight hazard list developed during the earlier PSA, including verifying the list of items identified in § 450.109 and any new hazards identified since completing the PSA. A hazard is a real or potential condition that could lead to an unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, serious injury, or damage to or loss of equipment or property. The list of items in proposed § 450.109(a)(1) is a list of hazard categories that exist in all commercial space operations and must therefore be eliminated or mitigated to acceptable levels.

After identifying and describing hazards, proposed § 450.109(a)(2) would require that an operator assess each hazard's likelihood and severity. This assessment would be used to establish mitigation priorities. The operator would then determine the severity of the specific potential hazardous condition with respect to public safety. An operator should determine the severity for a specific hazard by identifying the worst credible event that may result from the hazard. For example, if an operator identifies a hazard such as incorrect vehicle position data due to inertial measurement unit (IMU) drift leading to an off nominal trajectory, the operator would determine the public impact using the greatest off nominal vehicle trajectory and the worst credible public safety outcome. Meaning, if the vehicle would break up aerodynamically due to an off nominal trajectory caused by IMU drift, the operator should base its severity assessment on the debris event generated by the break up taking into account the population in the area. If the vehicle operates in a remote area the severity may be low; however, if the operation occurs within the reach of the population, the severity would be catastrophic.

After severity and likelihood are assessed, proposed § 450.109(a)(3) would require that an operator ensure that any hazard that may cause a casualty is extremely remote, and any hazard that can cause major damage to public property or critical assets is remote. If a particular hazard source has been observed in a similar operation under similar conditions, it will be difficult to justify that the likelihood of the reoccurrence of the event will qualify as remote or extremely remote. This requirement is substantively the same as current practice under § 431.35(c) and is specifically called out in § 437.55(a)(3) for experimental permits. Examples of suggested likelihood categories for remote and extremely remote are provided in FAA's Advisory Circular (AC) 437.55-1 "Hazard Analyses for the Launch or Reentry of a Reusable Suborbital Rocket Under an Experimental Permit" as 1 x 10-5 and 1 x 10-6, respectively.

The operator would then need to identify and describe risk elimination and mitigation measures as required by proposed § 450.109(a)(4). The operator should always consider whether the risk mitigation measures introduce new hazards. This proposed section codifies current practice under the § 431.35(c) broad system safety analysis requirement. Although not required, system safety standards and advisory material such as MIL-STD-882E, AC 437.55-1, and AC 431.35-2A "Reusable Launch and Reentry Vehicle System Safety Process" recommend that operators develop risk elimination or mitigation approaches in the following order:

1. Design for minimum risk. The first priority should be to eliminate hazards through appropriate design or operational choices.\69\ If an operator cannot eliminate a risk, it should minimize it through design or operational choices.

\69\ An example of designing out risk to the public would be to operate in an unpopulated area.

2. Incorporate safety devices. If an operator cannot eliminate hazards through design or operation selection, then an operator should reduce risks through the use of active or passive safety devices.\70\

\70\ An example of an active safety device would be a computing system that automatically shuts down the rocket engine when a sensor detects high thrust chamber temperatures. A passive safety device might be a firewall to prevent a fire from reaching a pilot.

3. Provide warning devices. When neither design nor safety devices can eliminate or adequately reduce identified risks, the operator should use a device to detect and warn of the hazardous condition to minimize the likelihood of inappropriate human reaction and response.\71\

\71\ An example of a warning device would be an abort indicator such as a flashing light or a message on a cockpit instrument panel.

4. Implement procedures and training. When it is impractical to eliminate risks through design or safety and warning devices, the operator should develop and implement procedures and training that mitigate the risks.\72\

\72\ An example of risk mitigation procedures and training are abort procedures and rehearsals of those procedures.

Proposed § 450.109(a)(5) would require that the risk elimination and mitigation measures achieve the proposed risk levels in § 450.109(a)(3) through verification and validation. Verification ensures the measures themselves are properly developed and implemented while validation ensures the measures will actually achieve the desired outcome. Verification takes place while developing the measures and validation after development and implementation. This requirement is substantively the same as current practice under § 431.35(c). The acceptable methods of verifying safety measures are:

1. Analysis: Technical or mathematical evaluation, mathematical models, simulations, algorithms, and circuit diagrams.

2. Test: Actual operation to evaluate performance of system elements during ambient conditions or in operational environments at or above expected levels. These tests include functional tests and environmental tests.

3. Demonstration: Actual operation of the system or subsystem under specified scenarios, often used to verify reliability, transportability, maintainability, serviceability, and human engineering factors.

4. Inspection: Examination of hardware, software, or documentation to verify compliance of the feature with predetermined criteria.

An operator could use methods separately or combine them depending on the feasibility of the methods and the maturity of the vehicle and operation.

Proposed § 450.109(b) would require that an applicant establish and document the criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards throughout the launch or reentry system lifecycle. Development, implementation, and continued operation of any system requires that changes be made throughout the lifecycle. Changes to the vehicle, especially to safety-critical systems and operations, can have significant impacts on public safety and will result in changes to the hazard analysis. Anomalies and failures can also identify unknown hazards. This requirement is substantively the same as the FAA's current practice under § 431.35(c). Parts 415 and 417 do not have a flight hazard analysis requirement.

Proposed § 450.109(c) would require that the flight hazard analysis be updated and complete for every launch or reentry. In other words, the analysis must be applicable to the specific mission. A hazard analysis for a previous mission may be used only if the vehicle and operational details of the mission do not impact the validity of any aspect of the hazard analysis. The FAA has not prescribed the methodology that an operator must follow to ensure the accuracy of a flight hazard analyses. However, this item is key to ensuring that the operator is aware of the hazards in the proposed operation.

Proposed § 450.109(d) requires that an operator continually update the flight hazard analysis throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. This requirement is substantively the same as current FAA practice under § 431.35(c).

Proposed § 450.109(e) establishes the flight hazard analysis application requirements. An applicant would be required to submit a flight hazard analysis in its application to provide the FAA with sufficient detail to evaluate the applicant's flight hazard analyses and its criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. The FAA recommends that the applicant provide at a minimum a hazard table that provides a description of each hazard identified, associated severity and likelihood of each hazard, the mitigation measures identified for each hazard, and a summary of the validation and verification of each hazard. For hazards that require mitigation, the applicant would also be required to provide the data showing the verification of those mitigations measures. The FAA expects the results of any testing or analysis associated with the verification to be in a format that is easily understood by an experienced technical evaluator. For items verified by analysis, the applicant should provide the assumptions and methodology used to conduct the analyses if it is not easily understood by evaluating the results. These application requirements would not require more than the current practices under § 431.35(c) and (d).

G. Computing Systems and Software Overview

G. Computing Systems and Software Overview

The FAA is proposing to address hazards associated with computing systems and software separate from flight hazard analysis. The FAA would consolidate all software safety requirements applicable to launch or reentry operations in a single section, in proposed § 450.111 (Computing Systems and Software).\73\ These proposed regulations address both software and how the software operates on the intended hardware and computing systems.\74\ While the FAA discusses hardware requirements elsewhere under the safety-critical systems requirements, it is important to recognize that software safety cannot be evaluated outside of the computing system in which it operates.\75\ A computing system is a complete system made up of the central processing unit, memory, related electronics, and peripheral devices.

\73\ For the purpose of this discussion, the phrase "software safety requirements" refers to software safety regulations and "software requirements" refers to the specifications that define a software component's intended functionality.

\74\ The FAA understands software to mean a combination of computer instructions and computer data that enables a computer to perform computational and control functions.

\75\ Hardware is the collection of physical parts of a computer system, including memory storage devices, power sources, and processors that execute software.

These proposed software safety requirements would streamline the software safety evaluation process by adding detail to the performance-based requirements in the existing rules. The software safety requirements in the proposed rule are levied in proportion to the potential software hazards and the degree of control over those hazards.\76\ In other words, software safety requirements would increase in rigor with the rise in potential safety risks and degree of autonomy. Conversely, software safety requirements would decrease in rigor with reductions in the potential safety risk or degree of autonomy.\77\ This approach would codify existing FAA practice of modulating the stringency of review commensurate with the level of public risk. The FAA would also add more clarity to the software scaled requirements to guide applicants to appropriate and predictable engineering judgments when determining the proper depth and breadth of software development, analysis, and verification activities. The FAA expects these changes would enable innovation by setting predictable safety requirements based on knowable characteristics of new software systems and in proportion to the risks involved with the innovation. For a detailed discussion, please see the Additional Technical Justification and Rationale discussion later in the preamble.

\76\ For the purpose of this rulemaking, software hazards are those hazardous conditions created by the execution of software, or for which software is used as a mitigation or control.

\77\ The FAA uses the phrase "level of rigor" to describe the amount of precision and effort applied by an applicant to address the severity of a hazard and associated software autonomy.

H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles

H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles

Hybrid vehicles are vehicles that have some characteristics of aircraft and other characteristics of traditional launch or reentry vehicles. This proposal would allow an operator to forego the use of flight abort as a hazard control strategy during certain phases of flight if the hybrid launch or reentry vehicle has a high demonstrated reliability during those phases of flight. The FAA would make these determinations on a case-by-case basis based on a vehicle's demonstrated reliability.

The FAA may regulate hybrid vehicles under either the commercial space transportation or the civil aircraft regulations, depending on the operation. For a flight of a hybrid vehicle where a carrier aircraft has been modified to carry a rocket and the operator intends to ignite the rocket, the FAA considers the aircraft a component of the launch vehicle.\78\ The combination launch vehicle system is authorized solely by a vehicle operator license or experimental permit under Title 51. The FAA currently authorizes the operation of hybrid vehicles using a license or permit for the entire mission from preflight ground activities through taxi, take off, flight, landing, wheel stop, and post-flight safing for all components of the combined launch vehicle system. The FAA has granted a license to hybrid vehicles such as the Stargazer/Pegasus, WhiteKnightOne/SpaceShipOne, WhiteKnightTwo/ SpaceShipTwo, and Cosmic Girl/LauncherOne combinations.

In addition to carrier aircraft models, hybrid vehicles may also include future concepts such as a single vehicle with both air-breathing and rocket engines, winged launch or reentry vehicles, balloon-launched rockets, and other concepts that may have characteristics of both aviation and traditional launch or reentry vehicles.\79\ The FAA will work with applicants using hybrid vehicles during pre-application to identify the appropriate regulatory path. To date, the FAA has issued guidance in two legal interpretations on the process for determining whether flights or portions of flights of hybrid vehicles are regulated under title 49 or Title 51.\80\ As new hybrid concepts are unveiled, the FAA anticipates issuing additional guidance to assist operators.

\78\ "Chapter 509 applies when [a hybrid] system operates as a launch vehicle from the flight of the carrier aircraft, through ignition of the rocket, to the return and landing of the carrier aircraft and the suborbital rocket. For a mission that does not entail ignition of the rocket, the FAA's aviation statute and regulations apply." See Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury (September 26, 2013).

\79\ An example of a hybrid vehicle that does not use a carrier aircraft is the World View capsule. This capsule is not a rocket, but it meets the definition of a launch vehicle because it operates at an altitude where it needs to be designed, built, and tested to operate in outer space. See Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury, September 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf). Similar to other hybrid vehicles, when not operating as a launch vehicle, World View will operate under the appropriate aviation provisions of title 49.

\80\ Legal Interpretation to Kelvin B. Coleman from Lorelei Peter, July 23, 2018; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2018/coleman-ast-1%20-%20(2018)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf); Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury, Sept. 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf).

The FAA has worked with and received input from industry on how to regulate hybrid vehicles. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, the FAA convened a Safety Risk Management (SRM) panel consisting of FAA and industry representatives to review and assess hazards associated with captive carry operations.\81\ The panel recommended dispensing with any aircraft hazard area requirement during the captive carry phase of flight for previously licensed hybrid vehicles with fixed-wing carrier aircraft. The ARC also recommended that the FAA set a different standard for hybrid vehicles, specifically that the FAA not require an FSA for operations where the agency has already considered impacts to public safety during the airworthiness certification process. Additionally, the ARC recommended that an operator only be required to conduct an FSA for those portions of flight when the hazardous configuration of the hybrid system differs from that approved under an experimental airworthiness certificate or equivalent authorization.

\81\ The SRM panel members included FAA representatives from the Air Traffic Organization, Aviation Safety, and the Office of Commercial Space Transportation. The panel also included civil aviation and commercial space participants such as the Air Line Pilots Association, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Orbital ATK, Virgin Galactic, Virgin Orbit, and Mojave Air and Space Port.

As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to provide flexibility for certain phases of flight with respect to FSA (proposed § 450.113(a)(5)) and FSS (proposed § 450.101(c)) requirements. This is consistent with the ARC's recommendation. The FAA recognizes that airworthiness certificates and licenses, when developed collaboratively between the Aviation Safety and Commercial Space Transportation lines of business, sufficiently protect the public. In these cases, the FAA would include a license term and condition for a current airworthiness certificate. Specifically, the license would impose terms and conditions such as compliance with certain part 91 (General Operating and Flight Rules) requirements and airworthiness operating limitations, not including any restrictions on compensation or hire. This blended approach of combining airworthiness with part 450's system safety requirements would ensure public safety without the need for an FSA.

This proposal would reduce FSA, CEC, and FSS requirements for phases of flight such as the captive carry phase, the carrier-vehicle-alone phase, and any rocket component glide back. The captive carry phase of flight starts when the carrier vehicle takes off carrying the rocket aloft and transports it to the rocket release location. The carrier-vehicle-alone phase starts when the carrier vehicle releases the rocket, and includes all flight activities in support of the mission until the carrier vehicle lands and is safed. During the carrier-vehicle-alone phase, the rocket component is conducting its rocket-powered and coast phases. The rocket coast phase occurs immediately after the rocket engine shuts down, and is not considered an aviation-like glide phase because the pilot does not have significant control authority over the instantaneous impact point (the predicted impact point following thrust termination of a vehicle). For returning rockets, there may be a glide phase which begins at a point to be determined on a case-by-case basis after the vehicle completes any reconfiguration necessary and demonstrates non-rocket powered control authority and ends when the vehicle lands.

The FAA would work with hybrid vehicle applicants during pre-application consultation to determine the applicability of FSA, CEC, and FSS requirements. For example, the FAA might determine the quantitative FSA requirement for those portions of a mission where the vehicle operates as a civil aviation aircraft governed by civil aviation regulations (as incorporated into the license) is unnecessary because the vehicle has demonstrated reliability during that phase as indicated by the issuance of an airworthiness certificate. Thus, an applicant would not have to conduct the quantitative FSA for the aircraft-like controllable phases of flight, such as the captive carry phase or for phases with non-rocket powered or glide phases previously authorized under an airworthiness certificate. This would not normally be the case during the rocket-powered, coast, reentry, or glide back phases of flight that are unique to space flight. All other regulatory requirements, including system safety requirements, would apply to the entire mission. Due to the unknown operating characteristics of future hybrid vehicles, the FAA is not proposing to provide a blanket FSA exemption for all hybrid systems.

I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview

I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview

For purposes of this proposed rule, a flight safety analysis consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to determine flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard areas, and other mitigation measures, and to verify compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. The FAA proposes 15 sections for flight safety analysis. The analyses are described here briefly because of their overall importance to the regulation and are discussed in greater detail in the "Additional Technical Justification and Rationale" section. Furthermore, the FAA plans to publish updated ACs and guidelines to describe acceptable means to conduct these analyses.

The first two sections for FSA would outline the scope, applicability, and methods for conducting FSAs:

1. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and Applicability (§ 450.113). This section would establish the portions of flight for which an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA and would identify the analyses required for each type of operation.

2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods (§ 450.115). This section would set methodology requirements for FSAs, including level of fidelity.

Three sections would require fundamental flight safety analyses:

1. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight (§ 450.117). All the FSAs depend on some form of analysis of the trajectory under normal conditions, referred to as a normal trajectory.

2. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight (§ 450.119). A malfunction trajectory analysis is necessary to determine how far a vehicle can deviate from its normal flight path in case of a malfunction. This analysis helps determine impact points in case of a malfunction and is therefore a vital input for the analyses needed to demonstrate compliance with risk criteria.

3. Debris Analysis (§ 450.121). A debris analysis is necessary to characterize the debris generated in various failure scenarios, including those that could produce an intact vehicle impact.

Four analyses would produce information necessary to implement flight abort as a hazard control strategy:

1. Flight Safety Limits Analysis (§ 450.123). A flight safety limit analysis is necessary to identify uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define when an operator must initiate flight abort to (1) ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of proposed § 450.101, and (2) prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission.

2. Gate Analysis (§ 450.125). A gate analysis is necessary to determine necessary openings in a flight safety limit through which a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined conditions indicating an ability to continue safe flight.

3. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses (§ 450.127). A data loss flight time analysis is necessary to establish when an operator must abort a flight following the loss of vehicle tracking information. A planned safe flight state analysis is necessary to determine when an FSS is no longer necessary.

4. Time Delay Analysis (§ 450.129). A time delay analysis is necessary to establish the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight abort rule and the time when the flight safety system is capable of aborting flight for use in establishing flight safety limits.

One section addresses probability of failure analysis:

1. Probability of Failure Analysis (§ 450.131). During any particular flight or phase of flight, an estimated probability of failure, and how that probability is allocated across flight time and vehicle response mode, is necessary to support the determination of hazard areas and risk.

One section addresses the determination of flight hazard areas:

1. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (§ 450.133). This analysis is necessary to determine any region of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect the public health and safety, and safety of property.

Three sections would be necessary to determine whether risk criteria are met for different types of hazards:

1. Debris Risk Analysis (§ 450.135). A debris risk analysis is necessary to determine whether the individual and collective risks of public casualties, due to inert and explosive debris hazards meets public safety criteria.

2. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis (§ 450.137). This analysis is necessary to determine whether the potential public hazard from broken windows as a result of impacting explosive debris, including impact of an intact launch vehicle, meets public safety criteria.

3. Toxic Hazards for Flight (§ 450.139). This analysis is necessary to determine whether hazards associated with toxic release meet public safety criteria.

Lastly, one section is necessary for the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting as a hazard control strategy. A launch vehicle using other mitigations would not be required to conduct this analysis:

1. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle (§ 450.141). This section would outline a wind weighting analysis that is required to ensure that the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting as a hazard control strategy meets public safety criteria.

J. Safety-Critical Systems

J. Safety-Critical Systems

1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation

The FAA proposes to consolidate the design, test, and documentation requirements for safety-critical components in proposed § 450.143 (Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and Documentation). A common set of requirements is needed for clarity and consistency.

1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation

Safety-critical systems or components include those systems or components whose performance is essential to ensuring public safety. Historically, the FAA has considered the FSS to be the only safety-critical system on an ELV. For RLVs and reentry vehicles, the use of a systematic, logical, and disciplined system safety process is meant to identify safety-critical systems and the extent of prudent operational controls.\82\ If a system failure would cause any hazards and those hazards could reach a populated area, then the system is likely a safety-critical system. Generally, RLV operators incorporate FSSs, although they may also incorporate other safety-critical elements of risk mitigation and hazard control. Non-RLV reentry vehicles also require a thorough system safety process to identify safety-critical hardware.

\82\ Some of the more commonly used methodologies include Preliminary Hazard Lists (PHL), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), Event Tree Analyses (ETA), Fault Tree Analyses (FTA), FMEAs, and FMECAs. Generally, these methodologies help operators determine whether a system failure could cause a loss of vehicle control, a vehicle breakup or other creation of uncontrolled debris, a discharge of hazardous material, or would prevent safe landing.

The current rules for ELV, RLV, and reentry vehicle safety-critical systems are quite different. However, in practice, the evaluation of the safety of such systems is very similar. Parts 415 and 417 require ELVs to have very reliable hazard-constraining FSSs that ensure public safety. These FSSs are subject to design requirements, extensive design qualification testing, and acceptance testing of all components. RLVs and reentry vehicles are required to undergo a comprehensive system safety engineering process that, in part, identifies and eliminates hazards to reduce the associated risk to acceptable levels by defining safety-critical systems and identifying associated hazards and risks. Under system safety, an operator develops design-level safety requirements and provides evidence for verification and validation of safety-critical systems and requirements. For safety-critical systems this serves the purpose of design qualification and acceptance. Given that RLVs are built to experience multiple flights, the lifecycle \83\ of safety-critical systems must also be considered as part of the design, testing, and documentation.

\83\ Many operators seek to refurbish or otherwise reuse safety-critical systems for multiple flights. Operators must design, test, and document safety-critical systems to demonstrate their safety-critical systems can continue to operate reliably throughout the component life in all predicted operating environments.

i. Current Qualification and Acceptance Testing Requirements

i. Current Qualification and Acceptance Testing Requirements

Qualification testing is an assessment of a prototype or other structural article to verify the structural integrity of a design. Generally, qualification testing involves testing the design under a number of different environmental factors to stress the design, with a multiplying factor applied to the expected environmental testing limit. This qualification testing is conducted for temperatures, tensile loads, handling shocks, and other expected environmental stressors.

Unlike qualification testing that is performed on qualification units, acceptance testing is performance testing conducted on the actual hardware to be used on a vehicle after the completion of the manufacturing process. Generally, acceptance tests are performed on each article of the safety-critical flight hardware to verify that it is free of defects, free of integration and workmanship errors, and ready for operational use. Acceptance testing includes testing for defects, along with environmental testing similar to the qualification testing described earlier.

For ELVs, qualification and acceptance testing are important verification of the reliability of all FSSs at the subsystem and component level, and ensures the safe operability of the only safety-critical system on any given ELV. For ELVs, current qualification and acceptance testing requirements and procedures for FSS subsystems and components are listed in Sec. § 417.305, 417.307, and appendix E of part 417 (E417). As FSSs are the only safety-critical systems on traditional ELVs, the component-level testing requirements in part 417 describe the testing of specific possible components in great detail, going so far as to differentiate testing requirements for silver-zinc batteries in E417.21 from nickel-cadmium batteries in E417.22. While the FAA has approved alternative FSSs, the prescription level of the current requirements discourages significant innovation.

The same emphasis on validation of design and verification of hardware tolerances applies to components that have been identified as safety-critical during a system safety process. For RLVs and reentry vehicles, a system safety process is required by § 431.35(c).\84\ Under the system safety process, a vehicle designer must assess nominal and non-nominal flight scenarios of the vehicle and must account for any possible safety-critical system failures during flight that could result in a casualty to the public. Those vehicle operators are required, by § 431.35(d)(3), to identify all safety-critical systems and are required by § 431.35(d)(7) to demonstrate the risk elimination in relation to those safety-critical systems. While not explicitly called out in the current part 431 or 435, qualification and acceptance testing are the widely accepted standards for demonstrating that safety-critical systems, subsystems, and components are not at risk of failing during flight.

\84\ Section 431.35(c) is required for reentry vehicles by § 435.33.

Current regulations are undefined with respect to the applicability of qualification and testing of safety-critical components that are not listed in Sec. § 417.301(b), 417.305 and 417.307, or appendix E of part 417. The regulations are similarly ambiguous if the vehicle does not have a traditional FSS but still has components that are considered safety-critical, like many vehicles licensed under part 431. This ambiguity has led to regulatory uncertainty, which in turn has resulted in lengthy exchanges between the FAA and license applicants about what components and systems needed to be tested, what testing would be acceptable to the FAA, and why that testing was necessary to be compliant. Testing is currently generally required for safety-critical systems across all vehicle types, either explicitly or as verification and validation in the system safety process, but this is often not well-reflected in the current regulations. As a result, applicants often are confused by qualification testing requirements asserted by the FAA for RLVs when there are no explicit qualification testing requirements in part 431. ii. Current Fault Tolerance Requirements

Fault-tolerance is the idea that a system must be designed so that it is able to perform its function in the event of a failure of one or more of its components. In a fault-tolerant design of a safety-critical system, no single credible fault should be capable of increasing the risk to public safety beyond that of a nominal operation. Typically, a fault-tolerant design applies redundancy or a system of safety barriers to ensure the system can function, though perhaps with reduced performance. An example of a fault-tolerant design is an aircraft with multiple engines that can continue flying even if one of the engines fails.

The current part 417 regulations cover fault-tolerant design of FSS components as a set of explicit prescriptive requirements. For instance, § 417.303(d) specifically lists fault-tolerance as a requirement of an FSS command control system design, requiring that no single failure point be able to inhibit the system's function or inadvertently transmit a flight termination command. An operator must demonstrate that the command system, in accordance with § 417.309(c), is fault tolerant through analysis, identification of possible failure modes, implementation of redundant systems or other mitigation measures, and verification that the mitigation measures will not fail simultaneously. Appendix D of part 417 (section D417.5) further details single fault tolerance and prescribes redundancy of command strings that are structurally, electrically, and mechanically separated to ensure that any failure that would damage, destroy, or otherwise inhibit the operation of one redundant component would not inhibit the operation of the other redundant component.

The current ELV regulations are prescriptive and often dictate specific implementations of fault-tolerance where other forms may be adequate. For instance, a fail-safe approach has been used in the rationale of past applicants that use thrust termination systems to protect public safety. A fail-safe design is a system that can fail in a controlled way, such that the failure will still ensure public safety, like elevator brakes held open by the tension of the elevator cable such that if the cable snaps the brakes engage and stop the elevator from falling. The FAA has granted waivers to the redundancy requirement of section D417.5(c) for fail-safe safety-critical systems that have been integrated in such a way that a loss of power to that system would result in direct thrust termination of the launch vehicle though deactivation of normally-closed valves. Also, ELOS determinations have been issued for flight termination receivers that have fail-safe commands that are issued on signal loss because the failure of the system automatically results in termination of the flight and the constraint of flight hazards. Less prescriptive fault-tolerant design regulations could enable such designs instead of requiring waivers or ELOS determinations.

Operations licensed under parts 431 and 435 may not have traditional FSSs, but the need for fault-tolerance is implicitly derived from the system safety process of § 431.35(c) and (d), as it is often a necessary control for an identified hazard. The FAA views fault-tolerance as a necessary characteristic of any reliable system.

The current fault tolerance provisions lack clarity in the scope of their applicability to RLVs and reentry vehicles because they are implicit in the system safety processes of hazard identification and mitigation. As with the testing requirements, a lack of regulatory clarity is detrimental to both applicants and the FAA, leading to confusion, a drawn-out application acceptance process, and lengthy discussions to arrive at a clear understanding of how fault tolerance is applicable to a proposed operation. iii. Current Reuse Requirements

Safety-critical FSSs of ELVs generally undergo a single flight. Therefore, very little life-cycle planning is required for them unless an operator seeks to reuse certain safety-critical components. However, ELV operators must still account for environments that the FSS is expected to encounter throughout the lifecycle of the system, including storage, transportation, installation, and flight, which generally are built into qualification and acceptance testing levels. Lifecycle planning is a more significant concern for reusable safety-critical systems because near-total reuse is an expected part of their operation.

Current parts 415 and 417 contain requirements for the reuse of ELV FSS components. To be a licensed ELV operator, an applicant must submit to the FAA any reuse qualification testing, refurbishment, and acceptance testing plans, in accordance with § 415.129(f). Those test plans must show that any FSS component is still capable of performing as required when subjected to the qualification test environmental levels plus the total number of exposures to the maximum expected environmental levels for each of the flights to be flown. Previously flown FSSs must also abide by Sec. E417.13(a)(3), and the components must undergo one or more reuse acceptance tests before each flight to demonstrate that the component still satisfies all its performance specifications when subjected to each maximum predicted environment. Additionally, tests for reuse must compare performance measurements to all previous tests to ensure no trends emerge that indicate performance degradation in the component that could prevent the component from satisfying all its performance specifications during flight. As the lines have blurred between ELVs with significantly reusable safety-critical systems and RLVs, these requirements still contain good safety policy, but they are constrained by their limited coverage of only traditional FSSs.

While operations licensed under part 431 are focused on RLVs, neither part 431 nor part 435 contain any explicit requirements placed on reuse. Like all other aspects of safety-critical system requirements, reuse under these parts is governed by the system safety process of § 431.35. Safety-critical systems that do not account for expected lifecycle, refurbishment, and reuse do not adequately meet the hazard identification and risk mitigation of the system safety requirements. Implicit in the system safety requirements, commensurate testing is required to demonstrate that the planned lifecycle performance remains accurate. Reuse of safety-critical components is a potential hazard that needs to be mitigated.

Reuse induces stress on components and systems that can degrade operational performance if not accounted for in design and testing. Additionally, "reuse" implies multiple uses of a component after its initial intended lifetime or outside of its initial intended operating environments. Based on industry best practices, intended use and lifetime should be designed into components initially; qualification and acceptance testing should be based on predicted operating environments that encompass the entire lifetime of a system; and lifecycle management practices should be used to refine initial predictions. The current lack of a clear, unified, and simple requirement that explicitly covers reuse for all safety-critical systems leads to prescriptive constraints on ELV operators and regulatory confusion for RLV and reentry operators who are unfamiliar with the implicit requirements of a system safety process. iv. Consolidation of Design, Test and Documentation Requirements

The FAA proposes to consolidate the design, test and documentation requirements for safety-critical systems and components, both identified by a system safety process and as part of an FSS, currently found in parts 415 and 417, 431, and 435. Specifically, the FAA proposes to provide performance-based requirements for safety-critical systems, including fault tolerant design, design qualification testing, hardware acceptance testing, and the verification of flight environments to assess the life-cycle of safety-critical systems for reuse purposes.

Under proposed § 450.143, all safety-critical systems would be required to meet these requirements, including a FSS that also would be required to meet the additional requirements of proposed § 450.145. By having a consistent set of overarching requirements regulating the design, testing, and documentation of safety-critical systems and hardware, the FAA anticipates that applicants would be enabled to implement new risk-mitigating design strategies under a clear and consolidated regulatory regime. New technologies that emerge would be covered by the general requirements without causing regulatory delays due to confusion, increasing paperwork burdens required for requesting waivers, or waiting for future rulemaking changes necessary to allow emerging technologies. These criteria would be the standards for demonstrating that such systems can survive and perform to an adequate level of safety in all operating environments.

The ARC recommended that better standards need to be developed regarding safety-critical systems. The ARC pointed out that there is no single process or procedure that documents an acceptable way to go through a system design and determine safety-criticality, and it asked for better guidance on safety-criticality, given that usually industry views criticality more from a mission assurance point of view. More generally, the ARC requested a more performance-based regulatory regime, with a clearer focus on safety and greater flexibility for novel operations. In regards to reuse and maintenance, the ARC suggested that requirements should be focused on maintaining reliability of inputs. The ARC specifically called out the section E417.13 requirement to remove and recomplete acceptance testing prior to reuse of flight safety system components between each flight as an untenable burden both in terms of cost and time. Furthermore, the ARC also noted that continued acceptance testing of flight hardware to predict environmental levels plus margins puts undue strain on flight systems and can significantly reduce their lifespan.

To remedy the confusion resulting from a current lack of regulatory clarity for RLVs and reentry vehicles, proposed § 450.143(c) and (d) would explicitly require qualification testing of the design and acceptance testing of the safety-critical flight hardware. To remedy the implied design constraints of current detailed requirements for ELVs, proposed § 450.143(c) and (d) would be general, high-level requirements for demonstrating the performance of safety-critical system design, and that the system is operational and free from defects and errors.

Specifically, proposed § 450.143(c) would require an operator to functionally demonstrate \85\ the design of a vehicle's safety-critical systems at conditions beyond its predicted operating environment. The design qualification tests should include enough margin beyond predicted operating environments to demonstrate that the system design can tolerate manufacturing variance or environmental uncertainties without performance degradation.

\85\ Functional demonstration is generally achieved through testing.

Proposed § 450.143(d)(1) would require operators to perform a functional demonstration of any safety-critical systems by exposing them to their predicted operating environment with margin. The performance of the flight hardware during the test would be required to demonstrate that the flight units are free of defects, integration or workmanship errors, and are ready for operational use. Alternatively, an applicant would be able to comply with proposed § 450.143(d)(2) instead of proposed § 450.143(d)(1). If an applicant chooses to comply with proposed § 450.143(d)(2), it would be required to ensure functional capability and that the flight hardware remains free from error and defect during its service life through a combination of in-process controls and a quality assurance process. This flexible approach to acceptance testing would relieve some of the burdens of a traditional acceptance testing regime and would add clarity that these demonstrations are required for all safety-critical flight hardware.

Proposed § 450.143 would clearly state the requirements for all safety-critical system components and eliminate the ambiguity that exists in the current regulations regarding required testing of safety-critical system components that are not a part of an FSS. While FSSs are safety-critical systems, their criticality requires additional requirements beyond proposed § 450.143. The consolidated performance requirements for FSS components are detailed in proposed § 450.145, and are discussed in the "Flight Safety System" section of this preamble.

As the proposed rule seeks to make the safety requirements of § 450.143 applicable to all commercial space launch and reentry vehicles, there should be better clarity across the industry and the government regarding what is required of safety-critical systems for both design qualification testing and flight hardware acceptance testing. Also, as recommended by the ARC, the FAA's proposal would allow for the possibility of other forms of acceptance testing methodologies and quality controls, subject to approval of the FAA, for safety-critical components that are not directly covered by the flight safety system requirements. This option should enable new business practices but maintain the safety verification necessary to ensure public safety.

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