84 FR 15296 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements
This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.
This document is proposed. It may have been replaced. Check the official source before relying on it.
C. Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight
Proposed § 450.105(a)(7) would require an operator to identify safety-critical systems. A safety critical system would be a system that is essential to safe performance or operation. A safety-critical system, subsystem, component, condition, event, operation, process, or item, is one whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance, is essential to ensuring public safety. It is important for an operator to clearly identify safety critical systems because many requirements in proposed part 450 relate to these systems.
Proposed § 450.105(a)(8) would require an operator to identify a timeline identifying all safety critical events. This timeline is important to identify the potential public safety consequences during any particular phase of flight.
Proposed § 450.105(b) would set the PSA application requirements. The applicant would be required to provide the results of the preliminary safety assessment in its application. The applicant would be required to provide information for every requirement listed under § 450.105(a). These application requirements are consistent with those currently in part 431. Although these specific system safety requirements would be new for ELV operators, the FAA does not expect they would add a substantial burden given that part 417 operators were performing similar work, albeit not under the system management umbrella. ELV operators must already identify vehicle failure modes; debris, toxics, distant-focusing overpressure, and other hazards; geographical containment and overflight trajectories; consequences that determine flight limits; and all safety critical systems and events. The PSA codifies these concerns as primary to safety and the development of hazard control strategies and requires all vehicle operators to document such considerations.
Development of the PSA would allow the operator to determine whether they must perform a flight hazard analysis. The operator would be required to assess each phase of flight to determine how public safety hazards are mitigated. If there is a phase of flight where all identified public safety hazards are not mitigated using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, the operator would be required to perform a flight hazard analysis, discussed later in this preamble, for that particular phase of flight.
D. Hazard Control Strategy
D. Hazard Control Strategy
Proposed § 450.107 (Hazard Control Strategies) would provide options for hazard control strategies that an operator could use to meet the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101 for each phase of a launch or reentry vehicle's flight. An operator could use physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort and would not be required to conduct a flight hazard analysis. Alternatively, an operator could conduct a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls. As part of its application, an operator would be required to identify the selected hazard control strategy for each phase of flight.
The use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls provides the most flexibility of any of the hazard control strategies. The ARC recommended this approach and stated that the system safety process should be used to identify hazards and develop control strategies, which would then be verified by means of flight safety analysis and relevant operational constraints and means of meeting those constraints.\64\ In certain circumstances, however, historical methods may also provide an acceptable level of safety. If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment can be mitigated adequately to meet the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort with a highly reliable FSS, an operator would not need to conduct a flight hazard analysis for that phase of flight. This proposal is different than current regulations, where the option of conducting a hazard analysis to derive hazard controls is only available to reusable launch vehicles. Under proposed part 450, the option to use a flight hazard analysis would not rest on whether a vehicle is expendable or reusable.
\64\ ARC Report at p. 10.
Under proposed § 450.107(b), an operator could use physical containment to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 when an operator's launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach an area where it exposes the public or critical assets to a hazard. These launches can take place from any launch site, depending on the size of the launch vehicle, the expected trajectory, and other factors. The more remote a launch site is, the greater its capacity to accommodate a launch using physical containment.
This approach is consistent with current practice because the FAA has always accepted a demonstration of physical containment as a means of satisfying risk requirements. The use of physical containment as a hazard control strategy is the easiest way to meet the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 and may, in a remote location, involve a simple showing that the maximum distance vehicle hazards can reach defines an area that is unpopulated and does not contain any critical assets. Because physical containment precludes the need for an FSS, an operator would not be required to meet any requirements relevant to an FSS. If an operator shows its vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any of its associated hazards to reach outside the flight hazard area, the operator would not have to perform a flight hazard analysis. Further, many other requirements would be either not applicable or easily met. Because physical containment may also involve visitor control, wind constraints, real-time toxic analysis, and other mitigation measures, the FAA would require an operator to apply other mitigation measures to ensure no public exposure to hazards, as agreed to by the Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
Under proposed § 450.107(c), an operator could use wind weighting to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 when an operator uses launcher elevation and azimuth settings to correct for wind effects that an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, typically called a sounding rocket, would experience during flight. Due to its relative simplicity and effectiveness, wind weighting has historically been used by NASA, the Department of Defense, and commercial operators as the primary method to ensure public safety for the launch of a sounding rocket. This approach is currently codified in part 417. Under part 431, an operator can use wind weighting as an acceptable hazard mitigation measure determined through the system safety process. Under proposed part 450, an operator launching a sounding rocket could use wind weighting or it could propose other hazard controls in its application through a flight hazard analysis. The specific wind weighting requirements are discussed in the "Additional Technical Justification and Rationale" section.
Under proposed § 450.107(d), an operator could use flight abort to satisfy the public safety requirements of proposed § 450.101 when an operator limits or restricts the hazards to the public or critical assets presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight, when necessary. This is discussed in more detail in the "Flight Abort" section.
If the public safety hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment cannot be mitigated adequately to meet the public risk criteria of proposed § 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort, an operator would be required to conduct a flight hazard analysis in accordance with proposed § 450.109 (Flight Hazard Analysis) to derive hazard controls for that phase of flight. The use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls is the primary approach used in current parts 431, 435, and 437. The FAA has previously required the use of a flight hazard analysis for reentry, for the captive carry portion of an air-launched vehicle, and for piloted suborbital vehicles. A detailed discussion of flight hazard analysis is included later in this preamble.
In its application, an applicant would be required to describe its hazard control strategy for each phase of flight. An applicant may elect to use different hazard control strategies for different phases of flight, depending on risks associated with those phases. For example, an applicant using an air-launched system might use a flight hazard analysis during the captive carry phase of flight, and flight abort during the rocket-powered phase of flight. Additionally, if using physical containment as a hazard control strategy, an applicant would be required to demonstrate that the launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach outside the flight hazard area. The applicant would also be required to describe the methods used to ensure that flight hazard areas are cleared of the public and critical assets.
E. Flight Abort
E. Flight Abort
As discussed earlier, flight abort is a hazard control strategy to limit or restrict the hazards to the public or critical assets presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight. Flight abort is a controlled ending to vehicle flight and is initiated by an operator when ending flight poses less risk to public safety and the safety of property than continued flight without a safety intervention. Flight abort is the primary hazard control strategy used today for orbital expendable launch vehicles under part 417, and under Air Force and NASA launch range requirements.
The FAA proposes to require this approach, with a reliable FSS, only when certain conditional risks are present. Specifically, proposed § 450.101(c) would require an operator to use flight abort with an FSS that meets the requirements of § 450.145 as a hazard control strategy if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-3 conditional expected casualties for uncontrolled areas.\65\ The basis for this number is discussed in the "Consequence Protection Criteria for Flight Abort and Flight Safety System" section. Under this test, a typical orbital launch from the Air Force Eastern and Western ranges would require an FSS capable of initiating flight abort. Small orbital launch vehicles launched from more remote locations, however, would not normally be required to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy. The FAA seeks comment on this approach.
\65\ The proposed requirement to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy is less restrictive than § 417.107(a), which requires a launch operator to use an FSS in the vicinity of the launch site if any hazard from a launch vehicle, vehicle component, or payload can reach any protected area at any time during flight, or if a failure of the launch vehicle would have a high consequence to the public.
To implement flight abort as a hazard control strategy, an operator would establish flight safety limits and gates in accordance with proposed Sec. § 450.123 (Flight Safety Limits Analysis) and 450.125, establish flight abort rules in accordance with § 450.165 (Flight Safety Rules), and employ an FSS in accordance with § 450.145 and software in accordance with § 450.111.
Flight abort as a hazard control strategy can be used by an operator, even if it is not required under § 450.101(c), as a hazard mitigation measure derived from the flight hazard analysis. For example, a piloted vehicle with low conditional expected casualty during powered flight may use an FSS in combination with other measures, such as propellant dumping, to keep vehicle hazards from reaching a populated area. 1. Flight Safety Limits and Uncontrolled Areas
An operator would have to identify the location of uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define when an operator must initiate flight abort to:
• Prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission, and
• Ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of § 450.101.
The FAA would define debris capable of causing a casualty with kinetic energy or other thresholds as will be discussed later. The public safety criteria that would go into determining flight safety limits would be collective risk, individual risk, risk to critical assets, and conditional risk. An uncontrolled area would be an area of land not controlled by a launch or reentry operator, a launch or reentry site operator, an adjacent site operator, or other entity by agreement. Under current regulations, these areas are referred to as "protected areas." Importantly, as discussed earlier, the conditional risk criteria would not apply to controlled areas, which are areas that are controlled by any of the entities listed earlier, because by exercising control over these areas the entity would have a greater ability to ensure that catastrophic risk is mitigated by other means.
In addition to establishing flight safety limits, an operator would establish gates, if the vehicle would need to overfly a landmass during its flight. A gate is an opening in a flight safety limit through which a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined conditions such that the vehicle performance indicates an ability to continue safe flight. If the vehicle fails to meet the required conditions to pass a gate, then flight abort would occur at the flight safety limit. In other words, the gate would be closed.
Flight safety limits and gates are discussed in greater detail later in this preamble. 2. Flight Abort Rules
An operator would identify the conditions under which the FSS, including the functions of any flight abort crew, must abort the flight to ensure compliance with § 450.101. An operator would be required to abort a flight if a flight safety limit is violated, or if some condition exists that could lead to a violation, such as a compromised FSS or loss of data.
Flight abort rules are discussed in greater detail later in this preamble. 3. Flight Safety System
To enable flight abort, an operator must use an FSS. An FSS is an integral part of positive control of a launch or reentry vehicle because it allows an operator to destroy the vehicle, terminate thrust, or otherwise achieve flight abort to limit or restrict the hazards to public health and safety and the safety of property presented by a vehicle while in flight. Traditional FSSs are comprised of an onboard flight termination system, a ground-based command and control system, and tracking and telemetry systems. Historically, the flight safety crew monitoring the course of a vehicle would send a command to the vehicle to terminate flight if the vehicle violated a flight abort rule. Recently, operators are favoring autonomous FSSs, negating the need for a ground-based command and control system or flight abort crew.
As discussed earlier, the CEC would establish whether an FSS is required, and if so, its reliability.
• If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is 1 x 10-2 conditional expected casualties or greater for uncontrolled areas, an operator would be required to employ an FSS with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing; or
• If the consequence of any vehicle response mode is between 1 x 10-2 and 1 x 10-3, an operator would be required to employ an FSS with a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing.
Note that if the consequence of any vehicle response mode is less than 1 x 10-3, the FAA would not require an FSS or mandate its reliability if an operator chooses to use one.
Unlike part 417, the FAA would not propose specific design or testing requirements for an FSS. Instead, the FAA would accept specified government or industry standards as meeting the FSS reliability requirements. At this time, only one government standard would meet the requirement for a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing, and that is RCC 319.\66\
\66\ RCC 319 can be found at http://www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Documents/319-14_Flight_Termination_Systems_Commonality_Standard/RCC_319-14_FTS_Commonality.pdf.
The FSS requirements codified in part 417, including component performance requirements and acceptance and qualification testing, were originally written to align FAA launch licensing requirements with the Federal launch range standards in RCC 319. Like part 417, RCC 319 requires qualification tests to demonstrate reliable operation in environments exceeding the expected operating environment for the system components, acceptance tests to demonstrate that the selected batch of components meets the requirements of the design specifications, and other preflight testing at the system or subsystem level to demonstrate functionality after installation.
In the short term, the FAA expects individual applicants to create their own FSS requirements based on RCC 319 and have them approved as an accepted means of compliance by the FAA prior to application submittal. This would be akin to "tailoring" RCC 319, which is current practice at the Federal launch ranges. In the long run, the FAA expects the industry to develop voluntary consensus standards for FSSs, particularly for those FSSs that are only required to have a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence. By removing detailed design and testing requirements from FAA regulations and relying on standards to meet reliability thresholds, the FAA would encourage innovation in flight abort. The FAA seeks comment on whether this approach would encourage innovation and more rapid evolution of FSS designs.
F. Flight Hazard Analysis
F. Flight Hazard Analysis
Proposed § 450.109 would require that an operator conduct and document a flight hazard analysis and continue to maintain the flight hazard analysis throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system unless an operator uses proven hazard control strategies such as physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort. At its most basic, a flight hazard analysis identifies all reasonably foreseeable hazards and the necessary measures to eliminate or mitigate that risk. A flight hazard analysis would be required only for those phases of flight for which the operator does not employ a traditional hazard control (e.g., physical containment). As noted earlier, the use of a flight hazard analysis to derive hazard controls would provide flexibility that does not currently exist under the prescriptive requirements in part 417 \67\ and is broadly consistent with the practice in parts 431 and 435.\68\
\67\ The current ELV regulatory scheme in parts 415 and 417 mitigates flight hazards for all launches by requiring a reliable FSS and prescriptive flight abort requirements.
\68\ Current RLV and reentry vehicle regulations in parts 431 and 435 do not specifically require a flight hazard analysis. However, § 431.35(c) and (d) require a system safety process to identify hazards, assess the risks, and the elimination or mitigation of the risk. In practice, the FAA has interpreted this broad section to require a flight hazard analysis.
Proposed § 450.109(a) would require that an operator further refine the flight hazard list developed during the earlier PSA, including verifying the list of items identified in § 450.109 and any new hazards identified since completing the PSA. A hazard is a real or potential condition that could lead to an unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, serious injury, or damage to or loss of equipment or property. The list of items in proposed § 450.109(a)(1) is a list of hazard categories that exist in all commercial space operations and must therefore be eliminated or mitigated to acceptable levels.
After identifying and describing hazards, proposed § 450.109(a)(2) would require that an operator assess each hazard's likelihood and severity. This assessment would be used to establish mitigation priorities. The operator would then determine the severity of the specific potential hazardous condition with respect to public safety. An operator should determine the severity for a specific hazard by identifying the worst credible event that may result from the hazard. For example, if an operator identifies a hazard such as incorrect vehicle position data due to inertial measurement unit (IMU) drift leading to an off nominal trajectory, the operator would determine the public impact using the greatest off nominal vehicle trajectory and the worst credible public safety outcome. Meaning, if the vehicle would break up aerodynamically due to an off nominal trajectory caused by IMU drift, the operator should base its severity assessment on the debris event generated by the break up taking into account the population in the area. If the vehicle operates in a remote area the severity may be low; however, if the operation occurs within the reach of the population, the severity would be catastrophic.
After severity and likelihood are assessed, proposed § 450.109(a)(3) would require that an operator ensure that any hazard that may cause a casualty is extremely remote, and any hazard that can cause major damage to public property or critical assets is remote. If a particular hazard source has been observed in a similar operation under similar conditions, it will be difficult to justify that the likelihood of the reoccurrence of the event will qualify as remote or extremely remote. This requirement is substantively the same as current practice under § 431.35(c) and is specifically called out in § 437.55(a)(3) for experimental permits. Examples of suggested likelihood categories for remote and extremely remote are provided in FAA's Advisory Circular (AC) 437.55-1 "Hazard Analyses for the Launch or Reentry of a Reusable Suborbital Rocket Under an Experimental Permit" as 1 x 10-5 and 1 x 10-6, respectively.
The operator would then need to identify and describe risk elimination and mitigation measures as required by proposed § 450.109(a)(4). The operator should always consider whether the risk mitigation measures introduce new hazards. This proposed section codifies current practice under the § 431.35(c) broad system safety analysis requirement. Although not required, system safety standards and advisory material such as MIL-STD-882E, AC 437.55-1, and AC 431.35-2A "Reusable Launch and Reentry Vehicle System Safety Process" recommend that operators develop risk elimination or mitigation approaches in the following order:
1. Design for minimum risk. The first priority should be to eliminate hazards through appropriate design or operational choices.\69\ If an operator cannot eliminate a risk, it should minimize it through design or operational choices.
\69\ An example of designing out risk to the public would be to operate in an unpopulated area.
2. Incorporate safety devices. If an operator cannot eliminate hazards through design or operation selection, then an operator should reduce risks through the use of active or passive safety devices.\70\
\70\ An example of an active safety device would be a computing system that automatically shuts down the rocket engine when a sensor detects high thrust chamber temperatures. A passive safety device might be a firewall to prevent a fire from reaching a pilot.
3. Provide warning devices. When neither design nor safety devices can eliminate or adequately reduce identified risks, the operator should use a device to detect and warn of the hazardous condition to minimize the likelihood of inappropriate human reaction and response.\71\
\71\ An example of a warning device would be an abort indicator such as a flashing light or a message on a cockpit instrument panel.
4. Implement procedures and training. When it is impractical to eliminate risks through design or safety and warning devices, the operator should develop and implement procedures and training that mitigate the risks.\72\
\72\ An example of risk mitigation procedures and training are abort procedures and rehearsals of those procedures.
Proposed § 450.109(a)(5) would require that the risk elimination and mitigation measures achieve the proposed risk levels in § 450.109(a)(3) through verification and validation. Verification ensures the measures themselves are properly developed and implemented while validation ensures the measures will actually achieve the desired outcome. Verification takes place while developing the measures and validation after development and implementation. This requirement is substantively the same as current practice under § 431.35(c). The acceptable methods of verifying safety measures are:
1. Analysis: Technical or mathematical evaluation, mathematical models, simulations, algorithms, and circuit diagrams.
2. Test: Actual operation to evaluate performance of system elements during ambient conditions or in operational environments at or above expected levels. These tests include functional tests and environmental tests.
3. Demonstration: Actual operation of the system or subsystem under specified scenarios, often used to verify reliability, transportability, maintainability, serviceability, and human engineering factors.
4. Inspection: Examination of hardware, software, or documentation to verify compliance of the feature with predetermined criteria.
An operator could use methods separately or combine them depending on the feasibility of the methods and the maturity of the vehicle and operation.
Proposed § 450.109(b) would require that an applicant establish and document the criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards throughout the launch or reentry system lifecycle. Development, implementation, and continued operation of any system requires that changes be made throughout the lifecycle. Changes to the vehicle, especially to safety-critical systems and operations, can have significant impacts on public safety and will result in changes to the hazard analysis. Anomalies and failures can also identify unknown hazards. This requirement is substantively the same as the FAA's current practice under § 431.35(c). Parts 415 and 417 do not have a flight hazard analysis requirement.
Proposed § 450.109(c) would require that the flight hazard analysis be updated and complete for every launch or reentry. In other words, the analysis must be applicable to the specific mission. A hazard analysis for a previous mission may be used only if the vehicle and operational details of the mission do not impact the validity of any aspect of the hazard analysis. The FAA has not prescribed the methodology that an operator must follow to ensure the accuracy of a flight hazard analyses. However, this item is key to ensuring that the operator is aware of the hazards in the proposed operation.
Proposed § 450.109(d) requires that an operator continually update the flight hazard analysis throughout the operational lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. This requirement is substantively the same as current FAA practice under § 431.35(c).
Proposed § 450.109(e) establishes the flight hazard analysis application requirements. An applicant would be required to submit a flight hazard analysis in its application to provide the FAA with sufficient detail to evaluate the applicant's flight hazard analyses and its criteria and techniques for identifying new hazards throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. The FAA recommends that the applicant provide at a minimum a hazard table that provides a description of each hazard identified, associated severity and likelihood of each hazard, the mitigation measures identified for each hazard, and a summary of the validation and verification of each hazard. For hazards that require mitigation, the applicant would also be required to provide the data showing the verification of those mitigations measures. The FAA expects the results of any testing or analysis associated with the verification to be in a format that is easily understood by an experienced technical evaluator. For items verified by analysis, the applicant should provide the assumptions and methodology used to conduct the analyses if it is not easily understood by evaluating the results. These application requirements would not require more than the current practices under § 431.35(c) and (d).
G. Computing Systems and Software Overview
G. Computing Systems and Software Overview
The FAA is proposing to address hazards associated with computing systems and software separate from flight hazard analysis. The FAA would consolidate all software safety requirements applicable to launch or reentry operations in a single section, in proposed § 450.111 (Computing Systems and Software).\73\ These proposed regulations address both software and how the software operates on the intended hardware and computing systems.\74\ While the FAA discusses hardware requirements elsewhere under the safety-critical systems requirements, it is important to recognize that software safety cannot be evaluated outside of the computing system in which it operates.\75\ A computing system is a complete system made up of the central processing unit, memory, related electronics, and peripheral devices.
\73\ For the purpose of this discussion, the phrase "software safety requirements" refers to software safety regulations and "software requirements" refers to the specifications that define a software component's intended functionality.
\74\ The FAA understands software to mean a combination of computer instructions and computer data that enables a computer to perform computational and control functions.
\75\ Hardware is the collection of physical parts of a computer system, including memory storage devices, power sources, and processors that execute software.
These proposed software safety requirements would streamline the software safety evaluation process by adding detail to the performance-based requirements in the existing rules. The software safety requirements in the proposed rule are levied in proportion to the potential software hazards and the degree of control over those hazards.\76\ In other words, software safety requirements would increase in rigor with the rise in potential safety risks and degree of autonomy. Conversely, software safety requirements would decrease in rigor with reductions in the potential safety risk or degree of autonomy.\77\ This approach would codify existing FAA practice of modulating the stringency of review commensurate with the level of public risk. The FAA would also add more clarity to the software scaled requirements to guide applicants to appropriate and predictable engineering judgments when determining the proper depth and breadth of software development, analysis, and verification activities. The FAA expects these changes would enable innovation by setting predictable safety requirements based on knowable characteristics of new software systems and in proportion to the risks involved with the innovation. For a detailed discussion, please see the Additional Technical Justification and Rationale discussion later in the preamble.
\76\ For the purpose of this rulemaking, software hazards are those hazardous conditions created by the execution of software, or for which software is used as a mitigation or control.
\77\ The FAA uses the phrase "level of rigor" to describe the amount of precision and effort applied by an applicant to address the severity of a hazard and associated software autonomy.
H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles
H. Hybrid Launch Vehicles
Hybrid vehicles are vehicles that have some characteristics of aircraft and other characteristics of traditional launch or reentry vehicles. This proposal would allow an operator to forego the use of flight abort as a hazard control strategy during certain phases of flight if the hybrid launch or reentry vehicle has a high demonstrated reliability during those phases of flight. The FAA would make these determinations on a case-by-case basis based on a vehicle's demonstrated reliability.
The FAA may regulate hybrid vehicles under either the commercial space transportation or the civil aircraft regulations, depending on the operation. For a flight of a hybrid vehicle where a carrier aircraft has been modified to carry a rocket and the operator intends to ignite the rocket, the FAA considers the aircraft a component of the launch vehicle.\78\ The combination launch vehicle system is authorized solely by a vehicle operator license or experimental permit under Title 51. The FAA currently authorizes the operation of hybrid vehicles using a license or permit for the entire mission from preflight ground activities through taxi, take off, flight, landing, wheel stop, and post-flight safing for all components of the combined launch vehicle system. The FAA has granted a license to hybrid vehicles such as the Stargazer/Pegasus, WhiteKnightOne/SpaceShipOne, WhiteKnightTwo/ SpaceShipTwo, and Cosmic Girl/LauncherOne combinations.
In addition to carrier aircraft models, hybrid vehicles may also include future concepts such as a single vehicle with both air-breathing and rocket engines, winged launch or reentry vehicles, balloon-launched rockets, and other concepts that may have characteristics of both aviation and traditional launch or reentry vehicles.\79\ The FAA will work with applicants using hybrid vehicles during pre-application to identify the appropriate regulatory path. To date, the FAA has issued guidance in two legal interpretations on the process for determining whether flights or portions of flights of hybrid vehicles are regulated under title 49 or Title 51.\80\ As new hybrid concepts are unveiled, the FAA anticipates issuing additional guidance to assist operators.
\78\ "Chapter 509 applies when [a hybrid] system operates as a launch vehicle from the flight of the carrier aircraft, through ignition of the rocket, to the return and landing of the carrier aircraft and the suborbital rocket. For a mission that does not entail ignition of the rocket, the FAA's aviation statute and regulations apply." See Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury (September 26, 2013).
\79\ An example of a hybrid vehicle that does not use a carrier aircraft is the World View capsule. This capsule is not a rocket, but it meets the definition of a launch vehicle because it operates at an altitude where it needs to be designed, built, and tested to operate in outer space. See Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury, September 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf). Similar to other hybrid vehicles, when not operating as a launch vehicle, World View will operate under the appropriate aviation provisions of title 49.
\80\ Legal Interpretation to Kelvin B. Coleman from Lorelei Peter, July 23, 2018; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2018/coleman-ast-1%20-%20(2018)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf); Legal Interpretation to Pamela L. Meredith from Mark W. Bury, Sept. 26, 2013; (https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/interpretations/data/interps/2013/meredith-zuckertscoutt&rasenberger%20-%20(2013)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf).
The FAA has worked with and received input from industry on how to regulate hybrid vehicles. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, the FAA convened a Safety Risk Management (SRM) panel consisting of FAA and industry representatives to review and assess hazards associated with captive carry operations.\81\ The panel recommended dispensing with any aircraft hazard area requirement during the captive carry phase of flight for previously licensed hybrid vehicles with fixed-wing carrier aircraft. The ARC also recommended that the FAA set a different standard for hybrid vehicles, specifically that the FAA not require an FSA for operations where the agency has already considered impacts to public safety during the airworthiness certification process. Additionally, the ARC recommended that an operator only be required to conduct an FSA for those portions of flight when the hazardous configuration of the hybrid system differs from that approved under an experimental airworthiness certificate or equivalent authorization.
\81\ The SRM panel members included FAA representatives from the Air Traffic Organization, Aviation Safety, and the Office of Commercial Space Transportation. The panel also included civil aviation and commercial space participants such as the Air Line Pilots Association, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Orbital ATK, Virgin Galactic, Virgin Orbit, and Mojave Air and Space Port.
As discussed earlier, the FAA proposes to provide flexibility for certain phases of flight with respect to FSA (proposed § 450.113(a)(5)) and FSS (proposed § 450.101(c)) requirements. This is consistent with the ARC's recommendation. The FAA recognizes that airworthiness certificates and licenses, when developed collaboratively between the Aviation Safety and Commercial Space Transportation lines of business, sufficiently protect the public. In these cases, the FAA would include a license term and condition for a current airworthiness certificate. Specifically, the license would impose terms and conditions such as compliance with certain part 91 (General Operating and Flight Rules) requirements and airworthiness operating limitations, not including any restrictions on compensation or hire. This blended approach of combining airworthiness with part 450's system safety requirements would ensure public safety without the need for an FSA.
This proposal would reduce FSA, CEC, and FSS requirements for phases of flight such as the captive carry phase, the carrier-vehicle-alone phase, and any rocket component glide back. The captive carry phase of flight starts when the carrier vehicle takes off carrying the rocket aloft and transports it to the rocket release location. The carrier-vehicle-alone phase starts when the carrier vehicle releases the rocket, and includes all flight activities in support of the mission until the carrier vehicle lands and is safed. During the carrier-vehicle-alone phase, the rocket component is conducting its rocket-powered and coast phases. The rocket coast phase occurs immediately after the rocket engine shuts down, and is not considered an aviation-like glide phase because the pilot does not have significant control authority over the instantaneous impact point (the predicted impact point following thrust termination of a vehicle). For returning rockets, there may be a glide phase which begins at a point to be determined on a case-by-case basis after the vehicle completes any reconfiguration necessary and demonstrates non-rocket powered control authority and ends when the vehicle lands.
The FAA would work with hybrid vehicle applicants during pre-application consultation to determine the applicability of FSA, CEC, and FSS requirements. For example, the FAA might determine the quantitative FSA requirement for those portions of a mission where the vehicle operates as a civil aviation aircraft governed by civil aviation regulations (as incorporated into the license) is unnecessary because the vehicle has demonstrated reliability during that phase as indicated by the issuance of an airworthiness certificate. Thus, an applicant would not have to conduct the quantitative FSA for the aircraft-like controllable phases of flight, such as the captive carry phase or for phases with non-rocket powered or glide phases previously authorized under an airworthiness certificate. This would not normally be the case during the rocket-powered, coast, reentry, or glide back phases of flight that are unique to space flight. All other regulatory requirements, including system safety requirements, would apply to the entire mission. Due to the unknown operating characteristics of future hybrid vehicles, the FAA is not proposing to provide a blanket FSA exemption for all hybrid systems.
I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview
I. Flight Safety Analysis Overview
For purposes of this proposed rule, a flight safety analysis consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to determine flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard areas, and other mitigation measures, and to verify compliance with the public safety criteria in proposed § 450.101. The FAA proposes 15 sections for flight safety analysis. The analyses are described here briefly because of their overall importance to the regulation and are discussed in greater detail in the "Additional Technical Justification and Rationale" section. Furthermore, the FAA plans to publish updated ACs and guidelines to describe acceptable means to conduct these analyses.
The first two sections for FSA would outline the scope, applicability, and methods for conducting FSAs:
1. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and Applicability (§ 450.113). This section would establish the portions of flight for which an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA and would identify the analyses required for each type of operation.
2. Flight Safety Analysis Methods (§ 450.115). This section would set methodology requirements for FSAs, including level of fidelity.
Three sections would require fundamental flight safety analyses:
1. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight (§ 450.117). All the FSAs depend on some form of analysis of the trajectory under normal conditions, referred to as a normal trajectory.
2. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight (§ 450.119). A malfunction trajectory analysis is necessary to determine how far a vehicle can deviate from its normal flight path in case of a malfunction. This analysis helps determine impact points in case of a malfunction and is therefore a vital input for the analyses needed to demonstrate compliance with risk criteria.
3. Debris Analysis (§ 450.121). A debris analysis is necessary to characterize the debris generated in various failure scenarios, including those that could produce an intact vehicle impact.
Four analyses would produce information necessary to implement flight abort as a hazard control strategy:
1. Flight Safety Limits Analysis (§ 450.123). A flight safety limit analysis is necessary to identify uncontrolled areas and establish flight safety limits that define when an operator must initiate flight abort to (1) ensure compliance with the public safety criteria of proposed § 450.101, and (2) prevent debris capable of causing a casualty from impacting in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is outside the limits of a useful mission.
2. Gate Analysis (§ 450.125). A gate analysis is necessary to determine necessary openings in a flight safety limit through which a vehicle may fly, provided the vehicle meets certain pre-defined conditions indicating an ability to continue safe flight.
3. Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight State Analyses (§ 450.127). A data loss flight time analysis is necessary to establish when an operator must abort a flight following the loss of vehicle tracking information. A planned safe flight state analysis is necessary to determine when an FSS is no longer necessary.
4. Time Delay Analysis (§ 450.129). A time delay analysis is necessary to establish the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight abort rule and the time when the flight safety system is capable of aborting flight for use in establishing flight safety limits.
One section addresses probability of failure analysis:
1. Probability of Failure Analysis (§ 450.131). During any particular flight or phase of flight, an estimated probability of failure, and how that probability is allocated across flight time and vehicle response mode, is necessary to support the determination of hazard areas and risk.
One section addresses the determination of flight hazard areas:
1. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (§ 450.133). This analysis is necessary to determine any region of land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to protect the public health and safety, and safety of property.
Three sections would be necessary to determine whether risk criteria are met for different types of hazards:
1. Debris Risk Analysis (§ 450.135). A debris risk analysis is necessary to determine whether the individual and collective risks of public casualties, due to inert and explosive debris hazards meets public safety criteria.
2. Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis (§ 450.137). This analysis is necessary to determine whether the potential public hazard from broken windows as a result of impacting explosive debris, including impact of an intact launch vehicle, meets public safety criteria.
3. Toxic Hazards for Flight (§ 450.139). This analysis is necessary to determine whether hazards associated with toxic release meet public safety criteria.
Lastly, one section is necessary for the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting as a hazard control strategy. A launch vehicle using other mitigations would not be required to conduct this analysis:
1. Wind Weighting for the Flight of an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle (§ 450.141). This section would outline a wind weighting analysis that is required to ensure that the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle using wind weighting as a hazard control strategy meets public safety criteria.
J. Safety-Critical Systems
J. Safety-Critical Systems
1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation
The FAA proposes to consolidate the design, test, and documentation requirements for safety-critical components in proposed § 450.143 (Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and Documentation). A common set of requirements is needed for clarity and consistency.
1. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation
Safety-critical systems or components include those systems or components whose performance is essential to ensuring public safety. Historically, the FAA has considered the FSS to be the only safety-critical system on an ELV. For RLVs and reentry vehicles, the use of a systematic, logical, and disciplined system safety process is meant to identify safety-critical systems and the extent of prudent operational controls.\82\ If a system failure would cause any hazards and those hazards could reach a populated area, then the system is likely a safety-critical system. Generally, RLV operators incorporate FSSs, although they may also incorporate other safety-critical elements of risk mitigation and hazard control. Non-RLV reentry vehicles also require a thorough system safety process to identify safety-critical hardware.
\82\ Some of the more commonly used methodologies include Preliminary Hazard Lists (PHL), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), Event Tree Analyses (ETA), Fault Tree Analyses (FTA), FMEAs, and FMECAs. Generally, these methodologies help operators determine whether a system failure could cause a loss of vehicle control, a vehicle breakup or other creation of uncontrolled debris, a discharge of hazardous material, or would prevent safe landing.
The current rules for ELV, RLV, and reentry vehicle safety-critical systems are quite different. However, in practice, the evaluation of the safety of such systems is very similar. Parts 415 and 417 require ELVs to have very reliable hazard-constraining FSSs that ensure public safety. These FSSs are subject to design requirements, extensive design qualification testing, and acceptance testing of all components. RLVs and reentry vehicles are required to undergo a comprehensive system safety engineering process that, in part, identifies and eliminates hazards to reduce the associated risk to acceptable levels by defining safety-critical systems and identifying associated hazards and risks. Under system safety, an operator develops design-level safety requirements and provides evidence for verification and validation of safety-critical systems and requirements. For safety-critical systems this serves the purpose of design qualification and acceptance. Given that RLVs are built to experience multiple flights, the lifecycle \83\ of safety-critical systems must also be considered as part of the design, testing, and documentation.
\83\ Many operators seek to refurbish or otherwise reuse safety-critical systems for multiple flights. Operators must design, test, and document safety-critical systems to demonstrate their safety-critical systems can continue to operate reliably throughout the component life in all predicted operating environments.
i. Current Qualification and Acceptance Testing Requirements
i. Current Qualification and Acceptance Testing Requirements
Qualification testing is an assessment of a prototype or other structural article to verify the structural integrity of a design. Generally, qualification testing involves testing the design under a number of different environmental factors to stress the design, with a multiplying factor applied to the expected environmental testing limit. This qualification testing is conducted for temperatures, tensile loads, handling shocks, and other expected environmental stressors.
Unlike qualification testing that is performed on qualification units, acceptance testing is performance testing conducted on the actual hardware to be used on a vehicle after the completion of the manufacturing process. Generally, acceptance tests are performed on each article of the safety-critical flight hardware to verify that it is free of defects, free of integration and workmanship errors, and ready for operational use. Acceptance testing includes testing for defects, along with environmental testing similar to the qualification testing described earlier.
For ELVs, qualification and acceptance testing are important verification of the reliability of all FSSs at the subsystem and component level, and ensures the safe operability of the only safety-critical system on any given ELV. For ELVs, current qualification and acceptance testing requirements and procedures for FSS subsystems and components are listed in Sec. § 417.305, 417.307, and appendix E of part 417 (E417). As FSSs are the only safety-critical systems on traditional ELVs, the component-level testing requirements in part 417 describe the testing of specific possible components in great detail, going so far as to differentiate testing requirements for silver-zinc batteries in E417.21 from nickel-cadmium batteries in E417.22. While the FAA has approved alternative FSSs, the prescription level of the current requirements discourages significant innovation.
The same emphasis on validation of design and verification of hardware tolerances applies to components that have been identified as safety-critical during a system safety process. For RLVs and reentry vehicles, a system safety process is required by § 431.35(c).\84\ Under the system safety process, a vehicle designer must assess nominal and non-nominal flight scenarios of the vehicle and must account for any possible safety-critical system failures during flight that could result in a casualty to the public. Those vehicle operators are required, by § 431.35(d)(3), to identify all safety-critical systems and are required by § 431.35(d)(7) to demonstrate the risk elimination in relation to those safety-critical systems. While not explicitly called out in the current part 431 or 435, qualification and acceptance testing are the widely accepted standards for demonstrating that safety-critical systems, subsystems, and components are not at risk of failing during flight.
\84\ Section 431.35(c) is required for reentry vehicles by § 435.33.
Current regulations are undefined with respect to the applicability of qualification and testing of safety-critical components that are not listed in Sec. § 417.301(b), 417.305 and 417.307, or appendix E of part 417. The regulations are similarly ambiguous if the vehicle does not have a traditional FSS but still has components that are considered safety-critical, like many vehicles licensed under part 431. This ambiguity has led to regulatory uncertainty, which in turn has resulted in lengthy exchanges between the FAA and license applicants about what components and systems needed to be tested, what testing would be acceptable to the FAA, and why that testing was necessary to be compliant. Testing is currently generally required for safety-critical systems across all vehicle types, either explicitly or as verification and validation in the system safety process, but this is often not well-reflected in the current regulations. As a result, applicants often are confused by qualification testing requirements asserted by the FAA for RLVs when there are no explicit qualification testing requirements in part 431. ii. Current Fault Tolerance Requirements
Fault-tolerance is the idea that a system must be designed so that it is able to perform its function in the event of a failure of one or more of its components. In a fault-tolerant design of a safety-critical system, no single credible fault should be capable of increasing the risk to public safety beyond that of a nominal operation. Typically, a fault-tolerant design applies redundancy or a system of safety barriers to ensure the system can function, though perhaps with reduced performance. An example of a fault-tolerant design is an aircraft with multiple engines that can continue flying even if one of the engines fails.
The current part 417 regulations cover fault-tolerant design of FSS components as a set of explicit prescriptive requirements. For instance, § 417.303(d) specifically lists fault-tolerance as a requirement of an FSS command control system design, requiring that no single failure point be able to inhibit the system's function or inadvertently transmit a flight termination command. An operator must demonstrate that the command system, in accordance with § 417.309(c), is fault tolerant through analysis, identification of possible failure modes, implementation of redundant systems or other mitigation measures, and verification that the mitigation measures will not fail simultaneously. Appendix D of part 417 (section D417.5) further details single fault tolerance and prescribes redundancy of command strings that are structurally, electrically, and mechanically separated to ensure that any failure that would damage, destroy, or otherwise inhibit the operation of one redundant component would not inhibit the operation of the other redundant component.
The current ELV regulations are prescriptive and often dictate specific implementations of fault-tolerance where other forms may be adequate. For instance, a fail-safe approach has been used in the rationale of past applicants that use thrust termination systems to protect public safety. A fail-safe design is a system that can fail in a controlled way, such that the failure will still ensure public safety, like elevator brakes held open by the tension of the elevator cable such that if the cable snaps the brakes engage and stop the elevator from falling. The FAA has granted waivers to the redundancy requirement of section D417.5(c) for fail-safe safety-critical systems that have been integrated in such a way that a loss of power to that system would result in direct thrust termination of the launch vehicle though deactivation of normally-closed valves. Also, ELOS determinations have been issued for flight termination receivers that have fail-safe commands that are issued on signal loss because the failure of the system automatically results in termination of the flight and the constraint of flight hazards. Less prescriptive fault-tolerant design regulations could enable such designs instead of requiring waivers or ELOS determinations.
Operations licensed under parts 431 and 435 may not have traditional FSSs, but the need for fault-tolerance is implicitly derived from the system safety process of § 431.35(c) and (d), as it is often a necessary control for an identified hazard. The FAA views fault-tolerance as a necessary characteristic of any reliable system.
The current fault tolerance provisions lack clarity in the scope of their applicability to RLVs and reentry vehicles because they are implicit in the system safety processes of hazard identification and mitigation. As with the testing requirements, a lack of regulatory clarity is detrimental to both applicants and the FAA, leading to confusion, a drawn-out application acceptance process, and lengthy discussions to arrive at a clear understanding of how fault tolerance is applicable to a proposed operation. iii. Current Reuse Requirements
Safety-critical FSSs of ELVs generally undergo a single flight. Therefore, very little life-cycle planning is required for them unless an operator seeks to reuse certain safety-critical components. However, ELV operators must still account for environments that the FSS is expected to encounter throughout the lifecycle of the system, including storage, transportation, installation, and flight, which generally are built into qualification and acceptance testing levels. Lifecycle planning is a more significant concern for reusable safety-critical systems because near-total reuse is an expected part of their operation.
Current parts 415 and 417 contain requirements for the reuse of ELV FSS components. To be a licensed ELV operator, an applicant must submit to the FAA any reuse qualification testing, refurbishment, and acceptance testing plans, in accordance with § 415.129(f). Those test plans must show that any FSS component is still capable of performing as required when subjected to the qualification test environmental levels plus the total number of exposures to the maximum expected environmental levels for each of the flights to be flown. Previously flown FSSs must also abide by Sec. E417.13(a)(3), and the components must undergo one or more reuse acceptance tests before each flight to demonstrate that the component still satisfies all its performance specifications when subjected to each maximum predicted environment. Additionally, tests for reuse must compare performance measurements to all previous tests to ensure no trends emerge that indicate performance degradation in the component that could prevent the component from satisfying all its performance specifications during flight. As the lines have blurred between ELVs with significantly reusable safety-critical systems and RLVs, these requirements still contain good safety policy, but they are constrained by their limited coverage of only traditional FSSs.
While operations licensed under part 431 are focused on RLVs, neither part 431 nor part 435 contain any explicit requirements placed on reuse. Like all other aspects of safety-critical system requirements, reuse under these parts is governed by the system safety process of § 431.35. Safety-critical systems that do not account for expected lifecycle, refurbishment, and reuse do not adequately meet the hazard identification and risk mitigation of the system safety requirements. Implicit in the system safety requirements, commensurate testing is required to demonstrate that the planned lifecycle performance remains accurate. Reuse of safety-critical components is a potential hazard that needs to be mitigated.
Reuse induces stress on components and systems that can degrade operational performance if not accounted for in design and testing. Additionally, "reuse" implies multiple uses of a component after its initial intended lifetime or outside of its initial intended operating environments. Based on industry best practices, intended use and lifetime should be designed into components initially; qualification and acceptance testing should be based on predicted operating environments that encompass the entire lifetime of a system; and lifecycle management practices should be used to refine initial predictions. The current lack of a clear, unified, and simple requirement that explicitly covers reuse for all safety-critical systems leads to prescriptive constraints on ELV operators and regulatory confusion for RLV and reentry operators who are unfamiliar with the implicit requirements of a system safety process. iv. Consolidation of Design, Test and Documentation Requirements
The FAA proposes to consolidate the design, test and documentation requirements for safety-critical systems and components, both identified by a system safety process and as part of an FSS, currently found in parts 415 and 417, 431, and 435. Specifically, the FAA proposes to provide performance-based requirements for safety-critical systems, including fault tolerant design, design qualification testing, hardware acceptance testing, and the verification of flight environments to assess the life-cycle of safety-critical systems for reuse purposes.
Under proposed § 450.143, all safety-critical systems would be required to meet these requirements, including a FSS that also would be required to meet the additional requirements of proposed § 450.145. By having a consistent set of overarching requirements regulating the design, testing, and documentation of safety-critical systems and hardware, the FAA anticipates that applicants would be enabled to implement new risk-mitigating design strategies under a clear and consolidated regulatory regime. New technologies that emerge would be covered by the general requirements without causing regulatory delays due to confusion, increasing paperwork burdens required for requesting waivers, or waiting for future rulemaking changes necessary to allow emerging technologies. These criteria would be the standards for demonstrating that such systems can survive and perform to an adequate level of safety in all operating environments.
The ARC recommended that better standards need to be developed regarding safety-critical systems. The ARC pointed out that there is no single process or procedure that documents an acceptable way to go through a system design and determine safety-criticality, and it asked for better guidance on safety-criticality, given that usually industry views criticality more from a mission assurance point of view. More generally, the ARC requested a more performance-based regulatory regime, with a clearer focus on safety and greater flexibility for novel operations. In regards to reuse and maintenance, the ARC suggested that requirements should be focused on maintaining reliability of inputs. The ARC specifically called out the section E417.13 requirement to remove and recomplete acceptance testing prior to reuse of flight safety system components between each flight as an untenable burden both in terms of cost and time. Furthermore, the ARC also noted that continued acceptance testing of flight hardware to predict environmental levels plus margins puts undue strain on flight systems and can significantly reduce their lifespan.
To remedy the confusion resulting from a current lack of regulatory clarity for RLVs and reentry vehicles, proposed § 450.143(c) and (d) would explicitly require qualification testing of the design and acceptance testing of the safety-critical flight hardware. To remedy the implied design constraints of current detailed requirements for ELVs, proposed § 450.143(c) and (d) would be general, high-level requirements for demonstrating the performance of safety-critical system design, and that the system is operational and free from defects and errors.
Specifically, proposed § 450.143(c) would require an operator to functionally demonstrate \85\ the design of a vehicle's safety-critical systems at conditions beyond its predicted operating environment. The design qualification tests should include enough margin beyond predicted operating environments to demonstrate that the system design can tolerate manufacturing variance or environmental uncertainties without performance degradation.
\85\ Functional demonstration is generally achieved through testing.
Proposed § 450.143(d)(1) would require operators to perform a functional demonstration of any safety-critical systems by exposing them to their predicted operating environment with margin. The performance of the flight hardware during the test would be required to demonstrate that the flight units are free of defects, integration or workmanship errors, and are ready for operational use. Alternatively, an applicant would be able to comply with proposed § 450.143(d)(2) instead of proposed § 450.143(d)(1). If an applicant chooses to comply with proposed § 450.143(d)(2), it would be required to ensure functional capability and that the flight hardware remains free from error and defect during its service life through a combination of in-process controls and a quality assurance process. This flexible approach to acceptance testing would relieve some of the burdens of a traditional acceptance testing regime and would add clarity that these demonstrations are required for all safety-critical flight hardware.
Proposed § 450.143 would clearly state the requirements for all safety-critical system components and eliminate the ambiguity that exists in the current regulations regarding required testing of safety-critical system components that are not a part of an FSS. While FSSs are safety-critical systems, their criticality requires additional requirements beyond proposed § 450.143. The consolidated performance requirements for FSS components are detailed in proposed § 450.145, and are discussed in the "Flight Safety System" section of this preamble.
As the proposed rule seeks to make the safety requirements of § 450.143 applicable to all commercial space launch and reentry vehicles, there should be better clarity across the industry and the government regarding what is required of safety-critical systems for both design qualification testing and flight hardware acceptance testing. Also, as recommended by the ARC, the FAA's proposal would allow for the possibility of other forms of acceptance testing methodologies and quality controls, subject to approval of the FAA, for safety-critical components that are not directly covered by the flight safety system requirements. This option should enable new business practices but maintain the safety verification necessary to ensure public safety.
The ARC did not speak specifically to fault tolerant design but did indicate that vehicle reliability and architecture should be considerations in the FAA's evaluation of novel systems. Proposed § 450.143(b) would require an applicant's safety-critical system to be designed so that no single credible fault would impact public safety. This proposal would provide clarity to the scope of the requirement of fault-tolerance by defining it as an explicit design performance requirement. It would replace many specific prescriptive requirements in part 417's subpart D and appendices D and E with a single general performance requirement and clarify the scope of applicability for RLV and reentry vehicle applicants. Additionally, by requiring only that the safety-critical systems be designed to be fault tolerant so that no single credible fault can lead to increased risk to public safety, the proposed regulations would allow flexibility as to the method an operator uses to comply with the requirements. For example, the FAA anticipates that an operator might choose to comply with proposed § 450.143(b) with a design that provides for redundancy for systems that can be duplicated or through damage-tolerant design for those safety-critical systems (like primary structures) that cannot be redundant. It is expected that this flexibility would accommodate technical innovation. Additionally, an operator would be able to satisfy the fault-tolerance requirement by fail-safe designs that have traditionally been approved through ELOS determinations, eliminating the need for applicants to apply for additional FAA review and evaluation.
The ARC advised the FAA to focus on verifying the veracity of maintenance processes for reuse, combined with alternatives to acceptance testing on per flight basis. The FAA believes it has addressed the testing alternatives in this NPRM and agrees that the processes and procedures to ensure safety-critical systems are safe for reuse are an important part of lifecycle validation. Given safety-critical systems are essential to public safety, the FAA proposes that an operator would be required to validate predicted operating environments against actual operating environments and assess component life throughout the lifecycle of the safety-critical unit. This validation can be done through an initial fatigue life assessment and continual accounting of remaining components life or through a comprehensive inspection and maintenance program that accounts for damage accumulation and fault detection.
Proposed § 450.143(e) would require that predicted operating environments be based on conditions expected to be encountered in all phases of flight, recovery, preparation, and transportation. It would also require an operator to monitor the environments experienced by safety-critical systems in order to validate the predicated operating environment and assess the actual component life left or to adjust inspection periods. While the system safety and FSS approaches to reuse can further define specific requirements, the FAA proposes more general requirements on the operator to account for the complete lifecycle of each safety-critical system, considering the design, testing, and use of safety-critical components. Allowing operators to determine a proposed lifecycle for a safety-critical system, to demonstrate operational capabilities and environmental endurance through testing, to devise processes for monitoring the lifecycle of the safety-critical system, and setting criteria and procedures for refurbishment or replacement allows operators flexibility in their business plans. Having this flexibility would allow applicants to demonstrate to the FAA how they would ensure reused safety-critical components will not degrade in performance. The FAA anticipates that such a demonstration would include elements such as qualification of the design for its intended lifetime; acceptance testing to screen components; monitoring of environmental levels during use; and monitoring component health through inspections for either disposal or refurbishment.
While the lifecycle management requirement would give the applicant flexibility on implementation, the proposed rule would require applicants to consider the implementation details such as maintenance, inspection, and consumable replacement. With the flexibility of the top-level requirement, applicants could continue to employ rigorous, per flight acceptance testing of safety-critical components, or with enough flight data they may be able to employ a system more similar to commercial aviation where flown components can be assessed in light of the actual operating environment and planned component reuse does not require component testing on a per flight basis. Monitoring of environments and assessment of safety-critical hardware for reuse is expected to affect the probability of failure that would feed back into FSAs as a check that risk to public safety is not increased. These flexible, top-level requirements for safety-critical systems would make explicit the currently implicit reuse requirements of parts 431 and 435's system safety process, improving regulatory clarity and operational flexibility, while still requiring the important planning, monitoring, and assessments necessary to ensure public safety.
To demonstrate compliance with the proposed performance requirements, the FAA proposes clear application requirements in § 450.143(f). As in the current § 431.35(d)(3) and (5), an applicant would have to describe and diagram all safety-critical systems in its application. Similar requirements exist for ELV flight safety systems of part § 415.127(b) and (c). Section 450.143(f)(3) also would require a summary of the analysis detailing how applicants arrived at the predicted operating environment and duration for all qualification and acceptance testing. This is current practice, and proposed § 450.143(e) makes this requirement explicit for RLVs and reentry vehicles. The proposed requirements are also more generalized and adaptable than the current component-level requirements for ELVs.
Under proposed § 450.143(f)(4) and (5), applicants would be required to detail their plans for lifecycle monitoring by describing any instrumentation or inspection processes used to assess reused safety-critical systems, and the criteria and procedures for any service life extension proposed for those system components. Much like the rest of the FAA's proposal, applicants of any vehicle type are already expected to provide this information, but the requirements have been distilled into high-level, generalized requirements to allow for maximum operational flexibility while still identifying the inputs the FAA needs to verify compliance with the safe performance and operation requirements. While FSSs are additionally subject to the requirements of proposed § 450.145, the proposed requirements for safety-critical systems would clarify existing practice and enable novel concepts of safety and safety-critical design. 2. Flight Safety System
An FSS is an integral tool to protect public health and safety and the safety of property from hazards presented by a vehicle in flight. An FSS allows an operator to exercise positive control of a launch or reentry vehicle, allowing an operator to destroy the vehicle, terminate thrust, or otherwise achieve flight abort. An extremely reliable FSS that controls the ending of vehicle flight according to properly established rules nearly ensures containment of hazards within acceptable limits. For that reason, the FAA considers an FSS a safety-critical system. The FAA currently requires an FSS for ELVs. Most RLVs--aside from unguided suborbital vehicles utilizing a wind weighting system or certain vehicles where the vehicle's operation is contained by physics--derive from the system safety process the need for some FSS to mitigate flight hazards.
Traditional FSSs for ELVs are comprised of an onboard flight termination system (FTS), a ground-based command and control system, and tracking and telemetry systems. Historically, the flight safety crew monitoring the course of a vehicle would send a command to self-destruct if the vehicle crossed flight safety limit lines and in doing so threatened a protected area. Redundant transceivers in the launch vehicle would receive the destruct command from the ground, set off charges in the vehicle to destroy the vehicle and disperse the propellants so that an errant vehicle's hazards would not impact populated areas. While this method of flight abort through ordnance is conventional, the FAA currently does not require an FSS to be destructive, as made explicit in the definitions of FSS in both Sec. § 401.5 and 417.3.
There has been some innovation in FSSs--thrust termination systems are used frequently and most RLVs can demonstrate regulatory compliance with part 431 with a safety system that achieves a controlled landing in the event of an aborted flight. As the commercial space transportation industry has matured, operators have proposed FSS alternatives. These alternative approaches include fail-safe single string systems that trade off mission assurance and redundancy, other fail-safe consequence mitigation systems, and dual purpose systems such as FSSs that reuse the output of safety-critical GPS components for primary navigation avionics. These alternative approaches are not well governed by the existing regulations. i. Current Regulatory Framework for FSS
The present ELV licensing requirements in parts 415 \86\ and 417 include lengthy and detailed requirements for the performance of an FSS and its components, as well as detailed testing and reporting requirements. These requirements were originally adopted to match current practices at Federal ranges. Section 417.107(a) identifies the need for an FSS while subpart D (Sec. § 417.301-417.311) identifies the performance requirements of an FSS and its component systems. Appendices D \87\ and E \88\ include prescriptive FSS design, performance, testing, and analysis requirements. Under part 417, an FSS must consist of an FTS, a command and control system,\89\ support systems (like tracking and telemetry),\90\ and identification of the functions of any personnel who operate FSS hardware or software.\91\ Together, these requirements allow for a very limited range of FSS concepts because they are primarily focused on containment of hazards by destruction of the vehicle or stage.
\86\ Part 415 contains the application requirements to demonstrate compliance with part 417 and the test report requirements to demonstrate compliance with the relevant appendices of part 417. Specifically, § 415.127 requires detailed descriptions and diagrams of the FSS and subsystems, a list of all system components that have a critical storage or service life, detailed descriptions of controls and displays, the system analyses of § 417.309, demonstration of compliance with the performance requirements, installation procedures, and tracking and monitoring validation procedures. Applicants must file all preliminary design data no later than 18 months before bringing any launch vehicle to a proposed launch site.
\87\ Appendix D lists very detailed performance requirements and design reliability requirements including fault tolerance and redundancy, environment survivability requirements, radio command destruct parameters, remote and redundant safing mechanisms, positively controlled arming mechanisms, installation procedures, and system health monitoring. It also requires vehicles to have an automatic or inadvertent separation destruct system for any stage that does not possess a complete command destruct system but is capable of reaching a protected area before the planned safe flight state.
\88\ Appendix E to part 417 contains the tests and analysis requirements to verify the performance requirements of FTSs and their components. It contains detailed component level charts for acceptance and qualification performance testing, including the number of samples (or percentage of the lot) that must undergo each test type. The testing plans must detail the environment, equipment, pass/fail criteria, measurements, other testing parameters, and any analyses planned in lieu of testing.
\89\ A command control system transmits a command signal that has the radio frequency characteristics and power needed for receipt of the signal by the flight termination system onboard the launch vehicle. The command control system must include equipment to ensure that an onboard flight termination system will receive a transmitted command signal and must meet specific performance requirements in § 417.303.
\90\ Currently, under § 417.307 an FSS must include two independent tracking sources and provide the launch vehicle position and status to the flight safety crew from liftoff until the vehicle reaches its planned safe flight state. Additionally, data processing, display, and recording systems must display, and record, raw input and processed data at no less than 0.1 second intervals.
\91\ As part of the current requirements for an FSS, § 417.311(a) requires human intervention capability for flight termination to be initiated by flight safety crew. Therefore, § 417.307 requires design, test, and functional requirements for systems that support the functions of a flight safety crew, including any vehicle tracking system.
Section 417.301(b) permits applicants to propose alternative FSSs, which do not need to satisfy one or more of the prescriptive requirements of subpart D of part 417. This provision is intended to enable greater flexibility for innovation without negatively impacting safety. The FAA approves an alternative FSS if an operator establishes through a clear and convincing demonstration that a launch would achieve an equivalent level of safety to an operation that satisfies all of the existing FSS requirements. Alternative FSS, like traditional FSS, must still undergo rigorous analysis and testing to demonstrate the system's reliability to perform each intended function.
Unlike ELVs, RLVs are not explicitly required to have an FSS, but the requirement for an FSS and its reliability requirement is derived as an essential hazard mitigation from a robust system safety process under part 431. This requirement falls under the § 431.35(c) requirement for applicants to use a system safety process to identify the hazards and mitigate risks to public health and safety under non-nominal flight of the vehicle and payload. An acceptable system safety analysis identifies and assesses the probability and consequences of any reasonably foreseeable hazardous event and safety-critical system failures during launch flight that could result in a casualty to the public. Based on current practice, most RLVs must have some method to reliably achieve flight abort to fully mitigate flight risks and consequences, either in the form of a pilot that can safely abort flight using system controls, a more traditional FSS that is designed and tested in the same manner as is required for ELVs, or a system that can meet the requirements for an alternative FSS under § 417.301(b). The lack of an explicit requirement for an FSS in part 431 often leads to confusion regarding what is expected for applicants mitigating hazards through flight abort.
Reentry vehicles under part 435 are also subject to a system safety process to identify hazards and mitigate risks to public health and safety under non-nominal flight of the reentry vehicle and any payload. Because § 435.33 points to part 431, an acceptable system safety analysis for reentry also assesses the probability and consequences of any reasonably foreseeable hazardous events during the reentry flight that could result in a casualty to the public. Unlike part 431, most part 435 reentries do not require an FSS because it is generally accepted that, if controlled reentries become uncontrolled, the vehicle is unlikely to substantially survive reentry. Due to the nature of the hazards associated with reentry, and since breakup is expected for non-nominal reentries, an FSS often cannot significantly ameliorate a reentry flight's risk or consequence. A reentry applicant must still account for the possibility of a random reentry in its risk analysis after attempting a reentry burn. ii. Autonomous Systems
Current regulations do not allow an operator to rely solely on an autonomous system to terminate a flight. At the time of their publication, human control capability was considered critical to safety because neither software nor hardware had been proven reliable to make flight termination decisions. Since that time, the FAA has approved the use of autonomous FSSs for ELVs by finding that they can meet the requirements of an alternative FSS under § 417.301(b). Applicants were able to demonstrate that the autonomous FSS achieved an equivalent level of safety to a launch with a human-in-the-loop as the risk to public safety was extremely low and the autonomous system had been flight tested in shadow mode. In past rulemakings, the FAA has made clear that, in requiring human intervention capability for activation of an FSS, the FAA did not intend to foreclose development or use of autonomous systems. However, despite those assurances and the FAA findings of equivalent safety, current FAA regulations still expressly require that a capability exist for a person to intervene and make decisions for FSS activation.
The FAA is proposing to update the regulations to match the current practice of allowing autonomous FSSs. By removing the outdated requirements for a human in-the-loop, the FAA believes that it would encourage further innovation without negatively impacting safety. The consequence analysis and reliability thresholds would continue to hold any potential autonomous FSS to the rigorous standards previously required of a human-initiated FSS, and the software as part of the autonomous FSS must be demonstrated to meet reliability requirements. With the recent advancements of the requisite technology and the performance constraints of the FSS, the FAA is confident that it is beneficial both to the commercial space transportation industry and public safety to explicitly allow flight abort to be governed by capable autonomous systems. iii. Current Requirement for Reliability of a FSS
Each FTS and command and control system must satisfy the predicted reliability requirement of 0.999 at the 95 percent confidence level. For FSSs on both ELVs and RLVs, there are effectively only two methods of currently demonstrating that a system meets reliability standards. The first method is to test 2,995 units at expected operating environment levels with 0 failures to demonstrate a 0.999 design reliability at a 95 percent confidence level. Given the cost of FSS components, the cost of testing, and the time required to conduct such tests, this is not practicable.
The second method arises out of RCC 319. The FSS requirements codified in part 417, including component performance requirements, and acceptance and qualification testing, were originally written to align FAA launch licensing requirements with the Federal launch range standards in RCC 319. Like part 417, RCC 319 requires qualification tests to demonstrate reliable operation in environments exceeding the expected operating environment for the system components, acceptance tests to demonstrate that the selected batch of components meets the requirements of the design specifications, and other preflight testing at the system or subsystem level to demonstrate functionality after installation.
The benefit of the part 417 and RCC 319 method is that for qualification tests, generally only three test units are required. Three units are required instead of many more because the units are tested with margin above their predicted operating environment. Testing three units with the margin specified achieves the required reliability and confidence levels of 0.999 design reliability at 95 percent confidence level, rather than having to test 2,995 units at the predicted operating environment with no margin. iv. Proposed Reliability Standards for FSS
Given the FAA anticipates that most commercial space vehicles will continue to control flight hazards through the use of FSSs, the FAA proposes in § 450.145 to continue to require a very reliable FSS in most instances. Under the current regulations, FSS not only enable an operation to meet the collective and individual risk criteria during flight but also protect against low-probability but high-consequence events near the launch site or when flying over populated areas. As previously discussed, the FAA's proposal to quantify these low-probability but high-consequence events as CEC in proposed § 450.101(c) would clearly delineate which operations are required to use an FSS to control for risks and consequences.\92\ The CEC calculation is the consequence, measured in terms of EC, without regard to the probability of failure.
\92\ As noted earlier, only operations that have a predicted consequence of 1 x 10-3 CEC or above for uncontrolled areas for each reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode in any one-second period of flight would be required to implement an FSS to abort flight as a hazard control strategy. An FSS would not be required for operations that can be shown to have a predicted consequence of less than 1 x 10-3 CEC; however, a hazard analysis would be required for any operations without a FSS or demonstrable physical containment.
The underlying intent of the current prescriptive requirements was to have an FSS that could reliably perform flight abort to restrict hazards from reaching populated or otherwise protected areas. The FAA also recognizes that vehicles operating in remote areas are less likely to have significant consequences in the case of a flight failure. For operations where the consequence of a flight failure is less, the FAA has determined that, while still being highly reliable, the FSS may not need to be as highly reliable as an FSS for a vehicle operating in an area where the consequence of a flight failure is higher. Generally, this proposed relaxation of the FSS reliability requirement--based on reduced potential consequence--is expected to be applicable to operations launching or reentering in remote locations or for stages that do not overfly population centers. In order to achieve these scalable, performance-based requirements, proposed § 450.145(a) would contain two reliability standards for an FSS.
Proposed § 450.145(a)(1) would require any operator with a consequence of 1 x 10-2 CEC or greater in any uncontrolled area for any vehicle response mode to employ an FSS with the standard design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate design, analysis, and testing. This reliability standard would be consistent with various sections of part 417, in particular § 417.309(b)(2), that require major FSS component systems, such as onboard flight termination systems and ground-based command control systems, to be tested to demonstrate 0.999 design reliability at 95 percent confidence. This reliability threshold would have to be demonstrated for the operation of the entire system, including any systems located on-board the launch or reentry vehicle, any ground-based systems, and any other component or support systems.
Alternatively, in order to make regulations adaptable to innovative operations while maintaining appropriate levels of safety, operations with lower potential consequences would require an FSS with less demonstrated design reliability at the same confidence. Proposed § 450.145(a)(2) would require any operator with a consequence of between 1 x 10-2 and 1 x 10-3 CEC in any uncontrolled area for any vehicle response mode to only employ an FSS with design reliability of at least 0.975 at 95 percent confidence and commensurate testing. The FAA considered simply setting the proposed § 450.145(a)(2) threshold an order of magnitude lower, at 0.99 design reliability with a 95 percent confidence, to reflect the order of magnitude less CEC from the consequence analysis. Absent other standards to demonstrate compliance with the reliability threshold, that would mean testing 299 units with 0 failures, instead of testing 2,995 units with 0 failures. However, in consultation with NASA and Air Force representatives in the CSWG, the FAA has elected to propose that the reduced reliability threshold should be set at 0.975 design reliability with a 95 percent confidence for lower consequence vehicles.
While there are no established standards to demonstrate the 0.975 reliability number, that threshold is consistent with reliability parameters in RCC 324 and represents existing single string flight reliability requirements. The FAA is confident that industry associations will develop consensus standards regarding design and testing that sufficiently demonstrate that a novel FSS design meets this reliability threshold. Until such time as an industry standard is established, proposed § 450.145(a)(2) in practice may result in single string or equivalent FSSs being approved for operations in remote areas or for phases of flight that do not overfly populated areas. Similar to FSS that must meet the more reliable threshold, all means of compliance would be required to be accepted by the FAA in accordance with proposed Sec. § 450.145(b) and 450.35.
These proposed reliability requirements would replace the existing launch and reentry FSS licensing requirements on all commercial space transportation missions. However, the FAA anticipates that, with the consequence analysis driving the requirement to have an FSS, most reentry operations would continue to not require an FSS as is the current case under part 435. For launch operators, applicants would still be required to demonstrate the reliability by submitting to review of their design, testing, and analysis. Operators would still be required to monitor the flight environments actually experienced by their FSSs in accordance with proposed § 450.145(c) to corroborate the qualification test data submitted to the FAA.
Proposed part 450 would consolidate and clarify the performance requirements for future FSSs. In doing so, the FAA anticipates that some operations will be relieved of the burden of unnecessarily stringent FSS reliability requirements and that some operations will be able to utilize innovative concepts to achieve flight abort. By appropriately scaling FSS reliability to consequence analysis, the FAA expects to see the emergence of new industry standards, increased use of autonomous FSSs, and no measurable adverse impact to public health and safety or the safety of property. There is expected to be no measurable adverse impact to public health and safety or the safety of property because the lowered reliability threshold will only apply to launches and reentries which would not create significant consequences, given a flight failure. Furthermore, while rigorous tests and analysis should still be expected for most FSSs, FAA regulations would no longer prescribe a particular form of FSS. The proposed performance measure of reliability to achieve safe flight abort to meet collective and individual risk limits and to mitigate the possibility of low probability but high consequence events is the best method for maintaining safety while scoping FAA regulations to govern only the function, not the form, of FSSs. v. FSS Design, Testing, and Documentation Requirements
Applicants using a FSS of any reliability threshold would be required to meet the proposed § 450.143 safety-critical system design, test, and documentation requirements discussed previously. As an FSS will always be considered a safety critical system, any operator utilizing an FSS must comply with the requirements to design their system as fault tolerant, conduct qualification and acceptance testing, and provide evidence to validate predicted operating environments and component life.
Proposed § 450.145(d) would include the application requirements for an FSS. Similar to the current part 415 requirements, proposed § 450.145 would require applicants to describe the FSS, including its proposed operation, and diagram the FSS in detail. The FAA's intent is to make these requirements less prescriptive than current regulations and also to allow more flexible time frames. Proposed § 450.145(d) would require applicants to submit any analyses reports and acceptance, qualification, and preflight test plans used to demonstrate that the reliability and confidence levels are met. Any test plans or documentation would be required to detail the planned test procedures and the test environments. Further, an applicant would have to submit procedures for validating the accuracy of any vehicle tracking data utilized by the flight safety crew or the FSS to make the decision to abort flight. While proposed § 450.145(d) consolidates these application requirements and removes prescriptive component-level design requirements, the proposed regulations would not require substantially different information than the FAA requires today to demonstrate that FSSs meet performance standards and will undergo the required testing prior to flight. vi. Reporting Requirements
Under the preflight reporting requirements in proposed § 450.213(d), operators would be required to submit, or to provide the FAA access to, any test reports associated with the flight safety system test plans approved during the application process. These reports must be submitted or made available no less than 30 days before flight unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame under § 404.15. In the reports, licensees would have to clearly show that the testing results demonstrate compliance with the reliability requirements in proposed § 450.145(a). This is current practice under § 417.17(c)(1) and (4) through (6).
To show the FSS is in compliance and can support the mission as intended, FSS reports would continue to be required to include testing reports that detail the results of the approved subsystem and component-level testing, including any failures, any actions necessary to correct for any failures, actual testing environment showing sufficient margin to predicted operating environments, and a comparison matrix of the actual qualification and acceptance test levels used for each component compared against the predicted flight levels for each environment. Proposed § 450.213(d)(4) would require licensees to report any components qualified by similarity analysis or some combination of analysis and testing. Preflight reporting is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the test plans approved in the application and to demonstrate that the FSS meets the reliability threshold prior to flight.
Proposed § 450.215 (Post-Flight Reporting) would continue to require licensees to submit a post-flight report no later than 90 days after an operation if there were any anomalies in the flight environment material to public health and safety and the safety of property, including those experienced by any FSS components; a practice currently required by § 417.25(c). RLV operators licensed under part 431 are not currently required to submit a post-flight report identifying anomalies that are material to public safety and corrective actions, but the added burden is expected to be minimal. To accurately report any such anomalies so that they may be corrected in future flights, operators would also be required to monitor the FSS during each flight, in accordance with proposed § 450.145(c). Any anomalies experienced by the FSS would be considered material to public health and safety and the safety of property and, therefore, would need to be included in post-flight reporting.
vii. ARC Recommendations
vii. ARC Recommendations
The ARC suggested that, in a performance-based licensing scheme, the regulations should be flexible with regard to FSSs and allow an operator to propose a means of achieving the performance metric without dictating a specific hardware approach. For example, the ARC recommended that an operator should be able to propose an alternative to having a destruct flight termination system. While, the FAA believes that the current regulations allow for non-destructive FSSs, it acknowledges that the preponderance of the existing prescriptive requirements address FSSs that terminate flight through destructive means. The ARC recommended the current prescriptive requirements be moved to a guidance document. As discussed previously, the FAA intends to recognize RCC 319 as the accepted means of compliance in demonstrating that a FSS has a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence. The RCC 319 document would maintain the common standards between all Federal launch and reentry safety authorities but also would be updated periodically to address the evolving space transportation industry. Industry could also develop new means of compliance in the future, as discussed below.
The ARC also recommended that an FSS should not be required, proposing instead that an operator should only be required to meet risk calculations in the FSA and may do so by utilizing a FSS. The FAA disagrees that an FSS should not be required, as there are other safety factors to be considered beyond simple individual or collective risk, namely, the consequence of a failure as discussed earlier. However, the FAA has attempted to propose more flexible regulations that would allow some operations to be licensed without an FSS, or with novel concepts of FSS, or an FSS that may require less extensive demonstration of reliability. In quantifying the low probability but high consequence events that necessitate an FSS beyond collective and individual risk limits, the FAA intends to more clearly delineate when it would be appropriate for an operation to forego an extremely reliable FSS or an FSS completely. If an FSS is not required, the applicant would be required to demonstrate that hazards are contained or mitigated through a hazard analysis and system safety principles. In addition to proposing the acceptability of FSSs with a design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence, under certain situations, the FAA proposes to indicate more clearly that FSS concept and design is flexible and open to innovation as long as the reliability thresholds for flight abort are met.
The ARC also discussed a number of concepts that industry believes should be considered in scaling an FSS's necessary reliability as determined through the FSA. The ARC pointed specifically to population density, the realm of reasonably foreseeable failures, trajectory, size, and explosive capabilities of the vehicle. The FAA proposes that these factors would be contemplated as a part of the consequence analysis required in the public safety criteria of proposed § 450.101(c), alongside traditional measures of risk. In identifying FSS reliability thresholds pegged to potential consequence, or CEC, the reliability of FSSs is determined through analysis that accounts for factors such as what population centers a vehicle or debris can reach and potential failure modes. The FAA anticipates that this would address the ARC's recommendation that vehicles with low risk to the public, especially vehicles operating in remote and sparsely populated areas, may require a lower demonstrated reliability.
To the question of how an applicant might demonstrate the reliability of an FSS with a less than extremely reliable design that does not otherwise meet current common standards like RCC 319, such as the FAA proposed threshold of 0.975 at 95 percent confidence, the ARC advised that several approaches may already exist. As previously discussed, the less reliable FSS can be demonstrated by testing several hundred units under expected environments, instead of the 2,995 tests required to demonstrate design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent--but it is still likely that neither is practical or viable for most operators. In their place, alternative standards are necessary to approximate the demonstration of the reliability threshold through less burdensome means. The ARC report pointed to the Air Force Space Command's Space and Missile Systems Center Standard SMC-S-016, "Test Requirements For Launch, Upper-Stage and Space Vehicles," as an example of a standard that allows for one unit of qualification testing, instead of the standard three units required by RCC-319.\93\ The ARC noted that standard may be useful for heritage systems that are already considered reliable. The FAA maintains that for 0.999 design reliability at 95 percent, the qualification testing of three or more units may be required to reduce the likelihood of either anomalous test passes or failures. The FAA seeks comment on this approach. The FAA also seeks comment on how SMC-S-016 could be incorporated as an accepted means of compliance for reliability demonstration of the lower reliability criteria.
\93\ As one company pointed out in the ARC report, SMC-S-016 and similar standards are for general vehicle testing and do not consider the higher reliability required for FSS, whereas RCC 319 and AFSPCMAN91-710 require additional margins and certainty. The company believes that testing a single unit is not sufficient, unless there was a tradeoff that increased the required test margin.
In discussions with Federal launch range personnel, it has been suggested that testing and analysis requirements in RCC 324 may be a more appropriate basis for evaluating a FSS meeting the lower reliability threshold. The FAA remains interested in identifying standards that are applicable or could be drawn upon to develop means of compliance to the proposed regulations.
The FAA is also not foreclosing the idea that vehicles can demonstrate the reliability of the FSS or vehicle through flight history. The ARC pointed out in their report that certain aspects of FSSs can be tested in flight--for example using an autonomous FSS in "shadow mode" on-board a vehicle and testing the system's function with no ordnance or other active destruct capabilities. The FAA ultimately decided to not propose any explicit requirements pertaining to acceptable flight testing as a means of allowing industry applicants and the FAA to develop new accepted means of compliance in the demonstration of reliability. While the FAA wishes to encourage the innovation and development of novel reliability demonstration standards, the FAA also recognizes that such standards are not currently developed and would require extensive evaluation before they could be accepted as demonstrating fidelity and safety. Because the FSS is so critical to flight safety in the instances where it is required, new reliability and compliance demonstration strategies must be accepted by the FAA prior to application acceptance.
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