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Advisory Circular Current Issued Mar 14, 2000 ANM-112 218 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

AC 25-22 Certification of Transport Airplane Mechanical Systems

Provides methods acceptable to the Administrator for showing compliance with the type certification requirements for transport airplane mechanical systems and equipment installations.

Official source ↗ Open PDF

U.S. Department of Transportation Advisory

Federal Aviation Administration Circular

AC 25-22 DATE: 3/14/00

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSPORT AIRPLANE MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

… Subject: CERTIFICATION OF TRANSPORT

AIRPLANE MECHANICAL SYSTEMS

Date: 3/14/00 AC No: 25-22

Initiated by ANM-110 Change: … 1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) provides methods acceptable to the Administrator for showing compliance with the type certification requirements for transport airplane mechanical systems and equipment installations. This AC is intended to provide guidance to airplane manufacturers, modifiers, foreign regulatory authorities, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) transport airplane type certification engineers and their designees. The methods and procedures described herein have evolved over many years and represent current certification practice. Like all advisory material, these guidelines are not mandatory and do not constitute regulations. They are derived from previous FAA experience in finding compliance with the airworthiness requirements and represent methods and procedures found to be acceptable by that experience. Although mandatory terms such as “shall” and “must” are used in this AC, because the AC method of compliance is not in itself mandatory, these terms apply only to applicants who seek to demonstrate compliance by use of the specific method described in this AC. 2. CANCELLATION. Advisory Circular 25-14, High Lift and Drag Devices, dated May 4, 1988, is cancelled. 3. APPLICABILITY. This advisory circular contains guidance for the latest amendment of the regulations and applies to all transport category airplanes approved under the provisions of part 25, for which a new, amended, or supplemental type certificate is requested.

4. RELATED DOCUMENTS. a. Related Federal Aviation Regulations. Sections which prescribe requirements for the design, substantiation, and certification of transport airplane mechanical systems are for most part in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25, subpart D - Design and Construction, and subpart F - Equipment. Additional sections (and their associated advisory circulars where applicable) that prescribe requirements which can have a significant impact on the overall design and configuration of mechanical systems are in subpart B- Performance, subpart C - Structure, subpart E - Powerplant, and subpart G - Operating Limitations and Information. Five advisory circulars are planned. Each AC will address primarily one area of regulations for transport category airplanes.

They are: Certification of Transport Airplane Mechanical Systems (AC 25-XX), Certification of Electrical Equipment Installations (AC 25- XX), Transport Airplane Propulsion Engine and Auxilliary Power Unit Installation Certification Handbook - The Propulsion Mega-AC (AC 25-XX), Certification of Transport Airplane Structure (A 25-21), and Transport Airplane Cabin Interiors Handbook (AC 25-17A). Each AC will cross reference the other four AC's, as necessary, for coverage of the related regulations. A cross reference index is provided as item 7 in appendix 4 of this AC. b. Advisory Circulars (AC’s). This AC can be found and downloaded from the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/avr/air/airhome.htm, at the link titled "Advisory Circulars. Copies of advisory circulars referenced in this AC may be obtained from the US Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution Office, SVC-121.23, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785. The help line number is 301-322-4961, and the fascimile number is 301-386-5394 DOT Warehouse. 5.

BACKGROUND. a In the past, advisory and guidance information applicable to transport airplane mechanical systems and equipment installations has been formally published within AC's. However, in many instances, policy has been developed and applied to specific certification projects without formal publication. This policy appeared in the form of policy memorandums and issue papers (or certification review items) which were distributed to the Aircraft Certification Offices. In many instances this information was not organized in a way that allowed easy access. This AC formalizes existing policy so that the public, FAA personnel, and their designees may have access to this information, and contains policy extracted from existing FAA communications used to provide guidance to applicants and other aircraft certification organizations.

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b. The guidance contained in this document is presented in a format that lists the regulatory text, intent of the rule, background of the rule, acceptable compliance methods, and references. This AC is considered to be a “living document.” As such, it will be revised to maintain currency, such as with the issuance of part 25 rule changes, or the development of substantive new guidance. An index of all references listed in this AC is included as an appendix to this document. c. The methods and procedures described in this AC are only one acceptable means of compliance. Any alternative means proposed by the applicant should be given due consideration. Applicants are encouraged to use their technical ingenuity and resourcefulness in order to develop more efficient and less costly methods of achieving the objective of part 25. /s/ Donald L. Riggin Donald L. Riggin Acting Manager Transport Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service, ANM-100

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. CONTENTS

Chapter 1. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. Section 25.671 General 1 a. Rule Text 1 2. Section 25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems 2 a. Rule Text 2 3. Section 25.699 Lift and drag device indicator 3 a. Rule Text 3 b. Intent of Rule 3 c. Background 3 (1) Amendment 25-23 3 d. Policy/Compliance 3 (1) Advisory Circular (AC) 25-14 4 e. Reference 7 4. Section 25.701 Flap interconnection 7 a. Rule Text 7 5. Section 25.703 Takeoff warning system 8 a. Rule Text 8 b. Intent of Rule 8 c. Background 8 d. Policy/Compliance 9 e. Reference 9 [6-10] [RESERVED] 9 Section 2. LANDING GEAR

11. Section 25.729 Retracting mechanism 11 a. Rule Text 11 b. Intent of Rule 12 c. Background 13 (1) Amendment 25-23 13 (2) Amendment 25-42 13 (3) Amendment 25-72 13 Paragraph Page No.

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 (4) Amendment 25-75 13 d. Policy/Compliance 13 (1) Protection of equipment in wheel wells 13 (2) Landing gear position indication system 14 (3) Flap system/landing gear warning system tie-in 15 (4) Landing gear position indication system 15 (5) Landing gear slush tests 16 e. References 17 f. Definitions 17 12. Section 25.731 Wheels 17 a. Rule Text 17 b. Intent of Rule 17 c. Background 17 (1) Amendment 25-72 18 (2) Harmonization 18 d. Policy/Compliance 18 e. References 19 13. Section 25.733 Tires 19 a. Rule Text 20 b. Intent of Rule 21 c. Background 21 (1) Amendment 25-23 21 (2) Amendment 25-38 21 (3) Amendment 25-49 21 (4) Amendment 25-52 22 (5) Amendment 25-72 22 (6) Amendment 25-78 22 d. Policy/Compliance 22 (1) Approval of retreaded tires by similarity 22 (2) Approval: nonretreadable tires - qualification testing 24 (3) Approval method for substitute tires 25 (4) Replacement of bias ply tires with radial ply tires 26 (5) Certification of radial tire installation 28 (6) Critical conditions and maximum ramp weight definitions 30 e. References 31

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. 14. Section 25.735 Brakes 31 a. Rule Text 31 b. Intent of Rule 33 c. Background 34 (1) Amendment 25-23 34 (2) Amendment 25-48 34 (3) Amendment 25-52 34 (4) Amendment 25-72 34 (5) Amendment 25-92 34 (6) Harmonization 35 d. Policy/Compliance 35 (1) Carbon brake refurbishment (redensification) 35 (2) FAA/JAA certification requirements; steel/carbon brakes 37 (3) Certification of replacement brakes 37 (4) Parking brake testing 40 (5) Worn brake requirements, non original equipment parts 41 (6) Determination of allowable worn brake limits 41 (7) Credit for reverse thrust in worn brake testing 46 (8) Certification of brake replacement components 47 (9) Ground equipment - brake cooling unit 51 (10) Certification of asbestos-free brake linings 52 (11) Certification of brake components - performance 53 (12) Approval of brake components utilizing new brake friction material 54 (13) Maximum quick turnaround times 55 e. References 57 Section 3. PERSONNEL AND CARGO ACCOMMODATIONS

15. Section 25.773 Pilot compartment view 59 a. Rule Text 59 b. Intent of Rule 60 c. Background 60 (1) Amendment 25-23 60 (2) Amendment 25-46 60 (3) Amendment 25-72 60 (4) Harmonization 60 d. Policy/Compliance 60 e. References 60 [16-25] [RESERVED] 60 Paragraph Page No.

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 26. Section 25.783 Doors 61 a. Rule Text 61 b. Intent of Rule 62 c. Background 62 d. Policy/Compliance 62 e. Reference 62 [27-29] [RESERVED] 62

Section 4. VENTILATION AND HEATING 30. Section 25.831 Ventilation 63 a. Rule Text 63 b. Intent of Rule 64 c. Background 64 (1) Amendment 25-41 64 (2) Amendment 25-87 65 (3) Harmonization 65 (4) Amendment 25-89 65 d. Policy/Compliance 65 (1) Ventilation rates 65 (2) Smoke evacuation 65 (3) Ventilation system design 66 (4) Airplane operation with airconditioning packs off 66 (5) Fresh air and normal operating conditions 69 (6) Ventilation during takeoff 70 e. Reference 70 31. Section 25.832 Cabin ozone concentration 71 a. Rule Text 71 b. Intent of Rule 71 c. Background 71 (1) Amendment 25-56 71 (2) Operating Rule 72 d. Policy/Compliance 72 (1) Sea level equivalent 72 (2) Ground test 74 (3) Use of default retention ratio 74 (4) Use of operational limitations 75 (5) Meaning of "time-weighted average" 76 (6) Example of compliance with § 25.832 77 e. References 80 Paragraph Page No. 32. Section 25.833 Combustion heating systems 80

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 a. Rule Text 80 b. Intent of Rule 80 c. Background 80 d. Policy/Compliance 80 (1) Standards for certification of combustion heaters 80 e. Reference 83 33. Section 25.841 Pressurized cabins 83 a. Rule Text 83 b. Intent of Rule 84 c. Background 84 (1) Amendment 25-38 84 (2) Amendment 25-87 84 (3) Harmonization 85 d. Policy/Compliance 85 (1) Rapid equalization of pressure 85 (2) Access to a pressurized cargo compartment in the engine burst zone during high altitude operation 85 (3) Cabin altitude limit; § 25.841(a) 86 e. References 87 34. Section 25.843 Tests for pressurized cabins 88 a. Rule Text 88 b. Intent of Rule 88 c. Background 88 (1) Amendment 25-87 88 (2) Harmonization 88 d. Policy/Compliance 89 (1) Pressure tests for compliance with § 25.843(a) 89 e. Reference 89

Section 5. FIRE PROTECTION 35. Section 25.851 Fire extinguishers 91 a. Rule Text 91 b. Intent of Rule 92 c. Background 92 d. Policy/Compliance 92 e. References 92

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. 36. Section 25.854 Lavatory fire protection 92 a. Rule Text 92 b. Intent of Rule 93 c. Background 93 d. Policy/Compliance 93 (1) Approval of lavatory smoke detectors 93 (2) Approval of lavatory fire extinguishers containing agents other than Halon 95 e. References 95 37. Section 25.855 Cargo or baggage compartments 96 a. Rule Text 96 b. Intent of Rule 96 c. Background 97 (1) Amendment 25-15 97 (2) Amendment 25-32 97 (3) Amendment 25-60 97 (4) Amendment 25-72 97 (5) Amendment 25-93 97 (6) Harmonization 97 d. Policy/Compliance 97 (1) Halon concentration 98 (2) Class D to class C conversion 98 (3) Protection of critical equipment in class E cargo compartments 100 e. Reference 101 38. Section 25.857 Cargo compartment classification 101 a. Rule Text 101 b. Intent of Rule 102 c. Background 102 (1) Amendment 25-32 102 (2) Amendment 25-60 102 (3) Amendment 25-93 103 (4) Harmonization 103 d. Policy/Compliance 103 (1) Main deck cargo compartment fire protection certification procedures 103 (2) Class A cargo compartments 105 (3) Class E cargo compartments 106

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 (4) Access to Class E cargo compartments 107 (5) Freighter aircraft with accessible class E compartment 107 e. References 108 39. Section 25.858 Cargo or baggage compartment smoke or fire detection systems 108 a. Rule Text 108 b. Intent of Rule 108 c. Background 108 (1) Amendment 25-93 109 d. Policy/Compliance 109 (1) Smoke detection certification testing 109 (2) Certification testing for smoke detection 110 (3) Smoke detection certification testing 111 (4) William J. Hughes Technical Center Research and Development 114 e. References 114 40. Section 25.863 Flammable fluid fire protection 114 a. Rule Text 114 b. Intent of Rule 115 c. Background 115 d. Policy/Compliance 115 e. Reference 115 41. Section 25.869 Fire protection systems 115 a. Rule Text 115 b. Intent of Rule 116 c. Background 116 (1) Amendment 25-72 116 d. Policy/Compliance 116 e. References 116

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. Chapter 2. POWERPLANT

Section 1. GENERAL

42. Section 25.943 Negative acceleration 117 a. Rule Text 117 Section 2. FUEL SYSTEM COMPONENTS

43. Section 25.1001 Fuel jettisoning system 119 a. Rule Text 119 Section 3. POWERPLANT FIRE PROTECTION

44. Section 25.1183 Flammable fluid-carrying components 121 a. Rule Text 121 45. Section 25.1185 Flammable fluids 122 a. Rule Text 122 46. Section 25.1189 Shutoff means 122 a. Rule Text 122

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No.

Chapter 3. EQUIPMENT

Section 1. GENERAL 47. Section 25.1301 Function and installation 125 a. Rule Text 125 b. Intent of Rule 125 c. Background 125 (1) Harmonization 125 d. Policy/Compliance 125 (1) JAR ACJ 25.1301(b) 126 e. Reference 126 48. Section 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations 126 a. Rule Text 126 b. Intent of Rule 127 c. Background 127 (1) Amendment 25-23 128 (2) Amendment 25-38 128 (3) Amendment 25-41 128 (4) Harmonization 128 d. Policy/Compliance 128 (1) Probability of a fire 128 (2) Examples 130 (3) Safe and reliable 130 e. References 130 [49-51] [RESERVED] 130 Section 2. INSTRUMENTS: INSTALLATION

52. Section 25.1325 Static pressure systems 131 a. Rule Text 131 b. Intent of Rule 132 c. Background 132 (1) Amendment 25-5 132 (2) Amendment 25-12 132 (3) Amendment 25-41 132 d. Policy/Compliance 132 e. Reference 132

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No.

Section 3. SAFETY EQUIPMENT 53. Section 25 1419 Ice protection 133 a. Rule Text 133 b. Intent of Rule 133 c. Background 133 (1) Amendment 25-23 134 (2) Amendment 25-72 134 d. Policy/Compliance 134 e. References 134 [54-58] [RESERVED] 134 Section 4. MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT 59. Section 25.1433 Vacuum systems 135 a. Rule Text 135 b. Intent of Rule 135 c. Background 135 (1) Amendment 25-72 135 d. Policy/Compliance 135 e. References 135 60. Section 25.1435 Hydraulic systems 135 a. Rule Text 135 b. Intent of Rule 136 c. Background 137 (1) Amendment 25-13 137 (2) Amendment 25-23 138 (3) Amendment 25-41 138 (4) Amendment 25-72 138 (5) Exemptions 138 (6) Harmonization 139 d. Policy/Compliance 139 (1) Hydraulic fluid contamination 139 (2) Certification of hydraulic lines for temporary repairs 140 (3) Use of hydraulic lines for temporary repairs 141 (4) Hydraulic system certification philosophy 142 (5) Interpretation of § 25.1435(a)(4) of 14 CFR 143 e. References 144

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. 61. Section 25.1438 Pressurization and pneumatic systems 145 a. Rule Text 145 b. Intent of Rule 145 c. Background 145 (1) Harmonization 145 d. Policy/Compliance 145 (1) Pneumatic versus pressurization system identification 145 e. References 146 62. Section 25.1439 Protective breathing equipment 146 a. Rule Text 146 b. Intent of Rule 147 c. Background 148 (1) Amendment 25-38 148 d. Policy/Compliance 148 (1) Protective breathing equipment usage when approved under TSO-C99 and TSO-C116 148 (2) Protective breathing equipment serviceability 149 (3) Protective breathing equipment on the flight deck 149 (4) Definition of terms used in § 25.1439 150 e. References 151 63. Section 25.1441 Oxygen equipment and supply 151 a. Rule Text 151 b. Intent of Rule 151 c. Background 151 d. Policy/Compliance 151 (1) Compliance with §§ 25.1309(c) and 25.1441(c) 151 (2) Guidance, availability of flightcrew oxygen 153 (3) Oxygen installation for medical use 155 e. Reference 156 64. Section 25.1443 Minimum mass flow of supplemental oxygen 156 a. Rule Text 156 b. Intent of Rule 157 c. Background 157 d. Policy/Compliance 157 e. Reference 157

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. 65. Section 25.1445 Equipment standards for the oxygen distributing system 158 a. Rule Text 158 b. Intent of Rule 158 c. Background 158 d. Policy/Compliance 158 e. Reference 158 66. Section 25.1447 Equipment standards for oxygen dispensing units 158 a. Rule Text 158 b. Intent of Rule 160 c. Background 160 (1) Amendment 25-41 160 (2) Amendment 25-87 160 d. Policy/Compliance 160 (1) Oxygen equipment for forward observer's position 160 e. References 161 67. Section 25.1449 Means for determining use of oxygen 161 a. Rule Text 161 b. Intent of Rule 161 c. Background 161 d. Policy/Compliance 162 (1) Oxygen equipment for observer's position 162 (2) Determination of passenger oxygen supply 163 e. References 163 68. Section 25.1450 Chemical oxygen generators 163 a. Rule Text 163 b. Intent of Rule 164 c. Background 164 d. Policy/Compliance 164 e. Reference 164 69. Section 25.1453 Protection of oxygen equipment from rupture 164 a. Rule Text 164 b. Intent of Rule 164 c. Background 164 d. Policy/Compliance 164 (1) Flexible plastic oxygen lines 165 (2) Use of plastic oxygen lines 165 e. Reference 166 Paragraph Page No.

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 70. Section 25.1455 Draining of fluids subject to freezing 166 a. Rule Text 166 b. Intent of Rule 166 c. Background 166 (1) Amendment 25-23 167 d. Policy/Compliance 167 e. Reference 167 71. Section 25.1461 Equipment containing high energy rotors 167 a. Rule Text 167 b. Intent of Rule 167 c. Background 168 (1) Amendment 4b-8 (CAR) 168 (2) Amendment 4b-12 (CAM) 168 (3) Amendment 25-41 168 d. Policy/Compliance 168 e. Reference 168

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No. Chapter 4. OPERATING LIMITATIONS AND INFORMATION

Section 1. OPERATING LIMITATIONS

72. Section 25.1529 Instructions for continued airworthiness 169 H25.4 airworthiness limitations section 169 a. Rule Text 169 b. Intent of Rule 169 c. Background 169 d. Policy/Compliance 170 e. Reference 170

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3/14/2000 AC 25-22 Paragraph Page No.

APPENDICES Appendix Subject 1. Cross reference for selected sections of part 25, 171 Section 4b of the civil air regulations (CAR) and Section 4b of the civil aeronautics manual (CAM) 2. Glossary of acronyms 172 3. Index of advisory circular references 173 4. Index of incorporated guidance material and references 178 (1) FAA memorandums and letters 178 (2) FAA technical standard orders (TSO) 181 (3) FAA orders 182 (4) FAA videos 182 (5) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) documents 183 (6) Miscellaneous references 186 (7) Cross reference to other AC handbooks 189

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Chapter 1. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. SECTION 25.671 - GENERAL.

a. Rule Text.

(a) Each control and control system must operate with the ease, smoothness, and positiveness appropriate to its function. (b) Each element of each flight control system must be designed, or distinctively and permanently marked, to minimize the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in the malfunctioning of the system. (c) The airplane must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems), within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot. (1) Any single failure, excluding jamming (for example, disconnection or failure of mechanical elements, or structural failure of hydraulic components, such as actuators, control spool housing, and valves).

(2) Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming (for example, dual electrical or hydraulic system failures, or any single failure in combination with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure). (3) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during takeoff, climb, cruise, normal turns, descent, and landing unless the jam is shown to be extremely improbable, or can be alleviated. A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable. (d) The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable if all engines fail. Compliance with this requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable. [Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5674, Apr. 8, 1970] NOTE: This regulation is the subject of a Federal Aviation Regulations/Joint Aviation Requirements (FAR/JAR) harmonization effort under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC).

The ARAC working group may recommend revisions to §§ 25.671 and 25.672. The ARAC working group is developing Advisory Circular (AC) 25.671-1.

2. SECTION 25.672 - STABILITY AUGMENTATION AND AUTOMATIC AND POWER-OPERATED SYSTEMS. a. Rule Text.

If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with § 25.671 and the following: (a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure.

Warning systems must not activate the control systems. (b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in § 25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense. (c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system- (1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered; (2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and (3) The trim, stability, and stall

characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing. [Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5675, Apr. 8, 1970]

NOTE: This regulation is the subject of a Federal Aviation Regulations/Joint Aviation Requirements (FAR/JAR) harmonization effort under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The ARAC working group may recommend revisions to §§ 25.671 and 25.672. The ARAC working group is developing AC 25.671-1. NOTE: For policy and guidance on compliance with this requirement, refer to AC 25.672-1, Active Flight Controls.

3. SECTION 25.699 - LIFT AND DRAG DEVICE INDICATOR. a. Rule Text.

(a) There must be means to indicate to the pilots the position of each lift or drag device having a separate control in the cockpit to adjust its position. In addition, an indication of unsymmetrical operation or other malfunction in the lift or drag device systems must be provided when such indication is necessary to enable the pilots to prevent or counteract an unsafe flight or ground condition, considering the effects on flight characteristics and performance. (b) There must be means to indicate to the pilots the takeoff, en route, approach, and landing lift device positions. (c) If any extension of the lift and drag devices beyond the landing position is possible, the controls must be clearly marked to identify this range of extension. [Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5675, Apr. 8, 1970] b. Intent of Rule. This rule prescribes standards for providing visual indication to the pilot of the high lift and drag device(s) surface positions for the takeoff, enroute, approach, and landing conditions. c. Background.

Effective February 1, 1965, part 25 was added to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), to replace part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR). Sections 4b.323(e) and 4b.323(f) of the CAR basically covered trailing edge devices. These sections became §§ 25.699(a) and 25.699(b) of 14 CFR for wing flap position indicator. (1) Amendment 25-23 (April 8, 1970) expanded the rule to specifically cover all high drag devices or high lift devices (such as slots, spoilers, and slats), and added the requirement for position indication for all lift and drag devices with separate cockpit controls. The title was revised accordingly. d. Policy/Compliance Methods. Indicators that show the position of the lift or drag devices must be provided. If asymmetric extension of lift or drag devices could result in an unsafe condition, an indication of each individual control surface is required. The indication must clearly identify each position setting. The controls should be designed so that inadvertent extension beyond the landing position is not possible.

For guidance on compliance with this requirement, refer to AC 25-14, dated 5/4/88, which is incorporated below.

AC No.: AC 25-14 HIGH LIFT AND DRAG DEVICES

Initiated by: ANM-110 Date: 5/4/88 1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means of compliance with the provisions of part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) dealing with the certification requirements for high lift and drag devices. Guidance information is provided for showing compliance with structural and functional safety standards for high lift and drag devices and their operating systems. The intent of the requirements and some acceptable means of compliance are discussed. Other means are acceptable if they meet the intent of the regulations. 2. RELATED FAR SECTIONS. The contents of this AC are considered by the FAA in determining compliance of flaps, slats and drag devices with part 25. Related sections are 25.301, 25.303, 25.333(e), 25.345, 25.457, 25.571, 25.671, 25.672, 25.697, 25.699, 25.701, 25.703, and 25.1309. 3. BACKGROUND. For several years, special consideration has been given to high lift and drag devices to ensure that malfunction or failure will not result in an unsafe condition.

These considerations are consolidated and incorporated in this AC. 4. STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS. The structure of high lift and drag devices must be designed to comply with the damage tolerance requirements of § 25.571, Amendment 25-45, of the FAR. The design should incorporate features which would provide a high probability of detection of any damage before the damage causes loss of the surface from the airplane. High lift and drag components to be evaluated under the requirements of § 25.571 typically include all structure which contributes significantly in reacting applied flight and actuation loads. Examples of such structure are the flap or slat surfaces, support linkages or tracks, hinges, fittings and attachments.

5. CONTROL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. The control system for high lift and drag devices must be designed to comply with the requirements of § 25.671. For the purpose of compliance with § 25.671, the control system ends where the control surface attaches to fixed structure such as the wing or fuselage. Examples of elements to be evaluated under the requirements of § 25.671 are linkages, hinges, cables, pulleys, quadrants, valves, actuator components, track rollers, movable tracks, bearings, and hydraulic or electrical systems. In accordance with § 25.671, the airplane must be shown to be capable of continued safe flight and landing without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength following the failure of any single mechanical element or any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming. Following this failure or combination of failures, the remaining structure

must be able to withstand the loads defined by §§ 25.333 and 25.345. These are considered ultimate loads for this condition. If the surfaces are automatically or power operated, the control system must also be designed to meet the requirements of § 25.672. 6. DETAIL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS. a. Unless the airplane has safe flight characteristics with the functionally related high lift or drag devices retracted on one side and extended on the other, the motion of the devices opposite sides of the plane of symmetry must be synchronized by a mechanical interconnection or approved equivalent means as required by § 25.701. The criteria of § 25.701 are considered equally applicable to high lift and drag devices. (1) The surface interconnection must be designed for the loads resulting when the surfaces on one side of the plane of symmetry are jammed and immovable while the surfaces on the other side are free to move and the full power of the surface actuating system is applied.

The flight loads from § 25.345 acting on the surface must be considered in combination with the actuating system loads (including system inertia loads). This is considered a limit load condition. (2) In showing compliance with the interconnection requirements of § 25.701, all possible jam locations in the drive and support system should be considered. The surface mechanical interconnection must be able to withstand the jam condition and preclude any unsafe asymmetrical condition. The interconnection system is comprised of all elements which react the drive output from the actuator source to the jam point. These elements may include structures, interconnection linkages, and drive system components. When the interconnection is the only means to prevent an unsafe asymmetrical condition, the loads associated with the jam conditions are considered limit loads and require a 1.5 factor of safety.

A factor of safety less than 1.5 may be used when a reliable (i.e., a probability of failure of 10-3 or less) and independent means is used, in addition to the mechanical interconnection, to prevent unsafe asymmetry of a high lift system. The alternate system should detect the jam and shut down the drive system before the loads from any jam condition are reacted by the mechanical interconnection. The factor of safety may be as low as 1.25 if the probability of failure of the alternate system is 10-5 or less; however, it should not be less than 1.25 unless the alternate system is found to be equivalent to a mechanical interconnection. When a torque limiter is used, the torque tolerance limit should be used to react the required load rather than the nominal or set torque. A torque limiter should not be located in the drive system in a position where the limiter itself would allow an unsymmetrical configuration if a jam occurred. (3) An equivalent means of compliance with the requirements for a mechanical interconnection system may be substantiated using a systems safety analysis.

Guidelines for performing a systems safety analysis are given in AC 25.1309-1, System Design Analysis.

b. Where failures in the drive system can result in uncommanded extensions or retractions of the high lift or drag devices, a positive means should be provided to limit the movement of the affected surfaces. This may be accomplished through irreversible drive actuators, no-back devices, redundancy in the drive system, or other equivalent means. c. In determining loads on high lift devices during actuation, it may be necessary to consider friction loads in the actuating system, which may be reasonably expected to occur in service. Flap tracks and rollers for instance, are often subjected to ice and slush which may offer high resistance to flap actuation. Each design should be evaluated to determine its susceptibility to friction in the mechanism and any loads associated with such resistance should be accounted for and applied in combination with normal operating loads. d. In evaluating the effects of failures or jamming of high lift surfaces, the effects of skewed surfaces on the operation of adjacent surfaces should be evaluated.

Damage to adjacent structures and systems due to skewing of the surface should also be evaluated. 7. INDICATING AND WARNING SYSTEMS. a. Indicating systems for high lift and drag devices must provide visual indication to the pilot of the surface positions for the takeoff, enroute, approach, and landing conditions. The position sensors should be located such that they show a direct indication of failure conditions. There should be independent monitoring of each functionally related set of surfaces (i.e., a set of surfaces on each side of the plane of symmetry that is driven by a common actuator, or is synchronized by some other means to ensure symmetric actuation) for which a failure will require an action or procedural change by the flightcrew. For instance, a functionally related flap set which is in an unsymmetrical configuration about the fuselage centerline would require an indication to the pilot of the unsymmetrical condition before takeoff.

The indication to the flightcrew need not indicate the specific surface which has failed, but must clearly reflect the abnormal configuration (§ 25.699). The cockpit surface position display must also clearly distinguish a fault which was caused by a high lift "asymmetrical" deployment from a high lift "disagree" condition. A "disagree" condition exists when the high lift surface is stopped at a position different than the position commanded-by the pilot through the flap selection switch or handle. This distinction will aid the pilot in using proper procedures to further deploy, retract, or leave the high lift or drag devices for continued flight. b. The takeoff warning system required by § 25.703 should sense the position of each functionally related set of high lift devices (symmetric about the airplane centerline) and provide aural warning during the initial portion of the takeoff roll if any set is not in an approved takeoff position. 8. FLIGHT LOADS MEASUREMENT.

Notwithstanding the advancements in analytical methods used in predicting loads on airplane structures, accurate prediction of loads on wing leading edge and trailing edge high lift devices continues to be a problem. It is, therefore, advisable to verify the loads on these surfaces by conducting flight loads surveys regardless of the level of confidence in the overall loads program.

9. AIRPLANE CONTROLLABILITY. It should be shown by analysis, and where necessary by ground, simulation or flight tests, that the airplane has adequate stall margins and controllability to sustain the failure conditions addressed in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this AC without requiring exceptional flightcrew skill or strength. It should also be demonstrated that no hazardous change in altitude or attitude will develop during transition to the unsymmetric condition considering likely transition rates.

END OF ADVISORY CIRCULAR 25-14 e. Reference. None. 4. SECTION 25.701 - FLAP INTERCONNECTION. a. Rule Text.

(a) Unless the airplane has safe flight characteristics with the flaps or slats retracted on one side and extended on the other, the motion of flaps or slats on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry must be synchronized by a mechanical interconnection or approved equivalent means. (b) If a wing flap or slat interconnection or equivalent means is used, it must be designed to account for the applicable unsymmetrical loads, including those resulting from flight with the engines on one side of the plane of symmetry inoperative and the remaining engines at takeoff power. (c) For airplanes with flaps or slats that are not subjected to slipstream conditions, the structure must be designed for the loads imposed when the wing flaps or slats on one side are carrying the most severe load occurring in the prescribed symmetrical conditions and those on the other side are carrying not more than 80 percent of that load. (d) The interconnection must be designed for the loads resulting when interconnected flap or slat surfaces on one side of the plane of symmetry are jammed and immovable while the surfaces on the other side are free to move and the full power of the surface actuating system is applied. [Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29777, July 20, 1990] NOTE: For policy and guidance on compliance with this requirement, refer to Advisory Circular (AC) 25-14, High Lift and Drag Devices, incorporated into this AC in § 25.699 paragraph d.

5. SECTION 25.703 - TAKE OFF WARNING SYSTEM. a. Rule Text.

A takeoff warning system must be installed and must meet the following requirements: (a) The system must provide to the pilots an aural warning that is automatically activated during the initial portion of the takeoff roll if the airplane is in a configuration, including any of the following, that would not allow a safe takeoff: (1) The wing flaps or leading edge devices are not within the approved range of takeoff positions. (2) Wing spoilers (except lateral control spoilers meeting the requirements of § 25.671), speed brakes, or longitudinal trim devices are in a position that would not allow a safe takeoff. (b) The warning required by paragraph (a) of this section must continue until- (1) The configuration is changed to allow a safe takeoff; (2) Action is taken by the pilot to terminate the takeoff roll; (3) The airplane is rotated for takeoff; or (4) The warning is manually deactivated by the pilot. (c) The means used to activate the system must function properly throughout the ranges of takeoff weights, altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.

[Amdt. 25-42, 43 FR 2323, Jan. 16, 1978] b. Intent of Rule. This rule prescribes a requirement for a takeoff warning system to warn the pilots during the initial portion of the takeoff roll if the airplane is in a configuration that would prevent successful completion of the takeoff. c. Background. This section was not addressed in either part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR) or part 25 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) when it was originally codified. This rule was introduced with Amendment 25-42, dated January 16, 1978. It was realized that wing flaps and associated leading edge devices posed a special problem because some airplanes have take off flap settings that vary with weight, altitude, temperature, and runway length. A warning system that accounts for these variables would be extremely complex, and would still require the pilot to enter the proper data.

In the interest of reliability, the rule requires the system to give a warning when the flaps or leading edge devices are not within the approved range of takeoff positions, e.g., when the pilot has not placed the flaps in an approved takeoff position or has retracted the flaps inadvertently, or if the flaps fail to move from the retracted position in response to a control input. Additionally, longitudinal trim devices (such as movable stabilizers) and drag devices (such as ground and flight spoilers) may be positioned inadvertently or due to failure conditions in a configuration that may prevent successful completion of a takeoff. The regulation applies to the stabilizer, speed brake systems, and rudder trim as well.

d. Policy/Compliance Methods. For policy and guidance on compliance with this requirement, refer to Advisory Circular (AC) 25-14, High Lift and Drag Devices, incorporated into this AC in § 25.699 paragraph d. e. Reference. The address for ordering the latest revision of the advisory circular listed below can be found in the Appendix to this AC. AC 25.703-1, Takeoff Configuration Warning Systems.

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Section 2. LANDING GEAR 11. SECTION 25.729 - RETRACTING MECHANISM. a. Rule Text.

(a) General. For airplanes with retractable landing gear, the following apply: (1) The landing gear retracting mechanism, wheel well doors, and supporting structure, must be designed for- (i) The loads occurring in the flight conditions when the gear is in the retracted position, (ii) The combination of friction loads, inertia loads, brake torque loads, air loads, and gyroscopic loads resulting from the wheels rotating at a peripheral speed equal to 1.3 VS (with the flaps in takeoff position at design takeoff weight), occurring during retraction and extension at any airspeed up to 1.6 VS1 (with the flaps in the approach position at design landing weight), and (iii) Any load factor up to those specified in § 25.345(a) for the flaps extended condition. (2) Unless there are other means to decelerate the airplane in flight at this speed, the landing gear, the retracting mechanism, and the airplane structure (including wheel well doors) must be designed to withstand the flight loads occurring with the landing gear in the extended position at any speed up to 0.67 VC .

(3) Landing gear doors, their operating mechanism, and their supporting structures must be designed for the yawing maneuvers prescribed for the airplane in addition to the conditions of airspeed and load factor prescribed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section. (b) Landing gear lock. There must be positive means to keep the landing gear extended, in flight and on the ground. (c) Emergency operation. There must be an emergency means for extending the landing gear in the event of- (1) Any reasonably probable failure in the normal retraction system; or (2) The failure of any single source of hydraulic, electric, or equivalent energy supply. (d) Operation test. The proper functioning of the retracting mechanism must be shown by operation tests. (e) Position indicator and warning device. If a retractable landing gear is used, there must be a landing gear position indicator (as well as necessary switches to actuate the indicator) or other means to inform the pilot that the gear is secured

in the extended (or retracted) position. This means must be designed as follows: (1) If switches are used, they must be located and coupled to the landing gear mechanical systems in a manner that prevents an erroneous indication of ''down and locked'' if the landing gear is not in a fully extended position, or of ''up and locked'' if the landing gear is not in the fully retracted position. The switches may be located where they are operated by the actual landing gear locking latch or device. (2) The flightcrew must be given an aural warning that functions continuously, or is periodically repeated, if a landing is attempted when the landing gear is not locked down. (3) The warning must be given in sufficient time to allow the landing gear to be locked down or a go-around to be made. (4) There must not be a manual shutoff means readily available to the flightcrew for the warning required by paragraph (e)(2) of this section such that it could be operated instinctively, inadvertently, or by habitual reflexive action.

(5) The system used to generate the aural warning must be designed to eliminate false or inappropriate alerts. (6) Failures of systems used to inhibit the landing gear aural warning, that would prevent the warning system from operating, must be improbable. (f) Protection of equipment in wheel wells. Equipment that is essential to safe operation of the airplane and that is located in wheel wells must be protected from the damaging effects of- (1) A bursting tire, unless it is shown that a tire cannot burst from overheat; and (2) A loose tire tread, unless it is shown that a loose tire tread cannot cause damage. [Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5676, Apr. 8, 1970; Amdt. 25-42, 43 FR 2323, Jan. 16, 1978; Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29777, Jul. 20, 1990; Amdt. 25-75, 56 FR 63762, Dec. 5, 1991] b. Intent of Rule. This rule provides minimum design and certification requirements for landing gear actuation systems to address:

(1) Structural integrity for the nose and main landing gear, retracting mechanism(s), doors, gear supporting structure for actuation loads, maneuvering loads, and yawing flight condition loads. (2) Emergency means to extend gear under certain failure conditions. (3) Downlock and uplock design. (4) Gear up-and-locked and down-and-locked position indications and aural warning.

(5) Protection of essential equipment located in the wheel well from a bursting tire or loose tire tread. (6) Function demonstration. c. Background. Effective February 1, 1965, part 25 was added to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to replace part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR). Sections 4b.334 and 4b.334-2 of the CAR, became § 25.729 of 14 CFR for landing gear retracting mechanism. (1) Amendment 25-23 (April 8, 1970) added a wheel rotational speed based on a factored takeoff speed of 1.3 Vs to be used for load computations under § 25.729(a)(1)(ii) and changed the reference from § 25.345 to § 25.345(a) under § 25.729(a)(1)(iii). (2) Amendment 25-42 (January 16, 1978) clarified the rule and made minor editorial changes to § 25.729(e)(3). (3) Amendment 25-72 (July 20, 1990) amended the rule. It made editorial changes and deleted reference to § 25.67(e) under § 25.729(e)(4), since § 25.67 no longer existed.

(4) Amendment 25-75 (December 5, 1991) revised § 25.729(e)(2) through (e)(6) to state objectives without stating how the requirements were to be met; thus allowing manufacturers to use their ingenuity in designing systems to minimize the occurrence of nuisance and inappropriate aural warnings. d. Policy/Compliance Methods. Guidance addressing flight testing used to demonstrate compliance with this section may be found in Advisory Circular (AC) 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes, chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 52, issued March 31, 1998. Also see AC 25.963-1, Fuel Tank Access Covers, section 4, for compliance to § 25.729(f)(2) (1) Protection of Equipment in wheel wells, § 25.729(f)(1). The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated December 4, 1997, which addresses whether wheel/tire assemblies containing thermal fuse plugs are sufficient to comply with the requirements of § 25.729(f)(1).

(a) The intent of the regulation is to protect essential equipment from the effects of a tire burst, regardless of the cause of the burst; overheat is just one way of causing a tire burst. Other ways a tire burst may be caused are: 1 foreign object damage. 2 under-inflation. 3 over-inflation. 4 overload. 5 an abnormal wheel component such as a melted/defective fuse plug. Additionally, compliance with § 25.1309(b) is required for a continued safe flight and landing. A tire burst must be considered regardless of its probability of occurrence.

(b) As cited in the preamble to Amendment 25-78: “A tire burst, as referred to in § 25.729(f), is a sudden, sometimes violent, venting of the pressure from within a tire, usually associated with a flaw in the tire, foreign object damage, or tire overheat/overload. The FAA assumes that tire bursts will occasionally occur, given the severe operating environment of airplane tires, and the fact that certain tire damage may go undetected until tire failure. With this in mind, equipment installed in wheel wells is evaluated at the time of certification to determine its ability to withstand the effects of a bursting tire. Analyses and laboratory tests are performed to identify critical areas, and design changes are often made to ensure that a single tire burst will not cause loss of critical functions. (2) Landing Gear Position Indication System - "Backup Requirement" (Section 25.729(e)).

The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated July 12, 1988, which addresses whether a backup gear position system is always required. (a) The failure of the landing gear position indicating system does not prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Further, service history has shown that gear-up landings on transport category airplanes are not catastrophic. Compliance with the requirements of § 25.729 may be accomplished by a straightforward engineering assessment of the design. A numerical probability analysis is not required. (b) If a review of the certification basis of the airplane reveals that a second method of landing gear position indication (e.g., a viewing port) was required due to the characteristics of the design, a replacement for the now-unusable viewing ports would have to be provided.

The replacement system could be of any type (electrical, mechanical, etc.), as long as it provided a back-up with reliability and functionality not less than that of the system approved under the original type certification basis. (c) If the back-up indication system was installed at the manufacturer's option, and was not required by the type certification basis, removing the system now could result in crew confusion or other operational problems. Although it is not recommended to remove an optional backup system (to avoid confusion in the cockpit), it would be acceptable provided the airplane continues to meet the original type certification basis requirements. Replacing the viewing ports with a system that would be similar in function to the original is encouraged, i.e., a redundant

means of determining that the landing gear is indeed down if there is any uncertainty from using the primary system. The determination of the reliability of the system need not be as rigorous as in (b), above, as long as the replacement system can be shown to perform its intended function. (d) Service difficulty reports relating to the landing gear indication system should be reviewed, and if the primary electrical system has required the use of the back-up viewing system to an inordinate degree, the back-up system would then become more important to the overall reliability of the indication system, and would be considered to be necessary under the provisions of § 21.21(b)(2). (3) Flap System/Landing Gear Warning System Tie-In. The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated December 19, 1983.

The memo addressed whether it was an acceptable design to provide two approach flap settings and two landing flap positions without including the “landing gear-up” warning required by § 25.729(e)(4), redesignated as § 25.729(e)(2), effective at Amendment level 25-72. (a) The FAA originally determined that providing no warning in this configuration was unacceptable. However, it was noted that there were transport category aircraft already certificated with approved alternate "selectable" means of changing the gear-up warning onset for alternate approach/landing flap configurations and that "uniformity" of certification warranted that this concept be approved if the proposed alternate means was judged acceptable by the cognizant Aircraft Certification Office. The concept was the use of a guarded, manually operated selection switch (location not specified) and the associated proposed Airplane Flight Manual procedures for the use of this system be provided. (b) FAA flight test personnel evaluated this proposed alternate design and found it acceptable.

Based on these events, it was determined that the proposed installation is acceptable, meets the intent of § 25.729(e)(4), and provides an acceptable equivalent level of safety. (4) Landing Gear Position Indication System. The following policy is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated June 3, 1983, which addresses whether other regulations need to be considered when finding compliance with § 25.729(e) (e.g., §§ 25.1301 and 25.1309). (a) Section 25.729(e) provides standards for landing gear position indicating systems. This section is necessary, but not sufficient, for certification of these systems.

This section only establishes the requirement for such a system; however, it is necessary to consider the requirements of § 25.1301 (that requires the system to be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function and function properly when installed), and §§ 25.1309(a) and 25.1309(b) (that require failures which reduce the capability of the aircraft or crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to be "improbable" and those that prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane to be "extremely improbable"). In summary, all sections of part 25 contained in the certification basis should be reviewed for applicability. (b) In addition, failures that result in presenting hazardously misleading indication to the crew must be improbable. An example of a hazardously misleading failure condition

would be if the gear indicating portions of the landing gear system indicate that all gear are down/locked when in actuality, all gear are not fully down and locked. (c) If the failure evaluation process of the landing gear system (including the gear position indication) shows that a gear-up landing will have catastrophic consequences, then the occurrence of this condition should be shown to be extremely improbable. However, if the evaluation shows that a gear up landing would only result in a hazardous condition, then the occurrences of this condition would fall in the improbable category. (d) Reviews of transport category accident/incident reports from the FAA files covering the five years prior to this memorandum have not listed a catastrophic result due to failures in the landing gear and/or indicating system.

Further, providing a second independent landing gear position indicating system may not improve the overall safety of' the aircraft and may, in some instances, lead to a more confused condition on the part of the crew in trying to sort out which indicating system should be used. (5) Landing Gear Slush Tests. The following policy is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated April 22, 1983. This memo addresses the need for slush tests to ensure that the landing gear can be extended for an aircraft with a single hydraulic system and no auxiliary power source. (a) There is no specific certification requirement for slush tests to evaluate landing gear retraction/extension systems during wet, freezing conditions. Service history indicates this can be a problem, even on large transport category airplanes with multiple hydraulic systems. The FAA has not made such tests a certification requirement because there is no practical means of preventing accumulation of slush in the wheel well area, short of prohibiting operation during slushy conditions.

Slush tests on a new airplane maintaining original design tolerances and properly lubricated joints would be of questionable value since the problem is often associated with poor maintenance practices. (b) In several reported instances of failure of the landing gear to extend, even with hydraulic pressure applied, the problems were usually corrected by lubrication of rotating joints. During slushy runway operation, water can enter rotating joints and freeze after cold soaking at altitude. The problem is usually reported during cold winter months and during low surface temperatures. (c) The design should be evaluated for possible accumulation of ice on the uplock mechanism and rotating joints, which could prevent manual operation of the emergency extension system. If, after careful review of a particular landing gear design, it appears that slush testing is necessary, such tests could be required under §§ 21.21(b)(2) and 25.729(d). If tests are deemed necessary, the tests should be conducted with little or no lubrication in all rotating joints.

e. References. The addresses for ordering the latest revision of advisory circulars and other referenced documents listed below can be found in the Appendix to this AC. AC 20-34D, Prevention of Retractable Landing Gear Failures. AC 23.729-1, Landing Gear Doors and Retraction Mechanism. (For information only). AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes. AC 43.13-1A, Acceptable Methods, Techniques and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair. AC 25.963-1, Fuel Tank Access Covers. SAE AIR-4566 - Crashworthiness Landing Gear Design. SAE ARP-1311A - Landing Gear- Aircraft. f. Definitions. For definitions of VS, VS1, and VC, see 14 CFR part 1, section 1.2, titled Abbreviations and symbols. 12. SECTION 25.731 - WHEELS. a. Rule Text.

(a) Each main and nose wheel must be approved. (b) The maximum static load rating of each wheel may not be less than the corresponding static ground reaction with- (1) Design maximum weight; and (2) Critical center of gravity. (c) The maximum limit load rating of each wheel must equal or exceed the maximum radial limit load determined under the applicable ground load requirements of this part. [Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29777, Jul. 20, 1990] b. Intent of Rule. This rule requires use of approved wheels, either approved under an applicable Technical Standard Order (TSO) e.g., TSO-C26c, or approved as part of the type design for the airplane. Wheels must satisfy both a design static (1g) load and design limit landing or taxiing load determined under the applicable ground load requirements (§§ 25.471 through 25.511). Standards for a tire installed on a wheel are contained in § 25.733. Standards for a brake installed on a wheel are contained in § 25.735. A TSO approval is not an approval to install wheels on the airplane. If the airframe manufacturer decides to install equipment approved under a TSO, they must conduct the applicable airplane certification tests and obtain FAA approval for the installation. c. Background. Effective February 1, 1965, part 25 was added to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to replace part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR). Sections 4b.335(a) and 4b.335(b) of the CAR became §§ 25.731(a) and 25.335(b) of 14 CFR for wheels.

(1) Amendment 25-72 (July 20, 1990) amended the rule to become compatible with § 25.25 (which had been amended). This amendment provides for weights that are in excess of takeoff weight, such as ramp weights, provided that the compliance with applicable structural requirements, including wheel strength, is demonstrated at the higher weights. (2) Harmonization. This regulation is the subject of a Federal Aviation Regulation/Joint Aviation Requirements (FAR/JAR) harmonization effort under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The ARAC working group is revising §§ 25.731 and 25.735, and is developing a new advisory circular AC 25.735-1, and a new TSO-C135 for transport category airplanes, replacing the applicable parts of the existing TSO-C26c. d. Policy/Compliance Methods. For guidance on compliance, the following material is extracted from Advisory Circulars (AC) 27-1, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and AC 29-2B, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft. It is applicable to certification of transport category airplanes.

While not specifically prepared for transport category airplanes, this policy material has been used for demonstrating compliance with § 25.731. For additional guidance, see AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes, chapter 4, section 4, par 53, issued March 31, 1998. (1) The structural design loads data shall contain both a static load and a landing and taxiing load for each wheel. These loads are determined by virtue of compliance with the standards of §§ 25.731(b) and 25.731(c). The ratings of the wheel shall not be exceeded. TSO-C26c contains minimum performance standards for TSO approval of aircraft wheels and wheel-brake assemblies. Ratings are assigned in accordance with this performance standard. (2) If a wheel selected for an aircraft design has TSO-C26c approval, the wheel manufacturer will supply the rating to the aircraft manufacturer. Each wheel shall be marked as prescribed which includes a listing of the TSO number.

Even though a wheel is TSO approved, the application on the aircraft (loads imposed on the wheel) requires proof that the rating is not exceeded. Wheel rating must not be less than airplane maximum radial load limits. (3) If a wheel selected for an aircraft design is not approved under TSO-C26, the necessary data, both detail design and assembly drawings and qualification tests and test report data, will be required to comply with the standards contained in part 25. Design control and inspections will be accomplished as a part of the aircraft type design. Structural substantiation and any appropriate qualification tests shall be accomplished. See §§ 25.471 through 25.497 for the ground load conditions.

(4) The Tire and Rim Association Inc., issues a yearbook listing aircraft tire and rim sizes and ratings. The dimensions and contours for aircraft wheel rims are contained in the yearbook. e. References. The addresses for ordering the latest revision of advisory circulars, technical standard orders, and other referenced documents listed below can be found in the Appendix to this AC.

Section 25.731 Wheels and § 25.735 Brakes, part 25 of 14 CFR. AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes. AC 27-1, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft. AC 29-2A, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft. AC 43.13-1A, Acceptable Methods, Techniques and Practices-Aircraft Inspection and Repair, Chap. 8, L. G. Equipment. TSO-C26, was an acceptable standard to Civil Aeronautics Administrator, but was not part of the regulations. TSO-C26a, was a part of the regulations, under part 514 of the Regulations of the Administrator, as § 514.72. TSO-C26b, was part of the regulations as § 37.172 of 14 CFR. TSO-C26c, was part of the regulations as § 37.172 of 14 CFR. TSO-C26c with Addendum I. The TSO was removed from regulations (§ 37.172, Amendment 25-52, 1980) and became a voluntary standard. SAE AIR-811B, Disposition of Wheels which have been Overheated. SAE ARP-1322, Overpressurization Release Devices. SAE ARP-1786, Wheel Roll on Rim Criteria for Aircraft Application. SAE AS-707B, Thermal Sensitive Inflation Pressure Release Devices for Tubeless Aircraft Wheels. 13. SECTION 25.733 - TIRES. a. Rule Text.

(a) When a landing gear axle is fitted with a single wheel and tire assembly, the wheel must be fitted with a suitable tire of proper fit with a speed rating approved by the Administrator that is not exceeded under critical conditions and with a load rating approved by the Administrator that is not exceeded under- (1) The loads on the main wheel tire, corresponding to the most critical combination of airplane weight (up to maximum weight) and center of gravity position, and (2) The loads corresponding to the ground reactions in paragraph (b) of this section, on the nose wheel tire, except as provided in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this section. (b) The applicable ground reactions for nose wheel tires are as follows: (1) The static ground reaction for the tire corresponding to the most critical combination of airplane weight (up to maximum ramp weight) and center of gravity position with a force of 1.0g acting downward at the center of gravity. This load may not exceed the load rating of the tire. (2) The ground reaction of the tire corresponding to the most critical combination of airplane weight (up to maximum landing weight) and center of gravity position combined with forces of 1.0g downward and 0.31g forward acting at the center of gravity. The reactions in this case must be distributed to the nose and main

wheels by the principles of statics with a drag reaction equal to 0.31 times the vertical load at each wheel with brakes capable of producing this ground reaction. This nose tire load may not exceed 1.5 times the load rating of the tire. (3) The ground reaction of the tire corresponding to the most critical combination of airplane weight (up to maximum ramp weight) and center of gravity position combined with forces of 1.0g downward and 0.20g forward acting at the center of gravity. The reactions in this case must be distributed to the nose and main wheels by the principles of statics with a drag reaction equal to 0.20 times the vertical load at each wheel with brakes capable of producing this ground reaction.

This nose tire load may not exceed 1.5 times the load rating of the tire. (c) When a landing gear axle is fitted with more than one wheel and tire assembly, such as dual or dual-tandem, each wheel must be fitted with a suitable tire of proper fit with a speed rating approved by the Administrator that is not exceeded under critical conditions, and with a load rating approved by the Administrator that is not exceeded by- (1) The loads on each main wheel tire, corresponding to the most critical combination of airplane weight (up to maximum weight) and center of gravity position, when multiplied by a factor of 1.07; and (2) Loads specified in paragraphs (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of this section on each nose wheel tire. (d) Each tire installed on a retractable landing gear system must, at the maximum size of the tire type expected in service, have a clearance to surrounding structure and systems that is adequate to prevent unintended contact between the tire and any part of the structure or systems. (e) For an airplane with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of more than

75,000 pounds, tires mounted on braked wheels must be inflated with dry nitrogen or other gases shown to be inert so that the gas mixture in the tire does not contain oxygen in excess of 5 percent by volume, unless it can be shown that the tire liner material will not produce a volatile gas when heated or that means are provided to prevent tire temperatures from reaching unsafe levels. [Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5676, Apr. 8, 1970; Amdt. 25-38, 41 FR 55467, Dec. 20, 1976; Amdt. 25-49, 44 FR 68745, Nov. 29, 1979; Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29777, Jul 20, 1990, as amended by Amdt 25-78, Mar 29, 1993] b. Intent of Rule. This rule specifies type certification requirements for both design and performance of tires used on transport category airplanes. The tire must be of proper fit and have approved speed and load ratings for a particular airplane application. The maximum static ground reaction for the condition specified must not exceed the maximum static load rating of each tire. Retractable gear system tires must have adequate clearance from surrounding structure and systems.

The tire inflation medium is to be an inert gas to avoid explosions. Tires installed on landing gear axles with multi-wheels (main wheel tires only), must have a 7% load margin included in their rating. Tire performance standards are contained in Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C62. A TSO approval is not approval to install tires on the airplane. The airframe manufacturer/user must conduct the applicable airplane certification tests and receive FAA approval for installation.

c. Background. Effective February 1, 1965, part 25 was added to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to replace part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR). Sections 4b.336(a) and 4b.336(b) of the CAR became §§ 25.733(a) and 25.733(b) of 14 CFR for tires. (1) Amendment 25-23 (April 8, 1970) added tire speed rating as a limitation governing the acceptance of tires for use on particular airplanes, identified the FAA Administrator to approve load and speed ratings in lieu of The Tire and Rim Association, and added the term "suitable" to "the tire of proper fit. (2) Amendment 25-38 (December 20, 1976) added § 25.733(c) to require that for retractable landing gear, the design must account for tire production tolerances and size increases expected in service. The tire should have adequate clearance to prevent jamming or interference of landing gear mechanisms and equipment/structure.

(3) Amendment 25-49 (November 29, 1979) improved minimum performance standards applicable to landing gear main and nose wheel tires (by revising § 37.167/TSO-C62b to TSO-C62c) and added more comprehensive design standards covering tire loads and speed ratings (§ 25.733). This amendment also specified a date (December 31, 1979) after which tire manufacturers could no longer identify their tires as approved under earlier standards (TSO-C62, C62a, C62b). (a) This amendment evolved as follows: The minimum performance standards for tires were set forth in the technical standard order (§ 37.167 "Aircraft Tires,” TSO-C62b) which was unchanged since it became effective in 1962. A series of accidents and incidents involving large commercial jet airplanes, particularly wide body types, in the mid 1970's involved failures of tires, wheels, brakes, and antiskid devices. The FAA intensified its surveillance efforts with respect to aircraft tires and began an analysis of the failures and potential corrective actions.

This led to joint FAA-Industry meetings in 1976 and 1977 that resulted in a proposed set of revised and updated standards (Notice 79-7) to reflect the latest technology and to meet operating conditions. (b) This amendment was a response to recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB issued a series of recommendations and advisory actions affecting tires in the areas of design standards, qualification testing, quality control during manufacture, and operational limits.

(4) Amendment 25-52 (June 2, 1980) revoked part 37, § 37.167 Aircraft Tires - TSO- C62c. Subpart A of 14 CFR part 37 became Subpart O of 14 CFR part 21. Subpart B of 14 CFR part 37 was eliminated, and the technical performance standards were made available at FAA Headquarters. (5) Amendment 25-72 (July 20, 1990) deleted the requirement to consider the effects of inertia, from § 25.733(a)(1) because such effects were determined to be negligible for constant speed taxi and takeoff conditions. In addition, § 25.733(c)(1) changed from a reference to § 25.733(a)(1) to a direct statement of the loading conditions for the sake of clarity. (6) Amendment 25-78 (March 29, 1993) added paragraph § 25.733(e) to require that for airplanes with a maximum certified takeoff weight of more than 75,000 pounds, the tires mounted on braked wheels be inflated with dry nitrogen or other inert gases so that the tire does not contain oxygen in excess of 5 percent by volume to prevent tire explosions.

The 75,000 pounds weight limit was based on a review of the service difficulty reports indicating that tire explosions, as opposed to tire bursts, tend to occur on the larger, heavier airplanes. The 5 percent by volume limit for oxygen content was based on a series of laboratory tests indicating that an abrupt auto-ignition could occur for oxygen concentrations of 10 percent or more. (a) There had been several cases where tire explosions had occurred in transport category operations. A tire explosion differs from a tire burst, which can occur when an overheated or over inflated tire fails and releases the high pressure air contained therein. Protection against tire burst is required under § 25.729(f). A tire explosion is the result of a chemical reaction occurring when gases released from overheated tire material mix with oxygen in the inflation air and ignite. In 1987, the FAA issued an airworthiness directive (AD 87-08-09) requiring use of nitrogen for tire inflation to ensure that the tires on braked wheels of airplanes do not contain more than 5 percent oxygen.

Amendment 25-78 was intended to accomplish the same purpose for new airplanes. d. Policy/Compliance Methods. For guidance on compliance with this requirement, refer to the preamble of this rule and the following information. (1) Approval of Retreaded Tires by Similarity. The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated March 1, 1995, that addresses whether “qualification by similarity” basis could be used for approving the production of retreaded aircraft tires, using a modified tread compound, in various sizes. (a) Background. A tire manufacturer had qualified several retreaded tires of different sizes in accordance with the stipulations of advisory circular (AC) 145-4, Inspection, Retread, Repair, and Alteration of Aircraft Tires (dynamometer testing). The manufacturer wished to produce other retreaded tires of different sizes and ratings, based on similarity. In the past, every tire size had to be tested for such an approval.

(b) Supportive Information. The following supportive information was provided: 1 Nature of the Change The formulation for the tread compound used to retread commercial aircraft tires had been modified as follows: (aa) Polymer: A proprietary description of the change. (bb) Filler: A proprietary description of the change. 2 Test Results. The change in tread compound had been proven by dynamic qualification testing on a sample of tire sizes. The various tire sizes were representative of the tire sizes listed for production approval in the applicant's letter. Qualification Test Reports (QTR’s) were submitted to the FAA. The QTR’s were approved by the cognizant Flight Standards District Office. 3 Physical Properties of the Tread Material. The physical properties measured in a laboratory showed that the new compound had a specific percent lower hysteresis value, an indicator of heat generation. This characteristic provided an indication of tread durability, and related to the qualification of tires that had been retreaded using the new compound.

Also, this lower modulus and a lower hardness of the new compound indicated a better resistance to scuffing and tearing actions to which the tire is subjected in service. 4 Static Test Results per AC 145-4. Because the tire design remained the same, all static measurements (overall diameter, section width, static-loaded radius, skid depth, and static unbalance) were not affected by this change. Tread weight remained within the retread process capability. 5 In-Service Evaluation. Tires retreaded with this new material had been evaluated in service with several different airlines. No problems had been reported by the operators and no tires had been prematurely removed from service due to tread-related conditions, such as chunking or tread separation. Field inspection and examination of returned worn casings, performed by qualified personnel, had indicated good tread integrity and wear characteristics. Based on cycle data gathered (number of landings per retread), the length of the maintenance interval remained within a reasonable percentage of the baseline tire. 6 Rationale Summary.

The tire sizes selected to demonstrate the continuation of performance were representative of the tire sizes for which production approval was requested. At least one tire size was qualified in each of the tire design types presently in service. For each tire application (nose and main landing gear), at least one tire was dynamically qualified. With one tire size, the highest speed rating in the list of proposed tire sizes was successfully qualified. With another tire size, the tested sample included the highest rated pressure tire. With yet another tire size, the largest skid depth in the list of proposed sizes was

dynamically tested. Within their own class of tires, these were, historically, the most difficult sizes to meet the qualifications of the AC 145-4 requirements. They had often been used in the past to prove process or material changes. 7 In view of the substantiating factors detailed above, it was requested that all of the additional tire sizes listed in their letter be authorized for production on the basis of “qualification by similarity.” (c) Approval. The FAA carefully considered the information provided above, and determined that there was sufficient merit to authorize production of the additional tire sizes for retreading, based on ”qualification by similarity. (2) Approval of Nonretreadable Tires - Qualification Testing.

The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated August 18, 1988, which addresses the definition and application of "major and minor" changes as they relate to products with a TSO versus aircraft installation approval. (a) TSO tire dynamometer testing, alone, is not considered acceptable for installation approval except for the most straightforward changes. This memorandum also addresses a potentially unsafe condition that may have resulted from retreading tires that were designed and approved as nonretreadable. 1 Based on evidence presented, including the adverse service history, it appears that the development of the lightweight and nonretreadable tires should have been classified as a "major change," which would have necessitated flight testing on the candidate airplane(s) prior to approval. (b) It was noted that the TSO was granted based on dynamometer testing, and that the tire was presumably shown to meet the required load-speed-time curve, and other airplane weight and load parameters.

However, FAA policy has been that dynamometer testing is not a suitable substitute for airplane tests for any but the most straightforward changes. (c) The memorandum recommended that a suitable test program be implemented as soon as possible that would demonstrate that these tires are appropriate for their intended application. The test program that was established in January 1984, for the introduction of radial tires, presented later in paragraph (4)(b), is also appropriate in this case since the effect of these tires on airplane performance, landing gear dynamics and antiskid operation, wheel/fuse plug integrity, brake energy absorption, and wheel-well tire burst, is unknown. These lower weight, and therefore lower strength, tires may have a profound effect on the airplane performance, the wheel/brake integrity, or the life of the tires.

The documentation that accompanies nonretreadable tires, once they are approved, must clearly show that the tires are not to be retreaded. (d) There is concern that there have been many changes to wheels, tires, and brakes that have been considered to be "product improvements," and approved under the TSO

system as "minor changes," that should have been demonstrated on the airplane prior to their approval. (3) Approval Method for Substitute Tires. The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated April 14, 1988, which addresses the certification considerations that should be taken into account when the installation approval of a new tire on a type certificated aircraft is requested. (a) A substitute tire must be shown to be adequate for its intended use. In some cases, the proposed tire will be listed in the airframe manufacturer's specification documents, and can be installed without further investigation. The airframe manufacturer should be contacted to determine if data exist regarding the acceptability of the proposed tire to be substituted on the airplane. (b) If the replacement tires are of the same basic type and construction as the currently approved tires, but they have not been previously approved on the airplane, the following items should be considered.

This list is not meant to imply that flight tests would be mandatory; rather, that the items should be discussed with the applicant and any discrepancy or concerns addressed. 1 The TSO load-speed-time curves should be compared to the airplane envelope to establish the suitability of the proposed tire for installation on the airplane. If the tire is not TSO authorized, it would be the applicant's responsibility to demonstrate that the tire meets all TSO requirements. 2 The physical dimensions of the mounted tire should allow adequate clearance to the wheel well and its contents, landing gear structure, gear doors, etc. Consideration should be given to new tires as well as retreads and possible growth effects of retreading. 3 If the weight of the proposed tire is significantly different from the original, or from other tires approved on the airplane, landing gear retraction times or emergency gear extension operation may be affected. A flight test should be conducted if there is a concern that any weight difference would be large enough to affect gear actuation times.

4 The spring rates for the proposed tire should be compared to other tires approved for the specific airplane at the expected load and deflection, to determine any adverse effect on the loads on the landing gear or any adverse dynamic coupling between the landing gear and tires.

5 The tire rolling radius, tire pressure, tire deflection, and tire footprint should be compared to other tires approved on the airplane, to determine the effect on water spray patterns or tire heating. If the tire pressure is adjusted to obtain a certain deflection, the effect on tire load carrying capability should be investigated. 6 Uninstrumented functional landings should be conducted. If antiskid is installed, these functional landings should be conducted on both wet and dry runways to determine if any adverse effects on the system have been introduced by the proposed tire. 7 If comparison of the proposed tire to other tires approved on the airplane reveals any significant differences in the factors noted above, or if there is evidence of significantly increased or decreased tire rolling resistance or tire µ, performance landings should be conducted. Increased tire rolling resistance could impact takeoff performance, decreased rolling resistance could affect fuse plug integrity, and a different tire µ could affect stopping performance.

(4) Replacement of Bias Ply Tires with Radial Ply Tires. The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated February 7, 1984. (a) This memorandum provided certification criteria for installation of radial tires on type certificated aircraft which only had bias tire approval. The radial tire had obtained TSO approval and this memorandum outlined the installation considerations. (b) Certification Program for Replacing Bias Tires with Radial Tires, part 25 Transports; All weight Categories, dated Jan. 12, 1984. A bias ply to radial ply tire change is not considered minor. The following certification program is designed for a TSO approved radial tire that is to replace a bias tire of equivalent rating. 1 The tire must be TSO-C62c approved, or equivalent as stated in § 25.733(c), and rated for the speed and gross weight under consideration.

The radial tire must have been tested to the equivalent of the TSO, i.e., loads, speeds, and energies, etc. 2 The vertical spring rate for the radial tire should be determined and compared to the original bias tire in order to assess the difference in energy absorption characteristics. The airplane vertical load factors should not exceed the original design values with the radial tire installed. Also, spin-up and spring-back loads should be evaluated if there are significant differences in the weight and moments of inertia of the two tire and wheel assemblies. (For guidance on compliance refer to §§ 25.479, 25.723, and 25.725. 3 The protection of the equipment in the wheel wells should be reassessed as the radial tire will have different failure burst characteristics than the bias tire. This assessment should cover tire air blast, as well as loose tread. (For guidance on compliance refer to § 25.729(f).)

4 Emergency gear extension should be reviewed and, if necessary, reassessed if tire size or weight changes are involved. (For guidance on compliance refer to § 25.729(c). 5 A maximum Rejected Takeoff (RTO) energy stop using the 3 mile taxi, 3 full stops criteria of AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes, chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 55, should be conducted. (aa) The tire pressure is to be set to the highest value appropriate for the maximum takeoff weight for which approval is being sought. Pressure should be set before taxi and with cold tires. This test is specified to confirm (at maximum takeoff weight) acceptable tire structural integrity, tire anti-skid dynamics, airplane braking performance, effectiveness of the fuse plugs, and to assess the directional control compatibility of the airplane if the fuse plugs melt late in the RTO run. In addition, the fire limitations of AC 25-7A, paragraph 55c(ii), or latest revision, are to be observed.

6 A sufficient number of RTO's and landings should be conducted to substantiate that the aircraft performance with radial tires is as good as, or better than, originally demonstrated with bias tires. Tests should be conducted in accordance with AC 25-7A, paragraph (2)(ii)(c), or latest revision. 7 The fuse plug integrity no-melt tests should be conducted in accordance with AC 25-7A, paragraph 55c(7), unless the applicant demonstrates the energies absorbed by the brake with a radial tire are no greater than the energies absorbed in the same brake when using the bias tire when comparing equivalent flywheel energies on the dynamometer. The fuse plug integrity test should also be run if the brake or tire temperatures of the radial tire/wheel/brake assembly are greater than the brake or tire temperatures of the bias tire/wheel/brake assembly when comparing equivalent flywheel energies on the dynamometer.

8 A sufficient number of flight tests should be conducted on wet and dry runways to establish that the anti-skid and/or autobrakes will function compatibly and acceptably with the radial tires. 9 A high speed takeoff at the highest speed for which approval is being sought, and sufficient taxi and turn tests to assess dynamic stability should be conducted. 10 If the airplane is approved for unimproved runways, additional evaluations should be conducted if there is an appreciable change in the tire footprint. 11 Water spray characteristics should be reviewed and, if necessary, reassessed. 12 Tire intermix, radial/bias, should be considered based on an evaluation on a case by case basis. For example, some of these items (1-11) may not apply for a nose tire

intermix. Any additional considerations deemed necessary by the cognizant ACO should be addressed. 13 If there is a significant tire tread change from one radial tire to another radial tire, the airplane performance should be considered and if necessary reassessed. 14 Additional testing may be required if certification for an increase in airplane weight or kinetic energy is requested. (5) Certification of Radial Tire Installation. The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum dated March 28, 1984, which addresses as to why is it necessary to consider items (4)(b)1. through (4)(b)14. addressed in the preceding paragraph, and provides historical information on the reasons for certain items contained in the radial tire certification program. It also explains some of the reasons why dynamometer testing alone is not considered adequate for installation approval of replacement tires. (a) The "Certification Program for Replacing Bias Tires with Radial Tires" dated January 12, 1984, is still the FAA recommended program. A bias ply tire to radial ply tire change is not considered minor.

Dynamometer tests are not an acceptable substitute for airplane tests for tires, wheels, and brakes. This position, which is supported by FAA certification experience, is taken in AC 25-7A, chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 55. 1 For example, the FAA was requested to certificate a medium transport with three sets of tire/wheel/brake combinations for an increased gross weight. The manufacturer wished to certificate these combinations based on extrapolated data from existing lower energy data of one set, and to the higher TSO authorized energy levels of all three sets; however, the FAA insisted a full testing program be done. All three sets failed to achieve the projected braking coefficient of friction (µ). In addition, the set that was supposed to have the greatest margin, the set designated for future growth potential, almost failed due to shearing of the brake rotor lugs. The wheels, tires and fuseplugs functioned properly. (b) Another example was the certification of a new model large transport.

The tires had received TSO authorization, but were failing at the high speed takeoffs within the TSO performance envelope. Going further back, the FAA has had similar experiences relative to fuseplugs, anti-skid brake lock-up, and so forth. These experiences confirm that the dynamometer is not a satisfactory tool in predicting performance, compatibility, fuseplug melt/no-melt, etc., for tires, wheels, and brakes. The dynamometer is even questionable when it is used for trend data, as demonstrated by the medium transport example above. It is, however, useful as background information. (c) That the dynamometer does not accurately simulate actual conditions may be due to its inherent inability to adequately simulate the following: 1 Actual runway conditions (i.e., round versus the flat surface of the runway, surface conditions and so forth).

2 Thermodynamic interaction (i.e., conduction. radiation, and convection between adjacent tires, wheels, and brakes, between the tire and the runway surface, and the effects of the air). 3 Airplane/System dynamics (i.e., the interaction between the airplane and supporting gear and systems, control systems and so forth). (d) Adequate means of simulation could probably be developed with new test criteria (if comparisons are to be made) and new techniques. The end result would most likely be a test fixture on a track with a complete landing system including supporting structure, systems duplicating the number of landing gear, and so on, which would be capable of intricate simulations of takeoff, landing and braking dynamics. However, it would probably be less expensive to test the airplane as is currently the practice. (e) Another problem is establishing the adequacy of the tire relative to the TSO data and to additional tests. The airframe manufacturer may request that the tire, wheel, and brake manufacturers conduct specific tests beyond the scope of the TSO.

Side loading and overloading are good examples of additional tests. We can never be sure after completing the airplane tests that the tire (wheel or brake also) reliability is dependent totally on the TSO tests or on the TSO test and the additional tests specified. We are aware of at least one case where two tires manufactured by two different companies were installed on the same airplane and operated within the same TSO envelopes, yet one tire type failed while the other passed. The successful tire type had additional side loads specified which were not part of the TSO testing. As a repetitive statement, the FAA position is that TSO data is not a satisfactory substitute for tire wheel or brake tests on the airplane. (f) If the radial ply tire is heavier than the bias tire, it must be determined whether that is significant. Lighter tire weight can affect some emergency extension systems as some of these systems use the landing gear weight to overcome the unlocking residual forces to provide enough inertia to extend the gear down, over center, and to lock the gear in place.

Heavier weight may have an effect on retraction times. Radial tires may weigh as much as 1/4 less than the bias tires they would replace. (g) Rejected takeoff tests are not only to prove the capability of the brakes, but also to prove the landing gear system and its interaction with associated components as well. These tests are to evaluate performance, dynamics, and system adequacy. As stated earlier, the dynamometer tests of the TSO are not an acceptable equivalent or substitute for the airplane tests. We also note that an applicant has stated that: "The radial tire exhibits less drag, and would therefore result in a slightly longer stopping distance at the same brake pressure (i.e., brake torque). The maximum RTO is conducted at the maximum brake pressure, therefore, the braking distance would appear to be longer, based on an applicant's comment. In addition to other considerations, the maximum RTO and other performance tests should help establish how much longer the braking distance is going to be.

(h) Note that for the same bias tire dynamometer test energy, the brake energy increases with a decrease in energy absorbed by the radial tire; therefore, the heat being delivered to the fuseplug through the wheel will probably increase. It is not known how much or how significant that increase will be. How the fuseplugs are going to act (no-melt/melt) should be established on the airplane prior to certification. (i) A sufficient number of flight tests should be conducted on wet and dry runways to establish that the anti-skid and the landing gear system will function compatibly and acceptably with the radial tires. (j) It should be established prior to certification that the airplane tire will behave structurally and dynamically on the airplane as well as it did on the dynamometer at high speed conditions. Because dynamic stability may be more of a function of gear dynamics coupled to the tire dynamics, airplane tests should be conducted, as the dynamometer is insufficient in simulating airplane and landing gear system dynamics.

(6) Critical Conditions & Maximum Ramp Weight Definitions. The following is extracted from an FAA telegraphic message dated January 26, 1981, which addresses definitions of "critical conditions" and "maximum ramp weight" as they relate to § 25.733. (a) Section 25.733(a) Critical Conditions. The critical conditions are those conditions where the takeoff or landing speed extremes that have been established by evaluating takeoff or landing performance for temperature, altitude, aircraft weight, aircraft configuration, runway conditions, engine performance, etc., may approach the tire speed rating. The critical conditions in this case are the takeoff or landing performance conditions that establish maximum tire speed. (b) Section 25.733(a)(1); (b)(1); (b)(3);Maximum ramp weight. The maximum ramp weight is the maximum weight allowed on the airplane (includes airplane weight, fuel, oil, baggage, etc.). This definition is used interchangeably with maximum taxi weight.

e. References. The addresses for ordering the latest revision of advisory circulars, technical standard orders, and other referenced documents listed below can be found in the Appendix to this AC. AC 20-97A, High-Speed Tire Maintenance and Operational Practices. AC 43.13-1A, Acceptable Methods, Techniques and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair, chap. 8, L. G. Equipment. AC 145-4, Inspection, Retread, Repair and Alterations of Tires. FAA Order 8000.54, Process Specifications for Retreading Tires and Inspection Procedures Manuals for Tire Retreaders. FAA Order 8000.64, Qualification of Aircraft Radial Tires for Use on Aircraft and for Retreading. FAA's Tire Approval Process Video, MTS 422/422.1, 42:15 Minutes. TSO-C62c, of § 37.167 14 CFR. This TSO was removed from regulations (§ 37.167, Amendment 25-52, 1980), and became a voluntary standard. TSO-C62c, With Addendum I. This TSO was removed from regulations (§ 37.167, Amendment 25-52, 1980), and became a voluntary standard. TSO-C62d, Tires. SAE AIR-1904 - Tire Spray Suppression - Airplane, Design Consideration and Testing. SAE ARP-1322 - Overpressurization Release Devices. SAE ARP-4834 - Recommended Practice for Retreaded Aircraft Tires - Radial and Bias. SAE AS-707B - Thermal Sensitive Inflation Pressure Release Devices for Tubeless Aircraft Wheels. SAE-AS 1188 - Aircraft Tire Inflation-Deflation Equipment. SAE AS-4833 - Aircraft New Tire Standard- Bias and Radial. 14. SECTION 25.735 - BRAKES. a. Rule Text.

(a) Each brake must be approved. (b) The brake system and associated systems must be designed and constructed so that if any electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic, or mechanical connecting or transmitting element (excluding the operating pedal or handle) fails, or if any single source of hydraulic or other brake operating energy supply is lost, it is possible to bring the airplane to rest under conditions specified in 25.125, with a mean deceleration during the landing roll of at least 50 percent of that obtained in determining the landing distance prescribed in that section. Subcomponents within the brake assembly, such as brake drum, shoes, and actuators (or their equivalents), shall be considered as connecting or transmitting elements, unless it is shown that leakage of hydraulic fluid resulting from failure of the sealing elements in these subcomponents within the brake assembly would not reduce the braking effectiveness below that specified in this paragraph. (c) Brake controls may not require excessive control force in their operation.

(d) The airplane must have a parking control that, when set by the pilot, will without further attention, prevent the airplane from rolling on a paved, level runway with takeoff power on the critical engine. (e) If antiskid devices are installed, the devices and associated systems must be designed so that no single probable malfunction will result in a hazardous loss of braking ability or directional control of the airplane. (f) The design landing brake kinetic energy capacity rating of each main wheelbrake assembly shall be used during qualification testing of the brake to the applicable Technical Standard Order (TSO) or an acceptable equivalent. This kinetic energy rating may not be less than the kinetic energy absorption requirements determined under either of the following methods: (1) The brake kinetic energy absorption requirements must be based on a rational analysis of the sequence of events expected during operational landings at maximum landing weight. This analysis must include conservative values of airplane speed at which the brakes are applied, braking coefficient of friction between tires and runway, aerodynamic drag, propeller drag or power-plant forward thrust, and (if more critical) the most adverse single engine or propeller malfunction. (2) Instead of a rational analysis, the kinetic energy absorption requirements for each main wheel-brake assembly may be derived from the following formula, which must be modified in cases of designed unequal braking distributions.

KE = 0.0443 WV2

N where- KE = Kinetic energy per wheel (ft.-lb.); W = Design landing weight (lb.); V = Airplane speed in knots. V must be not less than VS0 , the power off stalling speed of the airplane at sea level, at the design landing weight, and in the landing configuration; and N = Number of main wheels with brakes. (g) The minimum stalling speed rating of each main wheel-brake assembly (that is, the initial speed used in the dynamometer tests) may not be more than the V used in the determination of kinetic energy in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section, assuming that the test procedures for wheel-brake assemblies involve a specified rate of deceleration, and, therefore, for the same amount of kinetic energy, the rate of energy absorption (the power absorbing ability of the brake) varies inversely with the initial speed. (h) The rejected takeoff brake kinetic energy capacity rating of each main wheelbrake assembly that is at the fully worn limit of its allowable wear range shall be used during qualification testing of the brake to the applicable Technical Standard Order (TSO) or an acceptable equivalent. This kinetic energy rating may not be less than the kinetic energy absorption requirements determined under either of the following methods:

(1) The brake kinetic energy absorption requirements must be based on a rational analysis of the sequence of events expected during an accelerate-stop maneuver. This analysis must include conservative values of airplane speed at which the brakes are applied, braking coefficient of friction between tires and runway, aerodynamic drag, propeller drag or powerplant forward thrust, and (if more critical) the most adverse single engine or propeller malfunction. (2) Instead of a rational analysis, the kinetic energy absorption requirements for each main wheel brake assembly may be derived from the following formula, which must be modified in cases of designed unequal braking distributions:

KE = 0.0443 WV2

N where- KE = Kinetic energy per wheel (ft.-lb.); W = Design landing weight (lb.); V = Airplane speed (knots); N = Number of main wheels with brakes; and W and V are the most critical combination of takeoff weight and ground speed obtained in a rejected takeoff. [Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5676, Apr. 8, 1970; Amdt. 25-48, 44 FR 68742, Nov. 29, 1979; Amdt. 25- 72, 55 FR 29777, Jul. 20, 1990, as amended by Amdt. 25-78, 58 FR 11781, Feb. 26, 1993; Amdt. 25-92, 63 FR 8320, Feb. 18, 1998] b. Intent of Rule. (1) This rule requires use of approved brakes and wheel assemblies, either approved under an applicable technical standard order (TSO) e.g., TSO-C26c, or approved under the type certificate for the airplane. The existence of TSO approval with the article displaying required markings does not automatically constitute the authority to install and use the article on an airplane. (2) It is the responsibility of those desiring to install this article to determine that the aircraft operating conditions are within the TSO standards.

Additional requirements may be imposed based on airplane specifications, wheel and brake design, and quality control specifications. The airframe manufacturer/user must conduct the applicable airplane certification tests and receive FAA approval. (3) In addition to brake performance and safety requirements, the rule provides standards for systems and equipment associated with brakes, e.g., control mechanisms and antiskid systems. The brake and wheel assembly must have proper energy and load ratings for taxi, takeoff, refused takeoff, and landing. The braking system must have acceptable pilot-control forces, adequate parking brake capability, emergency braking capacity and directional control, and protection against overpressure, overtemperature, and fire.

c. Background. Effective February 1, 1965, part 25 was added to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to replace part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations (CAR). Sections 4b.337 (a)(1), 4b.337(a)(2) and 4b.337(a)(3), 4b.337(b), 4b.337(c), 4b.337(d), 4b.335(c), and 4b.335(d) of the CAR, respectively became §§ 25.735(a), 25.735(b), 25.735(c), 25.735(d), 25.735(e), 25.735(f) and 25.735(g) of 14 CFR, for brakes/braking systems. (1) Amendment 25-23 (April 8, 1970) deleted reference to a military specification (MIL-B-8075) as the means of compliance for antiskid devices under § 25.735(e) to allow any other acceptable means of compliance. In addition, proper units of "knots" were added to stall speed under § 25.735(f)(2). (2) Amendment 25-48 (November 29, 1979) revised the technical standard order TSO-C26b for aircraft wheels and wheel-brake assemblies and related type certification requirements for airplane brakes. The revised standards in § 37.172 - TSO-C26c incorporated an updated and improved minimum performance standard for the design and construction of aircraft wheels and brakes.

Under § 25.735(b), the incorrect reference to § 25.75 was replaced by a correct reference to § 25.125. Under § 25.735(f)(2), the numerical constant 0.0442 was corrected as 0.0443, and the letter "N" was appropriately redefined as the number of main wheels with brakes. Under § 25.735(f)(2), the term Vso in the formula was replaced with "V" such that V must not be less than Vso. Under § 25.735(g), the term Vso was replaced by V to be consistent with terminology used under § 25.735(f)(2). (3) Amendment 25-52 (June 9, 1980) eliminated § 37.172 Aircraft wheels and brakes - TSO-C26c from the regulations. TSO-C26c was made available at FAA Headquarters in the Office of Airworthiness. (4) Amendment 25-72 (July 20, 1990) revised the text of the last sentence in § 25.735(b) to clarify the intent. (5) Amendment 25-92 (February 18, 1998) added § 25.735(h) requiring that the maximum rejected takeoff kinetic energy capacity rating of the aircraft brakes be determined with the brake at the fully worn limit of its allowable wear range.

The requirement evolved from an National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendation as follows: In 1988, a large transport category airplane experienced an 86% maximum kinetic energy (KE) rejected takeoff (RTO) in a dispatch configuration in which eight of the ten brakes were worn close to the maintenance limits. The eight brakes failed early in the braking run and the airplane overran the runway. As a result, the FAA reviewed the methodology used in the determination of allowable brake wear limits for transport category airplanes. It was determined that brake wear limits should be established during certification to ensure that fully worn brakes will function properly during a maximum KE RTO. A series of airplane specific airworthiness directives were issued between 1989 and 1994 to establish brake wear limits using the new criteria. These criteria were applied to transport category airplanes that exceeded a gross weight of 75000 pounds. The test criteria to establish brake wear limits are discussed later under Policy/Compliance item d.(6).

The regulation was updated to reflect this new criteria.

(6) Harmonization. This regulation is the subject of a Federal Aviation Regulations/Joint Aviation Requirements (FAR/JAR) harmonization effort under Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The ARAC working group has recommended revisions to §§ 25.731 and 25.735, and has developed a new advisory circular (AC) 25.735-1. A new TSO-C135 for transport category airplanes, replacing the applicable parts of the existing TSO-C26c, was also developed. The proposed rule change, the proposed AC, and the proposed TSO package were published in the Federal Register, August 10, 1999, inviting public comments. The proposed harmonized AC 25.735-1 will not, however, replace all policy matter contained in this AC because several issues are not addressed in AC 25.735-1. d. Policy/Compliance Methods. Flight and ground testing procedures for demonstrating compliance with the requirements of § 25.735 may be found in AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes. (1) Carbon Brake Refurbishment (redensification).

The following is extracted from an FAA memorandum, dated April 11, 1996, which provides guidance regarding approval of an alternate process for redensification of carbon brake disks during brake overhaul. The redensification process involves a 2-for-1 brake disk refurbishment. The term 2-for-1 is associated with a re-building of the brake where two worn rotors are resurfaced, placed in an oven to have the carbon "redensified" and riveted together to form a new rotor, which is then placed in the brake as part of the re-building of the assembly. An approved repair shop that overhauls brakes in accordance with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) overhaul procedures, requested the FAA to approve, as a minor change, the option of using a different carbon brake redensification process developed by the shop and its associates. The only redensification option presently available is to return the brake components to the OEM.

The proposed process was initially applied to carbon brake disks used on a military aircraft. (a) Due to continued in-service problems associated with carbon brakes and their complex processing techniques, the FAA contacted major U.S. manufacturers to solicit background information regarding carbon brake overhaul procedures including the 2-for-1 refurbishment and redensification process. All brake manufacturers consider carbon brake redensification a complex and proprietary process which can affect brake performance. Experience at three (3) brake manufacturers of original equipment has shown that a very minor carbon processing change (heat treat operation) can have a significant effect on brake performance and airplane structural compatibility.

By the criteria established in AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes, paragraph 55, it has been determined that redensification is a major change. (b) For additional guidance on compliance with this requirement, refer to the latest revision of AC 25-7A, chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 55. (c) The typical dynamometer test program conducted by an OEM for an overhauled brake configuration can be quite substantial. An airplane manufacturer usually requires that the OEM conduct testing to obtain FAA TSO-C26c approval and re-qualify the brake before airline introduction and retrofit. This full scale brake requalification effort depends

on the type and degree of modification(s) done to the brake to obtain the overhauled configuration. (d) An airplane manufacturer pays particular attention to potential differences in brake torque, energy capacity, vibration, brake sensitivity, dynamic response, and structural strength. A brake requalification test program including the conditions below would be accomplished using a wheel/brake assembly in the most adverse service condition. 1 Design Landing Stops (Normal and Overload Energy levels). 2 Wet Brake Landing Stops (effect of moisture content in carbon). 3 New Brake Rejected Takeoffs (RTO's) at 60%, 80%, and 100% of maximum brake kinetic energy). 4 Worn Brake RTO's. 5 Wet Brake RTO's. 6 High Power/Torque Repeatability RTO. 7 Torque Sensitivity Testing. 8 Service Landing Wear Testing. 9 Fuse Plug No-Melt RTO series to evaluate disk warpage and thermal characteristics. 10 Brake Rolling Drag. 11 Brake Peak Torque Survey. 12 Static Low Speed Torque. 13 Vibration Testing. 14 Frequency Response. 15 Torque Recovery. 16 Hysteresis. 17 Static Structural Torque. 18 Dynamic Structural Torque Test. 19 Static Brake Torque to evaluate park brake hold capability. 20 Carbon Disk Oxidation Resistance. 21 Heat Sink Contamination Testing. 22 Intermix of New and Overhauled disks. 23 Brake Thermal Modeling. (e) The test results are then compared to the original new brake qualification test results to determine equivalence of the overhauled brake configuration. When changes include different heat sink material processing or are done by a supplier other than the OEM, it may be

necessary to perform airplane/brake system flight testing. This will validate the Airplane Flight Manual performance and the brake control system compatibility for the overhauled brake configuration. (f) Some additional considerations are as follows: 1 The FAA does not accept military airplane equipment test data for compliance with transport category airplane regulations. 2 The applicant has not conducted any tests whatsoever on the modified brakes. 3 The applicant may need to apply for a new TSO and possibly a supplemental type certificate (STC). (2) FAA/JAA certification requirements: steel/carbon brakes. The following is extracted from an FAA letter dated April 9, 1996, which addresses obtaining parts manufacturer approval (PMA) for manufacturers located outside of the United States, TSO procedures, and brake certification requirements for steel and carbon brakes. (a) There are no differences in the certification requirements between carbon and steel brakes. The TSO-C26c and AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, are still applicable.

In addition, each airframe manufacturer has specific vibration control criteria in their wheel and brake specification. This criteria is crucial to the brake dynamics, the particular airplane installation, and structural integrity of the airplane. (b) There are no known differences on the carbon brake certification requirements between the FAA and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). You are, however, advised to verify this with the JAA. (3) Certification of Replacement Brakes. The following is extracted from an FAA letter dated May 19, 1992, which addresses policy on aircraft brake replacement. The information was requested by a foreign airworthiness authority and is provided in the advisory circular format.

ADVISORY INFORMATION FOR BRAKE REPLACEMENT (a) Purpose. To provide advisory information and guidance for a non-U.S. manufacturer concerning an acceptable means of showing compliance with Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), applicable to the replacement of brakes for part 25 airplanes.

(b) Related Regulations and Documents. 1 Sections. The related sections of 14 CFR, part 25, are as follows: § 21.305 Approval of materials, parts, process, and appliances. § 21.502 Approval of materials, parts, and appliances. § 21.607 General rules governing holders of TSO authorizations. § 21.609 Approval for deviation. § 21.617 Issue of letters of TSO design approval: import appliances. § 25.109 Accelerate-stop distance. § 25.125 Landing. § 25.143 Controllability and maneuverability. § 25.231 Longitudinal stability and control. § 25.233 Direction stability and control. § 25.493 Braked roll conditions. § 25.735 Brakes. § 25.1301 Function and Installation. § 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations. 2 Advisory Circulars (AC's). The addresses for ordering the latest revision of the advisory circulars and technical standard orders listed below can be found in the Appendix to this AC. AC 21-23, Airworthiness Certification of Civil Aircraft Engine, Propellers, and Related Products. AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes. TSO-C26c, Aircraft Wheels and Wheel-Brake Assemblies with Addendum I. 3 Industry Documents. These documents provide additional information, guidance, and/or standards. The address to order the documents listed below can be found in the Appendix to this AC. SAE ARP-597C, Wheels and Brakes, Supplementary Criteria for Design Endurance - Civil Transport Aircraft. SAE ARP-813A, Maintainability Recommendations for Aircraft Wheels and Brakes. SAE ARP-1064B, Brake Dynamics. SAE AS-1145A, Aircraft Brake Temperature Monitor System (BTMS). SAE ARP-1619, Replacement and Modified Brakes and Wheels.

(c) Airworthiness Requirements. 1 Applicable Requirements. Replacement of brakes must be evaluated against the applicable part 25 airworthiness requirements. They are §§ 25.109, 25.125, 25.143, 25.231, 25.233, 25.493, 25.735, 25.1301, 25.1309, of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), and TSO-C26c. 2 Substantiation Procedures: (aa) The design and its design deviations should be substantiated by conducting the necessary analytical investigations, laboratory testing, and airplane testing to ensure that the change can be made without impairing airplane braking or rolling performance. The recommended substantiation procedures for replacement brakes are based on parts approval and their impact on the prior certification.

Depending upon the type and extent of change and the certification basis of the airplane, engineering judgment will be used to determine which of the substantiation procedures discussed in AC 25-7A, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 55, should be considered for replacement brake installations in addition to the laboratory tests required by the TSO. (bb) Aircraft brakes are approved under the Technical Standard Order (TSO) system (TSO-C26c). A TSO-C26c authorization indicates that the brake and its associated wheel have met certain requirements relating to strength, energy absorption, durability, construction, performance, and manufacture.

In addition, the holder of a TSO authorization has demonstrated certain quality control procedures and the ability to produce duplicate parts from approved drawings. (cc) A TSO authorization, by itself, is generally considered adequate to show that the wheel/brake combination is satisfactory for flight testing on an airplane, and would be safe for use during subsequent certification testing. However, it is not sufficient to show satisfactory performance within the operational envelope of the airplane, due to the welldocumented differences (load distribution on the landing gear, heat dissipation, brake efficiency, runway crown, etc.) between laboratory dynamometer testing and full-scale airplane testing. (d) Continued Airworthiness/Brake Wear Limits. 1. During previous certification activity, the determination of airplane performance and the demonstration of maximum brake kinetic energy capability was based on testing brakes at or near their new state. In 1988, a transport category airplane experienced a rejected takeoff (RTO) at 86% of the brake's maximum kinetic energy capability.

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