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Advisory Circular Current Issued Oct 28, 2010 AIR-120 66 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 20-170 Integrated Modular Avionics Development. Verification, Integration and Approval using RTCA/DO-297 and Technical Standard Order C153

This advisory circular (AC) shows you how to obtain Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness approval for the development, verification, and integration of an integrated modular avionics (IMA) system for installation into an aircraft or engine. We cite RTCA, Inc. document RTCA/DO-297, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidance and Certification Considerations, dated November 8, 2005 and supplement it with this text. This AC also provides guidance on how to show compliance with Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C153, Integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements. This AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. In it, we describe an acceptable means, though it is not the only means, to obtain FAA approval of IMA systems. This AC uses the terminology “should” when discussing compliance to the AC itself, as the AC represents one, but not the only, method of complying with the regulations. This AC uses the term “must” when discussing compliance to the regulations, as compliance to a regulation is not optional. In these cases, the AC text supplies, in square brackets, a reference to the specific rule(s) being discussed.

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Circular

0 Advisory U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration Circular

Subject: Integrated Modular Avionics Date: 11/21/2013 AC No: 20-170 Development, Verification, Integration, and Initiated by: AlR-120 Change: 1 Approval Using RTCA/OO-297 and Technical Standard Order-Cl53

Purpose. This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means ofcompliance for aircraft and engines that utilize Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) systems. This AC calls out and supplements the guidance material ofRTCAID0-297, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidance and Certificatitm Considerations, dated November 8, 2005. This AC incorporates pertinent guidance material and information from AC 20-145, Guidance.far Integrated Modular Ai·ionics (IMA) that Implement TSO-CJ53 Authorized Hardware Elements. AC 20-145 is now cancelled.

Principal Changes. This change incorporates minor changes and updates, and a new appendix to AC 20-170. These changes are necessary in order to address incorrect references in

RTCNDO-297 when using SAE ARP 4754, Rev. A, which is recognized by AC 20-174. Information regarding whom you may contact with questions regarding the information in this

AC, and where you may obtain a copy, are also included.

PAGE CONTROL Cl lART

Remove Pa es Dated Insert P cs Dated Table of Contents. page 10/28/IO Table ofContents. page iv. ­ iv (12/28/I 0) Pages 3 through 4 10/28/10 Pages 3 through 4 Page 26 10/28/10 Page 26 Pages D-1 through D-3 10/20/10 Appendix D. pages 0-1 through D-3 Appendix H. page Il-1

~~~~

f',;,J.. David W. I lempe

Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division Aircraft Certification Division

11/21/13 11/21/13

11/21/13

11/21/13 11/21/13

Advisory U.S. Department of Transportation Federal viation Admini tration Circular

Subject: Integrated M dular A ionics Date: I 0/28/ J o: 20-170 Development, Verificali n. Integration an Approval Using RTCA/OO-297 and Tecluucal Initiated by: AIR-120

Standard Order-Cl 53

Thi advi ory circular cts forth an acceptable mean f compliance for aircraft and engines that utiliz [ntegrated Modular Avjonics (I.MA) ·ystems. This AC calls out and supplements the guidance materia] ofRT A/DO-297, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidan e and Certification Consideration , dated November 2005. This A incorporates pertinent guidance material and infom1ati n from AC 20- l 45~ 01,idance for /11tegrated Modular Avionics (JMA) that Implement TSO-CI 53 Authoriz.ed Hardware Elements. AC 20-145 i now

cancelled.

h~ David W. Hempe

Manager, Aircraft Engine ring Di isi n Aircraft Certification Divi. i n

10/28/10 AC20-170

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 RTCA-0O-297 as an Acceptable Means of Compliance … 1

1-1. Purpose of this AC … 1

1-2. Whom this AC Aff~cts … l

1-3. Cancellation … 2

1-4. Using this AC and RTCA/DO-297 … 2

1-5. Applying RTCAIDO-297 as an Acceptable Means ofCompliance … 2

1-6. What This AC Covers … 4

Chapter 2 Acceptance And Incremental Acceptance … 5

2-1. Comparison ofRTCAIDO 297 Acceptance and FAA Approval … 5

2-2. Major Benefits of Incremental Acceptance … 6

2-3. IMA Module, Application, System, and Installation Acceptance … 6

2-4. Documentation And Data Packaging … 7

Chapter 3 Obtaining an IMA Component Acceptance Letter … 8

3-1. General Guidance Regarding LM A Component Acceptance Letters … 8

3-2. Parts of the IMA Component Acceptance Letter … 9

3-3. Essential Elements of the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter … I 0

3-4. Essential Elements of the IMA Component Acceptance Letter Data Sheet … 12

3-5. Acceptance Letter … 13

3-6. lMA Component Acceptance Letters For Revised IMA Components … 13

3-7. Cancelling an IMA Component Acceptance Letter … 14

Chapter 4 Reuse Of IMA Components … 15

4-1 . Reuse ofan Accepted lMA Component … l 5

4-2. What Can Be Reused … 15

4-3. Reuse of Other Types ofCompliance Data … , … 16

4-4. Reuse of Previously Accepted Software-Only or Hardware Component Containing

Airborne Software … 17

4-5. Reuse ofCEH or Hardware Component Containing CEH … 17

4-6. Reuse OfSEH or Hardware Component Containing SEH … J8

II

4-7. Reuse of EQT Data … 18

4-8. Data the Component Developer Owes to Lhe IMA Developer/System Integrator or

Applicant … 19

4-9. Reuse of a Previously Accepted IMA Component That Wa.,., Revised … 19

4-10. Reuse of an fMA Component with a Previous TSO Authorization … 20

Chapter 5 Configuration Management of an IMA System … 21

5-1. IMA Configuration Management … 21

5-2. Automated, Robust Configuration Management … 2 1

5-3. Non-Automated, Robust Configuration Management … 22

5-4. Software Loading Procedures … 22

5-5. Assurance Level of lMA Components Used in Configuration Management … 22

Chapter 6 IMA Recovery Features … 23

6-L Restarting Safety Critical IMA Functions … 23

6-2. Restart Mechanism Implementation … 23

Chapter 7 Topics Not Covered by RTCA/DO-297 … 24

7-1. Electrical Power For IMA Systems … 24

7-2. Field Loadable Software … 24

7-3. Electronic Identification Guidance … 26

7-4. Aircraft System Lightning and HCRF Protection … 27

Chapter 8 Use Of TSO Authorized Components In IMA Systems … 29

8-1. IMA Syste.ms and TS Os … 29

8-2. TSO-C 153 Authorization for IMA Hardware Components … 29

8-3. FunctionaJ TSO Authorization … 30

8-4. EQT of IMA Components with TSO Authorization … 30

8-5. lMA Component TSO Part Marking … 31

8-6. Integration ofTSO Authorized Components in [MA Systems … 32

8-7. Aircraft Installation Approval of IM A Systems including TSO Autl1orized Components .

… 32

8-8. Roles and Responsibilities When TSO Authorized Components Are Used in IMA

Systems … 32

Ill

11/21/2013 AC 20-170, Chg. 1

Appendix A Environmental Qualification Guidance forTSO-C153 … A-1

Appendix B Sample IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter … B-1

Appendix C Sample Acceptance Letter … C-1

Appendix D Related Documents And How To Get Them .•....•••...•...••...••.•••D-1

Appendix E Glossary … E-1

Appendix F Acronyms … •..••..•••..•• … •..•....•..• … • … •...F-1

Appendix G Partial List of Functional TSOs … G-1

Appendix H SAE ARP 4754 to ARP 4754A Cross-Reference Matrix ..• … H-1

iv

1-2. Whom this AC Affects.

Chapter 1 RTCA-OQ ..297 as an Acceptable Means of Compliance.

1-l. Purpose of this AC.

a. This advisory circular (AC) shows you 110w to obtain Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness approval for the development. verification, and integration ofan integrated

modular avionics (IMA) system for installation into an aircraft or engine. We cite RTCA, Inc. document RTCA/DO-297, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Development Guidance and Certification Considerations, dated November 8, 2005 and supplement it with this text. This AC also provides guidance on how to show compliance with Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C153, integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements.

b. This AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. In it, we describe an acceptable means, though it is not the only means, to obtain FAA approval of rMA systems.

c. This AC uses the terminology "should'' when discussing compliance to the AC itself, as the AC represents one, but not the only, method ofcomplying wiU1 the regulations. This AC

uses the term ''must" when discussing compliance to the re_brtilations, as compliance to a regulation is not optional ln these cases, the AC text supplies a reference to the specific rule(s)

being discussed.

1-2. Whom this AC Affects.

a. We wrote this AC for:

(I) Applicants for type certificates (fC), amended TC (ATC), supplemental TC (STC), or amended STC (ASTC) ofaircraft and aircraft engines implementing IMA systems and equipment,

(2) Developers of IMA systems, applications, and components,

(3) Applicants for TSO-C153, Integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements, and for functional TSOs as they apply to IMA systems,

(4) Integrators of lMA systems,

(5) Installers of the lMA system into the aircraft, and

(6) Those involved in the approval and continued airworthiness ofIMA systems.

b. When the term ..applicant'' is used in this AC, we are refening to the applicant for an aircraft or engine TC. STC, A TC. or ASTC. When this AC is referring to an applicant for a TSO authorization (TSOA), the phrase "applicant for TSO authorization" or other similar phrase is

1-5. Applying RTCA/DO-297 as an Acceptable Means of Compliance.

used. When this AC is referring to an applicant for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter, the phrase "applicant for fMA Component Acccptanc,e Letter•or other similar phrase is used.

1-3. Cancellation. This AC cancels AC 20-145, Guidance/or Integrated Modular Avionics (IMAJ that Jmpleme11t TSO-C153 Authori=ed Hardware Elements. and incorporntes all pertinent information from it that is not covered by RTCA/DO-297.

1-4. Using this AC and RTCA/0O-297.

a. The means in this AC are a complete method to sJ10w compliance and obtain approval of IMA components and systems for installatiou into an aircraft or engine. We intend that this AC be applied at the aircraft or engine level by the applicant for o TC, STC, A TC, or ASTC. That is, this AC is not intended as gujdance solely for an IMA developer, IMA system integrator, or lMA application/component supplier.

b. If you are an applicant for an authorizution for TSO-C 153, Integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements, you may use the guidance in this AC as one acceptable means of compliance to requirements defined in TSO-C153. See paragraph 8-7 and appendix A ofthis AC for more information.

c. We find that the objectives, processes, and activittes in RTCA/DO-297, plus the additional guidance material contained in this AC, constitute an acceptable means ofcompliance for the development, integration, verification, and installation approval of1MA systems. Ifthe applicant

wants to propose an alternative means. including those from other industry documents referenced by RTCA/DO-2971 document those altemative means and secure FAA approval during yoUI project's planning stage. Prepare to use Issue Papers to document agreements reached.

d. According to the definition of an lMA in Appendix E. Glossary, an [MA is a "shared set offlexible, reusable, and interoperable hardware and software resources that, when integrated, fonn a platform that provides services.'' You should keep in mind that an IMA system is defined by the system architecture, not by the functionality the system provides. lMA systems may not always implement functions historically regarded as "avionics", such as flight deck displays, navigation, communication, etc. IMA systems may also be used to implement other aircraft functionality, such as fly-by-wire flight controls, inertial reference/air data systems, or electrical

power control systems. There may be more than one IMA system on an aircraft. An IMA system could feasibly be mounted within an engine assembly.

1-5. Applying RTCA/DO-297 as an Acceptable Means of Compliance.

a. RTCNDO-297 des(..Tibes objectives. processes, and activities to incrementally accumulate design assurance and acceptance of IMA systems and components. RTCA/DO-297 refers to industry standards such as SAE Intemational's Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754, Certification Consideralio11sfor Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft, Syste,ns, and SAE ARP 4761, Guidelines and Methods ofConducti11g the Safety Assessment Process 0 11 Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment. When RTCA/0O-297 invokes the processes and methods in specific

11/21/2013 AC 20-170, Chg. 1

sections ofthose industry standards as part ofthe IMA development. integration, verification, or approval process, you should consider those sections of the referenced industry standard (or other acceptable alternative means) to be part of the overall acceptable means of compliance as outlined in RTCA/DO-297.

Note: SAE International updated their ARP 4754 to ARP 4754A, ··Guidelines.for Development ofCivil Aircraft and Systems"' in December 2010. AC 20-174. Development of

Civil Aircrc!ff and Systems, dated September 30,2011, recognizes ARP 4754A as an acceptable means of compliance for development ofaircraft systems. This revision A reflects a significant change to that document, including section and paragraph numbering from that used in the original release. As a result, several references to ARP 4754 by RTCA/DO-297 are incorrect when using SAE ARP 4754A. Please see appendix Hof this AC in order to cross reference ARP 4754 with ARP 4754A sections and paragraphs referenced by the original release ofRTCA/DO-297.

b. You may use this AC as an acceptable means ofcompliance for a IMA systems that include TSO authorized articles. Although RTCA/DO-297 docs not address TSOs, you should apply the intent ofits objectives in Annex A to IMA systems that include TSO authorization(s) in order to obtain IMA system approval. See chapter 8 ofthis AC for more information.

c. Ifyou choose to follow this AC to show compliance, apply the AC to your !MA development and approval process regardless ofthe complexity ofthe IMA system or business model under which it is developed and approved. RTCA/DO-297 is written primarily from the perspective of a complex IMA system developed and integrated by multiple organizations and companies (see RTCA/DO-297, subsection 2.4). Although the development, integration, verification. and approval of an IMA system developed by a single company are likely lo be less complex than for multiple companies. RTCA/DO-297 applies equally. This AC should be used as an acceptable means of compliance for IMA systems that:

(I) Arc developed by a single company as well as those developed by multiple companies. lfa single company develops a complete IMA system, many of the separate roles defined in RTCA/DO-297 - such as !MA developer, application developer, and !MA integrator -- will be taken by this single company.

(2) Are simple IMA systems as well as complex IMA systems. These terms are purposely left undefined. because it is difficult to make a clear distinction between them. The purpose of this item is to illustrate that this AC should be applied to IMA systems of all levels of complexity.

(3) Are closed architecture as well as open architecture. (See Appendix E. Glossary.)

11/21/2013 AC 20-170, Chg. 1

(4) Use TSO authorized components (that is, TSO-Cl53) and functional TSOs (such as TSO-C 113, Electronic Flight Displays and TSO-C9, Automatic Pilots) as well as IMA systems that do not use TSO authorized components.

Note: Because of the variations described inc. above, not all aspects of RTCND0-297 or the additional guidance contained in this AC may apply to every IMA development program. We strongly recommend that any question regarding the application ofthis AC be discussed with us at the beginning of the certification program and the a!,>reements reached during those discussions be documented. The FAA may require an Issue Paper on these questions.

d. Appendix A of this AC, Environmental Qualification Guidance for TSO-Cl 53, Integrated Modular Avionics Hardware Elements. shows applicants for TSO-C 153 authorization how to conduct environmental qualification testing (EQT) that ensures compliance to the minimum performance standard (MPS) ofTSO-Cl53. We do not require compliance to appendix A if you are not using TSO-C 153 authori,:cd hardware components.

1-6. What This AC Covers. This AC describes an acceptable means by which to apply RTCND0-297, along with the additional guidance material included in this AC, to an aircraft or engine certification program which uses an IMA system. We cover the following subjects in detail:

-Acceptance and Incremental Acceptance (in chapter 2). - Getting An IMA Component Acceptance Letter (in chapter 3 ). - Reuse Of IMA Components (in chapter 4 ). - Configuration Management ofan !MA System (in chapter 5).

- IMA Recovery Features (in chapter 6). - Additional Topics Not Covered by RTCA/D0-297 (in chapter 7). - Use of TSO Authorized Components in !MA Systems (in chapter 8).

2-1. Comparison of RTCA/DO 297 Acceptance and FAA Approval.

10/28/ lO AC 20-170

Chapter 2 Acceptance And Incremental Acceptance.

2-1. Comparison of RTCA/DO 297 Acceptance and FAA Approval.

a. RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 2.1.2, gjves the following definitions:

(I) Acceptance -Acknowledgement by the FAA thal the moduJe1 application, or system complies with its defined requirements. Ac;ceptance is recognition by the FAA (typically in the form ofa letter or stamped data sheet) signifying that the submission of data, justification, or claim ofequivalence satisfies applicable guidance or requirements. The goal ofacceptance is to achieve credit for future use in a certification project.

(2) Incremental Acceptance - A process for obtaining credit toward approval and certification by accepting or finding that an IMA module. applicalion, and/or off-aircraft lMA system complies with specific requirements. This incremental acceptance is divided into tasks. Credit granted for individual tasks contributes to the overall certification goal.

Incremental acceptance provides tbe ability to integrate and accept new applications and/or modules, in an IMA system, and maintain existing applications and/or modules, without the need for re-acceptance.

b. We view acceptance, as defined above, as part of the processes documented by Title 14 ofthe Code ofFederal Regulations ( l 4 CFR.) and published FAA policy used to approve airborne systems during an aircraft or engine certification program. To obtain approval for installation on a certified aircraft or engine, applicants must show that the aircraft or engine system/fwiction meets with the applicable regulatory requfrements. See§§ 2 l. l 7, 21.20, and 2Ll 15. Some of the regulatory requirements are accompanied by an AC (such as this one) that describes one, but not the only, possible means ofcomplying with those regulations.

c. The main differences between RTCA/DO-297 .. acceptance" and our current formal process ofshowing compliance in an aircraft certification program are 1) each stage of RTCA/OO-297 acceptance is accompanied by some fom1 ofrecognition, such as a "signed letter or stamped data sheet" or <(accepted or approved compliance data package,'' and 2) a goal of acceptance, as defined by RTCA/DO-297, is to "achieve credit for future use in a certification process." Otherwise, the two concepts are very similar: data submissions and statements of

compliance are used to show that an airborne system or component complies with all applicable requirements and therefore can be approved for installation onto an aircraft or engine.

d. "Acceptance" is a term often used during the approval ofaircraft or engine systems, but its meaning may not be consistent throughout the certification process. The meaning ofthis

word can depend on the context. For example, the RTCA/OO-297's "acceptance" is very similar, but not identical, lo AC 20-148, Reusable Software Components. That AC states: "Acceptance is credit the FAA grants for fully or pruiially meeting RTCA/OO-178B objectives

for an (Reusable Software Component) RSC. The FAA shows acceptance by issuing a RSC acceptance letter.'' Although the concept is similar between RTCA/DO-297 and AC 20-148, the specific definitions of"acceptance" are not identical. This example illustrates that the meaning

2-2. Major Benefits of Incremental Acceptance.

of''acceptance" may vary, given 1ts context. Make sure you understand the context and meaning of this term when you encounter it.

e. "Incremental acceptance", as defined in RTCA/ 00-297, takes the concept ofacceptance further. lt divides acceptance into «certification tasks" accomplished during different points, or increments, in the certification program. Each task builds upon previous tasks. Incremental acceptance of IMA components is no1mally associated with the (MA Component Acceptance Letter process described by RTCA/00-297. See RTCA/ 00-297, Section 4 for more infom1ation.

f. An applicant mayuse acceptance ofcomponents within the IMA to accumulate certification credit toward instaJlation approval of an I.MA system on an aircraft or engine. The concept of acceptance does not alter or replace FAA certification processes. [nstead, acceptance is a means to recognize that a specific lMA component complies with all docwnented requirements and objectives. and that an accepted component can be used without detailed examination of the compliance data for that component - that is, is the component acceptable for use in an approved airborne system? IMA Component Acceptance Letters described in Chapter 3 of this AC are not required to accumulate cettification credit toward installation approval.

2-2. Major Benefits of Incremental Acceptance.

a. The major bendit of using the incremental acceptance process, as defined in RTCA/D0­ 297, is that incremental acceptance provides the ability to integrate and accept new components in an IMA system and maintain existing components without the need for re-acceptance. This allows you to:

(I) Reuse accepted lMA components in multiple applications in the same certification program by submitting certification data packages that have an established pedigree. This reduces certification effort of the current aircraft or engine program without compromising system safety.

(2) Reuse accepted [MA components in future certification programs by submitting certification data packages that have an established pedigree. This reduces follow-on certification effort without compromising system safety.

b. The incremental acceptance -process defined in RTCA/00-297 shows how to package and docwnent the data and artifacts of a specific IMA component, so the previously accepted data and artifacts may easily be used in multiple concurrent or future programs.

2-3. IMA Module, Application, System, and Installation Acceptance.

a. Acceptance at each stage of IMA development and verification, as described RTCA/00­ 297, subsection 4.2 (Task I - Module Acceptance), subsection 4.3 (Task 2 - Application Acceptance), subsection 4.4 (Task J - IMA System Acceptance), and subsection 4.5 (Task 4 ­ Aircraft integration oflMA System), is required for IMA system installation approval. We intend that a11 important aspects in RTCA/00-297 regarding IMA development, integration.

verification, and approval (Tasks 1 t11rougb 4) be fo11owed and you show that the IMA system complies with all objectives ofRTCA/00-297, Annex A, regardless of whether you request IMA Component Acceptance Letters. The IMA Component Acceptance Letter process covered in RTCA/D0-297, Section 4, and chapter 3 of this AC is optional. As an applicant, IMA developer/system integrator. or IMA component supplier, you may decide whether or not to request an fMA Component Acceptance Letter.

Note: RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.6 (Task 5) deals with changes to accepted modules and subsection 4. 7 (Task 6) <leals with reuse of modules or applications. These subsections are

important and should be foJlowed. However, for the purposes ofthe initial acceptance ofthe IMA system and approval for installation on an aircraft or engine, only subsections 4.2 through

4.5 (Tasks l though 4) are relevant. Ifpreviously accepted components are being reused, subsection 4. 7 (Task 6) should a1so be consi<lered.

b. The documentation required to obtain acceptance when you are planning to reuse IMA components may be more than that required ifyou seeking approval for a component to be only used on a single TC/STC/ ATC/ ASTC program. Although it is not mandatory, we strongly suggest that in your initial certification plans for the IMA system and/or components, you state which components for which you desire [MA Component Acceptance Letters at the end ofthe certification program, aJong with the name of the company or companies that will be asking for those letters.

c. The FAA will not grant acceptance at the higher task levels- that is, Tasks 2, 3, and 4 ­ until aJJ acceptances at the subordinate levels on which those higher tasks depend have been completed. For example, to obtain acceptance for an IMA application, you should first obtain acceptance ofall modules which comprise that application. Likewise, all applications that make up an lMA system should be accepted before we accept the system.

d. If you are going to deviate from ccrti fication planning documents already accepted by the FAA, you should request a deviation to those plans. The request should include a justification for the deviation and the mitigating actions (ifany) that you plan to take.

2-4. Documentation And Data Packaging. RTCA/D0-297, Section 4 addresses the artifacts required for acceptance al the various task levels. Examples include the module acceptance plan, the module requirements specification, the module configuralion index, the fMA system certification plan, and the IMA system vaJidation and verification plan. This AC does not require that you use those specific document titles or methods ofdata packaging. They represent one particular acceptable means to comply with RTCND0-297. We accept alternative document titles and data packaging. However, if you use alternative documentation naming convention and data packaging, you should address all significant aspects in RTCA/D0-297, Section 4 and Annex A to claim compliance to this AC. See RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.1 for more infonnation.

3-1. General Guidance Regarding IMA Component Acceptance Letters.

Chapter 3 Obtaining an IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

3-1. General Guidance Regarding IMA Component Acceptance Letters.

a. Obtaining an IMA Component Acceptance Letter is optional for applicants, IMA developers/system integrators, and [MA component developers. The decision to apply or not apply for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter has no bearing on the final approval of the IMA system and its installation onto an aircraft or engine. The main reason to obtain an IMA Component Acceptance Letter is to formally document acceptance of the compliance data for future or concurrent reuse of that accept eel IMA component. If you do not request an IMA Component Acceptance Letter, we will not issue one.

b. We typically issue the fMA Component Acceptance Letter after:

( I) The applicant has completed and submitted all applicable documentation and shown that the objectives ofRTCAID0-297, Annex A, Table A-1 and/or A-2 (depending on if the IMA component is a module or an application), Table A-3, and Table A-4 have been achieved, and

(2) We find no installation, safety, operational, functional, or performance concerns.

c. lfthere are software operating systems, generic hardware computing/power supply modules, or other IMA components not dependent on IMA system integration or aircraft installation, we may issue an IMA Component Acceptance Letter before completion of those later stages ofIMA development and integration. However, you should work with the FAA during the planning process ifyou desire an IMA Component Acceptance Letter ptior to the certification ofthe aircraft or engine. Otherwise, this request for an IMA Component

Acceptance Letter may not be prioritized according to your needs, as the FAA will nonnally issue IMA Component Acceptance Letters after the completion of the certification program.

d. According to RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.7, future reuse ofcompliance data for a previously accepted IMA component is limited to IMA modules and applications. Therefore, we will only issue IMA Component Acceptance Letters for IMA modules and applications. We will not issue [MA Component Acceptance Letters for an IMA system or its installation onto an aircraft or engine.

c. RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.1, states: "IMA acceptaJtce can only be proposed in the context ofan actual certification project.'' That means we issue IMA Component Acceptance

Letters only for IMA components being developed and approved for a specific aircraft/engine certification program. We do not issue IMA Component Acceptance Letters for TSO authorized articles that are not for an identified aircrafi/engine certification program.

f. A request for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter is not limited to the developer ofan IMA component. The applicant, IMA developer/system integrator, or lMA component developer may apply for an £MA Component Acceptance Letter. The intent to request an IMA

Component Acceptance Letter should be included in the appropriate certification -planning documentation.

g. Because lMA component acceptance is relevant only within the context ofan aircraft/engine certification program, you may ask ifa specific compliance data package belongs

to the applicant, or to the company supplying the lMA component or system. The answer depends upon the agreemenls reached between the various companies. Consequently, we strongly suggest that all pa1iies document their plan for IMA Component Acceptance Letters,

including the intent for concurrent or future reuse, at the start of the aircraft or engine certification program. This way, all parties will understand and agree on how data for the current program may be used in the future-possibly for a different applicant than the current

aircraft/engine program.

h. Use the following guidance to detennjne which FAA office you should apply to for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter:

(I) If there is a valid [MA Component Acceptance Letter for an IMA component and that component is being updated, then you should apply for a new IMA Component Acceptance Letter to the Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) that issued the existing [MA Component Acceptance Letter. Otherwise, use the guidance in items (2) through (5).

(2) If the IMA component in question will not also be getting a TSO authorization (either TSO-C153 or functional TSO), you should apply for an lMA Component Acceptance Letter to the ACO that is responsible for the certification of the aircraft or engine that will be using that rMA component.

(3) lfthe lMA component is questi0n will also be getting a TSO authorization (either TSO-Cl 53 or functional TSO), you should apply for a new IMA Component Acceptance Letter

to the ACO that is responsible for issuing the TSO authorization for that IMA component.

(4) If the aircraft or engine in which the IMA component is to be installed is ofnon-U.S. design and manufacture, you should apply for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter to the ACO that you would normally apply to for a TSO authorization. The manufacturer of that aircraft or engine should be in the process ofobtaining, or has already obtained, an FAA certification. We will not issue an IMA Component Acceptance Letter for an lMA component that is used on an aircraft or engine that is not seeking an FAA certHication. In this case, the ACO to which the application for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter is made will coordinate with the FAA office that is acting as the Validating Authority for lhat aircraft or engine program.

(5) We will not issue an I.NIA Component Acceptance letter to a company that is not based within the United States. There JS not an ACO that has geographic responsibility and

oversight of that company.

3-2. Parts of the [MA Component Acceptance Letter.

a. An IMA Component Acceptance Letter is composed ofthree parts:

Q

3-3. Essential Elements of the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter.

10/28/10 AC 20-J 70

(I) The IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter, prepared and signed by the applicant for the IMA Component Acceptance Letter. See paragraph 3-3.

(2) The 1MA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet. prepared by the applicant for the IMA Component Acceptance Letter. See paragraph 3-4.

(3) The Acceptance Letter, prepared and signed by the FAA. See paragraph 3-5.

b. If you are an applicant for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter, assemble your request package (both the completed IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter and the lMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet) and submit it to the appropriate FAA office. Ifwe approve your request, we will prepare and sign a Acceptance Letter for that [MA component. We will send the applicant ·for the IMA Component Acceptance Letter a copy of the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter and the signed Acceptance Letter. We will retain and archive the original of all three parts of the IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

c. At your re-quest, we will provide extra copies of the signed Acceptance Letter and !MA Component Acceptance Cover Letter to you or to another company.

d. You should maintain your own files of the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter and IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet. We will not provide copies ofthe IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet.

e. We do not allow modifications to previo-usly accepted IMA components under an existing lMA Component Acceptance Letter. [fyou change a previously accepted IMA component and still want an IMA Component Acceptance Letter, you wm have to apply for another one. See paragraph 4-9 of this AC for more information on changes to an accepted lMA component.

3-3. Essential Elements of the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter.

a. The IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter specifies what compliance data is being accepted by the FAA. The applicant for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter should include

the followjng information in the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter:

(1) Date ofapplication for the IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

(2) The FAA office to which tbe request for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter is being made.

(3) Unique identifier for the JMA Comp<.1nent Acceptance Cover Letter. The specific fo1111at of this identifier is left to the discretion of the applicant for the IMA Component Acceptance Letter. It could be a company correspondence number or a unique identifier used solelyfor the purpose of application for IMA Component Acceptance Letters. However, once a particular identification is used. it should not be re-used.

(4) Name and contact infonnation for the company requesting the IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

(5) Name and contact information of the original IMA developer/system integrator, the airborne system and aircraft/engine in which the component will be installed. the target environment, such as the microprocessor, memory management unit, data busses, input/output devices~ etc., and other infonnation about the initial acceptance of the IMA component. lnclude

name and contact infomiation ofthe IMA component developer, ifdifferent than the applicant for the IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

(6) Contact infonnation fot persons or organizations who will answer questions about component acceptance and concurrent/future reuse.

(7) IMA component name, unique component identifier, and all associated document numbers, titles, and revision levels. Examples are the system, software or hardware (as appropriate) configuration index number and revision. a component's acceptance accomplishment summary number and revision, and any configuration information not included

in the module configuration index.

(8) All configuration infom1ation (use references to other documents as necessary) to fully define the component and its development environment.

(9) High level description ofthe component pw-pose und usage domain. See RTCA/DO­ 297, paragraphs 4.2.l0 and 4.3.2. and the Glossary ofthis AC for the discussion ofand definition ofusage domain.

( I 0) Short description ofthe software partitions, software levels, and hardware design assurance levels within the component.

(l 1) Definition of the comp! iance <lata type(s) being accepted and documented by this IMA component acceptance letter - that is. airborne so'flware, complex electronic hardware (CEH), comprehensive testing for simple electronic hardware (SEH) components, EQT. and any other data type that has been mutually agrce<l on.

(12) State whether each compliance data type shows full or partial compliance to their respective standards - for example, RTCA/DO-1788 for airborne software. A full description of any pa11ial compliance is not necessary, as we expect you lo include that infonnation 1n the IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet described in paragraph 3-4.

(13) Statement ofcompliance that the signatories attest that the IMA component meets al] the applicable requirements defined in the lMA Component Acceptance Letter.

(14) Signatures and dates. At least one managerial signature representing each of the technical disciplines covered by the IMA Component Acceptance Letter: RTCA/DO-178B compliance for airborne software, RTCA/DO-254 compliance for CEH, comprehensive testing

10/28/ lO AC 20-170

and analysis of SEH, and RTCA/DO- I 60F compliance for EQT. One signature may cover more than one technical disciplines. Other signatures, such as engineering personnel, may be included if the applicant for the lMA Component Acceptance Letter desires. Each signature should include the date of the signature and the typed or printed name, as well as an identification of which technical discipline that signature covers.

3-4. EssentiaJ Elements of the IMA Component Acceptance Letter Data Sheet.

b. See appendix B for a sample lMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter.

3-4. EssentiaJ Elements of the IMA Component Acceptance Letter Data Sheet.

a. The IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter or the accompanying IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet should fully define the usage domain ofthe IMA component, or else it should reference a document where the usage domain ofthe TMA component is fully defined. If that infonnation is not in the fMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter, then you should include it as part ofthe accompanying LMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet.

b. Each IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet should contain, at a minimum:

(1) Assumptions the JMA component developer made during the acceptance. These assumptions may be documented by referencing the component developer's accomplishment summary or other appropriate certification document. Include assumptions for each applicable RTCA/OO-297 objective in lhe approprial'e accomplishment summary. The asswnptions should be detailed enough that the FAA, the lMA developer/systc..,ns integrator, and applicant can apply this information to any future or concurrent IMA programs that will reuse this component.

(2) Summary oftechnical or policy issues that arose during the initial acceptance and how the applicant and FAA resolved them.

(3) Summary of additional activities that the lMA developer/system integrator and/or applicant need to perform to ensure that all objectives of RTCA-DO-297 Tasks 3 and 4 can be met when using the accepted [MA component. Describe any remaining compliance activity

required to show full compliance to the appropriate standard - for example, RTCA/DO-178B for airborne software, any remaining EQT required by RTCA/DO-160F, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures.for Airborne Equipment, not covered by the lMA Component Acceptance Letter.

(4) The software level(s) and/or hardware design assurance level(s) ofall software partitions and/or CEH/SEH devices.

(5) A description of the target computer. incl.uding the applicable hardware, operating system, board support package. diivers, etc., that will host software to perfonn aircraft-level

functions.

(6) High-level description of the function and/or purpose ofthe component and target environment. If the component contains multiple soltware partitions and/or multiple CEH/SEH devices, include a high level description ofeach. This allows us and the IMA component

3-6. IMA Component Acceptance Letten For Revised IMA Components.

integrator to clearly understand the relationship ofeach partition and/or hardware device and their associated software levels and/or hardware design assurance levels.

(7) Testing levels achieved for aU EQTs performed.

(8) Limitations, plus any installation, safety, operational. functional, or performance issues.

(9) Module or application acceptance dat~ including interface specifications, user's guide, and usage domain described in RTCA/DO-297, paragraphs 4.2.4e, 4.2.10, 4.2.12e, 4.3.2, and4.4.2.

( I 0) Full explanation of kinds of technical data other than those specific technical disciplines addressed in paragrnph 4-2.b of this AC included in the lMA Component Acceptance

Letter. The applfoant for the lMA Component Acceptance Letter should also include a detailed explanation of what remains to be done by the IMA developer/system integrator and/or aircraft or engine manufacturer, to obtain full compliance for the compliance data associated with this

technical discipline.

( 11 ) A copy ofany pertinent document that demonstrates the compliance data contained in the JMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet has been evaluated and found acceptable by the FAA orby an authorized representative of the FAA. Examples include signed 8110-3 fonns and TSOA letters. By including evidence that data within the IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet has found Lo be acceptable, you will significantly speed the process of evaluating the application for an IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

3-5. Acceptance Letter.

a. The FAA will prepare and sign an Acceptance Letter for the IMA component to signify that the IMA component has been accepted. Tile Acceptance Letter will reference the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter unique identifier, so that the Acceptance Letter will be associated with that speci fie lMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter.

b. See Appendix C for a sample Acceptance Letter.

3-6. IMA Component Acceptance Letten For Revised IMA Components.

a. If a previously accepted [MA component has been changed or revised in any manner, the original IMA Component Acceptance Letter is no longer valid. As stated in paragraph 3-5 above, an IMA Component Acceptance Letter is associated with a specific configuration of that component, defined by its accompanying documentation. Any change to a previously accepted IMA componentrequires at least some of tbe accompanying documentation - such as the component configuration index - to be updated. This requires a new IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

b. Lfthere's a change to a previously accepted IMA component and you want a new IMA Component Acceptance Letter for it, you should show that the component meets the guidance of RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.6 for the updated IMA component. Paragraph 4.6.5 ofRTCA/D0­ 297 discusses the change data that should be submitted when requesting a new IMA Component Acceptance Letter for a change to a previously accepted !MA component.

3-7. Cancelling an lMA Component Acceptance Letter.

a. The FAA may cancel a previously issued IMA Compone1;1t Acceptance Letter. Reasons that we may cancel an IMA Component Acceptance Letter include, but are not limited to, the followmg:

(1) The accepted IMA component is determined lo be the cause ofor contributed to an in-service accident or safety related incident.

(2) The accepted IMA component is the subject of a § 21.3 report.

(3) The lMA component developer. IMA developer/system integrator, or applicant detennincs that the IMA component does not meet the acceptance criteria defined in the original

IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

(4) It is discovered that the accepted component was developed from erroneous or incomplete requirements. and those erroneous or incomplete requirements could, given the correct circumstances, lead to a reduction in safety in any aiTcraft or engine in which the component i.s installed.

b. We wilJ notify the holder ofan IMA Component Acceptance Letter when it is cancelled. This action has the effect of not al1owing that version of the lMA component to be reused on a future or concurrent certification program until U1e reason for the cancellation has been

addressed. A new IMA Component Acceptance Letter for the updated JMA component may be requested per para!:,'Taph 3-6.

Note: Cancelling an IMA Component Acceptance Letler has no bearing on the continued safe operation of an aircraft or engine that uses that IMA component. lfaction is required, the FAA will issue an Airworthiness Directive lhat will require operators to update the component or aircraft function in question.

c. We expect the holder of an £MA Component Acceptance Letter to contact the ACO that issued the IMA Component Acceptance Letter in a timely manner if any issues such as those listed in a. are discovered.

4-2. What Can Be Reused.

Chapter 4 Reuse Of IMA Components.

4-1. Reuse of an Accepted IMA Component.

a. If a previously accepted IMA component is unchanged, its intended reuse meets the limitations in the IMA Component Acceptance Letter, and the FAA engineer for the certification program in which the lMA component is being reused does not have any concerns, you may reuse that component without need for additional FAA review of U1e originally accepted IMA component compliance data.

b. Ifyou are an IMA developer/system integrator or applicant proposing to reuse a previously accepted IMA component, you should ensure and document that you identified no safety, installation, operational, functional, or performance concems with the subsequent use of that component.

c. Although the intent ofIMA Component Acceptance Letters is to document our acceptance of the compliance data for an IMA component, the existence ofsuch a letter does not prevent us, on a new or concurrent TC/STC/ A TC/ASTC program, from

requesting to examine the compliance dala associated wilh lhe ::iccepted IMA component if we have questions or concerns. We will first try to address any open questions without resorting to re-examination of the previously accepted compliance data. However, ifwe have specific concerns that cannot be answered hy any other means, we may ask you to provide some of the previously accepted dnta. Only compliance data specific to the identified issue or concem should need to be rc-examin~d. If the initial IM A Component Acceptance Letter was done correctly and all necessary compliance data was included in the IMA Component Acceptance Letter, we should not need lo resort to re-examination of previously accepted compliance data.

d. RTCND0-297, paragraph 4. 7. I. states that future reuse ofany component should be planned during the initial development of that component and documented in tbe appropriate certification planning document. An IMA component not mitially developed for future reuse and lacking a signed Acceptance Letter should be treated as a newly developed component.

4-2. What Can Be Reused.

a. RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.7 states that reuse ofa previously accepted component should be limited to modules (see Task 1 in RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.2) and applications (Task 2, subsection 4.3). We do not allow reuse ofpreviously accepted data at the IMA system

level (Task 3, subsection 4.4) or IMA installation level (Task 4, subsection 4.5).

b. RTCA/00-297, subsection 4.7 Jimits reuse ofthe types ofdata for Tasks 1 and 2 to the following technical subjects:

(1) Airborne sotlware compliance to RTCA/D0-1788. See RTCND0-297, paragraph 4.7.2 and paragraph 4-4 below.

4-3. Reuse of Other Types of Compliance Data.

(2) CEH component compliance lo RTCA/DO-254. See RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 4.7.3 and paragraph 4-5 below.

(3) EQT compliance to RTCA/DO-1 60F. See RTCN DO-297, paragraph 4.7.4 and to paragraph 4-7 below.

c. In addition to those three technical data types, this AC identifies comprehensive testing of SEH as another data type for which acceptance data can readily be developed, packaged, and accepted for future reuse. Reuse ofcompliance data for SEH is not covered in RTCAIDO-297.

( I) RTCAIDO-254, subsection 1.6, provides the following definition:

Simple Hardware Item - Item with a comprehensive combination of detertninistic tests and analyses appropriate to the design assurance level that ensures correct functional perfonnance under all foreseeable operating conditions, with no anomalous behavior.

(2) AC 20-152, RTCA, Inc., Document R.TCAID0-254, Design Assurance Guidance.for Airborne Electronic Hardware, says that applicants should apply RTCA/DO-254 to custom

micro-coded components, which are a subset of"hardware items." This is AC 20-152's definition:

Custom micro-coded component - A component that includes application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), programmable logic devices (PLO), field programmable gate atTays (FPGA) and olher similar electronic components used in the design ofaircraft systems and equipment.

(3) FAA Order 8110. 105, paragraph 5-1 , explajns that SEH is a custom microcoded component that satjsfies the definition a simple hardware item ofRTCA/DO-254. The design ofan SER device can be shown to be correct and complete by comprehensive

testing and analysis without a detailed development assurance process. Ask your FAA ACO for more information regarding definitions and explanations ofCEH, SEH, hardware items, and custom micro-coded devices. See RTC A/0O-254) subsection 1.6 for more information on simple hardware items.

4-3. Reuse of Other Types of Compliance Data.

a. If you are an 1MA component developer intending to develop any data for future reuse beyond those listed in 4-2.b and 4-2.c, you should include U1is intent in the appropriate certification planning document. Work closely with us, the fMA developer/system integrator, and applicant at the beginning ofthe component development program to ensure that future reuse ofthis data is feasible, and all parties agree on what is required to ensure the success ofany future reuse. We are not required. to accept a proposal for future reuse ofdata beyond those

listed in 4-2.b and 4-2.c. but we wm consider your proposal.

4-5. Reuse of CEH or Hardware Component Containing CEH.

b. Any compliance data beyond those data types listed in paragraphs 4-2.b and 4-2.c. that you propose for inclusion in an TMA Component Acceptance Letter should fall within Tasks I and 21 per paragraph 4-2 above.

c. The IMA component requirements for the additional compliance data types should be documented in an appropriate certification document and referenced in either the IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter or the IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet.

4-4. Reuse of Previously Accepted Software-Only or Hardware Component Containing Airborne Software.

a. RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 4.7.2, addresses reuse of a software module or application. However, as stated in RTCNDO-297, paragraph 4.7.5, this guidance should also be followed for IMA hardware components that contain airborne software.

b. lo addition to the guidance for reuse of a previously accepted component containing airborne software provided by RTCA/DO-297, the guidance for the reuse of afrbome software contained in AC 20-148, Reusable Software Components, should also be used in its entirety, with the exception ofChapter 9 which addresses the Reusable Software Component (RSC) Acceptance Letter. AC 20-148 contains more detail than RTCNDO-297 about developing airborne software for reuse, and reusing that so ftware i11 another project. AC 20-148 specifies the roles and responsibilities ofall parties, the processes LO be used, how the data should be developed when future reuse is intended, and what data should be supplied by the software developer to the integrator of the software or to the applicant.

c. RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 4. 7.2 states lhal the prerequisites for reusing previously accepted software is that the software should be hosted on the "same target hardware" and is 'used in the same way operationally" for the carJier accepted application and the intended reuse application. Given the rapid change in technology employed in today's IMA systems as well as

the rapid rate ofhardware parts obsolescence. it's likely that the intended platfonn that is to host the reused software component wm not include the same target hardware that initially hosted the accepted software. The target hardware may include a microprocessor from the same family as that of the previous target hardware. However, coming from the same family ofmicroprocessors does not automatically qualify as "the same target hardware." lfan lMA developer/system integrator or applicant wants to reuse a previously accepted IMA component that contains software. but that software will be hosted on non-identical target hardware, the applicant should ensure compliance with all RTCA/DO-178B and RTCA/0O-297 objectives and document how

they intend on showing that compliance.

4-5. Reuse of CEH or Hardware Component Containing CEH.

a. AC 20-152, paragraph 2.c states that RTCA/DO-254 applies to complex custom microcoded components wiU1 hardware design assurance levels A, B, and C. See paragraph 4-2.c (2) for definition of custom micro-coded components. Accordingly, we restrict granting IMA Component Acceptance Letters {per RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 4.7.3) to RTCA/DO-254

4-7. Reuse of EQT Data.

complex custom micro-coded components - that is, to CEH and not commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware devices.

b. Your ACO will use FAA Order 8 1 l 0.105 for definitions and additional information on usingRTCNDO-254 as an acceptable means of compliance.

c. Currently, there is no guidance for CEH that define::; a detailed acceptable means of compliance similar to that provided by AC 20-148 for an RSC. However, because of the many similari6es between the processes in RTCA/OO-1788 for airborne software and those in RTCA/DO-254 for airborne electronic hardware, adapt the paragraphs ofAC 20-148 listed below to CEH. Use these paragraphs of AC 20-148 when negotiating an agreement between yourself and us on reusing CEH components:

(l) Paragraph 4 - General Guidelit1es for Getting the FAA 10 Accept an RSC.

(2) Paragraph 5 - Guidelines for the RSC Developer.

(3) Paragraph 6 - Data the RSC Developer Must Supply to the RSC Lntegrator or Applicant.

(4) Paragraph 7 - Guidelines for the lntegrator and Applicant Using the RSC.

(5) Paragraph 8 - Expectations from FAA on First Use of an RSC.

(6) Paragraph J0 - Expectations from FAA on the Subsequent Use of an Accepted RSC.

4-6. Reuse Of SEH or Hardware Component Containing SEH. As with CEH, there's no current guidance on reusing SEH compliu.nce data. Consult the same paragraphs listed 1n paragraph 4-5 above when negotiating wilb us on adapting and using these paragraphs for SEH components. Your ACO wiIJ use FAA Order 81 J0.105 for infonnation on SEH and our expectations regarding comprehensive testing of SEH components.

4-7. Reuse of EQT Data.

a. RTCA/DO-160F, Section 1, stresses the importance of selecting the right environmental conditions and test procedures for equipment under test. A phrase used throughout RTCA/DO­

160F is, ''detennine compliance with applicable equipment perfonnance standards.'' If you are the tester responsible for EQT, it is up to you lo detennine the spedfic test configuration and requirements appropriate for the equipment under test. There are many aspects ofenvironmental testing - vibration levels, temperature, altitude, orientation ofequipment, electrical connectors, electrical grounding schemes, and electrical wire lengths - specific to the aircraft in which the equipment will be installed. The qualification test plan for the equipment under test should properly define all variable test parameters.

b. RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 5.2.6 stresses the flexibility and reconfi1:,,urable nature of modem 1MA systems. That is, although the basic architeclure ofan IMA system is set and will

J0/28/10

not change, each lMA system can be tailored specifically for the aircraft or engine in which it is installed. This is true for the functionality provided by the IMA system as well as for the environmental conditions to which it is subjected-for example, vibration levels for installation in a rotorcraft versus a fixed wing aircraft. This flexibility, while beneficial in many respects, introduces complications when you attempt to develop reusable EQT data per RTCA/DO-297, paragraph 4.7.4.

c. A company asking us for an lMA Component Acceptance Letter for an IMA component being developed for future reuse should ensure that the data package ofthis component clearly identifies all variables and parameters used during EQT. The LMA developer/system integrator intent on reusing a previously accepted component which includes EQT data should ensure that all aspects of that testing are appropriate for the aircratl or engine in which it will be installed. If any testing variable or parameter used during the component's initial acceptance is not identical to what is required for the intended reuse, then Lhe integrator of U1at previously accepted component should document those differences and justify why they are acceptable for the new

intended installation. If there is not adequate justification for any difference between the original acceptance and the intended reuse, then the fMA developer/system integrator or applicant should re-test that aspect of the EQT, using the appropriate values and test configurations.

4-8. Data the Component Developer Owes to the IMA Developer/System Integrator or Applicant.

a. The developer ofa previously accepted !MA component should supply the IMA developer/system jntegrator and/or applicant who is reusing the component with many different types ofdata. This ensures that the lMA developer/system integrator and applicant can fully

satisfy tho objectives ofRTCA/DO-297, subsection 4.7 and Annex A. The data required by the IMA developer/system integrator and applicant are likely to exceed that included in the IMA Component Acceptance Letter.

b. instead of providing data directly to another company, the developer of a previously accepted lMA component may choose to use a data/software escrow approach. See AC 20-148, paragraph 6.j(2) for guidance regarding data/software escrow.

c. AC 20-148, paragraph 6 details the data for airborne software that a developer ofa previously accepte<l software component should make available to the IMA developer/system integrator, the apphcant, and to us, if we ask. As noted previously, there is oo similar guidance for accepted reuse ofeither RTCA/DO-254 or RTCA/DO- I60F compliance data. However,

RTCA/DO-297, parabrraphs 4.2.3, 4.2.12, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2 document many of the elements required. A developer ofa previously accepted IMA component should provide the data

required to ensure compliance with RTCA/DO-297, subsection 4.7 and with the objectives of Annex A, either directly or by data escrow, to the IMA developer/system integrator and/or applicant.

4-9. Reuse of a Previously Accepted lMA Component That Was Revised. A previously accepted IMA component that has been revised since its last acceptance should meet the

4-·10. Reuse of an IMA Component with n Previous TSO Autborjzation.

10/28/10 AC 20-L 70

guidance in RTCA/DO-297, subsection 4-5 lo be reused in a new or concurrent application. lf you wanta new IMA Component Acceptance Letter, see paragraph 3-6.

4-·10. Reuse of an IMA Component with n Previous TSO Autborjzation.

a. If the IMA component that has a previous TSO authorization also has been previously issued an IMA Component Acceptance Letter. then the process for reuse ofa previously accepted TMA component takes precedence. The applicant and IMA developer/system inte&rrator should use the guidance in section 4 without regard to remainder of this paragraph.

b. lfthe IMA component that has a previous TSO authorization has not been issued an IMA Component Acceptance Letter, then the following applies:

(1) You should follow all limitations described in the TSO authorization when integrating the component into the IMA system. These limitations should be documented in the appropriate certification planning documenl(s).

(2) The intended usage domain of th~ TSO authorized IMA component should be identical to the usage domain identified in the TSO authorization. If the intended usage domajn is not the same as identified in the TSO authorization, then you should <lo analysjs and/or testing to demonstrate those differences do not affect the use of the IMA component within the intended

usage domain.

(3) You should identify all RTCA/DO- 178B and RTCA/DO-254 objectives that have only been partially met under the TSO authorization and describe in the appropriate certification

planning document(s) how full compliance to these objectives will be shown for the integrated rMA system. See AC 20-148, paragraph 5.d(t) for more infonnation.

(4) You should identify all remaining EQT that are required for the aircraft or engine installation that is not covered by the TSO authorization. These remaining EQT should be described in the appropriate certification planning document(s). Any EQT results from the TSO authorization that you desire to take credit for at the aircraft or engine installation level should be described in the appropriate certification planning document(s). See paragraph 4-7 for more information regarding reuse ofEQT data.

(5) Any SEH devices that arc within the TSO authorized IMA component should be identified in the appropriate certification planning uocument(s). Compliance to RTCA/DO-254 for SEH devices are not covered by TSO authorizations, unless specifically stated in the TSO. The guidance of paragraph 4-6 should be used.

5-2. Automated, Robust Configuration Management.

L0/28/10 AC 20-170

Chapter 5 Configuration Management of an IMA System.

5·1. IMA Configuration Management.

a. The applicant is responsible for overall IMA system configuration management.

b. Configuration management of an [MA system instol led in an aircraft is critical because the system may contain many hardware components and functional software components, with each component having multiple approved versions or on-aircraft option selections. Some possible combinations of hardware and soflware versions will not be approved for flight.

c. Configuration management techniques to manage tJ1e IMA architecture are necessary to safely accommodate system attributes. such as (but not limited to) the following:

(J) Hosting multiple software applications on a single processor or on multiple, nondedicated processors.

(2) Producing and distributing hardware components without loading specific functional software.

(3) Allowing electronic part nwnbering for software components, without the need to physically mark hardware elements with the software part number(s).

(4) Allowing the clectronfo display ofTSO identification.

(5) Allowing the field-loadi ng of hardware components with functional software components for efficient maintenance and incorporation of approved design changes.

(6) Allowjng the stocking of gene1ic, non-configured hardware components for maintenance purposes. A non-configur~ hardware component is one that does not already contain the functional software components needed for satisfying an aircraft, engine or system function. These hardware components will be loaded later with field-loadable software. Each generic hardware component may have multiple versions, as components normally undergo updates during their lifecycle. Unless a specific effort is made to purge operator spares ofearlier versions of a hardware component, you should assume that every version ofa hardware component will exist in service and couJd be used on an aircraft or engine installation.

(7) Providing the ability to update and maintain IMA system configuration files without corruption.

5-2. Automated, Robust Configuration Management.

a. We strongly recommend a robust, automated configuration management scheme for an IMA system installed on an aircraft. A key feature ofan automated configuration management scheme is that the IMA system itselfmonitors the configuration ofeither all or a subset of the

10/28/t0 AC 20-170

IMA hardware and software components. When an invalid configuration of the monitored components is detected, it should be annunciated in a way that will not allow the aircraft to be dispatched until the invalid configuration is corrected.

b. A robust, automated configuration management scheme should be able to detect, at a muumum:

(I) Incompatible versions ofa software component hosted in a hardware component.

(2) Incompatible versions ofmultiple copies ofa software component hosted in multiple hardware components.

(3) Incompatibilities or uncertified configurations between various systems that are closely coupled, such as autopilot and flight managemem systems.

(4) Incompatible system configurations with the aircrafl model in which it is installed, and

(5) Incompatjb)e option selections.

c. Any loss offunction caused by configuration management system protections must be shown to be acceptable through the applicant's aircraft or engine level safety assessment. See § xx.1309, xx denoting parts 23, 25, 27, or 29 as applicable.

5-3. Non-Automated, Robust Configuration Management. lf your configuration management scheme of the .IMA system installed on the aircraft or engine is not automated or depends on maintenance personnel to configure the system, either fully or partially, and to determine ifthe system configuration correct for that specific aircraft or engine. you should explain, in the appropriate certification document, why your configuration management scheme is robust. You should address possible issues with your proposed approach, such as likely maintenance errors that could result in a uon-opproved rMA configuration. You should explain the testing and analysis that you plan to do to ensure the process is indeed robust.

5-4. Software Loading Procedures. For lMA systems that allow on-aircraft loading of software, the applicant should provide field-loading procedures that ensure correct software

loading, as well as a means to vetify that the software load operation was completed successfully and that the correct version ofsoftware is now installed.

5-5. Assurance Level of IMA Components Used in Configuration Management Any IMA system component used in determining the validity and/or safety ofan IMA configuration,

whether the configuration management system is fully automated or manual, should be developed to the assurance level commensurate with the hazard classification ofallowing a non.­ approved configuration to be dispatched. This includes automatic configuration monitoring and displaying electronically stored part numbers and versions on a flight deck or maintenance display.

6-2. Restart Mechanism Implementation.

10/28/ 1() AC 20-170

Chapter 6 IMA Recovery Features.

6-1. Restarting Safety Critical IMA Functions. Due to unforeseen circumstances. an fMA function, collection oflMA functions, or an entire Uv1A cabinet may unexpectedly shut down without the hosting ]MA hardware compone11ts experiencing a pcnnanent failure. IMA systems must include the ability to restart any hosted function or functions whose continued ope1·ation is required by the system or aircraft level safety assessment. See § xx.1309, x.x denoting parts 23, 25. 27, or 29 as applicable.

6-2. Restart Mechanism Implementation.

a. An IMA function or system restrut feature included in an IMA system, when feasible, should be initiated automatically when a safety critical loss of function is detected. The IMA design should avoid the need for crew-initiated recovery features.

b. lf an automatic recovery feature is not feasible and a crew-initiated - that is, nonautomated - recovery feature is implemented instead. you should putprotection mechanisms and operations procedures in place to prevent accidental a1,.'tivalion of the recovery featw-e by the flight crew

c. The system design should carefully consider how many automatic attempts at restarting failed lMA functions or cabinets should be attempted. Allempting to restart indefinitely when the failed function or cabinet repeatedly shuts itselfdown may cause increased crew workload or distraction. Repeated failures after restart attempts may indicate that there is a fai led JMA resource that should not be restarted. The system resta.it mechanism design should consider potential causes for restarts and determine the appropriate nwnber ofrestarts to attempt before dec]aring the system failed. Factors that influence this ar~hilecturc are the failure condition(s) associated with loss of IMA functionality, the in1pact ofmultiple restruts ofa function or functions on interfacing systems, and the functionality remaining from non-LMA systems.

d. The IMA design should not rely on cycling aircraft circuit breakers to restart any IMA system or function. If crew-initiated manual recovery features are used, design a means other than cycling circuit breakers.

e. The appl1cant should evaluate the effects of automatically and/or manually activating recovery features in both normal and failed conditions for all phases offlight. The applicant should evaluate the effects ofloss offunctions during manual or automatic restart for all phases offlight.

7-2. Field Load able Software.

I 0/28/10 AC 20-1 70

Chapter 7 Topics Not Covered by RTCA/00-297.

7-1. Electrical Power For l MA Systems.

a. The applicant and lMA developer/system integrator should design the physical and electrical power architecture of the lMA to suppoti the flight crew's ability to manage smoke or fire events without losing functions whose loss are catastrophic.

b. If arc fault circuit breakers (AFCB) are utilized for IMA cabinet or rack circuit protection, they should be specifically qualified for use on aircraft. At the issue date of this AC,

the use of AFCB technology in airborne systems is in its infancy. Therefore, until more experience is gained and updated regulatory and/or guidance material is issued for the certification ofAFCBs, the FAA may develop a metl1od of compliance Issue Paper for certification programs that use AFCB technology.

c. The 1MA cabinet or rack should not be powered with circuit protection features such as software controlled circuit breakers that are controlled by microprocessors hosted in that IMA cabinet or rack. The intent of this guidance is to prevent the complete loss ofcontrol of the circuit protection feature(s) ofany speci fie lMA cabinet or rack, or lMA components installed within that cabinet or rack, such that the electrical power input cannot be removed to that cabinet or rack ifit fails.

d. The following applies to part 25 transpor1 airplanes only.

(l) Electrical wiring interconnection system (EWJS) components, as defined by § 25.1701, associated with lMA systems must comply with the applicable EWlS requirements of Part 25. See § 25.170 I. Refer to Advisory Circular 25.170 1-1. Certificatio11 ofElectrical Wiring interconnection Systems on Transport Catego,y Airplanes, for specific compliance guidance.

(2) We consider EW IS to be an airpl.ane system. Therefore, EWIS associated witb IMA systems required for type certification or by operating rules, including those specifically listed in

§ 25. l 705(b) must be considered as an integral part of thal IMA system and must be considered in showing compliance with the applicable requirements for that LMA system. See§ 25.l705(b).

(3) Circuit protective devices for the IMA cabinet or rack must comply with the requirements of§ 25.1357. See§ 25.1357. Thjs inc1udes § 25.1357(f) which requires IMA systems for which the ability to remove or reset power during nonnal operations is necessary be designed so that circuit breakers are not the primary means to remove or reset system power

unless speci fically designed for use as a switch.

7-2. Field Load able Software.

a. Many IMA systems use field loadable software (FLS) as part of the TC/STC/ATC/ASTC installation. FLS is software that can be loaded into the host hardware without removing the equipment from the aircraft instaJlution. FLS might also include software

10/28/10 AC20-l70

loaded into a line replaceable unit (LRU) or hardware component at a repair station or shop. FLS can refer to either executable code or data, such as a database. When seeking approval to use FLS, you should consider the following:

(1) FLS should meet the objectives and guidance of RTCA/0O-178B or other acceptable means of compliance, as agreed to between the applicant and your responsible ACO.

(2) The FLS should be loaded on the target computer and hardware configuration that the software was verified on during D0-178B on-target verification testing.

(3) A means must exist to ensure that the FLS is loaded into the proper IMA configuration approved for that aircraft. See § 21.31. See Chapter 5 for more infonnation on configuration management.

(4) lfredundant functions of the IMA system are field loadable, the applicant should ensure that they have the same software configuration. unless intermixing of different software confi&rurations is supported by the safety assessment and approved for the aircraft configuration and type design.

(5) The applicant should have a process to assure that the software loaded is the software approved and that it hasn't been com1ptcd - for example, verification with a cyclic redundancy or other data transfer integrity check. Different data integrity algorithms give different assurances that the data transfer is correct. Ensure that the algorithm used is commensurate with the integrity required for the software level of the data being l.oaded.

(6) lf the applicant proposes more thai1 one medium for loading the FLS, such as a diskette, mass storage device or compact disc, loading from each medium should comply witit the guidance in this section.

(7) The applicant should demonstrate that the airborne equipment software part numbers can be verified with onboard equipment, carry-on equipment, an automated configuration management scheme, or other appropriate means.

(8) Loading protection mechanisms should be implemented to inhibit loading FLS during flight. The reliability of these mechanisms should be commensurate with the failure condition associated with the inadvertent loading ofsoftware during flight.

Note: Please refer to AC l20-76A, Guidelines.for the Certification, Airworthiness, and Operational Approl'Q/ ofElccLronic Flight Bag Computing Devices, for guidance that pertains to loadable IMA software components that implement an Electronic Flight Bag function.

b. FLS jnstallation documents should specify the following elements:

(1) Aircraft and hardware applicability and intennixability allowances for redundant systems that load software.

7-3. Electronic Identification Guidance.

11/21/2013 AC 20-170, Chg. 1

(2) Verification procedures to ensure that the sotiware was correctly loaded into an approved, compatible target computer and memory device(s).

(3) Any post-load verification and/or test procedures required to show compliance to the guidelines specified in this AC.

(4) Actions to take -for example, prohibiting dispatch of aircrati- if there's an unsuccessful load.

(5) Reference to an approved loading procedure.

(6) Maintenance record entry procedures required to document and maintain configuration control.

(7) Reference to the appropriate Aircrati Flight Manual (AFM). Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) or operator's manual. if necessary.

7-3. Electronic Identification Guidance.

a. Identification of software components field-loaded into hardware elements should be implemented by electronic means. Electronic identification markings consist of identifying sotiware components by electronically embedding the identification within sotiwarc contained in the hardware. rather than on the equipment nameplate.

b. Electronic software part numbers and versions should be verifiable through an electronic query, such as an electronic display. Software part number configuration errors detected by an automated robust IMA configuration management function should be annunciated to the flight crew until appropriate maintenance action is performed.

e. Equipment authorized by TSO must be permanently and legibly marked with specific information. Sec§ 45.IS(b). The applicant can demonstrate compliance to§ 45.IS(b) when you provide the information required by an electronic identification query system stored in nonvolatile memory. This approach is commonly called an '"electronic TSO nameplate." The electronic identification system should be verifiable onboard the aircrati when the aircrati is on the ground at any geographic location. lt must provide the specific information for all applicable TSOs being marked is using the electronic TSO nameplate as the only means of labeling. See § 45.15(b).

d. Electronic identification may also provide softv;are and hardware component revision or modification status information and RTCA/DO-178B software level. The applicant can use this to demonstrate conformity to type design configuration.

e. Include information identifying the location of each hardware component in the electronic identification. This is necessary because the configuration depends on the specific

location ofeach hardware component within the cabinet or rack. You can satisfy this

7-4. Aircraft System Lightning and HIRF Protection.

10/28/10 AC20-170

requirement when an automated configuration management system scheme tracks and protects the IMA system configuration by ensuring hardware components are properly located.

f. All hardware components that support functjons approved by a TSO should have a physical TSO nameplate. However, you may use electronic means instead of verifying nameplates on each hardware component, if aU required information is available electronically. Electronic identification does not replace hardware and software conformity inspections that determine the components are produced in conformity to type design.

g. Order 8150.1 (see the most current version) provides additional information on TSO part marking.

7-4. Aircraft System Lightning and HIRF Protection.

a. When you are showing compliance with aircraft lightning and HIRF protection regulations, you must demonstrate that the functions performed by electrical and electronic systems, whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing, are not adversely

affected when exposed to lightning and HIRF. See§§ 23. 1308, 25.1316, 25. 13 17, 27.1317, and 29.131 7. The compliance demonstration for these systems should consider the performance of the integrated system, not only the equipment or modules that make up the system. To comply with this requirement to demonstrate no adverse effects on the functions performed by the system, lightning, and HlRF tests should be perfom1ed with the IMA system in a test setup that represents the wiring, hardware, and software configuration that wi11 be installed on the aircraft. These lightning and HIRF system test configurations are typica11y more complex than those used for TSO compliance or equipment qualification. Guidance for compliance is in AC 20-1 36A,

Protection ofAircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems Against the lndirect Effects ofLightning, and AC 20-158, The CerNfication ofAircraft Electrical and Electronic Systems.for Operation in the High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HJRFJ Environment.

b. For systems that perfom1 functions whose failure would significantly reduce the capability of the aircraft or the abi lity of the flight crew to respond to an adverse operating condition, the compliance demonstration may be based on lightning and HlRF tests performed on individual elements ofequipment. RTCA/DO-l60F tests satisfy these rcqujrements.

c. Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) between the IMA system and other aircraft systems should be demonstrated when the IMA system is installed in the aircraft. RF emission tests, such as those in RTCA/DO- I 60F, Section 2 l, should be performed on the IMA modules, equipment and systems to provide confidence that the [MA system does not produce unacceptable RF emjssions. However, the EMC demonstration to comply with regulations such as §§ 23.1431 , 25.143 J, and 29.1431 should be perfom1ed with the IMA system and the other electrical and electronic systems installed on the aircraft.

7-5. lMA System Data Network. Many, if.not all, lMA systems will include a dedicated data network, such that the elements within an IMA system may communicate with each other without using the main aircraft or engine data network. This data network may be purely internal to an lMA cabinet or. for distributed IMA components, the data network may be

10/28/ l 0

required to span the length and breadth of the airframe in which the IMA is instal1ed. For data networks that are dedicated to or primarily for IMA system data transmission and reception and are distributed in nature - that is, not purely intemaJ to the rMA cabinets or modules - the applicant and IMA developer/system integrator should follow the guidance provided in AC 20­

156, Aviation Darabus Assurance, or use another acceptable means.

8-2. TSO-Cl53 Authorization for lMA Hardware Components.

Chapter 8 Use Of TSO Authorized Components In IMA Systems.

8-1. IMA Systems and TSOs.

a. IMA systems, depending on the specific aircraft or engine application, may combine many functions that were historically in funchonaJly and physically separated systems. These IMA functions are made up ofhardware and software components, each of which may be authorized by TSO, either complete or incomplete. Additionally, hardware modules, cabinets, and racks that host the IMA hardware modules may also be authorized by TSO.

b. TSO authorizations are allowed under 14 CFR part 2 1, subpart 0. Your responsible ACO can explain how we evaluate and issue TSOAs and letters ofTSO design approval (LODA) for aviation-related articles.

c. TSOs associated with lMA systems are:

(1) TSO-C153, which covers two types ofhardware used in lMA systems: generic hardware modules and cabinets/racks that host hardware modules.

(2) Functional TSOs. See paragraph 8-7 below and refer to Appendix G for examples of functional TSOs. You should keep in mind that this term is not normally used except in the context of IMA systems.

d. RTCNDO-297 does not specifically uddress TSO at1th01ized articles within an IMA system. This chapter offers you a way to obtain approval for IMA systems that contain hardware and/or software components authorized by TSO.

e. Due to the high integration, functi\mal TSO data packages for IMA systems are typically developed in parallel with the TC/STC/ATC/ASTC effort. In these cases, you should not submit TSO data to the ACO for authorization until the TC/STC/ A TC/ASTC testing for the IMA system is completed and the final IMA system configuration is established. This will ensure thai- the IMA system meets all required TSO MPS. Alternatively, compliance data for TSO authorization and compliance data for the TC/STC/ A TC/ASTC maybe be submitted to the appropriate FAA offices concurrently, such that the TSO authorization may be issued concurrently with the aircraft/engine certificate. This alternative approach requires a high level of coordination between the responsible FAA offices to ensure that issues that arise iD one area do not affect the other.

8-2. TSO-Cl53 Authorization for lMA Hardware Components.

a. To obtain TSO-Cl 53 auth01ization, the applicant for TSO authorization must demonstrate that the individual hardware components meet the MPS and defined subset of

RTCNDO- l 60F environmental qualification requirements in TSO-C153, as described in Appendix A. See§ 2 I .616(c). TSO-Cl 53 does not provide either functional or insta11ation

approval.

J0/28/) 0 AC 20-170

b. The applicant for an LMA Component Acceptance Letter may use TSO-C153 authorizalion as compliance data to obtain IMA component acceptance for IMA hardware components. See RTCA/DO-297, Table 4.

8-4. EQT of lMA Components with TSO Authorization.

8~3. Functional TSO Authorization.

a. A functional TSO is a TSO with a defined aircraft functionality. For example, TSO­ C I 06 is for an air data computer. Other examples of functional TSOs are listed in Appendix G of this AC. TSO-C 153 is not considered a functional TSO because the hardware element it addresses does not have system level functionality. A functional TSO authorization is issued for a specific IMA system configuration, including hardware and software components, that performs the function defined in the functional TSO MPS. lt is not simply for the software component that is loaded into a TSO-C 153 authorized hardware clement.

b. If the IMA system provides all or part of the functionality required by the functional TSOs MPS and the company applying for functional TSO authorization also controls the design and quality of the complete lMA system, then that company may apply for functional TSO authorizations (either complete or incomplete) for each aircraft function for which there is an applicable functional TSO. As noted above in 8-3(a), the TSO authorization will apply to the JMA system and not a specific lMA component.

Note: Per§ 21.601 (b)(S}, the manufacturer of an article is the ''person who controls the design and quality of the article produced ... including the parts ofthem and any processes or services related to them that are procured from an outside source." For paragraph 8-3(b) to be appljcable, the applicant for a TSO authorization must control the design and quality of the parts, processes, and services lhat are provided by any supplier to that applicant for a TSO authorization. See§ 21.60l(b)(S).

c. If the company supplying functional software that wilt be installed in an IMA system does not control the entire design and quality, per 8-3(b) above, ofthe article that provides the functionality defined in the functional TSO MPS, then that company may not apply for functional TSO authorization.

d. It should be noted that there will typically be multiple functional TSO authorizations that comprise the lMA system, and the lMA ~ystem will likely cont::iin functionality and features not addressed by any TSO. The overall functionality of the IMA system and the portions covered by TSOA versus TC, STC, A TC, or ASTC should be carefully documented and coordinated with

the FAA.

8-4. EQT of lMA Components with TSO Authorization.

a. There will be three different stages at which TSO authorized IMA components and the IMA system in which these components are installed need to comply with EQT requirements:

8-5. JMA Component TSO Part Marking.

10/28/ 10 AC 20-170

(I) TSO-Cl 53. This TSO contajns EQT MPS for IMA hardware modules that qualify for TSO-Cl53 authorization. Comply with these requirements lo obtain TS0-C153 authorization for the generic IMA hardware.

(2) Functional TSO MPS. Each individual functional TSO (see Appendix G for examples) MPS normally include EQT requirements. Comply with these requirements to obtain

the individual functional TSO authorization(s).

(3) Aircraft or engine installation EQT requirements. EQT procedures and test configurations are based on the specific aircraft or engine installation of the complete IMA system. Compliance to the aircraft or engine level installation EQT requirements may be completed under the aircraft/engine certification program independent of the TSO authorizations. Alternatively, certification credit at the aircraft or engine installation level may be taken from the TSO authorizations, if applicable at the installation level.

b. TSO-Cl53 was written specifically to address how partial EQT compliance at the aircraft or engine installation level can take credit from the EQT compliance from TSO-Cl53 authorization. EQT procedures that require tJ1e test to be mn on the specific IMA system configuration ash will be installed on the aircraft or engine should be accomplished during the aircraft or engine TC/ATC/STC/ ASTC program. TSO-C 153 and Appendix A of this AC address how this can be done.

c. Compliance to the EQT MPS for the individual functional TSO MPS is still required, even with TSO-Cl53 authorization of the hardware components which host that function.

d. An applicant for an IMA Component Acceptance Leiter may use the EQT compliance data from a TSO authorization to use as compliance data for lhe IMA Component Acceptance

Letter process addressed in Chapter 3 of this AC. The IMA Component Acceptance Cover Letter and the accompanying IMA Component Acceptance Letter data sheet should include which EQT are being accepted, including a statement offul I or partial comp] iance and a matrix or table ofal I EQT procedure testing levels accomplished.

8-5. JMA Component TSO Part Marking.

a. Tf loadable software components are used with generic hardware modules authorized under TSO-Cl 53 to implement a functional TSO, an applicant for functional TSO authorization should identify the loadable software - both the electronic identification and the physical or electronic media containing the loadable functional software - with the functional TSO

identification.

b. The generic hardware components authorized by TSO-C153 must be permanently marked as being authorized under that TSO, in addition to any electronic identification. See § 21.607(d).

c. See paragraph 7-3 for electronic identification guidance.

8-6. Integration ofTSO Authorized Components in IMA Systems.

8-6. Integration ofTSO Authorized Components in IMA Systems.

a. The applicant should demonstrate that all RTCA/OO-297 objectives required to obtain Acceptance of the IMA modules, applications. system, and installation into the aircraft or engine have been met. This is true regardless whether any ofthe modules or applications are also part of a TSO authorized article as described above in paragraph 8-3. The TSO authorization for the IMA function may be used, if relevant. in showing that you met RTCA/DO-297 objectives. The

presence of a TSO authorization in no way removes or reduces your responsibilities as an applicant, which is to ensure that the installed [MA system - including any TSO authorized components - meets the appropriate aircraft nnd engiue regulations and the guidance in this AC.

b. functional TSOs, such as TSO-C 113. Airbome Mulapmpose Electronic Displays, do not normally cover integration with other aircraft functions or hardware/software components in the integrated rMA system. Each TSO MPS is normally written assuming thal it is a stand-alone function and that no integration requirements exist beyond integration into the aircraft. For this reason~ additional work is

likely to be required beyond the TSO authorizations when showing compliance at the 1ntegrated IMA system level. Please refer to RTCNDO-297, subsection 4.4.

c. The installation instructions for TSO authorized lMA components should include all information necessary for the applicant and/or the IMA developer/system integrator to fully integrated the TSO authorized lMA component into the fMA system.

8-7. Aircraft InstaUation Approval of IMA Systems Including TSO Authorized Components.

a. The applicant must demonstrate that the installed CMA system configuration- including both hardware and software components - and perfonnancc meets the appropriate aircraft and engine certification basis. See § 2 1.20. This demonsu·ation should include functional perfonnance, interoperability, aircraft-level and system-level safety assessments, environmental qualification, system integration test, flight-test, software and hardware assurance, etc., as required to show compliance to the regulations.

b. The applicant may use TSO authorizations to support airworthiness assessment if you show tbat the TSO requirements apply to the installation into the aircraft or engine. Any change to the bardware or software configuration of an IMA component must be controlled at both the TSO and the aircraft installation level. See §§ 21.3 1and 21.61 I.

8-8. Roles and Responsibilities When TSO Authorized Components Are Used in IMA Systems.

This section identifies the major roles and responsibilities for the TSO-Cl 53 applicant, the functional TSO applicant, and the aircraft/engine applicant when TSO authorized components are used. These lists are not all-inclusive. We encourage all affected parties to coordinate with us throughout the entire IMA system development. See Appendix A for more guidance

applicable to TSO-Cl 53 authorization.

a. TSO-Cl 53 Applicant Roles and Responsibilities:

( l) Apply for TSO-Cl 53. If you arc a manufacturer ofa TSO article, due to the complexity oflMA projects, we recommend that you coordinate with us early in the program.

(2) Build an MPS for the hardware element according to TSO-C153. Ensure that you document all the appropriate items in TSO-Cl53, Appendix I and that we approved them.

(3) Develop and implement part identification and configuration management functionality into hardware elements. The configuration management and part identification approach should follow chapter 5 and paragraphs 7-3 and 8-5 of this AC.

(4) Coordinate with the applicant and/or IMA developer/system integrator who will be integrating and installing lhe hardware elements on the aircraft_ to ensure that the relevant issues

are identified and addressed as early as possible.

(5) Design and build hardware elements per TSO-C' 153 and the MPS.

(6) Perfunn the tests necessary to demonstrate compliance with the TSO-Cl 53 and the MPS. See paragraph 8-4 and appendix A of this AC. lfspecial purpose test software is used for EQT, validate and control the configuration ofthe hardware elements and software components to ensure the validity of the testing.

(7) Submit the data package (the information in TSO-CI 53 paragraph 5, including the MPS) to your responsible ACO for review and issue ofTSO authorization.

(8) Apply for changes to TSO-C153 elements as design changes occur, Notify TC, ATC, STC, and ASTC holders and functional TSO holders, ifany, of the design change.

b. Functional TSO Applicant Roles and Responsibilities.

( 1) Apply for functional TSO to your responsible ACO.

(2) Design the system according to the appropriate TSO MPS.

(3) Identify the usage domain in wluch the TSO authorized IMA component was shown to meet the TSO MPS. lf the envfronment in which the component verification was conducted is not exactly the same as the usage domain of the completed IMA system, then you should perfonn analysis and/or testing to demonstrate those differences do not affect the use of the IMA component witl1in the intended usage domain.

(4) Identify and address all integration and-approval issues with the LMA hardware component that will host the functional TSO software. Coordinate these issues with the applicant and/or the IMA developer/system integrator (if different than the functionaJ TSO applicant).

l 0/28/10 AC 20-170

(5) Develop mapping between the TSO requirements and the IMA system implementation - for example, a mapping matrix. Mapping should identify TSO requirements

that are fully met, partially met, or not met at all. This includes any partial compliance to RTCA/DO-178B for software, RTCNDO-254 for CEH, and RTCA/DO- l60F for EQT.

(6) Identify any limitations regarding the use of the lMA component in an IMA system.

(7) Refer to FAA Order 8150.1, Technical Srandard Order Program, as needed to understand the FAA policy regarding TSO authorized articles. You should contact your responsible ACO if you have any questions you cannot answer.

(8) Identify functions in the IMA system not addressed by the TSO. Any functionality not specifically addressed by the functional TSO MPS may require deviations. This additional functionality may be classified as a "non-TSO function", or it may be small enough in nature or

closely related to the functional TSO, such that the applicant for a functional TSO classifies it as a "feature." Both non-TSO functions and features should be documented and addressed.

(9) Perform tests to demonstrate compliance to the functional TSO or functional performance standards. Some required EQT may not have been accomplished during TSO-CJ 53

authorization. You should demonstrate that all testing, including EQTs required for the functional TSO, has been accomplished. Ifspecial purpose test software is used for environmental qualification, you should verify and control the configuration of the software to ensure the validity of the testing. Credit may be applied for EQT conducted for the TSO-Cl 53 authorization, ifappropriate. See paragraph 8-4 for more information.

( l 0) Submit the data package required by the functional TSO to the responsible ACO for review and issuance of the TSO authorization. Include installation data and configuration of the functional TSO as part of the data package. See paragraph 8-3 for more infonnation.

{I I) Apply for changes to functional TSOs, as design changes occur. Notify TC, STC, ATC, and ASTC holders ofthe design change.

c. Applicant Roles and Responsibilities.

(I) Develop and submit a Project-Specific Certification Plan (PSCP) for the fMA system to the responsible ACO for approval.

(a) We recommend that you include a detailed confonnity plan covering all hardware and software components' conformity and installation conformity inspections (including the plan for addressing any "red label" units).

(b) The PSCP should clearly identify what functions will and will not be approved through the TSOA process. This is necessary to identify what will be TSO authorized and what will be TC/STC/ATC/ASTC approved.

J0/28/1 0 AC 20-170

(c) The PSCP should address integration and approval ofall components of the IMA system (including all hardware elements and software components).

(2) Define aircraft system and performance requirements.

(3) Perfom, aircraft-level safety assessment per RTCA/D0-297, subsection 5.1 and submit it to your ACO.

(4) lntegrate all hardware elements and software components in the IMA system. This task may be accomplished by the 1MA developer/system integrator.

(5) Integrate the JM A system into the aircraft or engine.

(6) Ensure that no TSO assumptions are violated in the installation. For example. ensure that relocating the GPS card does not invalidate the environmental qualification credit for the GPS TSO. (See chapter 8 of this AC.)

(7) Develop field-loading procedures to ensure that proper software is loaded on the aircraft. (See paragraphs 5-4 and 7-2 of this AC.)

(8) Verify software and complex electronic hardware issues were properly addressed for the installation. (See RTCA/D0-297, Sections 3. 4, and subsection 5.2.)

(9) Determine appropriate aircraft environmental conditions and ensure that EQTs were performed. (See RTCND0-297, subsection 5.2.6.)

(10) Develop all required test plans (see RTCA/D0-297. Section 4) and perform necessary tests.

(11) Develop a plan for addressing human factors issues (see RTCA/D0-297, subsection 3.10) ahd perform human factors and flight crew evaluations of the IMA system.

(12) Ensure that the IMA systen1 meets all airworthiness requirements.

{13) Submit the functional hazard analyses. safety assessments, hardware design assurance data, software data, test plans, test results, compliance reports, and all other appropriate certification data to the FAA for approval. The preliminary functional hazard analysis and preliminary system safety analysis should be submitted before finalizing the software, CEH, and SEH levels and the IMA architecture.

(14) Maintain aircraft system configuration management. (See RTCA/D0-297. subsection 3.7 and paragraph 5-1 ofthis AC.)

L0/28/10 AC 20-170

(15) Evaluate and document changes lo IMA system and elements per§ 21.93. (See RTCA/D0-297, subsection 4.6.)

( 16) Ensure that aircraft design features address safoty (See RTCA/D0-297, subsection 3.3.)

Table 1-1. RT A/DO-160F Environmental Qualification Requirements.

------

I0/20/ LO Appendix A

Appendix A Environmental Qualification Guidance for TSO-C153.

1. T 0-Cl 53 Appendix I Ii t environm ntal qualification test (EQT) to atisfy the TSO minimum performance tandard. Perfonn th• e EQT · ac ording to procedure and category levels in RTCA/DO-l 60F. Select the category levels tested appropriate ti r the aircraft installation and environment. The EQTs hould apply to functional TSO environmental qualification and may be applied to the aircraft TC, STC, ATC or ASTC envir nment qualification.

2. Tabl 1-1 below li t the RTCAID0-16 Fen ironmental tests that can be accomplished under TSO-Cl 53 authorization. and how they may affect functional TSO authorization.

Table 1-1. RT A/DO-160F Environmental Qualification Requirements.

RTCA/ DO-160

Section

#

4

4

5 >---­

6

7

7

l O

1 l

12

13

RTC /DO-l60F

Section Title

Temperature and Altitude ­ Temperature

Temperature and Altitude ­ Altitude

Temperature Variati n

Humidity

perational Shock and Crash afety - Operati nal Shock

Operational Sh Safety - Crash

plosion-pro fne

Waterproofness

Fluid Susceptibility

and and Dust

Fungus Resi tance

Required for Required for TSO-Cl53 Functional TSO

Nol tested Yes

Ye

Not tested

Yes

t tested

Yes T 0- 153 quali ficati n data may be u ed by imilarity

Yes

Yes, TSO-C1 5 qualificati n data may be u ed b similarity

Yes

y . Yes, TSO-C 153 qualification data may be u ed by similarity

Yes

Ye if appropriate Yes, TSO-Cl 53 qualification data may be u ed by similarity

Yes, ifappropriate Yes, TSO­ 153 qualification data may be u cd by similarity

Ye if appropriate es TSO-Cl53 qualification data may be u ed by imilarity

Yes, ifappropri a le Yes, TSO-Cl 53 qualification data may be u ed by similarity

Yes if appropriat Yes TSO-Cl53 qualification data may be u ed by similarity

10/20/ l0 Appendix A

RTCA/ DO-160F RTCA/DO-160F Section Section itle # ]4 Salt Spray

Required for

TSO-C153

Ye . if appropriate

Required for Functional TSO

- Yes, TSO-Cl 53 qualification data may be used by similarity

15 Magnetic Effect Yes

- -

Yes, TSO-Cl 53 qualification data may be used by similarity

16 Power Input Nolte ted Yes - 17 V ltage Spike Ye Yes TSO­ 153 qualification data may be u ed by similarity - 18 Audio Susceptibility - Power [nputs

Ye Yes, TSOdata may b

153 qualification u ed by similarity

19 Induced Signal Su ceptibility Notte ted Yes - 20 Radio Frequency usceptibility N t tested Yes

21 Emissions of Radio Frequency Energy

Not tested Yes

._

22 Lightning Indu ed Transient Su ceptibility

Not tested Yes

23 Lightning Direc Effects Not tested Yes

24 Icing Ys Yes, TSO-Cl 53 qualification data may be used by similarity

25 Electrostatic Di harge Ye Yes TSO-C153 qualification

- - ~ata may be u ed by similarity -1

Note: RT A/DO-160Fl S ctions 20 and 22 may require additional te ting at aircraft in talla:tion.

3. Certain EQTs cannot e appropriately I erformed on th hardware element s part ofTS ­ Cl53. These EQTs can only be appropriate! pe1fonned when the IMA sy t m and hardware element ar arranged in the configuration specified for lhe applicable aircraft, as defined for the aircraft TC. STC, ATC, or ASTC. Also, lhe e EQ can nly be appropriately performed with the functional software in talled and operating. Therefore certain RTCNDO-160F EQTs are exclude from TSO-Cl53. You should addre s these EQ s as part of the functional T 0 compliance or a part f the TC/STC/ATC/ASTC environmental qualification. These te ts arc de crib d below:

a. EQT for temperature (RTCNDO-l 60F, Section 4) and temperature variation (RTCA/DO­ 160F ection 5), Perfonn these with the cabinet or rack and modules in the hardware configuration intended for the functional T O authorization r the TC/STC/ATC/ASTC approval. For temperature and temperature arialion tests ti r the functional T O or

10/20/ 10 Appendix A

TC/STC/ ATC/ ASTC, the hardware module urra11gement should represent the expected worstcase temperature conditions. Alternately, applicants for the functional TSO or for aircraft/engine certification may perform engineering analysis, using validated models, ofthe thermal characteristics of the expected cabinet or rack and module configuration variations to determine temperature test parameters that exceed the worst-case expected temperature conditions. These temperature test parameters could be used instead ofthe standard RTCA/DO-160F, Sections 4 and 5, temperature conditions.

b. EQT for operational shock (RTCA/DO-160F, Section 7) and vibration (RTCA/DO-160F, Section 8). Perform these with all cabinet/rack module positions occupied in the hardware con.figuration specified for the functional TSO or TC/STC/ ATC/ ASTC installation. Alternately, you could perform an engineering analysis, using validated models, of the characteristics of the expected cabinet or rack and module con.figurations to determine vibration and operational shock test parameters that exceed the worst expected conditions. These test parameters could be use-d instead ofthe standard RTCA/DO-l60F, Sections 7 and 8 conJitions.

c. EQT for induced transients {RTCA/DO-160F, Section 19), radio frequency {RF) susceptibility (RTCA/DO-160F, Section 20), RF emissions (RTCA/DO-160F, Section 21 ), and lightning induced transients (RTCA/DO-160P, Section 22). These are most appropriately performed with the functional hardware and software in the IMA system. This is because the response of the system may be highly dependent on the functional software and hardware. Therefore, perform these EQTs as part of the functional TSO compliance or as part ofthe TC/STC/ATC/ASTC environmental qualification.

d. EQT for lightning and HlRF protection. Perfom1 these with the hardware elements and software components loaded in the configuration specified for the applicable aircraft, per the lightning regulations, ACs, and the HIRF policy. The interface wiring and connected equipment should represent the wiring and connected equipment installed in the aircraft.

4. You may use EQT performed for a single functional TSO authorization or aircraft TC/STC/ATC/ASTC to support other applications for functional TSOs or aircraft TC/STC/ ATC/ ASTCs with similar configurations. A TSO applicant may use similarity assessment and worst-case test conditions Lo minimize the EQT required for subsequent functional TSO applications or aircraft TC/STC/A TC/ ASTC. Your use of the environmental qualification data should be accompanied by a rational engineering analysis of the differences between hardware and software configuration used during the original environmental tests a11d the proposed new configuration. The engineering analysis may consider worst-case environmental limits developed above.

5. The functional TSO qualification data sheet should state explicitly the RTCA/DO-l 60F test categories and tests performed in the functional TSO configuration and the test categories and tests perfom1ed in the TSO-Cl 53 configuration. Include this information in the installation instructions.

10/20/10 Appendix A

6. Hardware modules and software components providing a function that lacks an applicable functional TSO must meet the TC/STC/ATC/ ASTC environmental requirements. See § 2 1.3 1.

7. You must evaluate all hardware elements before installation lo ensure that the TC/STC/ A TC/ASTC environmental requirements have been satisfied. See § 21.31.

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