AC 25-28 Compliance of Transport Category Airplanes with Certification Requirements for Flight in Icing Conditions
This advisory circular (AC) describes an acceptable means of showing compliance with the supercooled large drop condition requirements of § 25.773, Pilot compartment view, § 25.1323, Airspeed indicating system, § 25.1324 Angle of attack system and § 25.1325, Static pressure system, as well as the requirements of § 25.1419, Ice protection, and § 25.1420, Supercooled large drop icing conditions, of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25. Part 25 contains the certification requirements for transport category airplanes. The compliance means described in this document are intended as guidance. They are meant to supplement the engineering judgment that must form the basis of any compliance findings for the supercooled large drop icing conditions in §§ 25.773, 25.1323, 25.1324, and 25.1325, as well as the compliance findings for §§ 25.1419 and 25.1420.
COVER PAGE
0 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration
Advisory
Circular
Subject: Compliance of Transport Category Airplanes with Certification Requirements for Flight in Icing Conditions
Date: 10/27114
Initiated By: ANM-11 0
AC No: 25-28
This advisory circular (AC) describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with the supercooled large drop condition requirements of§ 25.773, Pilot compartment view,§ 25.1323, Airspeed indicating system, § 25.1324, Angle ofattack system, and § 25.1325, Static pressure systems, as well as the requirements of§ 25.1419, Ice protection, and§ 25.1420, Supercooled large drop icing conditions, of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25. Part 25 contains the certification requirements for transport category airplanes. The compliance means described in this document are intended as guidance. They are meant to supplement the engineering judgment that must form the basis of any compliance findings for the supercooled large drop icing conditions in§§ 25.773, 25.1323, 25.1324, and 25.1325, as well as the compliance findings for§§ 25.1419 and 25.1420.
If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the feedback form at the end of this AC.
Michael Kaszycki Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service
Contents
Paragraph Page
ii
1 Purpose … 1
2 Applicability … 1
3 Cancellation … 3
4 Background … 3
CONTENTS › 5 Definition of Terms
5 Definition of Terms … 3
5.1 Advisory Ice Detection System … 3
5.2 Airframe Icing … 3
5.3 Anti-Icing … 3
5.4 Appendix C Icing Conditions … 4
5.5 Appendix O Icing Conditions … 4
5.6 Artificial Ice … 4
5.7 Automatic Cycling Mode … 4
5.8 Deicing … 4
5.9 Drizzle Drop … 4
5.10 Freezing Drizzle (FZDZ) … 4
5.11 Freezing Precipitation … 4
5.12 Freezing Rain (FZRA) … 4
5.13 Glaciated Icing Conditions … 4
5.14 Ice Protection System (IPS) … 4
5.15 Icing Conditions … 4
5.16 Icing Conditions Detector … 5
5.17 Irreversible Flight Controls … 5
5.18 Liquid Water Content (LWC) … 5
5.19 Mean Effective Diameter (MED) … 5
5.20 Median Mass Dimension (MMD) … 5
5.21 Median Volume Diameter (MVD) … 5
5.22 Migrating Ice … 5
5.23 Mixed Phase Icing Conditions … 5
5.24 Monitored Surface … 6
5.25 Primary Ice Detection System … 6
CONTENTS › 10 Critical Ice Shapes
Contents (continued)
Paragraph Page
iii
5.26 Rain Drop … 6
5.27 Reference Surface … 6
5.28 Reversible Flight Controls … 6
5.29 Runback Ice … 6
5.30 Simulated Ice … 7
5.31 Static Air Temperature … 7
5.32 Substantiated Visual Cue … 7
5.33 Supercooled Large Drops (SLD) … 7
5.34 Supercooled Water … 7
5.35 Water Catch … 7
6 Icing Envelopes … 7
6.1 The Appendix O Environment … 7
6.2 Use of Icing Envelopes … 10
7 Certification Plan … 13
8 Analysis … 14
8.1 Analytical Simulation Methods … 14
8.2 Substantiating Icing Simulation Analytical Tools … 14
8.3 Analysis of Areas and Components to be Protected … 14
8.4 Flutter Analysis … 15
8.5 Power Sources … 15
8.6 Failure Analyses … 15
8.7 Similarity Analyses … 18
8.8 Impingement Limit Analyses … 19
8.9 Ice Shedding Analyses … 19
8.10 Propeller Deicing Analysis … 20
8.11 Airspeed Indication and Static Pressure System Ice Protection … 20
8.12 Stall Warning System and Angle-of-Attack Ice Protection … 21
8.13 Runback Ice … 22
9 Simulated Ice Shapes and Roughness … 22
10 Critical Ice Shapes … 23
CONTENTS › Appendix C. Example of Certification to 25.1420(a)(1) Using Visual Cues
Contents (continued)
Paragraph Page
iv
11 Compliance Tests (Flight/Simulation) … 23
12 Certification with § 25.1420 … 32
12.1 Certification with §§ 25.1420(a)(1) and 25.1420(a)(2) … 32
12.2 Certification to § 25.1420(a)(3) … 37
13 Pneumatic Deicer Boots … 37
14 Emergency and Abnormal Operating Conditions … 37
15 Ice and Icing Conditions Detection Systems … 37
15.1 Compliance with § 25.1419(e)(1) and (e)(2) … 37
15.2 Compliance with § 25.1419(e)(3) … 41
15.3 Compliance with § 25.1419(f) … 42
15.4 Compliance with § 25.1419(g) … 42
15.5 Compliance with § 25.1420(a)(1) or (a)(2) … 43
16 Performing Intended Functions in Icing … 44
16.1 Engines and Equipment … 44
16.2 Engine Alternate Induction Air Sources … 44
16.3 Fuel System Venting … 44
16.4 Landing Gear … 44
16.5 Primary and Secondary Flight Control Surfaces … 44
16.6 Ram Air Turbine … 44
17 Ice Inspection Light(s) … 44
18 Caution Information … 45
19 Airplane Flight Manual … 46
19.1 Operating Limitations Section … 46
19.2 Operating Procedures Section … 46
20 Guidance for Amended Type Certificates and Supplemental Type Certificates … 48
21 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness … 48
Appendix A. Related Regulations and Documents … A-1
Appendix B. History of Icing Certification Rules … B-1
Appendix C. Example of Certification to 25.1420(a)(1) Using Visual Cues … C-1
CONTENTS › Tables
Contents (continued)
Paragraph Page
v
Appendix D. Guidance for Amended Type Certificates and Supplemental Type Certificates .. D-1
Appendix E. Capabilities of Engineering Tools for Compliance with Part 25, Appendix O Requirements … E-1
Appendix F. Acronyms … F-1
Tables
Table 1. Freezing Drizzle Drop Size Distributions Represented Using 10 Bins … 11
Table 2. Freezing Rain Drop Size Distributions Represented Using 10 Bins … 12
Table A-1. Related Regulations … A-1
Table A-2. Related Advisory Circulars … A-3
Table A-3. Related Industry Documents … A-5
Table E-1. Assessment of Appendix O Engineering Tool Capabilities … E-2
Table E-2. Appendix O Icing Standard Roughness … E-12
Table F-1. Acronyms and Definitions … F-1
2 APPLICABILITY. › 2.3 This material in this AC does not change or create any additional…
1 PURPOSE.
1.1 This AC describes an acceptable means for showing compliance with the supercooled large drop condition requirements of § 25.773, Pilot compartment view, § 25.1323, Airspeed indicating system, § 25.1324, Angle of attack system, and § 25.1325, Static pressure systems, as well as the requirements of § 25.1419, Ice protection, and § 25.1420, Supercooled large drop icing conditions, of 14 CFR part 25. Part 25 contains the certification requirements for transport category airplanes. The compliance means described in this document are intended as guidance. They are meant to supplement the engineering judgment that must form the basis of any compliance findings for the supercooled large drop icing conditions in §§ 25.773, 25.1323, 25.1324, and 25.1325, as well as the compliance findings for §§ 25.1419 and 25.1420.
1.2 The following appendices appear at the end of this AC:
• Appendix A, Related Regulations and Documents.
• Appendix B, History of Icing Certification Rules.
• Appendix C, Example of Certification to § 25.1420(a)(1) Using Visual Cues.
• Appendix D, Guidance for Amended Type Certificates and Supplemental Type Certificates.
• Appendix E, Capabilities of Engineering Tools for Compliance with Appendix O Requirements of Part 25.
• Appendix F, Acronyms.
2 APPLICABILITY.
2.1 This AC provides guidance directed to airplane manufacturers, modifiers, foreign regulatory authorities, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airplane type certification engineers and their designees. This guidance applies to certification of part 25 transport category airplanes for flight in icing conditions.
2.2 This material in this AC is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. It describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations. The FAA will consider other methods of demonstrating compliance that an applicant may elect to present. While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience. If, however, we become aware of circumstances that convince us that following this AC would not result in compliance with the applicable regulations, we will not be bound by the terms of this AC, and we may require additional substantiation or design changes as a basis for finding compliance.
2.3 This material in this AC does not change or create any additional regulatory requirements, nor does it authorize changes in, or permit deviations from, regulatory requirements.
2 APPLICABILITY. › 2.7 This AC contains information on flight tests for ice protection…
2.4 The guidance provided in this AC applies to certification of part 25 transport category airplanes for flight in icing conditions. If certification for flight in icing conditions is desired, the airplane must be able to safely operate throughout the icing envelope defined in 14 CFR part 25, Appendix C. Additional icing requirements in part 25 apply to airplanes for which at least one of the following applies—
• The airplane’s gross weight is less than 60,000 lbs, or
• The airplane is equipped with reversible flight controls.
2.5 Such an airplane, besides being able to operate safely in Appendix C icing conditions, must also be able to safely operate in or exit the icing conditions defined by 14 CFR part 25, Appendix O, Supercooled Large Drop Icing Conditions. The applicant, however, has several certification options available for Appendix O icing conditions. The airplane can be certified for—
2.5.1 The ability to detect Appendix O conditions and safely exit all icing conditions,
2.5.2 The ability to operate safely throughout a portion of Appendix O icing conditions and safely exit all icing conditions when that portion of Appendix O is exceeded, or
2.5.3 The ability to operate safely throughout all Appendix O icing conditions.
2.6 Sections 25.1419 and 25.1420 provide specific airframe requirements for certificating an airplane to operate in the icing conditions defined in Appendices C and O. Additionally, for other parts of the airplane (i.e., engine, engine inlet, propeller), there are more specific icing requirements and associated guidance. These are contained in the regulations and ACs listed in Appendix A of this AC. Some icing-related regulations must be complied with even if the airplane is not certificated for flight in icing. The following are examples:
2.7 This AC contains information on flight tests for ice protection certification. Additional information on flight tests for showing compliance with the airplane performance and handling qualities requirements for icing certification may be found in AC 25-25A, Performance and Handling Characteristics in Icing Conditions. AC 20-73A, Aircraft Ice Protection, also contains flight-in-icing approval guidance. The guidance in this AC is applicable to new type certificates (TCs), supplemental type certificates (STCs), and amendments to existing TCs for airplanes certified under part 4b of the Civil Air
5 DEFINITION OF TERMS. › 5.3 Anti-Icing.
Regulations (CAR) and under part 25, for which approval under the provisions of § 25.1419 is desired.
3 CANCELLATION. This AC cancels AC 25.1419-1A, Certification of Transport Category Airplanes for Flight in Icing Conditions, dated May 7, 2004, and AC 25.1419-2, Compliance with the Ice Protection Requirements of §§ 25.1419(e), (f), (g), and (h), dated October 27, 2009.
4 BACKGROUND. Before 1953, airplanes were certificated under part 04 of the Civil Air Regulations (CARs). The first icing rule, section 04.5814, stated that if deicer boots were installed on an airplane, positive means for deflation of all wing boots was required. There were no other references to an airplane ice protection system (IPS) in part 04. Part 4b of the CAR was codified on December 31, 1953, and it was subsequently recodified into 14 CFR part 25, effective February 1, 1965. Over the years, as our knowledge has increased about icing conditions and their effects on safe operation of airplanes, we have made changes to the regulations. A detailed history of icing certification requirements can be found in Appendix B of this AC.
5 DEFINITION OF TERMS. For purposes of this AC, the following definitions are used.
Note: These definitions of terms are intended for use only with respect to §§ 25.1419 and 25.1420.
5.1 Advisory Ice Detection System. A system that advises the flightcrew of the presence of ice accretion or icing conditions. An advisory ice detection system can only be used in conjunction with other means (most commonly, visual observation by the flightcrew) to determine the need for, or timing of, activating the anti-icing or deicing system. When using an advisory ice detection system, the flightcrew is responsible for monitoring icing conditions or ice accretion as defined in the airplane flight manual (AFM), typically using total air temperature and visible moisture criteria or visible ice accretion. The flightcrew is responsible for activating the anti-icing or deicing system(s).
5.2 Airframe Icing. Ice accretion on the airplane, except for on the propulsion system.
5.3 Anti-Icing. Prevention of ice accretions on a protected surface either by evaporating the impinging water, or allowing the impinging water to run back and off the protected surface or freeze on non-critical areas.
5 DEFINITION OF TERMS. › 5.15 Icing Conditions.
5.4 Appendix C Icing Conditions. The environmental conditions defined in Appendix C of 14 CFR part 25.
5.5 Appendix O Icing Conditions. The environmental conditions defined in Appendix O of 14 CFR part 25.
5.6 Artificial Ice. Real ice formed by artificial or simulated means, such as by a spray rig in a tunnel or behind an icing tanker.
5.7 Automatic Cycling Mode. A mode of operation of the airframe deicing system that provides repetitive cycles of the system without the need for the pilot to select each cycle. This is generally done with a timer, and there may be more than one timing mode.
5.8 Deicing. Removing or the process of removing an ice accretion after it has formed on a surface.
5.9 Drizzle Drop. A drop of water measuring 100 to 500 micrometers, or microns (µm), (0.1 – 0.5 mm) in diameter.
5.10 Freezing Drizzle (FZDZ). Supercooled drizzle drops that remain in liquid form and freeze on contact with objects colder than 0 °C.
5.11 Freezing Precipitation. Any form of supercooled liquid precipitation that freezes on impact with the ground or exposed objects colder than 0 °C—freezing rain or freezing drizzle.
5.12 Freezing Rain (FZRA). Supercooled rain drops that remain in liquid form and freeze on contact with objects colder than 0 °C.
5.13 Glaciated Icing Conditions. Icing conditions in which only ice crystals are present.
5.14 Ice Protection System (IPS). A system that protects certain critical airplane parts from ice accretion.
5.15 Icing Conditions. The presence of atmospheric moisture and temperature conducive to airplane icing.
5 DEFINITION OF TERMS. › 5.23 Mixed Phase Icing Conditions.
5.16 Icing Conditions Detector. A device that detects the presence of atmospheric moisture and temperature conducive to airplane icing.
5.17 Irreversible Flight Controls. Flight controls in the normal operating configuration that have force or motion originating at the airplane’s control surface (through aerodynamic loads, static imbalance, or trim or servo tab inputs, for example) that is transmitted to the actuator and its mounting. The force or motion cannot be transmitted directly back to the flight deck controls. This term refers to flight controls in which all of the force necessary to move the pitch, roll, or yaw control surfaces is provided by hydraulic or electric actuators, the motion of which is controlled by signals from the flight deck controls.
5.18 Liquid Water Content (LWC). The total mass of water contained in liquid drops within a unit volume of air, usually given in units of grams of water per cubic meter (g/m3).
5.19 Mean Effective Diameter (MED). The calculated drop diameter that divides the total liquid water content present in the drop size distribution in half. Half the water volume will be in larger drops and half the volume in smaller drops. This value is calculated, as opposed to measuring actual drop size. The MED is based on an assumed Langmuir drop size distribution. The fact that it is a calculated measurement is how it differs from median volume diameter, which is based on actual drop size.
5.20 Median Mass Dimension (MMD). The particle size (sphere or equivalent mass) that divides the total ice mass present in an ice particle distribution in half. Half the ice mass is in larger particles and half the ice mass is in smaller particles.
5.21 Median Volume Diameter (MVD). The drop diameter that divides the total liquid water content present in the drop distribution in half. Half the water volume will be in larger drops and half the volume in smaller drops. This value is obtained by actual drop size measurements.
5.22 Migrating Ice. Ice resulting from the down-stream migration and build up of ice from wet protected surfaces to areas that cool sufficiently for the migrating ice to adhere to the surface.
5.23 Mixed Phase Icing Conditions. Icing conditions in which both ice crystals and supercooled liquid water drops are present.
5 DEFINITION OF TERMS. › 5.29 Runback Ice.
5.24 Monitored Surface. The surface of concern regarding the ice hazard (for example, the leading edge of a wing). Ice accretion on the monitored surface may be measured directly or correlated to ice accretion on a reference surface.
5.25 Primary Ice Detection System. A detection system used to determine when the IPS must be activated. This system announces the presence of ice accretion or icing conditions, and it may also provide information to other airplane systems. A primary automatic system automatically activates the anti-icing or deicing IPS. A primary manual system requires the flightcrew to activate the anti-icing or deicing IPS on indication from the primary ice detection system.
5.26 Rain Drop. A drop of water greater than 500 µm (0.5 mm) in diameter.
5.27 Reference Surface. The observed surface used as a reference for the presence of ice on the monitored surface. The reference surface may be observed directly or indirectly. Ice must occur on the reference surface before—or at the same time—it appears on the monitored surface. Examples of reference surfaces include windshield wiper blades or bolts, windshield posts, ice evidence probes, the propeller spinner, and the surface of ice detectors. The reference surface may also be the monitored surface.
5.28 Reversible Flight Controls. Flight controls in the normal operating configuration that have force or motion originating at the airplane’s control surface (through aerodynamic loads, static imbalance, or trim or servo tab inputs, for example) that is transmitted back to flight deck controls. This term refers to flight deck controls connected to the pitch, roll, or yaw control surfaces by direct mechanical linkages, cables, or push-pull rods in such a way that pilot effort produces motion or force about the hinge line.
5.28.1 Aerodynamically Boosted Flight Controls. Reversible flight control systems that employ a movable tab on the trailing edge of the main control surface linked to the pilot’s controls or to the structure in such a way as to produce aerodynamic forces that move, or help to move, the surface. Among the various forms are flying tabs, geared or servo tabs, and spring tabs.
5.28.2 Power-Assisted Flight Controls. Reversible flight control systems in which some means is provided, usually a hydraulic actuator, to apply force to a control surface in addition to that supplied by the pilot to enable large surface deflections to be obtained at high speeds.
5.29 Runback Ice. Ice formed from the freezing or refreezing of water leaving one area on an airplane surface that is above freezing temperature and flowing downwind to another area that is
6.1 The Appendix O Environment. › 6.1.3 Section 25.1420 requires compliance with § 25.1420(a)(1), (a)(2),…
sufficiently cooled for freezing (or refreezing) to take place. This ice type is frequently an unwanted product of thermal deicing systems.
5.30 Simulated Ice. Ice shapes fabricated from wood, epoxy, or other materials by any construction technique.
5.31 Static Air Temperature. The air temperature that would be measured by a temperature sensor that is not in motion in relation to that air. This temperature is also referred to in other documents as “outside air temperature,” “true outside temperature,” or “ambient temperature.”
5.32 Substantiated Visual Cue. Ice accretion on the airplane’s protected surface or on a reference surface that has been demonstrated by testing to correlate with ice accretion on a monitored surface.
5.33 Supercooled Large Drops (SLD). Supercooled liquid water that includes freezing rain or freezing drizzle.
5.34 Supercooled Water. Liquid water at a temperature below the freezing point of 0 °C.
5.35 Water Catch. The amount of water that strikes an airplane surface.
6 ICING ENVELOPES.
6.1 The Appendix O Environment.
6.1.1 The conditions included in the part 25, Appendix C, icing envelopes are unchanged by the addition of Appendix O. For details on the Appendix C icing envelopes, see AC 20-73A, Aircraft Ice Protection, and FAA Technical Report DOT/FAA/CT-88/8-1, Aircraft Icing Handbook. Appendix O was developed to define a representative icing environment for supercooled large drops. Supercooled large drops, which include freezing drizzle and freezing rain conditions, are not included in Appendix C.
6.1.2 Section 25.1420 requires that the airplane operate safely in the supercooled large drop icing conditions defined in part 25, Appendix O. This section is applicable to airplanes for which either of the following applies—
6.1.2.1 The airplane’s maximum gross weight is less than 60,000 pounds, or
6.1.2.2 The airplane is equipped with reversible flight controls.
6.1.3 Section 25.1420 requires compliance with § 25.1420(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). When complying with § 25.1420(a)(1), the applicant must provide a method for detecting that
6.1.4 Appendix O defines freezing drizzle and freezing rain… › 6.1.4.3 Freezing rain environment with an MVD less than 40 µm.
the airplane is operating in Appendix O icing conditions. Following detection, the airplane must be capable of operating safely while exiting all icing conditions. If the applicant seeks certification for safe operation in portions of Appendix O conditions, such as freezing drizzle only, or during specific phases of flight, § 25.1420(a)(2) applies. If this option is chosen, following detection of conditions that exceed the selected portion of Appendix O, the airplane must be capable of operating safely while exiting all icing conditions. Certification for a portion of Appendix O (§ 25.1420(a)(2)) or none of Appendix O (§ 25.1420(a)(1)) requires substantiated methods of alerting the flightcrew when those portions of Appendix O are exceeded (§ 25.1420(a)(2)) or when Appendix O conditions are encountered (§ 25.1420(a)(1)). Section 25.1420(a)(3) applies when the applicant seeks certification for all of the icing conditions described in Appendix O. An airplane certified to § 25.1420(a)(3) must be capable of safely operating throughout the conditions described in Appendix O and does not need a means to detect Appendix O conditions. In effect, when § 25.1420(a)(3) is chosen, the airplane is certificated for flight in icing without any specific AFM procedures or limitations to exit icing conditions.
Note: While this AC provides guidance for compliance with § 25.1420(a)(2), further advancements in engineering tools may be necessary before an applicant is able to substantiate compliance with this option. A 2009 review of engineering tool capabilities found that current technology does not support distinguishing between freezing drizzle and freezing rain in flight. Therefore, certification for a portion of Appendix O will be challenging and will require close coordination with certifying authorities. Consult Appendix E of this AC for additional details on engineering tool capabilities.
6.1.4 Appendix O defines freezing drizzle and freezing rain environments by using four spectra of drop sizes with associated liquid water content (LWC) limits. An FAA detailed report on the development of Appendix O is available from the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center (see FAA Technical Report DOT/FAA/AR-09/10, Data and Analysis for the Development of an Engineering Standard for Supercooled Large Drop Conditions, dated March 2009). Following are the four drop size spectra:
6.1.4.1 Freezing drizzle environment with a median volume diameter (MVD) less than 40 microns (µm). In addition to drizzle drops, which are defined as measuring 100 µm to 500 µm in diameter, this environment contains drops less than 100 µm, with a sufficient number of drops less than 40 µm so the MVD is less than 40 µm.
6.1.4.2 Freezing drizzle environment with an MVD greater than 40 µm. In addition to freezing drizzle drops, this environment contains smaller drops, with diameters less than 100 µm.
6.1.4.3 Freezing rain environment with an MVD less than 40 µm. In addition to freezing rain drops, which are defined as measuring more than 500 µm in diameter, this environment also contains smaller drops of less than 500 µm with a sufficient number of drops less than 40 µm so the MVD is less than 40 µm.
6.1 The Appendix O Environment. › 6.1.9 Liquid water content maximum values for freezing drizzle and…
6.1.4.4 Freezing rain environment with an MVD greater than 40 µm. In addition to freezing rain drops, this environment also contains smaller drops of less than 100 µm.
6.1.5 Initial certification for flight in a portion of Appendix O conditions will likely include all of freezing drizzle or all of freezing rain. Such certification could be restricted to operation in Appendix O conditions by phase of flight. Certification for flight in a portion of Appendix O conditions depends on the applicant substantiating an acceptable way for the flightcrew to distinguish the portion of Appendix O conditions for which the airplane is certified from the portion of Appendix O conditions for which the airplane is not approved. Certification for a portion of Appendix O allows latitude for certification with a range of techniques. Ice shapes will need to be developed to test for the portion of the envelope for which the airplane is approved, as well as for detecting and exiting icing conditions beyond the selected portion.
6.1.6 Ice shapes developed using the approved portion of the icing envelope should account for the range of drop distribution and water content and consider the proposed method for identifying icing conditions that must be exited. The definition of the certificated portion of Appendix O for a particular airplane should be based on measured characteristics of the selected icing environment and be consistent with methods used for developing Appendix O.
6.1.7 Water content versus drop size relationships defined in Appendix C, figures 1 and 4, are defined in terms of mean effective diameter. Part 25 does not require consideration of specific distributions for Appendix C icing conditions. As referenced in FAA Technical Report DOT/FAA/CT-88/8-1 and AC 20-73A, single mode distributions such as Langmuir distributions have been used to represent the range of drop sizes and water content associated with a specific Appendix C icing condition.
6.1.8 The distributions assumed for Appendix C icing conditions are not appropriate for freezing precipitation icing conditions. This is because these icing conditions often consist of small and large drops that are bi-modally distributed. Langmuir type distributions cannot capture the bi-modal characteristic. Consequently, distributions of drop sizes are defined as part of Appendix O. The need to include distributions comes from the fact that a larger percentage of the cloud’s total water mass is contained in the larger diameter drops of Appendix O. The water mass of larger drops affects the water catch on airplane components. It also affects drop impingement, icing limits, and the ice build-up shape. Ice accretions resulting from the water catch must be considered for their effects on safe flight of the airplane.
6.1.9 Liquid water content maximum values for freezing drizzle and freezing rain decrease as temperature decreases. This is defined in Appendix O, figures 1 and 4, respectively. Appendix O values of total liquid water follow the same standard as those in Appendix C. They represent liquid water content for a horizontal extent distance of 17.4 nautical miles (20 statute miles).
6.2 Use of Icing Envelopes. › 6.2.2 Applications of drop size distributions typically require a bin…
6.1.10 The maximum vertical extent distance of 12,000 feet for freezing drizzle includes the cloud layer and all drizzle precipitation below the cloud that is within 12,000 feet of the cloud top. The maximum altitude of freezing drizzle is the same as that for an Appendix C continuous maximum icing cloud—22,000 feet (Appendix O, figure 3). Temperatures range to as low as -13 °F (-25 °C).
6.1.11 The maximum vertical extent distance for freezing rain is 7,000 feet. The maximum altitude of freezing rain is 12,000 feet. Temperatures range to as low as 8.6 °F (-13 °C).
6.1.12 It is not appropriate to use the United States Standard Atmosphere Temperature Lapse Rate with Altitude for freezing drizzle and freezing rain. Typically, freezing rain is associated with temperature inversions. Freezing drizzle is associated with other deviations from the standard lapse rate. When generating ice shapes associated with vertical transits through freezing drizzle and freezing rain, the critical temperature should be determined and used for the duration of the vertical exposure.
6.1.13 Liquid water content of continuous freezing drizzle and freezing rain decreases as the length of the precipitation area, or its horizontal extent, increases. The horizontal extent of an airplane’s exposure to freezing drizzle and freezing rain can be anywhere from a brief encounter to an extended one. An “f-factor” is used in Appendix O to calculate liquid water content per cubic meter based on the length of the cloud (its horizontal extent). The f-factor used in Appendix O is the same as is used in Appendix C for these calculations. This f-factor is discussed in appendix N of AC 20-73A.
6.2 Use of Icing Envelopes.
6.2.1 AC 20-73A addresses the use of Appendix C. Use of Appendix C is not changed by the addition of Appendix O. Appendix O is designed to be similar to Appendix C and to be used in much the same manner. The principal differences between using Appendix O and using Appendix C are that for Appendix O, the applicant must now—
6.2.1.1 Consider four icing conditions rather than two when determining critical icing conditions, and
6.2.1.2 Address drop size distributions.
6.2.2 Applications of drop size distributions typically require a bin tabulation of the proportion of mass (liquid water content) to drop diameter. Table 1 and table 2, which follow, represent 10-bin tabulations for the cumulative distributions in Appendix O. Mass proportions for the bins were selected to provide a reasonable resolution of the upper range of the distributions. The shaded columns (a) and (b) in the tables contain values typically used as input to ice accretion computer codes. For some simulation techniques, different methods of segregating the bins may be appropriate.
Table 1. Freezing Drizzle Drop Size Distributions Represented Using 10 Bins
Freezing Drizzle Environment
with MVD<40 μm
Freezing Drizzle Environment with
MVD>40 μm
(a) (b) (b)
Bin
Proportion
of Mass
Left Boundary
Point
(μm)
Mass- Weighted
Midpoint
(μm)
Right Boundary
Point
(μm)
Left Boundary
Point
(μm)
Mass- Weighted
Midpoint
(μm)
Right Boundary
Point
(μm)
1 0.100 1 9 10 1 11 15
2 0.200 10 13 16 15 22 36
3 0.200 16 18 20 36 64 106
4 0.200 20 23 27 106 150 197
5 0.100 27 29 33 197 221 247
6 0.050 33 36 40 247 261 276
7 0.050 40 48 66 276 292 309
8 0.050 66 97 137 309 330 354
9 0.025 137 163 202 354 370 390
10 0.025 202 252 388 390 417 473
Note: Drop size distributions in one-micron-drop bin resolution are available in electronic files from the William J. Hughes Technical Center.
6.2 Use of Icing Envelopes. › 6.2.4 An additional effect of the supercooled large drop environment is…
Table 2. Freezing Rain Drop Size Distributions Represented Using 10 Bins
Freezing Rain Environment with
MVD < 40 μm
Freezing Rain Environment with
MVD > 40 μm
(a) (b) (b)
Bin
Proportion
of Mass
Left Boundary
Point
(μm)
Mass- Weighted
Midpoint
(μm)
Right Boundary
Point
(μm)
Left Boundary
Point
(μm)
Mass- Weighted
Midpoint
(μm)
Right Boundary
Point
(μm)
1 0.100 1 7 8 1 9 14
2 0.200 8 10 12 14 35 236
3 0.200 12 15 19 236 399 526
4 0.200 19 25 53 526 645 765
5 0.100 53 255 468 765 833 912
6 0.050 468 534 595 912 957 1008
7 0.050 595 655 718 1008 1066 1129
8 0.050 718 792 883 1129 1197 1288
9 0.025 883 942 1034 1288 1345 1420
10 0.025 1034 1191 1553 1420 1545 2228
Note: Drop size distributions in one-micron-drop bin resolution are available in electronic files from the William J. Hughes Technical Center.
6.2.3 When compared with the Langmuir distributions of drop sizes commonly associated with Appendix C clouds, Appendix O drop size distributions have much larger drop sizes and a larger percentage of the total water mass in large drop sizes. The liquid water contents associated with icing conditions in Appendix O are different from those associated with Appendix C. These differences may affect water collection efficiency. They may result in impingement limits that are further aft for Appendix O icing conditions than they are for Appendix C icing conditions. For more discussion of the effects of drop size and trajectory influence, see FAA Technical Report DOT/FAA/CT-88/8-1 and AC 20-73A.
6.2.4 An additional effect of the supercooled large drop environment is the variability in distribution of drop sizes. Ice shapes developed to simulate Appendix C icing
7 CERTIFICATION PLAN. › 7.9 If the IPS or icing detection system contains complex electronic…
conditions are sometimes calculated by using a monodispersed drop distribution. This is because predicted main ice shapes are not highly sensitive to commonly assumed distributions for Appendix C (such as the Langmuir distributions). In a monodispersed drop distribution, all drop diameters are assumed to be equal to the MVD. The large variations of drop size and the larger percentages of water in the larger drops defined by Appendix O tend to magnify effects of distributed drop sizes. This may be reflected in the main ice shape and in runback ice characteristics.
7 CERTIFICATION PLAN. At the start of the design and development of an airplane, the applicant should submit a certification plan that addresses the IPS to the appropriate FAA aircraft certification office (ACO) for approval. This certification plan should include the following basic information:
7.1 A general description of the airplane that includes dimensions, airworthiness limitations, and other data that may be relevant to the airplane’s IPS.
7.2 Description of the IPS.
7.3 A compliance checklist addressing each section of part 25 applicable to the IPS.
7.4 Identification of the certification methods for each applicable section of part 25, including a description of analyses and tests or references to similarity of designs, that the applicant intends to use for certifying the IPS. The applicant and the FAA should agree on these compliance means early in the certification program and before certification testing begins.
7.5 A failure hazard assessment to determine the criticality of the system.
7.6 If the ice protection or detection system contains software, software plans as described in Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (or another acceptable means of compliance for software).
7.7 Projected schedules of design, analyses, testing, and reporting.
7.8 A list of any anomalous results from completed icing certification tests (relevant to the requirements of 14 CFR 33.68 and 33.77) that will require special operating procedures unless this information is provided in a separate certification document or other airworthiness approved documentation.
7.9 If the IPS or icing detection system contains complex electronic hardware (such as programmable logic devices or application-specific integrated circuits), plans for providing a level of design assurance for these devices commensurate with their potential contribution to airplane hazards and system failures. Such hazards or failures could result from electronic hardware faults or malfunctions. The applicant should consult RTCA DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware,
8 ANALYSIS. › 8.3 Analysis of Areas and Components to be Protected.
and RTCA DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, on how to provide design assurance for these devices.
8 ANALYSIS. The applicant should prepare analyses to substantiate the choice of ice protection equipment for the airplane. Such analyses should clearly state the basic protection required and assumptions made, and delineate the methods of analysis used. All analyses should be validated by tests or should have been validated by the applicant on a previous certification program. The applicant who uses a previously validated method should substantiate why that method is applicable to the new program.
8.1 Analytical Simulation Methods. Analytical simulation methods for icing include impingement and accretion models based on computational fluid dynamics (CFD). The applicant will typically use these methods to evaluate protected as well as unprotected areas for potential ice accretions. Analytical simulation provides a way to account for the variability in drop distributions. It also makes it possible to examine impingement in relation to visual icing cues and to analyze the location of detection devices for detrimental local flow effects.
8.2 Substantiating Icing Simulation Analytical Tools.
8.2.1 The substantiation process for icing simulation analytical tools, such as icing codes and cross comparisons, should be made with data derived from using other types of tools to show that the analytical simulation results are equivalent or conservative. Other types of test data that the icing simulation analytical tool data could be compared with are:
• Natural icing flight test data.
• Tanker test data.
• Icing tunnel data.
• Icing tunnel data.
8.2.2 Results of analysis with icing codes, as well as results of icing tunnel tests and tanker tests, should be compared to results of natural icing flight tests in Appendix C conditions that are required by § 25.1419. Engineering judgment is required when evaluating these comparisons because most simulation tools are steady-state simulations and they will be compared with tests made in natural icing conditions, which are variable. See AC 20-73A for additional guidance about substantiating icing simulation tools. The guidance in this paragraph applies to airframe, engine, and propeller icing tools for Appendix C and the applicable portion of Appendix O.
8.3 Analysis of Areas and Components to be Protected. In evaluating the airplane’s ability to operate safely in Appendix C icing conditions and relevant icing conditions of Appendix O, and in determining which components will be protected, the applicant should examine those areas listed in AC 20-73A to determine the degree of protection required. An applicant may determine that protection is not
8.6 Failure Analyses. › 8.6.1 Failure Analysis for § 25.1419 (Appendix C Conditions).
required for one or more of these areas or components. If so, the applicant’s analysis should include the supporting data and rationale for allowing those areas or components to remain unprotected. The applicant should show that the lack of protection does not adversely affect handling characteristics or performance of the airplane, as required by § 25.21(g). The applicant must also show that the lack of protection does not affect the operation and functioning of affected systems and equipment (e.g., pitot probes). Accessory cooling air intakes that face the airstream could become restricted with ice accretion. Inlets (including National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) inlets) that do not accrete ice in Appendix C conditions may accrete ice in Appendix O conditions.
8.4 Flutter Analysis. AC 25.629-1B, Aeroelastic Stability Substantiation of Transport Category Airplanes, provides guidance for showing compliance with § 25.629. For airplanes approved for operation in icing conditions, that AC addresses nominal configurations with ice accumulations on unprotected surfaces as well as ice accumulations resulting from any single failure in the deicing system or any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. AC 25.629-1B also provides guidance for consideration of inadvertent encounters with icing for airplanes not certificated for flight in icing conditions, as required by § 25.629(d)(3). Flutter analyses should reflect all mass accumulations of ice on protected and unprotected surfaces from exposure to Appendix C and Appendix O conditions in accordance with the guidance in AC 25.629-1B. This includes any accretions that could develop on control surfaces.
8.5 Power Sources. The applicant should evaluate the power sources in the IPS design (e.g., electrical, bleed air, and pneumatic sources). An electrical load analysis or test should be conducted on each power source to determine that it is adequate to operate the IPS as well as to supply all other essential electrical loads for the airplane throughout the airplane flight envelope. The effect of an IPS component failure on availability of power to other essential loads should be evaluated in accordance with § 25.1309. All power sources affecting engines or engine IPSs for multi-engine airplanes must comply with the engine isolation requirements of § 25.903(b).
8.6 Failure Analyses.
8.6.1 Failure Analysis for § 25.1419 (Appendix C Conditions). AC 25.1309-1A, System Design Analysis, provides guidance for demonstrating compliance with § 25.1309. The hazard classifications of IPS failure conditions are typically substantiated with analyses and/or testing. A failure analysis should include the potential contribution of complex electronic hardware faults and malfunctions to system failure conditions. It should also classify the hardware assurance level appropriately, as outlined in RTCA DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware. For purposes of a quantitative analysis, the probability of encountering Appendix C icing conditions is considered “1.”
8.6.2.1 Hazard Classification. › 8.6.2.1.4 While definitive statistics are not available, a historical…
8.6.2 Failure Analysis for § 25.1420 (Appendix O Conditions). Applying the system safety principles of § 25.1309 is helpful in determining the need for system requirements to address potential hazards from an Appendix O icing environment. The following addresses application of the § 25.1309 principles to Appendix O conditions and may be used for showing compliance with § 25.1309.
8.6.2.1 Hazard Classification.
8.6.2.1.1 Assessing a hazard classification for compliance with § 25.1309 is typically a process combining quantitative and qualitative factors. If the design is new and novel and has little similarity to previous designs, a hazard classification based on past experience may not be appropriate. If the new design is derivative in nature, the assessment can consider the icing event history of similarly designed airplanes, and, if applicable, the icing event histories of all conventionally designed airplanes. The applicant should consider specific effects of supercooled large drop icing when assessing similarity to previous designs (see paragraph 12.1.4, Some Areas of Interest for Appendix O).
8.6.2.1.2 Qualitative analysis may be used to determine the hazard classification for an unannunciated encounter with Appendix O icing conditions. The analysis can be applied to airplanes shown to be similar to previous designs with respect to Appendix O icing effects, and to which the icing event histories of all conventionally designed airplanes are applicable. The following assumptions may be used to support the qualitative analysis:
8.6.2.1.2.1 The airplane is certificated to either detect Appendix O icing conditions and safely exit all icing after detection of Appendix O icing conditions, or safely operate in a selected portion of Appendix O icing conditions and safely exit all icing after detection of Appendix O icing conditions beyond those for which it is certificated.
8.6.2.1.2.2 The unannunciated encounter is with Appendix O icing conditions in which the airplane has not been shown to operate safely.
8.6.2.1.2.3 The airframe and propulsion IPSs have been activated prior to the unannunciated encounter.
8.6.2.1.3 The applicant may use service history, design, and installation appraisals to support hazard classifications for § 25.1309. Service history may be appropriate to support a hazard classification if a new or derivative airplane has similar design features to a previously certificated airplane.
8.6.2.1.4 While definitive statistics are not available, a historical perspective can provide some guidance. Many airplanes flying through icing have been exposed to supercooled large drop conditions without the pilot being aware of it. The interval of exposure to the supercooled large drop
8.6.2 Failure Analysis for § 25.1420 (Appendix O Conditions). › 8.6.2.3 Numerical Safety Analysis.
conditions may have varied from a brief amount of time (such as could occur during a vertical transition through a cloud) to a more sustained exposure (such as during a hold). Severity of the exposure conditions in terms of water content may have varied significantly. Therefore, not all encounters with supercooled large drop conditions will result in a catastrophic event.
8.6.2.1.5 Icing event history of conventionally designed airplanes certificated before the introduction of § 25.1420. Given the volume of airplane operations and the number of reported incidents that did not result in a catastrophe, a factor of around 1 in 100 is a reasonable assumption of probability for a catastrophic event if an airplane encounters Appendix O conditions in which it has not been shown capable of safely operating. An applicant may assume that the hazard classification is severe major for an unannunciated encounter with Appendix O conditions while the IPS is activated, in accordance with AC 25.1309-1A, provided that both of the following are true: (1) the airplane is similar to previous designs with respect to Appendix O icing effects, and (2) the applicant can show that the icing event history of all conventionally designed airplanes is relevant to the airplane being considered for certification
8.6.2.1.6 If an airplane is not similar to a previous design, an assessment of the hazard classification may require more analysis or testing. One method of hazard assessment would be to consider effects of ice accumulations similar to those expected for airplanes being certified under § 25.1420. Such ice shapes may be defined from a combination of analysis and icing tanker or icing wind tunnel testing. Aerodynamic effects of such shapes could be evaluated with wind tunnel testing or, potentially, CFD. See AC 20-73A for additional guidance on assessing aerodynamic effects of ice build-ups. Hazard classification typically takes place early in a certification program. Therefore, a conservative assessment may be required until sufficient supporting data is available to reduce the hazard classification.
8.6.2.2 Probability of Encountering Appendix O Conditions. Appendix C was designed to include 99 percent of icing conditions. Therefore, the probability of encountering icing outside of Appendix C drop conditions is on the order of 10-2. The applicant may assume that the average probability for encountering Appendix O icing conditions is 1 x 10-2 per flight hour. This probability should not be reduced based on phase of flight.
8.6.2.3 Numerical Safety Analysis. For the purposes of a numerical safety analysis, the applicant may combine the probability of equipment failure with the probability, defined above, of encountering Appendix O icing conditions. If the applicant can support a hazard level of “hazardous,” using the above probability (10-2)
8.7 Similarity Analyses. › 8.7.3 Section 25.1419(b) requires flight testing in measured natural…
of encountering the specified supercooled large drop conditions, the probability of an unannunciated failure of the equipment that alerts the flightcrew to exit icing conditions should be less than 1 x 10-5.
8.6.2.4 Assessment of Visual Cues. Typical system safety analyses do not address the probability of flightcrew actions, such as observing a visual cue before performing a specified action. As advised in AC 25.1309-1A, quantitative assessments of flightcrew errors are not considered feasible. When visual cues are to be the method for detecting Appendix O conditions and determining when to exit them, the applicant should assess the appropriateness and reasonableness of the specific cues (see paragraph 12.1.3.2 of this AC for additional guidance). Reasonable tasks are those for which the applicant can take full credit because the tasks can realistically be anticipated to be performed correctly when required. The applicant should assess the task of visually detecting Appendix O conditions to determine if it could be performed when required. The workload for visually detecting icing conditions should be considered in combination with the operational workload during applicable phases of flight. The applicant may assume that the flightcrew is already aware that the airplane has encountered icing. The assessment of whether the task is appropriate and reasonable is limited to assessing the task of identifying Appendix O accumulations that require exiting from the icing conditions.
8.7 Similarity Analyses.
8.7.1 For certification based on similarity to other type-certificated airplanes previously approved for flight in icing conditions, the applicant should specify the airplane model and the component to which the reference of similarity applies. The applicant should show specific similarities in the areas of physical, functional, thermodynamic, pneumatic, and aerodynamic characteristics as well as in environmental exposure. The applicant should conduct analyses to show that component installation, operation, and effect on the airplane’s performance and handling are equivalent to that of the same or similar component in the previously approved configuration.
8.7.2 A demonstration of similarity requires an evaluation of both system and installation differences. Differences should be evaluated for their effect on IPS functionality and on safe flight in icing. If there is uncertainty about the effects of the differences, the applicant should conduct additional tests and/or analyses as necessary and appropriate to resolve the open issues.
8.7.3 Section 25.1419(b) requires flight testing in measured natural icing conditions. Flight test data from previous certification programs may be used to show compliance with § 25.1419(b) if the applicant can show that the data is applicable to the airplane in question. If there is uncertainty about the similarity analysis, the applicant should conduct flight tests in measured natural icing conditions for compliance with § 25.1419(b).
8.9 Ice Shedding Analyses. › 8.9.1 Airframe ice shedding may damage or erode engine or powerplant…
8.7.4 On derivative or new airplane designs, the applicant can use similarity to previous type designs shown to comply with § 25.1420 or airplanes that have shown compliance with § 25.1419 that have a successful service history, if the effects of differences are substantiated. Natural ice flight testing may not be necessary for a design shown to be similar. At a minimum, the following differences should be addressed:
• Airfoil size, shape, and angle of attack.
• IPS design.
• Operating altitude and airspeed.
• Center of gravity.
• Flight control system.
• Engine and propeller operation.
Note: The applicant must possess all the data to substantiate compliance with applicable regulations, including data from past certifications on which the similarity analysis is based.
8.8 Impingement Limit Analyses.
8.8.1 The applicant should prepare a drop trajectory and impingement analysis of—
• Wings,
• Horizontal and vertical stabilizers,
• Propellers, and
• All other critical surfaces on which ice may accrete.
8.8.2 This analysis should consider the various airplane operational configurations, phases of flight, and associated angles of attack. The analysis should establish upper and lower aft drop impingement limits that can then be used to establish the aft ice formation limit and its relationship to the IPS coverage.
8.9 Ice Shedding Analyses.
8.9.1 Airframe ice shedding may damage or erode engine or powerplant components as well as lifting, stabilizing, and flight control surface leading edges. Fan and compressor blades, impeller vanes, inlet screens and ducts, and propellers are examples of powerplant components subject to damage from shedding ice. For fuselage-mounted turbojet engines (and pusher propellers that are very close to the fuselage and well aft of the airplane’s nose), ice shedding from the forward fuselage and from the wings may cause significant damage. Ice shedding from components of the airplane, including antennas, should not cause damage to engines and propellers that would adversely affect engine operation or cause serious loss of power or thrust (compliance with § 25.1093). The applicant should also consider airplane damage that can be caused by ice shedding from the propellers.
8.9.2 Control surfaces such as elevators, ailerons, flaps, and spoilers, especially those constructed of thin metallic, nonmetallic, or composite materials, are also subject to damage. Currently available trajectory and impingement analyses may not adequately predict such damage. Unpredictable ice shedding paths from forward areas such as radomes and forward wings (canards) have been found to negate the results of these analyses. For this reason, a damage analysis should consider that the most critical ice shapes will shed and impact the areas of concern. For analysis of the radome as a potential airframe ice source, the applicant may use qualitative analysis of the design supported by similarity to previous design that has shown successful service history to have confidence that the historical methodology for certification represented by Table 1—Minimum Ice Slab Dimensions Based on Engine Inlet Size of § 33.77 is appropriate.
8.10 Propeller Deicing Analysis. The applicant should perform a propeller deicing analysis that—
8.10.1 Substantiates ice protection coverage in relation to chord length and span,
8.10.2 Substantiates the IPS power density, and
8.10.3 Considers the effect of inter-cycle ice accretions and potential for propeller efficiency degradation. Qualitative analysis of the design supported by similarity to prior designs with successful service histories in icing may be used to show compliance with this aspect.
8.11 Airspeed Indication and Static Pressure System Ice Protection.
8.11.1 Compliance with the minimum performance standard in Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C16a, Electrically Heated Pitot and Pitot-Static Tubes, is not sufficient by itself to show compliance with § 25.1323. Section 25.1323 requires a heated pitot probe or an equivalent means of preventing malfunction due to icing conditions specified in Appendix C, certain Appendix O icing conditions, and in specific mixed phase icing and ice crystal conditions. It is unlikely that the icing conditions critical to the equipment will be encountered during flight tests. Consequently, certification programs should supplement the icing flight tests with icing tunnel test and/or tanker test data, as necessary. In-service experience during severe atmospheric conditions has shown that use of pitot probes qualified to the older standards has resulted in airspeed fluctuations and even loss of indicated airspeed. However, similarity to a previous pitot probe installation with positive in-service history may be a consideration when showing compliance. Section 25.1326 requires a system to advise the flightcrew when a pitot heating system is not operating. An acceptable indication system may consist of separate lights or a flightcrew alert indication on an electronic display for each pitot source. Additional guidance on an acceptable means of compliance with § 25.1326 is provided in AC 25-11B, Electronic Flight Deck Displays.
8.11.2 TSO-C16a references Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aeronautical Standard AS8006, Minimum Performance Standard for Pitot and Pitot-Static Tubes, and
supplements the icing requirements with specific part 25, Appendix C icing conditions and specific liquid water content tests from British Specification 2G 135, Specification for Electrically-Heated Pitot and Pitot-Static Pressure Heads. However, it does not contain tests for Appendix O icing conditions, mixed phase, or ice crystal conditions. The applicant is responsible for showing that the pitot heat is adequate for the Appendix C and applicable Appendix O icing conditions. If this proof of compliance is not obtained in flight tests, analysis or icing tunnel test data should be submitted.
8.12 Stall Warning System and AngleofAttack Ice Protection. › 8.12.1 Compliance with the minimum performance standard for stall…
8.11.3 Although Appendices C and O of part 25 only consider the liquid water content of icing conditions, recent cloud characterization research has indicated that approximately 40 percent of icing condition events consist of liquid water drops and ice crystals (mixed phase icing conditions). Also, glaciated atmospheric conditions, which consist solely of ice crystals, are encountered during airplane operations. The ice crystal environment may be more critical than liquid water for thermal systems because evaporating ice crystals requires more energy. Section 25.1323(i) requires a means to prevent malfunctions in the mixed phase and ice crystal requirements described in part 33, Appendix D. Appendix D of part 33 provides an environmental definition of conditions that may be encountered. These environmental conditions include parameters for total water content as a function of temperature, altitude, and horizontal extent.
Altitude is a parameter identified in Appendix D of part 33 and must be considered when developing the test conditions and supporting analysis necessary to show compliance. In addition, ice crystal concentrations at an exterior mounted probe could be higher than the free stream conditions defined in Appendix D of part 33. Therefore, installation effects should be evaluated. A combination of CFD codes and icing tunnel testing would be an acceptable method of compliance. If not enough heat is provided to melt the ice crystals in mixed phase or ice crystal conditions, blocked pitot probes can result. Blocked pitot probes can prevent accurate airspeed indications. Icing tunnel tests with simulated mixed phase and glaciated icing combined with analysis is an acceptable way to show compliance with § 25.1323.
8.11.4 To ensure proper drainage, airspeed indication probes should be evaluated in the heavy rain conditions described in § 25.1323(i) as installed on the airplane. It is foreseeable that flight into freezing conditions could occur after encountering heavy ground level rain. If not enough heat is provided under these conditions, blocked pitot probes and inaccurate airspeed indications can result. Pitot probes should continue to operate after such an encounter.
8.12 Stall Warning System and Angle-of-Attack Ice Protection.
8.12.1 Compliance with the minimum performance standard for stall warning instruments in TSO-C54, Stall Warning Instruments, is not sufficient by itself to show compliance with § 25.1324. Section 25.1324 requires a heated angle-of-attack system sensor or equivalent means to prevent malfunction due to icing conditions specified in Appendix C, certain Appendix O icing conditions, and specific mixed phase icing and ice crystal conditions. AC 25-25A contains additional guidance on stall warning requirements.
9 SIMULATED ICE SHAPES AND ROUGHNESS. › 9.2 Flight in measured natural icing conditions,
8.12.2 With certain exceptions and additions, TSO-C54 requires compliance with performance specifications of SAE Aerospace Standard AS403A, Stall Warning Instrument. As in AS393B, Airspeed Tubes Electrically Heated, these requirements include a test to demonstrate deicing and anti-icing capability, but only temperature and airspeed are specified. The precipitation test conditions of SAE AS403A include moderate icing conditions for Type II instruments. “Moderate,” however, is not defined. Although functioning of angle-of-attack sensors is evaluated in natural icing conditions during certification test programs, there is no requirement to flight test at the Appendix C or Appendix O icing limits because the low probability of finding those conditions imposes a burden. The applicant is responsible for showing that stall warning heat is adequate for the Appendix C and applicable Appendix O icing conditions. If proof of this is not obtained in flight tests, analysis or icing tunnel test data should be submitted.
8.12.3 Section 25.1324 also requires consideration of the mixed phase and glaciated icing conditions defined in part 33, Appendix D, for angle-of-attack sensors. Conventional trailing vane designs are such that ice crystals are not likely to be captured. A qualitative analysis based on the service history on trailing vane angle-of-attack sensors is an acceptable means of compliance.
8.12.4 In addition, § 25.1324 requires consideration of heavy rain conditions. To ensure proper drainage, angle-of-attack sensors should be evaluated in the heavy rain conditions as installed on the airplane. It is foreseeable that flight into freezing conditions could occur after encountering heavy ground level rain. Angle-of-attack sensors should continue to operate after such an encounter.
8.13 Runback Ice. Water not evaporated by thermal IPSs and unfrozen water in near-freezing conditions (or in conditions when the freezing fraction is less than one) may run aft and form runback ice. This runback ice can then accumulate additional mass from direct impingement. The determination of runback ice is described in further detail in AC 20-73A. Runback ice should be considered when determining critical ice shapes. Simulated runback ice shapes may be used when evaluating effects of critical ice shapes. The applicant should consider potential hazards resulting from the shedding of runback ice.
9 SIMULATED ICE SHAPES AND ROUGHNESS. AC 25-25A contains guidance on icing exposure during various phases of flight that should be considered when determining simulated ice shapes and surface roughness. AC 20-73A also contains additional guidance related to simulated ice shapes. The shape and surface roughness of the ice should be developed and substantiated with acceptable methods. Common practices include—
9.1 Use of computer codes for modeling drop impingement limits and ice shape predictions (see SAE ARP5903, Droplet Impingement and Ice Accretion Computer Codes),
9.2 Flight in measured natural icing conditions,
9.3 Icing wind tunnel tests (see SAE ARP5905, Calibration and Acceptance of Icing Wind Tunnels), and
11.2 The primary purposes of flight testing are to— › 11.2.3 Show compliance with the performance and handling qualities…
9.4 Flight in a measured controlled simulated icing cloud (e.g., behind an icing tanker, see SAE ARP5904, Airborne Icing Tankers).
10 CRITICAL ICE SHAPES. When developing critical ice shapes, the applicant should consider ice accretions that will form during all phases of flight and those that will occur before activation of the IPS. If applicable, runback, residual, and inter-cycle ice accretions should also be considered.
10.1 The applicant should assume that, during holding conditions, the airplane will remain in a rectangular “race track” pattern, with all turns being made within the 17.4 nautical mile icing cloud. Therefore, no horizontal extent correction should be used for this analysis.
10.2 The applicant should substantiate the drop diameter distribution (mean effective, median volume, spectra), liquid water content, and temperature that will cause formation of an ice shape critical to the airplane’s performance and handling qualities.
10.3 Ice roughness used should be based on icing tunnel, natural icing, or tanker testing.
10.4 See AC 20-73A for more information on critical ice shapes.
11 COMPLIANCE TESTS (FLIGHT/SIMULATION).
11.1 The following paragraphs address methods normally used to show compliance with §§ 25.1419 and 25.1420. These requirements state that the airplane must be able to operate safely in the continuous maximum and intermittent maximum icing conditions described in Appendix C and in the applicable icing conditions described in Appendix O. The airplane should be shown to comply with certification requirements when all IPS are installed and functioning. This can normally be accomplished by performing tests in those conditions found to be most critical to basic airplane aerodynamics, IPS design, and powerplant functions. All IPS equipment should perform its intended function throughout the entire operating envelope.
11.2 The primary purposes of flight testing are to—
11.2.1 Determine that the IPS is effective and performs its intended functions during flight as predicted by analysis or ground testing.
11.2.2 Evaluate any degradation in performance and flying qualities.
11.2.3 Show compliance with the performance and handling qualities requirements identified in § 25.21(g). Flight tests to show compliance with these requirements are addressed in
AC 25-25A. Flight testing also verifies the adequacy of flightcrew procedures as well as limitations for the use of the IPS in normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.
11.3.3.1 Thermal Ice Protection Leading Edge Systems. › 11.3.3.1.2 Measurements of supply air mass flow rate, energy input, and…
11.2.4 Confirm that the powerplant installation as a whole (engine, inlet, anti-ice system, etc.) performs satisfactorily in icing conditions. If the auxiliary power unit performs essential functions, it should be evaluated for performance in icing conditions. In accordance with part 33, engine icing certification results should also be carefully reviewed before any part 25 engine or airframe icing flight tests to determine if there were any anomalous results requiring special airplane/engine operating procedures.
11.3 Both §§ 25.1419 and 25.1420 require two or more means of compliance for flight in icing approval. It is common to use a combination of methods in order to adequately represent the conditions and determine resulting degradation effects with sufficient confidence to show compliance.
11.3.1 Dry Air Ground Tests. Depending on details of the IPS design, some preliminary ground tests of the equipment may be warranted to verify the basic function of each item. The applicant should collect quantitative data, as necessary, to verify the system designs. These data should include operating temperatures of thermal devices, deicing fluid flow rates, and operating pressures and rates of inflation of pneumatic components.
11.3.2 Dry Air Flight Tests with Ice Protection Equipment Operating. The first flight tests conducted to evaluate the airplane with the IPS operating are usually dry air flight tests. The initial dry air tests are conducted to verify that the IPS does not affect flying qualities of the airplane in clear air, and to obtain a thermal profile of an operating thermal IPS.
11.3.3 Typical Dry Air Flight Test Practices for Commonly Used Ice Protection Systems. Several commonly used IPSs and components are discussed below to illustrate typical dry air flight test practices. Other types of equipment should be evaluated as their specific design dictates.
11.3.3.1 Thermal Ice Protection Leading Edge Systems. Dry air flight tests are conducted to verify the system design parameters and thermal performance analyses.
11.3.3.1.1 Normally, instruments are installed on system components to measure the anti-icing mass flow rate or energy input (for electrical systems), supply air temperature, and surface temperatures. The dry air test plan generally includes operating conditions such as the climb, holding, and descent phases of a normal flight profile. Since the presence of moisture can affect surface temperatures, tests should be conducted where no visible moisture is present.
11.3.3.1.2 Measurements of supply air mass flow rate, energy input, and air temperature allow determination of how much heat is available to the
11.3.3.3 Electrically Heated Propeller Boots. › 11.3.3.3.3 The applicant should consider the maximum temperatures a…
system. The adequacy of the IPS can then be demonstrated by comparing the measured data to the theoretical analysis for both Appendix C and either Appendix O for compliance with § 25.1420(a)(3) or the portion of Appendix O proposed for compliance with § 25.1420(a)(2). Surface temperatures measured in the dry air, for example, can be useful in extrapolating the maximum possible leading edge surface temperature in flight, the heat transfer characteristics of the system, and the thermal energy available for the IPS. Supply air temperatures or energy input may also be used to verify that the IPS materials were appropriately chosen for the thermal environment.
11.3.3.2 Pneumatic Leading Edge Boots. Tests should demonstrate a rise and decrease in operating pressures, which results in the effective removal of ice. This pressure rise time, as well as the maximum operating pressure for each boot, should be evaluated throughout the altitude range defined in Appendices C and O. Boots should be operated in flight at the minimum envelope temperature (-22 °F) of Appendix C continuous maximum icing conditions and Appendix O. This is to demonstrate adequate performance throughout the entire flight envelope and to demonstrate that no damage occurs during inflation and deflation. The appropriate speed and temperature limitation (if any) on boot activation should be included in the AFM. Boot inflation should have no significant effect on airplane performance and handling qualities.
11.3.3.3 Electrically Heated Propeller Boots. For compliance with provisions of §§ 25.901(c), 25.903(b), 25.929, and 25.1419(c):
11.3.3.3.1 When flight testing in dry air, surface temperature measurements should be made and monitored to confirm proper function. These measurements are useful for correlating analytically predicted dry air temperatures with actual temperatures, and as a general indicator that the system is functioning and that each deicer is heating. It is suggested that system current, brush block voltage (i.e., between each input brush and the ground brush), and system duty cycles be monitored to ensure that adequate power is applied to the deicers.
11.3.3.3.2 System operation should be checked throughout the full revolutions per minute and propeller cyclic pitch range expected during flight in icing. All significant vibrations should be investigated.
11.3.3.3.3 The applicant should consider the maximum temperatures a composite propeller blade may be subjected to when deicers are energized. It may be useful to monitor deicer bond-side temperatures. When performing this evaluation, the most critical conditions should be investigated (e.g., airplane on the ground or propellers not rotating) on a hot day with the system inadvertently energized.
11.3 Both §§ 25.1419 and 25.1420 require two or more means of… › 11.3.5 Icing Flight Tests.
11.3.3.4 Windshield Anti-Ice. Section 25.773(b)(1)(ii) requires that the airplane have a means of maintaining a clear portion of windshield in the icing conditions defined in Appendix C and in certain Appendix O icing conditions. The applicant should conduct dry air flight tests to verify the thermal analysis. Measurements of both the inner and outer surface temperature of the protected windshield area may be needed to verify the thermal analysis. Thermal analysis should show that the windshield surface temperature is sufficient to maintain anti-icing capability without causing structural damage to the windshield. An evaluation of visibility, including distortion effects through the protected area, should be made for both day and night operations. In addition, the size and location of the protected area should be reviewed to confirm that it provides adequate visibility for the flightcrew, especially during the approach and landing phases of flight. Analysis of exposures to Appendix C and Appendix O conditions should consider holding operations consistent with the applicable “Holding Ice” definition contained in Part II of those appendices.
11.3.3.5 Bleed Air Systems. Effects of bleed air extraction on engine and airplane performance, if any, should be examined and included in the AFM performance data. The surface heat distribution analysis should be verified for varying flight conditions including climb, cruise, hold, and descent. Temperature measurements may be necessary to verify the thermal analyses. In accordance with provisions of § 25.939(a), the maximum bleed air for ice protection should have no detrimental effect on engine operation throughout the engine’s power range.
11.3.4 Dry Air Flight Tests with Predicted Simulated Ice Shapes and Roughness. The primary function of dry air flight tests with simulated ice shapes is to demonstrate the ability of the airplane to operate safely with an accumulation of critical ice shapes based on exposure to Appendix C icing conditions and applicable Appendix O icing conditions. The specific flight tests used to evaluate airplane performance and handling qualities are addressed in AC 25-25A. In addition, effects of ice accretion on locations forward of pitot-static sensors, angle-of-attack sensors, and static pressure ports should be assessed. For failure conditions of the IPS that are not extremely improbable, validation testing may be required to demonstrate that the effect on safety of flight (as measured by degradation in flight characteristics) is commensurate with the failure probability. Such validation testing may consist of flight tests, flight simulator tests, wind tunnel tests, or validated CFD analyses.
11.3.5 Icing Flight Tests. Flight tests in measured natural icing and tests performed with artificial icing tools, such as icing tankers, are normally used to demonstrate that the IPS performs during flight as predicted by analysis or other testing. Such tests are also used to confirm analyses used in developing the various components, such as ice detectors, and ice shapes.
11.3.5.1 Instrumentation. › 11.3.5.1.7 Median volume drop diameter and drop diameter spectra.
Section 25.1419 requires measured natural icing flight tests within the icing conditions of Appendix C. If necessary, measured natural icing flight tests should be accomplished in Appendix O conditions. The natural icing flight tests are accomplished to corroborate the general nature of the effects on airplane handling characteristics and performance determined with simulated ice shapes (see AC 25-25A), as well as to qualitatively assess the analytically predicted location and general physical characteristics of the ice accretions. If necessary, there should be a means to measure and record ice accumulations and impingement limits. These can be approximated by various means, such as a rod mounted on the airfoil and black paint on the airfoil to increase the contrast between the ice accretion and the airfoil.
11.3.5.1 Instrumentation. The applicant should plan sufficient instrumentation to allow documentation of important airplane, system, and component parameters, as well as icing conditions encountered. The following parameters should be considered:
11.3.5.1.1 Altitude.
11.3.5.1.2 Airspeed.
11.3.5.1.3 Engine power level or speed.
11.3.5.1.4 Propeller speed and pitch, if applicable.
11.3.5.1.5 Temperatures that could be affected by ice protection equipment or ice accumulation or that are necessary for validation of analyses, such as the temperatures of—
• Static air,
• Engine components,
• Electrical generation equipment,
• Surfaces, and
• Structural components.
11.3.5.1.6 Liquid water content. This should be measured over the complete water drop size distribution.
11.3.5.1.7 Median volume drop diameter and drop diameter spectra. When measurement of the icing environment drop diameter is necessary, instrumentation used for measuring drop sizes should be appropriate for the Appendix C and Appendix O icing conditions. For airplanes to be certified to a portion or all of Appendix O, measuring and recording drop diameter spectra should be accomplished.
11.3.5.2 Artificial Icing. › 11.3.5.2.2 Use of an icing tanker can provide high confidence in local…
11.3.5.1.8 Microscopic measurement of drop impact craters on a gelatin oil or soot slide exposed to an icing cloud may be an impractical way of measuring a median volume drop diameter because of the splashing and bouncing characteristics of large drops. Also, gelatin oil or soot slides are impractical for recording the drop diameter spectra of Appendix O type clouds. MVDs and drop diameter distributions are more practically obtained with more sophisticated equipment, such as laser-based drop measuring and recording instruments, or their equivalent. Depending on the drop size measurement capability of the instruments used, more than one instrument may be required to measure the expected range of drop diameters. If testing is performed with a calibrated icing tanker, large drop instrumentation on the test airplane may not be necessary. Some icing conditions may contain mixed phase icing (liquid plus ice). The instrumentation should provide the ability to distinguish between liquid drops and ice crystals. Equipment should be calibrated and properly maintained to obtain quality data.
11.3.5.2 Artificial Icing.
11.3.5.2.1 Flight testing in artificial icing environments, such as behind icing tankers, is one way to predict capabilities of individual elements of the ice protection equipment and to determine local ice shapes. Since the ice plume has a limited cross-section, testing is usually limited to components, such as heated pitot tubes, antennas, air inlets including engine induction air inlets, empennage, airfoil sections, and windshields. Calibration and verification of the icing cloud produced by the tanker should be accomplished as necessary for meeting test objectives. SAE ARP5904 provides recommended practices for using tanker icing simulations.
11.3.5.2.2 Use of an icing tanker can provide high confidence in local icing effects. But obtaining small drop sizes may be difficult with some spray nozzles. As a result, these methods could produce larger ice build-ups and different ice shapes than those observed in natural Appendix C icing conditions. Icing tanker techniques can be used in a manner similar to icing tunnel testing with respect to ice shape development. The plume may be of sufficient size that it could be applied to sections of the airframe to examine any potential hinge moment or CLMAX effects from ice accretions behind protected areas in Appendix C or Appendix O conditions. This method also has the advantage of being able to combine the effects of thermal systems (such as runback) with direct accretion to simulate resulting ice accumulations. Tanker simulation could also be used to estimate accretion areas for use in estimates of drag from extended accretion regions (such as ice accretions extending beyond a radome) during exposures to Appendix O conditions. Atmospheric effects such as humidity and drop residence time (time required to bring the drop to static temperature) should be considered in this type of testing.
11.3.5.3 Appendix C Natural Icing Flight Testing. › 11.3.5.3.5 The applicant should perform a test to determine if moisture…
11.3.5.3 Appendix C Natural Icing Flight Testing.
11.3.5.3.1 Section 25.1419(b) requires measured natural icing flight tests. Flight tests in measured natural icing conditions are intended to verify the ice protection analysis, to check for icing anomalies, and to demonstrate that the IPS and its components function as intended. AC 20-73A provides additional information useful for planning a natural icing flight test program. The airplane should be given sufficient exposure to icing conditions to allow extrapolation to the envelope critical conditions by analysis. Test data obtained during these exposures may be used to validate the analytical methods used and the results of any preceding artificial icing tests.
11.3.5.3.2 Past experience indicates that an airplane performing flight testing in natural intermittent maximum icing conditions may be exposed to lightning strikes, severe turbulence, and hail encounters that could extensively damage it. When design analyses show that the critical ice protection design points (i.e., heat loads, critical ice shapes, accumulation, accumulation rates, etc.) are adequate under these conditions, and sufficient ground or flight test data exist to verify the analysis, a flight test in intermittent maximum icing conditions may not be necessary.
11.3.5.3.3 Flight testing in natural icing conditions should also be used to verify AFM procedures for activation of the IPS, including recognition and delay times associated with IPS activation. Such testing should verify the analytically predicted location and general physical characteristics of the ice accretions. Critical ice accumulations should be observed, where possible, and sufficient data taken to allow correlation with dry air testing. Remotely located cameras either on the test airplane or on a chase airplane have been used to document ice accumulations on areas that cannot be seen from the test airplane’s flight deck or cabin.
11.3.5.3.4 For an airplane with a thermal deicing system, the applicant should demonstrate the effectiveness of the deicing operation either in artificial icing conditions or during a natural icing flight test certification program. The tests usually encompass measurements of the surface temperature time history. This time history includes the time at which the system is activated, the time at which the surface reaches an effective temperature, and the time at which the majority of ice is shed from the leading edge. The data should be recorded in the flight test report.
11.3.5.3.5 The applicant should perform a test to determine if moisture can be trapped and prevent normal operation of deicing boots or surface mounted sensors if the moisture freezes during flight. To verify proper operation of the deicing boots and surface mounted sensors, the airplane should operate on the ground in moderate rain; take off and fly through moderate rain;
11.3.5.4 Appendix O Natural Icing Flight Testing. › 11.3.5.4.2 Flight testing in natural Appendix O icing conditions should…
and climb and maintain an altitude above the freezing level. During this test, all IPS should be operated in accordance with the AFM procedures.
11.3.5.4 Appendix O Natural Icing Flight Testing. Section 25.1420(a) requires airplanes with a certified maximum takeoff weight less than 60,000 pounds or equipped with reversible flight controls to operate safely in the supercooled large drop icing conditions defined in part 25, Appendix O.
11.3.5.4.1 Unless shown by other means, such as discussed in paragraph 11.3.5.4.2, flight testing in measured natural Appendix O icing conditions may be necessary to—
11.3.5.4.1.1 Verify the general physical characteristics and location of the simulated ice shapes used for dry air testing and, in particular, their effects on airplane handling characteristics,
11.3.5.4.1.2 Determine if ice accretes on areas where ice accretion was not predicted,
11.3.5.4.1.3 Verify adequate performance of ice detectors or visual cues,
11.3.5.4.1.4 Conduct performance and handling quality tests as outlined in § 25.21(g), and
11.3.5.4.1.5 Evaluate effects of ice accretion not normally evaluated with simulated ice shapes (on propeller, antennas, spinners, etc.) and evaluate operation of each critical airplane system or component after exposure to Appendix O conditions.
11.3.5.4.2 Flight testing in natural Appendix O icing conditions should not be necessary if similarity is shown to an airplane that has shown compliance with § 25.1419 and has a successful service history, or if—
11.3.5.4.2.1 The design analyses show that the critical ice protection design points (i.e., heat loads, critical ice shapes for performance and handling qualities, accumulation, accumulation rates, etc.) are adequate under Appendix O conditions and various airplane operational configurations, and
11.3.5.4.2.2 Except where Appendix E of this AC allows the use of one method to perform the analysis in paragraph 11.3.5.4.2.1 above, at least two different methods of predicting Appendix O ice accretions must be shown to provide similar results (ice accretion thickness, location). One method should be either an icing wind tunnel or icing tanker test.
Note: Icing tunnels and analysis with CFD codes are considered two different methods, but two different CFD codes are not.
11.3.7 Icing Wind Tunnel Tests. › 11.3.7.1 Icing wind tunnels provide the ability to simulate natural…
11.3.5.4.2.3 Determination of the appropriate analyses and/or tests should include consideration of the need to evaluate more than one airplane component simultaneously.
11.3.5.4.2.4 One consideration for evaluating more than one component simultaneously could include evaluating airplane performance with propeller and airframe ice accretion or with asymmetric ice accretions from propeller wash.
11.3.5.4.2.5 Another consideration for evaluating more than one component simultaneously could include evaluating engine performance with inlet (including cooling ducts for engine accessories) ice accretions.
11.3.5.4.2.6 Another consideration for evaluating more than one component simultaneously could include evaluating the stall warning system and characteristics with ice accretion that affects air data used by stall protection systems.
11.3.5.4.3 The need for flight testing in natural Appendix O icing is reduced for airplanes limited to exiting from Appendix O conditions according to § 25.1420(a)(1) as a result of reduced exposure to such conditions.
11.3.5.4.4 Flight testing in natural Appendix O icing conditions should be accomplished for airplane derivatives whose ancestor airplanes have a service record that includes a pattern of accidents or incidents due to in-flight encounters with Appendix O conditions. For derivative airplanes whose ancestor airplane is free of accidents or incidents recorded in icing conditions, flight testing in natural Appendix O icing conditions should not be necessary.
11.3.6 Fluid Anti-Icing/Deicing Systems. Flight testing should include evaluation of fluid flow paths to confirm that adequate and uniform fluid distribution over the protected surfaces is achieved. Fluid flow paths should be determined when the fluid is mixed with impinging water during system operation. A means of indicating fluid flow rates, fluid quantity remaining, etc., should be evaluated to determine that the indicators are plainly visible to the pilot and that the indications provided can be effectively read. A shutoff valve should be provided in systems using flammable fluids. Fluid anti-icing/deicing systems may be used to protect propellers and windshields as well as leading edges of airfoils. The fluid for windshield fluid anti-ice systems should be tested to demonstrate that it does not become opaque at low temperatures. The AFM should include information advising the flightcrew how long it will take to deplete the amount of fluid remaining in the reservoir.
11.3.7 Icing Wind Tunnel Tests.
11.3.7.1 Icing wind tunnels provide the ability to simulate natural icing conditions in a controlled environment. A variety of Appendix C icing conditions and
Appendix O freezing drizzle conditions can be simulated, depending on the tunnel. Icing wind tunnels have been used to evaluate ice shapes on unprotected areas and on or aft of protected areas, such as inter-cycle, residual, and runback ice. They have also been used to evaluate performance of IPSs, such as pneumatic and thermal systems. Scale models may be used in icing wind tunnels, with appropriate scaling corrections, if the scale testing on the component has been validated with full-scale testing or analysis. Hybrid models, with the full-scale leading edge extending beyond the impingement limits, may also be used. The applicant may use these models to estimate impingement limits, examine visual icing cues, and evaluate ice detection devices.
12 CERTIFICATION WITH § 25.1420. › 12.1 Certification with §§ 25.1420(a)(1) and 25.1420(a)(2).
11.3.7.2 Surface temperature measurements are typically made for air-data instruments, such as pitot tubes, pitot-static pressure probes, and angle-of-attack probes, during icing wind tunnel tests to verify thermal analyses. The acceptability of the installed air-data instrument ice protection should be evaluated during natural or artificial icing tests.
11.3.8 Dry Air Wind Tunnel Tests. Dry air wind tunnel testing using scaled models and ice shapes has been used to determine ice protection requirements. The scaling, including the effect of the roughness of the ice, should be substantiated using methods found acceptable to the authorities.
12 CERTIFICATION WITH § 25.1420. Section 25.1420 requires that the airplane operate safely in the supercooled large drop icing conditions defined in part 25, Appendix O. For guidance on engineering tool capabilities, see Appendix E of this AC.
12.1 Certification with §§ 25.1420(a)(1) and 25.1420(a)(2). As an alternative to the requirements of § 25.1420(a)(3), applicants have the option of complying with §§ 25.1420(a)(1) or (a)(2), which allows an airplane to be certified for a limited range of conditions, from certification to Appendix C only to certification to Appendix C and a portion of Appendix O. The icing conditions the airplane may be certified to fly through may be defined in terms of any parameters that define Appendix O conditions and could include phase of flight limits, such as takeoff or holding, in Appendix O or a portion of Appendix O. For example, an airplane may be certificated to take off in portions of Appendix O conditions, but not be certificated for holding in those same conditions. Substantiated means must be provided to inform flightcrews when the selected icing conditions boundary is exceeded. The applicant must show compliance with § 25.21(g) for exiting the restricted Appendix O icing conditions. Ice shapes to be tested are those representing the critical Appendix O icing conditions during recognition and subsequent exit from those icing conditions. Methods of defining the selected Appendix O icing conditions boundary should be considered early in the certification process, with concurrence from the appropriate ACO. See
12.1 Certification with §§ 25.1420(a)(1) and 25.1420(a)(2). › 12.1.2 The modified inertia parameter is commonly used in icing wind…
section 19 of this AC for specific guidance on AFM limitations and operating procedures.
Note: While this AC provides guidance on compliance with § 25.1420(a)(2), further advancements in engineering tools may be necessary before an applicant is able to substantiate compliance with this option. A 2009 review of engineering tool capabilities found that current technology does not support distinguishing between freezing drizzle and freezing rain in flight. Therefore, certification for a portion of Appendix O will be challenging and will require close coordination with certifying authorities. Consult Appendix E of this AC for additional details on engineering tool capabilities.
12.1.1 Selection of Appendix O Boundary. The physics of ice accretion is complex. (See FAA Technical Report DOT/FAA/CT- 88/8-1 for a detailed discussion on the icing physics process. Some generalizations, however, can be made about the effects of supercooled water drop impingement and ice limits. The “modified inertia parameter” is a similarity parameter relating a water drop’s inertia to the drag from the airflow. The inertia of smaller drops tends to be dominated by the airflow effect, so their trajectories tend to follow the local streamlines of air. Sufficiently small drops, depending on the size of the drop and the airplane component they are approaching, may simply flow around the airframe. (A larger airplane component increases the flow disturbance ahead of the component, deflecting airflow and the trajectories of smaller drops. On the other hand, the inertia of larger drops tends to dominate the airflow effect and so the trajectories tend toward straight lines. Thus, large drops are much less likely to miss the airframe.
The modified inertia parameter depends very strongly on drop size. It depends strongly on airplane (or model) size and airplane (or tunnel) velocity, and it also depends on drop density and air viscosity and density. The modified inertia parameter assumes a spherical drop and does not reflect drop distortion, drop break-up, or drop splashing. Standard impingement parameters, such as impingement limits, overall impingement, and leading edge impingement, all increase as a function of the modified inertia parameter. Other influences affecting the object’s water collection efficiency, drop impingement, icing limits, ice shape, and runback ice include splashing of the large water drops and breakup of the large water drops when forces on the distorted drop exceed the surface tension required to hold the drop together. These latter influences become more evident for the larger drops defined in Appendix O. Drop size distributions and the related distribution of water mass are important considerations for water catch, impingement limits, and ice limits, as well as for runback ice.
Consideration of these influences allows comparison of critical icing conditions that can be correlated to ice accretions in aft locations, such as behind protected areas.
12.1.2 The modified inertia parameter is commonly used in icing wind tunnel testing to compare high altitude flight conditions to the available low altitude test conditions. To simulate effects of high altitudes and true airspeeds on impingement, larger drops are used at the lower altitude test conditions. As an example, an IPS designed to protect against 50 µm drop impingement at 22,000 feet and 200 knots calibrated air speed (KCAS) (290 knots true air speed (KTAS)) would be equivalently protected against
12.1.3.2 Substantiated visual cues can range from direct observation of… › 12.1.3.2.1 Visual cues should be developed with the following considerations
76 µm drops at sea level and 200 KCAS (190 KTAS) because of an equivalent modified inertia parameter (assuming a 6-foot chord).
12.1.2.1 Based on these physical processes, it is difficult to select a boundary for Appendix O icing conditions based on drop size. Consideration of the drop inertia effects throughout the flight envelope will likely be required. While technology does not currently exist to discriminate icing conditions based on specific drop sizes (exclusive of inertia effects), methods may be developed in the future to certify airplanes for flight in icing in such a manner.
12.1.2.2 Alternative methods of defining a selected boundary for Appendix O icing conditions may be considered. For example, it may be possible to develop an exit cue so that unrestricted flight in Appendix O freezing drizzle is approved but exit is required from Appendix O freezing rain.
12.1.2.3 See Appendix C of this AC for an example of a plan for certificating to Appendix C only (§ 25.1420(a)(1)) based on drop size discrimination.
12.1.3 Means for Detecting Appendix O Boundaries. Determining whether the selected boundary for Appendix O icing conditions has been exceeded can potentially be accomplished using visual cues, an ice detection system, or an aerodynamic performance monitor.
12.1.3.1 Ice detection systems and aerodynamic performance monitors are discussed in paragraph 15.5 of this AC. For compliance with § 25.1420(a)(1), it is acceptable to use an ice detection system that detects accretions behind the airplane’s protected areas.
12.1.3.2 Substantiated visual cues can range from direct observation of ice accretions aft of the airplane’s protected surfaces to observation of ice accretions on reference surfaces. Methods used to substantiate visual cues should be agreed on with the appropriate certification authorities. Responding to a cue should not require the flightcrew to judge the ice to be a specific thickness or size. Examples of potential visual cues are accretions forming—
• On side windshields,
• On sides of nacelles,
• On propeller spinners aft of a reference point,
• On radomes aft of a reference point, and/or
• Aft of protected surfaces.
12.1.3.2.1 Visual cues should be developed with the following considerations:
12.1.3.2.1.1 Visual cues should be within the flightcrew’s primary field of view if possible. If outside the primary field of view, the cues should be visible from the design eye point and easily incorporated into the flightcrew’s visual scan with a minimum of head movement while seated and performing their normal duties.
12.1.4 Some Areas of Interest for Appendix O. › 12.1.4.1 Ice Shapes Aft of Protected Areas of Lifting Surfaces.
12.1.3.2.1.2 Visual cues should be visible during all modes of operation (day and night) without use of a handheld flashlight.
12.1.3.2.2 During the certification process, the applicant should verify the ability of the flightcrew to observe visual cues or reference surfaces. Visibility of the visual cues should be evaluated from the most adverse flightcrew seat locations in combination with the range of flightcrew heights, within the approved range of eye reference point locations, if available. A visual cue is required for both the left and right seats. If a single visual cue is used, it should be visible from each seat. Consideration should be given to the difficulty of observing clear ice. The adequacy of the detection method should be evaluated in all expected flight conditions. The applicant can carry out night evaluations with simulated accretions to assess visibility in and out of clouds.
12.1.3.2.3 Visual cues should be substantiated by tests and analysis, including tests in measured natural icing, or icing tanker tests, or potentially through icing wind tunnel tests. The applicant should consider the drop distributions of Appendix O when developing the cue, and the applicant should substantiate that these cues would be present in all the restricted Appendix O icing conditions. If a reference surface is used, the applicant should substantiate that it accumulates ice at the same time as or prior to ice accumulation on the critical surfaces.
12.1.3.2.4 AC 25-25A should be reviewed for guidance on the time flightcrews need to visually detect Appendix O icing conditions.
12.1.4 Some Areas of Interest for Appendix O. The following are some areas of interest specific to supercooled large drop conditions:
12.1.4.1 Ice Shapes Aft of Protected Areas of Lifting Surfaces. Appendix O icing conditions may result in a ridge of ice or ice roughness aft of the protected areas. On airplanes with reversible flight controls, a ridge of ice may cause uncommanded deflections of the control surfaces, which may result in an airplane upset. Airplanes may also incur reduced maximum lift and stall at lower angles of attack, independent of the flight control system. Appendix O ice build-ups can result in an airplane upset or stall if the stall protection system activation schedules are not adjusted.
12.1.4 Some Areas of Interest for Appendix O. › 12.1.4.6 Holding Ice Considerations.
12.1.4.2 Ice Shapes on Unprotected Areas of Lifting Surfaces. Ice shapes resulting from Appendix O icing conditions can extend further aft on the airfoil than those from Appendix C icing conditions. When portions of the airfoil leading edge are unprotected, performance and handling qualities can be affected.
12.1.4.3 Ice Shapes on Unprotected Airframe Regions. Areas of the airframe that do not accrete ice under Appendix C conditions should be examined for impingement and accretion in Appendix O conditions. The applicant should evaluate such issues as visibility through the windshield, locations of air-data sensors, and potential airflow disturbance (for example on the airplane nose) from Appendix O accretions that could influence performance of the air-data sensors.
12.1.4.4 Drag and Power Effects. Airplanes may exhibit reduced performance in Appendix C conditions because ice accretions cause increased drag and reduced lift. Such impacts can be exacerbated in Appendix O conditions, since the accretions may extend further aft on protected areas, extend beyond protected areas, or occur in areas not typically protected (extended accretions on the fuselage and the lower wing surface, for example). Ice accretions may be rough and cause large local drag increases. Thrust effects of bleed penalties from system operations or degradation of thrust from powerplant losses (e.g., propeller icing) should be addressed. See AC 25-25A for more information about evaluating potential effects on airplane performance.
12.1.4.5 Engine Considerations. Ice accumulation on the airframe and on air induction system components resulting from Appendix O icing conditions should be analyzed for potential ingestion of ice by the engine (relative to requirements of § 25.1093) and potential blockage effects. For § 25.1093 compliance, analysis may be used for the radome as a potential airframe ice source. Applicants may use qualitative analysis of the design supported by similarity to a previous design that has shown successful service history to have confidence that the historical methodology for certification represented by Table 1—Minimum Ice Slab Dimensions Based on Engine Inlet Size of § 33.77 is appropriate. Service history for designs similar to the ones under consideration should be part of the icing certification plan. In order to demonstrate compliance using similarity, the applicant should show successful service history of the previous design and establish confidence that the historical certification methodology is appropriate for the current certification.
12.1.4.6 Holding Ice Considerations. Analysis of exposures to Appendix C and Appendix O conditions should consider holding operations consistent with the applicable “Holding Ice”
definition contained in Part II of those appendices. Appendix O, Part II, contains different holding ice conditions depending on the level of certification requested in Appendix O conditions. For airplanes not certified to § 25.1420, the applicant should choose the holding ice conditions for which certification is sought. If the component will be certified for unrestricted operations in Appendix O, or a portion of Appendix O, then holding ice is defined in Appendix O, Part II, paragraph (c)(4). If the component will be certified for “detect and exit” operations, then the holding ice is defined in Appendix O, Part II, paragraph (b)(2).
Continue reading ↓ 120 of 247 passages shown