Radar Vectors
Proposed Rule Proposed Issued Apr 15, 2019 149 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

84 FR 15296 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements

This rulemaking would streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and remove obsolete requirements. This action would consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The proposed rule would describe the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.

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A. Definition and Scope of Launch

Another point of current uncertainty is when launch begins from a non-U.S. site. Title 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 gives the FAA authority to issue a launch license to a U.S. citizen conducting a launch anywhere in the world. However, the current definition of launch is silent as to when launch begins from a non-U.S. site. This has resulted in operators lacking clarity as to when launch begins. In recent years, the FAA has licensed launches from international waters, Australia, the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, and Spain. In licensing these launches, the FAA has consistently interpreted that launch from outside of U.S. territory to begin at ignition or at the first movement that initiates flight, whichever occurs earlier.

The ARC commented about the definition of launch for licensed launches from a U.S. launch site. The ARC report stated that launch should be defined on a case-by-case basis for all operators. The ARC recommended licensed activities on U.S. launch sites for all vehicles include preflight ground operations, flight operations, and launch operations phases as tailored by each launch operator. The ARC further recommends the initiation and scope of launch activities, including preflight ground operations and flight operation phases, be defined by the impact of each activity on public safety and property. These activities may include both hazardous and safety-critical operations, the latter encompassing non-hazardous activities that may impact public risk during other pre-launch and flight activities. A list of performance-based criteria for licensed activities would be tailored for each operator and the FAA based on their specific concept of operations. This scope should only include hazardous operations unique to activities as defined in the operator's license application documents and not activities already regulated by another government agency.

In light of the multiple waiver requests and ARC recommendations, the FAA proposes to amend the regulatory definitions of launch and reentry (discussed later in this section) to match the statutory definitions. The FAA would also move the details in the definitions for beginning and end of launch (discussed later in this section) and reentry to the scope of a vehicle operator license requirements in proposed § 450.3. In addition, the FAA would revise "beginning of launch" to be more performance-based and "end of launch" to remove references to ELVs and RLVs. Finally, the FAA proposes to clarify that launch from a non-U.S. site would begin at ignition, and that the arrival of a payload to a launch site does not constitute beginning of launch. The FAA believes the proposed revisions capture the primary intent of the ARC's recommendation, which is to limit FAA oversight to those launch operations that pose a hazard to public safety and the safety of property.

The FAA would revise the definitions of launch and reentry in § 401.5 to mirror the statutory definitions. Specifically, the FAA would remove the beginning and end of launch language from the definition of "launch," and add the term "human being" to align with the 2015 update to the Act. Similarly, the FAA would revise the definition of "reenter/reentry" in part 401 to mirror the statutory definition, and would add the term "human being" to align with the 2015 update to the Act.

The FAA would move the beginning and end of launch and reentry language to proposed § 450.3. The FAA proposes this change because such detail in a definition makes the definition unwieldy and, unlike regulatory requirements, definitions cannot be waived.

The FAA would amend beginning of launch such that launch begins with the first hazardous activities related to the assembly and ultimate flight of the launch vehicle at a U.S. launch site. Unless a later point is agreed to by the Administrator, hazardous preflight ground operations would be presumed to begin when the launch vehicle or its major components arrive at the launch site. For operations where an applicant identifies a later time when hazardous operations begin, the applicant may propose the event that it believes should constitute the beginning of launch during the pre-application process.\162\ As a result, there would be no need to request a waiver.

\162\ The FAA's proposal regarding how an operator would determine what event constitutes the beginning of launch, and how to obtain the Administrator's approval, is located in the Ground Safety section under the Identifying First Hazardous Activity sub-heading of this preamble.

This proposed change would also clarify that for launch vehicle stages or when launch begins for an RLV that returns to a launch site and remains there in a dormant state, FAA oversight is not necessary since no hazardous activity that falls under the FAA's oversight responsibilities are being performed.

This proposal would clarify that, absent vehicle hardware, the arrival of payload does not constitute beginning of launch. Instead, launch would begin with the arrival of a launch vehicle or its major components at a U.S. launch site, or at a later point as agreed to by the Administrator.

This proposal would also specify that launch from a non-U.S. site begins at ignition, or at the first movement that initiates flight, of the launch vehicle, whichever comes first. For hybrid vehicles, flight commences at take-off. The current "beginning of launch," as defined in the definition of "launch" refers only to launches from a U.S. launch site, and is silent with regard to launches from sites outside the United States. Although the FAA issues launch licenses for launches from non-U.S. launch sites if the operator is a citizen of the U.S., the FAA considers it outside its authority to license preflight activities that take place at a non-U.S. launch site in light of the statutory definition of launch that explicitly refers to "activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle . . . when those activities take place at a launch site in the United States." The FAA also believes that this interpretation is necessary because of issues of sovereignty and liability under international law. For these non-U.S. launch sites, the FAA has historically licensed launches beginning at ignition, or if there is no ignition, then at the first movement that initiates flight. In order to provide clarity for launch operators launching from non-U.S. sites, the FAA is proposing to codify this approach in part 450.

In addition to addressing issues in the current definition of "launch" regarding when launch begins, the FAA proposes to clarify when launch ends. First, the FAA would move the provisions in the current definition of launch regarding end of launch to proposed § 450.3. Second, the FAA would remove the distinction between ELVs and RLVs, which is consistent with one of the overall goals of this proposed rule. Overall, the substance of the current provisions related to end of launch currently located in § 401.5 would not change. Specifically, launch ends:

1. For an orbital launch of an ELV, after the licensee's last exercise of control over its vehicle whether on orbit or a vehicle stage impacting on Earth;

2. For an orbital launch of an RLV, after deployment of all payloads or if there is no payload, after the launch vehicle's first steady state orbit; and

3. For a suborbital launch of either an ELV or RLV that includes reentry, launch ends after reaching apogee; or for a suborbital launch that does not include a reentry, launch ends after the vehicle or vehicle component lands or impacts on Earth.

In all these cases, activities on the ground to return either the launch site or the vehicle or vehicle component to a safe condition are part of launch and could possibly extend the end of launch. In the rare, yet to be seen, situation of a suborbital launch that does not require an FAA launch license but does require a reentry license, launch ends after the vehicle reaches apogee. In addition, the FAA would move the provisions related to reentry readiness and returning the vehicle to a safe state on the ground to proposed § 450.3. Including these reentry provisions in the scope of a vehicle operator license would clarify an operator's responsibilities regarding post-flight ground operations related to returning the vehicle to a safe state on the ground.

Finally, the FAA proposes to modify the definition for reentry. Title 51 U.S.C. 50902 defines reentry as: to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload or human beings, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth. In 2000, the FAA codified the current regulatory definition of reentry in the final rule, Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations. Section 401.5 defines "reenter; reentry" as: To return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth. The term "reenter; reentry" includes activities conducted in Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness, and that are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry flight. The term "reenter; reentry" also includes activities conducted on the ground after vehicle landing on Earth to ensure the reentry vehicle does not pose a threat to public health and safety or the safety of property. As noted earlier, the FAA proposes to revise the definition to mirror the statute and move the provisions related to reentry readiness and returning the vehicle to a safe state on the ground to proposed § 450.3.

B. Ground Safety Requirements

B. Ground Safety Requirements

This proposal would revise current ground safety requirements to make them more flexible, scalable, and adaptable to varying types of launch and reentry operations. The proposal seeks to ensure that the FAA's oversight of ground operations at U.S. launch sites would only cover activities that are hazardous to the public and critical assets. Specifically, as proposed in § 450.179, an operator would be required to protect the public from adverse effects of hazardous operations and systems associated with preparing a launch vehicle for flight, returning a launch or reentry vehicle to a safe condition after landing, or after an aborted launch attempt, and returning a site to a safe condition. An operator would be required to conduct a ground hazard analysis (proposed § 450.185) and comply with certain prescribed hazard controls during those preflight activities that constitute launch. In addition, an operator would be required to comply with other ground safety and related application requirements in proposed part 450.

The FAA proposed the part 417 ground safety regulations in the 2000 NPRM \163\ and codified it in the 2006 final rule. The 2006 final rule adopted ground safety standards governing the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight. The final rule specified that in order for a launch operator to meet part 417 ground safety requirements, an operator must conduct a ground hazard analysis to meet the requirements of subpart E, part 417, as well as a toxic release hazard analysis to meet the requirements of § 417.227. For launches conducted from a Federal launch range, a launch operator could rely on an LSSA as an alternative means of demonstrating compliance with the FAA's part 417 ground safety rules. Because most licensed ground operations were covered by the LSSA approach, the FAA did not begin to exercise the ground safety requirements in part 417 until 2016.

\163\ Licensing and Safety requirements for Launch, NPRM. 65 FR 63922 (October 25, 2000).

Beginning in 2016, the FAA received several applications for launch licenses from non-Federal launch sites.\164\ Applicants were required to demonstrate compliance with the ground safety regulations in part 417. During the FAA's evaluation, the agency found that many of its ground safety requirements were overly burdensome, highly prescriptive, and did not include criteria for determining public safety. Furthermore, the FAA discovered the requirements were out-of-date with commercial space transportation practices and operations, and in some cases duplicated other state and Federal regulations.

\164\ The FAA's first license application involving a launch from a non-Federal launch range was from SpaceX for operations at pad 39A in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The FAA completed its evaluation and issued SpaceX the license on February 2017. Astra Space originally applied for a launch license from a non-Federal launch range in June 2017, and the FAA issued its license March 2018.

Part 431 does not include explicit ground safety requirements. However, the scope of a launch license under part 431 includes preparing a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. In conducting its safety review under § 431.31, the FAA must determine whether an applicant is capable of launching an RLV and payload, if any, from a designated launch site without jeopardizing public health and safety and the safety of property. The FAA evaluates on an individual basis all public safety aspects of a proposed RLV mission to ensure they are sufficient to support safe conduct of the mission, including ground safety. In licenses issued under part 431, the FAA has required operators to address reasonably foreseeable hazards to ensure the safety of pre- and post-flight ground operations. The lack of clarity in part 431 is problematic, and would be fixed by the ground safety requirements in this proposal.

The ARC recommended that the FAA create ground safety regulations that are flexible and streamlined, continue to protect the public, and are not duplicative of other state or Federal authorities. The ARC provided four primary recommendations for ground safety. First, the ARC recommended the FAA allow operators to determine what activities and operations would be covered under FAA regulations by performing an analysis to define hazards. Second, the ARC recommended the FAA scale the scope of what is considered licensed activities based on each operator's unique operations. Third, the ARC recommended the FAA focus its regulatory authority solely on those things that affect public safety. Finally, the ARC recommended the FAA only regulate those things that are not already overseen by other governmental authorities.

The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendations that ground safety regulations should be flexible, performance-based, and utilize a ground hazard analysis that determines the best methods for protecting the public. The proposed ground safety regulations would rely on a system safety approach to allow flexibility by stripping away specific design requirements, establishing more performance-based requirements, and giving the operator flexibility in satisfying these requirements. Specifically, an operator would conduct a ground hazard analysis (proposed § 450.185), and comply with prescribed hazard controls. In addition to any mitigations identified in the ground hazard analysis, the proposed regulations would require several prescribed hazard controls, including an accounting of how the operator would protect members of the public who enter areas under their control, provisions on how the operator would mitigate hazards created by a countdown abort, an explanation of the operator's plans for controlling fires, and generic emergency procedures an operator would implement. As will be discussed later, operators using toxic materials would have to perform a toxic release hazard analysis (proposed § 450.187), show how it would contain the effects of a toxic release, or how the public would be protected from those risks from toxic releases. Operators would also be required to develop an explosive siting plan (proposed § 450.183) and to coordinate with licensed launch and reentry site operators (proposed § 450.181). 1. Ground Safety: Identifying First Hazardous Activity

In proposed § 450.3, an operator would have the flexibility to determine for its particular operation when the first preflight activity that poses a hazard to the public begins in coordination with the FAA. An operator could identify the arrival of the vehicle or its major components at the launch site as the beginning of hazardous operations, which is consistent with current practice. This option would provide a clear demarcation of when launch begins that is easily understood by both an operator and the FAA. The license would cover all ground operations that may present a hazard to the public from the time flight hardware first arrives at the launch or reentry site to the end of launch or reentry.

Alternatively, an operator could identify some other action, after the arrival of the vehicle or its major components at the launch site, as the beginning of hazardous activities. As discussed earlier in the scope of a vehicle operator license discussion, this option would be available for those operations where the arrival of the launch vehicle does not constitute the beginning of hazardous activities. It would also provide flexibility to operators because the start of hazardous launch operations is unique to each operator's circumstances. These hazardous launch operations would include the pressurizing or loading of propellants into the vehicle or launch system,\165\ operations involving a fueled launch vehicle,\166\ or the transfer of energy necessary to initiate flight.\167\

\165\ This would include the loading of propellants or pressurants, where there are potential hazards such as overpressure, explosion, debris, deflagration, fire, and toxic material release. The operations that are typically performed include wet dress rehearsals, cold flow, returning the vehicle to a safe state following a scrub, and tests that might be performed while the vehicle is being fueled.

\166\ This would include static fire or tests with a fully-fueled integrated vehicle.

\167\ This would include activities that involve placing the launch vehicle into a state that would enable it to achieve suborbital or orbital flight. Even if traditional propellants are not used, the energy needed to escape Earth's gravity is significant and the initiation of the action to launch a vehicle could potentially have significant impact to public safety.

While this option offers greater flexibility, it would require that an applicant talk with the FAA during pre-application consultation to identify which activity would be the beginning of hazardous launch operations. This is necessary for the FAA to scope its requirements accordingly, and so that the applicant knows what to include in its application. Early interactions with the FAA would allow a potential applicant to work with the FAA to determine which preflight operations constitute launch and therefore must occur under a license. An applicant that elects to identify an activity after the arrival of a launch vehicle or associated major components at a launch site as the beginning of launch should be prepared to discuss its operations with the FAA so that the FAA can determine that operations occurring prior to that point would not pose a threat to public safety. Note that under this proposal, indemnification and reciprocal waiver of claims coverage would start when launch begins as it does under current regulations. In other words, financial responsibility requirements would apply from the first hazardous operation until launch ends. 2. Ground Safety: Ground Hazard Analysis

Proposed § 450.185 (Ground Hazard Analysis) would require an operator to complete a ground hazard analysis which would include a thorough assessment of the launch vehicle, the launch vehicle integrated systems, ground support equipment, and other launch site hardware. The analysis would include an identification of hazards, a risk assessment, an identification and description of mitigations and controls, and provisions for hazard control verification and validation. Although the analysis might incorporate employee safety and mission assurance, this proposal would only require an applicant to identify the hazards that affect the public, and how an operator would mitigate those hazards.

Proposed § 450.185(a) would require an operator to identify hazards. A hazard is a real or potential condition that could lead to an unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, serious injury, or damage to or loss of equipment or property. The FAA proposes separating ground hazards into two primary categories: System and operational hazards. System hazards would include, but would not be limited to, vehicle over-pressurization, sudden energy release including ordnance actuation, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, fire or deflagration, radioactive materials, toxic release, cryogens, electrical discharge, and structural failure. Operational hazards would be hazards introduced to the launch site through procedures and processes that occur during vehicle processing. Operational hazards would include propellant handling and loading, transporting vehicles or components, vehicle system activation, and related tests.

Once an operator has identified hazards, proposed § 450.185(b) would require an operator to conduct a risk assessment. In other words, an operator would have to evaluate each hazard to determine the likelihood and the severity of that hazard. This assessment should identify the likelihood of each hazard causing a casualty. This assessment should also account for the likelihood of each hazard causing major damage to public property or critical assets. Public property, in this case, means any property not associated with the operation. Critical assets means an asset that is essential to the national interests of the United States, and includes property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national defense, or assured access to space for national priority missions.

Proposed § 450.185(c) would require an operator to identify mitigations or controls used to eliminate or mitigate the severity or likelihood of identified hazards. An operator would be required to demonstrate, as part of its ground hazard analysis, that the mitigations or controls reduce the likelihood of each hazard that may cause (1) death or serious injury to the public to an extremely remote likelihood, and (2) major damage to public property or critical assets to a remote likelihood. These qualitative thresholds are the same as those in § 437.55(a)(3) and proposed § 450.109(a)(3). A hazard control is a preventative or mitigation measure that reduces the likelihood of the hazard or ameliorates its severity.

Proposed § 450.185(d) would require an operator to identify and describe the risk elimination and mitigation measures required to satisfy the risk criteria in proposed § 450.185(c). Under current industry standards, these measures include one or more of the following: Design for minimum risk, incorporate safety devices, provide warning devices, or implement procedures and training, as previously discussed in reference to the analogous flight hazard analysis requirement in § 450.109(a)(4).\168\

\168\ MIL-STD-882E, section 4.3.4.

Finally, proposed § 450.185(e) would require an operator to demonstrate through verification and validation that the risk elimination measures meet the remote and extremely remote standards discussed earlier. Verification is an evaluation to determine that safety measures derived from the ground hazard analysis are effective and have been properly implemented. Verification provides measurable evidence that a safety measure reduces risk to acceptable levels. Validation is an evaluation to determine that each safety measure derived from the ground hazard analysis is correct, complete, consistent, unambiguous, verifiable, and technically feasible. Validation ensures that the right safety measure is implemented, and that the safety measure is well understood.

While this proposal would require an operator to complete a full ground hazard analysis as described previously, an operator would not need to submit this analysis in its entirety as part of its vehicle operator license application. Rather in proposed § 450.185(f), the FAA would require an applicant to provide a description of the ground safety hazard analysis methodology, a list of the systems and operations involving the vehicle or payload that may cause a hazard to the public, and the results of the ground hazard analysis that affect the public. Although the results of the ground hazard analysis would be unique to each applicant's operations, the ground hazard analysis application deliverables should have common elements. Specifically, the ground hazard analysis should contain the hazards that have a high likelihood or high severity of affecting the public. The analysis should include controls for the hazards that mitigate the risk to the public and all of the other requirements shown in § 450.185.

Common hazards that affect public safety, which the FAA would expect to be addressed in a ground hazard analysis, include propellant loading, ordinance installation or actuation, proximity to pressurized systems during operations, certain lifting operations (such as solid rocket motors and payload integration), operations which could result in toxic release, and RF testing. Fundamentally, if the operator identifies a hazard that affects the public, it must be properly documented and mitigated to reduce the risk to the public. It should be noted that any part of the ground hazard analysis could be reviewed during inspection. 3. Ground Safety: Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls

In addition to those mitigations an operator would implement as a result of its ground hazard analysis, proposed § 450.189 (Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard Controls) would require an operator to implement certain prescribed hazard controls during the ground operations period of launch or reentry. These prescribed hazard controls would require that an operator document how it would protect members of the public who enter areas under the operator's control, mitigate hazards created by a countdown abort. They would also require the operator's plans for controlling fires and emergency procedures.

Specifically, proposed § 450.189(b) would require an operator to document a process for protecting members of the public who enter any area under the operator's control. Although the public would be protected from many hazards because they are excluded from safety clear zones and prevented from entering the site during certain hazardous operations, an operator should account for the protection of the public when they are allowed to be on the site. The proposed rule would require an operator to develop procedures to identify and track members of the public while on site, and methods to protect the public from hazards in accordance with the ground hazard analysis and the toxic hazard analysis. For example, the operator could have plans in place to control who enters its site, whether or not members of the public on site will be escorted, how the public will be made aware of and protected from hazards, and if members of the public will be required to wear personal protective equipment.

This rule would also require an operator to establish, maintain, and perform procedures for controlling certain hazards in the event of a countdown abort or recycle operation. Current § 417.415(b) requires an operator to meet specific requirements for safing their vehicle, maintaining control of their FSS, and controlling access to the site until it is returned to a safe state. This rule would require a more performance-based approach to ensuring the safety of the vehicle and the site following a countdown abort or recycle operation in order to accommodate many different types of flight safety systems and operations.

Proposed § 450.189(c) would require that an operator, following a countdown abort or recycle operation, establish, maintain, and perform procedures for controlling hazards related to the vehicle and returning the vehicle, stages, or other flight hardware and site facilities to a safe condition. In all of these instances, this proposal would require an operator to have provisions in place to keep the public safe while returning the launch vehicle or launch site back to a safe condition. If a launch vehicle does not lift-off after a command to initiate flight, an operator would be required to ensure that the vehicle and any payload are in a safe configuration, prohibit the public from entering into any identified hazard areas until the site is returned to a safe condition, and maintain and verify that any FSS remains operation until certain that the launch vehicle does not represent a risk of inadvertent flight. These more specific requirements would be levied on an operator in the event of a failure to lift-off after a command to initiate because a launch vehicle can be in a particularly hazardous state.

This proposed requirement is similar to § 417.415(b), which requires a launch operator to establish procedures for controlling hazards associated with a failed flight attempt where an engine start command was sent, but the launch vehicle did not lift-off. These procedures must include maintaining and verifying that each flight termination system remains operational, assuring that the vehicle is in a safe configuration, and prohibiting launch complex entry until the launch pad area safing procedures are complete.

Proposed § 450.189(d) would require an operator to have in place reasonable precautions for reporting and controlling any fire that occurs during launch and reentry activities in order to prevent the occurrence of secondary hazards such as a brush fire caused by a static fire test or some related ground launch activity. These secondary hazards, if not controlled, could reach pressure vessels or other related equipment causing more damage. An operator may choose to meet industry standards or fire codes as a means of satisfying this requirement.

Proposed § 450.189(e) would require an operator to establish general emergency procedures that address how emergencies would be handled at the site. An emergency has the potential to directly affect the public or create secondary hazards that may affect the public; therefore, implementation of these procedures are critical for safety of the public. An emergency would include any event that would require an evacuation, or a response from emergency officials such as the fire department or emergency medical technicians. Additionally, the establishment of general emergency procedures would allow the operator to have roles, responsibilities, and plans in place in advance of an emergency to reduce the effects of any emergency on the public. Section 417.111(c)(15) currently requires an operator to have generic emergency procedures in place for any emergency that may create a hazard to the public, and this rule would replace those prescriptive requirements with performance-based requirements.

Proposed § 450.189(f) would require an applicant to submit its process for protecting members of the public who enter any area under the operator's control. This process would be submitted as part of an applicant's vehicle operator license application. 4. Ground Safety: Coordination With a Licensed Launch or Reentry Site Operator

Under proposed § 450.181(a), for a launch or reentry conducted from or to a Federal launch or reentry site or a site licensed under part 420 or 433, an operator must coordinate with the site operator because the two entities each have public safety responsibilities during ground operations. Specifically, an operator must coordinate with the site operator to ensure public access is controlled where and when necessary to protect public safety, to ensure launch or reentry operations are coordinated with other launch and reentry operators and other affected parties to prevent unsafe interference, to ensure that any ground hazard area does not unnecessarily interfere \169\ with continued operation of the launch or reentry site, and to ensure prompt and effective response in the event of a mishap that could impact public safety. This is similar to § 417.9(b)(2), which requires a launch operator to coordinate with a launch site operator and provide any information on its activities and potential hazards necessary for the launch site operator to determine how to protect any other launch operator, person, or property at the launch site. Part 431 requires an agreement between a launch or reentry operator and any site operator in § 431.75. In addition, in the mission readiness review requirements in § 431.37(a), an operator must involve launch site and reentry site personnel and verify their readiness to provide safety-related launch property and launch services.

\169\ The FAA has proposed minimum requirements for ground hazard areas based on safety thresholds, either toxic hazard areas or other hazard areas derived from the ground hazard analysis, but has always allowed operators to propose to clear areas larger than necessary to ensure greater safety. In consultation with NASA and the Department of Defense, the FAA discovered that FAA approved ground hazard areas were having adverse impacts on neighboring space operations in easily avoidable ways. As such, the FAA has proposed ground hazard areas be coordinated with the affected launch or reentry site operators prior to licensing.

For a launch or reentry conducted from or to a site licensed under part 420 or 433, § 450.181(b) would require an operator to also coordinate with the site operator to establish roles and responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and investigating any mishap during ground activities at the site. The same mishap plan requirements in proposed § 450.173 would apply to a site operator leaving open the assignment of roles and responsibilities between a site and launch or reentry operator for reporting, responding to, and investigating mishaps during ground operations. Proposed § 450.181(b) is designed to ensure those roles and responsibilities are established.

As part of its application, an applicant would be required to describe how it is coordinating with a Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator in compliance with this section. As discussed earlier, in reference to proposed § 450.147, a vehicle operator would be required to submit as part of its vehicle operator license application references to any agreements with other entities utilized to meet any requirements of this section. In this context, agreements may include security, access control services, any lease agreements for launch sites, services used for hazard controls or analysis, or any agreement with local emergency or government services. 5. Ground Safety: Explosive Site Plan

Proposed § 450.183 (Explosive Site Plan) would require an applicant to include an explosive site plan as part of its vehicle operator license application, if it proposes to conduct a launch or reentry from or to a site exclusive to its own use. The explosive site plan would have to demonstrate compliance with the explosive siting requirements of Sec. § 420.63, 420.65, 420.66, 420.67, 420.69, and 420.70. Currently for exclusive use sites, § 417.9(c) requires a launch operator to satisfy the requirements of the public safety requirements of part 420. With proposed § 450.183, the FAA is clarifying that the only requirements from part 420 that need be conducted by an exclusive use operator is the explosive safety requirements. 6. Ground Safety: Toxic Hazards During Ground Operations

Proposed § 450.187 contains requirements for toxic hazard mitigation for ground operations. This is discussed later in the "Additional Technical Justification and Rationale" section, in the subsection on toxic hazards for flight, due to the commonality of toxic requirements for ground operations and flight.

Process Improvements

Process Improvements

A. Safety Element Approval

This proposal would modify part 414 to enable applicants to request a safety element approval in conjunction with a license application as provided in proposed part 450. Proposed § 450.39 (Use of Safety Element Approval) would allow an applicant to use any vehicle, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety element approval under part 414 without the FAA's reevaluation of that safety element during a license application evaluation to the extent its use is within its approved envelope. Finally, this proposal would change the part 414 term from "safety approval" to "safety element approval" to distinguish it from "safety approval" as used in parts 415, 431, and 435, and proposed part 450, because these terms, as discussed later in this section, have entirely different meanings. i. Part 414 and 415 Safety Approval Clarification

A. Safety Element Approval

As defined in current § 414.3, a safety approval is an FAA document containing an FAA determination that one or more safety elements, when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter, or situation, will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property. As listed in the Act, safety elements include: (1) Launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified component thereof; or (2) qualified and trained personnel, performing a process or function related to licensed launch activities or vehicles. In contrast, parts 415, 431, and 435 reference "safety approval" to mean an FAA determination that an applicant is capable of launching a launch vehicle and its payload without jeopardizing public health and safety, and safety of property. Other chapter III parts, including parts 431 and 435, reference "safety approval" as described in part 415.

The use of identical terms in parts 414, 415, 431, and 435 to reference different meanings has caused confusion. Therefore, the FAA proposes to distinguish these terms by changing the part 414 term to "safety element approval." This proposed term more accurately reflects the substance of a part 414 safety approval of a particular element that may be used to support the application review for one or more launch or reentry licenses. Other than the addition of "element" to the current term, the part 414 definition and related references in parts 413 and 437 would remain the same. The FAA would make conforming changes throughout parts 413, 414, and 437, where a part 414 safety approval is referenced, to change those references to "safety element approval." The term "safety approval" would maintain the same meaning as that in current 415, 431 and 435 where it appears in the proposed rule. ii. Part 414 Safety Element Approval \170\ Application Submitted in Conjunction With a License Application

\170\ For readability and ease of understanding, this section refers to a current part 414 safety approval as a safety element approval, regardless of whether the discussion is referencing the current regulations or the proposed regulations. For direct quotations, the FAA retains the previous term "safety approval."

Part 414 enables a launch and reentry operator to use an approved safety element within a specified scope without a re-examination of the element's fitness and suitability for a particular launch or reentry proposal. A safety element approval may be issued independent of a license, and it does not confer any authority to conduct activities for which a license is required under chapter III. A safety element approval does not relieve its holder of the duty to comply with all applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to the holder's activities.

The ARC recommended that an applicant for a launch or reentry license be able to identify one or more safety elements included in the applicant's license application and to request review of those safety elements for a safety element approval concurrent with the license application review.\171\

\171\ ARC Report, p. 24-25.

The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendation. The FAA notes that its practice has always been to accept references to information provided in a previous license application so long as the applicant can demonstrate the relevance of that information to the current application. The FAA also relies on previous evaluations where it analyzed compliance with a particular requirement if the same operator submits a more recent application using the same analysis. The proposed changes would codify this approach for safety element approval applications in proposed § 450.39 \172\ and the relevant sections in part 414.

\172\ Proposed § 450.39 is similar to § 437.21(c) for experimental permits, which states that if an applicant proposes to use any reusable suborbital rocket, safety system, process, service, or personnel for which the FAA has issued a safety approval under part 414, the FAA will not reevaluate that safety element to the extent its use is within its approved envelope. Parts 415 and 431 do not have similar sections because they were developed before part 414 was issued.

This proposal would allow an applicant to request a safety element approval as part of its vehicle operator license application. Specifically, this rule would provide a process in proposed § 414.13 to apply for a safety element approval concurrently with a license application. These safety element approval applications submitted in conjunction with a license would largely use information contained in a license application to satisfy part 414 requirements. This would alleviate the need to provide separate applications for a vehicle operator license and a safety element approval. The FAA envisions safety element approvals in conjunction with a license application to cover the same safety elements as delineated in § 414.3.

Using similar processes as for part 414, the FAA would determine whether a safety element is eligible for a safety element approval. The FAA would base its determination on criteria in proposed part 450. The applicant would be required to specify the sections of the license application that support its application for a safety element approval. The technical criteria for reviewing a safety approval submitted as part of a vehicle operator license application would be limited to the requirements of proposed part 450. This limitation would simplify the safety element approval process by eliminating the need to provide a Statement of Conformance letter, as required under current § 414.1(c)(3) for a safety element approval separate from a vehicle operator license application. To avoid this limitation to proposed part 450 criteria, an applicant could apply for a safety element approval separate from a vehicle operator license. However, there is no difference between a safety element approval issued through a separate application or a vehicle operator license application.

Finally, the FAA proposes to remove the requirement stating that, for each grant of a safety element approval, the FAA will publish in the Federal Register a notice of the criteria that were used to evaluate the safety element approval application, and a description of the criteria. The FAA provided the rationale for this notification in the preamble to a proposed rule.\173\ The FAA explained that the purpose of this notification requirement was to make clear the criteria and standards the FAA used to assess a safety element. However, the FAA has found that this requirement is unnecessary, and has potentially discouraged applications for safety element approvals due to concerns that proprietary data may be disclosed. Going forward, a safety element approval application submitted concurrently with a vehicle operator license application would be evaluated based only on criteria in proposed part 450. For other safety element approvals, experience has shown that there is no need to publish the criteria because the FAA's determinations were not based on any uniquely-derived standard. In fact, all eight safety element approvals granted by the FAA have been evaluated against regulations in 14 CFR chapter III. Therefore, the FAA proposes to revise the requirement in current § 414.35 (re-designated as § 414.39) such that safety element approval evaluation criteria, whether related to an application submitted concurrently with a license application or separately, would not require publication.

\173\ Safety Approvals, NPRM, 70 FR 32191, 32198 (June 1, 2005).

Given the FAA's proposal to not require publication of evaluation criteria, the confidentiality provision under current § 414.13(d) \174\ is no longer necessary. That provision notifies applicants that if proposed criteria is secret, proprietary, or confidential, it may not be used as a basis to issue a safety approval.

\174\ Current § 414.13 would be renumbered in this proposal as § 414.17 to maintain sequential section numbering.

B. Incremental Review of a License Application

B. Incremental Review of a License Application

In response to the ARC recommendations, the FAA proposes to amend part 413 and to include language in proposed part 450 to allow an applicant the option for an incremental review of the safety approval portion of its application.

Under 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1), the FAA is required by statute to issue or deny a launch or reentry license not later than 180 days after accepting an application. Under the same statute, the FAA must inform the applicant of any pending issue and action required to resolve the issue not later than 120 days after accepting an application. To ensure that the FAA has sufficient time to complete a thorough review to evaluate whether the applicant complies with the FAA's commercial space transportation regulations in the prescribed time frame, § 413.11 states the FAA screens the application to determine if it contains sufficient information for it to begin its review. It also states that if the application is so incomplete or indefinite that the FAA cannot start to evaluate it, the FAA will notify the applicant accordingly. In accordance with internal policy, the FAA aims to make this complete enough determination within two calendar weeks after receiving the application. When the FAA accepts an application, the 180-day review period begins on the date that the FAA received the application. If the FAA accepts an application as complete enough to review, the FAA works with applicants to identify additional information and documentation needed to demonstrate regulatory compliance, and advises applicants when those materials are needed. If the additional materials are not provided within an appropriate time frame, the FAA tolls the review period, stopping the counting of time towards the 180-day deadline. Once the FAA has completed its review, it issues a license, or informs the applicant, in writing, that the license application is being denied and states the reasons for denial.

Industry representatives have expressed frustration both with a lack of clarity as to what is "complete enough" for the FAA to accept an application and begin review and with the 180-day review period. The FAA seeks comment on how the FAA can improve the clarity of "complete enough" to address past frustrations. For an applicant that is in the early stages of development, there are challenges with compiling all of the documentation in parallel with their vehicle development. First-time applicants regularly underestimate the amount of time needed for licensing. For nearly all applicants, much of the vehicle and mission information is only refined and finalized within the 180-day review period, which may subject the application to tolling and business risk to the applicant's timeline for launch operations. The timing of the issuance of an FAA authorization has never caused a delay to a launch or reentry operation, but the FAA is cognizant that there could be impacts on an operator even absent an operation delay.

In part to address these issues, and bearing in mind that a written application is the means by which the FAA determines whether a launch or reentry operator can conduct a launch or reentry safely, the FAA invited the ARC to describe how the FAA might modify its application process to improve efficiency for both the FAA and applicants. The ARC suggested in part that the FAA allow for an incremental or modular application and review process. Specifically, the ARC recommended that the application review process should be modified to allow for incremental approvals of subsections to guide a focused review and avoid tolling. The recommendation suggested further that, rather than 180 days for review of an entire application, the FAA should assign a brief period for each subsection or module.

The current application process is already modular to an extent. The FAA has issued payload determinations outside of a license, primarily for payload developers seeking early assurances that their payload would be permitted to be launched. The FAA has even conducted preliminary policy reviews to provide similar assurances to future applicants on a less formal basis. Despite these allowances, the vast majority of FAA commercial space licensing evaluation time is spent on evaluating the safety implications of a license application. Because this proposed rule seeks to convert the prescriptive safety requirements to performance-based criteria, the FAA believes that it may be possible to develop a flexible safety review process that can afford applicants early determinations, providing an applicant more flexibility and control over the timing of the licensing process.

The ARC also recommended that the FAA reduce its application review time. The ARC focused on differentiating between experienced and inexperienced operators in order to decrease FAA review time of license applications. While the FAA agrees that experienced operators may require shorter application review times, it should be noted that this would likely be due to familiarity with the application process, more streamlined application materials that lend themselves to a more efficient review, and established processes that have been through FAA review previously (such as ground safety analyses).

While the proposed incremental review process would empower operators to better define when certain portions of an application are reviewed and would allow an operator that has satisfied certain requirements early to receive credit for those portions of its application in advance, other proposals in this rulemaking, such as safety element approvals concurrent with a license application, flexible time frames, and reduced application burdens, would probably serve to reduce review times more effectively than an incremental application process. Nevertheless, the modular nature of payload determinations, policy approvals, environmental evaluations, and financial responsibility requirements, and the more granular incremental review of compliance with the safety approval requirements would allow an applicant to seek partial approval of an application as soon as a portion is ready to be evaluated. These approvals would allow an operator to better manage its timeline and any potential timeline risk.

The flexible nature of this proposal would allow the FAA to further engage with industry and establish new best practices and greater efficiencies for both government evaluators and our commercial partners. The option of using an incremental approach would provide more flexibility to operators who are able to provide portions of their application in advance.

In proposed § 450.33 (Incremental Review and Determinations), the FAA would revise the launch and reentry regulations to allow for an incremental review application submission option for vehicle operator license applicants. Because the current regulations already allow an operator to submit the payload, policy, environmental, and financial responsibility portions of its application independently, the FAA proposes that the incremental review process apply specifically to the safety approval portion of a license application. Given the large variety of applicant experience, proposed operations, and company timelines, the FAA recognizes a need for flexibility. Accordingly, the FAA is proposing amendments to part 413 and regulatory language in proposed part 450 to allow for incremental application submission and determinations. This incremental review application process would not replace the traditional review of a full, complete application submitted at once--the incremental review would be an optional path to obtaining an FAA license determination that allows an applicant to choose an application submission process that suits their business model and program needs.

The FAA is proposing in § 450.33(a) that, prior to any submission, an applicant would be required to identify to the FAA that it plans to avail itself of the incremental review and determination application process. During pre-application consultation, the FAA would work with an applicant towards an incremental review process that is aligned to both the development process for an applicant and the necessities of the FAA's evaluation framework. The FAA proposes to coordinate with applicants during pre-application consultation to determine the following: (1) Appropriate portions of an operator's application that could be submitted and reviewed independently; (2) the application and review schedule with dates of key milestones; (3) the applicant's planned approach to demonstrate compliance with each applicable regulation, to include any foreseeable requests for waiver; and (4) the scope of the proposed action being applied for, the identification of any novel safety approaches or other potentially complicating factors, and how those will be addressed during the licensing process.

The details of an applicant's incremental application process would have to be approved by the FAA in accordance with proposed § 450.33(b) prior to application submission and the FAA could issue determinations towards a safety approval resulting from those reviews, in accordance with proposed § 450.33(c). An applicant would be able to propose sections of the safety approval portion of its application that the FAA could review independently. This process would allow an applicant to submit completed sections, for example the System Safety Program, to the FAA early, rather than wait until the entire application was complete enough. The FAA would also be able, where appropriate, to review and make determinations on these increments prior to a full licensing determination. It would also allow an applicant to identify more challenging or lengthy portions of an application that could be submitted earlier to avoid delays and tolling closer to a launch date. The FAA believes this process would improve predictability for applicants seeking assurances against business risks. As the FAA gains more experience with the incremental application process, the FAA may issue guidance for the process or an example of a process that has been found to satisfy the intent of the regulation.

The FAA considered the ARC's recommendations for predetermined modules, but identified several concerns in attempting to model the practice of such a process. The ARC provided a flow diagram that partitioned the evaluation process into nine conceptual 30-day modules, with the proposal that those modules could be reviewed in serial or in parallel. As noted earlier, the FAA is statutorily limited to a 180-day review process, so any review of modules in serial could not exceed 180 days. The ARC recommended that if the modules are submitted in parallel for concurrent review, extra time should be provided for FAA review up to 90 days to allow for dependent analyses.

The ARC recommendation asserted the importance that the modules are independent in terms of content, when possible, but correctly acknowledged that some modules will necessarily depend on others.\175\ The FAA seeks to provide as much flexibility as practicable in the proposed process to enable innovative business practices and schedules that contemplate frequent launches and reentries, but many aspects of the safety evaluation are interdependent, and the FAA requires certain material from one aspect of a safety evaluation to inform and remain consistent with other aspects. Furthermore, operators generally develop and define standards, methodologies, processes, preliminary designs, and plans for an aspect of their evaluation long before they are able to submit advanced analysis products or testing results. The FAA seeks comment on how a formal incremental review process would account for the statutory 180-day review period, when application increments or modules are likely to be submitted and reviewed at very different time periods.

\175\ ARC Report, p. 61.

To enable incremental application submission and review, the FAA is proposing to amend § 413.1 to broaden the term application to encompass either a full application submitted for review or an application portion submitted under the incremental review process. In making this amendment, the FAA would be able to accommodate applications submitted under either process. The FAA proposes to retain the pre-application consultation requirement of § 413.5, which is streamlined by the proposed removal of § 415.105 and its duplicative requirement for a more prescriptive pre-application consultation process. Under this proposal, an operator would be required to identify whether it wants to enter into the incremental application process during pre-application consultation. Should an operator elect to submit its application incrementally, it would work with the FAA to detail what is needed for each application portion to begin review. In proposing an approach to incremental review, the FAA expects that an applicant would consider the following:

1. Application increments submitted at different times should be not be dependent on other increments to the extent practicable.

2. Application increments should be submitted in a workable chronological order. In other words, an applicant should not submit an application increment before a separate application increment on which it is dependent. For example, the FAA would not expect to agree to review a risk analysis before reviewing a debris analysis or probability of failure analysis because the risk analysis is directly dependent on the other two analyses.

3. An applicant should be able to clearly identify all the regulations and associated application materials that would be required for each application increment, and should be able to demonstrate to the FAA that all the applicable regulations are covered by the separately submitted portions.

4. Examples of application increments that may be suitable for incremental review include: System Safety Program, Preliminary Safety Assessment for Flight, Flight Safety Analysis Methods, and FSS Design.

The FAA seeks comment on the incremental approach generally. The FAA further seeks comment on any other useful guidelines that an applicant should consider when crafting an incremental approach. Finally, the FAA also seeks comment on any other safety approval sections of a license application that would be appropriate for incremental review.

Finally, the FAA would amend § 413.15 to provide that the time frame for any incremental review and determinations would be established with an applicant on a case-by-case basis during pre-application consultation. The FAA would continue to work with applicants during the pre-application phase to assist applicants in navigating the FAA's regulations and identifying potential challenges.

C. Time Frames

C. Time Frames

Chapter III regulations include a number of prescriptive time frame requirements that the FAA proposes to make more flexible. In 2016, the FAA conducted a review of the time frames in chapter III and found that many could be made more flexible without any discernable impact on safety. During meetings with the Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) \176\ in 2017 and 2018, some members of industry expressed concern about the FAA's restrictive time frame requirements. The ARC also stated that the current regulatory time frames and requirements for submission of changes is onerous and untenable for high flight rates.\177\

\176\ The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) states that its mission is "to promote the development of commercial human spaceflight, pursue ever-higher levels of safety, and share best practices and expertise throughout the industry." Its member businesses and organizations include commercial spaceflight developers, operators, spaceports, suppliers and service providers.

\177\ ARC Report, p. 48.

In consideration of the industry's comments and the FAA's review of chapter III time frames, the FAA proposes in § 450.15 to increase flexibility by allowing an operator the option to propose alternative time frames that better suit its operations. The FAA would revise the time frame requirements in parts 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 437, and 440 that are overly burdensome and may result in waiver requests. Further, the FAA would, after reviewing the operator's request for an alternative time frame, provide the FAA's expected review period to make its determination on the proposed alternative time frame. The proposed revisions to parts 415, 417, and 431 would be included in new proposed part 450. For ease of reference, the FAA would list all revised chapter III time frames in proposed appendix A to part 404.

Proposed § 450.15(b) would inform the operator to submit its request for an alternative time frame in writing. The "in writing" provision could be in the form of a formal letter or email sent electronically to the email address [email protected], with the subject line "Alternative Time Frame Request." If an operator would like to send the request in hardcopy, it would mail the request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Room 331, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Alternative Time Frame Request. The FAA anticipates that an operator would submit these requests during the pre-application consultation or during the application process, and not after a license has been issued. At a minimum, the operator would be required to submit its request before the time frame specified in the regulations. Note, the FAA would need time to process the request. For example, if a requirement states that an operator must submit a document 30 days before launch, the operator may not submit a request for an alternative time frame 30 days before launch or later. Also, under the proposal, the requested alternate time frame must be specific. For example, an operator could request to submit a document 15 days before launch, but not "as soon as possible." The FAA would provide the operator its decision in writing.

Proposed § 404.15(c) would provide the conditions under which the Administrator would agree to an alternative time frame. That is, the FAA would review and agree to an alternative time frame if the proposed alternative time frame would allow time for the FAA to conduct its review and make the requisite findings. For example, the default time frame in proposed § 450.213(b) for a licensee to submit to the FAA certain payload information would be not less than 60 days before each mission conducted under a license. The FAA uses the information to verify that each payload fits within any approved class of payload under the license, and to address any issues that may arise. The FAA may only need a shorter time frame for this effort if the approved payload classes are well defined and unlikely to generate payload-specific issues. As another example, the default time frame in proposed § 450.213(d) for a licensee to submit to the FAA certain flight safety system test data would be no later than 30 days before flight. The FAA may agree to a shorter time frame for an experienced operator that uses a proven flight safety system.

D. Continuing Accuracy of License Application and Modification of License

D. Continuing Accuracy of License Application and Modification of License

The FAA proposes to consolidate continuing accuracy requirements currently in Sec. § 417.11 and 431.73 in proposed § 450.211. The proposed rule would preserve the standards in Sec. § 417.11 and 431.73. In addition, it would allow an applicant to request approval of an alternate method for requesting license modifications during the application process. This option currently only exists in § 437.85 for experimental permits.

Under the current regulations, an operator must ensure that any representation contained in a license application is accurate for the entire term of a license. After the FAA issues a launch license, an operator must apply to the FAA for a license modification if any representation that is material to public health and safety or safety of property is no longer accurate (commonly referred to as "material change"). An application to modify a license must be prepared and submitted in accordance with part 413. The licensee must indicate what parts of its license application or license terms and conditions would be affected by a proposed modification.

Although license applications are often updated during the application process, the application, as fixed at the time of license issuance, becomes part of the licensing record. After issuing the license, the FAA deems any material change to a representation in the application to be a modification to the license. However, changes may occur after a license is issued, particularly among operators that are developing new systems or incorporating innovative technology. The FAA does not wish for the material change requirement to deter those changes intended to improve operations. Although the FAA and operators may not always agree on what constitutes a material change, the FAA works with the operator to resolve any issues and reduce uncertainties.

Regarding compliance with an issued license, the ARC recommended that information needed prior to each launch, as long as it is within the approved flight envelope, should be minimized and a centralized, automated system for submitting preflight information should be established. Continuing accuracy reviews should be limited to an assessment of the risks created by the change. The ARC further recommended that if the regulations continued to use the term "material change," then that term should be defined in the regulations, guidance, or pre-application agreement.

The FAA agrees with the ARC's recommendations. While there already exist avenues by which a licensee can minimize the need for license modifications,\178\ this rule would adopt an approach from § 437.85 where the FAA may identify the types of changes that a permittee may make to a reusable suborbital rocket design without invalidating the permit. In proposed § 450.211, the FAA may approve an alternate method for requesting license modifications if requested during the application process. The FAA envisions that this approach would permit an applicant during the application process to propose a method that is responsive to its anticipated types of changes after a license is issued.

\178\ A license applicant may circumvent or lessen the need for frequent license modification due to material change by providing in its application a range of payloads, flight trajectories, hazard areas, and orbital destinations, so as to encompass more flexibility in actual licensed operations. A license applicant may also create acceptable processes for making changes to safety critical systems and their components, mission rules, hazard areas, and safety organization, that limit the need for license modifications. Part of these processes would include a mechanism for informing FAA of the change.

Regarding the recommendation for the development of a centralized automated system for submitting preflight information, while the FAA has been flexible in accepting application material and license updates submitted in electronic format, it recognizes that an improved system is desirable. The FAA is exploring mechanisms to facilitate these submissions.

Finally, the FAA agrees with the ARC recommendation that it should develop guidance on what constitutes a "material change" and has identified the following areas that often constitute a material change:

1. Safety-critical system or component changes (e.g., flight safety system) that may affect public safety, including--

a. Substitution of an existing safety-critical component with a component with a new part number or manufacturer (reflecting changed dimensions, changed functional or performance specifications, or changed manufacturing process).

b. Modifications to a safety critical component deemed necessary by an anomaly investigation, and requiring re-verification by test or inspection.

c. Rework or repair of a safety-critical component after inspections or tests revealed fabrication or assembly imperfections.

d. Reuse, after an earlier launch or reentry, of safety-critical systems or components, requiring refurbishment, re-qualification testing, and re-acceptance testing.

2. Hazard analysis changes that may affect public safety such as the validity of the hazard analysis, mitigation measure, or verification of a safety critical system or component.

3. Flight safety rule changes that may affect public safety such as flight commit criteria associated with public safety.

4. Hazard area changes that may affect public safety, including the dimensions of the area.

5. Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) related changes that affect the validity of the assumptions used to establish the MPL (e.g., change in the number of personnel within a hazard area, change in trajectory resulting in more overflight of people or property, increase in vehicle size with more propellant, hazardous materials, or potential debris).

6. Environmental Assessment related changes that affect the validity of an environmental assessment (e.g., changes to mitigation measures outlined in a record of decision or environmental impact statement).

7. Safety organization changes that may affect public safety such as changes to the roles and responsibilities of the safety organization or personnel, including changes in contractual safety services.\179\

\179\ As discussed earlier in the preamble, the proposed rule would eliminate the current requirement to name a specific individual as the safety official. Instead, the NPRM would allow for one person or several persons to perform the safety official functions, and, the operator would be required to designate a position, not a specific individual, to accomplish the safety official functions. Therefore, under this proposal, if the operator changes the specific individual performing the safety official functions, that would not constitute a material change.

8. Critical documents or processes that may affect public safety.

The FAA believes that this list provides guidance to help operators better understand what constitutes a material change. As the industry continues to develop and the FAA identifies material changes, it will consider providing more detailed guidance.

Other Changes

Other Changes

A. Pre-Application Consultation

As discussed earlier, the ARC recommended that the FAA require the pre-application process only for new operators or new vehicle programs. For all other operations, the ARC recommended that pre-application occur at the operator's discretion.\180\ The FAA does not agree that pre-application should be discretionary for anyone. In light of the various flexibilities proposed in this rule, pre-application consultation would remain critical to assist operators with the licensing process, especially those that choose to avail themselves of the flexibilities provided in this proposal. These flexibilities include incremental review, timelines, and the performance-based nature of many of the regulatory requirements. Pre-application consultation eases the burden on both the applicant and the FAA during the application process by identifying and resolving issues that allow applicants to submit application materials the agency can accept as complete enough for review. That being said, pre-application consultation with an experienced operator conducting an operation substantively similar to one previously licensed would likely be an abbreviated process.

A. Pre-Application Consultation

\180\ ARC Report, p. 23.

In response to the ARCs request for defined review times, the FAA considered an approach to pre-application consultation that would culminate in a mutually agreeable "compliance plan." Under this approach, a compliance plan would be developed collaboratively between the applicant and the FAA. Key milestones that could be established by the compliance plan would include, but would not be limited to, the planned dates of the formal application submittal, the FAA's licensing determination, and the submission of any required information that is unavailable at the time of formal application submittal. The FAA chose not to propose this requirement because it could be overly burdensome, possibly delay an application submittal, and the compliance plan could require frequent updates. However, the FAA would be open to commenters' views on how to best develop a voluntary pre-application product, such as a compliance plan.

B. Policy Review and Approval

B. Policy Review and Approval

The FAA currently reviews a launch and reentry license application to determine whether it presents any issues affecting national security interests, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. As part of its review and in accordance with section 50918 of the Act, the FAA consults with the Department of State, Department of Defense, and other executive agencies, as appropriate. The Department of Defense assesses the effect of the launch on U.S. national security, and the Department of State assesses its effect on foreign policy interests and international obligations of the United States. For good practice, the FAA also consults with NASA, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for counsel on those U.S. interests related to the primary responsibilities of each agency. As such, the FAA coordinates with the FCC and NOAA over matters related to frequency licensing and Earth imaging, respectively, and with NASA for matters particularly related to its assets in space.

Section 415.25 currently contains application requirements for a policy review of the launch of a vehicle other than an RLV, § 431.25 for the launch and reentry of an RLV, and § 435.23 for the launch of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV.\181\ To date, these informational requirements have served their purpose well. However, the FAA believes that the current informational requirements should be modified to relieve the applicant of unnecessary burden and to improve the utility of the information requested for a policy review. Currently, Sec. § 415.25(b) and 431.25(b) both require an applicant to identify structural, pneumatic, propellant, propulsion, electrical and avionics systems. Section 431.25(b) also requires an applicant to identify thermal and guidance systems used in the launch vehicle, and all propellants. Although identifying the aforementioned systems is important for a safety review, the FAA believes that this information is not critical for a policy review, which addresses whether the launch or reentry presents issues affecting national security interests, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States.

\181\ These sections require an applicant to provide basic information about the launch or reentry vehicle, its ownership, launch site, flight azimuths, trajectories, associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points, sequence of planned events or maneuvers during flight, range of nominal impact areas for all spent motors and other discarded mission hardware, and for each orbital mission, the range of intermediate and final orbits of each vehicle upper stage, and their estimated orbital lifetimes.

The FAA proposes to consolidate the policy review requirements contained in Sec. § 415.25 and 431.25 under proposed § 450.41 (Policy Review and Approval). In doing so, the FAA would retain the substance of the current requirements while further tailoring the informational requirements toward a policy review. Also, the FAA would replace the launch or reentry vehicle description requirements with vehicle description requirements that are more appropriate for a policy review. Finally, the FAA would require the applicant to provide flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points, and contingency abort \182\ profiles, if any, for the duration of the licensed activity.

\182\ The FAA proposes to revise the definition in § 401.5 of "contingency abort" to mean a flight abort with a landing at a planned location that has been designated in advance of vehicle flight. The proposed definition is discussed later in this preamble.

Specifically, proposed § 450.41(e)(2) would replace the current requirement to identify structural, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, thermal, guidance and avionics systems with a requirement to describe the launch or reentry vehicle and any stages, including their dimensions, type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. As previously mentioned, currently required information is not critical for a policy review because policy determinations do not require the same level of technical detail as a safety review and do not need to delve into vehicle design specifics. Instead, the information required by proposed § 450.41(e)(2) would provide the FAA and its interagency partners with the scope of the proposed activity that is more pertinent to a policy review. Moreover, the FAA anticipates that the proposed changes would be significantly less burdensome for an applicant, as the information is readily available and requires minimal effort to provide. In contrast, the currently required information, while also readily available, might be extensive and require more effort to compile.

Additionally, it is unclear that the requirements to supply flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points, currently found in Sec. § 415.25(d)(2) and 431.25(d)(2), apply for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e., from lift-off to the end of licensed activities). For example, applicants previously have interpreted the requirement to supply flight azimuths and trajectories to end at orbital insertion because that is when ground tracks and instantaneous impact points vanish. However, during interagency coordination for policy reviews of orbital missions, NASA and the Department of Defense have repeatedly, and specifically, requested information from the FAA concerning the trajectories of upper stages after orbital insertion in order to determine the potential for the proposed mission to jeopardize the safety of government property in outer space or national security.

Therefore, in addition to consolidating Sec. § 415.25(d)(2) and 431.25(d)(2) into proposed § 450.41(e)(4)(ii), the FAA would add language to clarify that the requirement to supply flight azimuths, trajectories, and associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points applies for the duration of the licensed activity (i.e., lift off to the end of launch). This clarification would eliminate the need for the FAA to request additional information from an applicant to satisfy inquiries from NASA and the Department of Defense during policy reviews and prevent any unnecessary delays to the policy review process.

C. Payload Review and Determination

C. Payload Review and Determination

The FAA proposes to consolidate the payload review requirements. The agency would also remove the requirement to identify the method of securing the payload on an RLV, add application requirements to assist the interagency review, such as the identification of approximate transit time to final orbit and any encryption, clarify the FAA's relationship with other federal agencies for payload reviews, and modify the 60-day notification requirement currently found in Sec. § 415.55 and 431.53.

While speaking of payload reviews, it is important to keep in mind the definitions of launch vehicle and payload as defined in FAA regulations. The FAA is not proposing to amend these definitions. A launch vehicle is a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload in, outer space or a suborbital rocket. A payload is an object that a person undertakes to place in outer space by means of a launch vehicle, including components of the vehicle specifically designed or adapted for that object. Thus, a payload can become a reentry vehicle. For example, the Dragon is a payload when it is launched on the Falcon 9 and a reentry vehicle when it reenters from Earth orbit. The FAA believes that any component attached to, or part of, a launch or reentry vehicle that has an intended use in space other than transporting itself or a payload, is in fact a payload. For example, the FAA has treated canisters of cremains attached to a stage left in orbit as payloads.

Pursuant to § 415.51, unless the payload is exempt from review under § 415.53, the FAA reviews a payload proposed for launch to determine whether an applicant, payload owner, or operator has obtained all the required licenses, authorization, and permits. The FAA further determines whether a payload's launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. Similarly, both § 431.51 for launch and reentry of an RLV and § 435.41 for reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV, require the FAA to review a payload to examine the policy and safety issues related to the proposed reentry of a payload.

Current Sec. § 415.59 and 431.57 also require the applicant to submit basic payload information to allow the FAA to conduct a payload review. While the information requirements for payload review in Sec. § 415.59 and 431.57 are similar, they are not identical. Both sections require that an applicant provide the payload's physical dimensions and weight; owner and operator; orbital parameters for parking, transfer, and final orbits; and hazardous materials, as defined in § 401.5, and radioactive materials, and the amounts of each. However, § 415.59 requires an applicant to provide the name and class of the payload, the intended payload operations during the life of the payload, and the delivery point in flight at which the payload will no longer be under the licensee's control. Whereas, § 431.57 requires an applicant to provide either the payload name or payload class and function; the physical characteristics of the payload in addition to the payload's dimensions and weight; the explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials found on the payload or RLV during reentry; and the method of securing the payload on the reusable launch vehicle. It also replaces delivery point with designated reentry site(s); and requires the identification of intended payload operations during the life of the payload. With respect to hazardous materials, § 431.57 also requires the applicant to identify the container of the hazardous materials, in addition to the type and amount, because how the hazardous materials are contained is important for reentry.

The FAA believes that the current payload review informational requirements necessitate modification to improve the utility and efficiency of payload review. During interagency review, other agencies have requested information from the FAA for the amount of time a payload will take to reach its final orbital destination. This information allows the agencies to assess the payload's potential to impact their operations. However, current regulations do not contain an informational requirement that the applicant provide this information. As a result, the FAA often must make additional requests to the applicant in order to provide the requesting agencies with the information.

In the past, most non-government payloads were telecommunications or remote sensing satellites for which there were well-established regulatory regimes. Operators are now proposing payloads with new intended uses such as servicing other satellites and mapping frequency use. The capabilities of payloads continue to grow; for example, cubesats are appearing in great numbers with unique capabilities. As a result, it is possible that these new uses may pose threats to national security, such as the resolution of on-board cameras that might be used to survey national security space assets. Consequently, payload reviews increasingly need to address the threat that these new uses and capabilities might pose to U.S. national security, either unintentional or malicious.

Additionally, § 415.53 provides that the FAA does not review payloads regulated by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. Section 431.51 provides that the FAA does not review payloads subject to regulation by other federal agencies. However, neither of these regulations reflect current practice. In practice, the FAA includes payload information in its interagency reviews for all payloads, with the exception of certain U.S. Government payloads for which information is unavailable due to national security concerns, because § 415.51 provides that the safety requirements apply to all payloads, regardless of whether the payload is otherwise exempt. Even though the FAA conducts a review of all payloads, the FAA does not impinge on the authority of the FCC or the Department of Commerce, nor question the decision of the FCC or NOAA to approve communications or remote sensing satellites. It does not question the decision of another federal agency concerning its payloads. More accurately, while the FAA may conduct a review of all payloads, the FAA does not make a payload determination on what it considers an "exempt" payload.

Changes in the types of payloads that are being launched or proposed have also complicated the scope of FAA payload reviews and demonstrated that the language exempting certain payloads from review is overly restrictive. The FAA has made payload determinations for payloads that will undoubtedly require FCC or NOAA licensing, but the proposed payload missions were beyond the scope of communications or remote sensing. These payloads were examined in the interagency process and neither the FCC nor NOAA took exception to the FAA's approach.

Section 50918 of Title 51 of the U.S. Code mandates that the Secretary of Transportation consult with the Secretary of Defense on matters affecting national security, the Secretary of State on matters affecting foreign policy, and the heads of other agencies when appropriate. Section 50919(b) states that chapter 509 of Title 51 does not affect the authority of the FCC or Department of Commerce. The language of FAA regulations exempting from review those payloads subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC, NOAA, and other agencies, is more restrictive regarding the FAA's authority than what is required in the statutory mandate of 51 U.S.C. 50918 and 50919. The genesis of this more-limited role by the FAA came from the Report of House of Representatives, May 31, 1984, that accompanied H.R. 3942. Specifically, the report stated: "[t]he Committee intends that the Secretary not review or otherwise evaluate the merits of communications satellites licensed and approved by the FCC, other than to assure the proper integration of such payload with the launch vehicle and its launch into orbit." At that time, almost all non-government payloads were communications or remote sensing satellites, regulated by the FCC and NOAA, respectively.

When DOT published the initial licensing regulations in 1988, the preamble noted that the payloads subject to existing payload regulation included only telecommunications satellites licensed by the FCC and remote sensing satellites licensed by NOAA. It went on to state that payloads that were not subject to review by DOT included all domestic payloads not presently regulated by the FCC or NOAA and all foreign payloads. Almost any domestic payload, even if it is not a telecommunications satellite, however, requires FCC licensing because it will invariably have a U.S.-owned or -operated transmitter for telemetry purposes. Therefore, it appears that the intention of the rule was only to exclude from FAA regulation telecommunications satellites licensed by the FCC and likewise, remote sensing satellites licensed by NOAA, and not any satellite with a transmitter licensed by the FCC or with some incidental remote sensing capability.

In recent years, there have been proposals for commercial payloads where the primary purpose might be scientific or exploratory or even artistic. Despite their primary purpose, these payloads almost always require an FCC license because they have transmitters for telemetry. Similarly, some payloads also require approval by NOAA even though remote sensing may be ancillary to the main purpose. Without an interagency review, the FAA has no direct means of knowing whether a payload is exempt from review and, as a result, has initiated interagency reviews. These reviews also serve the purpose of alerting the other agencies to launches of payloads that might jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States, even if they are exempt from an FAA payload review. Although the FAA has not to date been faced with the Department of Defense or the Department of State raising concerns through the interagency review regarding national security or foreign policy for an "exempt" payload, the FAA believes that it would be its responsibility to convey those concerns to the appropriate agencies for resolution.

The ARC asserts that the payload reviews being conducted are more detailed than necessary to assure the protection of "public health and safety." The ARC recommended that payloads that stay within the vehicle, have non-hazardous materials, or those that have previously been approved for flight, should not require reviews. It recommended that safety goals can be met by only requiring reviews for hazardous payloads that could impact "public health and safety." The ARC also stated that it would be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous payloads ejected from the launch vehicle in reportable quantities using the existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101. It believes such an approach would reduce unnecessary paperwork and subsequent FAA review for "benign payloads," and the reduction of burden on the FAA to review "non-safety related payloads" would support industry's increased flight tempo and reduce FAA review times.

The FAA does not agree with the ARC recommendation that payloads that stay within the vehicle, payloads that are non-hazardous materials, or those that have previously been approved for flight should not require reviews. The fact that a payload remains on or within the launch or reentry vehicle does not change the function of the payload. The payload's intended use in space or changes in the orbit of the vehicle to accommodate the payload operation might present issues because it could affect NASA or Department of Defense assets either due to its orbit or function. For example, the Department of Defense has concerns regarding payloads that may pass close enough to its assets to photograph them. The FAA recognizes that some payloads, such as canisters of cremains, attached to an upper stage, might have little or no safety or policy implications. However, a review is still necessary to make that determination. Obviously, the absence of hazardous materials also removes some safety concerns; however, as previously discussed, hazardous materials are not the only concern addressed in the payload review.

While payloads that stay within a vehicle, do not contain hazardous materials, or have previously been approved may require less scrutiny, a payload review is still required because the FAA is statutorily mandated under 51 U.S.C. 50904(c) to determine whether a license applicant or payload owner or operator has obtained all required licenses, authorization, and permits. If no license or authorization or permit is required by another federal agency, the FAA must determine whether a launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. Similarly, while potentially it might be more cost effective to regulate only hazardous payloads ejected from a launch vehicle in reportable quantities using existing standards in 49 CFR 172.101, the FAA must still comply with the statutory requirements imposed on it by 51 U.S.C. 50904(c). Both the FAA's current and proposed regulations reflect this statutory requirement.

As for payloads that have previously been approved for launch, the FAA already authorizes classes of payloads under Sec. § 431.53 and 415.55, but it still requires identification of the specific payload at least 60 days prior to the launch in order to confirm that the payload fits within the authorized class and to coordinate with other federal agencies. The FAA currently does not make a new payload determination if a payload fits within a class of payloads authorized under a particular license, but the review is still necessary to confirm there are no issues that affect public health and safety, the safety of property, or national security. The more defined the payload class, the less the likelihood of any issues once the specific payload is identified. For series of virtually identical payloads, the FAA has authorized the entire series. A payload or launch operator can work with the FAA to facilitate and expedite payload approvals by defining payload classes to accommodate possible payloads. Also, payload classes authorized for one operator will usually be authorized for another operator. The FAA acknowledges that the current 60-day notification requirement might be unnecessary for certain well-defined payload classes and proposes to modify this requirement to permit a shorter notification on a case-by-case basis. The FAA anticipates that the notification requirement would be specified either in the separate payload determination or in a vehicle operator license.

The ARC recommended that payloads that contain hazardous materials in Federally-reportable quantities be reviewed in 15 days. The FAA does not agree with the ARC's recommendation because there are other considerations regarding intended operations in space that might affect national security or the safety of property. For example, a payload may have the capability of observing or interfering with U.S. national security assets or violate a provision of a treaty.

The FAA proposes to consolidate the requirements for a payload review currently contained in subparts D of parts 415, 431, and 435 in proposed § 450.43 (Payload Review and Determination). The proposed consolidation would retain most of the current payload review requirements. The limited changes the FAA proposes to the payload requirements are discussed in this section.

The FAA proposes to modify the relationship with other agencies by removing the misleading statement that the FAA does not review payloads that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. Specifically, the FAA proposes to modify the regulation to reflect that while it does not review those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce, it still reviews the payloads to determine their effect on the safety of launch. The FAA also consults with other agencies to determine whether their launch would jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. Proposed § 450.43(b) would provide that the FAA would not make a payload determination over those aspects of payloads that are subject to regulation by the FCC or the Department of Commerce. The FAA does not intend to interfere with any requirement that these agencies might impose or with approvals or denials. This clarification is merely a recognition of current practice regarding payloads that do not easily fit into the existing regulatory rubric.

The FAA also proposes not to retain the specific reference to NOAA in § 415.53(a). Although commercial remote sensing is currently licensed by NOAA's Office of Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA), the Secretary of Commerce recently proposed merging CRSRA with NOAA's Office of Space Commerce and moving them directly under the Office of the Secretary of Commerce. As a result, proposed § 450.43(b) would revise the description of which payloads are exempt, to clarify that a payload planning to conduct remote sensing operations would be exempt if licensed by any office within the Department of Commerce.

In consolidating the informational requirements in parts 415, 431, and 435, the FAA proposes to eliminate information requirements concerning the method of securing a payload that was a requirement under § 431.57(g) for RLVs because that information is not relevant to a payload review. The FAA considered replacing that informational requirement with a more general one to provide the potential of the payload to affect the dynamics of the vehicle. However, the FAA determined such information was more pertinent to the vehicle operator and should instead be included in systems safety analysis for the launch or reentry, if appropriate.

Proposed § 450.43(i)(1) also would require an applicant to provide an expanded description for the payload that would include its composition and any hosted payloads in addition to the current requirements of physical dimensions and weight. The FAA proposes to ask for any foreign ownership of the payload or payload operator. In addition, the FAA would add the approximate transit times to final orbit for the payload. The FAA proposes to elaborate what it means by intended payload operations during the life of the payload by adding its anticipated life span and any planned disposal. Further, it proposes a requirement to describe any encryption associated with data storage on the payload and transmissions to or from the payload. Encryption helps ensure against cyber intrusion, loss of spacecraft control, and potential debris-causing events. The FAA is proposing these additions to the information requirements for launches to assist other federal agencies because NASA and the Department of Defense frequently have requested this information in response to the FAA's interagency review in order to determine whether the proposed payload would jeopardize the safety of government property in outer space, or U.S. national security.

The FAA also proposes to add a general requirement that it may request any other information necessary to make a determination based on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA believes that it would rarely invoke this provision but believes that it is crucial to address unique payloads.

The FAA anticipates that for payload classes--as distinguished from specific payloads--the applicant might only be able to provide a range of expected transit times and would find this acceptable. Similarly, for classes of payloads the FAA would find it appropriate to provide ranges for information related to size of the payload and quantities of hazardous materials. It also proposes to add the explosive potential of payload materials, alone and in combination with other materials on the payload for launches, as it already does for reentries because the information is equally relevant to the safety of a launch as for a reentry.

The FAA anticipates that these additional data requirements would impose minimal burden, if any, on the applicant. For example, the payload operator should already have detailed plans for moving its payload to its final destination, and the explosive equivalent for most materials is easily calculated using readily-available information. As another example, in requesting information about what encryption, if any, is used, the FAA is not asking for a detailed account of encryption methodology. Many operators are already using 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard encryption (AES-256) to protect commercial telemetry, tracking, and control data links and mission data transmission or storage. In this case, an operator would only need to state that it uses AES-256. These additional data requirements help inform the overall evaluation of a payload.

By specifying in its regulations what is required to expedite the FAA's payload review process without the need to make supplemental requests to an applicant to address interagency concerns, and the applicant would avoid having to respond to such requests. The FAA seeks comment on this proposed approach.

D. Safety Review and Approval

D. Safety Review and Approval

As part of its current licensing process under parts 415 and 431, the FAA conducts a safety review to determine whether a proposed launch or reentry will jeopardize public health and safety and safety of property. The FAA would not change the philosophy or purpose of a safety review in this rulemaking. As with the current regulations, an applicant would have to satisfy the safety requirements in order to obtain a license to conduct a launch or reentry. Only a vehicle operator license applicant would be eligible to apply for a safety approval, and may apply for a safety approval separately and incrementally. As with current regulations, the FAA would advise an applicant, in writing, of any issues raised during a safety review that would impede issuance of a license, and the applicant may respond in writing, or amend its license application in accordance with § 413.17. This proposal would also not change the process by which the FAA denies a license, and the recourse afforded an applicant if a license is denied.

For launches and reentries from, or to, a Federal launch range or any launch or reentry site where a Federal launch range provides safety-related launch or reentry services or property by contract, the FAA would accept the service or property as meeting the relevant requirements of proposed part 450, as long as the FAA determines that the Federal launch range's safety requirements for the launch or reentry services or property provided satisfy those requirements. Note that a Federal launch range could, at the direction of the operator, provide FSA products such a debris risk analyses or flight safety limits analyses, directly to the FAA on behalf of an operator.

While the FAA is not proposing to change the philosophy and purpose of a safety review and approval, the FAA is proposing changes to the requirements to obtain a safety approval. The FAA proposes to locate the application requirements for a safety approval in proposed § 450.45 (Safety Review and Approval), in paragraph (e), and throughout proposed subpart C.

The application requirements in proposed § 450.45(e) are general and not specific to any safety requirement, and would include information not covered explicitly in proposed subpart C. Proposed § 450.45(e)(1) would address basic requirements for an application, such as the inclusion of a glossary of terms and a listing of referenced material. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.107, although the proposed regulation would not include the requirement for an application to be logically organized, with a clear and consistent page numbering system, and topics cross-referenced. The FAA expects an applicant to ensure its application meets these basic organizational standards without explicitly requiring them.

In proposed § 450.45(e)(2), the FAA would require an applicant to submit information about its launch or reentry site. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.109(a), with the addition of references to a reentry site.

In proposed § 450.45(e)(3), the FAA would require an applicant to submit information about its launch or reentry vehicle, including safety critical systems. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.109(b), but would include reentry vehicles in addition to launch vehicles.

In proposed § 450.45(e)(4), the FAA would require an applicant to submit a generic launch or reentry processing schedule that identifies any readiness activities, such as reviews and rehearsals, each safety-critical preflight operation, and day of flight activities. Although the proposed regulations do not necessarily require reviews or rehearsals, should the applicant propose them to meet readiness requirements, they should be included in the schedule. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.119, but with the addition of reentry vehicles.

Proposed § 450.45(e)(5) would apply to any proposed launch or reentry with a human being on board the vehicle, and would require an applicant to demonstrate compliance with certain safety requirements in part 460. This proposed requirement is similar to current § 415.8, except that it would include reentry vehicles.

Proposed § 450.45(e)(6) would address the potential launch or reentry of radionuclides, similar to current § 415.115(b) but with the addition of reentries. Because such proposals are rare, it is the current practice of the FAA to address the public safety issues on a case-by-case basis. This proposed rule would not change this approach.

Lastly, in proposed § 450.45(e)(7), the FAA would reserve the right to request additional information if necessary. This request would include information incorporated by reference in the license application, such as a previous application submittal. The FAA could also request additional products that would allow the FAA to conduct an independent safety analysis. The FAA periodically conducts independent system safety and flight safety analyses in order to gain a deeper understanding of the safety issues associated with a launch or reentry proposal. This independent analysis is particularly important for novel systems or operations. The FAA proposes to continue this practice with this rulemaking.

Proposed subpart C would contain the remainder of the application requirements for a safety approval. With some exceptions, discussed later, each safety requirement in proposed subpart C has application requirements articulated at the end of each section. Under current regulations for ELVs, application requirements are contained in part 415, while safety requirements are contained in part 417. Under current regulations for RLVs contained in part 431, application requirements and safety requirements are not distinguished so clearly. The proposed approach is designed to clearly separate safety requirements from application requirements.

However, the following proposed sections do not include application requirements, either because they introduce other sections or because the FAA would not require a demonstration of compliance to obtain a license:

1. § 450.101: This section would address the core public safety criteria for launching a launch vehicle or reentering a reentry vehicle. An applicant would demonstrate that it can meet these criteria in other parts of proposed subpart C.

2. § 450.113 (Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope and Applicability): This section would address the scope and applicability of the FSA requirements contained in Sec. § 450.113 through 450.141.

3. § 450.157: This section would include requirements for communication procedures, but an applicant would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license.

4. § 450.159: This section would include requirements for preflight procedures. Similar to proposed § 450.157, an applicant would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license.

5. § 450.169: This section would include requirements for launch and reentry collision avoidance analysis. An applicant would not have to demonstrate compliance with this section in order to obtain a license, but it would have to provide certain information to the FAA prior to a launch or reentry.

6. § 450.179 (Ground Safety--General): This section would address the scope and applicability of the ground safety requirements contained in Sec. § 450.181 (Coordination with a Site Operator) through 450.189.

E. Environmental Review

The FAA proposes to consolidate environmental review requirements for launch and reentry operators in a single section, as proposed § 450.47 (Environmental Review). Currently, these requirements are set forth in Sec. § 415.201, 415.203, 431.91, 431.93, and 435.61. In addition, the FAA proposes to revise current Sec. § 420.15, 433.7, 433.9, and 437.21 to conform to the changes in proposed § 450.47. Apart from consolidation, these proposed revisions would not alter the current environmental review process.

E. Environmental Review

The FAA is responsible for complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable environmental laws, regulations, and Executive Orders prior to issuing a launch or reentry license. To comply with NEPA, the FAA must first determine whether the licensing action requires a Categorical Exclusion (CATEX), an Environmental Assessment (EA), or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). A CATEX is appropriate when actions, individually or cumulatively, do not have a significant effect on the human environment. An EA broadly documents evidence and analysis necessary to determine whether a proposed action may significantly affect the human environment requiring the preparation of an EIS or results in a finding of no significant impact (FONSI). If the action may significantly affect the human environment, NEPA requires preparation of an EIS. An EIS is a thorough analysis of a proposed action's impacts on the environment, including a public involvement process.

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