Order JO 7210.56C Air Traffic Quality Assurance
This document is cancelled. Cancelled by JO 7210.632. Check the official source before relying on it.
Text read by OCR from a scanned file (15 of 113 pages). Check the original, as some words may be misread.
JO 72120.56C Air Trafic Quality Assurance, Change 2 incorporated…
U.S. Department
Of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
7210.56C Air Traffic Quality
Assurance
Distribution: ZAT-721 August 15, 2002 Prepared by the Air Traffic
Evaluations and Investigations Staff,
a
This Web version contains Change 2, dated 7/20/2009
RECORD OF CHANGES DIRECTIVE NO. 7210.56C
CHANGE SUPPLEMENTS OPTIONAL CHANGE SUPPLEMENTS OPTIONAL TO BASIC
TO BASIC
FAA Form 1320-5 (6-80) Use Previous Edition
Change 2 (effective 7-20-09)
Distribution: ZAT 721; ZAT-464 Initiated By: AJS-0 Vice President, Office of Safety
CHANGE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
JO 7210.56C
CHG 2
Air Traffic Organization Policy
Effective Date:
July 20, 2009
SUBJ: Air Traffic Quality Assurance
1. Purpose of This Order. This change transmits revised pages to Federal Aviation Administration Order (FAAO) JO 7210.56C, Air Traffic Quality Assurance.
2. Audience. This notice applies to the following Air Traffic Organization (ATO) service units: En Route and Oceanic, Terminal, System Operations; The Office of Safety, The Office of the Service Center; all air traffic control facilities, all federal and non-federal contract facilities.
3. Where Can I Find This Order? This order is available on the MyFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/.
4. Explanation of Policy Changes. In order to better assess risk in the National Airspace System, it is imperative that the ATO fully participate in full and open reporting and analyses of all appropriate safety data. As we continue to make improvements to our safety culture, we must ensure that we move toward a just culture in which blame is not associated with reporting of safety information and there is a significant focus on determining why events occur. This notice takes a significant step in that process by disassociating specific employee identification with reported operational errors/deviations and proximity events. References to employee identification, training record entries, performance management, and return-to-duty actions that have been historically tied to reported events are removed from FAAO JO 7210.56C by this notice. Facility managers are still expected to address observed and documented performance; however, this is an important step in de-coupling such performance management from safety data reporting. In addition, significant changes have been made to the time requirements for reporting operational errors and deviations. Most errors and deviations will be reported the next administrative day instead of within the current 4-hour time frame. This change is being made to reduce the workload of reporting within the operational environment and allows operational personnel to remain focused on the task at hand. It also demonstrates the intent to reduce our organizational focus on individual incidents and move toward a systemic risk-analysis based approach to safety.
5. Distribution. This notice is distributed to the following Air Traffic Organization (ATO) service units: En Route and Oceanic, Terminal, System Operations; the Office of Safety, the Office of the Service Center; all air traffic control facilities; all federal and non-federal contract facilities; Air Traffic Safety Oversight; the William J. Hughes Technical Center; and the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center.
6. Disposition of Transmittal. Retain this transmittal until superseded by a new basic order.
07/20/09 JO 7210.56C CHG2
7. Page Control Chart. See the page control chart attachment. Robert Tarter Vice President, Office of Safety Air Traffic Organization
Date:
Change 2 (effective 7-20-09) › Page Control Chart
7/20/09 JO 7210.56C CHG 2
Page Control Chart 1
PAGE CONTROL CHART
7210.56C CHG 2
July 20, 2009
REMOVE PAGES DATED INSERT PAGES DATED
Table of Contents iii through v … 08/04/08 Table of Contents iii through iv … 07/20/09 3-2 … 08/15/02 3-2 … 07/20/09 4-3 and 4-4 … 08/04/08 4-3 and 4-4 … 07/20/09 5-1 through 5-13 … 08/04/08 5-1 through 5-11 … 07/20/09 Appendix 2 … 08/15/02 Appendix 2 … 07/20/09 Appendix 4, Pages 3 through 10 … 08/15/02 Appendix 4, Pages 3 through 9 … 07/20/09 Appendix 5 … 08/15/02 Appendix 5 … 07/20/09 Appendices 9 through 12 … 08/15/02 Appendix 13 … 08/04/08 Appendix 9 … 07/20/09 Appendix 14 … 08/04/08 Appendix 10 … 07/20/09 Appendix 15 … 08/04/08 Appendix 11 … 07/20/09 Appendix 16 … 08/04/08 Appendix 12 … 07/20/09
Change 2 (effective 7-20-09) › Explanation of Changes
07/20/09 7210.56C CHG 2
E of C-1 Explanation of Changes
Air Traffic Control Explanation of Changes
Direct questions through appropriate facility/service center office staff
to the Office of Primary Interest (OPI)
a. 3-1-4. DOCUMENTATION
Paragraphs b(2) and (3) were replaced so that there was no reference to an OE/OD or other reportable events during the TTD. References should only be made to the documented performance and associated training accomplished.
b. 4-1-3. QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW (QAR)
Paragraph i was deleted because the reporting requirements were consolidated in paragraph 5- 1-5k and are covered in other directives.
c. 5-1-1. DEFINITIONS
The definition of Conformance Category (paragraph q) was modified to clarify that Conformance Categories are depictions of proximity outcome, not event severity.
This definition of Significant Event (paragraph r) was modified to coordinate with changes described below in OE reporting processes.
The definition of Training & Proficiency Record (paragraph t) was removed to clarify that OE/Ds are not to be entered into the employee’s Training and Proficiency Records.
d. 5-1-3. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS
Added verbiage in paragraph a to indicate that employees should only rarely be removed from an operational position pending the result of an OE/OD/PE investigation.
Paragraph b(4) was deleted because controllers need not be removed to conduct an OE/OD investigation.
e. 5-1-4. MULTIPLE LOSSES OF SEPARATION OR MULTIPLE DEVIATIONS DURING A SINGLE EVENT
The reference to employee performance in paragraph a was deleted since it has no bearing on reporting requirements.
Paragraph b was deleted because employees will no longer be identified on OE/OD reports.
f. 5-1-5. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Paragraphs b(1) through b(5) were replaced because there is no longer a requirement to interview employees in an OE/OD investigation.
Paragraph f was deleted because there is no longer a requirement to interview employees in an OE/OD investigation.
Paragraph l was amended to reflect the current title of the Office of Safety and changed to eliminate the four-hour time limit to report an OE/OD, leaving the four-hour reporting requirement and telephonic notification in-place for surface errors and significant events.
Paragraph n was deleted because employees will not be required to be interviewed. Additionally, training is covered in another paragraph.
Paragraph r was reworded to reflect that there is no longer a requirement to identify any involved specialists.
Paragraph s was changed to reflect the correct fax number.
7210.56C CHG 2 07/20/09
Explanation of Changes E of C-2
g. 5-1-6. ATM RESPONSIBILITIES
Paragraph a(4)(b) was deleted because employees will no longer be identified in the report.
h. 5-1-8. PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS
This section was reworded to indicate that training should be accomplished IAW agency directives and the CBA. The specific performance steps in this section were eliminated. In addition, the provisions of N JO 7210.707, Participation in Voluntary Safety Event Reporting, were incorporated.
i. 5-1-9. RETURN TO OPERATIONAL DUTY 5-1-10. WHEN THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER IS INVOLVED 5-1-11. FOLLOW-UP PERFORMANCE SKILL CHECK 5-1-12. SKILL ENHANCEMENT TRAINING
These paragraphs were deleted to reflect that individuals are not named in the OE/OD report and that training should be accomplished IAW agency directives and the CBA.
j. 5-1-13. FINAL REPORTS
Since no employees will be identified in the report, paragraph b was changed to delete the references to providing the employee a copy of Part I & II. The section was also changed to delete the manager’s consideration of the employee’s comments.
Paragraph c has been changed to remove the reference to the employee’s statement.
Paragraph e was deleted because employees will no longer receive a copy of Part III of the report.
k. 5-1-14. ENTRIES IN TRAINING & PROFICIENCY RECORD (FAA Form 3120-1)
This section was changed since OE/OD data will no longer be entered into the employee’s training records.
l. 5-1-16 FACILITY, HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES
Paragraph a(3) was deleted to indicate that training should be accomplished IAW agency directives and the CBA.
m. Appendix 2. Instructions for FAA Form 7210-2
Block 13a is changed. The last six numbers of an employee’s SSN are no longer to be entered into the form.
Block 13e is changed. The date of the last certification is no longer to be entered into the form.
Block 13f is changed. The previous OEs/ODs are no longer to be entered into the form.
n. Appendix 4. Instructions for FAA Form 7210-3
The instructions were changed to leave Blocks 11-22, 28, 31, and 37 blank.
The verbiage in Blocks 23-27, 29-30, 32-34, 39-40, 61, and 69 was changed to eliminate reference to any employee.
The requirement in Block 65 to explain why the controller did not maintain separation was removed. The examples were removed due to the references to particular employees.
The instructions and example in Block 68 were changed to enter all causal factors under column “A” only without reference to any employee.
The examples were deleted due to the references to particular employees.
07/20/09 7210.56C CHG 2
E of C-3 Explanation of Changes
o. Appendix 9. Interview Statement and Participating in Post Incident Investigations
The appendix was deleted since it is a restatement of what is contained in the Human Resource Policy Manual (HRPM). While interviews may still be conducted, the intent is to gather important safety data. Employees are aware of their responsibility to cooperate with all investigations as the Standards of Conduct are briefed yearly per the FAA/NATCA CBA.
p. Appendix 10. General Reporting Procedures
The appendix was deleted since it was a repetition of reporting requirements that are contained elsewhere.
q. Appendix 11. Air Traffic Incident Handling Procedures
The appendix was deleted since it was a repetition of reporting requirements that are contained elsewhere.
r. Appendix 12. Data Retention
The appendix was deleted because it contained outdated information.
s. Appendix 16. FAA Form 7210-6
The verbiage for Block 12 was changed to eliminate reference to the controller.
Change 1 (effective 8-04-08)
Distribution: ZAT-721; ZAT-464 Initiated By: AJS-0 Safety Services
CHANGE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
JO 7210.56C
CHG 1 Air Traffic Organization Policy Effective Date:
August 4, 2008
SUB: Air Traffic Quality Assurance
1. Purpose of This Change. This change transmits revised pages to Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7210.56C, Air Traffic Quality Assurance.
2. Audience. This change applies to the following Air Traffic Organization (ATO) service units: En Route and Oceanic, Terminal, Safety, System Operations Services; service center offices; all air traffic control facilities; all federal and non federal contract facilities.
3. Where Can I Find This Change? The notice is available on the MYFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/ and on the air traffic publications Web site at http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications.
4. Explanation of Policy Changes. This change includes editorial corrections and incorporates N JO 7210.661, Terminal/TRACON Audit Process for Operational Errors & Operational Deviations, effective May 23, 2007; N JO 7210.663, Operational Error Reporting, Investigation, and Severity Policies, effective June 25, 2007; N JO 7210.682, Operational Error Reporting, Investigation, and Severity Policies, effective March 17, 2008.
5. Distribution. This change is distributed to the following ATO service units: En Route and Oceanic, Terminal, Safety, System Operations Services; service center offices; all air traffic control facilities; all federal and non federal contract facilities; Air Traffic Safety Oversight; the William J. Hughes Technical Center, and the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center.
6. Disposition of Transmittal. Retain this transmittal until superseded by a new basic order.
7. Page Control Chart. See the page control chart attachment. Robert Tarter Vice President, Safety Services Air Traffic Organization
Change 1 (effective 8-04-08) › Page Control Chart
08/04/08 7210.56C CHG 1
Page Control Chart 1
PAGE CONTROL CHART
REMOVE PAGES DATED INSERT PAGES DATED iii through iv (TOC) … 8/15/02 iii through v (TOC) … 8/04/08 1-1 through 1-4 … 8/15/02 1-1 through 1-4 … 8/04/08 4-3 through 4-6 … 8/15/02 4-3 through 4-6 … 8/04/08 5-1 through 5-10 … 8/15/02 5-1 through 5-13 … 8/04/08 6-1 through 6-4 … 8/15/02 6-1 … 8/04/08 8-1 … 8/04/08 Appendix 1 (1-1 through 1-2) … 8/15/02 Appendix 1 (1-1 through 1-2) … 8/04/08 Appendix 13 - 16 … 8/04/08
Change 1 (effective 8-04-08) › Explanation of Change
08/04/08 7210.56C CHG 1
Explanation of Changes E of C-1
Air Traffic Control Explanation of Changes
Direct questions through appropriate facility/service center office staff To the Office of Primary Interest (OPI)
a. 4-1-7 SPILL OUTS This paragraph was changed to reflect the change in organizational responsibilities within the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), the telephone number used to submit spill out reports, and the e-mail address to electronically report spill outs.
b. 5-1-1 DEFINITIONS;
5-1-2 SUSPECTED EVENT; 5-1-3 INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS; 5-1-4 MULTIPLE LOSSES OF SEPARATION OR MULTIPLE DEVIATIONS DURING A SINGLE EVENT; 5-1-5 INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS; 5-1-6 ATM RESPONSIBILITIES; 5-1-7 RECLASSIFICATION; 5-1-8 PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS; 5-1-9 RETURN TO OPERATIONAL DUTY; 5-1-10 WHEN THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER IS INVOLVED; 5-1-11 FOLLOW-UP PERFORMANCE SKILL CHECK; 5-1-12 SKILL ENHANCEMENT TRAINING; 5-1-13 FINAL REPORTS; 5-1-14 ENTRIES IN TRAINING & PROFICIENCY RECORD; 5-1-15 DOCUMENTATION RETENTION; 5-1-16 FACILITY, HEADQUARTERS, & SERVICE UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES; 5-1-17 ATO SAFETY SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS; 5-1-18 ANALYSIS & FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS This change incorporates Notice N JO 7210.682 and Notice N JO 7210.663 into the full document. Paragraph 5-1-4 has been revised to clarify the intent when filing multiple reports for single events involving OEs, ODs, and PEs. These changes implement the separation conformance method of categorizing the conformance of operational errors (OE), and creates a new category of incident (Proximity Event). These changes emphasize transition to an outcome based conformance
classification and provide standard processes that will give greater transparency and ultimately increased understanding by our customers, owners and employees. c. 6-1 CONFORMANCE CATEGORIES The title of chapter 6 was changed from Severity Index to Conformance Categories to reflect the change from using the term severity to conformance throughout the document. d. 6-1-1 DEFINITIONS This change incorporates Notice N JO 7210.663 into the full document. These changes implement the separation conformance method of categorizing the conformance of operational errors (OE), and creates a new category of incident (Proximity Event) to identify and track the most minor of airborne non-wake turbulence losses of separation.
e. 8-1-1 BACKGROUND
8-1-2 FACILITY AUDIT PROCESS; 8-1-3 SAFETY ASSURANCE OFFICE RANDOM AUDIT This change incorporates Notice N JO 7210.661 into the full document. These changes implement the addition of facility audits and random audits, adds allowance to use playback tools to identify OE/ODs, and ensures that all OE/ODs are being reported as validation of the strength of local assurance programs.
f. APPENDICES 13 – 16 The original Appendix 13 (Operational Error/Deviation Handling Procedures and Return to Operational Duty) was deleted and the following appendices have been added: APPENDIX 13 – NON-WAKE SEPARATION CONFORMANCE CATEGORIZATION APPENDIX 14 – SEPARATION CONFORMANCE CLASSIFICATION TOOL APPENDIX 15 – CONFORMANCE CATEGORIZATION TABLES APPENDIX 16 – PROXIMITY EVENT FORM
8/15/02 7210-56C
i (and ii)
FOREWORD
This order is derived from a mutual goal of addressing quality efforts at the national, regional, facility and individual level. It provides specific guidance on investigation, reporting and recording types of incidents that impact the quality of air traffic services. This order represents several new ways of addressing quality assurance in a manner designed to improve the system. All concerned personnel shall familiarize themselves with the provisions pertaining to their responsibilities.
Linda M. Schuessler Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations Staff, AAT-20
Table of Contents
07/20/09 JO 7210.56C CHG 2
iii
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. General
Paragraph Page 1-1-1. PURPOSE … 1-1 1-1-2. DISTRIBUTION … 1-1 1-1-3. CANCELLATION … 1-1 1-1-4. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES … 1-1 1-1-5. EFFECTIVE DATE … 1-4 1-1-6. RELATED PUBLICATIONS … 1-4 1-1-7. USE OF TERMS … 1-5 1-1-8. SCOPE … 1-5
Chapter 2. Quality Assurance (QA) Programs
2-1-1. OVERVIEW … 2-1 2-1-2. RESPONSIBILITIES … 2-1 2-1-3. PROGRAM CONTENT … 2-2
Chapter 3. Technical Training Discussions
3-1-1. OVERVIEW … 3-1 3-1-2. DEFINITIONS … 3-1 3-1-3. RESPONSIBILITIES … 3-1 3-1-4. DOCUMENTATION … 3-2
Chapter 4. Air Traffic Incidents
4-1-1. DEFINITIONS … 4-1 4-1-2. GENERAL HANDLING PROCEDURES … 4-2 4-1-3. QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW (QAR) … 4-3 4-1-4. EMERGENCIES … 4-4 4-1-5. FLIGHT ASSISTS … 4-4 4-1-6. MILITARY FACILITY DEVIATIONS … 4-5 4-1-7. SPILL OUTS … 4-5 4-1-8. AIRSPACE INTRUSIONS … 4-6 4-1-9. INVALID MODE C REPORTING … 4-6 4-1-10. SURFACE INCIDENTS AND RUNWAY INCURSIONS … 4-6
Chapter 5. Air Traffic Operational Errors and Deviations, Investigations
and Reporting
5-1-1. DEFINITIONS … 5-1 5-1-2. SUSPECTED EVENT … 5-2 5-1-3. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS … 5-2 5-1-4. MULTIPLE LOSSES OF SEPARATION OR MULTIPLE DEVIATIONS DURING A SINGLE EVENT … 5-3 5-1-5. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS … 5-3 5-1-6. ATM RESPONSIBILITIES … 5-6 5-1-7. RECLASSIFICATION … 5-7
07/20/09 JO 7210.56C CHG 2
iv
Paragraph Page 5-1-8. PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS … 5-7 5-1-9. FINAL REPORTS … 5-8 5-1-10. ENTIRES IN TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY RECORD (FAA Form 3120-1) … 5-8 5-1-11. DOCUMENTATION RETENTION … 5-9 5-1-12. FACILITY, HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES … 5-9 5-1-13. ATO SAFETY SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS … 5-10 5-1-14. ANALYSIS & FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS … 5-11
Chapter 6. Conformance Categories
6-1-1. DEFINITIONS … 6-1
Chapter 7. Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP)
7-1-1. EN ROUTE OPERATIONAL ERROR DETECTION PROGRAM (OEDP) … 7-1 7-1-2. OEDP AUDIT … 7-1
Chapter 8. Terminal/TRACON Audit Process for Operational Errors
& Operational Deviations
8-1-1. BACKGROUND … 8-1 8-1-2. FACILITY AUDIT PROCESS … 8-1 8-1-3. SAFETY ASSURANCE OFFICE RANDOM AUDIT … 8-1
Appendices
Appendix 1. Radar Data Processing
Appendix 2. Instructions for FAA Form 7210-2, Preliminary Operational Error/Deviation
Investigation Report
Appendix 3. Example of FAA Form 7210-2, Preliminary Operational Error/Deviation
Investigation Report
Appendix 4. Instructions for FAA Form 7210-3, Final Operational Error/Deviation Report
Appendix 5. Example of FAA Form 7210-3, Final Operational Error/Deviation Report
Appendix 6. Instructions and Example for FAA Form 7210-5, Operational Error/Deviation
Classification Report
Appendix 7. Instructions for FAA Form 7210-6, Flight Assist Report
Appendix 8. Example of FAA Form 7210-6, Flight Assist Report
Appendix 9. Non-Wake Separation Conformance Categorization
Appendix 10. Separation Conformance Classification Tool
Appendix 11. Conformance Categorization Tables
Appendix 12. Proximity Event Investigative Report Form
Chapter 1. General
8/15/02 7210.56C CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
Par 1-1-1 1-1
1-1-1. PURPOSE
This order provides specific direction for the reporting, investigation, and recording of air traffic incidents. Additional guidance is provided for the identification and correction of performance deficiencies through establishing a quality assurance program at the facility and regional level. This order is designed to work in concert with current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Orders concerning facility evaluations, air traffic technical training, performance management systems, and bargaining unit contractual agreements.
1-1-2. DISTRIBUTIONS
This Order is distributed to selected offices in Washington Headquarters, Regional Offices, the William J. Hughes Technical Center, the David J. Hurley Air Traffic Control System Command Center, and the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center. Also, copies are sent to all air traffic control facilities, all international aviation field offices, and the interested aviation public.
1-1-3. CANCELLATION
This revision cancels FAA Order 7210.56B, Air Traffic Quality Assurance, dated June 15, 2001.
1-1-4. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES
Numerous editorial and formatting changes were made where necessary. The significant changes encompass several Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and policy memorandums from the Director of Air Traffic, AAT-1. Brief explanations of these changes are listed below. If further information is desired, direct questions through the appropriate facility/regional staff to AAT-20.
a. 2-1-2 a. (4) Quality Assurance Programs Responsibilities, establishes the requirement for AAT-20 to conduct formal investigations for facilities with high or increasing numbers of operational errors or incidents.
b. 2-1-2 a. (5) Quality Assurance Programs Responsibilities, establishes recognition for facilities that achieve a million error free operations.
c. 2-1-2 b. Quality Assurance Programs Responsibilities, adds several more requirements and/or responsibilities for each Regional Air Traffic Division (ATD) Manager. These new requirements have been adopted from policy memorandums distributed by the Director of Air Traffic, AAT-1 and include:
(1) Provide a copy of all Regional and Facility Quality Assurance (QA) Orders and Operational Error/Deviation (OE/OD) prevention plans to AAT-20.
(2) Annually review all QA and OE/OD prevention plans.
(3) Ensure a “Back to Basics” approach is included in each OE/OD prevention plan.
(4) Ensure each facility’s OE/OD prevention plan is facility specific.
(5) Ensure regional/facility OE/OD prevention plans provide the means to identify and correct noncompliance or eliminate future non-compliance.
(6) Provide trend analysis, statistical data and recommendations to assist facilities with their prevention efforts.
(7) Establish methods for early identification of facility trends in order to raise awareness. OE/OD rates per 100,000 operations will be tracked and distributed to heighten awareness.
(8) Ensure towers include a comprehensive plan to prevent surface incidents in their facility runway incursion prevention plan.
d. 3-1-2. Technical Training Discussions Definitions, adds the definitions of controller proficiency and performance.
e. 3-1-3. a. (1) Technical Training Discussions Responsibilities, redefines the use of certified radar playback tools as a performance management tool.
f. 3-1-3. a. (3) Technical Training Discussions Responsibilities Note, explains the intent of Technical Training Discussions (TTD) is to provide first level supervisors a formal venue to address and/or re-address identified proficiency/performance issues.
g. 3-1-3. c. (1) Technical Training Discussions Responsibilities, establishes the requirement for the facility staff to complete a report to the ATM, describing all technical training that was assigned and completed through the TTD process.
h. 3-1-3. e. Technical Training Discussions Responsibilities, establishes a Controller self-critique and its inclusion into their Technical Training Discussion (TTD). To facilitate and assist employee selfdevelopment activities, an employee may request and receive a tape of his/her own session. A self–critique, if discussed with the employee’s supervisor, may be included in the employee’s technical training discussion.
7210.56C 08/04/08
1-2 Par 1-1-4
i. 3-1-4. b. Technical Training Discussions Responsibilities, adds the requirement for the employee to sign for receipt of the discussion. It should be noted that the employee’s signature does not constitute agreement with the contents of the discussion, only that they have received a copy and a verbal briefing on its contents. Additionally, it adds the requirement to include previous Operational Errors (OE), Operational Deviations (OD), Quality Assurance Reviews (QAR), regional/national OE/OD trends, and facility evaluations.
j. 4-1-1. Air Traffic Incidents Definitions, adds specific definitions of air traffic incidents that were incorporated from FAA Order 8020.11.
k. 4-1-2. General Handling Procedures, adds the requirement to log all air traffic incidents as a QAR on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation.
l. 4-1-2. b. (5) (b) Air Traffic Incidents General Handling Procedures, redefines the employee interview (formerly consult) and documentation of the interview.
m. 4-1-3. Quality Assurance Review outlines the QAR process as a means for facilities to identify and correct system deficiencies (not just employee deficiencies) in a timely manner.
n. 4-1-3. a. (4) Quality Assurance Review, adds Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP) alert to the QAR process. Existing standalone OEDP logs may be utilized in lieu of entries into the facility operational log (FAA Form 7230-4). This addition simply formalizes the current OEDP process on a national level. As with any investigation, the Air Traffic Manager shall ensure the investigation is conducted in sufficient depth to assess the system performance with reasonable accuracy.
o. 4-1-3. d. Quality Assurance Review, reemphasizes the need to conduct an investigation in sufficient detail as to accurately portray the incident and take appropriate corrective action.
p. 4-1-3. k. Quality Assurance Review, adds the requirement for a 45 day retention of all supporting documentation on all suspected losses of separation.
q. 4-1-4. c. and d. Emergencies, redefines the requirement to immediately notify AAT-200 on all significant emergencies and provide a preliminary report within 3 hours.
r. 4-1-5. Flight Assists, redefines the procedures for the handling of FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report and outlines the Regional and National Outstanding Flight Assist Award.
s. 4-1-7. Spill Outs, redefines the information needed on all spill outs.
t. 4-1-8. a. (3) Airspace Intrusions, adds the requirement of tracking and identifying aircraft that enter Special Use Airspace (SUA).
u. 4-1-9. Invalid Mode C Reporting, allows for the electronic distribution of invalid Mode C reporting.
v. 5-1-1. Air Traffic Operational Error and Deviations Investigations and Reporting, definitions are added to include technical violations, the Operational Error/Operational Deviation Steering Committee, controlled event, uncontrolled event, severity index, and operational error casual factors.
w. 5-1-2. Air Traffic Operational Errors and Deviations Investigations and Reporting, Suspected Event, redefines Air Traffic Policy that any employee who is aware of any occurrence that may be an operational error, operational deviation, or air traffic incident (as defined in paragraph 4-1-1, Definitions) immediately notify the appropriate management official.
x. 5-1-3. Initial Investigations, outlines the intent and process the Investigator-in-Charge should follow with a preliminary investigation. Additionally, it stipulates the need for a timely interview and a written statement from all involved employees and the initial return to duty process under the conformance classification process (See Chapter 6). Keep in mind; if during the preliminary investigation a loss of separation can be attributed to ATC, then a preliminary report should be completed. If both ATC and the Flight Crew of an aircraft are contributory, then both reports should be completed.
y. 5-1-4. Multiple Losses of Separation During a Single Event, the return to duty process will be based on the higher severity event when multiple errors occur and the return to duty plans will be combined.
z. 5-1-5. Investigative Process, redefines the guidelines to help assure a comprehensive and accurate investigation is completed.
aa. 5-1-7. Reclassification, reinforces the ATD responsibility to validate each reclassification request individually and, if warranted, coordinate a reclassification with AAT-200.
bb. 5-1-8. Performance Based Actions, performance management is a daily task. It is incumbent upon every one to identify and address their individual proficiency. Additionally:
(1) Decertification shall not be based solely on the number of or involvement in an OE, but rather on the employees’ overall performance history.
08/04/08 7210.56C
Par 1-1-4 1-3
(2) The revocation or suspension of control tower operator certificate and facility ratings shall not be used for addressing performance deficiencies.
(3) No employee will be decertified or required to complete remedial training for any operational error(s) classified as low conformance or any operational deviation.
cc. 5-1-9. Return to Operational Duty,
(1) All employees found to be primary/ contributory to a low conformance error shall be returned to operational duty as soon as the preliminary investigation is completed. No skill check or follow-up skill check shall be completed. Skill Enhancement training may only be assigned if the event was classified as uncontrolled.
(2) All employees found to be primary/ contributory to a moderate or high conformance, as well as all surface, MVA/obstruction, oceanic/non-radar errors or at a facility where radar data is not available and where less than 80% of the separation standard was maintained, shall not be returned to operational duty until the provisions of paragraph 5-1-9, Return to Operational Duty are completed. Skill enhancement training or decertification and remedial training may be administered if the employees’ documented performance history warrants such action.
dd. 5-1-12. Skill Enhancement Training, is designed to increase the proficiency of a specialist in a skill or task on a position on which the specialist is certified. Based on the circumstances unique to a specific error, skill enhancement training need not always be accomplished prior to an employee continuing operational duties. Skill enhancement training shall be based upon the factors identified during the investigation.
ee. 5-1-15. a. (3) Documentation Retention, all supporting documentation, including the original NTAP or CDR plot shall be retained in approved electronic media, as well as all documentation, i.e. the supervisor’s return to duty plan, performance skill checks and conformance chart.
ff. 5-1-15. b. Documentation Retention, preliminary and final OE reports that are classified as low conformance and/or OD reports, while retained for 2 1/2 years, shall be sanitized after 12 months so that any information which could lead to the identification of an employee either primary or contributory to the OE/OD, has been removed.
gg. 5-1-15. c. Documentation Retention, all references to a specific OE/OD shall be removed from the employees’ FAA Form 3120-4 and returned to the employee 2 1/2 years after the incident. All references to a specific OE classified as a low conformance and/or OD shall be removed from the employees’ FAA Form 3120-4 and returned to the employee 12 months after the incident.
hh. 5-1-16. b. (6) Headquarters and Air Traffic Division Roles and Responsibility, changes the requirement to; All ATDs shall establish a follow-up mechanism to determine if corrective actions contained in FAA Forms 7210-3 are effective and are accomplished in a timely manner. All corrective actions shall specify a completion deadline.
ii. 6-1-1. Severity Index, as recommended by U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, we have developed a method to determine conformance, or collision hazard, for operational errors that occur in flight. In addition, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), dated January 17, 2001, stipulated that an operational error classification system be developed and implemented no later than April 30, 2001. A classification model was developed as a result of studying numerous operational errors throughout the nation. The model selected is based upon a total of 100 points made up of several factors including vertical and horizontal separation distances, flight paths and cumulative closure rates, as well as the level of air traffic control involvement. A validation and testing period was completed to ensure that the model accurately captured each airborne event. This classification system was put into full implementation on April 1, 2001.
(1) The model for classification of each airborne OE that occurs in domestic airspace includes components that are allotted point values corresponding with their relative significance during the event. To achieve an accurate determination, a radar playback, with voice, of each airborne OE should be prepared so each event can be viewed repeatedly, if necessary. It is important that OE’s be assessed in a timely manner so field managers are able to make informed operational and personnel decisions. For these reasons, compliance with the following procedures is required. If any problems arise which make compliance with these procedures unlikely, coordination with AAT-200 is required.
(2) Each applicable OE shall be analyzed and assessed by AAT-200 personnel and a determination made as to the conformance of the event. Each OE that occurs in domestic airspace, under radar control, will be rated and categorized into one of three levels of conformance. Most final determinations will be completed within 10 business days of the initial OE call-in to AAT-200.
(3) After carefully analyzing each event, point values will be assessed for several operational factors and once totaled this cumulative number will fall into a range that defines each category.
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jj. 7-1-1. En-route Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP), outlines the en-route procedures to be followed when a facility receives an OEDP alert.
kk. 7-1-2. OEDP Audit, outlines the requirement for en-route facilities to develop a process to audit their internal OEDP alert validation process.
ll. Appendix 1, Radar Data Processing; NTAP, SATORI, CDR plots, Radar Audio Playback Terminal Operations Recording (RAPTOR), Radar View Point, MSDT, ATC Plot and other reduction or playback tools are available to assist in investigations. As technological advances are made, the ATC system must adjust to these changes and ensure that radar reduction tools are used correctly and consistently throughout the system in order to provide the most accurate recreation possible.
(1) NTAP, SATORI, CDR data, and other reduction or playback tools shall not be arbitrarily used as the primary initiating source (triggering event) for reporting an OE/OD or commencing an investigation. However, these reduction/playback tools may be used in the investigation of suspected incidents to determine the amount of separation that existed or the position of aircraft. Additionally, these tools may be used for individual employee performance review/improvement and/or system/facility evaluation. When this is accomplished and a loss of separation is discovered, that error shall be reported, but attributed to the facility as a facility error. Skill enhancement training may be assigned to those employees’ determined to be contributory to these events. However, decertification shall not be imposed.
(2) SATORI, RAPTOR or other playback tool may be used in the investigation of a QAR, suspected OE/OD, pilot deviation, NMAC, TCAS event, miscellaneous incident, or accident; to determine the relative flight tracks, speeds, headings, location and separation of the involved aircraft. These tools may be used to determine controller and/or pilot performance and/or involvement in the incident, as well the aircrafts closest proximity.
mm. Appendix 1-2, en-route LST 5 measurements data are more precise than NTAP measurements. Whenever possible a LST 5 shall be used to determine closest proximity.
nn. Appendix 1-3, Continuous Data Recording (CDR), defines terminal radar data classes.
oo. Appendix 1-4, defines CDR extraction and voice recording procedures.
pp. Appendix 2 and 3, adds the new preliminary operational error/deviation instructions and report.
qq. Appendix 3 and 4, FAA Form 7210-3, Final Operational Error/Deviation Report, changes include,
addition of the conformance, elimination of the employees name and addition of employees last six digits of their social security number for identification purposes.
rr. Appendix 9, FAPM 2635 was recently replaced with the FAA Human Resource Policy Manual. The interview statement has changed and stipulates that it is the duty of every employee to give to any supervisor or official conducting an official investigation or inquiry, all information and testimony about all matters inquired of, arising under the law, rules, and regulations administered by the FAA. Additionally, it is the responsibility of every employee to make themselves available as directed so that such an interview may be accomplished (as outlined in FAA Human Resource Policy Manual, ER 4.1 Standards of Conduct). As appropriate the interview statement shall be read or given to an employee before conducting an interview.
ss. Appendix 10, General Reporting Procedures, adds a quick reference chart for the reporting of all air traffic incidents.
tt. Appendix 11, Air Traffic Incident Handling Procedures, adds a generalized quick reference page for specific air traffic incidents and their notification requirements.
uu. Appendix 12, Data Retention adds a quick reference chart for document retention requirements.
1-1-5. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Order is effective August 15, 2002.
1-1-6. RELATED PUBLICATIONS
The following publications are the primary references to be used in coordination with provisions of this order:
a. FAA Order 3120.4, Air Traffic Technical Training.
b. FAA Order 7010.1, Air Traffic Evaluations.
c. FAA Order 7110.10, Flight Services.
d. FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control.
e. FAA Order 7210.3, Facility Operation and Administration.
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f. FAA Order 8020.11, Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting.
1-1-7. USE OF TERMS
First-Level Supervisor shall include the Air Traffic Manager (ATM) wherever the ATM also performs such duties.
First-Level Supervisor, ATM, etc., shall include their official designees, except where specifically noted, for the purpose of accomplishing roles and responsibilities.
Establish, Designate, Identify, Develop, Waive, Authorize etc., shall be understood to require such actions to be specific and in writing.
1-1-8. SCOPE
Quality assurance is a dynamic process used to continually improve the air traffic system. Although we will continue to measure the quality of our service by some historical methods, such as the number of operational errors, delays, employee and customer feedback, we must also recognize factors that cannot as readily be measured. Our willingness to function as a team, our training, and the actions taken to support the goal of zero operational errors all factor into quality assurance. The success of our quality assurance efforts is dependent on the recognition by the entire air traffic workforce that all of us, independently and collectively, must strive to provide the best service possible. We are all accountable for the quality of that service.
Chapter 2. Quality Assurance (QA) Programs
8/15/02 7210.56C CHAPTER 2. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAMS
Par 2-1-1 2-1
2-1-1. OVERVIEW
A critical component of any effective quality assurance program is problem prevention. This chapter provides a list of proactive quality assurance strategies. While it is by no means all-inclusive, it does provide some ideas that may be developed in individual quality assurance programs.
2-1-2. RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations Staff, AAT-20, shall:
(1) Provide guidance and assistance to Regional Air Traffic Divisions to develop their QA Programs.
(2) Ensure all Air Traffic QA Programs are evaluated through the national evaluation process.
(3) Maintain, on file, each regional QA program, and provide an annual assessment of those programs to the Director of Air Traffic, AAT-1.
(4) Conduct Investigative Reviews of Air Traffic Services (IRATS) for facilities with high or increasing numbers of operational errors or incidents.
(5) With assistance from Regional Quality Assurance Staffs, identify and recognize air traffic facilities that:
(a) Have achieved 1,000,000 error free operations. Facilities achieving the significant milestone of 1,000,000 error free operations shall be presented with a Certificate from the Director of Air Traffic signifying their inclusion in the "None in a Million" Club.
(b) Have achieved significant reductions in OE/OD rates.
b. Regional Air Traffic Division (ATD) Managers shall:
(1) Develop a Regional QA Program.
(2) Identify which facilities within the region shall be required to develop a Facility QA Program.
(3) Provide a copy of all Regional and Facility Quality Assurance Orders and Operational Error/Operational Deviation (OE/OD) prevention plans to AAT-20.
(4) Annually review existing regional quality assurance orders and programs and, as necessary, develop new quality assurance orders or revise existing
orders that address OE/OD prevention. In doing so, each ATD shall take into account past deficiencies identified by AAT-20. In addition, each ATD shall ensure that all facilities have an OE/OD prevention plan written, approved, and in effect. Each ATD shall also ensure that existing or revised QA orders are in compliance with this order.
Note: Individual facility OE/OD prevention plans may be combined into a single HUB document.
(5) Ensure a "Back to Basics" approach is included in each OE/OD prevention plan. The objective of a back to basics approach is to reduce and prevent OE/ODs by emphasizing proper use of the basics of air traffic control. As a minimum, all facilities shall continually emphasize the use of standard phraseology, the need to ensure pilot read-backs are complete and correct, and the use of position relief checklists during position relief briefings. This back to basics approach can be implemented using a variety of methods such as weekly team briefings, staff meetings, increased dialog with the workforce during performance related discussions and by posting examples monthly on facility or QA bulletin boards.
(6) Ensure that facility OE/OD prevention plans include items pertinent to a particular facility. In developing OE/OD prevention plans, Air Traffic Managers (ATM) shall consider past deficiencies identified by AAT-20.
(7) Ensure that regional/facility OE/OD prevention plans provide the means for identification of non-compliance with national, regional, and local facility directives or standards; identify the cause(s) of the noncompliance; immediately rectify occurrences of noncompliance; and eliminate future non-compliance.
(8) Provide trend analysis, statistical data, recommendations and other pertinent information to assist field facilities with their prevention efforts. Regional Quality Assurance Staffs shall also provide assistance and support to all terminal facilities to ensure that all national surface error prevention strategies have been implemented as required.
(9) Establish methods for early identification of facility operational trends in order to raise facility operational awareness. OE/OD rates per 100,000 operations will be tracked and distributed to heighten awareness of each facility’s OE/OD trends.
(10) Ensure that towers include a comprehensive plan to prevent surface incidents, if one is not already contained in a separate facility Runway Incursion Prevention Plan.
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c. Hub Managers/ATM's shall:
(1) Maintain a level of awareness and involvement in their facility's operations/programs so as to ensure their maximum quality and efficiency.
(2) Develop a Facility QA Program as directed by the ATD or Hub manager.
(3) Identify which facilities within their Hub shall be required to develop a Facility QA Program.
2-1-3. PROGRAM CONTENT
QA programs shall establish methods to identify and correct deficiencies and recognize successes in, as a minimum, the following four areas:
a. Operational Error and Operational Deviation (OE/OD) Prevention:
(1) From the following list, include, as a minimum, three actions to preclude OE/OD's from occurring:
(a) Hearback/Readback programs.
(b) Surface error prevention programs.
(c) Incentive/recognition programs.
(d) Employee of the Month/Quarter programs.
(e) List of good operating practices.
(f) Tape talks/Phraseology Improvement Programs.
(g) Supplemental, refresher or skill enhancement training and/or simulation training.
(h) Personal accounts of lessons learned.
(i) Periodic QA briefings in the facility covering trends, customer input, evaluations, etc.
(j) Aggressive resolution of problems identified by the Unsatisfactory Condition Report (UCR) program.
(k) Review of Monitor Alert Parameters (MAP).
(l) Incorporate previous OE scenarios into the training program.
(2) Regional QA Programs shall include procedures for the regular, periodic review of facilities'
OE/OD trends. These procedures shall provide for appropriate investigation and reporting of observed trends.
b. Teamwork. From the following list, include as a minimum, two items that will instill teamwork within the air traffic control specialist (ATCS) workforce, administrative workforce, and between facilities, outside entities, etc.:
(1) Air Traffic Teamwork Enhancement (ATTE) training, internal and external teams.
(2) Teamwork incentive/recognition programs.
(3) Roles of different positions/jobs (facilitywide cross training).
(4) Supervisor/CIC skills course.
(5) Team meetings.
(6) Clearly communicated expectations.
c. Communications. From the following list, include as a minimum, four items to improve communications among all employees and create an atmosphere conducive to the sharing of information:
(1) Electronic Bulletin Board System or Internet/Intranet access to data.
(2) National Database - containing facility, regional and national QA data.
(a) http://aat20.faa.gov/
(3) Newsletter(s) - electronic editions where possible.
(4) QA seminars and conferences.
(5) System wide QA TELCONs.
(6) Team briefings on trends and issues.
(7) All hands meetings.
(8) SUPCOM
(9) Industry reports (e.g. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports, Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) newsletters).
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d. Customer Service/Feedback. From the following list, include as a minimum, four items to solicit employee and customer feedback (internal/external customers) regarding the quality of service provided by the facility and the organization's impact on other organizations, users, and individuals:
(1) Operation Raincheck/Operation Takeoff.
(2) Surveys of internal and external customers.
(3) Interaction with other organizations - NTSB, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), Department of Defense (DOD).
(4) Employee evaluation of shift performance.
(5) All hands meetings.
(6) SUPCOM.
(7) Familiarization flights.
(8) Bargaining unit representatives.
(9) Contacts with user organizations (e.g. Fixed Base Operators, Flight Schools).
(10) Pilot safety seminars and airport management workgroups.
Chapter 3. Technical Training Discussions
8/15/02 7210.56C CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL TRAINING DISCUSSIONS
Par 3-1-1 3-1
3-1-1. OVERVIEW
To provide for the continuous enhancement of technical proficiency and correction of any performance deficiencies in the air traffic workforce, individualized training requirements for technical performance must be identified and accomplished. FAA Order 3120.4 provides direction on technical proficiency training that shall be followed in accomplishing the procedures contained in this chapter.
Technical Training Discussions (TTD's) are intended to provide formal feedback from first-level supervisors regarding an employee’s proficiency and to develop plans to enhance their development as appropriate. TTD's are not intended to be viewed as "pass/fail", "satisfactory/unsatisfactory”, to discuss issues of conduct, nor employee performance in areas outside of air traffic control. TTD's are not intended to be based upon a single, "snapshot" observation, but rather a summary of observations by the employee’s first-level supervisor, the employee, or other supervisors/staff specialists within the work unit, since the previous TTD. In preparation, supervisors should document in their supervisory notes their own observations, along with those forwarded by others, as well as formal documentation such as QAR’s, or operational errors.
EXAMPLE- Some technical areas that may be addressed: Phraseology, Interphone Usage, Emergency Handling, and Impact of Actions, Coordination, Sequencing, Speed Control (ground speed vs. indicated airspeed), Application of Visual Separation, Application of Visual approaches, etc.
3-1-2. DEFINITIONS
a. Proficiency: Knowing, understanding, and applying air traffic procedures in a safe and efficient manner.
b. Performance: The act of operating in a proficient manner.
3-1-3. RESPONSIBILITIES
a. The first-level supervisor shall accomplish the following for each of their employees who are certified on at least one operational position:
(1) Continuously assess the employees’ technical proficiency through both direct and indirect methods. Think of the TTD as a means of addressing not only performance deficiencies, but a means of addressing performance improvement as well. Indirect methods may include remote monitoring, tape reviews,
Continuous Data Recording (CDR) playback, Radar Audio Playback Terminal Operations Recording (RAPTOR), the Systematic Air Traffic Operational Research Initiative (SATORI), and any other playback tool that may be available.
NOTE: SATORI/RAPTOR combines radar data recorded in the HOST/ARTS/STARS/EARTS computer system and digital voice recordings for a visual and audio display of information. This allows review of aircraft and air traffic situations within requested time and airspace parameters. SATORI/RAPTOR may be used as a "lessons learned" performance management tool to recreate the events that contributed to an OE/OD, incident, accident, or other operational scenarios.
(2) Using the appropriate job functions and indicators described in FAA Order 3120.4 as a guide, develop and direct individualized proficiency training as appropriate.
NOTE: Technical performance issues consist of areas of knowledge and application that might benefit from training. These issues are not necessarily areas of deficiency. An employee may demonstrate overall acceptable technical proficiency, but might benefit from technical training in the application of a particular skill or task.
(3) At least once every six months, conduct technical training discussions about the employees’ individualized proficiency and any assigned training that has been accomplished, since the last TTD, and/or will be conducted to address technical proficiency issues in the near future. If no new technical proficiency issues have been identified, a documented discussion shall still take place to advise the employee of this and of regional, national and/or facility trends. Additionally, these discussions shall be conducted:
(a) Whenever the first-level supervisor identifies an area in an employees’ technical proficiency that might benefit from individualized technical training.
(b) No later than 6 months from the employees’ previously documented technical training discussion.
(c) No later than 60 days after the first-level supervisor assumes supervisory responsibility for an employee who has not had a technical training discussion documented during the previous 6 months.
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NOTE- TTDs are intended to provide first-level supervisors a formal process to address or re-address identified proficiency issues and maintain a history of proficiency discussions.
(4) Ensure all technical training identified is completed in a timely manner.
(5) Ensure all discussions conducted under this chapter are documented as described in paragraph 3-1-4, Documentation.
b. Certain first-level supervisors may be unable to observe their employees’ technical proficiency on a regular, on-going basis. An example of such a situation might be supervisors who are not permanently assigned to the same facility as their employees, or supervisors whose span of supervision is so broad as to prohibit routine, meaningful observations of all their employees. The ATD Manager may waive the TTD requirements for employees in such cases, provided that alternative procedures are first established that ensure each employee receives regular, meaningful observation and feedback on their technical performance, and appropriate proficiency training. An example of such a program might be a process for peer review between en-route operations supervisors, with specific expectations for direct observations, feedback on areas for improved proficiency, and coordination of results with their immediate supervisors.
c. Facility staff assigned quality assurance responsibilities shall:
(1) At least once every 12 months complete a report, describing all technical training that was assigned and completed through the TTD process. This report shall be designed to allow the ATM to identify recurring and significant proficiency training needs in order to develop effective future facility training plans.
(2) Notify the employee’s first-level supervisor, in a timely manner, of any technical proficiency issues, which they identify through routine QA initiatives.
d. The ATM shall:
(1) Identify, in writing, facility proficiency training objectives and ensure those objectives are met.
(2) Identify, in writing, facility technical performance trends and ensure appropriate followup action is completed.
(3) Ensure that first-level supervisors have access to employees’ training records, in the course of their official duties.
e. The Employee may request and receive a tape of his/her own session to facilitate and assist selfdevelopment activities. The self-critique, if discussed with the employee’s supervisor, may be included in the employee’s technical training discussion.
3-1-4. DOCUMENTATION
a. Each technical training discussion shall be documented in the employees’ FAA Form 3120-4, Training and Proficiency Record, in accordance with FAA Order 3120.4.
b. A record of discussion documenting the content of each TTD shall be retained in the facility's records for 1 year from the date of the discussion. FAA Forms 3120-25, -26, or -32 may be used as a guide and/or record of the discussion. The record of discussion shall contain the following:
(1) Name and signature of the employee and the first-level supervisor conducting the discussion.
(2) Any technical training that was assigned and completed through the TTD process since the previous discussion.
(3) Discussion of trends such as OE/OD, facility evaluations, etc.
(4) If no new technical proficiency issues have been identified, a documented discussion shall still take place.
(5) Date discussion was completed.
Chapter 4. Air Traffic Incidents
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Par 4-1-1 4-1
4-1-1. DEFINITIONS
There are several types of incidents that adversely affect the capabilities of air traffic control (ATC) facilities to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious movement of air traffic:
a. The following incidents are defined and FAA Order 8020.11 provides for their reporting procedures:
(1) Aircraft Accident – an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and until such time as all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.
(2) Near Midair Collision (NMAC) – an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which the possibility of collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or flight crewmember stating that a collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft.
(a) Workload permitting, notify any member of a flight-crew receiving air traffic control services who expresses concern about the proximity of another aircraft to contact facility representatives. Use the following phraseology, “(aircraft identification) advise you contact (facility) at (telephone number)”.
(b) Upon receiving any telephone call from a flight crewmember that expresses concern about the proximity of another aircraft, the supervisor/controller-in-charge shall ask the caller if he/she desires to file a formal near midair collision report. All such calls shall be taken on a recorded line, if available.
(3) Pilot Deviation – the actions of a pilot that result in the violation of a Federal Aviation Regulation or a North American Aerospace Defense (Command Air Defense Identification Zone) tolerance.
(a) When it appears that the actions of a pilot constitute a possible pilot deviation, notify the pilot, workload permitting, using the following phraseology “(aircraft identification) possible pilot deviation, advise you contact (facility) at (telephone number)”.
NOTE: These classifications include TCAS RA, spill outs and controlled airspace intrusions that result in a loss of separation.
(4) Vehicle and Pedestrian Deviation – any entry or movement on the airport movement area by a vehicle operator or pedestrian that has not been authorized by air
traffic control (includes surface incidents involving aircraft operated by non-pilots, such as mechanics).
b. The following definitions are for incidents whose reporting procedures are provided for by this chapter:
(1) Emergency – a distress or urgent situation that requires special handling of an aircraft by air traffic (AT); includes giving priority that may result in delays to other aircraft.
(2) Flight Assist - when in-flight assistance is provided to an aircraft in a potentially dangerous situation.
(3) Military Facility Deviation - an operational error or operational deviation that involves delegated AT responsibilities performed by a military facility, including all Authorization for Interceptor Operations (AFIO) deviations.
NOTE: This classification does not include instances when approved separation minima are used between military aircraft that are less than those used by the FAA.
(4) Spill Out - an excursion of an IFR or VFR military aircraft, or a civil aircraft contracted to the military, including remotely operated aircraft, from the exterior boundary of Special Use Airspace (SUA) allocated to military using agencies into other controlled airspace without coordination or prior approval. SUA includes Altitude Reservations (ALTRV); ATC Assigned Airspace (ATCAA); Military Operations Areas (MOA); Military Training Routes (MTR); Prohibited, Restricted, and Warning Areas.
(5) Surface Incident (SI) - any event where unauthorized or unapproved movement occurs within the movement area associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of flight.
NOTE: Surface incidents result from Pilot Deviations, Operational Errors, Vehicle or Pedestrian Deviations, or Operational Deviations.
(6) Runway Incursion - any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft. The occurrence may involve a pilot taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land.
NOTE: Runway incursions result from one of three types of airport surface incidents: pilot deviations, operational errors, and vehicle or pedestrian deviations.
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c. Operational Errors and Operational Deviations (OE/OD) are defined and their reporting procedures provided for in Chapter 5.
4-1-2. GENERAL HANDLING PROCEDURES
In addition to any procedures provided for by other FAA orders and other sections of this document, the following procedures shall be applied to all air traffic incidents addressed in paragraph 4-1-1, Definitions:
a. Compiling Information. The facility first learning of or primarily involved in an incident shall obtain and complete a summary of the pertinent data immediately upon learning of the incident, or as soon thereafter as duties permit, to meet the reporting time requirements for the particular incident. A reference to this incident shall be logged on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation as a Quality Assurance Review (QAR), as outlined in paragraph 4-1-3, Quality Assurance Review.
b. Incidents Involving More Than One Facility.
(1) The ATM's of the involved facilities shall cooperate in the investigation and the preparation of the final report.
(2) If circumstances prevent collaboration, the facility most involved shall prepare the final report and provide a copy to the other.
(3) Do not submit individual reports on the same incident.
(4) When facility or regional boundaries overlap, send a copy of the final report to each ATD involved.
(5) When an incident occurs and it is suspected that other facilities may have provided services (flight plan, pilot briefing, radio contact, etc.), transmit a priority FF message on Service B to all facilities as follows (text only): "Advise whether any services provided (aircraft identification) today (or specify date). Negative replies requested."
(a) Limit the reply to the message reference, the aircraft identification, the services provided, and the time and the date the records will be forwarded.
EXAMPLE- (text only): Reference message from your office (RUMES) (date-time) N1235M. Pilot briefed 1410, VFR flight plan filed. Records will be mailed (date).
(b) After interviewing the employee involved, if necessary, prepare a narrative summary of
the interview and attach facsimile copies of the pertinent records.
NOTE: FSS's are responsible for the immediate delivery of the request message (either by telephone or hand delivery) to addressees in their flight planning area.
c. Telegraphic Notification. Any incident that warrants telegraphic notification will require adherence to the following procedures:
(1) The message shall be a numbered operational priority message.
(2) No part of the message shall exceed twenty lines, as that will cause an incomplete message to be relayed.
(3) The originating facility shall obtain and record an acknowledgment from each addressee.
d. Post-Incident Coordination. As part of the initial process for handling accidents or serious incidents, it is imperative that facilities remain aware of the potential personal impact to involved individuals and to any special needs or requests that may develop as a result. To that end, the ATD must ensure that appropriate regional counterparts are kept abreast of developing information so that they may participate in subsequent decisions affecting facility personnel.
(1) ATM's shall, following a major aircraft accident or serious incident; contact the regional ATD and provide an assessment of the personal affect on facility personnel. Additionally, any proposed personnel action that results from the incident shall be coordinated with the appropriate regional offices.
(2) ATD Managers shall ensure that subsequent coordination is accomplished as necessary with the Aviation Medical Division, Human Resource Management Division, as well as the Assistant Chief Counsel. Employee Assistance Program Coordinators or Contractors should also be alerted to the potential need of their services. Additionally, any proposed personnel action that results from the incident shall be coordinated with AAT-20 before initiation.
e. Coordination with Regional Counsel. Incidents resulting in personal injury or property damage may result in a lawsuit. In such event, the files and records relating to the investigation and any actions taken may be subject to disclosure to the attorneys for the litigants and produced in court. Therefore, coordinate follow-up actions with the Regional Counsel. The purpose of this action is not to minimize or restrict actions but to provide assurance that the findings upon which the action is taken contain no misleading language resulting in possible liability to the agency or the individual.
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4-1-3. QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW (QAR)
For the ATC system to be effective, it is essential that all system deficiencies be identified and corrected. Serious system deficiencies may be involved in air traffic incidents that fall outside of the definitions and corrective procedures for OE/ODs. QARs provide an opportunity for the identification, investigation, and resolution through corrective training of these identified deficiencies.
a. Conduct a QAR for all of the following when air traffic control services are involved:
(1) Aircraft accidents.
(2) Air traffic incidents other than OE/ODs.
NOTE- QARs are not required for incidents preliminarily identified as OE/ODs. As such reviews would be redundant to OE/OD investigative/corrective procedures (see Chapter 5, AT OE/OD Investigation and Reporting).
(3) Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory (RA) Reports.
(4) Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP) alert.
(5) Other miscellaneous incidents or reports that involve a loss of separation.
(6) Public inquiries regarding air traffic control services provided during a specific operation; e.g. flight crewmember, passenger, or media inquiries.
(7) Interfacility traffic management initiatives that cause “NO NOTICE GROUND STOPS” or “NO NOTICE AIRBORNE HOLDING”.
NOTE: Both the initiating and receiving facilities shall conduct a review of these interfacility initiatives. The review shall include the causes and the effects of these initiatives.
b. Determine in a QAR whether employee performance, procedures, and/or equipment may have contributed to, increased the conformance of, or unreasonably failed to mitigate the initiating incident.
EXAMPLE- [1] In review of a pilot deviation resulting in a runway incursion, determine whether a local controller's scanning of movement areas was adequate.
[2] In review of an aircraft accident, determine whether an in-flight specialist's weather briefing to the involved pilot was adequate.
[3] Determine whether a controller's radar vectors resulted in an instrument approach intercept inside the final approach fix.
c. The ATM shall designate the personnel responsible for the conduct of QARs. This designation may be made on a permanent or ad hoc basis.
d. Conduct the QAR in sufficient detail so as to assess the system performance with reasonable accuracy. The detail of a QAR may range from simply discussing the situation with the involved employees, to a full investigation that may include reviewing recorded radar data and voice communications from the incident (see paragraph 5- 1-5a, Investigative Process, Fact Finding, for investigative sources to consider).
e. The result of a QAR that involves an employee shall be communicated to the affected employee as soon as practical, normally the employees’ next assigned shift and forwarded to the employees’ first-level supervisor for review.
f. Accomplish appropriate corrective training for all identified employee technical proficiency deficiencies. Training shall be administered in accordance with FAA Order 3120.4.
NOTE- In cases of serious technical performance deficiencies, appropriate training may include decertification and remedial training if documented performance history warrants.
g. Communicate the conclusions of the QAR, including those finding no employee performance deficiency, to the ATM.
h. Record notification of the QAR initiating incident and conclusion of its review on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation, in accordance with FAA Order 7210.3.
i Notify the ATD through the ROC within 3 hours of the occurrence of all surface pilot deviations, vehicle runway deviations, “NO NOTICE GROUND STOPS”, “NO NOTICE AIRBORNE HOLDING”, and any other safety related incidents, regardless of whether standard separation was lost. This requirement is supplemental to the requirements contained in FAA
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j Retain all suspected air traffic incidents (listed above) and supporting data that are investigated and determined to be a non-occurrence for 45 days.
NOTE- Retain all supporting documentation including; certified re-recordings of the pertinent voice tapes, employee statements, and NTAP/CDR data in electronic format used to determine the event was a non-occurrence. Facilities that determine the event was a non-occurrence based on a printed NTAP or CDR Plot (i.e. significant target jump) shall retain both the original paper printout and an electronic copy.
4-1-4. EMERGENCIES
a. When appropriate, make emergency notification using FAA Form 8020-3, Facility Accident/Incident Notification Record.
b. Compile the information and document on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation, the events, the notifications, and the termination of the emergency.
c. Notify AAT-200, the ATD, and the appropriate FSDO through the ROC/WOC whenever:
(1) The aircraft involved is an air carrier, a commuter, or an air taxi; or
(2) The aircraft is carrying members of Congress or prominent persons; or
(3) The emergency is or may become newsworthy by coming to the attention of the public or the news media.
d. Prepare FAA Form 8020-11, Incident Report in accordance with FAA Order 8020.11. For significant emergencies (e.g., involving air carriers, air taxis, or prominent persons), immediately notify AAT-200, ATD ROC/WOC by telephone, and forward a preliminary report within 3 hours.
4-1-5. FLIGHT ASSISTS
a. Report instances where a pilot is provided in-flight assistance to the appropriate FSDO through the ROC within 3 hours of the occurrence. Obtain the information required to complete FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report, and include the pilot's name and address if obtainable. Instructions for completing FAA Form
7230-6, Flight Assist Report are contained in Appendix 7 Instructions for FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report.
b. When another pilot helps in providing flight assistance, obtain the assisting pilot's name and address, via telephone, and include in Item 16 of FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report.
c. Prepare FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report within 10 administrative days of the occurrence and include the following:
(1) The pilot's name and address, if obtainable, in Item 16.
(2) If the assistance was of an outstanding nature, enter the word "Outstanding" at the top center of the form.
(3) If a pilot helps in providing assistance, include their name in Item 16.
(4) Indicate in Item 16 when an FAA Form 8020-17, Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report, is filed as a result of a flight assist.
(5) For outstanding flight assists, indicate in item 17 the name of the employee primarily responsible for the assist. All other names in item 17 will be considered as having provided additional assistance.
d. Pilot Recognition:
(1) The ATM shall review the circumstances when a pilot aids in providing flight assistance. If appropriate, write a letter of recognition. Attach a copy to FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report.
(2) When pilot assistance is of an outstanding nature, the ATD shall review the circumstances, and if appropriate, prepare a regional level letter of recognition.
e. Distribute FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report as follows, and indicate on the original to whom the copies are routed:
(1) The original to the facility's files.
(2) The ATD.
(3) ATX-400.
(4) The FSDO.
(5) Others as determined by the ATD.
f. Process Annual National and regional Outstanding Flight Assist Award as follows:
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1. Annual National and Regional Outstanding Flight Assist Awards recognize employees whose actions contribute significantly to the safety of aviation. The selection of an outstanding flight assist will be judged on the basis of operational efficiency. Factors to be considered are the method used, expediency of the assist, circumstances surrounding the flight assist, analytical decision exhibited, timely action, the all-out effort demonstrated, and any other special factors that are appropriate.
2. Each region may submit three nominations (one per option: en-route, terminal and flight service).
3. Each nomination is expected to include a narrative statement describing the details of the flight assist, a copy of FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report, a certified voice recording of the flight assist, and any other documentation relative to the occurrence.
4. Nominations for the preceding year must be received by the Program Director of Air Traffic Resource Management, ATX-1, by February 15.
NOTE: An employee is limited to one monetary award for a single contribution. Therefore, it is recommended that regional or facility awards are not made until it is determined that the occurrence does not warrant a national award.
4-1-6. MILITARY FACILITY DEVIATIONS
a. The AT facility or representative (ATREP, RADLO, etc.) noting or receiving information about a military facility deviation shall report the occurrence immediately to the respective ATD.
(1) The report number shall be composed of the letter "M", followed by the last digit of the calendar year, a slant line, and the sequential number of military facility deviations forwarded by the reporting FAA office. Use a new sequence of numbers beginning January 1 of each year.
(2) Report the deviation in narrative form by memorandum within 10 administrative days of the occurrence. Prepare the report as follows:
(a) Include a chronological summary of the incident. Details shall be as complete as security considerations and data availability will permit.
(b) Include a brief statement of the probable cause or causes if the available data is sufficient to make these conclusions.
(c) Include recommendations, as appropriate, to preclude a recurrence of the event.
b. Distribute the report as follows:
(1) Original to the ATD.
(2) Facility's files.
(3) AAT-20.
(4) Military Distribution:
(a) Designated Regional Office Military representative.
(b) Send one copy to the facility’s major command (MAJCOM/MACOM). Obtain MAJCOM/MACOM information from the facility or the appropriate regional military representative.
1. Air Force HQ AFFSA/XAES 1535 Command Drive Suite D-309 Andrews AFB, MD 20762 –7002
2. Army US Army Aeronautical Services Agency ATTN: Chief, Airspace Support Division 9325 Gunston Road Bldg 1466, Suite N-319 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5582
3. Navy/Marine Chief, Air Traffic Branch CNO N885F Navy Department Washington, DC 20350-2000
4-1-7. SPILL OUTS
Spill out reporting is a non-punitive program to identify design and/or procedural problems with special use airspace. Facilities shall report all spills outs within three (3) hours of the incident by forwarding the following information electronically (i.e. facsimile, email with attachment) to the Safety/Quality Assurance division, through the Service Area, ROC, and the WOC, with an information copy to the Systems Operations Support Center (SOSC), AJR-215 at 202.267.9208 or email [email protected]. Electronic submissions should be confirmed via telephone or return-receipt.
a. If the spill out resulted in a loss of separation or report of a NMAC with another aircraft outside the SUA, report the incident as a pilot deviation and forward the following information to ATO Safety, Safety Assurance, via the Washington Operations Center (WOC) within 3 hours of the incident:
(1) Reporting facility.
(2) Date and time (UTC) of the incident.
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(3) Aircraft identification.
(4) Type, number, and equipment suffix of aircraft.
(5) Location (VOR with DME Fix).
(6) Altitude of incident.
(7) Type of flight plan, i.e. IFR or VFR.
(8) Branch of Military service of aircraft.
(9) Special Use Airspace Name.
(10) Special Use Airspace Type.
(11) Using Agency Name.
(12) Type of control of using agency (ATC or MRU).
(13) Controlling facility.
(14) Was there a loss of separation?
(a) Call sign/Tail number.
(b) Type aircraft.
(c) Closest proximity.
(15) Summary of events.
4-1-8. AIRSPACE INTRUSIONS
Intrusions are reported as pilot deviations in accordance with FAA Order 8020.11.
a. ATM's (excluding AFSS and FSS managers) shall provide guidance in facility directives for the tracking and identification of aircraft that enter:
(1) Class A or B airspace without authorization.
(2) Class C or D airspace without establishing communications with air traffic control (ATC).
(3) Special Use Airspace, e.g. Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR), prohibited areas, and other restricted airspace without authorization.
NOTE: The Chief Counsel's office has instructed the Regional Counsel offices to include the ATD on their distribution lists for notification following final enforcement action on controlled area intrusions.
b. When enforcement action is taken as a result of a controlled area intrusion, the ATD shall be responsible for ensuring notification through the facility ATM to the
reporting controller of the outcome of the enforcement action.
4-1-9. INVALID MODE C REPORTING
a. In order to track and report aircraft with transponders equipped with invalid Mode C readouts whose pilots have been advised to stop the altitude squawk, facility managers shall provide guidance in a facility directive(s) to ensure that a designated facility officer compiles a weekly list of invalid Mode C reports and forwards this report to the Regional Flight Standards Division. This report may be forwarded electronically with the concurrence of the Regional Flight Standards Division and shall include:
(1) Aircraft registration number/call sign.
(2) UTC date and UTC time of the incident.
(3) Assigned altitude and Mode C reported altitude.
(4) Facility 3-character identifier and facility type.
NOTE: A negative report is not required.
4-1-10. SURFACE INCIDENTS AND RUNWAY INCURSIONS
a. For significant surface incidents and runway incursions (e.g., involving air carriers, air taxis, or prominent persons), in addition to routine reporting procedures, notify the ATD, regional airports division, AAT-20, and the WOC through the ROC by telephone.
b. Notify airport management of all surface incidents, regardless of type, by the close of business the next administrative day. If previously reported incidents are determined to be runway incursions, inform the airport operator of the status change.
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5. AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND DEVIATIONS,
INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING
5-1-1. DEFINITIONS
a. Closest Proximity. The closest proximity is defined as the point at which the combined lateral and vertical separation results in the lowest slant range, regardless of geometry, as determined by the separation conformance calculator. Closest proximity is entered into Block 7 of the Preliminary OE/OD Report (Form 7210-2) and Block 8 of the Final OE/OD Report (Form 7210-3), and the appropriate block of the Proximity Event Report (new), Form 7210-6.
b. Final Report. Refers to FAA Form 7210-3, “Final Operational Error/Deviation Report.”
c. No Conformance. Refers to losses of the separation minima that do not qualify for a separation conformance rating; e.g., minimum vectoring altitude (MVA), oceanic, surface, nonradar, and military formation flights.
d. Operational Deviation (OD). An occurrence attributable to an element of the air traffic system which did not result in an Operational Error (OE) as defined in this Notice, but:
(1) Less than the applicable separation minima existed between an aircraft and adjacent airspace without prior approval; or
(2) An aircraft penetrated airspace that was delegated to another position of operation or another facility without prior coordination and approval; or
(3) An aircraft penetrated airspace that was delegated to another position of operation or another facility at an altitude or route contrary to the altitude or route requested and approved in direct coordination or as specified in a letter of agreement (LOA), precoordination, or internal procedure; or
(4) An aircraft is either positioned and/or routed contrary to that which was coordinated individually or; as specified in a LOA/directive between positions of operation in either the same or a different facility; or
NOTE- This does not apply to inter/intra-facility traffic management initiatives.
(5) An aircraft, vehicle, equipment, or personnel encroached upon a landing area that was delegated to another position of operation without prior coordination and approval.
e. Operational Error (OE). An occurrence attributable to an element of the air traffic system in which:
(1) Less than 90% of the applicable separation minima results between two or more airborne aircraft, or less than the applicable separation minima results between an aircraft and terrain or obstacles (e.g., operations below minimum vectoring altitude (MVA); aircraft/ equipment / personnel on runways), as required by FAA Order 7110.65 or other national directive; or
(2) An aircraft lands or departs on a runway closed to aircraft operations after receiving air traffic authorization, or
(3) An aircraft lands or departs on a runway closed to aircraft operations, at an uncontrolled airport and it was determined that a NOTAM regarding the runway closure was not issued to the pilot as required.
f. Performance. Human conduct including actions (or inactions) leading to, during, and after an OE/PE/OD.
g. Preliminary Report. Refers to FAA Form 7210-2, “Preliminary Operational Error/Deviation Report.”
h. Proximity Event. A loss of separation minima between two aircraft where 90 percent or greater separation is maintained in either the horizontal or vertical plane. This does not include any violation of wake turbulence separation minima or losses of separation that are classified under the No Conformance minima.
i. Proximity Event Report. Refers to FAA Form 7210-6, “Proximity Event Report.”
j. Regional Operations Center (ROC). One of nine communications center serving the FAA’s local Regional offices and the ATO’s Service Area and Service Center offices.
k. Remaining hazards. Primary and/or contributing causes of operational errors identified
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as still present following an operational error investigations or analysis.
l. Separation loss. The amount of separation (feet or nautical miles) less than the prescribed separation minima.
m. Separation retained. The amount of separation remaining (feet or nautical miles) when the separation loss is subtracted from the prescribed separation minima.
n. Separation Conformance. A numerical indicator of the percentage of the separation maintained as a function of the separation required at the point of closest proximity. An electronic calculator is available (see ATQA website) to calculate the separation conformance number and the associated conformance category. If unable to access the calculator, multiple tables are available (see Appendix 11) to determine the conformance category. Separation distances (lateral and vertical) used to classify any separation loss are entered into Block 22 of the Preliminary OE/OD Report (Form 7210-2) and Block 65 of the Final OE/OD Report (Form 7210-3) using the format: “SC … (lateral distance in NM)/ … (vertical distance in ft), ____ (conformance category).” Separation conformance is not calculated for “No Conformance” events.
o. Separation Conformance Index. Aggregate number that results from adding multiple composite slant range numbers together and dividing by the total number of (incidents) numbers used in the aggregate.
p. Service Area. Replaces regional Air Traffic Division (ATD) throughout the previous version of Order 7210.56C.
q. Conformance Category. Refers to the scale used to classify OEs and Proximity Events; A, B, and C categories refer to a group of OEs with similar proximity outcomes, with Category A being those resulting in the closest proximities. Proximity Event refers to the most minor of airborne losses of separation.
r. Significant event. A suspected or actual separation loss:
(1) involving Presidential Aircraft, a member of the Congress, or the media; or
(2) resulting in a Conformance Category A OE (see Chapter 6); or
(3) that will likely generate significant media interest.
s. Slant Range. The straight line distance between two aircraft.
t. Washington Operations Center (WOC). Communications center serving the FAA’s Headquarters and key ATO offices.
5-1-2. SUSPECTED EVENT
All separation losses must be individually investigated and analyzed to determine the performance of the air traffic control system, and to determine the correct actions to take to ensure that the providing of air traffic services is both predictable and maintains the target level of safety.
NOTE- 1. Maintaining an efficient and safe air traffic control system requires that all deficiencies (including losses of separation) in our system be identified for analysis and reporting. Separation losses, even small losses such as Proximity Events, must be immediately reported to any available management official or controller-in-charge (CIC), even if not electronically detected. Proximity Events must be reported regardless of the probable cause.
2. To support the agency’s initial determination as to whether an investigation is warranted, employees must be verbally notified they have been associated with a possible OE/OD and must provide the preliminary information of which they have knowledge, when requested by the management official or CIC. This phase is meant only to determine the need for an investigation and is not investigatory.
5-1-3. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS
a. The initial investigation should be fact finding in nature. It determines what occurred in the system, ensures corrective action is initiated to maintain system integrity, and provides for appropriate reporting and future analysis. Managers should rarely remove employees from any operational position pending the outcome of an OE/OD/PE investigation. For serious safety events or significant performance concerns, it may be necessary to remove an employee from operational duties either at the determination of management or at the request of the employee.
NOTE– 1. There are occasions when higher levels of management may require further review of a suspected
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incident, and this further review may result in the discovery of an incident not previously identified.
2. It is understood and expected that some level of investigation will be required to determine whether an event is an operational error, proximity event or nonevent. Some facilities presently have tools in place to aid in this investigation (FALCON, TARP, PRM-LSI, NOP). Additional tools are being developed and will be delivered in the future.
b. The management official, or the CIC when a management official is not available, must determine the validity of suspected OE/PE/OD, and if valid, must ensure the following items are accomplished.
NOTE- Other facility personnel must help the management official and/or CIC gather data to conduct the initial investigation, when possible.
(1) When information indicates that an OE/PE/OD may have occurred in another facility, advise that facility’s management official or CIC immediately, and conduct a QAR in accordance with section 4-1-3 of Order 7210.56C.
(2) When preliminary review indicates that 90% or more of the required vertical or lateral separation was maintained, and wake turbulence separation did not apply to an airborne separation loss, consider the incident to be a Proximity Event.
NOTE– Minimize the operational disruptions for any investigation of Proximity Events.
(3) When the preliminary review indicates that less than 90% of the required vertical or lateral separation was maintained, or wake turbulence separation did apply to an airborne separation loss, consider the incident to be an Operational Error.
5-1-4. MULTIPLE LOSSES OF SEPARATION OR MULTIPLE DEVIATIONS DURING A SINGLE EVENT
During a single incident in which multiple OEs/PEs/ODs are reported and/or discovered, each OE/PE/OD must be reported individually by completing a separate FAA Form 7210-2 or 7210-6. Each form should describe the individual OE/PE/OD, including a reference, if necessary for clarity, to the other related incidents.
NOTE– 1. When both an operational deviation and a proximity event result from the same incident, a separate report for both events is required. However, when the same incident results in an operational deviation and an operational error, only the operational error report is required. Subparagraph b, below, may still be applicable to multiple OE/PE/OD that result in chain reaction from a single event.
2. Multiple PEs may be reported on a summary report (see paragraph 5-1-5, subparagraphs).
5-1-5. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
If at any time the investigation of a separation loss reveals that an operational error/deviation actually occurred, process that incident in accordance with this paragraph. Ensure that investigations are conducted in accordance with any negotiated agreements between the FAA and pertinent labor organizations.
a. Fact Finding. The investigation of an OE/OD must entail an in-depth inquiry into all causal factors. The following should be considered for a comprehensive investigation:
(1) Facility procedures.
(2) Facility training.
(3) Facility supervision.
(4) Equipment.
(5) Control environment.
(6) External factors.
(7) Controller action vs. inaction.
(8) Airspace configuration.
(9) Traffic flow/volume/initiatives.
(10) Pilot actions, including the consequence of any Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) event.
(11) Route of flight or taxi route, as appropriate.
(12) Weather.
(13) Position configuration.
(14) Coordination procedures.
(15) Airport environment:
(a) Runway markings.
(b) Ramp use.
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(c) Areas of poor visibility (blind spots, fog).
(d) Runway configuration.
(e) Airport Congestion.
(f) Surface Conditions (rain, ice, snow)
(16) Human factors.
(17) Compare the system time of any pertinent equipment.
(18) Staffing levels and/or position assignments based on proficiency vs. complexity/volume.
(19) Radar Data (see Appendix 1, Radar Data Processing).
b. Interviews. To ensure effective safety investigations and analysis it is imperative that all valuable information and insights are gathered from any and all sources. All employees must be aware that the sharing of valuable safety information is a fundamental tenet of a safety culture and a primary function of their job regardless of position. Failure to provide safety information erodes the very foundation of a true safety culture and must be discouraged through available and appropriate means.
When conducting interviews, it is crucial that they be conducted in an atmosphere of shared concern that is designed to determine the underlying causes that may be indicative of risk in the NAS. It should be noted that, while certain operational personnel may have taken action(s) or failed to take action(s) that were directly related to the OE/D being reported, management personnel conducting interviews should emphasize the informationgathering purpose of any interview so that as much usable information as possible can be collected.
Personnel interviews should be conducted to the extent necessary to determine if an operational error/deviation has actually occurred. In addition, it will at times be necessary to gather additional information from operational personnel that were providing air traffic services during, or were witnesses to, an incident to properly complete FAA Forms 7210-2 and 7210-3. Since many personnel in a facility, e.g., controllers, air traffic assistants, and supervisors may be knowledgeable of, or actually were providing air traffic services during an incident, it is recommended that operational personnel be interviewed as appropriate.
c. If the review of radar data cannot occur immediately following a suspected OE/OD, record the incident and report the incident using estimated closest proximity, (FAA Form 7210-2, block 7) until such time a review of radar data can occur.
NOTE- This review should occur in a timely manner, i.e., next business day.
d. Review available radar data (see Appendix 1, Radar Data Processing, FAA Order 7210.56C), flight strips, and appropriate computer data. Many new systems retain data on their individual hard drives. These data are generally deleted from the hard drives after 15 calendar days or 45 calendar days. The Manager or designee is responsible for advising (Technical Operations) the System Operations Center (SOC), or Operational Control Center (OCC), as appropriate, in a timely manner so that they can extract these data onto a storable/retainable electronic medium.
NOTE- 1. For Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) systems, data reduction and analysis tool printouts will indicate a chronological sequence of textual CPDLC transactions. Individual CPDLC messages are stored in the DataLink Applications Processor temporary file as a binary encoded message and can be printed out in a text format for review.
2. Requests for User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) and Display System Replacement (DSR) data should be made through the DSR/URET Helpdesk at 800-377- 0308.
e. Review voice recordings as soon as feasible.
(1) Two certified re-recordings, one marked “original” and the other marked “Copy” must be made from the original voice recording and must include the audible time channel. Facilities must retain both recordings in the OE/OD file. These recordings must be certified and labeled in accordance with FAA Order 8020.16. Cassette tapes, digital file (e.g. WAV), and computer diskette are suitable media. Include all communications for a period of five minutes before initial contact to five minutes after the last contact with each position involved in the OE.
(2) If the above period exceeds 30 minutes, the Director of Operations at the Service Area may approve, with Safety Services Investigations &
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Evaluations concurrence, limiting the recording to that period pertinent to the specific OE/OD.
f. When the preliminary investigation indicates that another facility is involved in the occurrence, confer with the other Manager(s) as soon as feasible to determine the scope of the other facility’s investigative effort and how long it will take.
g. The Manager of any other involved facility must provide the reporting facility with information and assistance as required. This may require an investigation on the same scale as that performed by the reporting facility, in which case the Manager must have the same responsibilities, as defined in 5- 1-3, Initial Investigations. The Manager of any other involved facility must also retain all pertinent original data.
h. Notify the Air Traffic Manager of the OE/OD.
i. If the incident involves multiple facilities and they cannot agree on which facility has the primary responsibility, all involved facilities must complete FAA Form 7210-2 within the required notification period, and request relief from an official above them in the organization (e.g. hub, Service Area, Service Unit, and/or Safety Services).
j. Ensure that FAA Form 7210-2, Preliminary Operational Error/Deviation Investigation, is completed for OEs and ODs.
NOTE- Appendix 2 of Order 7210.56C contains instructions for completing FAA Form 7210-2. FAA Form 7210-2 must include pertinent actions of the pilot(s) and air traffic services leading up to the event and any subsequent action. When writing the summary, be as clear and concise as possible using who, what, when, where, and how to describe the entire incident.
k. Notify the Office of Safety Quality Assurance staff (QA Staff) and the Service Area of all reported or suspected OE/ODs as follows:
(1) Significant events and surface errors:
(a) Fax the completed FAA Form 7210- 2, and a reduced copy of the ESAT data, NTAP plot, and LST 5 text data (En Route only) to the ROC for transmittal to the QA Staff. Fax transmittal must be completed prior to any telephonic briefing.
(b) A facility management official or CIC must brief the QA Staff telephonically through the ROC/WOC within 4 hours after the OE is first reported or suspected.
(2) All other OEs and all ODs:
(a) Fax the completed FAA Form 7210- 2, and a reduced copy of the ESAT data, NTAP plot, and LST 5 text data (En Route for OEs only) to the ROC for transmittal to the QA Staff by 1600 local time (of reporting facility) of the next administrative day after the OE/OD is first reported or suspected.
(b) OEs that are not significant events/surface errors, and all ODs, do not require telephonic notification but do require a POC and phone number in block 22, Summary.
NOTE- The time limit should not prevent the preliminary investigation from continuing. Instead, it ensures that the QA staff is aware of reported or suspected events within a reasonable time. If unable to meet the reporting time requirement, the management official or CIC must request an extension from the QA staff prior to the requested reporting time-limit.
l. Suspected equipment or automation anomalies that may be causal or contributory must be immediately reported to (Technical Operations) the System Operations Center (SOC), or Operational Control Center (OCC), as appropriate, and investigated thoroughly. If an equipment or automation anomaly from another facility is suspected, advise a management official at the other facility immediately. Document the notification on FAA Form 7230-4.
m. Continuous Data Recording (CDR) and National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) are the most common event records used to determine proximity. Safety Services expects CDR or NTAP records as soon as feasible after every OE. In addition, En Route facilities will prepare SATORI, with voice, and capable Terminal facilities will prepare a movie file (containing RAPTOR video of radar and digital recording of voice communications), as soon as feasible after every OE. Terminal facilities not capable of producing a movie file shall provide CDR data and a cassette tape (digital WAV file is acceptable) re-recording of voice communications with the time channel, as soon as feasible after every OE/OD.
NOTE- Surveillance sensor(s) being actively used at the control position(s) at the time of the loss of separation must be utilized to conduct the investigation and to determine the closest proximity and loss of separation.
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n. When the initial investigation results in a determination of a non-occurrence, retain all data used in the investigation process (e.g., pilot/specialist statements, records of conversations, ESAT, and CDR/NTAP data in an approved electronic format), as well as any other pertinent data not otherwise required to be retained, for 45 calendar days after the date of the determination. Facilities that determine the event was a nonoccurrence based on a printed ESAT, CDR/NTAP data and plots must retain both the original paper printout and an electronic copy.
o. Electronic files may be made available to Safety Services using the file transfer protocol (FTP://172.22.8.31) secured intranet site.
p. For losses of separation determined to be Proximity Events, review available voice and radar data in order to accurately provide information required to complete Form 7210-6.
q. Forward the required information for each Proximity Event directly to Safety Services, either by fax to (202) 385-4718 or electronically: 9-ATOS-HQ-INVESTIGATIONS/AWA/FAA by close of business of the next administrative day following the event. Information may be provided either by completion of individual Forms 7210-6 for each separate Proximity Event, or information for multiple events may be provided in a single summary report containing all required information.
5-1-6. ATM RESPONSIBILITIES
a. The ATM of the facility whose personnel were responsible for the separation of the aircraft involved, regardless of where the OE/OD occurred, shall:
(1) Ensure that OE/OD investigations are conducted in accordance with any negotiated agreements between the FAA and pertinent labor organizations.
(2) When the Preliminary OE/OD Investigation Report indicates that another facility(s) is involved in the occurrence, as soon as feasible confer with other ATM(s) to determine the scope of the other facility's investigative effort and how long it will take. This includes gathering data and completing Parts I and II of FAA Form 7210-3, Final Operational Error/Deviation Report. If the reporting ATM and the other ATM cannot concur in any phase of their respective investigations, their
differences shall be reported to the ATD for a resolution.
(3) Designate the Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The IIC may be designated on a rotational or permanent basis. Supervisory personnel or facility staff shall perform the IIC function. If the only facility officer is the ATM, and there are no assigned supervisors, the ATM performs the IIC functions.
(4) Designate a team to assist the IIC in the investigation of each OE/OD. The ATM shall determine the size and composition of the team, but shall as a minimum afford a Union designated representative reasonable opportunity to participate as a member of the investigative team.
(5) Ensure FAA Form 7210-3 is completed. Instructions for completing FAA Form 7210- 3 are contained in Appendix 4.
b. The ATM of any other involved facility shall be responsible for providing the reporting facility with information and assistance as required. This may require an investigation on the same scale as the reporting facility, in which case the ATM shall have the same responsibilities as defined under paragraph 5-1-3, Initial Investigations. The ATM of any other involved facility shall also be responsible for retaining all pertinent original data until notified of release by AAT-20.
c. The IIC is responsible for conducting a complete investigation and shall be the final authority for the findings and recommendations to be submitted to the ATM. In addition the IIC shall:
(1) Ensure that all pertinent data has been collected and documented in Part I of FAA Form 7210-3 and distributed to the ATM.
(2) When other facilities are involved, ascertain the scope of their investigation and coordinate the exchange of data and assistance as required.
(3) Assign duties to team members.
(4) Ensure that interviews conducted are done in accordance with paragraph 5-1-5b, Interviews.
d. The IIC Investigative Team shall:
(1) Assist the IIC by performing and completing all assigned tasks.
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(2) Remain under the supervision and jurisdiction of the IIC until relieved by the IIC or ATM.
5-1-7. RECLASSIFICATION
a. After preliminary notification procedures are completed, a review of the data may indicate a reclassification of the incident to one of the following:
(1) A pilot deviation.
(2) Military facility deviation.
(3) An OD (from an OE or PE).
(4) An OE (from an OD or PE).
(5) A PE (from an OD or OE).
(6) A non-occurrence.
b. If a reclassification is determined to be appropriate, the Manager must:
(1) Complete FAA Form 7210-5, Operational Error/Deviation Reclassification Report.
NOTE- If an incident is reclassified from an OE to an OD or PE, an OD to an OE or PE, or from a PE to an OE or OD, reclassify the original incident to a “Non-occurrence,” and indicate the new report number in the supporting documentation.
(2) Forward FAA Form 7210-5, along with the rationale and all necessary supporting documentation, including voice tapes and radar data, to the Service Area for review no later than 45 calendar days from the date of the initial report.
c. The Service Area must thoroughly review all requests for reclassification for completeness of data and validity. They must forward the requests they believe have merit to the Service Unit no later than 60 calendar days from the date of the initial report.
d. The Service Unit must thoroughly review all forwarded requests for reclassification. They must forward the requests they believe have merit to Safety Services Investigations & Evaluations no later than 75 calendar days from the date of the initial report.
e. Safety Services Investigations & Evaluations must review the forwarded requests for reclassification and determine whether the requests
should be granted. Safety Services Investigations & Evaluations must advise the Service Unit via memorandum of the disposition of the FAA Form 7210-5 no later than 90 calendar days from the date of the initial report.
NOTE- Facilities are responsible for completing/changing the appropriate forms after reclassification approval is received.
f. All original forms and supporting investigative data must retained in the facility for 2 ½ years.
5-1-8. PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS
Historically, performance management for operational personnel has been driven by reportable events (OE/Ds, PDs, etc.) and has been conducted post-event. This method has proven to be ineffective and is contrary to a just and safe culture. While facility management must address any performance issues identified during the course of an investigation in the most appropriate manner, this should not be the primary method of observing and documenting performance. Managers are expected to conduct performance management on an ongoing basis following the model set forth in the FAA Performance Management System (PM- 9.1). In addition, Terminal Services and En Route Services are developing Quality Control directives that will provide specific requirements for monitoring performance and providing feedback that will set a framework for conducting effective performance management. Managers are reminded that any training assigned to employees must be accomplished in accordance with FAAO 3120.4 and the FAA/NATCA CBA (for bargaining unit employees).
a. Facilities operating under ATSAP must follow the guidance contained in N JO 7210.705 regarding performance based actions for events that have been reported to and accepted by the ERC.
b. Disciplinary action may not be taken for performance which led to an OE, OD, or PE if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The employee’s action or lack of action was inadvertent.
(2) The employee’s action or lack of action did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or action under Section 609 of the Federal Aviation
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Act which discloses a lack of qualification or competency, which is wholly excluded from this policy.
(3) The employee shows proof that within 10 days after the occurrence of the OE, OD, or PE, he/she completed and submitted, electronically or by mail, a report of the occurrence to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) ASRS. The submission and acceptance of a report under the ATSAP program, this order, Chapter 9, will automatically submit a report to the ASRS.
5-1-9. FINAL REPORTS
The ATM shall:
a. Analyze the data submitted by the IIC in Part I of the FAA Form 7210-3 to determine:
(1) The classification of the occurrence; i.e., operational error, operational deviation, pilot deviation, or no occurrence. If it is determined that an OE/OD can be reclassified, the ATM shall request that the incident be reclassified in accordance with paragraph 5-1-7, Reclassification.
(2) The categorization of the OE/OD; i.e., ATCS, manager/supervisor/other personnel, procedural, equipment, or any combination thereof.
(3) The causal factors of the OE/OD.
(4) The recommendations and corrective actions to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the OE/OD.
b. Provide copies of Part I and Part II to the Principal Union Representative, before completing Part II, Item 69, Facility Manager's Recommendations and Corrective actions. The union representative may submit comments or recommendations in writing to the ATM within 5 calendar days of receipt. Recommendations should concern corrective actions that can be undertaken to preclude a similar occurrence. The ATM shall consider these comments in his/her deliberations before completing Facility Manager's Recommendations and Corrective Actions and shall append the union representative’s comments to Part II.
c. Complete Part II of the FAA Form 7210-3 and submit two copies of Parts I and II and all attachments (including union statements) to the Director of Operations, and one copy each to other ATMs and Directors of Operations as required,
within 30 administrative workdays of the date the occurrence was reported.
d. Investigations conducted by Safety Services under 5-1-17, ATO Safety Services Investigations, of this Notice do not relieve facility management of the requirement to complete the Final Operational Error/Deviation Report (FAA Form 7210-3).
e. For Proximity Events, the information contained on FAA Form 7210-6 or optional summary report constitutes the final report. If the investigation has revealed information that differs from that which was initially reported, an amended FAA Form 7210-6 must be prepared.
f. When an employee of another facility is involved in an OE, ensure that the employee’s front line manager, is given sufficient documentation to determine the appropriate corrective action.
g. Retain the original report in the facility files.
h. Establish a follow-up method to evaluate the effectiveness of the local recommendations and actions that result from the investigation.
i. Send copies of the completed FAA Form 7210- 2 or 7210-6 to (Technical Operations) the System Operations Center (SOC), or Operational Control Center (OCC), for any operational error (OE) or Proximity Event (PE) where equipment or automation is found to be contributory.
j. Service Areas must work closely with other Service Areas when an OE involves facilities in different Service Areas and the respective Managers cannot concur in any phase of their investigations. If 5 business days have passed since the incident and a decision cannot be reached with the other Service Areas, forward all investigative data to the Service Unit for review and resolution. If 5 business days have passed since the incident was elevated and the Service Units can not reach a decision forward all data to Safety Services for resolution. Retain all recordings, data, and documentation pertaining to the incident until Safety Services reaches a decision.
5-1-10. ENTRIES IN TRAINING & PROFICIENCY RECORD (FAA Form 3120-1)
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