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Final Rule Current Issued Aug 27, 2024 30 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

89 FR 68706 System Safety Assessments

The FAA is amending certain airworthiness regulations to standardize the criteria for conducting safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport category airplanes. With this action, the FAA seeks to reduce risk associated with airplane accidents and incidents that have occurred in service, and reduce risk associated with new technology in flight control systems. The intended effect of this rulemaking is to improve aviation safety by making system safety assessment (SSA) certification requirements more comprehensive and consistent.

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Vol. 89

Tuesday,

No. 166

August 27, 2024

Part II

14 CFR Part 25

System Safety Assessments; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 166 / Tuesday, August 27, 2024 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No.: FAA-2022-1544; Amdt. No. 25-152] RIN 2120-AJ99

System Safety Assessments

System Safety Assessments

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is amending certain airworthiness regulations to standardize the criteria for conducting safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport category airplanes. With this action, the FAA seeks to reduce risk associated with airplane accidents and incidents that have occurred in service, and reduce risk associated with new technology in flight control systems. The intended effect of this rulemaking is to improve aviation safety by making system safety assessment (SSA) certification requirements more comprehensive and consistent.

Dates

DATES: Effective September 26, 2024.

ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking documents and other information related to this final rule, see "How to Obtain Additional Information" in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Martin, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax (206) 231-3210; email [email protected].

Supplementary Information

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Authority for This Rulemaking

The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the FAA's authority.

I. Authority for This Rulemaking

This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General Requirements." Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It prescribes new safety standards for the design and operation of transport category airplanes.

II. Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

II. Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

Table 1--Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

Acronym Definition

AC … Advisory Circular.

AD … Airworthiness Directive.

AFM … Airplane Flight Manual.

ALS … Airworthiness Limitations section.

ARAC … Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

ASAWG … Airplane Level Safety Analysis Working

Group.

CAST … Commercial Aviation Safety Team.

CMR … Certification Maintenance Requirement.

CS-25 … Certification Specifications for Large

Aeroplanes (issued by EASA).

CSL+1 … Catastrophic Single Latent Failure Plus

One (a failure condition).

EASA … European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

ELOS … Equivalent Level of Safety.

EWIS … Electrical Wiring Interconnection System.

FCHWG … Flight Controls Harmonization Working

Group.

FTHWG … Flight Test Harmonization Working Group.

ICA … Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.

LDHWG … Loads and Dynamics Harmonization Working

Group.

NTSB … National Transportation Safety Board.

PPIHWG … Powerplant Installation Harmonization

Working Group.

SDAHWG … System Design and Analysis Harmonization

Working Group.

SLF … Significant Latent Failure.

SSA … System Safety Assessment.

Table of Contents

I. Authority for This Rulemaking II. Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document III. Overview of Final Rule IV. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

B. Related Actions

C. NTSB Recommendations

D. Summary of the NPRM

I. Authority for This Rulemaking II. Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document III. Overview of Final Rule IV. Background

E. General Overview of Comments V. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule

A. Section 25.4, Definitions

B. Section 25.302, Interaction of Systems and Structures

C. Section 25.629, Aeroelastic Stability Requirements

D. Section 25.671, Flight Control Systems

E. Section 25.901, Engine Installation

F. Section 25.933, Reversing Systems

G. Section 25.1301, Function and Installation

H. Section 25.1309, Equipment, Systems and Installations

I. Section 25.1365, Electrical Appliances, Motors, and Transformers

J. Miscellaneous Comments

K. Advisory Material VI. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Evaluation

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

F. International Compatibility

G. Environmental Analysis VII. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

B. Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

D. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation VIII. Additional Information

A. Electronic Access and Filing

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

III. Overview of Final Rule

The FAA is amending regulations in title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes) related to the safety assessment \1\ of airplane systems. The changes to part 25 affect applicants for type certification and operators of transport category airplanes. Applicants for type certification will be required to conduct their SSAs in accordance with the revised regulations. Changes to the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) affect operators of newly certified airplanes, although the impact on those operators is not significant.

III. Overview of Final Rule

\1\ A system safety assessment is a structured process intended to systematically identify the risks pertinent to the design of aircraft systems, and to show that the systems meet safety requirements.

The FAA is revising and adding new safety standards to reduce the likelihood of potentially catastrophic risks due to latent failures in critical systems.

Because modern aircraft systems (for example, avionics and fly-by-wire systems) are much more integrated than they were when the current safety criteria in § 25.1309 and other system safety assessment rules were established in 1970,\2\ the new standards are more consistent for all systems of the airplane, reducing the chance of a hazard falling into a gap between the different regulatory requirements for different systems.

\2\ 35 FR 5665 (Apr. 8, 1970).

Consistent criteria for conducting SSAs also provides predictability for applicants by reducing the number of issue papers and special conditions necessary for airplane certification projects.\3\

\3\ As discussed in the preamble, special conditions are rules of particular applicability that the FAA issues to address novel or unusual design features. See 14 CFR 21.16.

Specifically, this final rule--

• Requires that applicants limit the likelihood of a catastrophic failure condition that results from a combination of two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight. See § 25.1309(b)(5).

• Revises safety assessment regulations to eliminate ambiguity in, and provide consistency between, the safety assessments that applicants must conduct for different types of airplane systems. Section 25.1309 continues to contain the safety assessment criteria applicable to most airplane systems. Section 25.901(c) (powerplant installations) is amended to remove general system safety criteria. Instead, the powerplant installations covered in this section are required to comply with § 25.1309 (system safety criteria). Section 25.933(a) (thrust reversing systems) allows compliance with § 25.1309 as an option. Sections 25.671, 25.901, and 25.933 continue to contain criteria specific to flight control systems, powerplant installations, and thrust reversing systems, respectively, that are not addressed by § 25.1309.

• Requires applicants to assess and account for any effect that the failure of a system could have on the structural performance of the airplane. See § 25.302.

• Defines the different types of failure of flight control systems, including jams, and defines the criteria for safety assessment of those types of failures. See § 25.671.

• Requires applicants to include, in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the airplane's ICA, necessary maintenance tasks that applicants identify during their SSAs. See § 25.1309(e).

• Removes the "function properly when installed" criterion in § 25.1301(a)(4) for installed equipment whose function is not needed for safe operation of the airplane.

IV. Background

IV. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

This action is necessary because airplane accidents, incidents, and service difficulties have occurred as a result of failures in airplane systems. Some of these occurrences were caused, in part, by insufficient design standards for controlling the risk of latent failures, which are failures that are not detected or annunciated when they occur. Current FAA regulations do not prevent the certification of an airplane with a latent failure that, when combined with another failure, could cause a hazardous or catastrophic accident.

A. Statement of the Problem

Also, current regulations do not require establishment of mandatory inspections for significant latent failures (SLFs) that may pose a risk in maintaining the airworthiness of the airplane design. Such inspections are currently undertaken as industry practice and may be necessary to reduce exposure to these latent failures so airplanes continue to meet safety standards while in service.

Additionally, current regulations do not adequately address new technology in flight control systems and the effects these systems can have on controllability and structural capability. These issues are currently addressed by special conditions and equivalent level of safety (ELOS) findings.

This action is also necessary to address flight control systems whose failure can affect the loads imposed on the airplane structure.

Lastly, certain system safety requirements have not been standardized across airplane systems. These regulations have specified different safety assessment criteria for different systems, which can lead to inconsistent standards across the airplane. Also, when systems that traditionally have been separate become integrated using new technology, applicants have expressed uncertainty regarding which standard to apply.

The FAA is addressing these issues by revising the system safety assessment requirements in part 25.

B. Related Actions

B. Related Actions

1. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Recommendations

Advances in flight controls technology, increased airplane system integration, and certain incidents, accidents, and service difficulties related to system failures prompted the FAA to task the ARAC with developing recommendations for new or revised requirements and compliance methods related to the safety assessment of airplane and powerplant systems. The ARAC accepted tasks on various airplane systems issues and assigned them to the Powerplant Installation Harmonization Working Group (PPIHWG),\4\ Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG),\5\ Loads and Dynamics Harmonization Working Group (LDHWG),\6\ and System Design and Analysis Harmonization Working Group (SDAHWG).\7\ The FAA also tasked the ARAC to make recommendations for harmonizing the relevant part 25 rules with the corresponding European certification specifications for large airplanes.\8\ The ARAC accepted this task and assigned it to the relevant working groups.

1. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Recommendations

\4\ 57 FR 58844 (Dec. 11, 1992).

\5\ 63 FR 45554 (Aug. 26, 1998).

\6\ 59 FR 30081 (Jun. 10, 1994).

\7\ 61 FR 26246 (May 24, 1996).

\8\ As the FAA noted in the Federal Register in 1993: "The FAA announced at the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)-Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Harmonization Conference in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, (June 2-5, 1992) that it would consolidate within the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee structure an ongoing objective to "harmonize" the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) and the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). Coincident with that announcement, the FAA assigned to the ARAC those projects related to JAR/FAR 25, 33 and 35 harmonization which were then in the process of being coordinated between the JAA and the FAA." 58 FR 13819, 13820 (Mar. 15, 1993).

Although the working groups each addressed the subject of managing latent failures in safety critical systems, their recommendations were not consistent when defining the criteria for latent failures. After reviewing the relevant regulations and the recommendations from the working groups, the FAA, along with the European, Canadian, and Brazilian civil aviation authorities, identified a need to standardize SSA criteria.

Therefore, in 2006, the FAA tasked the ARAC, which assigned the task to the Airplane-Level Safety Assessment Working Group (ASAWG),\9\ with creating consistent SSA criteria. The ASAWG completed its work in May 2010 and recommended a set of consistent requirements that would apply to all systems. Specific areas addressed in the recommendation report include latent failures, aging and wear, Master Minimum Equipment Lists, and flight and diversion time. The ASAWG recommended that the general system safety criteria for all airplane systems be governed by § 25.1309, and recommended adjustments to the regulations and advisory material addressed by the working groups mentioned previously, to implement consistent system safety criteria. All ARAC working group recommendation reports are available in the docket for this final rule.

\9\ 71 FR 14284 (Mar. 21, 2006).

2. Harmonization With European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Standards

2. Harmonization With European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Standards

EASA certification standards for large airplanes (CS-25) prescribes the airworthiness standards corresponding to 14 CFR part 25 for transport category airplanes certified by the European Union. Applicants for FAA type certification of transport category airplanes may also seek EASA validation of the FAA's type certificate. Where part 25 and CS-25 differ, an applicant must meet both airworthiness standards to obtain a U.S. type certificate and validation of the type certificate by foreign authorities, or obtain exemptions, equivalent level of safety findings or special conditions, or the foreign authority's equivalent to those, as necessary to meet one standard in lieu of the other. Where FAA and EASA can maintain harmonized requirements, applicants for type certification benefit by having a single set of requirements with which they must show compliance, thereby reducing the cost and complexity of certification and ensuring a consistent level of safety.

EASA incorporated the SDAHWG-recommended changes to CS/Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309, and associated guidance, in its initial issuance of CS-25 on October 17, 2003.\10\ EASA incorporated the criteria regarding interaction of systems and structures recommended by the LDHWG into its regulatory framework as CS 25.302 and appendix K of CS-25 at amendment 25/1 on December 12, 2005.\11\ EASA incorporated the PPIHWG-recommended changes to CS/Sec. § 25.901(c) and 25.933(a)(1), and associated guidance, at amendment 25/1. EASA incorporated the ASAWG-recommended regulatory and advisory material implementing consistent SSA criteria, at amendment 25/24 to CS-25, on January 10, 2020.\12\ This final rule harmonizes FAA requirements with those of EASA to the extent possible, with differences described in the section entitled "Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule."

\10\ www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/1516/en.

\11\ www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/certification-specifications/cs-25-amendment-1.

\12\ www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/108354/en.

C. NTSB Recommendations

C. NTSB Recommendations

This final rule addresses National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendations A-99-22, A-99-23,\13\ A-02-51,\14\ and A-14-119.\15\

\13\ NTSB Safety Recommendations A-99-22 and A-99-23 are available in the docket and at www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A99_20_29.pdf.

\14\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-02-51 is available in the docket and at www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A02_36_51.pdf.

\15\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-14-119 is available in the docket and www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-14-113-127.pdf.

In Safety Recommendation A-99-22, the NTSB recommends that the FAA ensure that future transport category airplanes provide a reliably redundant rudder actuation system. In Safety Recommendation A-99-23, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require type certificate applicants to show that transport category airplanes are capable of continued safe flight and landing after jamming of a flight control at any deflection possible, up to and including its full deflection, unless the applicant shows that such a jam is extremely improbable. The final rule addresses these recommendations by revising § 25.671(c).

In Safety Recommendation A-02-51, the NTSB recommends that the FAA review and revise airplane certification regulations, and associated guidance, applicable to the certification of transport category airplanes, to ensure that applicants fully address wear-related failures so that, to the maximum extent possible, such failures will not be catastrophic. The requirement to include certification maintenance requirements (CMRs) in the ALS responds to this safety recommendation, as well as the ACs accompanying this final rule that contain guidance on assessing wear-related failures as part of the SSA.

In Safety Recommendation A-14-119, the NTSB recommends that the FAA provide its certification engineers with written guidance and training to ensure that assumptions, data sources, and analytical techniques are fully identified and justified in applicants' safety assessments for designs incorporating new technology. Additionally, the NTSB recommends that an appropriate level of conservatism be included in the analysis or design, consistent with the intent of the draft guidance material that the SDAHWG recommended. AC 25.1309-1B, accompanying this final rule, contains the guidance.\16\

\16\ This advisory circular, and the other advisory circulars that accompany this final rule, are in the docket.

D. Summary of the NPRM

D. Summary of the NPRM

The FAA issued an NPRM on December 8, 2022 (87 FR 75424), that proposed amending certain airworthiness regulations. These regulations concern safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport category airplanes. The NPRM explained how the proposed regulations would reduce risk associated with airplane accidents and incidents that have occurred in service, and reduce risk associated with new technology in flight control systems. This action finalizes the proposal with changes made to address comments.

E. General Overview of Comments

E. General Overview of Comments

V. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule

Harmonization

The NPRM explained that the FAA's proposed rule would harmonize with the requirements of EASA to the extent possible, although there were differences in the requirements and language of the FAA's proposed regulations compared to EASA's corresponding regulations in CS-25. Almost all organizational commenters requested the FAA revise the proposed rule to harmonize more closely with EASA CS-25. These commenters expressed concern that differences between the FAA's proposal and EASA's existing regulations would burden applicants requesting validation of a type certificate issued by another civil aviation authority because the applicants would have to meet two sets of requirements and show multiple means of compliance for certification of the same design. As discussed below, the FAA decided to address this concern by increasing harmonization of its final rule with the corresponding EASA CS-25 requirements.

Harmonization

The FAA acknowledges that there are some remaining differences between the FAA's and EASA's regulations on this topic. The majority of differences between the final rule and the corresponding CS-25 regulations are differences in wording or structure that were made to satisfy FAA rulemaking constraints or improve the final rule language due to requests from commenters. Although a few differences may be significant standards differences,\17\ as subsequently explained, the FAA does not expect these differences to increase the cost and complexity of certification for applicants pursuing validation nor result in a different level of safety between authorities.

\17\ Significant standards difference (SSD) refers to a validating authority airworthiness standard that either differs significantly from the certifying authority (CA) standard or has no CA equivalent. Reference: Technical Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness and Environmental Certification between the FAA and EASA, Revision 7, dated October 19, 2023, in the docket.

In addition, the commenters addressed the draft ACs that accompanied the NPRM. The FAA's responses to these comments can be found at the Dynamic Regulatory System (drs.faa.gov), along with the finalized ACs.

A. Section 25.4, Definitions

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed new § 25.4 to define certain terms that the FAA is using in these revised regulations for system safety assessment of transport category airplanes. 1. Add Definitions

A. Section 25.4, Definitions

Boeing and GAMA/AIA requested the FAA add definitions of several terms to § 25.4, including "continued safe flight and landing," "flightcrew," "cabin crew," "ground crew," "maintenance personnel," "exposure time," "safety requirements" and "candidate CMR." GAMA/AIA requested the FAA explain why some terms, but not others, were defined in proposed § 25.4.

The FAA does not agree to add new terms to § 25.4 in this final rule. The FAA's intent in adding § 25.4 is to define key terms that are new to part 25 rule text and used in the regulations that are part of this rulemaking (e.g., failure condition categories and probabilities). AC 25.671-1, Control Systems--General, and AC 25.1309-1B, System Design and Analysis, include additional definitions for terms related to the requirements of Sec. § 25.671 and 25.1309.

Boeing, GAMA/AIA, and Gulfstream suggested that the FAA add definitions for terms commonly used throughout part 25 regulations (e.g., "impractical," "essential" and "critical"). The FAA declines to define additional terms used in part 25, because the FAA does not intend § 25.4 to include every term that is repeated in part 25. 2. Remove Definitions

ANAC, Bombardier, and Garmin requested the FAA not adopt proposed § 25.4, Definitions. ANAC preferred that the FAA define these terms in 14 CFR part 1, Definitions and Abbreviations, while Bombardier and Garmin preferred that the FAA define these terms in guidance so that they can be more easily changed as needed. Gulfstream also noted that several terms that the FAA proposed to be included in § 25.4 are not extensively used in part 25 and should be relocated to AC 25.1309-1B.

The FAA does not agree to omit new § 25.4 from the final rule. Section 25.4 is necessary to define key terms and concepts that are new to part 25 rule text and part of this rulemaking. AC 25.1309-1B provides further information on these terms.

Gulfstream requested that the FAA move "hazardous failure condition" to AC 25.1309, unless the definition is applicable to "hazardous" across all regulations.

The FAA does not agree to move this definition to the AC. The definition for "hazardous failure condition" in § 25.4(b)(2) only applies to the part 25 regulations in which that exact phrase is used, and it does not apply to the terms "hazard" or "hazardous," which are used throughout part 25 in different contexts. The FAA's use of "hazardous" across other part 25 rules does not necessarily imply a hazardous effect on the aircraft, flightcrew, or occupants. While not relevant to the Gulfstream comment, the FAA notes a similar situation exists with the term "extremely remote." The § 25.4(c)(3) definition of "extremely remote failure condition" does not apply to the term "extremely remote" as used in § 25.933 or § 25.937. When those regulations were published, the term "extremely remote" meant "extremely improbable," as used today.\18\

\18\ The use of the term "extremely remote" in Sec. § 25.933 and 25.937 dates to the initial issue of 14 CFR in 1965. Section 25.933 was based on Civil Air Regulation (CAR) 4b.407, which was adopted at amendment 4b-01, May 17, 1954. Section 25.937 was based on CAR 4b.408, which was adopted at amendment 4b-6, July 8, 1957. The term "extremely remote" also appeared in CAR 04.310 on November 9, 1945. The FAA also stated in the Federal Register in 2001, "The term `extremely improbable' (or its predecessor term, `extremely remote') has been used in 14 CFR part 25 for many years. The objective of this term has been to describe a condition (usually a failure condition) that has a probability of occurrence so remote that it is not anticipated to occur in service on any transport category airplane." 66 FR 23086, 23108 (May 7, 2001).

3. Revise Definitions

3. Revise Definitions

TCCA commented that the proposed definitions of "major failure condition" and "hazardous failure condition" do not include a pilot compensation aspect and suggested changes to these definitions. TCCA suggested adding "(5) Considerable pilot compensation is required for control" to the definition of "major failure condition" and "(4) Intense pilot compensation is required to retain" to the definition of "hazardous failure condition" in accordance with a pilot task-oriented approach for evaluating airplane handling qualities. The FAA does not agree to change the definitions as suggested. The FAA's definitions of "major failure condition" and "hazardous failure condition" already include the effects on the flightcrew and their workload. Lastly, the definitions of "major failure condition" and "hazardous failure condition" specified in § 25.4 are harmonized with those specified in EASA AMC 25.1309. Changing those definitions would disharmonize them with that AMC.

GAMA/AIA and Gulfstream requested the FAA replace "persons" with "occupants" in the § 25.4 definition of "hazardous failure condition." The commenters stated that the use of "persons" in lieu of "occupants" is an unsubstantiated expansion of the scope of the safety analysis to include people not on the aircraft. In addition, EASA's definition uses "occupants." The FAA does not agree with this request. The FAA intends the term "persons" not to be limited to aircraft occupants. Although EASA's definition uses the term "occupants," EASA has interpreted "occupants" to include persons other than airplane occupants in its Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 25.1309. Specifically, AMC 25.1309 states, "Where relevant, the effects on persons other than the aeroplane occupants should be taken into account when assessing failure conditions in compliance with CS 25.1309."

TCCA commented that the FAA should revise its definition of "hazardous failure condition" to exclude fatalities. TCCA stated that any fatalities should be considered catastrophic. The FAA did not make this change in this final rule, as doing so would not be consistent with long-standing FAA equivalent safety findings, nor with industry standards and practice, and would disharmonize the definition of "hazardous failure condition" with EASA AMC 25.1309.

Boeing and GAMA/AIA requested the FAA revise the definition of "catastrophic failure condition" to incorporate a note regarding failure conditions, which would prevent continued safe flight and landing (CSFL). Boeing also requested the FAA standardize the definition across the ACs associated with this rulemaking because the draft ACs were not consistent in their use of CSFL and associating this concept with "catastrophic failure condition." The FAA partially agrees with this request. The FAA added a note to the definition of "catastrophic failure condition" in AC 25.1309-1B to indicate that a failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing should be classified as "catastrophic" unless otherwise defined in other, more specific, ACs. The FAA did not add the note to the regulatory definition in § 25.4 because the note is guidance on the application of the definition.

Boeing requested that the FAA update the § 25.4(b)(1) definition of "major failure condition" to add "physical discomfort" as an effect on the flight crew and to use the term "cabin crew" instead of "flight attendants" for consistency with EASA Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 25.1309. The FAA agrees and has incorporated these updates in the final rule for § 25.4(b)(1).

GAMA/AIA and Gulfstream requested the FAA remove § 25.4(b)(1)(iv) ("An effect of similar severity") from the definition of "major failure condition" in § 25.4(b)(1). They stated this is a new addition to the definition and may cause confusion. The FAA does not agree to remove "an effect of similar severity" from the definition. This phrase replaces the term "for example" in EASA's definition. This does not add any additional criteria to the existing safety objective of "major" severity.

Boeing and GAMA/AIA requested the FAA revise the definition of "significant latent failure" to "Any latent failure that is present in any combination of failures or events resulting in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition." Boeing stated that this proposed definition minimizes possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the significant latent failure. The FAA did not make this change because the wording of the significant latent failure definition is well-established and unchanged from AC 25.1309-1A.

Except for the foregoing updates to the definition of "major failure condition" in § 25.4(b)(1), new § 25.4, Definitions, is adopted as proposed.

B. Section 25.302, Interaction of Systems and Structures

B. Section 25.302, Interaction of Systems and Structures

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a new section, § 25.302, that would require an applicant to account for systems, and their possible failure, when assessing the structural performance of its proposed design. Modern flight control systems are more sophisticated than their predecessors and offer advantages such as load limiting and alleviation. However, as the FAA discussed in the NPRM, these systems can also have failure states that may allow the system to function in degraded modes that flightcrews may not readily detect and in which the load alleviation or limiting function may be adversely affected.

The FAA based much of its proposed regulation on the requirements of special conditions that the FAA has issued for several years to address these concerns on previous certification programs. However, as detailed in the NPRM, proposed § 25.302 included a number of differences compared to the special conditions and as compared to EASA CS 25.302. The primary objective of the § 25.302 rule that the FAA proposed in the NPRM was to reduce confusion for authorities and applicants by simplifying the rule text relative to previously-issued special conditions.

ATR, Boeing, Bombardier, TCCA, Airbus, EASA, GAMA/AIA, Gulfstream, and ANAC did not object to the FAA codifying the terms of its special conditions that it has been issuing to address this issue. However, they requested the FAA harmonize (by using the same language and, if possible, the same paragraph and appendix numbering for) proposed § 25.302 as EASA CS 25.302, which includes Appendix K by reference.

The FAA recognizes the benefits of harmonization. These benefits include regulatory predictability and the reduction of burden on applicants and civil aviation authorities. Therefore, except as discussed below, in this final rule, the FAA has harmonized new § 25.302 with EASA CS 25.302 to match the language and structure of EASA's rule to the extent allowed by FAA rulemaking constraints.

In this final rule, the FAA has revised the proposed § 25.302 to more closely harmonize with EASA CS 25.302, which includes Appendix K by reference. The FAA has revised proposed § 25.302 to harmonize with CS 25.302 in the determination of structural safety factors; the load conditions that the applicant must consider following system failures; residual strength substantiation; fatigue and damage tolerance; failure indications; and dispatch with known failure conditions. The FAA is revising these requirements relative to what was proposed in the NPRM because much of the criteria in CS 25.302 more closely matches the FAA Interaction of Systems and Structures special conditions that have been applied on numerous transport category airplane programs and have proven to provide a satisfactory level of safety.\19\ Also, the NPRM proposal, if adopted, would have introduced a number of differences between FAA and EASA requirements and created a potential certification burden.

\19\ 87 FR 16626 (Mar. 24, 2022); 82 FR 36328 (Aug. 4, 2017).

The FAA stated in the NPRM that the proposed § 25.302(e), which would have provided structural requirements for dispatch under the master minimum equipment list provided by the applicant, would provide safety benefits by using a simpler approach to address the risk associated with dispatching an airplane with known failure conditions. However, the FAA agrees with commenters that two different sets of criteria (FAA and EASA) would only cause more difficulty for manufacturers, the FAA, and other civil aviation authorities. The FAA also stated in the NPRM that proposed § 25.302 would provide safety benefits by using simpler, and in some cases more conservative, criteria compared with CS 25.302 and previous FAA special conditions. The FAA agrees with commenters that its special conditions, which used the same factor-of-safety formulae as used in CS 25.302, have proven to provide a satisfactory level of safety and that more conservative criteria are not necessary. By more closely harmonizing with CS 25.302 and previous FAA special conditions, applicants will be able to rely on past practices. The public could have reasonably anticipated the FAA would adopt final rule text that closely harmonizes with CS 25.302, given the FAA's prior special conditions, the common safety purpose of the FAA and EASA regulations on this topic, and the harmonization discussion throughout the NPRM.

In this final rule, the FAA has also revised § 25.302 to harmonize with CS 25.302 in terms of the rule structure and paragraph numbering, although CS-25 includes CS 25.302 criteria within Appendix K, while 14 CFR part 25 includes all criteria directly in § 25.302.

The regulatory text proposed by the FAA in the NPRM did not require applicants to consider the effect of nonlinearities, but the preamble reflected the FAA's assumption that applicants would do so. Consistent with CS 25.302, in this final rule, the FAA has made this consideration a regulatory requirement.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that proposed § 25.302 would not include any aeroelastic stability requirements, only loads requirements. The FAA did not revise this final rule to harmonize with CS 25.302 in terms of aeroelastic stability criteria. As discussed in the NPRM, the FAA finds that the failure criteria specified in § 25.629 are adequate, and there is no need to propose different failure criteria in § 25.302.

Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Dassault, DeHavilland, GAMA/AIA, Gulfstream, Pratt & Whitney, and TCCA requested specific changes to proposed § 25.302 in the event the FAA chose not to harmonize § 25.302 with EASA CS 25.302. The requested specific changes are no longer applicable as the FAA has largely harmonized § 25.302 in this final rule with EASA CS 25.302.

Airbus proposed that the FAA consolidate, into new § 25.302, the requirement of § 25.305(f) that the airplane must be designed to withstand any forced structural vibration resulting from any failure, malfunction, or adverse condition in the flight control system. The FAA does not agree. In this final rule, the FAA keeps those as separate requirements because the requirement in § 25.305(f) may apply to systems and failures not addressed by § 25.302. Also, § 25.305(f) is currently harmonized with CS 25.305(f). 1. Summary of Requirements

For airplanes equipped with systems that affect structural performance, § 25.302, in this final rule, requires the applicant take into account the influence of these systems and their failure conditions when showing compliance with the requirements of subparts C and D of 14 CFR part 25. New § 25.302(b) specifies requirements for when the systems are fully operative. New § 25.302(c) specifies requirements for failure conditions at the time of occurrence (§ 25.302(c)(1)) and for the continuation of flight (§ 25.302(c)(2)). New § 25.302(c) includes requirements related to structural vibrations, residual strength, and fatigue and damage tolerance for these failure conditions. Finally, the rule provides failure indication (§ 25.302(d)) and dispatch requirements (§ 25.302(e)). 2. Applicability

Boeing, Bombardier, DeHavilland, GAMA/AIA, and Pratt & Whitney requested that the FAA clarify the applicability of proposed § 25.302, including whether the FAA's final rule would apply only, as did the FAA's special conditions and EASA CS 25.302, to the airplane structure whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. The applicability of § 25.302 in this final rule is as follows.

As stated in the final rule text, § 25.302 applies to systems that affect structural performance, either directly or as a result of a failure or malfunction. A system affects structural performance if it can induce loads on the airplane or change the response of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions.

Examples of these systems include flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, and fuel management systems.

Section 25.302, in this final rule, specifies the loads that the applicant's analysis must apply to structure, taking into account the systems defined above, operating normally and in the failed state. As stated in the final rule text, these structural requirements apply only to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of the special conditions that the FAA has been applying for more than twenty years.

Section 25.302, in this final rule and as proposed in the NPRM, does not apply to the flight control jam conditions covered by § 25.671(c)(3) or the discrete source events covered by § 25.571(e). Section 25.302 also does not apply to any failure or event that is external to (not part of) the system being evaluated and that would itself cause structural damage. 3. Clarification of Terms

In this final rule, § 25.302(b) states that with the system fully operative, the applicant must investigate the effect of nonlinearities sufficiently beyond limit conditions to ensure the behavior of the system presents no detrimental effects compared to the behavior below limit conditions. The intent of this sentence is to require the applicant to investigate the system effects "sufficiently beyond limit" to ensure that no detrimental effects could occur at limit load or just beyond.

Sections 25.302(c)(1)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii) of this final rule include a reference to residual strength substantiation. This is referring to the residual strength substantiation required by § 25.571(b).

Section 25.302(c)(2)(iv) of this final rule states that if the loads induced by the failure condition have a significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance, then the applicant must take their effects into account. A failure condition has a "significant" effect on fatigue or damage tolerance if it would result in a change to inspection thresholds, inspection intervals, or life limits.

Section 25.302(d)(1) of this final rule requires the flightcrew to be made aware of certain failure conditions before flight, as far as practicable. In this case, "as far as practicable" means that if automatic failure indication can detect such a failure using current technology, then that failure should be so monitored and indicated to the flightcrew before flight. 4. Significant Standards Differences Between § 25.302 and EASA CS 25.302

Section 25.302 of this final rule differs from CS 25.302 and Appendix K, as discussed below.

As noted above, unlike CS 25.302, new § 25.302 does not include any aeroelastic stability requirements. Section 25.629 and CS 25.629 both specify flutter speed margins for failure conditions, but CS 25.302 includes additional aeroelastic failure criteria. As indicated in the NPRM, the FAA finds the failure criteria specified in § 25.629 to be adequate, and additional failure criteria in § 25.302 are unnecessary. This is a significant standards difference between § 25.302 and CS 25.302.

The NPRM proposed, and in this final rule § 25.302 requires, the evaluation of any system failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable or that results from a single failure. Several commenters, including Bombardier, Airbus, and TCCA, stated that single failures that an applicant shows to be extremely improbable should not be included in § 25.302, while Boeing agreed that single failures should be included regardless of probability. The FAA does not agree to exclude single failures from § 25.302 in this final rule for the following reasons:

(1) To be consistent with Sec. § 25.671 and 25.1309, both of which require the evaluation of single failures, and related guidance, and past practice for these regulations, the FAA determined, as indicated in the NPRM, that single failures should be assumed to occur regardless of probability.

(2) The typical language of the FAA's Interaction of Systems and Structures special conditions, used to address this issue on a variety of transport category airplane programs for more than twenty years, refers to any system failure condition "not shown to be extremely improbable." Even though the special conditions have not explicitly mentioned single failures, the FAA's long-standing position on single failures is that they cannot be accepted as being extremely improbable. As noted in AC 25.1309-1A, dated June 21, 1988: "In general, a failure condition resulting from a single failure mode of a device cannot be accepted as being extremely improbable."

(3) The FAA has determined that not including single failures in the evaluation would reduce safety.

To conclude, CS 25.302 requires the evaluation of any system failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable, and that rule does not explicitly mention single failures. Therefore, this is a significant standards difference between § 25.302 in this final rule and CS 25.302.

CS 25.302 and § 25.302 in this final rule both require evaluation of failure conditions that affect structural performance, and for these failure conditions, both rules specify certain load conditions that must be evaluated for the continuation of flight. Section 25.302 includes an additional requirement not included in CS 25.302: Section 25.302(c)(2)(i)(F) requires the applicant to evaluate any other load condition for which a system is specifically installed or tailored to reduce the loads of that condition. "Tailored" means the system is designed or modified to change the response of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions and thereby affect the resulting loads on the airplane. This is necessary to account for any systems that are designed to reduce the loads resulting from load conditions not specified in § 25.302(c)(2)(i)(A) through (E) and whose failure would increase loads relative to the design load level. This is a significant standards difference between § 25.302 and CS 25.302. 5. Nonsignificant Standards Differences Between § 25.302 and EASA CS 25.302

Section 25.302 does not include paragraphs (a) and (b) from CS-25 Appendix K, K25.1 General, except for one sentence from K25.1(a). That sentence indicates that the criteria in § 25.302 are only applicable to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. Also, new § 25.302(c), discussed above, does not include paragraph (c)(3) from Appendix K, K25.2 Effects of Systems on Structures. The FAA did not include these paragraphs because the FAA determined they are general in nature and do not contain any specific requirements.

Section 25.302 does not include the definitions found in paragraph K25.1(c). The FAA determined these terms are sufficiently understood and do not need to be provided in the rule.

While § 25.302 is mostly harmonized with CS 25.302, there are a number of minor differences in wording, as follows:

CS-25 K25.2 paragraph (b) provides requirements for a fully operative system. Section 25.302(b) mandates the same requirements but states them more succinctly.

CS-25 K25.2 paragraph (c) provides requirements for a failed system. Section 25.302(c) mandates the same requirements but removes passive voice and states those requirements more succinctly.

CS-25 K25.2 paragraph (d) provides failure indication requirements. Section 25.302(d) mandates the same requirements but does not include the last two sentences of K25.2 paragraph (d)(1) because they are unnecessary given the first two sentences of paragraph (d)(1).

CS-25 K25.2 paragraph (e) and § 25.302(e) of this final rule address dispatch requirements. In § 25.302(e), the FAA includes a specific reference to the Master Minimum Equipment List, which the operator uses to develop their Minimum Equipment List, the primary document that controls dispatch requirements. Also, CS 25.302(e) includes a requirement that flight and operational limitations be such that being in a failure state and then encountering limit load is extremely improbable. The FAA did not include this requirement because § 25.302(e) already includes specific criteria related to dispatch, and this requirement could potentially conflict with those criteria.

Finally, EASA includes CS 25.302 criteria within CS-25 Appendix K, while this final rule includes the equivalent criteria in § 25.302.

In conclusion, to address the potential effects of aircraft systems on structure, the FAA does not adopt the text of § 25.302 that the FAA proposed in the NPRM. Instead, the FAA, as requested by several commenters, adopts a new § 25.302 that more closely hews to the language of the FAA's longstanding special conditions on this topic and to EASA CS 25.302, with the modifications set forth in the foregoing discussion.

C. Section 25.629, Aeroelastic Stability Requirements

C. Section 25.629, Aeroelastic Stability Requirements

Summary of Changes to Current Rule

Section 25.629 establishes several requirements to ensure the aeroelastic stability of the airplane. For example, it requires the applicant to consider the potential effect of several types of failures on the airplane's aeroelastic stability. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section, as discussed below.

Summary of Changes to Current Rule

In this final rule, the FAA is revising the paragraph numbers of § 25.629 to correspond with EASA's rule (i.e., § 25.629(d)(9) becomes (d)(10); § 25.629(d)(10) becomes (d)(11); and the failure evaluation requirements are introduced in § 25.629(d)(9)), as requested by commenters and explained below. The FAA is also revising the text in § 25.629(d)(9), as requested by commenters and as explained below, to harmonize with EASA CS 25.629(d)(9) and to clarify when the new failure evaluation requirements are applicable. Furthermore, as requested by commenters and explained below, the FAA is not revising § 25.629(b), as was proposed in the NPRM, to include the reference to § 25.333. Instead, the FAA is revising § 25.629(a) to clarify that the aeroelastic evaluation must include any condition of operation within the maneuvering envelope. This revision to proposed § 25.629(a) is consistent with current existing industry practice of evaluating the aeroelastic impact of loads due to allowed maneuvers for part 25 airplanes and is stated explicitly in § 23.629 at amendment 23-63 \20\ and EASA CS 23.629 amendment 23/4. The FAA also revised § 25.629(a) in this final rule to consistently use the singular term "evaluation" where it appears in order to prevent confusion.

\20\ 76 FR 75736 (December 2, 2011).

1. Paragraphs (a) and (b)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to specify that the aeroelastic stability envelope addressed by § 25.629(b) includes the range of load factors in § 25.333, Flight Maneuvering Envelope.

GAMA/AIA, Gulfstream, DeHavilland, Airbus, Bombardier, and Boeing requested the FAA not make this change. The commenters stated this would be an expansion of the traditional scope of § 25.629 and that it would disharmonize the FAA's rule with EASA rules. The commenters also stated that the structural design envelope defined in § 25.333 is not intended for aeroelastic stability analysis and should not be confused with the normal flight envelope of an airplane.

1. Paragraphs (a) and (b)

The FAA agrees with the commenters that the proposed change would disharmonize with CS 25.629 and potentially confuse the FAA's aeroelastic stability requirements with the strength requirements of § 25.333. Therefore, in this final rule, the FAA did not adopt the reference to § 25.333 in § 25.629(b), which remains unchanged.

However, including conditions within the flight maneuvering envelope that is described in § 25.333 in aeroelastic stability evaluations is common practice because such conditions are anticipated to be encountered in flight and therefore need to be free from aeroelastic instabilities. Thus, although paragraph (b) of § 25.629 does not reference § 25.333, in this final rule, paragraph (a) of § 25.629 now states that the aeroelastic evaluation must "include any condition of operation within the maneuvering envelope." This change to § 25.629(a) is consistent with § 23.629 at amendment 23-63 and EASA CS 23.629 amendment 23/4, which also address conditions of operation in paragraph (a). The FAA has also issued AC 25.629-1C, Aeroelastic Stability Substantiation of Transport Category Airplanes, to provide more details, further clarify the intent of the rule change, and provide an acceptable means of compliance. 2. Paragraph (d)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to relocate certain requirements for applicants to analyze specific failures from § 25.671(c)(2) to § 25.629(d).

Gulfstream requested the FAA revise proposed § 25.629(d) to consider the probability of the noted failure conditions and exclude extremely improbable failure combinations. Gulfstream stated that current § 25.671(c)(2) states "Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. . ."; however, proposed § 25.629(d)(10) would not have limited its scope to "combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable." In addition, GAMA/AIA requested the FAA not adopt proposed § 25.629(d)(10) and instead leave these requirements in current § 25.671. GAMA/AIA stated that by explicitly adding the failures to proposed § 25.629(d)(10), regardless of probability, a more strenuous requirement is added without justification. GAMA asserted that retention of the exclusion of extremely improbable combinations will serve to incentivize designs of higher reliability.

The FAA does not agree with these requests. The FAA does not agree with the commenters' suggestions to limit the required consideration to failures that the applicant cannot show are extremely improbable. The stated conditions need to be considered by the applicant regardless of probability calculations if the airplane's aeroelastic stability relies on flight control system stiffness, damping, or a combination of both. Proposed § 25.629(d)(10), which is now paragraph (d)(9) in the final rule, reflects current industry practice and existing guidance in AC 25.629-1B and EASA Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) § 25.629. In addition, the requested change would have introduced a significant difference between the standards of the FAA and EASA CS 25.629.

Boeing, Bombardier, and Gulfstream requested that proposed paragraph § 25.629(d)(10) be more closely harmonized with the corresponding CS 25.629 paragraph in its introductory text to include the text "where aeroelastic stability relies on flight control system stiffness and/or damping" to provide clarity to the application of this requirement. The FAA agrees with this request because it clarifies the situations for which failure evaluations are required and has updated § 25.629(d)(9) in the final rule to more closely harmonize with EASA and to include the text "where aeroelastic stability relies on flight control system stiffness, damping, or both."

Airbus requested that the FAA remove the reference to § 25.671 from current § 25.629(d)(9). Airbus stated that this reference may no longer be applicable because, in the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidate the requirements in current § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) under proposed § 25.1309.

In this final rule, the FAA has redesignated paragraph (d)(9) of § 25.629 as paragraph (d)(10) and updated § 25.671(c) to align with CS 25.671(c). The FAA has retained the reference to § 25.671 in § 25.629(d)(10) because, in the final rule, applicants must still evaluate the failure conditions of paragraph § 25.671(c) under § 25.629(d)(10).

D. Section 25.671, Flight Control Systems

D. Section 25.671, Flight Control Systems

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a number of revisions and additions to § 25.671, as summarized and discussed below. Airbus, ANAC, Boeing, GAMA, Gulfstream, Safran, and TCCA requested the FAA harmonize one or more paragraphs of § 25.671 with EASA CS 25.671. The FAA agrees with these requests and, in this final rule, has changed proposed § 25.671(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) to better align with EASA CS 25.671. 1. Paragraph (a)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise § 25.671(a) by referring to each "flight control" and "flight control system" instead of "control" and "control system." To harmonize with CS 25.671(a), the final rule now refers only to each "flight control system." This is not a substantive change from the NPRM.

In the NPRM, the FAA also proposed to revise § 25.671(a) to require the flight control system to continue to properly operate, and not hinder airplane recovery when the airplane experiences certain conditions, including any "pitch, roll, or yaw rate, or vertical load factor." The FAA proposed that this change would ensure there would be no features or unique characteristics of the flight control system that restrict the pilot's ability to recover from any attitude, pitch, roll or yaw rate, or vertical load factor expected to occur due to operating or environmental conditions. ANAC and TCCA suggested changing proposed § 25.671(a) to specify "any flight dynamics parameter" instead of "any pitch, roll, yaw rate, or vertical load factor" to harmonize with EASA language. The FAA does not agree. The suggested change would be a potentially open-ended requirement because "any flight dynamics parameter" could mean many different parameters. The text in § 25.671(a) \21\ is more specific, sufficient to accomplish its purpose, and is adopted as proposed.

\21\ AC 25.671-1 provides additional information.

2. Paragraph (b)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise § 25.671(b) by referring to incorrect assembly that could result in "failure of the system to perform its intended function." To harmonize with CS 25.671(b), the final rule now refers to incorrect assembly that could result in "failure or malfunctioning of the system." This is not a substantive change from the NPRM.

2. Paragraph (b)

An individual commenter requested the FAA move the requirement to minimize the probability of incorrect assembly from § 25.671(b) to § 25.1309 and make it applicable to all systems. The commenter stated that designing a system to ensure it can only be assembled correctly is a basic good engineering practice. The FAA does not agree to make this change to the regulation. The requirements of § 25.671(b) apply only to flight control systems. Other systems are subject to different requirements for minimizing incorrect assembly and different marking requirements. The incorrect assembly addressed by § 25.671(b) is that which could result in failure or malfunctioning of the system. Section 25.1309(a) requires the proper functioning of the equipment, systems, and installations whose function is required by subchapter C of title 14. The issue of incorrect assembly is addressed in AC 25.1309-1B, by reference to Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 "Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment." Improper assembly within ARP4761 is a manufacturing consideration with consideration to common mode type sources or failures/errors only.

ANAC requested the FAA harmonize proposed § 25.671(b) with EASA CS 25.671(b) by adding "taking into consideration the potential consequence of incorrect assembly" to the requirement. The FAA does not agree with this request. The general requirements of this paragraph apply to each element of each flight control system regardless of the potential consequence of incorrect assembly.

Revised § 25.671(b) is therefore adopted as proposed. 3. Introductory Text of Paragraph (c)

The NPRM proposed certain conforming changes to the introductory text of paragraph (c), as a result of the FAA's proposal to remove the flight control system failure criteria of § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) and substitute the general criteria of 14 CFR 25.1309. As explained below, the FAA decided to retain the specific criteria of § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2), and so the proposed changes to the introductory text of paragraph (c) are now no longer necessary. Therefore, in this final rule, the introductory paragraph (c) is unchanged from the current paragraph (c), except as described herein.

The current § 25.671(c) introductory text refers to the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems). To harmonize with CS 25.671(c), the final rule refers only to the flight control system, which includes surfaces and the other referenced systems. This is not a significant change.

The current § 25.671(c) introductory text requires the applicant to show that the airplane is capable of continued safe flight and landing after jams and other failures "without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength." Gulfstream requested the FAA not remove "without requiring exceptional skill or strength" from § 25.671(c). The FAA does not agree because that clause is now included in the definition of continued safe flight and landing provided in AC 25.671-1. Therefore, including this phrase in § 25.671(c) is no longer necessary. The final rule is also harmonized with CS 25.671(c) and AMC 25.671 in this regard.

Gulfstream requested the FAA not eliminate, as it proposed in the NPRM, the § 25.671(c) requirement for probable flight control failures to have only "minor" effects. The company stated that minor failures for § 25.1309 tend to only have a functional hazard assessment (FHA)-level review in the SSA. There is no specific requirement in § 25.1309(b) to address minor failures. As such, there may be probable flight control failures that are not explicitly addressed by the § 25.1309(b) process. The FAA agrees. The final rule retains the noted text.

ANAC requested the FAA move the requirement that compliance be shown "by analysis, test, or both . . ." from § 25.671(c) to AC 25.671-1, stating that this text is guidance. The FAA does not agree. This portion of the text in § 25.671(c) was not proposed to be revised in the NPRM, has been in place for many decades in the current rule, is understood by applicants, and is harmonized with CS 25.671(c). 4. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2)

The NPRM proposed that current § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) be removed and all flight control system failures be covered by § 25.1309. Boeing, Airbus, ANAC, GAMA/AIA, Gulfstream, and TCCA requested the FAA retain the current § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) in order to better align § 25.671(c) with EASA CS 25.671(c). The FAA agrees with commenters that removing § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) would create a certification burden due to differences with EASA requirements and because different means of compliance are normally used for Sec. § 25.671(c) and 25.1309(b), as described in their respective ACs. Therefore, the FAA agrees to retain § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2).

If the FAA chose not to change § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2), TCCA, ANAC, Bombardier, and Boeing requested specific changes to § 25.671(c) in order to more closely harmonize with EASA CS 25.671(c). The requested changes are no longer relevant as the FAA has decided to retain § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2). 5. Paragraph (c)(3)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that revised § 25.671(c) would address flight control jams. With the retention of § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2), described above, flight control jams will continue to be addressed by § 25.671(c)(3). The proposed rule would have addressed flight control jams in § 25.671(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3). The corresponding paragraphs for these requirements in this final rule are § 25.671(c)(3)(i), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(3)(iii).

To harmonize with CS 25.671(c)(3) and as recommended by the ARAC FCHWG, and as described in the NPRM, this final rule refers to jams of a flight control surface or pilot control that are "fixed in position" due to a physical interference. 6. Exception in Paragraph (c)(3)(ii)

Proposed § 25.671(c)(2) would have excepted jams that occur immediately before touchdown if the applicant were able to show that such jams are extremely improbable. (In this final rule, § 25.671(c)(2) is renumbered as § 25.671(c)(3)(ii).) The FAA proposed this exception due to the lack of practical means for applicants to show compliance, and the short duration of the potential hazard.

GAMA/AIA and Gulfstream requested the FAA revise proposed § 25.671(c)(2) to incorporate the 2002 ARAC FCHWG recommendation, which excluded consideration of jams occurring immediately before touchdown regardless of probability.

The FAA agrees that the consideration of jams before touchdown should not be linked with a numerical estimate of the probability of the jam. Instead, in this final rule the FAA has reworded § 25.671(c)(3)(ii) to exclude consideration of jams immediately prior to touchdown if the risk of a potential jam is minimized to the extent practical. AC 25.671-1 provides guidance on acceptable means of showing compliance with this requirement.

This is a difference between § 25.671(c)(3)(ii) and EASA CS 25.671(c)(3)(ii) because CS 25.671(c)(3)(ii) does not include an exception for jams occurring just before touchdown. The FAA expects this difference to have no effect in practice because EASA guidance included in Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) § 25.671 similarly allows jams before touchdown to be excluded if an assessment of the design shows that all practical precautions have been taken. Therefore, the FAA finds that, with this final rule, there will not be a significant standards difference between the FAA and EASA requirements.

Airbus asked that the FAA also except jams during the takeoff phase because, in both cases, exposure time is limited. The FAA does not agree. The ARAC FCHWG did not recommend excluding the takeoff phase, only the landing phase. Although flight control jams can occur during takeoff, practical design solutions can be put in place to mitigate such jams. Note that AC 25.671-1 states that, for jams that occur during takeoff, the applicant may assume that if the jam is detected prior to V1, the takeoff will be rejected.

DeHavilland requested confirmation that the new requirements related to flight control jams do not change what the company describes as accepted current practice. That practice would allow jams in spring-tab mechanisms that could occur during takeoff to be evaluated probabilistically, and the short exposure time during takeoff could be considered in determining the probability of such jams. This final rule requires the applicant to determine the type of jam or failure being assessed. For those flight control jams evaluated under § 25.671(c)(3), the probability of the jam, and the short exposure time during takeoff, may not be considered in showing compliance with that regulation. The FAA did not change the rule or associated guidance as a result of this comment. 7. Paragraph (c)(3)(iii)

Section 25.671(c)(3)(iii) states that in addition to the jam being evaluated, any additional failure conditions that could prevent continued safe flight and landing must have a combined probability of 1/1000 or less, rather than "less than 1/1000" as proposed in the NPRM. This harmonizes with CS 25.671(c)(3).

GAMA/AIA requested that the FAA use "failure states" in place of "failure conditions" in § 25.671(c)(3)(iii) because the 2002 ARAC FCHWG report used "failure states." The FAA does not agree. The term "failure conditions" is well-understood, has been used for many years, and is appropriately used in this regulation. In addition, CS 25.671(c)(3) also refers to "failure conditions." The FAA added guidance in AC 25.671-1 to explain this requirement.

Except for the differences noted in the foregoing discussion, revised § 25.671(c) is adopted as proposed. 8. Paragraph (d)

Section 25.671(d) requires that the airplane remain controllable if all engines fail. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to add a requirement that an approach and flare to a landing and controlled stop must also be possible, assuming that a suitable runway is available. GAMA/AIA, TCCA, and Boeing requested the FAA add "and flare to ditching" to the new requirements. Since the most likely scenario leading to a controlled ditching is loss of all engines, the scenario is relevant, according to the commenters. The FAA agrees with this request because a flare to a ditching may require different reconfiguration than would be required for landing; for example, flap settings and pitch attitude. Adding the flare to a ditching requirement to § 25.671(d) will also harmonize the rule with CS 25.671(d).

Gulfstream and GAMA/AIA requested the FAA remove the requirement for a controlled stop from proposed § 25.671(d) as they felt a braking requirement should not be added to a general flight control system requirement. The FAA does not agree. Stopping capability can be affected by flight controls, including spoilers, flaps, and rudder. In addition, this would result in a difference compared to EASA CS-25 language.

TCCA and ANAC requested that the FAA remove the following sentence from proposed § 25.671(d): "The applicant may show compliance with this requirement by analysis where the applicant has shown that analysis to be reliable." The commenters stated that this sentence describes an acceptable means of compliance, which is adequately covered in the corresponding guidance. The FAA agrees and did not include this sentence in the final rule.

Except for the changes noted in the foregoing discussion, § 25.671(d) is adopted as proposed. 9. Paragraph (e)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to add new § 25.671(e), requiring the flight control system to indicate whenever the primary control means are near the limit of control authority. The FAA proposed this change due to the lack of direct tactile link between the flightdeck control and the control surface on airplanes equipped with fly-by-wire control systems.

DeHavilland requested that the FAA use "must provide appropriate feedback to the flight crew . . ." in place of "must indicate to the flight crew" in new § 25.671(e). The company stated that for non-fly-by-wire systems, the air loads are either naturally sensed or simulated. The company also commented that the use of the word "indicate" in the proposed requirement has a potential for misinterpretation, as tactile feedback is not normally considered as an "indication." The commenter acknowledged draft AC 25.671-X addresses use of feel forces and cockpit control movement to meet this requirement.

The FAA does not agree to make this change. As noted by the commenter, the AC addresses use of tactile feedback as a method of compliance with this requirement.

ANAC and TCCA commented that the FAA should harmonize the new requirement of § 25.671(e) with CS 25.671(e) to remove any possible misunderstanding. The FAA agrees. The proposed rule stated that the "flight control system" must indicate to the flightcrew whenever the primary control means is near the limit of control authority. This final rule is revised to harmonize with CS 25.671(e) and requires "the airplane" to be designed to indicate to the flightcrew whenever the primary control means is near the limit of control authority. This is not a substantive change. 10. Paragraph (f)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to add new § 25.671(f), requiring that the flight control system alert the flightcrew whenever the airplane enters any mode that significantly changes or degrades the normal handling or operational characteristics of the airplane.

ANAC and TCCA commented that the FAA should fully harmonize § 25.671(f) with CS 25.671(f) to remove any possible misunderstanding. The FAA agrees. The proposed rule would have required that the flight control system alert the flightcrew whenever the airplane enters a flight control mode of concern. This final rule is revised to harmonize with CS 25.671(f) and thus requires the system to provide "appropriate flightcrew alerting." This is not a substantive change. 11. Relationship Between Sec. § 25.671(c) and 25.1309

ANAC, Boeing, and GE sought clarification from the FAA on the applicability of Sec. § 25.671(c) and 25.1309, particularly in light of the changes proposed in the NPRM. As explained above, the FAA decided to retain the structure of existing § 25.671(c) in the final rule, which will address the concerns raised by these commenters. The FAA provides the following additional explanation relative to the requirements of the final rule. Section 25.1309 applies to all systems and equipment installed on the airplane, including the flight control system. Section 25.671(c) also applies to the flight control system. The safety requirements in § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) correspond with those in § 25.1309(b)(1). There are no fundamental differences between these two sets of safety requirements as they apply to the flight control system.

However, different methods of compliance may be used to comply with § 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) as compared to § 25.1309(b)(1).

Sections 25.671(c)(1) and (c)(2) require the airplane to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any single failure and after any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Section 25.1309 requires that these failure conditions not be catastrophic. While worded differently, these requirements are functionally equivalent. AC 25.1309-1B states that a flight control system failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing should be classified as catastrophic. AC 25.671-1 provides specific criteria unique to the assessment of flight control system failures. AC 25.1309-1B also provides guidance on assessing failure conditions that apply to the flight control system.

Sections 25.1309(b)(2) through (b)(5), (c), and (e) also apply to the flight control system. There are no requirements in § 25.671 that correspond to these subparagraphs.

E. Section 25.901, Engine Installation

E. Section 25.901, Engine Installation

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that § 25.901(c) would specify that the requirements of § 25.1309 would apply to powerplant installations. The FAA also proposed to remove the prohibition in § 25.901(c) on catastrophic single failures and probable combinations of failures since addressing such failures would be adequately addressed by the proposed § 25.1309(b). The FAA proposed that these changes would harmonize § 25.901(c) with EASA CS 25.901(c).

Pratt & Whitney requested that the FAA add to § 25.901(c) the phrase "or any other failure consistent with existing § 33.75 single element exception requirements" to ensure consistency with § 25.901(c) and existing requirements. The FAA does not agree with the request. The referenced exception requirements only address instances in which the failure of the single element is likely to result in a hazardous engine effect. These effects are among the conditions applicants use for evaluating the hazard to the engine under engine airworthiness requirements, which do not consider the effect of the airplane installation. For example, hazardous effects on the engine may not necessarily result in a catastrophic failure at the airplane level. Since the requirements of § 33.75 are independent of the aircraft airworthiness requirements, they are inadequate for evaluating the hazard to the aircraft installation. The exceptions to § 25.1309(b) that the FAA has identified in § 25.901(c) are consistent with existing powerplant installation requirements in part 25 and compliance showings to § 25.901(c) before adoption of this final rule. Expanding the exceptions to § 25.1309(b) to include aspects of § 33.75 would not be consistent with existing part 25 powerplant installation requirements. The potential failure conditions of the engine type design that should be excepted from § 25.1309(b) are adequately addressed by the exceptions identified by § 25.901(c).

The FAA therefore adopts revised § 25.901(c) as proposed.

F. Section 25.933, Reversing Systems

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to add a "reliability option" for thrust reversers to § 25.933(a), allowing applicants to show that an unwanted deployment of the reverser is extremely improbable (i.e., complies with 14 CFR 25.1309(b)), instead of only that the airplane remains controllable if the reverser deploys in flight.

F. Section 25.933, Reversing Systems

GAMA/AIA commented that the proposed wording of § 25.933(a) does not clearly communicate that the controllability option would still require compliance with § 25.1309, as noted in the regulatory evaluation (footnote 58 of the NPRM). GAMA/AIA requested the wording of § 25.933(a) be changed to clearly define the requirement to show compliance with § 25.1309 regardless of controllability.

The FAA acknowledges that compliance with § 25.1309 is required regardless of which option an applicant chooses under § 25.933(a) since § 25.901(c) requires compliance with § 25.1309. However, the FAA partially agrees, and in this final rule has revised § 25.933(a) to clarify, that when an applicant chooses the reliability option (new § 25.933(a)(ii)), the applicant must account for the potential hazard to the airplane assuming the airplane would not be capable of continued safe flight and landing during and after an in-flight thrust reversal when showing compliance with § 25.1309(b). Section 25.901(c) applies to the powerplant and auxiliary power unit (APU) installation, except for the specific items listed in new § 25.901(c). Compliance with § 25.1309 is required for the powerplant and APU installation, which includes the thrust reversing system, per the new § 25.901(c). The FAA finds that it is unnecessary to restate in § 25.933(a)(1) that compliance with § 25.1309 is required for the reversing system since it is already required by the new § 25.901(c) and not one of the items excepted.

Air Tech Consulting objected to the "reliability option" that the FAA proposed in the NPRM. The commenter cited three inflight reverser deployments in the past twelve months as justification for maintaining the existing rule.

The FAA does not agree with this request. The incidents cited by the commenter were not in-flight thrust reverser deployments, only component failures or false indications.\22\ The FAA has made equivalent safety findings on many proposed airplane models based on the ARAC PPIHWG recommendations for § 25.933(a)(1) and certified many designs using the reliability approach rather than the controllability approach in current § 25.933(a)(1). The FAA does not agree that these particular in-service events show that the systems would not have met § 25.1309(b) or that the longstanding reliability approach for certification of the thrust reverser system is inadequately safe.

\22\ Each of the three cited events were the result of either a false indication of an unlocked reverser door or failure of the primary lock followed by a small movement of a reverser door until the secondary lock engaged, where the movement was enough to result in an unlocked reverser indication. In either circumstance, the reverser door did not deploy and an actual in-flight thrust reversal did not occur. Also, after the close of the comment period for this rule, a FedEx Boeing Model MD-11 experienced an unwanted in-flight deployment on June 21, 2023. The thrust reversers on the airplane were not certified using the reliability approach; however, the design was reviewed by the FAA and Boeing (formerly Douglas) using the "Criteria for Assessing Transport Turbojet Fleet Thrust Reverser System Safety," Revision A, dated June 1, 1994, which was a reference document used by the ARAC PPIHWG to develop recommendations for changes to § 25.933(a). Boeing used a mixed approach, in which the company demonstrated the Model MD-11 was controllable following an unwanted in-flight deployment within certain portions of the flight envelope and showed reliability, using a thrust reverser SSA, for the remainder of the flight envelope.

TCCA commented that systems design often needs to strike a balance between availability (system performs its intended function when needed) and integrity (protecting against system malfunctions). TCCA requested that the FAA revise Sec. § 25.933 and 25.1309(b) to emphasize the need to consider system availability in conjunction with integrity.

The FAA agrees that system availability is an important consideration when designing the thrust reverser system. However, there are already applicable airworthiness requirements, such as Sec. § 25.901(b)(2) and 25.1309(a)(1), that address system availability and reliability and that are related to the system's effect on airplane safety. It is not necessary to provide additional emphasis on system availability within Sec. § 25.933 and 25.1309(b) since these existing requirements are adequate to address the availability of thrust reverser system. Section 25.933(a)(1) addresses the specific failure condition of an unwanted in-flight deployment only, and § 25.1309(b) addresses the safety of equipment and systems as installed on the airplane. Therefore, the FAA does not agree with the commenter's request since requirements that influence system availability and the relationship with propulsion system reliability, which apply to the thrust reverser system, are already addressed in existing regulations. The FAA included guidance on § 25.901(b)(2) that is related to Sec. § 25.901(c) and 25.1309(b) in AC 25.901-1. Guidance for § 25.1309(a)(1) can be found in AC 25.1309-1B.

The FAA therefore adopts revised § 25.933 as proposed.

G. Section 25.1301, Function and Installation

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove the "function properly when installed" criterion in § 25.1301(a)(4) for installed equipment whose function is not needed for safe operation of the airplane. In addition, the FAA proposed to remove § 25.1301(b) because it is redundant and unnecessary. Section 25.1301(b) required that a proposed airplane's EWIS meet the requirements of subpart H of part 25. The FAA proposed removing § 25.1301(b) because subpart H specifies its applicability and the requirements in subpart H can stand alone. The FAA received no substantive comments on proposed § 25.1301.

G. Section 25.1301, Function and Installation

The FAA therefore adopts revised § 25.1301 as proposed.

H. Section 25.1309, Equipment, Systems and Installations

1. Applicability

In the NPRM, the introductory paragraph of proposed § 25.1309 explained that regulation would apply to any equipment or system installed on the airplane except as provided in paragraphs (e) and (f). Boeing, ANAC, Gulfstream, GAMA/AIA, and Garmin requested that the FAA delete paragraphs (e) and (f) of proposed § 25.1309 and move their content to the introductory paragraph to align with CS 25.1309. The commenters also noted that these paragraphs included regulatory exceptions to § 25.1309 and showing compliance to an "exception" raised administrative issues. The FAA agrees and updated § 25.1309 accordingly.

1. Applicability

Proposed § 25.1309(e) would have excluded flight control jams governed by § 25.671(c) from the proposed single-failure requirement in § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii). Gulfstream proposed that flight control jams be excluded from all of § 25.1309 and stated that additional guidance would be needed if flight control jams were not excluded from § 25.1309(b). Although the FAA has historically used § 25.671(c) rather than § 25.1309 to address flight control jams, the FAA does not agree that flight control jams should be excluded from the other paragraphs of § 25.1309 because those requirements apply to flight control systems and are necessary for managing the risk of flight control jams.

The FAA agrees, however, that flight control jams should be excluded from all of § 25.1309(b), and the final rule is revised accordingly. The FAA did not intend § 25.1309(b) to apply to flight control jams because an evaluation of the failure conditions under § 25.1309(b) requires the applicant to determine numerical probabilities, which is not practical for flight control jams. Since EASA CS 25.1309 excludes flight control jams from only CS 25.1309(b)(1)(ii), this is a substantive difference between the FAA and EASA's regulations.

Proposed § 25.1309(f)(1) stated that § 25.1309(b) does not apply to single failures in the brake system because such failures are addressed by § 25.735(b)(1). GAMA/AIA requested the FAA change "single failures" to "failures" to be consistent with § 25.735. The FAA does not agree with this request because other types of failures in the brake system should be evaluated under § 25.1309(b).

Proposed § 25.1309(f)(2) stated that § 25.1309(b) would not apply to the failure effects addressed by Sec. § 25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812. Gulfstream and GAMA/AIA requested that the FAA replace "25.810(a)(1)(v)" with "25.810" to harmonize with CS 25.1309. The FAA does not agree because § 25.810(a)(1)(v) provides specific deployment and usability criteria for certain means of evacuation assistance, and this subparagraph alone is relevant to the exception discussion. However, the FAA updated "failure effects" to "failure conditions" to harmonize with CS 25.1309.

EASA requested that the FAA clarify the exception from compliance with § 25.1309(b) that proposed § 25.1309(f)(3) would have provided regarding § 25.1193, "Cowling and nacelle skin," and suggested that the FAA change it from § 25.1193 to § 25.1193(a). EASA also stated that there may be value in considering § 25.1193 as applicable under § 25.1309 for systems that are used for opening or closing doors and monitoring proper closure/latched conditions. Furthermore, EASA asked why § 25.1193 was not also included in the propeller debris release exception in proposed § 25.1309(f)(4).

The FAA made no changes to the final rule in response to these comments. The NPRM explains that Sec. § 25.1193 and 25.905(d) already require applicants to consider the specific failures of fires from uncontained engine failures and engine case burn-through. Thus, it is not necessary to consider these same failures under § 25.1309 as well. Furthermore, nacelle cowl door opening, closure, position monitoring, latching, and other potential failure conditions are discussed in AC 25.901-1 for compliance with Sec. § 25.901(c) and 25.1309. 2. Paragraph (a)

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that all installed airplane equipment and systems whose improper functioning would reduce safety perform as intended under the airplane operating and environmental conditions (§ 25.1309(a)(1)). The FAA also proposed that all equipment and systems not subject to the foregoing requirement not have an adverse effect on the safety of the airplane or its occupants (proposed § 25.1309(a)(2)). The latter requirement would have allowed such equipment to be approved by the FAA even if it may not perform as intended.

ANAC commented that proposed § 25.1309(a)(1) stated "equipment and systems, as installed, must meet" this requirement, while the ARAC SDAHWG recommended wording states "equipment and systems must be designed and installed so that . . . ." \23\ ANAC recommended that the FAA adopt the proposed ARAC wording and match EASA CS 25.1309. The FAA agrees to harmonize the rule text to avoid any possible interpretation differences and this final rule has updated § 25.1309(a).

\23\ www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEsdaT2-5241996.pdf.

GAMA/AIA and Boeing requested the FAA revise proposed § 25.1309(a)(1) to replace "whose improper functioning would reduce safety" with "whose function is necessary for safe operation of the airplane." The commenters were concerned that using the proposed phrase could result in equipment, systems, and installations intended for convenience to be subjected to § 25.1309(a)(1) requirements. The FAA did not revise § 25.1309(a)(1) as suggested because this change would exclude evaluation of systems whose failure would have a safety effect. The suggested change would also disharmonize this rule with EASA CS 25.1309(a)(1).

Bombardier requested the FAA harmonize its proposed § 25.1309(a)(2) rule text of "functioning normally or abnormally" with the CS 25.1309(a)(2) rule text of "not a source of danger." The FAA declines to update proposed § 25.1309(a)(2) as suggested. Although the phrase "functioning normally or abnormally" used in proposed § 25.1309(a)(2) is different from the "not a source of danger in themselves" used in EASA CS 25.1309(a)(2), the FAA considers these phrases as having generally the same meaning. "Not a source of danger" is largely synonymous with "safe." An applicant must evaluate the systems addressed by § 25.1309(a)(2) to verify that their normal operation and failure or abnormal functioning have no safety effect (i.e., they do not affect the operational capability of the airplane, do not increase flightcrew workload, and do not affect the safety of passengers or cabin crew).

GAMA/AIA requested the FAA change "must not adversely affect" in proposed § 25.1309(a)(2) to "do not adversely affect" as used in CS 25.1309(a)(2). GAMA/AIA stated that using "do not" in the regulation instead of "must not" changes the tone from preventative to evaluative. The FAA agrees and updated § 25.1309(a)(2) to align with CS 25.1309(a)(2).

Bombardier questioned whether § 25.1309(a)(2) should be interpreted by applicants to apply to electromagnetic interference (EMI) generated by systems operating abnormally. In a related question, Bombardier asked the FAA to clarify what applicants should address in a qualitative failure evaluation of equipment and systems under § 25.1309(a)(2). Bombardier stated that the NPRM preamble implies that applicants would have to show that an equipment failure will not result in increased electromagnetic emissions; however, Bombardier does not consider this to be the intent of proposed § 25.1309(a)(2).

The FAA intends that systems addressed under § 25.1309(a)(2), in this final rule, do not have to meet the former requirement that they "perform as intended" when installed. AC 25.1309-1B explains that the systems addressed by § 25.1309(a)(2) should be designed so that their failures have no safety effect. In addition, normal installation practices can be used to isolate these systems, and a qualitative installation evaluation based on engineering judgment can be used to determine that the failure or improper functioning of these systems would not affect the safety of the airplane. Thus, the extent of EMI testing that is required for systems addressed under § 25.1309(a)(1) is not required for systems addressed under § 25.1309(a)(2). However, if there is a risk that the failure of a system addressed under § 25.1309(a)(2) will result in electromagnetic emissions that affect the proper function of systems addressed under § 25.1309(a)(1), then formal methods such as testing or analysis may be used to evaluate the failure in lieu of a qualitative installation evaluation that uses engineering judgment to conclude that electromagnetic omissions would not occur.

Except for the foregoing changes, § 25.1309(a) is adopted as proposed. 3. Paragraph (b)

Section 25.1309(b) requires applicants to assess safety at the airplane level for airplane systems and associated components, evaluated separately and in relation to other systems, and requires that the airplane's systems and components meet certain reliability standards. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise § 25.1309(b) to address design and installation so that each catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable and does not result from a single failure, each hazardous failure condition is extremely remote, and each major failure condition is remote.

In this final rule, the FAA has adopted proposed § 25.1309(b)(1) through (b)(3) with no changes but revised § 25.1309(b)(4) and (b)(5) to align with the corresponding sections of EASA CS 25.1309.

Proposed § 25.1309(b)(4) would have required that significant latent failures (SLFs) be eliminated, except if the Administrator determined that doing so was impractical. If the applicant proved to the Administrator that such elimination was impractical, the regulation would have required the applicant to limit the likelihood of the SLF to 1/1000 between inspections. If the applicant proved that such limitation was impractical, then the proposed regulation would have required the applicant to minimize the length of time the failure would be present but undetected.

Garmin expressed concern that the 1/1000 requirement in proposed § 25.1309(b)(4)(i) could be burdensome without a cutset \24\ limit because no matter how many cutsets deep the latent failure is (e.g., 3, 4, 5, or more cutsets), it still would have to meet the 1/1000 requirement unless the applicant obtains agreement with the FAA that it has been adequately minimized. Thus, Garmin recommended that the FAA remove the 1/1000 requirement from § 25.1309(b)(4) to align with EASA and suggested that the 1/1000 requirement be moved to AC 25.1309-1B as one way to show the SLF is minimized. Garmin proposed that a cutset limit be applied to either the 1/1000 requirement within § 25.1309(b)(4) or to the definition of SLF if the FAA did not remove the 1/1000 requirement from § 25.1309(b)(4) in the final rule. The FAA agrees to remove the 1/1000 criteria from § 25.1309(b)(4) and include it in AC 25.1309-1B as a possible means of compliance. This change is consistent with the ASAWG recommendations that led to this rulemaking. Specifically, the ASAWG specific risk tasking report recommendations that the FAA require applicants to control specific risks of concern did not include a recommended limit latency requirement for all SLFs. The report only recommended a limit latency requirement of 1/1000 for CSL+1 failure combinations (ASAWG report, section 6.4.1.2).

\24\ A cutset is a number of failures or events that when combined will result in a system failure.

ANAC, TCCA, and Bombardier requested the FAA harmonize § 25.1309(b)(4) with CS 25.1309(b)(4) by removing the 1/1000 criterion, while EASA requested the FAA provide a rationale for not harmonizing. The FAA agrees to harmonize § 25.1309(b)(4) with CS 25.1309(b)(4).

Both regulations address eliminating SLFs as far as practical and minimizing the latency of the SLF if such elimination is not practical. This ensures that the applicant evaluates each SLF, eliminates it when practical, and minimizes its latency if elimination is not practical. However, in this final rule, § 25.1309(b)(4) includes a new exclusion, requested by Garmin, from these proposed requirements for latent failures. This exclusion is described in the following paragraph.

Garmin requested that the FAA modify proposed § 25.1309(b)(4) to exclude the requirements for latent failures where the applicant meets the requirements of § 25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2) with the latent failure assumed, in the applicant's risk assessment, to have already occurred, or where the applicant took no credit in that risk assessment for the latency period. The FAA agrees to add this exclusion to § 25.1309(b)(4) because it meets the decision criteria that the specific risk of concern will be evaluated as per the 2010 ARAC ASAWG specific risk tasking report.\25\ When a latent failure or the specific risk of concern is assumed as having occurred, its probability becomes 1 in the calculation of the failure condition. This probability of 1 is the same as stating that no credit is taken for a latency period. This is a difference between § 25.1309(b)(4) and CS 25.1309(b)(4) since EASA's rule does not contain this exclusion. The FAA does not expect this difference to be significant because the exclusion in § 25.1309(b)(4) allows applicants to use a conservative assessment of a failure condition to show compliance.

\25\ ASAWG report, revision 5.0, Section 6.1.2, Figure 6-1.

GAMA/AIA, Gulfstream, and Boeing requested language for the § 25.1309(b)(4) final rule that was different from what the NPRM proposed and what EASA published in CS-25. The commenters' proposal provides criteria for acceptance of SLFs that depend on the probability and severity of the outcome. The FAA did not update the rule language as suggested; however, the FAA has incorporated the approach as a means of compliance for the catastrophic failure conditions in AC 25.1309-1B. This approach also incentivizes development of practical designs that meet the safety objectives of § 25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2). The approach for hazardous failure conditions was not included in AC 25.1309-1B since it was not considered in the 2010 ARAC ASAWG specific risk tasking report.

ANAC, Garmin, and Airbus requested changes to proposed § 25.1309(b)(4)(i) and (b)(4)(ii). The suggested changes are no longer relevant because paragraphs (i) and (ii) are not included in the § 25.1309(b)(4) final rule.

Proposed § 25.1309(b)(5) provided a new standard for limiting the risk of a catastrophic failure combination that results from two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight. ANAC stated that the criteria in proposed § 25.1309(b)(5) is significantly different from the criteria in CS 25.1309(b)(5) and these differences may burden applicants by requiring them to comply with two different sets of criteria and may result in different product configurations. TCCA commented that differences between the proposed FAA rule and CS-25, both in wording and intent, would result in significant difficulties and increase the burden on applicants, particularly given the inherent complexity of safety assessments both at system and aircraft level. EASA stated that having different criteria in § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) and CS 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) would result in a duplication of effort for applicants. The FAA agrees that differences between FAA and EASA requirements could result in increased burden on applicants and civil aviation authorities. The final rule is therefore revised to improve harmonization, as described below.

Several commenters recommended changes to § 25.1309(b)(5). TCCA and ANAC recommended that the FAA fully harmonize § 25.1309(b)(5) and CS 25.1309(b)(5), while EASA encouraged the FAA to implement the same criteria as CS 25.1309(b)(5)(iii). GAMA/AIA and Garmin suggested the FAA harmonize § 25.1309(b)(5)(i) with CS 25.1309(b)(5)(i) by changing "fault tolerance" to "redundancy." Boeing suggested the FAA update § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) to ". . . the residual average probability per flight hour of the catastrophic failure condition occurring due to all subsequent single failures is remote." Airbus and Gulfstream preferred that the FAA harmonize § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) with CS 25.1309(b)(5)(iii), while GAMA/AIA preferred the FAA's proposed wording for § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii). Boeing suggested the FAA change § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) to "The probability of the latent failure occurring over its maximum exposure time does not exceed 1/1000."

The FAA uses the term "fault tolerance" in § 25.1309(b)(5)(i) instead of "redundancy" as used in CS 25.1309(b)(5)(i) because the term "redundancy" could be interpreted as a prescriptive design requirement, and § 25.1309 is intended to be a performance-based rule. In this final rule, the FAA revised § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) to refer to "the residual average probability" of the catastrophic failure condition following a single latent failure. The term "residual average probability" is the remaining probability of a failure condition given the presence of a single latent failure. This change aligns with the recommendations from the 2010 ARAC ASAWG specific risk tasking recommendation report, sections 6.3.1.6 and 6.3.1.7. The final rule uses "all subsequent active failures" rather than the proposed § 25.1309(b)(5)'s "all subsequent single failures" to ensure the applicant accounts for the residual average probability of all active failures in a failure condition. Finally, the FAA agrees to harmonize § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) with CS 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) to ensure that combined probability of all the latent failures is accounted for as recommended by the commenters, except that the FAA uses "active failure" in § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii), instead of "evident failure" as used in CS 25.1309(b)(5)(iii). Having harmonized § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) with CS 25.1309(b)(5)(iii), the FAA does not expect the differences in wording between § 25.1309(b)(5) and CS 25.1309(b)(5) to be burdensome to applicants. 4. Paragraph (c)

In the NPRM, proposed § 25.1309(c) would require the applicant to provide information concerning unsafe system operating conditions to enable the flightcrew to take corrective action and to show that the design of systems and controls, including indications and annunciations, minimizes crew errors that could create additional hazards. ANAC, TCCA, and Boeing requested the FAA revise proposed § 25.1309(c) to include "in a timely manner" as part of the corrective action to be taken by the flightcrew. The FAA has updated the final rule accordingly. This change more closely harmonizes § 25.1309(c) with CS 25.1309(c). In addition, the discussion of this proposal in the NPRM preamble refers to the importance of providing timely and effective annunciations to allow appropriate crew action.

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