89 FR 17230 Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for the Joby Aero, Inc. Model JAS4-1 Powered-Lift
The FAA announces the special class airworthiness criteria for the Joby Aero, Inc. (Joby) Model JAS4-1 powered-lift. This document sets forth the airworthiness criteria the FAA finds to be appropriate and applicable for the powered-lift design.
Vol. 89
Friday,
No. 47
March 8, 2024
Part III
Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for the Joby Aero, Inc. Model JAS4-1 Powered-Lift; Final Rule
and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
[Docket No. FAA-2021-0638]
Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for the Joby Aero, Inc. Model JAS4-1 Powered-Lift
Agency
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT
ACTION: Issuance of final airworthiness criteria.
SUMMARY: The FAA announces the special class airworthiness criteria for the Joby Aero, Inc. (Joby) Model JAS4-1 powered-lift. This document sets forth the airworthiness criteria the FAA finds to be appropriate and applicable for the powered-lift design.
Dates
DATES: These airworthiness criteria are effective April 8, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Clary, Emerging Technology Coordination Section, AIR-611, Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone 817-222-5138; email [email protected].
Supplementary Information
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The Joby Model JAS4-1 (Model JAS4-1) powered-lift has a maximum gross takeoff weight of 4,800 lbs. and is capable of carrying a pilot and four passengers. The aircraft uses six tilting electric engines with 5-blade propellers attached to a conventional wing and V-tail.\1\ The aircraft structure and propellers are constructed of composite materials. As a powered-lift, the Model JAS4-1 has characteristics of both a rotorcraft and an airplane. The Model JAS4-1 is intended to be used for Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 91 and 135 operations, with a single pilot onboard, under visual flight rules (VFR).
Background
\1\ A V-Tail aircraft design incorporates two slanted tail surfaces instead of the horizontal and vertical fins of a conventional aircraft empennage. The two fixed tail surfaces of a V-Tail act as both horizontal and vertical stabilizers and each has a moveable flight-control surface referred to as a ruddervator.
On November 2, 2018, Joby applied for a type certificate for the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift. Under 14 CFR 21.17(c), Joby's application for type certification is effective for three years. Section 21.17(d) provides that, where a type certificate has not been issued within that three-year time limit, the applicant may file for an extension and update the designated applicable regulations in the type certification basis. Because the project was not certificated within three years after the application date above, the FAA approved the applicant's request to extend the application for type certification. As a result, the date of the updated type certification basis is June 14, 2022.
The FAA issued a notice of proposed airworthiness criteria for the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift, which published in the Federal Register on November 8, 2022 (87 FR 67399). The FAA issued a notice extending the comment period to December 22, 2022, which published in the Federal Register on December 7, 2022 (87 FR 74994).
Discussion
Discussion
Because the FAA has not yet established powered-lift airworthiness standards in 14 CFR, the FAA type certificates powered-lift as special class aircraft. Under the procedures in § 21.17(b), the airworthiness requirements for special class aircraft, including the engines and propellers installed thereon, are the portions of the requirements in 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 found by the FAA to be appropriate and applicable to the specific type design and any other airworthiness criteria found by the FAA to provide an equivalent level of safety to the existing standards. These final airworthiness criteria announce the applicable regulations and other airworthiness criteria developed, under § 21.17(b), for type certification of the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift.
The Model JAS4-1 powered-lift has characteristics of both a rotorcraft and an airplane. It is designed to function as a rotorcraft for takeoff and landing, and as an airplane cruising at speeds higher than a rotorcraft during the enroute portion of flight operations. The electric engines on the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift will use electrical power instead of air and fuel combustion to propel the aircraft through six 5-bladed composite variable-pitch propellers. Accordingly, the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift proposed airworthiness criteria contained standards from parts 23, 33, and 35 as well as other proposed airworthiness criteria specific for a powered-lift and the engines and propellers installed thereon.
For the existing regulations that were included without modification, the proposed airworthiness criteria included all amendments to the existing parts 23, 33, and 35 airworthiness standards in effect as of the application date of June 14, 2022. These are part 23, amendment 23-64, part 33, amendment 33-34, and part 35, amendment 35-10.
The Model JAS4-1 powered-lift proposed airworthiness criteria also included new performance-based airworthiness criteria. The FAA developed these criteria because no existing standard captured the powered-lift's various flight modes and electric engines, and some unique characteristics of their propellers. The new requirements specific to the Model JAS4-1 in the proposed airworthiness criteria used a "JS4.xxxx" section-numbering scheme.
Because many of the proposed airworthiness criteria are performance-based, like the regulations found in part 23, the FAA has proposed to adopt § 23.2010 by reference, which would require that the means of compliance used to comply with the airworthiness criteria be accepted by the Administrator. Because no powered-lift consensus standards are currently accepted by the Administrator, the means of compliance will be accepted through the issue paper process.\2\
\2\ See Order 8110.112A, Standardized Procedures for Usage of Issue Papers and Development of Equivalent Levels of Safety Memorandums.
Summary of Changes From the Proposed Airworthiness Criteria
Summary of Changes From the Proposed Airworthiness Criteria
These final airworthiness criteria reflect the following changes, in addition to others as explained in more detail under Discussion of Comments: The FAA made changes to the aircraft performance section to incorporate an optional, "increased performance" approval, which requires greater aircraft performance capabilities beyond that of the baseline "essential performance" approval. The expectations for aircraft performance at both levels are clearly defined at the requirement level. Requirements to address various scenarios involving failures that can lead to loss of thrust were clarified and consolidated into a consistent terminology across all airworthiness criteria. Expectations were added for the aircraft to be capable of a controlled emergency landing following any condition where the aircraft can no longer provide the commanded power or thrust required for continued safe flight and landing (CSFL).
The proposed requirement to incorporate a bird strike deterrent system was not adopted in these final airworthiness criteria, nor were other requirements not applicable to the Model JAS4-1, such as requirements for operations on water, approval for aerobatic flight, and others, as discussed in further detail under Discussion of Comments. The FAA modified and developed revised aeroelasticity criteria to more directly address concerns expressed by commenters related to "whirl flutter" and aeromechanical stability. The FAA revised requirements in response to numerous comments requesting clarification or recommending changes to address safety gaps in the proposed criteria, particularly in the areas of aircraft handling and control, structural airframe loads and durability, flight controls, protection of occupants, and protection of systems from high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) and lightning. The FAA updated requirements for electric engines in response to requests for improved clarity on applicability and relationship to the airframe requirements.
The FAA also updated definitions for "controlled emergency landing," "CSFL," and "sources of lift" and added a definition for "local events."
Lastly, the FAA clarified that, should Joby apply to amend the type certificate to include another model powered-lift, these airworthiness criteria would apply to that model also, provided the criteria remain appropriate to the changed aircraft in accordance with part 21, subpart D. This change was necessary so that each future change to the aircraft will not necessarily require an application for a new type certificate.
Discussion of Comments
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received responses from 46 commenters. The majority of commenters were government agencies, private companies, and organizations as follows: Alaka'i Technologies Corporation (Alaka'i); Aerospace Industries Association (AIA); AIBOT LLC (AIBOT); Airbus; Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA); Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC); Archer Aviation Inc. (Archer); Ascot Aviation Associates (Ascot); Aerospace, Security and Defense Industries Association of Europe (ASD-Europe); Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI); BETA Technologies, Inc. (Beta); United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UKCAA); Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC); Diamond Aircraft; EASA; End State Solutions; General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA); Hartzell Propeller (Hartzell); LDR; Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB); Lilium eAircraft GmbH (Lilium); Martin Aerotech; MTLS Aerostructure (MTLS); National Business Aviation Association (NBAA); Odys Aviation (Odys); Overair Inc. (Overair); Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (Rolls-Royce); Rotorcraft Drive Systems; Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA); Vertical Aerospace; and Volocopter GmbH (Volocopter). The FAA received comments from individual commenters as well.
Support
Support
AIA, AUVSI, ASDIA, NBAA, and individual commenters expressed support for type certification of the Model JAS4-1 as a special class of aircraft and establishing airworthiness criteria under § 21.17(b). ALPA expressed support for the use of 14 CFR part 35 propeller airworthiness standards. An individual commenter expressed support for the CSFL and controlled emergency landing definitions.
Definitions
Definitions
The FAA proposed criteria that created new or modified definitions for the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift. The FAA received and reviewed comments from AIBOT, Airbus, ASDIA, ALPA, Alaka'i, Beta, Diamond Aircraft, EASA, End State Solutions, GAMA, Hartzell, Lilium, MTLS, Odys, Overair, TCCA, UKCAA, Volocopter, and individual commenters that requested the FAA clarify, revise, or adopt as proposed certain definitions. Specifically, these comments were focused on the topic areas of "CSFL," "controlled emergency landing (CEL)," and "loss of power/thrust," along with requests for clarification on other uses of the term "thrust." GAMA and Overair also proposed modifications to the "source of lift" definition. Additionally, comments from Airbus, ALPA, ASDIA, EASA, Odys, TCCA, UKCAA, and an individual commenter requested the establishment of a higher safety target for powered-lift like the Model JAS4-1. In response, the FAA created an "increased performance" approval that may be granted based on the aircraft's ability to meet higher performance standards for continued flight under certain failure conditions. The FAA modified JS4.2000(a) to provide for the higher safety target of "increased performance" as well as to establish the proposed minimum safety target for CSFL as "essential performance." The Model JAS4-1 must meet either the essential or increased performance requirements in this certification basis. Additionally, the Model JAS4-1 may be approved for both essential and increased performance with appropriate and different operating limitations.
The FAA has modified the definition of "CSFL" to establish the different expected outcomes based on the performance approval sought. The definition of "CSFL" was modified slightly for the essential performance approval to include pilot alertness; however the ability to continue to the planned destination or alternate is a requirement to meet the increased performance approval. Increased performance is a higher level of safety that guarantees fly-away capability after any failure not shown to be extremely improbable. Essential performance does not require the aircraft to have the capability to land at the planned or an alternate landing site as is required for increased performance.
Several commenters suggested the FAA adopt EASA's special condition for vertical take-off and landing aircraft (SC-VTOL) requirements for powered-lift. The FAA disagrees and has instead adopted "essential" and "increased" performance approvals. Although the FAA's "essential" and increased" performance approvals are similar to EASA's "Category Basic" and "Category Enhanced" approvals, differences remain. The FAA is establishing these airworthiness criteria for the Model JAS4-1 to provide a certification basis for aircraft design approval, while the operational approval is accomplished outside of the aircraft certification process. Additionally, both the FAA's and EASA's performance levels include the aircraft's ability to conduct a controlled emergency landing after a condition when the aircraft can no longer provide the commanded power or thrust required for CSFL as specified in JS4.2105(g). To complete the integration of these defined levels of safety requirements, the FAA modified JS4.2115 "Takeoff performance," JS4.2120 "Climb requirements," and JS4.2130 "Landing" to incorporate the essential and increased performance requirements.
The FAA received several comments that the proposed definition of a "CEL" was not sufficient to ensure that the relevant instances that may be encountered in operation are addressed beyond a "critical loss of thrust" as required under the proposed JS4.2105(g). The FAA agrees with the concerns raised by these commenters. As such, the FAA revised the proposed CEL definition and the requirements in JS4.2105(g) to establish the minimum level of safety required when the aircraft can no longer provide the commanded power or thrust required for CSFL.
One commenter requested the FAA remove the part of the CEL definition that requires that the pilot be capable of choosing the direction and area of touchdown and instead require a controlled descent. As indicated by the term itself, "controlled emergency landing" is a defined airworthiness attribute in which the design maintains sufficient control to change direction to an area of touchdown, while reasonably protecting occupants from serious injury. However, the FAA has updated the definition of CEL by relocating the pilot reference to focus the requirement on aircraft functionality. Overall pilot controllability requirements are addressed in JS4.2135, which requires that the aircraft be controllable and maneuverable without requiring exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength. The intent of the definition of CEL is to provide equivalency to the part 23 airplane gliding requirements and the part 27 rotorcraft autorotation requirements. Both minimize the aircraft's speed (forward and vertically) while still allowing directional control of the aircraft to an emergency landing.
One commenter requested the FAA clarify the statement "reasonably protecting occupants" in the definition of "CEL" and further commented that non-participants should also be protected since these aircraft plan to operate in highly-populated urban environments. The FAA agrees with the need to provide additional clarity and has modified the definition of CEL to clarify that the expected safety outcome is protection from serious injury, which inherently provides a level of protection for non-participants on the ground. This approach is similar to the level of safety in Sec. § 23.2270, 23.2320, and 23.2510 for normal category airplanes.
The FAA also received comments seeking clarification of the term "some damage" in the definition of CEL. The allowance for some damage to the aircraft exists in the 14 CFR 23.2000 definition of CSFL. For the Joby Model JAS4-1, this allowance was moved to the definition for CEL. The intent is that, although there may be aircraft damage, the occupants remain protected to the extent that egress may still be achieved following the landing.
The FAA received several comments requesting clarity on the meaning of "loss of thrust" and "critical loss of thrust" in JS4.2000 and throughout the airworthiness criteria. These terms were inherited from the existing airworthiness standards used to create the proposed airworthiness criteria. The FAA agrees that the "loss of thrust" term is inadequate for the Model JS4-1, which incorporates distributed propulsion with an integrated flight and propulsion control system. Historically, this terminology was used to convey an assumed complete engine failure because of the critical nature that engines, propellers, and transmissions provided regarding continued flight or CSFL capability. With the advent of distributed propulsion, the underlying assumptions of design features, mitigations, and substantiation of capability under endurance testing established within the legacy requirements are no longer valid, requiring revision.
Distributed propulsion with an integrated flight and propulsion control system adjusts the aircraft's flight path using aerodynamic and/or propulsive forces. In addition to addressing the complete loss of thrust at any individual location and its effects, the design must address additional failures from the flight and propulsion control system that may inadvertently generate more or less thrust than commanded by a pilot. For powered-lift with tilting nacelle designs like the Model JAS4-1, the design must also address the possibility of any given nacelle to fail in an orientation that does not match its commanded position, and account for the subsequent thrust vector that results. In part, some of these failures are identified through the system safety process. However, other considerations exist outside of that process that are necessary for identifying other critical failures. As such, the FAA has included a definition of "critical change of thrust" to address the thrust's magnitude and orientation. Critical change of thrust may consist of more than one condition depending on what flight conditions it adversely affects (performance, handling qualities, or both). A critical change of thrust will require a dedicated assessment encompassing all the above elements.
Further, the proposed definition for "loss of power/thrust" was not adopted in these final airworthiness criteria. Since this term was only used in the proposed JS4.2105(g), the final JS4.2105(g) requirement was rewritten to directly incorporate the previous "loss of power/thrust" definition language and clarify that the condition represents any scenario in which commanded thrust is insufficient to ensure CSFL, regardless of cause.
The FAA also received recommendations to modify the proposed "source of lift" definition to use terminology consistent with the powered-lift definition in 14 CFR part 1. The FAA agrees and has revised this definition to align with the powered-lift definition more closely.
One commenter requested the FAA clarify the meaning of "predominately" and what was meant by "combination" in the definition of "source of lift." The FAA has changed "predominantly" to "principally" in the JS4.2000(b)(3) of these final criteria, as the term "principally" is used in the part 1 definitions of powered-lift and rotorcraft. The FAA intended for the definition of "source of lift" in JS4.2000(b)(3) to be aligned with the existing regulatory definitions of powered-lift and rotorcraft. The FAA intends the term "combination" to capture instances where the sources of lift involve both engine driven lift devices (e.g., rotors) and non-rotating airfoils (e.g., fixed wings), generally in a manner in which the balance between the two is varying during transition from wing-borne flight to thrust-borne flight and vice-versa.
The FAA received a comment seeking clarification on the use of the term's "transition" and "transitional" within the airworthiness criteria. The term "transition" is used within the airworthiness criteria to describe a change in configuration or mode of operation and is not an indication of a specific source of lift. Within the preamble of the notice of proposed airworthiness criteria, the term "transitional" is intended to mean the same as "semi-thrust borne." As the use of the term "transitional" to mean "semi-thrust borne" was limited to the preamble language, no modification to the airworthiness criteria is needed.
The FAA received a comment asking to replace the term "hover" with "taxi" in the listed phases of flight in JS4.2000(b)(2). The FAA disagrees, as the term "hover" refers to an airborne flight condition and "taxi" refers to movement while on the ground. Another commenter requested that the FAA add "taxi" to the criteria, since the terms is also used in JS4.2225. The FAA disagrees as the term "ground operations" in JS4.2000(b)(2) includes taxi operations. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA received comments asking that the terms "shutdown," "start," "restart," and "idle" be defined for electric engines. The FAA disagrees. The FAA intends that these terms have the same meaning as for existing engine technology, but recognizes that there may be some differences based on the specific design of the Model JAS4-1 and its engine operations.
The FAA received a comment questioning the applicability of part 33 requirements that used the term "rotorcraft." Upon further review, the FAA found similar issues with the references to "airplane" within part 33 and part 35. The FAA agrees with the concern and updated JS4.2000(c) to clarify that part 33 and part 35 requirements that use the terms "airplane" and "rotorcraft" mean "aircraft." This also prompted the FAA to remove the inappropriate reference to typical airplane installations in § 35.37(c)(2). The FAA also received a comment questioning the use of the term "of this part" in part 33. The FAA agrees; the revision to JS4.2000(c) also clarifies that "this part" means "these airworthiness criteria" when used in part 33 and part 35 requirements.
Lastly, the FAA added a definition for the term "local events" in response to comments requesting clarification of this term as used in requirements in subparts H and I.
Applicable Criteria
Applicable Criteria
The FAA proposed applicable criteria by determining the appropriate airworthiness requirements that apply to the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift. These criteria are tailored to the powered-lift's design, including its engines and propellers, as well as its construction, intended use, and suitability for compliance with operational requirements.
CAAC, EASA, GAMA, Lilium, Martin Aerotech, Odys, Overair, TCCA, Vertical Aerospace, and Volocopter requested the FAA remove sections and terms from the proposed airworthiness criteria that do not specifically apply to the Model JAS4-1 design. The FAA agrees and did not adopt the following in these final airworthiness criteria as they were not specifically applicable to the Model JAS4-1:
• JS4.2225(c);
• JS4.2240(b) (a new JS4.2240(b) has been added);
• § 23.2310;
• JS4.2320(d), (e) (the remaining requirements of JS4.2320 have been transitioned to § 23.2320);
• JS4.2325(h);
• § 23.2420;
• § 23.2435;
• § 23.2530(e);
• JS4.2540; and
• § 35.43.
The following phrases were not adopted in these final airworthiness criteria as they are not specifically applicable to the Model JAS4-1 design:
• JS4.2400(a): "or provides auxiliary power to the aircraft;"
• JS4.2405(a), (b), (c): "reverser system;"
• JS4.2430(a)(3): "and auxiliary power unit;" and
• JS4.2430(c), (c)(1), (c)(3): "refilling or."
The FAA received comments that questioned the inclusion of HIRF and lightning requirements for aircraft approved for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations. The requirements are conditional for IFR approved designs. The FAA found it prudent to specify basic design requirements for HIRF and lightning based on the expectation that future design modifications could include an IFR approval. However, additional design and installation requirements beyond those specified in these airworthiness criteria would be needed for the aircraft to be approved to operate under IFR.
Lastly, the FAA received numerous comments noting that the airplane levels prescribed by 23.2005 should no longer be referenced in these criteria, as they apply to conventional airplanes and not to a powered-lift. The FAA agrees and has revised the airworthiness criteria accordingly.
Technical Areas in General Order of the Airworthiness Criteria Sections
Technical Areas in General Order of the Airworthiness Criteria Sections
Aircraft Performance, Handling, and Control
The FAA received and reviewed comments from Alaka'i, AIBOT, Airbus, ALPA, ANAC, ASDIA, Beta, Diamond Aircraft, EASA, End State Solutions, GAMA, Lilium, MTLS, Odys, Overair, Rolls-Royce, Rotorcraft Drive Systems, TCCA, Vertical Aerospace, Volocopter, and individual commenters requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to aircraft performance, handling, and control for the Model JAS4-1.
Aircraft Performance, Handling, and Control
The FAA received a comment noting the inconsistent use of terms when referring to the applicable atmospheric references in proposed JS4.2105, JS4.2115, and JS4.2130. Under JS4.2105(a), performance requirements at atmospheric conditions must be applied to all requirements in Subpart B unless otherwise prescribed, including JS4.2115 and JS4.2130. The FAA modified JS4.2115 and JS4.2130 to include fixed performance parameters for takeoff and landing, respectively; however, this does not negate the requirement to account for atmospheric conditions as denoted in JS4.2105(a).
One commenter suggested adding "at sea level" to JS4.2105(a), consistent with the language for levels 1 and 2 low-speed airplanes in part 23. The FAA disagrees. JS4.2105(a) as proposed achieves the intended safety objectives and aligns the airworthiness criteria with the appropriate level of safety intended by utilizing appropriate standards from both parts 23 and part 27, with revisions specific to the Model JAS4-1. The FAA did not modify JS4.2105(a) as a result of this comment.
The FAA received comments that stated a concern that proposed JS4.2105(b)(1) inadvertently limits airport altitudes to 10,000 ft. The FAA agrees and has changed the airworthiness requirement to develop performance data to the maximum altitude for which certification is being sought.
The FAA also received a comment requesting clarification whether the 10,000 feet specified in JS4.2105(b)(1) should be expressed in either mean sea level or above ground level. The language in JS4.2105 is consistent with the existing airworthiness standard § 23.2105 and is referenced to the altitude above sea level. No change was made as a result of this comment.
One commenter requested revision of JS4.2105(c), stating the rule is too vague and recommending that a minimum crosswind limit be established similar to parts 27 and 29. The FAA received another comment requesting clarification on dealing with wind gusts arising in urban environments. The FAA agrees with the need for a minimum crosswind limit but does not agree that details addressing urban environments belongs in JS4.2105(c). The FAA revised JS4.2135(a)(6) in response to similar comments to specify a minimum of 17 knots all azimuth capability. The FAA did not change JS4.2105(c) as a result of these comments.
The FAA received comments about JS4.2105(f) expressing confusion about what the phrase "critical loss of thrust" means relative to a powered-lift design of the Joby JAS-4 type. As mentioned previously, the FAA replaced the phrase "critical loss of thrust" with a new term, "critical change of thrust," which is defined in JS4.2000.
Several commenters noted inconsistent utilization of the term "flight envelope" and requested clarification. One such instance was identified in JS4.2135(a), where the criteria referenced an "operating envelope." The FAA's intent was not to imply this flight envelope was different from others referenced in these airworthiness criteria. To be consistent, the FAA has generally replaced "operating envelope" with "approved flight envelope" where applicable, such as in JS4.2105(f) and JS4.2135(a), except for JS.2425(b) and JS4.2710(d), where the proposed requirements define operating envelopes specific to the engine.
The FAA received several comments requesting clarification of the new term "loss of power or thrust" defined in proposed JS4.2000(b)(4) and used in proposed JS4.2105(g) to specify the required level of safety after a condition when the aircraft can no longer provide commanded power or thrust required for CSFL. This proposed term generated confusion with similar terminology referring to "loss of thrust" in other sections of the criteria. The FAA agrees that clarification is necessary and therefore has not adopted the "loss of power/thrust" definition in final JS4.2000. The FAA has also revised JS4.2105(g) by replacing the term "loss of power or thrust" with the definitional language from proposed JS4.2000(b)(4).
Several commenters asked for clarification on JS4.2105(g) and the use of system safety or operational mitigations as the compliance showing. The FAA modified JS4.2105(g) to provide additional clarity. Revised JS4.2105(g) is intended to assure that in the event of cockpit mismanagement, energy exhaustion, improper maintenance, or other failures, a controlled emergency landing can be achieved. JS4.2105(g) establishes safety objectives and the FAA's acceptance of a specific means of compliance is beyond the scope of these airworthiness criteria.
A commenter asked for clarification on JS4.2105(g) as to whether a conventional forward landing would be an acceptable mitigation for loss of power or thrust. A conventional forward landing may be acceptable if the aircraft is capable of a controlled emergency landing in that configuration. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA received comments requesting that the FAA more explicitly state that the speed for thrust-borne flight in JS4.2110 and JS4.2150 may include hover. The minimum safe speed determined in JS4.2110 must cover all phases of flight (including hover) and all sources of lift, and JS4.2150 uses that minimum safe speed. As such, no change to the criteria is necessary.
The FAA also received a request to revise JS4.2110 to require minimum safe speed for "each flight condition and configuration" instead of only for each flight condition. The FAA disagrees. The phrase "flight condition" includes the aircraft configuration, phases of flight, and the sources of lift. No change to the criteria is necessary.
Several commenters stated that the proposed airworthiness criteria for takeoff performance in JS4.2115, climb performance in JS4.2120, and landing performance in JS4.2130 do not establish sufficient minimum performance requirements to meet the public's expectations and levels of safety. One commenter recommended rewording paragraph (b) of JS4.2115, JS4.2120, and JS4.2130 to require the applicant to account for a range of engine or distributed propulsion system failures instead of accounting for loss of thrust.
As explained previously, the FAA recognizes the need to clarify the difference in requirements for "essential" and "increased" performance levels as defined in JS4.2000(b)(1) for the Model JAS4-1 with respect to the takeoff, climb, and landing performance criteria of JS4.2115, JS4.2120, and JS4.2130, respectively. The FAA has revised these performance requirements to include scenarios for all engines operating and for critical changes of thrust. As revised, JS4.2115, "Takeoff performance" addresses all engines operating, as well as critical change of thrust conditions, for both essential and increased performance levels. Essential performance level requirements ensure all engines operating takeoff capability and the capability to perform either a safe stop or safe landing following a critical change of thrust. Increased performance, while similar for safe stops, defines the requirements for continued takeoff following a critical change of thrust, including the capability to continue the climb and then subsequently achieve the configuration and airspeed specified for increased performance in JS4.2120, "Climb Performance."
The FAA revised JS4.2120 to establish targets for both essential and increased climb performance for all engines operating, as well as after a critical change of thrust, as defined in JS4.2000. The FAA developed essential and increased climb performance requirements with all engines operating using part 23 requirements. Essential performance also requires that the applicant assess critical change of thrust impacts on takeoff and climb performance capabilities. Increased performance after a critical change of thrust defines minimum criteria utilizing part 23 and part 27 Category A climb requirements, dependent on the takeoff flight path and sources of lift defined in JS4.2000 along that path.
Multiple commenters requested clarity on where glide and autorotation performance are captured. The FAA added JS4.2120(e), which requires the applicant determine the performance for gliding or autorotation.
The FAA received a number of comments noting the lack of specificity in proposed JS4.2130. The comments noted that JS4.2130 was overly vague and did not provide enough substantive detail to support the intent of the criteria. The FAA agrees and has revised JS4.2130 to ensure the level of safety and capability for essential and increased performance for takeoff in JS4.2115 is consistent with the level of safety and capability for essential and increased performance for landing in JS4.2130. Landing under JS4.2130 now contains requirements for both essential and increased performance levels, such that the aircraft must be able to make a landing upon a critical change of thrust. For increased performance, the FAA has also included a minimum criterion to safely transition to a balked landing condition following a critical change of thrust.
The FAA received a comment that determining the performance for all potential partial loss of power conditions in proposed subpart B may be impractical. The FAA agrees. As mentioned previously, a new term, "critical change of thrust" has been defined in JS4.2000 to identify the most critical thrust-related failure condition(s) for the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift. This term requires consideration of the most adverse effect on performance or handling qualities. The FAA modified JS4.2115, JS4.2120, JS4.2125, and JS4.2130 to use this new definition of critical loss of thrust.
A commenter requested clarification on the phrase "applicable sources of lift" in JS4.2135(a)(2). During a specific phase of flight, an aircraft design may only allow for a singular source of lift during that phase of flight. In other phases of flight, one or more sources of lift may be possible. Therefore, "applicable sources of lift" refers to only those allowable by the aircraft design. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
Multiple commenters requested the FAA establish an additional limit flight envelope which would establish the controllability limits of the aircraft. The FAA does not agree with this request. The FAA intended proposed JS4.2135 to establish the regulatory requirement for controllability that is used to define the approved flight envelope. The FAA recognizes that excursions outside of the aircraft's approved flight envelope can occur and must be considered from a safety perspective. The FAA has replaced the proposed requirement of § 23.2160(a) with new JS4.2160 to address speed excursions beyond the approved flight envelope.
The FAA received multiple comments requesting the FAA utilize the multiple flight envelope concept in EASA's SC-VTOL, in lieu of the proposed minimum safe speed requirement in JS4.2110. The commenters stated that the FAA's proposed requirement may be appropriate for wing-borne flight, but it is not appropriate for other aircraft configurations. The FAA determined that the establishment of a minimum safe speed and an approved flight envelope establishes a level of safety for the Model JAS4-1 that is consistent with the safety levels established in parts 23 and 27.
The FAA also received comments seeking clarification on atmospheric effects, scoping, and sources of lift in regard to JS4.2110. The intent of that requirement is to address flight conditions in normal operation considering the most adverse conditions, which includes adverse atmospheric effects. Accordingly, no change to this requirement is necessary. Establishment of minimum safe speeds in regard to specific sources of lift will be established in the means of compliance.
Regarding controllability, the FAA received comments asking the FAA to adopt the requirement in § 23.2135(a)(3), to address "likely reversible flight control or propulsion system failure" instead of proposed JS4.2135(a)(3), which requires addressing "likely flight-control or propulsion-system failure." Commenters further clarified that they believed flight controls are fully addressed by the proposed requirement that the Model JAS4-1 comply with § 23.2510. The FAA disagrees and determined that specific airworthiness criteria for controllability are needed to address the integration of the advanced flight-control system and the propulsion-system. In addition, JS4.2135(a)(3) is to ensure that likely failures not included in the system safety process of § 23.2510 are addressed and that failures that are included have an adequate handling quality assessment, which is outside the scope of § 23.2510. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
The FAA received a comment seeking clarity on the difference between JS4.2135(a)(3) and JS4.2135(a)(5), which requires addressing degraded flight control system operating modes not shown to be extremely improbable. The intent of JS4.2135(a)(3) is for the applicant to identify likely failures that can be seen in service that are not addressed by a system safety analysis. These may include mechanical or other single point failures. JS4.2135(a)(5) includes failures that are identified during the formal system safety process. The intent of JS4.2135(a)(5) is to ensure that those failures that result in degraded handling qualities are assessed. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
One commenter asked the FAA to remove JS4.2135(a)(5) because the requirements of proposed Subpart F would sufficiently mitigate this hazard. The FAA disagrees. JS4.2135(a)(5) requires controllability evaluation using approved flight test methods of compliance. The requirements in Subpart F, which apply to equipment, do not adequately address this concern. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA received a comment to modify JS4.2135(a)(5) to remove the phrase "not shown to be extremely improbable." The FAA disagrees. Removing this phrase would require the applicant to address all failure conditions regardless of their probability. The FAA included this phrase to limit the cases where handling qualities are evaluated to those conditions not shown to be extremely improbable to limit the applicants burden. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
Several commenters requested that a minimum level of safety be established with respect to proposed JS4.2135(a)(6), which requires that the aircraft can land safely in wind conditions. Multiple commenters questioned whether JS4.2135(a)(6) was only applicable to thrust-borne flight. The FAA concurs that a minimum level of safety should be defined and has amended JS4.2135(a)(6) to contain a more prescriptive all-azimuth minimum wind speed requirement of 17 knots. This minimum wind limit is applicable to the thrust-borne operations and is consistent with requirements for parts 27 and 29 rotorcraft.
The FAA received a comment that the term "loading" in proposed JS4.2135(a)(1) needed to be revised to include energy level considerations (i.e., degraded or low battery). Energy level considerations are covered under JS4.2135(a)(3), (a)(5), and (b), which address propulsion system failures, flight control system operating modes, and critical control parameters such as limited-control power margins, respectively. Propulsion system failures include the electrical distribution and batteries. The same commenter proposed adopting a new requirement to address a rolling takeoff in maximum crosswind. The situation noted by the commenter is already addressed by JS4.2135(a)(2), which covers all phases of flight (e.g., takeoff for the approved flight envelope including crosswinds). No changes were made as a result of these comments.
Multiple commenters asked for clarity on the phrases "critical control parameters" and "limited control power margins" in JS4.2135(b). The phrase "critical control parameters, such as limited control power margins" is intended to capture parameters or limits in which the aircraft is control or performance limited. The applicant must define these parameters as they apply to their unique design. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
The FAA received a comment recommending that "change from one flight condition to another" be replaced with "transition from one flight condition to another" in JS4.2135(c). The FAA agrees and has updated JS4.2135(c) accordingly.
Several commenters stated that the language utilized from part 23, pre-amendment 23-64, in the development of proposed JS4.2145 did not provide appropriate granularity between static and dynamic stability and sources of lift for a powered-lift. The FAA agrees and has revised the requirements in JS4.2145 to account for the difference in stability requirements that arise between wing-borne, semi-thrust-borne, and thrust-borne flight for the Model JAS4-1.
The FAA received comments asking the FAA to provide specific likely failure cases to be considered in addition to more detailed control feel requirements in proposed JS4.2145(a). The FAA partially concurs with these comments. The intent of JS4.2145(a) is for the applicant to identify likely failures that may be encountered in service that are not addressed by system safety analysis; those could include mechanical or other single point failures. The FAA has revised the language in JS4.2145(a) to improve clarity but did not concur with the commenters' request to identify specific failure conditions, including detailed control feel requirements.
The FAA also received a comment seeking clarity on the term "unstable" in JS4.2145(b). The FAA revised proposed JS4.2145(b) (now JS4.2145(c), due to changes discussed previously) to clarify that the intent is to ensure dynamic stability characteristics. The FAA intends "unstable" to mean the same as is stated in the criteria: that the characteristics do not increase the pilot's workload or otherwise endanger the aircraft and its occupants.
The FAA also received comments regarding aerobatics and whether such proposed criteria are applicable to this class of vehicle or if instead the criteria should be better tailored to Joby's design. The FAA agreed and revised JS4.2145 and JS4.2150 accordingly with the recognition that Joby is not seeking approval for aerobatics for the Model JAS4-1.
The FAA received a comment that proposed JS4.2150 may be adequate for wing-borne operation but not thrust-borne operation. The FAA agrees and has revised JS4.2150 to address all sources of lift.
The FAA received a comment asking for removal of proposed JS4.2150(b) as it was redundant. The FAA disagrees and finds it necessary to have an airworthiness requirement that the aircraft not inadvertently depart controlled flight.
The FAA also received a comment questioning the terminology "critical loss of thrust" in proposed JS4.2150(b). The FAA agrees this term was inappropriate for an aircraft capable of vertical takeoff and landing operations because it requires a hazardous test condition that would result in an initial adverse environment, which was not the intent. The FAA has updated JS4.2150(c) (previously proposed JS4.2150(b)) to replace "critical loss of thrust" with "sudden change of thrust" to remove this hazardous condition and to distinguish it from the term "critical change of thrust" defined in JS4.2000. The FAA intends the term "sudden change of thrust" to refer to short-term commanded thrust changes, whether directly by the pilot or from the flight control system in normal operation.
The FAA received comments on proposed JS4.2150 that a maximum speed limitation may be necessary to prevent loss of control on a powered-lift. The FAA agrees with the commenters, but because JS4.2150 relates to minimum safe speed requirements, the FAA has revised JS4.2160 to include this safety requirement in JS4.21060(b).
The FAA received a comment requesting clarification on the applicability of § 23.2155. The commenter questioned the necessity for this requirement with the assumption that powered-lift do not taxi under their own power. The FAA disagrees that this requirement should not be adopted as proposed, as the Model JAS4-1 has the ability to taxi. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
The FAA received a comment on JS4.2140(c) requesting removal of the word "likely" from the term "likely abnormal or emergency operations." The FAA does not agree as the term is needed to appropriately bound the requirement. This is in alignment with § 23.2140(c), the existing airworthiness standard used to develop JS4.2140(c). No changes were made as a result of the comment.
The FAA also received a comment on proposed JS4.2140(c) suggesting the removal of "multi-engine." The commenter stated that because the Model JAS4-1 is a multi-engine aircraft, including this term adds no value and may create confusion. The FAA agrees and did not adopt the reference to "multi-engine aircraft."
Finally, the FAA received several comments about JS4.2140(c)'s use of the language, "loss of thrust not shown to be extremely improbable" in the context of trim system requirements. As mentioned previously, a new term, "critical change of thrust" was defined in JS4.2000 to provide an equivalent term adapted to the model JS4 design. The FAA modified JS4.2140(c) to use "critical change of thrust" as a result.
One commenter noted that proposed JS4.2140(a) should not be limited to just cruise flight. The FAA agrees and has removed the reference limiting the requirement to cruise flight. Additionally, commenters expressed a concern that normal phases of flight utilized in proposed JS4.2140(a) and the flight conditions identified in proposed JS4.2140(b) may create some confusion. The FAA agrees and has revised the language in JS4.2140(a) to specify "normal operations" instead of "normal phases of flight."
One commenter requested the FAA change the phrase "level flight" to "cruise" in JS4.2140(b)(2). JS4.2140(b)(2) references flight conditions and not phases of flight, and therefore "level flight" is appropriate. The commenter also requested the FAA add "hover" to JS4.2140(b). Hover does not have a longitudinal component, and as such trim in that axis is not applicable. Adjustments of trim may not apply any discontinuities as identified in JS4.2140(c). No changes were made as a result of these comments.
The FAA received comments concerning the use of the term "trim" in proposed JS4.2140 and questioning its appropriateness with fly-by-wire control systems that do not use traditional trimming arrangements. The FAA finds the requirements in JS4.2140 applicable because the Model JAS4-1 fly-by-wire flight controls may implement a trimming function rather than conventional trim device tabs or bias springs. Such a function would be equivalent to a trim or auto-trim device. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
One commenter requested that the FAA replace the term "primary flight controls" in proposed JS4.2140(a) and (b) with the term "inceptor." The FAA disagrees. Although inceptors and effectors may fall under the term "primary flight controls," the FAA does not find this change necessary as it prescribes a specific implementation of technology. No changes were made as a result of this comment. Icing
The FAA received and reviewed comments from ALPA, EASA, GAMA, Overair, and TCCA requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to flight into known icing (FIKI) conditions as well as inadvertent icing encounters. Specifically, commenters requested the FAA explain why references to icing conditions requirements were excluded, revise the level of prescriptiveness of the criteria, and remove FIKI requirements because the Model JAS4-1 is not seeking FIKI approval at this time. At the same time, the FAA received comments requesting the FAA include more specific requirements for FIKI conditions.
Based on numerous comments received noting that Joby does not seek approval for FIKI on the Model JAS4-1 at this time, the FAA did not adopt proposed JS4.2165(a). Proposed JS4.2165(b) and (c), which address inadvertent icing encounters, remain applicable to the Model JAS4-1, and have been renumbered to JS4.2165(a) and (b), accordingly. JS4.2415 is similarly intended to capture any aircraft icing during an inadvertent encounter that adversely affects powerplant operation.
The FAA received comments requesting the FAA include requirements for recirculating snow and accumulation of ice and snow, because smaller rotors and airfoils, such as those on the Model JAS4-1, are known to be susceptible to the effects of snow and icing. The FAA agrees with concerns regarding the effect of scale on ice accretion, but finds they are addressed by proposed JS4.2165(b) (JS4.2165 (a) in these final criteria) for an inadvertent icing encounter. Recirculating snow and accumulation of snow are foreseeable conditions addressed by § 23.2415(a) for engine operation and by JS4.2600(a) for flightcrew visibility considering accumulations on the windshield due to recirculating snow.
The FAA received requests to remove proposed JS4.2165(b) since the Model JAS4-1 powered-lift is not seeking FIKI approval. The FAA does not agree, as proposed JS4.2165(b) (JS4.2165(a) in these final criteria) addresses inadvertent icing encounters, not FIKI. The relatively low revolution speed and resulting low centrifugal acceleration effect on ice shedding capability, as well as the effect of increased torque on electric engines, need to be addressed in an inadvertent icing encounter.
Lastly, the FAA received several comments on proposed JS4.2165(a), which the FAA did not adopt in the final rule. The commenters requested that the FAA explain why the reference to the icing conditions defined in appendix C of part 25 were excluded from these airworthiness criteria. The icing conditions for which certification is sought will be defined in future amended airworthiness criteria should Joby seek icing certification after initial type certification. This will allow Joby to seek a standard that reflects their operating limitations.
Structural Design Loads
Structural Design Loads
The FAA received comments from Airbus, ALPA, Diamond Aircraft, EASA, GAMA, Overair, Rolls-Royce, TCCA, Volocopter, and an individual requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to structural design loads for the Model JAS4-1, including vibration and buffeting, flight modes, and wing borne vs. thrust-borne design loads.
The FAA received a comment to modify § 23.2215(a) to cover the whole operational envelope of the aircraft. The FAA does not agree. The objective of this criteria covers the structural design envelope, which may exceed the operational envelope requirement recommended by the commenter. The design envelope loads requirement will be further clarified in the means of compliance. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
A commenter recommended the FAA include the structural requirement for vibration and buffeting and harmonize with EASA's SC-VTOL.2215(b) for powered-lift, by adding "Vibration and buffeting must not result in structural damage up to dive speed, within the limit flight envelope" to § 23.2215.
The FAA agrees that vibration and buffeting must not result in structural damage, but the FAA does not agree to use the SC-VTOL.2215(b) language. The FAA finds that EASA's scope for vibration and buffeting in SC-VTOL is not sufficient for powered-lift. The FAA instead moved the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2215 to JS4.2215(a) and added a new paragraph (b), which states, "There must be no vibration or buffeting severe enough to result in structural damage, at any speed up to dive speed, within the structural design envelope, in any configuration and power-setting."
Two commenters requested the FAA clarify the transitional flight mode for engine-driven lifting-device assembly provisions per JS4.2225(d). The commenters pointed out that the structural loads requirements for this special class of aircraft include loads resulting from the transitional flight phase that are not considered under loading conditions in parts 23 and 27. Specifically, the commenters were concerned that propellers, when repositioned in-flight relative to the aircraft primary axis, may introduce unique load cases relative to conventional propeller loads that would impact the static strength evaluations. The commenters recommended the FAA capture requirements for loads in all phases of flight by revising JS4.2225(d). One commenter requested revising JS4.2225(d) to read "Engine-driven lifting-device assemblies, considering loads resulting from flight (including transitional flight mode) and ground conditions, as well limit input torque at any lifting-device rotational speed." Another commenter requested revising JS4.2225(d) to read "(d) Engine-driven lifting device assemblies, considering loads resulting from flight and ground conditions, limit input torque at any lifting-device rotational speed as well as propeller holding or clocking (locking) conditions if applicable."
The FAA agrees that all powered-lift flight configurations need clarification for the calculation of structural design loads for transitional flight phases. The FAA also recognizes that changes in propeller "disk" orientation during flight will affect aircraft loads resulting from the aerodynamic influence of the propellers on the aircraft. Similarly, the FAA considers it likely that aircraft aerodynamics loads will influence the propeller aerodynamic loads. Therefore, the FAA concluded that proposed JS4.2200 Structural Design Envelope should be revised instead of JS4.2225 (as suggested by the commenters) to include, "Thrust[hyphen]borne, wing[hyphen]borne, and semi[hyphen]thrust[hyphen]borne flight configurations, with associated flight load envelopes." The FAA added JS4.2200(g) accordingly.
Multiple commenters asked for clarity on the requirements in JS4.2225(d) and whether the intent of that criteria could be shown through means of compliance with JS4.2225(a). The FAA disagrees. JS4.2225(a) is specific to loads for the engine mount, whereas JS4.2225(d) is specific to lifting device assemblies.
Multiple commenters requested the FAA provide clarification in JS4.2200(b) with respect to appropriate design maneuvering load factors for powered-lift designs. The intent of JS4.2200 is to describe the various design envelopes that must be considered by the applicant in the loads analysis. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
One commenter requested that the FAA define the term "sufficiently" in JS4.2200(a)(1) and (2). As explained in the notice of proposed criteria, the FAA based proposed JS4.2200 on § 23.2200, with revisions to address the powered-lift structural design envelope. The terms "be sufficiently greater" in JS4.2200(a)(1) and "provide sufficient margin" in JS4.2200(a)(2) have the same meaning, and will be applied to the Model JAS4-1 in the same manner, as in § 23.2200(a)(1) and (2). No changes were made as a result of the comment.
A commenter stated that JS4.2200(e), which proposed to require that the applicant account for each critical altitude up to the maximum altitude, does not consider redistribution of loads if deflections under load would significantly change the distribution of external or internal loads. EASA requested the FAA revise JS4.2200(e) similar to EASA SC-VTOL.2200(e). The FAA does not concur, as the critical altitude and redistribution of loads requirement in SC-VTOL.2200(e) is already captured by JS4.2200(e) and § 23.2210. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA received multiple comments questioning the requirement to use service history in the development of the design load maneuvering factors in JS4.2200(b), since the Model JAS4-1 has no service history. One commenter requested the FAA add specific language to the airworthiness criteria that points to using service history from existing normal category aircraft. The FAA agrees that the service history utilized in this showing should come from service experience from both rotorcraft and small airplane service history. However, the FAA disagrees that a change to the airworthiness criteria is necessary.
One commenter recommended the FAA revise proposed JS4.2225 to be more generic by specifying source of loads for any relevant structural components, and not only the components specific to the Model JAS4-1. The FAA disagrees, as these airworthiness criteria are specific to the applicant's design.
Structures
Structures
The FAA received and reviewed comments from ASDIA, Airbus, ANAC, EASA, GAMA, Lilium, Martin Aerotech, MTLS, Overair, Odys, TCCA, and Volocopter requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to aircraft structure for the Model JAS4-1.
One commenter requested the FAA incorporate requirements equivalent to EASA SC-VTOL.2240(b) for structural durability. Several commenters suggested adding the level 4 airplane requirements for damage tolerance in § 23.2240(b) to JS4.2240 to incorporate damage tolerance principles. The FAA partially concurs with the recommendations of the commenters and has clarified to JS4.2240(b) consistent with the FAA's long-standing policies regarding use of fail-safe methodology in conjunction with damage tolerance inspections. Fail-safe methodologies, also referred to as safety-by-design, incorporate multi-load-path structure (i.e., redundant load paths) to act as back-up structure should any one of the original load paths (i.e., fail-safe structure) fail. Damage tolerance (i.e., safety-by-inspection) is a property of structure relating to its ability to sustain defects safely until those defects can be detected.
The FAA does not agree that adoption of § 23.2240(b) is necessary or appropriate, as this requirement is specific to airplanes that meet the definition in § 23.2005 for a Level 4 airplane that can carry 10-19 passengers. The § 23.2240(b) requirement for Level 4 airplanes was derived from § 23.574 at amendment 23-48 and excluded the option to use fail-safe methodologies for commuter category airplanes (Level 4). In addition, § 23.574(a) requires the use of damage tolerance and allows the use of safe-life in § 23.574(b) only when damage tolerance is found to be impractical.
Damage tolerance is one available option to use when complying with JS4.2240(a), along with the options to use safe-life and fail-safe methodologies, provided the fail-safe option relies on damage tolerance or safe life as stipulated in numerous FAA policies including AC 27-1B, "Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft;" AC 23-13A, "Fatigue, Fail-Safe, and Damage Tolerance Evaluation of Metallic Structure for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes;" and AC 91-82A, "Fatigue Management Programs for In-Service Issues." The FAA notes further that the intent of adding JS4.2240(b) to these final criteria was to incorporate inspection when the fail-safe method is used. Incorporating inspections addresses long-standing and known deficiencies with fail-safe methodologies on all part 23 airplanes, as clarified in the preamble to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for amendment 23-64, in which the FAA identified potential shortcomings in the ability to detect all possible failure scenarios and ensure that all structural failures would be immediately obvious and corrected before further flight. The intent of structural durability requirements in both Sec. § 23.2240(a) and 27.571 is to use the appropriate application of safe-life or damage tolerance principles to ensure that fail-safe structure maintains the required safety margins without extended periods of operation with reduced safety margins.
The FAA agrees with the commenters that further clarification on the stipulations that govern use of fail-safe methodologies should be included in the Model JAS4-1 criteria to reiterate the FAA's requirements in this regard. Consequently, the FAA has added a new JS4.2240(b) that reflects the intent of § 27.571(d) together with amendment 23-64 and associated policies to incorporate damage tolerance principles into powered-lift aircraft. The requirements in JS4.2240(b) will mitigate deficiencies in the fail-safe option and will apply to the Model JAS4-1 structure beyond those elements specifically identified by § 27.571. This is consistent with § 21.17(b), which directs the FAA to use the requirements from existing airworthiness standards, as appropriate, to determine the level of safety for the aircraft.
Multiple commenters requested that the FAA align JS4.2240(c) with EASA SC-VTOL.2240(d). The FAA notes that JS4.2240(c) is similar to SC-VTOL.2240(d), although SC-VTOL.2240(d) refers to "lift/thrust unit" instead of "engine." The EASA term "lift/thrust unit" includes the engine and propeller or rotor assembly. This topic is an ongoing discussion with foreign certification authorities. For the Model JAS4-1, other rotating parts within the system, except for propeller blades or rotors, should be evaluated using typical rotor burst methods, including shielding where practical.
The FAA received a comment to move JS4.2240(c) to outside of Subpart C Structures. The FAA disagrees as JS4.2240(c) is a requirement specific to structural durability and is appropriately included in JS4.2240, which is consistent with § 23.2240. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
Several commenters requested the FAA align § 23.2250(c) with the failure criteria in EASA SC-VTOL.2250(c). SC-VTOL.2250(c) contains a requirement for Category Enhanced that a single failure must not have a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft. The FAA's airworthiness criteria do not contain requirements equivalent to EASA's "Category Enhanced" requirements. However, the changes to JS4.2240(b) in these final criteria require inspections to reliably detect damage before it could result in a structural failure, therefore mitigating that structural failures do not result in a catastrophic failure. The FAA also changed the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2250(c) to new JS4.2250(c) to require the applicant to prevent single failures from resulting in a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft.
The FAA received a comment requesting the airworthiness criteria include a requirement to address corrosion on metallic or semi-metallic structure components resulting from high voltage difference of electric potential. The FAA does not concur. JS4.2240(a) provides an appropriate regulatory framework for addressing corrosion, as it embodies the safety intent of the prescriptive requirements in pre-amendment 64 regulations § 23.573 and § 23.574, which directly address corrosion, among other factors, in both composite and metallic structure. This framework will be applied to the Model JAS4-1 in the same manner as § 23.2240 for normal category airplanes to address corrosion resulting from any source, including high voltage difference of electric potential. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
Multiple commenters requested clarification on the lack of environmental requirements in § 23.2260(e), which applies to only thermal effects. Environmental effects are addressed in § 23.2260(a), and as such the FAA made no change as a result of these comments.
Aeroelasticity & Aeromechanical Stability
Aeroelasticity & Aeromechanical Stability
The FAA received and reviewed comments requesting the FAA revise the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2245 to address whirl flutter. The FAA agrees that whirl flutter and all similar dynamic instabilities related to rotating surfaces, non-aeroelastic aeromechanical stability, and power generating components should be addressed for the Model JAS4-1. However, the FAA disagrees with using the specific term "whirl flutter," as doing so may incorrectly limit the scope to classical airplane whirl flutter only, and not address all possible instabilities for the Model JAS4-1 configuration.
Based on the commenter's recommendation, the FAA has replaced the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2245 with new JS4.2245 to require that component and rotating surfaces must be free of any aeroelastic instability under each appropriate speed and power condition. Additionally, the FAA determined that the related issue of aeromechanical stability should similarly be addressed but does not consider it to be covered under the subject of aeroelasticity. Therefore, the FAA created a new section JS4.2241, "Aeromechanical stability," incorporating requirements from rotorcraft airworthiness standards, similar to ground resonance requirements in § 27.241, to address aeromechanical instabilities considered possible for the Model JAS4-1 when operating in thrust-borne and semi-thrust-borne flight.
Flight Controls
Flight Controls
The FAA received and reviewed comments from Airbus, ASDIA, EASA, GAMA, Lilium, MTLS, Overair, TCCA, and an individual commenter requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify, proposed airworthiness criteria related to flight controls for the Model JAS4-1.
The FAA received a comment stating that 14 CFR part 23 amendment 23-64's requirements for flight controls should be sufficient for the Model JAS4-1 and the FAA should use those requirements. The FAA disagrees. Part 23 at amendment 23-64 did not envision the type or complexity of the design of powered-lift flight controls, such as those on the Model JAS4-1. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA received several comments that raised concerns with the suitability of proposed JS4.2300(b), which was developed from part 23 requirements for trim systems on normal category airplanes, for fly-by-wire powered-lift with distributed propulsion. The FAA concurs with the comments and modifies proposed JS4.2300(b)(2) by replacing the specific trim indications with a requirement that the trim systems and functions provide information necessary for safe operation. The specific indications listed in proposed JS4.2300(b)(2)(i)--(b)(2)(iv), which summarized the prescriptive indications from 23.677(a) and ASTM F3232 section 4.4, may be used as means of compliance with final JS4.2300(b)(2) if they are applicable, or they may be modified for the novel implementation of trim functions on the Joby Model JAS4-1.
Commenters raised concerns over the flightcrew control margin awareness for fly-by-wire flight control systems and recommended including a requirement addressing this issue. The FAA concurs with the comments and has added JS4.2300(a)(3) requiring the flightcrew to be made suitably aware whenever the means of primary flight control approaches the limits of control authority. For the context of this airworthiness criteria, "suitably aware" indicates an appropriate balance between nuisance alerting and necessary operation.
One commenter asked for clarification of the term "indirect flight-control systems" in JS4.2300(c). The FAA agrees that this term caused confusion. The FAA did not adopt this term and instead revised JS4.2300(c) for clarity.
Several commenters stated that proposed JS4.2300 was overly prescriptive because the requirements could be better addressed in means of compliance and could conflict with automation in fly-by-wire flight controls. In contrast, other commenters stated that proposed JS4.2300 was insufficiently prescriptive and noted that regulations need to explicitly guide applicants, especially for novel aircraft, and specific requirements for awareness of reduced flight envelopes should be provided.
The FAA considered these comments and revised proposed JS4.2300 to be less prescriptive in instances where other requirements adequately address the same safety objective. The FAA did not adopt the proposed requirements in JS4.2300(c)(1), (c)(2)(i), and (c)(2)(iii) because they were redundant with other requirements and were unnecessarily prescriptive. The FAA added a more prescriptive requirement specifically for control margin awareness in response to these recommendations.
One commenter suggested a revision to the phrase "the onset characteristics of each protection feature is appropriate for the phase of flight and type of maneuver" in proposed JS4.2300(c)(2)(i). The FAA notes there should be no discontinuous inputs into the flight control system from envelope protection systems, but agrees that abrupt inputs may be necessary in some situations (e.g., preventing stall in response to an atmospheric disturbance). The FAA determined that this requirement is adequately addressed by JS4.2300(a)(1) and therefore did not adopt proposed JS4.2300(c)(2)(i).
The FAA received a comment on § 23.2305 requesting that the FAA add a requirement for parking brakes. The FAA disagrees. Section 23.2305(b) requires a reliable means of stopping the aircraft. One means to accomplish this may include a parking brake; however, the applicant may propose other means. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
Occupant System Design Protection
Occupant System Design Protection
The FAA received comments from ALPA, ANAC, EASA, GAMA, Lilium, Overair, Rolls-Royce, and TCCA on occupant system design protection requirements.
The FAA received comments seeking clarification on the proposed inclusion of the ditching exclusion in § 23.2315(a)(1) and a comment that this contradicts the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2310 for seaplanes and amphibians. The FAA concurs that the language proposed caused confusion and has revised these proposed requirements. The FAA did not adopt the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2310 as it is not applicable to the Model JAS4-1. The FAA maintained the scope of § 23.2315 (now JS4.2315) specific to the "cabin configured for takeoff or landing" but did not adopt the exclusion for ditching because the Model JAS4-1 is not seeking ditching approval.
One commenter requested that the FAA require shrouding on propellers. The FAA does not concur with the comment. JS4.2315(a)(1), originally proposed as § 23.2315, requires that passenger doors are not located where they would endanger persons using the door. Operational requirements are also used to ensure safety of passengers, ground crews, and property, as required for existing aircraft. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
The FAA received comments regarding aerobatics and whether such criteria are applicable to this class of vehicle or if the proposed criteria for aerobatics should be removed. The FAA agrees and has removed the proposed requirement to comply with § 23.2315(b) because the Model JAS4-1 does not seek approval for aerobatics.
The FAA received comments asking the FAA to include the protection of occupants in proposed JS4.2320(a)(2). Another commenter asked for clarification of proposed JS4.2320(a)(2). Another commenter asked the FAA to modify proposed JS4.2320(a)(2) to protect the pilot, flight controls, and propulsion electrical power and control from propellers. The intent of proposed JS4.2320(a)(2) (now § 23.2320(a)(2) in these final criteria) is to protect the pilot and systems so the pilot can land the aircraft in the event of a propeller failure. Protection of the occupants embarking and disembarking is required by JS4.2315. Propulsion control is required by § 23.2320(a)(2) as a part of the flight controls on the Model JAS4-1. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
Bird Strike
Bird Strike
The FAA received and reviewed comments from AIBOT, Airbus, Alaka'i, ALPA, ANAC, ASDIA, Beta, EASA, End State Solutions. GAMA, JCAB, Lilium, MTLS, Odys, Overair, Rolls-Royce, TCCA, UKCAA, Vertical Aerospace, Volocopter, and individual commenters requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to bird strike requirements for the Model JAS4-1.
Some commenters requested that the FAA increase the bird-impact size, while other commenters requested that the bird mass should not be prescribed, or a lower bird mass should be used with considerations for multiple bird strikes. Some commenters requested complete removal of the requirement, while other commenters only requested removal of the requirement for bird deterrence devices. Several commenters questioned the bird mass differences between the aircraft level requirement in proposed JS4.2320, the propeller requirement in § 35.36, and the bird ingestion evaluation in JS4.2718.
The FAA maintains the rationale presented in the notice of proposed airworthiness criteria for the proposed level of bird strike protection for the Model JAS4-1. The proposed requirements were based on the increased exposure to birds in the environment in which the Model JAS4-1 is expected to operate, the expectation of public safety, and the recommendations presented in the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Rotorcraft Bird Strike Working Group (RBSWG) report.\3\
\3\ ARAC RBSWG Report, Rev. B, May 8, 2019, page 15, Section "Bird Mass" (ARAC RBSWG Report), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20RBSWG%20Final%20Report%20Rev.%20B.pdf.
The safety level obtained with the 2.2-lb bird strike requirement for transport category rotorcraft (as established in § 29.631) has been demonstrated in service to be sufficient. Similarly, the existing bird strike requirement with a 4.0-lb bird for type certificated propellers (established in § 35.36) has also been demonstrated in service to be sufficient. The bird ingestion requirements in JS4.2718 are not driven by either of these bird sizes. Therefore, the proposed bird impact protection requirement remains unchanged and will retain the proposed 2.2-lbs at the aircraft level, while maintaining propeller requirements at 4.0-lbs in § 35.36.
The FAA also considered the comments received on the bird deterrent system requirement in proposed JS4.2320(b), and the FAA concurs with not adopting this proposal. Although the FAA is aware of some research supporting the use of such devices, the FAA agrees the data is insufficient to mandate such a system at this time. The FAA encourages applicants such as Joby to consider voluntary implementation of these systems or similar bird deterrence mitigations, as good design practice.
The FAA also received comments that questioned whether the bird strike requirement should be listed under proposed JS4.2320, "Occupant Physical Environment," since as written, it applies to more than just the occupant physical environment. The FAA agrees with these comments. The bird strike requirement placed in proposed JS4.2320 was intended and described in the notice as an aircraft-level requirement. Therefore, the FAA did not adopt proposed JS4.2320(b) and instead placed some of the requirements from proposed JS4.2320(b) into a new JS4.2311, "Bird Strike" in Subpart D, "Design and Construction," to reinforce its intent as a general, aircraft-level requirement.
Lastly, several commenters expressed concern with flocking bird strikes that could affect multiple engines at the same time and recommended this be addressed by the ingestion requirements in JS4.2718(a). The FAA notes that the airworthiness criteria in Subpart H apply to each single engine used in the aircraft distributed propulsion system. The requirements in JS4.2718(a) address ingestion from likely sources such as foreign objects, birds, ice, and hail, and are intended to capture engine effects from any ingestion source determined to be applicable to the Joby electric engine design. Common cause effects across multiple engines will be addressed under the applicable aircraft-level requirements, including § 23.2510, so no change to the engine airworthiness criteria is necessary.
Fire and High Energy Protection
Fire and High Energy Protection
The FAA received and reviewed comments from Diamond Aircraft, EASA, GAMA, JCAB, Lilium, MTLS, Odys, Overair, TCCA, and Volocopter requesting that the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to fire and high energy protection on the Model JAS4-1.
Several commenters recommended the FAA revise Sec. § 23.2325 and 23.2270 to protect against fires in baggage and cargo compartments propagating and creating an unsafe condition. The commenters suggested incorporating requirements similar to those in EASA SC-VTOL.2270, and further recommended clarifying proposed § 23.2325 by removing the references to part 23 airplane certification levels.
The FAA agrees with the need to mitigate the risk of fires in baggage and cargo compartments, commensurate with the intended level of safety for the Model JAS4-1. The FAA reviewed the baggage and cargo compartment fire protection requirements in parts 23 and 27, the intended operational uses of the Model JAS4-1, and the EASA SC-VTOL requirements. The proposed airworthiness criteria did not require the design to alert the pilot of a fire in a baggage or cargo compartment, or require these compartments be constructed of or lined with fire resistant materials to protect the aircraft and occupants if the pilot was unaware of a baggage or cargo compartment fire. However, part 27 contains requirements to protect rotorcraft occupants from the risk of fire in a baggage compartment through the use of flame and fire resistant materials in its construction. The FAA revised proposed § 23.2325 (now JS4.2325) by removing the part 23 airplane certification levels. The FAA also added JS4.2325(e) requiring that the Model JAS4-1 baggage and cargo compartments be constructed of or lined with fire resistant materials, similar to § 27.855(a)(2), or be equipped with a fire or smoke detection system to allow the pilot to take immediate action to land, or be located where a fire would be visible to the pilots and accessible for the manual extinguishing of a fire, which adopts some elements of SC-VTOL.2270.
A commenter recommended the FAA revise proposed § 23.2325 to be more generic by specifying performance-based safety objectives. The FAA does not agree, as the revisions to proposed § 23.2325 (now JS4.2325) discussed previously are specific to the Model JAS4-1.
The FAA received comments recommending retaining the language in § 23.2330 of "designated fire zone" in lieu of the proposed JS4.2330 "fire zone." The term "fire zone" includes designated fire zones and new fire zones developed to address fire threats from new technologies. Much of existing guidance is defined for designated fire zones, which assume a fire involving kerosene or aviation gasoline. Other terms will be determined by the applicant, including designated fire zones, to distinguish between different types of fire zones and the fire threat that exists in those zones. The difference in language does not impose requirements beyond the intent of part 23, and also allows new fire zones to be established for aircraft using non-conventional propulsion and energy supply. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
The FAA received a comment to align the language in JS4.2330(a) and JS4.2330(b) ("fire zone") with the language in SC-VTOL.2330 ("designated fire zone"). As discussed above, the FAA has moved away from using the term "designated fire zone." EASA SC-VTOL.2330(a) is broader than JS4.2330(a) and includes additional components by applying to "flight critical systems" instead of only "flight controls." Although JS4.2330 is not as broad as EASA SC-VTOL.2330(a) as far as the scope of components, it is broader with respect to the types of fire zones that those components must address, by using the term "fire zone" instead of "designated fire zone." Protection of flight critical systems other than flight controls and ensuring CSFL after a fire or release of stored energy are addressed in JS4.2440 and § 23.2510.
The FAA received multiple comments to add survivable emergency landing fire protection requirements to § 23.2325. The FAA disagrees as this is covered by JS4.2430(a)(6). No changes are necessary as a result of these comments.
The FAA received a comment to add a requirement to JS4.2335 to minimize the risk of electrical shock to the crew, passengers, service, and maintenance personnel similar to the requirement in § 27.610(d)(2). This concern is adequately addressed by proposed JS4.2335(b), which requires the appropriate protection against hazardous effects caused by accumulation of electrostatic charge. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA also received a comment to revise JS4.2335(b) to require protection against catastrophic and hazardous effects. The proposed airworthiness criteria state that the aircraft must be protected from hazardous effects, which represent the minimum hazard level that must be addressed; by definition, this requires that catastrophic effects must also be addressed. No changes are necessary as a result of this comment.
The FAA received comments questioning proposed JS4.2440 in lieu of requiring compliance with § 23.2440 for powerplant fire protection. JS4.2440 is more performance-based, allowing for all powerplant related fire protection concerns to be covered by a singular airworthiness criteria. No changes are necessary as a result of this comment.
The FAA received comments recommending replacing the term "powerplant system" in JS4.2440 with "powerplant" or "powerplant installation." The FAA does not concur as the proposed terminology is consistent with § 23.2410. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
Propulsion Safety and Integration
Propulsion Safety and Integration
The FAA received comments from Airbus, ASDIA, EASA, GAMA, Hartzell, JCAB, Lilium, Odys, Overair, TCCA, Rolls-Royce, Volocopter, and an individual commenter requesting that the FAA revise, remove, or clarify the proposed airworthiness criteria related to propulsion safety and integration on the Model JAS4-1.
Proposed JS4.2405(d) specifies "extremely remote" as an acceptable probability of failure for power or thrust control systems, assuming manual backup capability. Several commenters stated that reliance on manual backup control of power or thrust on distributed propulsion powered-lift aircraft is unlikely to be acceptably achievable to ensure CSFL, and that failure of the propulsion control system is potentially catastrophic. Commenters also stated that specifying the power or thrust control system failure probability as extremely remote may be inconsistent with the extremely improbable requirement in JS4.2135.
The FAA agrees the airworthiness criteria should not specify an acceptable failure probability for power or thrust controls systems on a distributed propulsion powered-lift. Additionally, the FAA agrees that control of distributed propulsion powered-lift, using manual control of individual engines and propellers, should not be assumed. The FAA revised JS4.2405 by not adopting proposed paragraph (d). The appropriate hazard classification and failure probability for power or thrust control systems will be determined using the aircraft-level system safety process in § 23.2510, as well as JS4.2135, if controllability is affected.
The FAA received a comment that JS4.2405(b) and § 23.2410(a) contradict one another, with the suggestion to remove the phrase "if CSFL cannot be ensured, the hazard has been minimized" from § 23.2410(a). The FAA disagrees. JS4.2405 establishes the safety objective for power or thrust control systems, whereas § 23.2410 is applicable to all powerplant systems and permits minimization of the hazard in limited cases. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
Multiple commenters recommended the FAA replace proposed JS4.2405 (power or thrust control systems) and JS4.2425 (powerplant operational characteristics) with a requirement to comply with § 23.2405 (automatic power or thrust control systems) and 23.2420 (reversing systems), or otherwise address those systems under the safety analysis requirements of § 23.2510. Commenters also recommended the airworthiness criteria be revised to allow the propulsion-control system to be evaluated along with the flight control system within the aircraft-level safety analyses required by § 23.2510. The FAA does not agree with these recommendations and notes that § 23.2405 and 23.2420 are not limited to functions defined in former § 23.904 and 23.933, as discussed in the preamble to part 23 amendment 23-64.\4\ As noted previously, the FAA agrees that for the Model JAS4-1, the engines and propellers should be considered part of the flight control system, to include at a minimum all equipment and systems used for control of pitch, roll, yaw, and vertical motion.
Furthermore, the subsystem analysis required by JS4.2405 for the engine power or thrust control system does not relieve the applicant from aircraft-level requirements such as JS4.2300, § 23.2500, or 23.2510 when incorporated into a system such as the flight control system. Conversely, specific subsystem requirements, such as JS4.2405, are not imposed on other subsystems that make up a higher-level system simply because they become part of a higher-level system. The FAA did not change the proposed criteria as a result of these comments; however, as noted previously, references to the "reverser system" in proposed JS4.2405 have not been adopted because that system is not applicable to the Model JAS4-1.
\4\ 81 FR 96639 (Dec. 30, 2016).
One commenter requested that the FAA include tilting systems in proposed JS4.2405(a). As stated in the preamble of the notice of proposed airworthiness criteria, JS4.2405 addresses nacelle rotation, which encompasses tilting systems as well as systems in which the nacelle is attached to a movable lifting surface. No changes were made to the criteria.
Multiple commenters requested the FAA consider modifying JS4.2425(b), "Powerplant Operational Characteristics," to include wording from SC-VTOL.2425(b) that would only require inflight engine shutdown and restart capability if the safety benefits outweigh the hazards. Another commenter requested clarity on JS4.2425, which requires a means for shutdown and restart of the powerplant within an established operational envelope. It does not prohibit procedures or control logic that would restrict engine restart under certain conditions. The FAA disagrees with modifying the criteria. The FAA will address the requirements of appropriate shutdown and restart procedures through the aircraft flight manual limitations and operating procedures. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
One commenter suggested the FAA change JS4.2430(a)(1) to include "control and management systems" along with energy storage and supply systems. The FAA agrees that battery control and management systems are covered by JS4.2430(a)(1) in addition to § 23.2525, but do not consider a change necessary as the FAA considers the term "energy storage and supply systems" to include battery control and management systems. The FAA received another comment requesting to remove § 23.2525(b) as it was duplicative to JS4.2340(a)(1). The FAA does not agree with this proposal and made no changes from the comment as § 23.2525 addresses required power for intended operations for all aircraft systems that use the electrical storage system, whereas JS4.2430(a)(1) contains propulsion criteria that ensures the independence between multiple electrical storage systems providing electrical power to the propulsion system.
Commenters requested the FAA clarify "where the exposure to lightning is likely" in JS4.2430(a)(2), which they believe could be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation suggested by commenters is to consider "likely" as it applies to areas of the aircraft where lightning may strike, while another interpretation is in reference to operating environments where lightning is likely. The FAA agrees with this concern and has revised the airworthiness criteria by removing the phrase "where the exposure to lightning is likely." The FAA notes that JS4.2430(a)(2) and § 35.38 assume the aircraft will be exposed to lightning regardless of any environmental operating limitations and require protection of the energy system from catastrophic events. The applicant will show compliance with JS4.2430(a)(2) for the Model JAS4-1 consistent with other type certificated products by identifying areas of the powered-lift where direct attachment of lightning is "likely," along with evaluating the resulting effects.
The FAA received a comment asking the FAA to consider the failure due to overload of the landing system in JS4.2430(a)(6). The Model JAS4-1 is not required to address specific failures due to overload of the landing system since its landing system is not located near its energy storage systems. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
The FAA received a comment requesting that airworthiness criteria be added to protect occupants from possible hazards from the energy systems. The FAA notes that proposed JS4.2430(a)(6), as written, covers this and therefore did not make changes as a result of this comment.
The FAA also received a comment recommending that JS4.2430(a)(6) be expanded to include minimizing hazards to emergency service responders in addition to occupants. The FAA concurs with this suggestion and adds first responders to the airworthiness criteria.
Commenters requested the FAA explain the reservation of proposed JS4.2430(a)(7) and JS4.2430(c)(2). A commenter also recommended the FAA adopt EASA SC-VTOL.2430(a)(7) and add it as JS4.2430(a)(7) to ensure appropriate power quality within the energy system. The FAA did not incorporate the requirements from 23.2430(a)(7), which are similar to the requirements from EASA SC-VTOL.2430(a)(7), or (c)(2) into the Model JAS4-1 proposed criteria, and instead listed them as "Reserved," because they cover physical contamination of stored energy. Stored electrical energy is not susceptible to physical contamination in the way that convention fuel is. Damaged or failed electrical storage and distribution systems may prevent delivery of stored electrical energy to an intended load, which is a different condition than contaminated energy. The FAA notes these concerns are covered by uninterrupted energy supply and fluctuation requirements under JS4.2430(a)(4). To avoid confusion, the FAA did not adopt the proposal to "reserve" paragraphs JS4.2430(a)(7) and (c)(2) and renumbered (c)(3) accordingly.
The FAA received a comment that likely hazards for energy systems are not limited to temperature influences as mentioned in JS4.2430(b)(2). The FAA agrees and did not adopt the qualifier "due to unintended temperature influences" in these final airworthiness criteria.
Several commenters suggested clarification on the application of system safety requirements, propulsion requirements, and flight control system requirements due to the integration of these functions on the aircraft. The commenters questioned whether power or thrust control system requirements need to be applied to flight control systems or if flight control system requirements need to be applied to power or thrust control systems. The FAA concurs with the commenters' request to consider the engines and propellers part of the flight control system. The flight control system includes, at a minimum, all equipment and systems used for control of pitch, roll, yaw, and vertical motion. The FAA notes that the subsystem analysis required by JS4.2405 for the engine power or thrust control system does not relieve the applicant from higher-level requirements such as those in JS4.2300, § 23.2500, or § 23.2510, when engine or thrust control systems are incorporated into a higher-level system such as the flight control system. Conversely, specific subsystem requirements such as JS4.2405 would not be imposed on other subsystems that make up a higher-level system simply because they become part of that higher-level system. The safety requirements in § 23.2510 apply at the aircraft level to the integrated functions of all systems on the aircraft, in addition to specific system requirements such as JS4.2300 and JS4.2405.
Several commenters expressed concern regarding the appropriateness of the system-level safety objectives in proposed JS4.2405 and § 23.2425 for such highly integrated systems. The commenters suggested JS4.2405 and JS4.2425 are not necessary, since compliance with § 23.2510 can require the applicant to define both system and aircraft level safety objectives.
The FAA recognizes there may be inconsistencies between safety objectives required at the powerplant installation level and those at the aircraft level, but notes this is the case for type certificated airplanes and rotorcraft. Existing powerplant rules define a minimum level of safety that permits certification of a broad range of products for single and multi-engine aircraft. One common requirement for powerplant installations has been the "no single failure" concept, which is practically applied given the number of engines installed. This concept remains critical even for highly integrated and distributed powerplant systems. Aircraft level safety objectives may not drive the level of safety typically provided in a powerplant installation, such as isolation between all engines on a multi-engine aircraft with more than two engines, so the powerplant requirements establish a minimum safety objective that may not always align with those at the aircraft level. As powered-lift and distributed propulsion systems evolve, there may be less need to capture powerplant installation unique safety requirements. Until then, the FAA will use JS4.2405 to capture those requirements for the Model JAS4-1 and ensure the powerplant installation level of safety is appropriate regardless of the aircraft level safety objectives.
Multiple commenters requested clarification regarding the definition of "energy" and the instances in the criteria where liquid fuel is still relevant, despite the consideration of electric propulsion systems. The term "fuel" is used in part 23 and includes any form of energy used by an engine or powerplant installation, such as provided by carbon-based fuels or electrical potential.\5\ The FAA recognizes that using the term "fuel" instead of "energy" has implied the criteria are limited to non-fossil-fuel-based propulsion systems and is inconsistent with language used by other airworthiness authorities. As such, the FAA has replaced the term "fuel" with "energy" throughout these Model JAS4-1 airworthiness criteria. The FAA notes that "energy" includes any form of energy, including carbon-based fuels, electrical potential, and other means of energy storage or power generation for propulsion.
\5\ 81 FR 96641 (Dec. 30, 2016).
Several commenters requested that the FAA revise proposed JS4.2400(b) to clarify that the Model JAS4-1 engines and propellers will not be individually issued type certificates, but rather approved under the aircraft's type certificate, and as such, any requirements mentioning the "type certificate" should be excluded. The FAA agrees and has revised JS4.2400(b) to remove the requirement that each engine and propeller installed on the Model JAS4-1 have a type certificate.
The FAA received comments to add "propeller" to JS4.2400(c) and specifically mention "propeller vibration" in JS4.2400(c)(4). The FAA does not agree. Powerplant installation as defined in JS4.2400(a) includes all components for propulsion, which includes propellers. Thus, propeller vibration and fatigue are covered by the requirement in JS4.2400(c)(4). No changes are necessary as a result of the comments.
The FAA received a comment to distinguish between airplane and engine hazards in JS4.2400(e). The requirement in JS4.2400(e) addresses powerplant components at the aircraft level. Engines are one of many powerplant components installed at the aircraft level, each of which must meet any limitations or installation instruction provided with that component or be shown to not to create a hazard. Engine specific hazards for the Model JS4-1 are found in subpart H of the airworthiness criteria. The FAA disagrees that the distinction requested by the commenter is necessary, and no changes were made as a result of this comment.
The FAA received comments requesting the FAA either remove § 23.2525(c) and modify JS4.2430(a)(3) to explicitly include energy storage systems, or revise § 23.2525(c) to remove the primary source failure consideration. The FAA disagrees. Section 23.2525 addresses required power considering the failures and malfunctions of the primary source at the aircraft level, whereas the requirements in JS4.2430(a)(3) are specific to energy systems used for propulsion. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
System Safety
System Safety
The FAA received and reviewed comments from ASDIA, AIBOT, Airbus, ALPA, EASA, End State Solutions, GAMA, Lilium, Odys, Vertical Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, TCCA, UKCAA, Volocopter, and individual commenters requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to system safety and cybersecurity requirements for the Model JAS4-1.
Several commenters cited differences between EASA's SC-VTOL and the proposed FAA airworthiness criteria for the Model JAS4-1 with regard to EASA's creation of a "Category Enhanced" set of requirements. EASA included a structural requirement in SC-VTOL.2250, "Design and construction principles," that for Category Enhanced a single failure must not have a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft. The FAA acknowledges that the airworthiness criteria for the Model JAS4-1 as a special class aircraft differ from the requirements in EASA's SC-VTOL, which is a set of generalized requirements intended to cover a class of aircraft. The FAA's long-standing technical practice manages risk due to structural failures through the use of critical or life-limited parts, which mitigates any need to address potential catastrophic structural failure modes under the system safety requirements of § 23.2510. While this practice differs from that of EASA's approach, the FAA finds both approaches comparable and acceptable for risk mitigation. As discussed previously, the FAA revised proposed § 23.2250(c) (now JS4.2250(c)) to add a requirement that single failures must not result in a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft.
One commenter requested the FAA adopt language from § 29.953(a)(2) to require that the energy system allow power to be supplied to each powerplant through a system independent of those parts of each system supplying energy to other powerplants. The FAA does not concur that this addition is necessary or appropriate. Proposed JS4.2430(a)(1) and (a)(3) were derived from § 27.953 for multi-engine normal category rotorcraft and § 23.953(a) for multi-engine normal category airplanes and are appropriate to address the issue of energy loads required for propulsion for the Model JAS4-1. The FAA notes that these sections capture the intent of what the commenter seeks to address by incorporating § 29.953, which is applicable to transport category rotorcraft. Section 23.2525(c) ensures power remains available for essential loads to supply other critical systems.
Several commenters identified that these criteria do not include specific failure condition probability targets or required development assurance level criteria and requested that they be included with appropriate rationale. The FAA does not agree, as existing aircraft airworthiness standards (parts 23, 25, 27, and 29) also do not prescribe specific failure condition probability targets or development assurance level criteria. This guidance may be found in advisory circulars or industry consensus standards, which provide one means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the regulatory requirements. These means will likely need to be modified to consider powered-lift designs such as the Model JAS4-1.
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