88 FR 1932 Safety Management Systems
The FAA proposes to update and expand the requirements for safety management systems (SMS) and require certain certificate holders and commercial air tour operators to develop and implement an SMS. This proposed rule would extend the requirement for an SMS to all certificate holders operating under the rules for commuter and on-demand operations, commercial air tour operators, production certificate (PC) holders that are holders or licensees of a type certificate (TC) for the same product, and holders of a TC who license out that TC for production. The FAA also proposes this rule in part to address a Congressional mandate as well as recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and two Aviation Rulemaking Committees (ARCs). Additionally, the proposed rule would more closely align the United States with Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. This proposed rule is intended to improve aviation safety by requiring organizations to implement a proactive approach to managing safety.
This document is proposed. It may have been replaced. Check the official source before relying on it.
Vol. 88
Wednesday,
No. 7
January 11, 2023
Part VI
14 CFR Parts 5, 21, 91, et al.
Safety Management Systems; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 / Proposed Rules DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No.: FAA-2021-0419; Notice No. 23-05] RIN 2120-AL60
[Docket No.: FAA-2021-0419; Notice No. 23-05] RIN 2120-AL60
Safety Management Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to update and expand the requirements for safety management systems (SMS) and require certain certificate holders and commercial air tour operators to develop and implement an SMS. This proposed rule would extend the requirement for an SMS to all certificate holders operating under the rules for commuter and on-demand operations, commercial air tour operators, production certificate (PC) holders that are holders or licensees of a type certificate (TC) for the same product, and holders of a TC who license out that TC for production. The FAA also proposes this rule in part to address a Congressional mandate as well as recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and two Aviation Rulemaking Committees (ARCs). Additionally, the proposed rule would more closely align the United States with Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. This proposed rule is intended to improve aviation safety by requiring organizations to implement a proactive approach to managing safety.
Dates
DATES: Send comments on or before March 13, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2021-0419 using any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Addresses
• Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these comments, without edit, including any personal information the commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For Further Information Contact
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this action, contact Scott Van Buren, Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention, AVP-4, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Room 300 East, Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202) 494-8417; mail [email protected].
Supplementary Information
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This NPRM
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits II. Authority for This Rulemaking III. Purpose of This Rulemaking IV. Background
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committees
B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
I. Executive Summary
C. Safety Management System Rulemaking Efforts
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act
E. International Movement Toward SMS V. Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
B. General Requirements and Definitions
C. Components of Safety Management Systems
D. Implementation of SMS
E. Proposed Changes to Sections 119.8, 91.147, 21.135, and 21.147
F. Scalability
G. Examples of Real World Scenarios
H. Data Reporting and Protection VI. Guidance Material
A. Guidance for Aviation Service Providers
B. Guidance for Design and Production Approval Holders VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation IX. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
B. Confidential Business Information
C. Request for Comments
D. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
AC--Advisory Circular ACSAA--Aircraft Certification and Accountability Act ANPRM--Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ARC--Aviation Rulemaking Committee CBI--Confidential Business Information CFR--Code of Federal Regulations EASA--European Union Aviation Safety Agency FAA--Federal Aviation Administration FOIA--Freedom of Information Act ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization IRFA--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis LOA--Letter of Authorization NAICS--North American Industry Classification System NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board OMB--Office of Management and Budget PC--Production Certificate RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act RIA--Regulatory Impact Analysis SBA--Small Business Administration SMS--Safety Management System TC--Type Certificate U.S.C.--United States Code
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This NPRM
A safety management system (SMS) provides an organization-wide approach to identifying safety hazards, assessing, and managing safety risk, and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. An SMS provides a set of decision-making processes and procedures that can improve safety by assisting an organization in planning, organizing, directing, and controlling its aviation-related business activities. Currently, the SMS requirements of part 5 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) apply only to air carriers certificated under part 119 and conducting operations in accordance with part 121 (part 121 operators). In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes to expand the applicability of the SMS requirements to include additional entities in an effort to enhance safety, respond to a Congressional mandate, and more closely align the FAA's SMS requirements with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 19.
A. Purpose of This NPRM
Historically, the approach to aviation safety was based on the reactive analysis of past accidents and the introduction of corrective actions to prevent the recurrence of those events. An SMS, however, helps organizations to proactively identify potential hazards in the operating environment, analyze the risks of those hazards, and mitigate those risks to prevent an accident or incident. In 2015, the FAA promulgated 14 CFR part 5, which required part 121 operators to develop and implement SMS and set out the basic requirements for those systems. The FAA believes that the next step in improving aviation safety is to extend SMS requirements to additional organizations that play a critical role in the design, manufacturing, and operation of aircraft (i.e., part 119 certificate holders operating under part 135, Letter of Authorization (LOA) holders operating commercial air tours under § 91.147, and certain certificate holders under part 21).
These organizations are in the best position to prevent future incidents and accidents because they are closest to the hazards, and they know the most about their operations and products. An SMS provides a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to proactively identify hazards and manage safety risk. With implementation of an SMS, these organizations would be better able to develop and implement mitigations that are appropriate to their environment and operational structure. The FAA believes the implementation of SMS can be used to avoid or mitigate future accidents. Representative examples of accidents that the FAA believes could be avoided can be found in sections V.G. and VII.A of this proposal. This proposal is based on the recommendations of two previous Aviation Rulemaking Committees (ARCs),\1\ the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),\2\ and the Joint Authorities Technical Review of the Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System.\3\
\1\ The SMS ARCs are discussed in Section IV.A.
\2\ NTSB recommendations are discussed in Section IV.B.
\3\ Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations, Washington, October 11, 2019.
Further, the Aircraft Certification Safety and Accountability Act (Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 2309, hereafter referred to as ACSAA), enacted on December 27, 2020, mandated the application of SMS regulatory requirements to holders of both a Type Certificate (TC) and a Production Certificate (PC) issued under part 21.\4\ ACSAA further mandated that the FAA include certain requirements in its implementing regulations. The FAA proposes amendments to part 5 in accordance with this legislation.
\4\ Section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA.
Lastly, requiring SMS for certain commercial operators, and design and manufacturers would more closely align the FAA's SMS requirements with ICAO Annex 19; therefore, this proposed rule would increase U.S. alignment with other civil aviation authorities that are also implementing SMS requirements in accordance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices.\5\
\5\ Several major civil aviation authorities have established or are in the process of establishing SMS requirements for air operators, air traffic management, airports, and maintenance organizations, including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Brazil, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. Fewer countries have design and manufacturing organizations and, therefore, they have not established SMS requirements for those entities. However, New Zealand, Japan, and EASA have established SMS requirements for design and manufacturing organizations.
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
An SMS requires four essential components--safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. Additionally, an SMS requires that an organization document the system itself and maintain any records produced under that system. In this NPRM, the FAA proposes to expand the applicability of the SMS requirements to include additional entities, add new requirements to part 5, and amend existing regulations in parts 5, 21, 91, and 119. Several of these proposed amendments respond to the statutory mandate in ACSAA.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to expand the applicability of part 5 beyond part 121 operators to include part 135 operators, § 91.147 air tour operators, and certain certificate holders under part 21. These entities would receive the greatest safety benefits of an SMS as they are best situated to prevent future incidents and aviation accidents.
In response to the statutory requirements in ACSAA, the FAA proposes to add a requirement for each SMS to include a code of ethics that applies to all employees and clarifies that safety is the highest priority. Consistent with ACSAA, the FAA also proposes to revise the existing requirement for a confidential employee reporting system by adding a provision to ensure that employees can report without concern of reprisal.
Additionally, the FAA proposes several amendments to part 5 that are intended to increase the effectiveness of SMS, including several new requirements. The FAA proposes to require organizations to develop a system description, which is a summary of aviation-related processes and activities and a description of interfacing persons that contribute to the safety of the organization's aviation-related products and services. The FAA proposes to add information that must be considered during the system analysis, which is conducted when a person applies safety risk management. Specifically, the FAA proposes to require persons to consider the interfaces of the system in conducting the system analysis. The FAA also proposes to require persons who identify hazards to notify interfacing persons who are best able to address or mitigate the hazard.
To account for these new requirements, the FAA proposes conforming amendments to the SMS documentation and recordkeeping requirements to ensure organizations document the system description and retain all communications concerning the notification of hazards to interfacing persons. Furthermore, the FAA proposes several amendments to part 5, including a revision to the definition of "hazard" to ensure it encompasses aviation incidents as well as accidents, the relocation of the definitions to the beginning of the subpart to facilitate readability of part 5, and the removal of all references to the term "certificate holder" to conform to the new applicability proposed by the rule. The FAA also proposes amendments to certain regulations in parts 21, 91, and 119 to conform with, and enable the implementation of, the proposed requirements in part 5.
The following table summarizes the proposed provisions and provides the proposed section(s) of the Federal Aviation Regulations that contains the provisions.
Table 1 provides a summary of the major provisions of this proposed rule.
Table 1--Summary of Major Provisions
Proposed 14 CFR Sec.
Provision affected Summary of proposed provision
Applicability of part 5 … 5.1, 21.55, 21.135, 21.147, Expand the applicability of part 5
91.147, and 119.8. (currently limited to part 121
operators) to make SMS requirements
applicable to part 135 operators, Sec.
91.147 air tour operators, and certain
holders of a TC \6\ and PC issued under
part 21 for the same product.\7\
Definition of "Hazard" … 5.3 \8\ … Revise the definition of "hazard" to
also mean conditions or objects with
the potential to cause or contribute to
an incident.
General Requirements … 5.5(b) … Add a new requirement to develop and
maintain a system description that
includes information about the aviation
products or services provided by the
person and a description of the
interfacing persons that contribute to
the safety of the person's products or
services.
Part 121 operators … 5.7(a) … Require part 121 operators to revise
their current SMS in accordance with
the new requirements of part 5 and to
submit revisions no later than 12
months after effective date of final
rule.
Applicants seeking to operate under part 5.7(b) … Require applicants seeking to operate
121. under part 121 to develop and implement
an SMS in accordance with part 5 and to
submit a statement of compliance as
part of the certification process.
Part 135 operators and Sec. 91.147 air 5.9(a) … Require part 135 operators and Sec.
tour operators. 91.147 air tour operators to develop
and implement an SMS in accordance with
part 5 and to submit a statement of
compliance no later than 24 months
after the effective date of final rule.
Applicants seeking to operate under part 5.9(b) … Require applicants seeking to operate
135 or Sec. 91.147. under part 135 or Sec. 91.147 to
develop and implement an SMS in
accordance with part 5 and to submit a
statement of compliance as part of the
certification or LOA process.
Holders of PC and TC for the same product 5.11 … Require any person that holds a PC and
TC \9\ issued under part 21 for the
same product to develop an SMS in
accordance with part 5; to submit an
implementation plan for FAA approval no
later than December 27, 2024; and to
implement the SMS no later than
December 27, 2025.
TC holders applying for a PC for same 5.13 … Require TC holders \10\ who apply for a
product. PC for the same product to develop an
SMS in accordance with part 5, to
submit an implementation plan for FAA
approval during the certification
process, and to implement the SMS no
later than one year after obtaining FAA
approval.
TC holders who have a licensing agreement 5.15(b) … Require TC holders, who have a licensing
to allow other persons to obtain a PC. agreement to allow other persons to
obtain a PC, to develop an SMS in
accordance with part 5; to submit an
implementation plan for FAA approval no
later than December 27, 2024; and to
implement the SMS no later than
December 27, 2025.
TC holders who enter into a licensing 5.15(c) … Require TC holders, who enter into a
agreement to allow other persons to licensing agreement to allow other
obtain a PC. persons to obtain a PC, to develop an
SMS in accordance with part 5, to
submit an implementation plan for FAA
approval when providing written
licensing agreements to the FAA, and to
implement the SMS no later than one
year after obtaining FAA approval.
Implementation plans … 5.17 … Require implementation plans filed under
Sec. § 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15 to
include a description of how the person
intends to comply with part 5, and for
the person to make available, upon
request, all necessary information and
data that demonstrates that the SMS has
been or will be implemented in
accordance with the implementation
plan.
Safety policy … 5.21(a)(7) … Add a new requirement for the safety
policy to include a code of ethics that
is applicable to all employees,
including management personnel and
officers, which clarifies that safety
is the organization's highest priority.
System analysis and hazard identification 5.53(b)(5) … Add a new requirement for the person
conducting the system analysis to
consider the interfaces of the system.
Safety performance monitoring and 5.71(a)(7) … Revise the requirement for a
measurement. confidential employee reporting system
by adding a provision to ensure that
employees can report without concern of
reprisal.
5.71(c) … Add a new requirement for holders of
both a TC and PC for the same product
to submit a summary of the confidential
employee reports to the FAA every 6
months.
Notification of hazards to interfacing 5.94 … Add a new section to: (1) require the
persons. person who identifies a hazard to
notify the interfacing person who, to
the best of their knowledge, could
address the hazard or mitigate the
risk; and (2) require procedures for
reporting and receiving hazard
information with interfacing persons.
SMS documentation … 5.95(c) … Add a new requirement for SMS
documentation to include the system
description.
SMS records … 5.97(d) … Add a new requirement for persons to
retain records of all communications
provided under new § 5.94 for a
minimum of 24 consecutive calendar
months.
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits
\6\ As discussed in Section V.A.3 of the preamble, the FAA considers a licensee of a TC to be equivalent to a holder of a TC. For purposes of this table, each reference to "TC holder" or "holder of a TC" is intended to encompass "licensee of a TC." Thus, part 5 would also apply to a person who holds a PC and is a licensee of a TC for the same product.
\7\ Part 5 would also apply to applicants seeking to operate under part 135 or § 91.147, and to an applicant for a PC who is the holder or licensee of a TC for the same product.
\8\ The definitions and general requirements currently exist in Sec. § 5.5 and 5.3, respectively. The FAA proposes to relocate the definitions to § 5.3 and the general requirements to § 5.5.
\9\ See footnote 7.
\10\ See footnote 7.
The FAA estimated quantified annualized costs of $51.3 million using a 7 percent discount rate over a 5-year period of analysis. The costs represent resources to develop and implement an SMS. Mitigation costs to reduce or eliminate any hazards identified by an SMS, which are yet to be identified and thus unknown, are not quantified in the analysis. The FAA evaluated benefits qualitatively. The benefits are the value that would result from avoided fatalities, injuries, aircraft damage, and investigation costs. Please see Section VII. for more information.
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
In 2010, Congress mandated that the FAA conduct rulemaking to require part 121 operators to implement an SMS in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2366).\11\
\11\ See § 215(a).
Subsequently, Congress enacted section 102(a)(1) of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (Pub. L. 116-260; 134 Stat. 2309, hereafter referred to as ACSAA), on December 27, 2020. Section 102, titled "Safety Management Systems," requires the FAA to initiate a rulemaking to require manufacturers that hold both a TC and a PC issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44704 have an SMS consistent with Standards and Recommended Practices established by ICAO and contained in Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), for such systems. Section 102 of ACSAA requires the implementing regulations to include a confidential employee reporting system through which employees can report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents, without concern for reprisal for reporting, and a code of ethics. This rulemaking proposes regulations in accordance with those requirements.
Additionally, given this clear Congressional support for SMS as a safety concept, the FAA is proposing to use its discretion under the following authorities to proactively extend SMS requirements to part 119 certificate holders authorized to operate under part 135 and LOA holders operating under § 91.147.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the Administrator to promulgate regulations and rules.
This rulemaking is also promulgated under 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) ("The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security"); 44701(a)(2)(A) ("The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards in the interest of safety for inspecting, servicing, and overhauling aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances"); 44702(a) ("The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may issue airman certificates, design organization certificates, type certificates, production certificates, airworthiness certificates, air carrier operating certificates, airport operating certificates, air agency certificates, and air navigation facility certificates"); and 44704(a)(1) ("The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
issue a type certificate for an aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller, or for an appliance specified under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection when the Administrator finds that the aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is properly designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and minimum standards"). Additionally, this rulemaking is consistent with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 44701(d)(1)(A) ("When prescribing a regulation or standard under [49 U.S.C. chapter 447], the Administrator shall consider the duty of an air carrier to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.").
Finally, 49 U.S.C. 44701(c) directs the Administrator to "carry out this chapter in a way that best tends to reduce or eliminate the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air transportation." This rulemaking is intended to require certain entities that are regulated under the foregoing statutory authorities to develop and maintain an SMS to improve the safety of their operations. The development and implementation of SMS may enhance safety in air transportation and design and manufacturing so that persons can proactively identify and mitigate safety hazards, thereby reducing the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air transportation consistent with the mandate in § 44701(c). For these reasons, the proposed regulations are within the scope of the FAA's authority and are consistent with Congress's mandate that the FAA exercise its authority to proactively--not just reactively--promote safe flight of civil aircraft and to reduce or eliminate hazards that could result in accidents in air transportation.
III. Purpose of This Rulemaking
III. Purpose of This Rulemaking
An SMS is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and ensuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk. An SMS is a management system integrated into an organization's operations that enforces the concept that safety should be managed with as much emphasis, commitment, and focus as any other critical area of an organization.
The purpose of an SMS is to reduce incidents, accidents, and fatalities by aiding organizations in identifying hazards and mitigating those hazards before they lead to an incident or accident. Anecdotal evidence from SMS voluntary program participants indicates that SMS improves the safety of organizations.\12\ Although the authors of a 2012 study by the Australian Transport Safety Board acknowledged the prevalence of earlier studies that were inconclusive, they ultimately concluded that "recent studies have demonstrated that well-implemented SMS, especially those where the organisation invests effort into the SMS, are associated with enhanced safety performance." \13\ Research by Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen \14\ suggests that the attention an SMS would bring to seemingly smaller events, or near accidents, could prevent catastrophes. Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen studied near accidents in dozens of companies across industries and in laboratory simulations.
They determined that multiple near accidents preceded and foreshadowed every disaster and business crisis they studied, and that most near accidents were ignored. The authors found that identifying near accidents and correcting root causes are good investments for an organization. Similarly, in examining large U.S. commercial airlines that operated from 1990 to 2007, Madsen, Dillon, and Tinsley \15\ found that for airlines to continue to improve safety they must attend to the yet undiscovered or unrecognized risks in the system without waiting for an accident to bring attention to them. Additionally, the FAA contends that expanding the implementation of SMS in the aviation industry would increase overall safety for each entity using an SMS, as well as requiring communication across the aviation industry with respect to identified hazards.
\12\ As described in the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the rule, for example, one participant noted that the compressed executive awareness time of new safety related issues resulted in formal management actions occurring in less than 90 days for low-risk issues and within hours for high-risk issues. Another participant noted that they have a seen a substantial drop in the major risk categories that they track.
\13\ Thomas, Dr. Matthew J.W.; A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Safety Management Systems, Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2012, p. 27. https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/4053559/xr2011002_final.pdf.
\14\ Tinsley, Catherine H. et al., How to Avoid Catastrophe. Harvard Business Review, Brighton, 2011. https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-to-avoid-catastrophe.
\15\ Madsen, Peter et al., Airline Safety Improvement Through Experience with Near-Misses: A Cautionary Tale. Risk Analysis, May 2016, Vol. 36, No. 5.
The FAA previously forecasted a reduction in fatalities as a result of implementing SMS for part 121 certificate holders.\16\ The FAA still expects an overall reduction in fatalities, however quantifying the effects of part 5 requirements on part 121 certificate holders cannot be done at this time due to inadequate data. The data available for 2020 and 2021 is both significantly reduced and atypical due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
\16\ See Section V (Regulatory Notices and Analysis) starting on page 1318 of 14 CFR part 5 final rule published January 8, 2015, 80 FR 1308.
Over the last few decades, accidents involving commercial aviation operators have decreased.\17\ Despite an overall reduction in accidents, the FAA has determined that many of the accidents involving part 135 and § 91.147 operators could have been effectively mitigated by the presence of an SMS. These accidents highlight the systemic improvement opportunities to safety as described in the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for this rulemaking. According to NTSB data, from 2015 to 2019, there were 215 accidents involving part 135 operators, with a total of 121 fatalities,\18\ as well as 33 accidents involving air tour operators operating under § 91.147, with a total of 16 fatalities.\19\ The FAA identified 35 of these accidents involving part 135 operators and four accidents involving § 91.147 operators which involved fatalities and serious injuries that could have been mitigated had those operators implemented an SMS. Additional accidents not involving fatalities or serious injuries may also have been avoided. The FAA also identified several accidents across parts 91, 121, and 135 involving design and production issues that resulted in fatalities and serious injuries that could have been mitigated or prevented if the design and manufacturing organizations involved had implemented an SMS.\20\ A full listing of each accident used to inform the analysis of this rulemaking (including a brief description of the accident, a quantified estimate of the probability of mitigation through the adoption of SMS, and a rationale for estimated probability) is included in Appendix A to the RIA.
\17\ U.S. Air Carrier Safety Data, https://www.bts.gov/content/us-air-carrier-safety-data. Accessed March 22, 2022.
\18\ National Transportation Safety Board. U.S. Civil Aviation Accident Rates. 2022. Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/Pages/research.aspx.
\19\ Data file of sightseeing accidents provided by the NTSB April 2020.
\20\ These accidents include those identified by NTSB accident numbers: DCA19MA086, ERA18LA199, DCA18MA142, ERA18FA120, DCA17FA021, WPR16FA153, DCA16FA199, ERA16FA185, WPR16FA055, DCA16FA013, CEN15MA290, ERA15FA254, and DCA15FA073.
Given the rapid development, growth, and increasing complexities of the airspace, the FAA believes that SMS requirements should extend to parties that play a critical role in the design, manufacturing, and operation of aircraft. ACSAA requires the FAA to include holders of both a TC and a PC among those organizations that should be required to implement an SMS. Applying SMS to commuter and on-demand air carriers, air tours, and the manufacturers responsible for design and production of products would continue to reduce incidents, accidents, and fatalities and improve safety in aviation by requiring these organizations to proactively identify hazards, assess risk of those hazards, and develop and implement mitigations, as necessary. The FAA anticipates that this systemic safety effort will have a measurable effect on the reduction in fatalities as described in the RIA for this rulemaking. ICAO, other civil aviation authorities, industry advisory groups, and the NTSB all agree that the use of an SMS improves safety. An SMS has been implemented by each part 121 operator, and many other organizations have implemented an SMS following the FAA's SMS Voluntary Program. The FAA has also implemented SMS within many of its own organizations. The FAA's own experience has shown that organizations that have an SMS may:
• Increase safety of products or services by identifying and addressing problems before they occur.
• Improve data-informed decision making to prioritize resource allocation.
• Enhance communication regarding safety by using common, consistent terminology within the organization and throughout the industry.
• Strengthen the organization's safety culture.
Further, expansion of the SMS requirements would increase U.S. alignment with other civil aviation authorities that are also implementing SMS requirements in accordance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices. With an SMS, a U.S. company would have an improved ability to operate internationally due to better alignment with ICAO standards and recommended practices. Furthermore, a U.S. company without an SMS could even be barred from doing business in a country where the civil aviation authority requires them to have an SMS.
To date, SMS requirements have mainly focused on internal identification and mitigation of risk within an organization. However, the FAA is proposing to augment these requirements to encourage a more collaborative approach in which persons required to have an SMS share hazard information with each other and work together to identify and address hazards and safety issues. To enable this more collaborative approach, this proposal includes requirements to share hazard information with other organizations, which are intended to ensure that relevant information is shared with the person in the best position to address the hazard. The expanded applicability and hazard information sharing among interfacing organizations would enable a network of organizations working collaboratively to manage risk, thereby enhancing the safety benefits of SMS by assuring that hazards are communicated and mitigated effectively.
IV. Background
IV. Background
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committees
The FAA chartered two ARCs composed of industry stakeholders to provide advice on implementing SMS in aviation regulations, including parts 21, 91, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145. The industry stakeholders on these ARCs included individual companies and associations representing operators, design and manufacturing organizations, repair stations, and training organizations. These ARCs expressed industry support for SMS and recommended that the FAA publish rules requiring use of SMS. 1. SMS ARC (2009)
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committees
On February 12, 2009, the FAA chartered the SMS ARC with membership from across the aviation industry to evaluate the public comments submitted in response to an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on potential rulemaking requiring certain part 21, 119, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145 certificate holders to develop an SMS \21\ and provide its recommendations regarding further action the agency should consider in developing and implementing SMS requirements.\22\
\21\ 74 FR 36414, July 23, 2009.
\22\ Safety Management System (SMS) Aviation Rulemaking Committee; Order 1110.152, Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/SMSARC-2122009.pdf (as of March 15, 2022).
In its report, the ARC recommended the FAA issue regulations on SMS and that those regulations apply to certificate holders under 14 CFR parts 21, 119, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145, as well as operators under 14 CFR part 91 subpart K. This broad applicability would more closely align with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices. The ARC, however, recommended phased promulgation of SMS regulations and that the FAA prioritize new SMS regulations based on the potential safety benefit, as well as industry experience and regulatory oversight readiness. The FAA addressed these recommendations by first focusing on part 121 by promulgating 14 CFR part 5 on January 8, 2015 and proposing a rule to require airports certificated under part 139 to implement an SMS. Although the SMS requirements in part 5 currently apply only to part 121 operators, the FAA explained in that rulemaking that part 5 was designed for broader application and the FAA intended for the SMS requirements to apply to other FAA-regulated entities in the future.\23\ The rulemakings implementing SMS for part 121 operators and airports certificated under part 139 are addressed in more detail in Section IV.C. of this NPRM preamble.
\23\ NPRM, "Safety Management Systems for Part 121 Certificate Holders," 75 FR 68224, 68232 (November 5, 2010).
When considering this proposed rule, the FAA explored applying part 5 SMS requirements to additional certificate holders and operators consistent with the ARC recommendations, as well as any certificate holders and operators required by ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices in ICAO Annex 19 (i.e., parts 21, 135, 141, 142, 145, and some operators under part 91). However, in this proposed rule the FAA is choosing to address the most impactful parts to which ICAO Annex 19 is applicable (part 135 [operators], part 21 [design and manufacturing], and § 91.147 [air tours]).
The ARC also recommended that the FAA provide additional protections for SMS safety information and proprietary data. As discussed in more detail in Section V.H., the FAA has addressed data protection in this proposal.
The ARC recommended alignment with the SMS framework developed by ICAO in Annex 19, which would facilitate SMS requirement compatibility with States actively engaged in developing and adopting their own SMS requirements. The FAA designed part 5 consistent with this recommendation.
The ARC recommended that the FAA recognize existing systems and processes. For instance, some operators have systems for internal auditing, employee reporting, and revising manuals, which could be leveraged in the development of their SMS. The FAA is incorporating this recommendation in this proposed rule by encouraging certificate holders and LOA holders to leverage their existing systems and processes to meet the requirements. In addition, the FAA is proposing guidance material that describes how existing systems and processes may align with SMS requirements.
Further, the ARC expressed concern regarding the potential impact of SMS requirements on small businesses. The FAA addressed this concern. Just as existing part 5 requirements are performance-based and scalable, each revision proposed in this NPRM is also intended to be scalable. Scalability is discussed further in Section V.F. of this NPRM preamble. In addition, the proposed guidance accompanying this NPRM should assist certificate holders in appropriately scaling the implementation of SMS to fit their operations. The guidance material is discussed further in Section VI. of this preamble. 2. Part 21 SMS ARC (2012)
The Part 21 SMS ARC, established on October 5, 2012,\24\ evaluated improvements to the effectiveness and efficiency of existing "certification procedures for products and parts," and the benefits of incorporating SMS in the design and manufacturing environment. The FAA received the ARC's final report in October 2014.\25\
\24\ 14 CFR 21/Safety Management Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee Charter. Available at: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/Part21ARC-10052012.pdf (visited March 15, 2022).
\25\ Part 21/Safety Management Systems (SMS) Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration: Recommendations on Certification Procedures for Products and Parts. October 5, 2014.
The ARC recommended establishing regulatory requirements for implementing SMS for design and production approval organizations that would be consistent with the part 5 requirements.\26\ The ARC recommended that SMS requirements apply to organizations that design or manufacture products (under a TC or a PC) and to those that design or manufacture articles (under a technical standard order authorization or parts manufacturer approval), or that make changes to products (under a supplemental type certificate) that could directly prevent continued safe flight and landing if they fail.\27\
\26\ At the time the ARC submitted its final report in 2014, the FAA had not finalized the proposed part 5 requirements. Part 5 became effective March 9, 2015.
\27\ Part 21/Safety Management Systems (SMS) Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration: Recommendations on Certification Procedures for Products and Parts, page 31. October 5, 2014.
The FAA analyzed the ARC's recommendation and developed an alternative (see Alternative 1 in Section VII.A.5.) to the current proposal that may have met the intent of the ARC's recommendation by extending SMS requirements beyond holders of both a TC and a PC for the same product. This alternative would require SMS for design and production approval holders who design or produce products typically used for compensation or hire with some exceptions (described in Alternative 1 in Section VII.A.5.). As part of this alternative, the FAA considered permitting design and production approval holders to apply to be excluded from part 5 requirements if the failure of the article or product alteration would have little or no impact on the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. After analyzing the costs and benefits, the FAA determined that there were costs to including these design and production approval holders, but was unable to estimate the magnitude of benefits. The analysis of this alternative is provided in Section VII.A.5. As a result, the FAA is not proposing to adopt the full scope of the ARC's recommendation in this NPRM at this time.
B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
The NTSB first recommended in 1997 that transportation organizations implement an SMS, and early recommendations were aimed at improving safety in the maritime industry. Since then, a number of NTSB investigations related to various modes of transportation, including aviation, have cited organizational factors contributing to accidents and have recommended SMS as a way to prevent future accidents and improve safety. The NTSB issued 18 recommendations regarding SMS for aviation organizations over a 15-year period, spanning 2007 through 2021.\28\ These recommendations covered commercial operations under 14 CFR parts 121 and 135, revenue passenger carrying business operations under part 91, and certificate holders under part 21. Eight of the 18 NTSB recommendations were issued to the FAA.\29\
\28\ NTSB Safety recommendations: A-07-010 (2007), A-09-016 (2009), A-09-089 (2009), A-09-098 (2009), A-09-106 (2009), A-12-062 (2012), A-12-063 (2012), A-14-105 (2014), A-14-106 (2014), A-16-036 (2016), A-19-028 (2020), A-19-036 (2019), A-19-038 (2019), A-20-025 (2020), A-21-007 (2021), A-21-013 (2021), A-21-014 (2021), and A-21-048 (2021).
\29\ NTSB Safety recommendations: A-07-010 (2007), A-09-089 (2009), A-09-016 (2009), A-16-036 (2016), A-19-028 (2020), A-21-013 (2021), A-21-014 (2021), and A-21-048 (2021).
The NTSB regularly publishes a Most Wanted List, which "highlights transportation safety improvements needed now to prevent accidents, reduce injuries, and save lives." \30\ The NTSB 2021-2022 Most Wanted List recommended that the FAA, "Require and Verify the Effectiveness of Safety Management Systems in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation Operations." \31\
\30\ 2021-2022 NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements, www.ntsb.gov/mwl.
\31\ 2021-2022, NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements, Require and Verify the Effectiveness of Safety Management Systems in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation Operations, https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/mwl-21-22/mwl-as-01.aspx.
C. Safety Management System Rulemaking Efforts
1. Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations
1. Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations
On July 23, 2009, the FAA published an ANPRM to solicit public comments on whether certain 14 CFR part 21, 119, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145 certificate holders, product manufacturers, applicants, and employers (product/service providers) should be required to develop an SMS.\32\ Subsequently, on August 1, 2010, Congress enacted the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2366), which directed the FAA to conduct rulemaking to "require all part 121 air carriers to implement a safety management system." \33\ To meet the rulemaking deadlines mandated by the Act, the FAA decided not to immediately address SMS for other product/service providers.\34\ The FAA limited the SMS rulemaking project to part 121 air carriers, issuing an NPRM on November 5, 2010, \35\ and subsequently withdrawing the ANPRM.\36\
\32\ ANPRM, "Safety Management Systems," 74 FR 36414. July 23, 2009.
\33\ See § 215(a).
\34\ See "Safety Management System; Withdrawal," 76 FR 14592. March 17, 2011.
\35\ 75 FR 68224.
\36\ See id.
On January 8, 2015, the FAA published the Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations Certificate Holders final rule (SMS for part 121 final rule) requiring operators authorized to conduct operations under part 121 to develop and implement an SMS to improve the safety of their aviation related activities.\37\ The final rule added part 5 to Title 14 of the CFR, creating the SMS requirements for part 121 certificate holders, modeled on the ICAO SMS framework in ICAO Annex 19 and consistent with the 2009 ARC recommendations. The requirements in part 5 were meant to be applicable to organizations of various sizes and complexities, as well as adaptable to fit the different types of organizations in the air transportation system and operations within an individual company. The final rule also modified 14 CFR part 119 to specify applicability and implementation of the new SMS framework in part 5 for part 119 certificate holders authorized to conduct operations under part 121. Part 121 operators met the requirement to have an SMS acceptable to the FAA by 2018. The FAA has seen continuous improvement in 121 operators' use of SMS to manage the safety of their operations and, therefore, is proposing to expand part 5 applicability with this rulemaking.
\37\ 80 FR 1308. The FAA published technical amendments on January 13, 2015 (80 FR 1584) and May 25, 2017 (82 FR 24009) to correct a date and a reference in the rule, respectively.
2. Safety Management Systems for Part 139 Airports
On July 14, 2016, the FAA published the "Safety Management System for Certificated Airports" supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking [(81 FR 45872)] (Airports SMS SNPRM). The Airports SMS SNPRM proposed to require airports that meet certain criteria to develop and implement an SMS in the airport's movement and non-movement areas. The FAA is working to finalize that rule.
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act
The Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents involving the Boeing 737 MAX resulted in several investigations, not only of the accidents, but also of the FAA's oversight and certification processes. One such investigation, convened by the FAA in April of 2019, was the Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System Joint Authorities Technical Review. The Joint Authorities Technical Review included representatives from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the FAA, and several foreign civil aviation authorities. One of the Joint Authorities Technical Review recommendations was that the FAA encourage applicants to have a system safety function, such as a safety management system, that is independent from their design organization.\38\
\38\ Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations. October 11, 2019.
Subsequently, on December 27, 2020, Congress enacted ACSAA, which set forth a variety of reforms intended to address certain safety standards relating to the aircraft certification process. Section 102 of ACSAA requires that the FAA promulgate rules to require holders of both a TC and a PC issued under 14 CFR part 21 to implement an SMS. ACSAA also establishes a timeline for those certificate holders to adopt an SMS (i.e., no later than four years after the date of enactment, December 27, 2024), and it establishes certain requirements for the rulemaking, including a confidential employee reporting system through which employees can report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents without concern for reprisal for reporting, and a code of ethics.
E. International Movement Toward SMS
E. International Movement Toward SMS
ICAO Annex 19, Safety Management, establishes a framework for member States to develop and implement SMS requirements within their State's rules. Several member States, including the U.S., started developing and implementing SMS requirements within their countries after Annex 19 First Edition was published in July 2013 and became applicable in November 2013.\39\ Annex 19 currently requires States to establish requirements for SMS for international commercial air transportation, design and manufacturing, maintenance, air traffic services, training organizations, and certified aerodromes, as well as SMS criteria for international general aviation operators of large or turbojet airplanes.
\39\ The Second Edition of Annex 19 was published in July 2016 and became applicable in November 2019.
Member States continue to make progress in developing, implementing, and maintaining requirements for SMS that are aligned with ICAO's SMS standards and recommended practices, including certificating authorities in Canada, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and Europe (European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)). In the EASA regulatory framework, SMS is mandatory for certificated operators of airplanes and helicopters authorized to conduct commercial air transportation. Additionally, as a result of recent EASA rulemaking efforts, SMS will also be applicable for continuing airworthiness of an aircraft and its components. The EASA also adopted a rule for design and production organizations (part 21), which will become applicable on March 7, 2023.\40\
\40\ European Union Aviation Safety Agency Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/203 of 14 February 2022.
FAA also notes that other civil aviation authorities and interested parties are initiating evaluations to determine the effects of SMS post implementation. Two evaluations of note are discussed as follows.
In 2019 Transport Canada Civil Aviation published an evaluation of the impact of SMS on aviation safety 10 years after it was mandated for airline operators, private operators, approved maintenance organizations that service airline operator aircraft, air navigation services, and aerodromes/airports/heliports.\41\ The evaluation findings were based on multiple lines of evidence, including a survey of nearly 1800 aviation industry stakeholders (operators, approved maintenance organizations, aerodromes), case studies involving eight enterprises and interviews. The evaluation found that many organizations have implemented policies and practices associated with an effective SMS, specifically, non-punitive reporting, executive commitment and hazard identification and mitigation. The evaluation found notable buy-in to SMS among those surveyed. Although accident trends declined over the 10-year evaluation period it was also noted that a lack of objective data limited ability to show safety improvement directly attributable to SMS because of the difficulty in separating other effects that may also benefit safety.
\41\ Evaluation of Safety Management Systems in Civil Aviation--Transport Canada, July 2019. Available at: https://tc.canada.ca/sites/default/files/2021-02/evaluation-safety-management-systems-civil-aviation.pdf.
A Griffith University (Queensland Australia) doctoral thesis paper evaluated the impact of SMSs on safety performance for commercial aviation operations using two case studies.\42\ Legislation in Australia for the implementation of an SMS for regular public transport Air Operator Certificate holders was mandated by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in 2009 with phased implementation to be complete by 2011.
\42\ The Impact of Safety Management Systems on Safety Performance: Commercial Aviation Operations--Griffith University thesis paper. April 2015. Available at: https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/367145.
The first case study examined SMSs in the international general aviation and charter operation sector while the second case study reviewed SMSs in the Australian airline sector. In the first case study, researchers conducted an analysis of de-identified Flight Safety Foundation general aviation and charter sector audit findings. A total of 7,625 audit findings were reviewed from 2011-2014 from a population of 117 operators. The determination of safety performance was not possible for this sample population using a conventional accident rate metric due to the lack of availability of flight departure data. However, the study concluded that safety performance had improved since SMS implementation, showing a uniform decrease in the number of negative audit findings. Although the study did not control for the number and thoroughness of audits performed during the years under study, the study did present qualitative findings by year and discipline, independent of the number of audits conducted. The study further concluded that a decrease in findings for the last two years of the study were likely due to the improvements brought about by growing and maturing safety management systems.\43\
\43\ Yeun, Richard Chee Kin, The Impact of Safety Management Systems on Safety Performance: Commercial Aviation Operations, Ph.D. Thesis (Queensland Australia: Griffith University, 2015), See table 6.5, pp 122-123. https://hdl.handle.net/10072/367145.
In the second case study, researchers conducted a review of airline SMSs in Australia by comparison of Civil Aviation Safety Authority safety audit indicators for the sampled population before and after the implementation of SMS. The study concluded that the empirical evidence indicates that SMSs improve the safety performance of commercial aviation operations. The study also showed that SMS safety assurance plays the most critical role in an effective SMS; its associated subcomponents of continuous improvement, safety performance monitoring and measurement, and management of change have the highest net influence of all the SMS components. FAA notes that the Griffith University study conclusions and multiple correlation analyses are based on a short timeframe (three years of fully implemented SMS) and study of longer timeframes involving more mature SMSs is desirable.
V. Discussion of the Proposal
V. Discussion of the Proposal
The FAA proposes changes to part 5 to further the safety of flights for compensation or hire and passenger carrying operations. To that end, the FAA considers that overall aerospace system safety would be increased by requiring entities beyond part 121 operators to implement SMS, including other operators that fly for compensation or hire and the designers and manufacturers of products used in the system. The FAA envisions these safety management systems to be scalable to the size and complexity of the organization, and to not be unduly burdensome. By requiring entities that span the disparate sectors of aviation from manufacturing and design to operations to implement an SMS, the FAA seeks to create a network of organizations that speak the same language of safety management and can better communicate with one another and share information about any hazards they identify during the course of their business. Although some part 121 operators may communicate with one another voluntarily at this time, the FAA considers that there would be greater safety benefit if all aviation organizations, from the manufacturer to the operator, were to communicate hazard information to one another. The FAA considers that the benefits of safety management systems are derived from each of the components of an SMS and that the proposed changes to part 5 would assist in maximizing the potential of an SMS to increase safety across the aerospace system.
A. Applicability
A. Applicability
Part 5 currently applies only to persons authorized to conduct operations under part 121. The FAA proposes to amend § 5.1 and expand the applicability of part 5 to: (1) any person authorized or applying to conduct operations under part 135 or § 91.147; (2) any person that holds or applies for a PC issued under part 21 for a product for which they are the TC holder or licensee; and (3) TC holders who license the TC for production.
Although the FAA recognizes the value of the variety of voluntary safety programs, their optional nature and lack of comprehensive application of all elements of part 5 may not yield as much safety benefit as a mandatory SMS that complies with all proposed requirements of part 5. Therefore, to ensure that the minimum standard is met, the FAA is proposing to broaden the application of part 5 SMS requirements. 1. Part 135 Operators
As described in Section III, the FAA identified a number of accidents involving part 135 operators which resulted in fatalities and serious injuries that could have been mitigated through SMS. These accidents involved both passenger-carrying and cargo-only operations. Each of these accidents stemmed from different circumstances; however, the accidents analyzed were a representative cross section of the overall circumstances that were present in the balance of total part 135 accidents that occurred. Therefore, the FAA considers that an SMS would have been effective in similar accidents among those not analyzed.
The FAA proposes to require all part 119 certificate holders authorized to operate under part 135 and applicants for those certificates to develop and implement an SMS that meets the part 5 requirements. This aligns the proposed part 5 applicability with ICAO Annex 19 and with other civil aviation authorities that generally do not differentiate between size and complexity of air carriers. SMS is necessary for safety of air transportation generally because anyone who engages in air transportation must understand the hazards associated with their operation, effectively assess the risks, and understand how to mitigate those risks. The identification of hazards through SMS may include analyzing the potential risk associated with crewmember fatigue when compounded by variations in individual 135 operations, such as scheduling variances, frequency of operations, distance, and number of pilots.\44\
\44\ See report from the Part 135 Pilot and Duty Rules Aviation Rulemaking Committee dated July 2, 2021, a copy of which has been placed in the docket for this rule.
The FAA considered excluding part 135 operators who use only one pilot-in-command in their operations from the SMS requirements. Approximately 31 percent (594) of the part 135 operators use one pilot-in-command. These operators have between 1 and 7 aircraft. Similar to most part 135 operators, these operators might also meet the size standard for small businesses (see Section VII.B for details). However, as all part 135 operators conduct air transportation of passengers and cargo, the FAA determined such exclusion would not be in the interest of safety as evidenced by the part 135 accidents discussed in Section III that could have been mitigated through an SMS (including those involving only one pilot-in-command).
As a fundamental matter, the flying public expects safe carriage from operators offering flight services for hire. Irrespective of whether an operator employs one pilot or a thousand, that company has the same responsibility to conduct safe operations. Part 135 operators employing just a single pilot are not immune to accident or serious injury; the FAA's review of NTSB reports from 2015 to 2020 showed that part 135 operators employing just a single pilot were involved in five accidents involving a fatality or serious injury. This record demonstrates that very small and single pilot part 135 operators continue to face insufficiently addressed safety hazards that cause the loss of life. More importantly, the FAA concluded that these operators could have used basic components of SMS, such as establishing safety policies, performing safety risk management to assess risk and develop controls, and using safety assurance to verify risk control effectiveness to address hazards that contributed to these accidents.
These SMS elements, which require the operator to proactively monitor its practices, procedures, and how it makes decisions, are especially important for small organizations Small organizations by definition have fewer people and, as a result, have fewer opportunities for checks and balances on decisions that can affect safety. SMS addresses this by requiring small operators to create a structure for proactively monitoring their decision-making processes and addressing deficiencies. Very small operators may implement SMS requirements differently than larger operators. For example, with respect to § 5.93, small operators will have fewer employees to communicate with than large operators where personnel may have a more narrow set of responsibilities and less awareness of all operations. At one end of the spectrum, a one-person operator would have a system for documenting their own hazard information, actions, mitigations, safety performance, etc. for future reference.
At the other end of the spectrum, a large organization would have a system capable of documenting and sharing information with larger groups of people. In particular, certain aspects of SMS such as developing more routine expectations for monitoring and responding to hazards may be particularly beneficial for smaller operators. The FAA requests comment regarding how SMS might present unique opportunities or challenges for smaller organizations.
The five accidents involving single-pilot part 135 operators between 2015 and 2020 resulted in 5 fatalities and 4 serious injuries.\45\ Appendix A of the RIA describes how SMS could help avoid similar accidents in the future. The following discussion describes three of those accidents and identifies how having an SMS could have addressed the hazards contributing to the accidents. In each of these cases, if the operator had invested in an appropriately scaled SMS program on the front end, it could have avoided property damage, injury, and loss of life on the back end.
\45\ NTSB accident numbers: CEN18FA215, ANC18LA046, ANC16FA017, ANC17TA015, and CEN17FA100.
According to the NTSB, the probable cause of accident CEN18FA215 was the pilot's decision to fly over the river at a low altitude and his failure to maintain clearance with wires during low-level flight. The FAA examined the effect SMS would be expected to have on this accident and determined that SMS would have enabled the operator to identify hazards along waterways. As a result of conducting safety risk management (Sec. § 5.51-5.55) the organization would develop a safety risk control that would help prevent the accident from occurring. Specifically, the risk control might have established a minimum altitude above known or presumed obstructions (§ 5.55(c)). The operator might have also established a policy or control that whenever the pilot is operating around wires, the pilot would mark the location of the wires on a map. This risk control would have helped to mitigate the risk of the pilot inadvertently flying into the wires because these additional controls would help to ensure the pilot's situational awareness regarding the location of the wires in relation to the aircraft. In this case, the pilot would monitor the safety performance (§ 5.71), by validating the location of the wires on the map and updating the information as appropriate. This is one way that the operator could verify that risk controls were appropriately applied and effective. In a small organization the operator could communicate (§ 5.93) the control to others in the organization face-to-face, via email, or other methods that the company regularly uses to communicate with its employees.
The probable cause of accident ANC18LA046 was the pilot's selection of an unsuitable takeoff area with unfavorable wind conditions, which resulted in the airplane's inability to maintain a climb. The FAA determined that the effect SMS would have had on this accident was similar to that of accident CEN18FA215. In this case, had the operator conducted safety risk management (Sec. § 5.51-5.55), it would likely have developed risk controls to ensure safer operations (§ 5.55(c)). For example, the operator could establish tools for a go/no-go decision customized for its operations. This could include special procedures specific to the environment or operations. Another risk control might be establishing procedures to ensure that the equipment is appropriate for the environment. Both of these controls would be documented using standard information tools already in use within the company. Conducting safety risk management could have included identifying and evaluating company approved unimproved landing areas to include ingress/egress routes and minimum acceptable weather performance limits could mitigate these hazards. In this case, safety performance monitoring (§ 5.71) might include periodic review of operations in non-standard environments to ensure that the controls provide the intended effect.
Similar to the previous example, the operator could communicate (§ 5.93) the control to others in the organization face-to-face, via email, or other methods that the company regularly uses to communicate with its employees.
The probable cause of accident ANC16FA017 was the pilot's inadvertent turn toward terrain that was higher-than-expected while trying to avoid poor visibility conditions and his subsequent attempt to clear terrain, which reduced the airspeed and led to the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall and spin was the probable cause of accident. The FAA determined that SMS would have had an effect on this accident. In this case, with an SMS, the operator would have conducted safety risk management (Sec. § 5.51-5.55), and it would likely have identified hazards with low visibility hazards and mountainous terrain. The operator might develop safety risk controls regarding route suitability (§ 5.55(c)). These risk controls could include setting higher alternative weather minimums and selection of alternative routes that are consistent with the aircraft's performance, along with training to support these risk controls. The operator would also monitor its safety performance (§ 5.71), by validating that the higher alternative weather minimums and alternative routes are appropriate mitigations. Similar to other examples, the operator could communicate (§ 5.93) the control to others in the organization face-to-face, via email, or other methods that the company regularly uses to communicate with its employees.
In addition to addressing risk in this segment of the part 135 population, the FAA considers that a part 119 certificate holder authorized to operate under part 135 with only one pilot-in-command receives the same privileges and authorization as any other size or complexity part 119 certificate holder authorized to operate under part 135, and should therefore be subject to the same requirements with regard to SMS. The FAA recognizes that the implementation of part 5 requirements, applicable to all part 135 operators, must remain scalable to the size and complexity of the organization. (For more information regarding scalability, please refer to Section V.F.).
Some part 119 certificate holders may be authorized to operate under both parts 121 and 135. The proposal would extend the SMS requirements to operations conducted by those combination certificate holders authorized to operate under both parts 121 and 135. Certificate holders that already have an SMS in place for only their part 121 operations would have to implement SMS for their part 135 operation. 2. Section 91.147 Letter of Authorization Holders
The FAA is proposing to extend the SMS requirements to all holders and applicants of LOAs issued under § 91.147 to enhance the safety of commercial air tour operations. Most operations for compensation or hire are conducted pursuant to a part 119 certification, however, nonstop commercial air tours operated under a § 91.147 LOA conduct operations for compensation or hire without a part 119 certificate. Because air tours operated under § 91.147 carry passengers for compensation or hire, the FAA is proposing to apply part 5 to these operations.
The FAA considered excluding some smaller § 91.147 LOA holders from this proposal (those conducting fewer than 100 flights per year). The FAA does not collect data on number of flights conducted under § 91.147 LOAs; however, approximately 54 percent (373) have only one aircraft registration. These LOA holders might also meet the size standard for small businesses, but the FAA does not have data to make this determination either (see Section VII.B for details). Consistent with the approach proposed for part 135 operators who use only one pilot-in-command in their operations, the FAA believes such an exception would not meet the safety objective.
FAA review of NTSB accident reports from 2015 to 2020 identified one accident involving a fatality or serious injury in the segment of § 91.147 LOA holders conducting fewer than 100 flights per year. As discussed in Section V.A.1, small operators bear the same responsibility for safety as large operators.
The § 91.147 LOA holder accident resulted in 5 fatalities involving an operator conducting air tours.\46\
\46\ NTSB accident number: ERA18MA099.
The NTSB indicated that the probable cause of this accident was the operator's use of a passenger harness/tether system, which caught on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever. As a result, the aircraft lost engine power in-flight and ditched into the East River. In addition, the operator allowed outside influence on company decisions. Moreover, they failed to address foreseeable safety risks associated with the harness/tether device.
If the operator had an SMS in place the company would have conducted safety risk management prior to installing the harness/tether device. While conducting safety risk management, the hazard of the harness/tether device potentially shutting off the fuel lever would have been identified under § 5.53(a) and analyzed under § 5.55(a). Based on that analysis, the company would assess the safety risk (§ 5.55(b)) and implement appropriate safety risk controls (§ 5.55(c)). After developing safety risk controls, the organization would communicate them to the appropriate flight crews and maintenance personnel (§ 5.93) face-to-face, via email, or other methods that the company regularly uses to communicate with its employees.
In addition, all § 91.147 LOA holders are authorized to provide the same service, regardless of their size. Improving aviation safety for all passenger-carrying operations conducted for compensation or hire would require all § 91.147 LOA holders to meet part 5 requirements for SMS, so long as the implementation of those requirements remains scalable to the size and complexity of the organization. (For more information regarding scalability, please refer to Section V.F.). As the requirements are scalable, so too will be compliance costs.\47\ And, as evidenced by the accident discussed, there are safety benefits to be achieved from implementation of SMS even among these smaller operators.
\47\ For example, in Section VII.B, Regulatory Flexibility Act, the FAA finds that the annual costs as a percentage of receipts for smaller operators with 1 to 9 aircraft is about 0.1% to 0.4% compared to those with a larger number of aircraft between 100 to 500 is about 0.2% to 0.3%.
The FAA is aware that there are § 91.147 LOA holders with low flight volume, as well as 135 operators who use only one pilot-in-command in their operations.\48\ The FAA seeks supporting information and data regarding whether this applicability should be limited to a certain subset of § 91.147 LOA holders and part 135 operators, and if so, how?
\48\ There are some § 91.147 LOA holders that conduct infrequent air tours even though that is not their primary business (e.g., flight schools, aerial applicators, or electronic news gathering, etc.).
3. Part 21 Certificate Holders
3. Part 21 Certificate Holders
The FAA is proposing to require holders of both a TC and a PC issued for the same product under part 21 to develop and implement an SMS that complies with the part 5 requirements. Section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA requires the FAA to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to require that, "manufacturers that hold both a type certificate and a production certificate issued pursuant to section 44704 of title 49, United States Code, where the United States is the State of Design and State of Manufacture, have in place an SMS that is consistent with the standards and recommended practices established by ICAO." As discussed in Section IV.E., Annex 19 requires ICAO member States to mandate SMS for the management of safety risk in design and production of aviation products. To meet the statutory requirement and align U.S. aviation design and manufacturing organizations with safety management practices followed by other international organizations complying with Annex 19, the FAA proposes to require holders of both a TC and a PC issued for the same product under part 21 to develop and implement an SMS that complies with the part 5 requirements.
Additionally, the FAA proposes to apply part 5 to: (1) persons who hold or are licensees of a TC and are seeking a PC for that same product, and (2) persons who hold a PC for a product for which the person is a licensee of the TC. This approach ensures that there are no gaps in SMS applicability for part 21 certificate holders because TC licensees have the same privileges as TC holders under § 21.45 and the same reporting requirements as TC holders under § 21.3 for failures, malfunctions, and defects. Therefore, in the context of an SMS, the FAA considers a licensee of a TC to be equivalent to a holder of a TC and should be required to comply with the requirements of this proposed rule.
Through ACSAA, Congress intended for SMS requirements to apply to entities that design and manufacture products. The FAA further recognizes that critical decisions are made during design and development that impact the safety of aviation products. Consequently, companies that design a product and allow other companies to produce that product should be held to the same regulatory requirements as a person holding both the TC and a PC for the same product. Upon evaluating section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA, the FAA determined that the implementing regulations combined with the regulatory framework of part 21 could enable certain persons to avoid the proposed requirements by licensing their TC to another person to obtain a PC.\49\ To address this gap, the FAA proposes to apply part 5 to TC holders who license their TC to other persons in accordance with Sec. § 21.47 and 21.55.
\49\ Under Sec. § 21.47(a) and 21.55, a person who holds a TC for a product may enter into a written licensing agreement to allow another person to use that TC to obtain a PC. As a result, the person obtaining the PC would be allowed to use the TC holder's design approval to manufacture the product. Therefore, some business relationships result in one person holding the TC and a different person holding the PC for the same product.
The FAA notes that there may be persons who manufacture products under a TC in accordance with part 21 Subpart F. Section 21.123(g) requires these persons to obtain a PC within 6 months after the date of issuance of the TC. Therefore, these persons would be required to comply with the proposed rule because they have applied for a PC.
The FAA also notes that there may be persons who hold a PC for a supplemental type certificate. A supplemental type certificate is a design approval for a modification to a product. A person who holds a PC for a supplemental type certificate may produce articles used to modify the product but cannot produce a complete product. Under the proposed rule, part 5 would not apply to either a supplemental type certificate holder or a PC holder for a supplemental type certificate because these design and production approvals are for modifications to a product and not for complete products. Similarly, there are persons who may hold a TC and a PC that is designated for the production of parts or articles only. The proposed rule would not apply because the PC is only for the production of a part or an article and not for the same product.
The FAA considered applying part 5 to certain persons holding other design and production approvals such as technical standard order authorizations, parts manufacturer approvals, and supplemental type certificates, an approach that would be consistent with the Part 21 SMS ARC recommendation. Although there may be safety benefits to applying SMS to this larger population, the FAA could not substantiate these benefits. The FAA invites comments as to whether part 5 should apply to all holders of TCs, PCs, supplemental type certificates, technical standard order authorizations, or parts manufacturer approvals. The FAA requests that comments specify whether any exceptions should be made in the event that the FAA extends part 5 to these design and production approval holders and what those exceptions should entail. The FAA further requests information and data related to the safety benefits or impact of applying part 5 to additional design and production approval holders beyond the applicability in this proposed rule.
B. General Requirements and Definitions
B. General Requirements and Definitions
1. Definitions
The FAA is proposing to move the definitions in part 5 from current § 5.5 to proposed § 5.3 and to amend the definitions of "hazard" and "safety policy. Currently, the definition of "hazard" in part 5 is "a condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR 830.2. In Annex 19, ICAO defines "hazard" as "a condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident." \50\ The FAA is proposing to amend the definition of the term "hazard" to "a condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an incident or aircraft accident, as defined in 49 CFR 830.2," to further align with the internationally-recognized definition published by ICAO. Although the FAA previously did not include incidents in the definition of hazard,\51\ the FAA now considers that the definition of hazard should include anything that affects or could affect the safety of aviation operations, not just those conditions or objects that could result in serious injury, death, or substantial damage.
1. Definitions
This is because many of the same circumstances that result in an incident could just as easily result in an accident. As discussed in Section III, Tinsley, Dillon, Madsen studied near accidents in dozens of companies across industries and in laboratory simulations. They determined that multiple near accidents preceded and foreshadowed every disaster and business crisis they studied, and that most near accidents were ignored. The authors found that "surfacing near misses and correcting root causes is one [of] the soundest investments that organizations can make." \52\ Therefore, the FAA is proposing to add to the definition of hazard, the term "incident" as defined in 49 CFR 830.2. The FAA believes that this proposed change would improve both international alignment and the identification of hazards. 49 CFR 830.2 defines "incident" as an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations. The FAA does not define a threshold or de minimis standard for what could affect aviation safety.
The FAA believes that organizations are in the best position to determine what occurrences would have the ability to impact the safety of their products or services, and as a part of developing their SMS they may define thresholds for what might entail a reportable incident that could affect aviation safety.\53\ They are also in the best position to determine the processes and tools they can use to communicate this information to their employees. Because safety risk management and safety assurance are ongoing and iterative processes, the organization will continually improve its ability to identify, communicate, and mitigate hazards, preventing them from resulting in incidents or accidents.
\50\ International Civil Aviation Organization, Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Safety Management, Second Edition, pp. 1-2. July 2016.
\51\ 80 FR 1308.
\52\ Tinsley, Catherine H., Robin L. Dillon, and Peter M. Madsen. How to Avoid Catastrophe. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-to-avoid-catastrophe. 2011.
\53\ For additional discussion on hazard information sharing, please see section V.C.4.b. (Safety Promotion (Subpart E), Proposed amendments to subpart E).
In addition, the FAA proposes two other modifications to the definition of "hazard" to more closely align with the ICAO definition: (1) while objects are a subset of the term "condition," the FAA is proposing to add the term "object," and (2) the FAA is proposing to change "foreseeably" to "the potential to." These changes would align the definition more closely with the ICAO definition of "hazard".
In addition, the FAA proposes to amend the definition of safety policy to change "certificate holder" to "person." This proposed change would make the definition consistent with the revised applicability proposed by this rule, which includes persons who are not certificate holders (e.g., LOA holders). 2. Requirement To Develop and Implement SMS
As discussed previously, the FAA is proposing to move the General Requirements for SMS currently contained in § 5.3 to proposed § 5.5. For clarity, the FAA would reorganize proposed § 5.5 into three subparagraphs: (1) general requirements for the components of an SMS, (2) a new proposed requirement for a system description, and (3) the requirement to maintain an SMS in accordance with part 5. Additionally, the FAA is proposing to remove certain provisions from current § 5.3 as unnecessary.
The FAA proposes to add a requirement for all persons subject to part 5 to develop a system description. A system description is a summary of aviation-related processes and activities and a description of interfacing persons that contribute to the safety of the aviation-related products and services provided. The FAA considers that organizations that receive the aviation-related products and services could contribute to the safety of those products and services and would, therefore, be identified among the interfacing persons.
A system description is important because organizations are often made up of a complex network of interactions involving different internal departments that also interface with external organizations that contribute to the safe operation of the organization. For an organization to have an effective SMS, it must fully understand its aviation-related business operations and activities that impact the management of aviation safety. Without that understanding, the SMS is unlikely to be clearly defined, adequately applied, or effectively executed. The use of an organization system description would also enable the organization to have a clear picture of its many interactions.
Although the focus of this regulation is on aviation, some organizations might also extend their SMS to their non-aviation related activities, such as security and occupational safety and health issues. If an organization elects to do so, the FAA would only conduct oversight of the SMS related to its aviation functions. The FAA is proposing to limit the application of SMS only to the aviation-related activities conducted by the organization under 14 CFR.
The FAA also proposes to add a provision in § 5.5(c) to make clear that the SMS requirements in part 5 are continuing requirements. For example, the requirements of part 5 do not cease to apply the moment a person develops and implements an SMS. Rather, a person must also maintain SMS in accordance with part 5. The new provision in proposed § 5.5(c) is not intended to impose a new requirement on the regulated community; it is intended only to clarify the existing requirements.
Furthermore, to remove unnecessary rule text, the FAA proposes to remove the provisions that are currently contained in § 5.3(b) and (c). Section 5.3(b), which requires the SMS to be maintained in accordance with the recordkeeping requirements of Subpart F of part 5, is unnecessary because the recordkeeping requirements of Subpart F apply irrespective of this provision. Additionally, § 5.3(c), which requires compliance with the relevant regulatory requirements of 14 CFR, is unnecessary because persons must comply with applicable regulatory requirements in 14 CFR irrespective of whether the FAA expressly requires compliance in § 5.3(c).
The FAA also proposes to remove two requirements from current § 5.3(a). First, the FAA proposes to remove the requirement for the SMS to be submitted to the Administrator for acceptance. The proposal to expand the applicability of part 5 has resulted in the FAA proposing new regulations to address the additional entities that would be covered by part 5, namely Sec. § 5.7, 5.9, 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15. These proposed regulations would set forth the requirements for each regulated entity, including which documents the entity must submit to the Administrator for acceptance or approval. Second, the FAA proposes to remove the requirement for an SMS to be appropriate to the size, scope, and complexity of the organization's operation. The FAA has determined that this provision is unnecessary because the FAA's SMS requirements are performance-based and scalable. As such, persons that are required to develop an SMS under part 5 may scale their SMS to the size and complexity of their organizations. The FAA does not need to expressly require scalability in the regulations when the performance-based requirements are designed for that purpose.
C. Components of Safety Management Systems
C. Components of Safety Management Systems
An SMS is composed of four major components: (1) safety policy, (2) safety risk management, (3) safety assurance, and (4) safety promotion. Additionally, an SMS requires documentation and recordkeeping. Currently, part 5 contains a subpart for each major component and a subpart for documentation and recordkeeping. The proposed rule would retain these subparts but includes proposed amendments to each one. 1. Safety Policy (Subpart B)
Safety policy is the foundation for an SMS and must be documented and communicated throughout the organization. All organizations must define policies, processes, procedures, and organizational structures to accomplish their safety objectives and goals. A documented safety policy ensures that all employees of the organization are aware of management's commitment to achieving the organization's safety objectives and are aware of their own role in meeting the safety objectives.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart B
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart B
Subpart B of part 5 sets forth the requirements for the organization's safety policy. The safety policy component of SMS includes safety policy documentation, identification accountability and authority in regard to safety, designation and responsibilities of safety management personnel, and emergency response planning. Section 5.21 currently requires a documented safety policy that: (1) establishes the organization's safety objectives, (2) includes a commitment to fulfill those safety objectives, (3) contains a statement concerning the necessary resources for implementation of the SMS, (4) contains a safety reporting policy, (5) defines unacceptable behavior and conditions for disciplinary action, and (6) establishes an emergency response plan for transitioning from normal to emergency operations. b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart B
The FAA is proposing to add a requirement to § 5.21(a) that would require the safety policy to include a code of ethics that applies to all employees, including management personnel and officers. The code of ethics would clarify that safety is the organization's highest priority. This proposed requirement responds to section 102(f) of ACSAA, which mandates that "the regulations issued under subsection (a) shall require a safety management system to include establishment of a code of ethics applicable to all appropriate employees of a certificate holder, including officers (as determined by the FAA), which confirms that safety is the organization's highest priority." The FAA agrees that a code of ethics is beneficial to overall safety; therefore, this proposal would fulfill that legislative mandate and extend the requirement to all persons required to have an SMS.
The FAA acknowledges that section 102(f) of ACSAA only requires the FAA to apply the code of ethics requirement to certain part 21 certificate holders. However, to the greatest extent possible, the FAA seeks consistency in the SMS requirements. Furthermore, the FAA believes having a code of ethics, applicable to all employees of the organization, would influence the safety culture of the organization. If employees see their management engaged with safety as the highest priority, then that same safety attitude would likely prevail throughout the entire organization. Therefore, all persons required to have an SMS would benefit from having a code of ethics that confirms that safety is the organization's highest priority. For that reason, the FAA is proposing to apply this requirement to all persons who would be required to have a part 5-compliant SMS.
Additionally, the FAA proposes minor amendments to subpart B (Sec. § 5.21 through 5.27) to reflect the new applicability requirements of the proposed rule. Currently, these regulations use the term "certificate holder" because part 5 applies to part 119 certificate holders authorized to conduct operations under part 121. The FAA proposes to remove all references to "certificate holder." Instead, the proposed rule refers to "person" to reflect the new applicability set forth in proposed § 5.1. Additionally, the FAA proposes to amend the current requirements of § 5.25 that refer only to "certificate(s)" by adding a reference to "Letter(s) of Authorization." This would ensure that the requirements of § 5.25 pertaining to the accountable executive apply to § 91.147 LOA holders. 2. Safety Risk Management (Subpart C)
Another core component of an SMS is safety risk management. A comprehensive SMS using safety risk management includes identifying hazards, assessing risk, and developing risk controls to reduce or eliminate risk associated with those hazards. Safety risk management allows an organization to focus on the areas of greatest risk from a safety perspective, taking into account system complexity and scope of the operations, and allows the organization to implement appropriate risk controls.
Organizations must apply safety risk management when implementing new or revising existing systems, developing operational procedures, and to address hazards or ineffective controls identified through safety assurance processes. For example, an organization would initiate safety risk management after learning that certain de-icing operations are not effective and use safety risk management to analyze the de-icing operations.\54\ Safety risk management includes the following: (1) system analysis, (2) identifying hazards associated with the system, (3) analyzing the risk associated with the hazards, (4) assessing risk associated with the hazards to determine acceptable safety risk, and (5) controlling the risk of identified hazards when necessary.
\54\ There are existing regulations that prohibit a takeoff when frost, ice, or snow (contamination) is adhering to the wings, control surfaces, rotors or propellers of an aircraft and some operations require a de-icing program [Sec. § 91.527, 121.629, and 135.227]. However, this example describes how operators can use SMS to focus on certain de-icing operations that may not be performing adequately and use a structured process to correct performance deficiencies or identify design changes (additional controls) using the SRM process. Current regulations prohibit takeoff when certain conditions are met, but there are no requirements for the company to look more broadly at the system and determine if or when there is a systemic issue with de-icing.
The system analysis serves as the initial source for hazard identification when new systems are designed, when systems are revised, and when new operational procedures are developed. The system analysis also serves as a basis for describing and organizing information for risk analysis when potential hazards or ineffective risk controls are discovered in the safety assurance process. The system analysis processes ensure that information regarding the function and purpose of the system; the system's operating environment; outline of the system's processes and procedures; and the personnel, equipment, and facilities that the system requires for operation are analyzed so that hazards may be appropriately identified.
Next, an organization must use established processes to identify hazards within the context of the system analysis. Any hazards that are identified must be analyzed to the extent necessary to determine possible outcomes associated with each hazard.
The organization must then analyze the outcomes to determine the severity and likelihood (i.e., risk) associated with the outcomes.\55\ Subsequently, the organization must assess the safety risk, which requires the certificate holder to determine whether the safety risk is acceptable or mitigation is required.
\55\ As discussed in examples later in the preamble, this analysis may be either qualitative or quantitative depending on the size of the organization, the nature of the safety issue being addressed, and availability of relevant data, among other factors. SRM, as with all components of the SMS, should be scaled to fit the organization. Since each safety issue is unique and each SMS is developed to fit the organization, the FAA cannot make general estimates or judgments regarding the amount of time or documentation an organization would need for any given identified hazard. Consistent with the intent to scale this rule to the organization and the issue, the FAA would look to the organization to make that determination on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, the organization would develop and implement risk controls where necessary. Risk controls may mitigate the outcomes by reducing the likelihood or severity of the outcome or eliminating hazards by design. After these controls are developed, but before being implemented, the organization must assess whether the controls are likely to be effective and would not introduce any new hazards. When the risk controls are assessed and determined to be acceptable, the organization would implement them. Those controls would then be continuously monitored under the processes developed under subpart D, Safety Assurance, to ensure they are effective. a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart C
Subpart C of part 5 currently contains the safety risk management requirements for an SMS. Section 5.51 establishes when a certificate holder would need to apply safety risk management processes and procedures to systems to identify the hazards and assess the risk associated with the systems. Once a certificate holder determines that the processes of safety risk management have been triggered under § 5.51, it must conduct a system analysis, as required by § 5.53. Section 5.53 provides information that must be considered when conducting a system analysis and identifying hazards. Currently, when conducting a system analysis, the following must be considered: (1) function and purpose of the system, (2) the system's operating environment, (3) an outline of the system's processes and procedures, and (4) the personnel, equipment, and facilities necessary for operation of the system. Section 5.55 establishes the requirements for safety risk assessment and controls. b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart C
The FAA is proposing several changes to subpart C. First, as in the other subparts, the FAA is proposing to amend § 5.51 and § 5.55 by removing the term "certificate holder" to reflect the broadened applicability of the proposed rule. Instead, these sections will refer to "any person required to have an SMS under this subpart."
Additionally, the FAA is proposing to add a new requirement, § 5.53(b)(5), which would add the interfaces of the system to the list of items that must be considered when conducting a system analysis in accordance with § 5.53. Interfaces are a point where two or more operations, systems, subjects, or organizations connect and interact. Interfaces can be internal (e.g., between functional groups in an organization, between hardware/software components of the system being analyzed, or between processes in the system being analyzed), or they can be external (e.g., between organizations, between the system being analyzed and other systems, or between a human using the system and the system itself). The FAA is proposing to include the interfaces of the system in the list of considerations required when performing the system analysis in § 5.53 because hazards can exist with interfacing organizations, processes, or systems in the way the two interfacing parts interact with each other.
Understanding the interfaces while conducting a system analysis is important because the system analysis serves as the basis for identifying and analyzing hazards and their associated risk. This addition would further improve the ability of part 121 operators to analyze risk. As the aviation system becomes more complex, dynamic, and integrated, understanding these interfaces can assist in the identification of related hazards and improve safety overall. An SMS that looks both inward and outward is more effective at identifying hazards, a core function of any operational SMS. The FAA emphasizes that under this proposed requirement interfaces would be considered only to the extent that they affect aviation safety. For example, the interface between a part 21 aircraft manufacturer's engineering and payroll departments would not be considered when conducting a systems analysis under § 5.53 because this interface would not impact the aviation safety of the aircraft design.
Additionally, the use of fall-arrestors in operator maintenance facilities to protect individuals working on aircraft would not be considered when conducting a system analysis in § 5.53 either because the interface is an occupational safety and health concern and does not directly affect the quality of work performed on the aircraft. 3. Safety Assurance (Subpart D)
Safety assurance verifies that the risk controls put into place under safety risk management continue to be effective in managing risk and that the organization's safety performance is meeting or exceeding its safety objectives. Safety assurance has three elements: (1) safety performance monitoring and measurement; (2) safety performance assessment; and (3) continuous improvement.
Safety performance monitoring and measurement requires the development and maintenance of processes and systems that monitor operational processes and collect data on the performance of the organization. Within an organization, there are processes to collect data, such as those to meet regulatory requirements or voluntary reporting programs. In addition, there are external data sources, such as FAA systems or information from other organizations. Safety assurance processes must also include investigations of accidents and incidents. Employee reporting systems provide another source of information regarding the performance of the organization.
The safety performance assessment is used to assess the organization's performance against its safety objectives. The safety performance assessment includes verifying the organization's compliance with established safety risk controls. In addition, the safety performance assessment identifies changes in operational environments, potential new hazards, and ineffective controls. If the assessment reveals new hazards or ineffective controls, the organization must initiate safety risk management processes. The accountable executive designated in accordance with § 5.25 must review information from the safety performance assessment on a regular basis.
Finally, safety assurance requires continuous improvement. The analysis and assessment functions of safety assurance are essential in alerting the organization to significant changes in the operating environment, possibly indicating a need for system change to maintain effective risk controls. As a result, an organization with an SMS must take steps to correct any safety performance deficiencies identified in the assessments. a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart D
Safety assurance requirements for an SMS are established in subpart D of part 5. Section 5.71 covers safety performance monitoring and measurement, § 5.73 covers safety performance assessment, and § 5.75 covers requirements for continuous improvement. Pursuant to § 5.71(a), a person must develop and maintain processes and systems to acquire data with respect to its operations, products, and services to monitor the safety performance of the organization. Section 5.71(a) prescribes specific data that must be monitored, audited, evaluated, and investigated. Among these requirements, § 5.71(a)(7) requires the processes and systems to include a confidential employee reporting system in which employees can report hazards, issues, occurrences, and incidents, as well as a means to propose solutions and safety improvements. Once an organization with an SMS collects data through its safety monitoring and measurement processes, it must use the processes developed under § 5.71(b) to analyze the data.
Specifically, § 5.73 requires the organization to conduct assessments of its safety performance against its safety objectives contained in its safety policy, which include reviews by the accountable executive to: (1) ensure compliance with safety risk controls, (2) evaluate the performance of the SMS, (3) evaluate the effectiveness of safety risk controls, (4) identify changes in the environment that may introduce new hazards, and (5) identify new hazards. This analysis is used to transform raw data into usable information that can support informed decision-making related to safety.
Finally, § 5.75 requires the organization to establish and implement processes to correct any safety performance deficiencies that are identified in the safety performance assessment, which ensures continuous improvement of the organization's safety performance. b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart D
The FAA is proposing to remove the word "operations" from § 5.71(a) to clarify the requirement and avoid confusion with the term "operator." In addition, the FAA is proposing to amend Sec. § 5.71-5.75 by replacing "certificate holder" with "person" or "a person required to have an SMS under this subpart" to reflect the proposed broadened applicability of the rule.
The FAA is also proposing to add the text, "without concern of reprisal for reporting" to the confidential employee reporting system requirement in current § 5.71(a)(7) to meet section 102(e) of ACSAA which mandates that the proposed regulation:
[R]equire a safety management system to include a confidential employee reporting system through which employees can report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents. A reporting system under this subsection shall include provisions for reporting, without concern for reprisal for reporting, of such items by employees in a manner consistent with confidential employee reporting systems administered by the Administrator.
Further, section 102 mandates that regulations required by the statute shall also require holders of both a TC and a PC to submit a summary of confidential employee reports received in accordance with section 102 to the Administrator at least twice per year. Therefore, the FAA is proposing to add a new § 5.71(c), which would require holders of both a TC and a PC for the same product to submit a summary of the confidential employee reports received under § 5.71(a)(7) to the FAA once every six months.
Continue reading ↓ 120 of 323 passages shown