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Proposed Rule Proposed Issued Dec 8, 2022 31 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

87 FR 75424 System Safety Assessments

The FAA proposes to amend certain airworthiness regulations to standardize the criteria for conducting safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport category airplanes. With this action, the FAA seeks to reduce risk associated with airplane accidents and incidents that have occurred in service, and reduce risk associated with new technology in flight control systems. The intended effect of this proposed action is to improve aviation safety by making system safety assessment (SSA) certification requirements more comprehensive and consistent.

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Vol. 87

Thursday,

No. 235

December 8, 2022

Part IV

14 CFR Part 25

System Safety Assessments; Proposed Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No.: FAA-2022-1544; Notice No. 23-04] RIN 2120-AJ99

System Safety Assessments

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

Action

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to amend certain airworthiness regulations to standardize the criteria for conducting safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport category airplanes. With this action, the FAA seeks to reduce risk associated with airplane accidents and incidents that have occurred in service, and reduce risk associated with new technology in flight control systems. The intended effect of this proposed action is to improve aviation safety by making system safety assessment (SSA) certification requirements more comprehensive and consistent.

Dates

DATES: Send comments on or before March 8, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2022-1544 using any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.

Addresses

• Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these comments, without edit, including any personal information the commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which you can review at https://www.dot.gov/privacy.

Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For Further Information Contact

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Suzanne Masterson, Strategic Policy Transport Section, AIR-614, Strategic Policy Management Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax (206) 231-3211; email [email protected].

Supplementary Information

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority for This Rulemaking

The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.

Authority for This Rulemaking

This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General Requirements." Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It prescribes new safety standards for the design and operation of transport category airplanes.

Acronyms and Frequently Used Terms

Acronyms and Frequently Used Terms

Table 1--Acronyms Frequently Used in This Preamble

Acronym Definition

AC … Advisory Circular.

AD … Airworthiness Directive.

AFM … Airplane Flight Manual.

ALS … Airworthiness Limitations section.

ARAC … Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

ASAWG … Airplane-Level Safety Analysis

Working Group.

CAST … Commercial Aviation Safety Team.

CMR … Certification Maintenance Requirement.

CS-25 … Certification Specifications for Large

Aeroplanes (issued by EASA).

CSL+1 … Catastrophic Single Latent Failure Plus

One (a failure condition).

EASA … European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

ELOS … Equivalent Level of Safety.

EWIS … Electrical Wiring Interconnection System.

FCHWG … Flight Controls Harmonization Working

Group.

ICA … Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.

LDHWG … Loads and Dynamics Harmonization Working

Group.

NTSB … National Transportation Safety Board.

PPIHWG … Powerplant Installation Harmonization

Working Group.

SDAHWG … System Design and Analysis Harmonization

Working Group.

SLF … Significant Latent Failure.

SSA … System Safety Assessment.

Table 2--Terms Used in This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

Term Definition

General

Certification maintenance requirement A required scheduled maintenance task established during the design

(CMR) *. certification of the airplane systems as an airworthiness limitation

of the type certificate or supplemental type certificate.

Error … An omission or incorrect action by a crewmember or maintenance

personnel, or a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation.

Event … An occurrence that has its origin distinct from the airplane, such as

atmospheric conditions (e.g., gusts, temperature variations, icing,

and lightning strikes); runway conditions; conditions of

communication, navigation, and surveillance services;

bird-strike; cabin and baggage fires (not initiated by features

installed on the airplane). The term does not cover sabotage or other

similar intentional acts.

Failure … An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or

element such that it no longer functions as intended. This includes

both loss of function and malfunction.

Note: Errors and events may cause failures or influence their effects

but are not considered to be failures.

Failure condition … A condition, caused or contributed to by one or more failures or

errors, that has either a direct or consequential effect on the

airplane, its occupants, or other persons, accounting for--

• Flight phase,

• Relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions,

and

• External events.

Latent failure … A failure that is not apparent to the flightcrew or maintenance

personnel.

Single failure … Any occurrence, or set of occurrences, that cannot be shown to be

independent from each other (e.g., failures due to a common cause),

that affect the operation of components, parts, or elements such that

they no longer function as intended. (See definition of "Failure.")

Structural performance … The capability of the airplane to meet the structural requirements of

14 CFR part 25.

Failure conditions in order of increasing severity

Minor failure condition … A failure condition that would not significantly reduce airplane safety

and would only require flightcrew actions that are well within their

capabilities. Minor failure conditions may result in--

• A slight reduction in safety margins or functional

capabilities,

• A slight increase in flightcrew workload, such as routine

flight plan changes,

• Some physical discomfort to passengers or flight

attendants, or

• An effect of similar severity.

Major failure condition * … A failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or

the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating

conditions, to the extent that there would be--

• A significant reduction in safety margins or functional

capabilities,

• A significant increase in flightcrew workload or in

conditions impairing the efficiency of the flightcrew,

• Physical distress to passengers or flight attendants,

possibly including injuries, or

• An effect of similar severity.

Hazardous failure condition * … A failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or

the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating

conditions, to the extent that there would be--

• A large reduction in safety margins or functional

capabilities,

• Physical distress or excessive workload such that the

flightcrew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately

or completely, or

• Serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of

persons other than the flightcrew.

Note: For the purpose of performing a safety assessment, a "small

number" of fatal injuries means one such injury.

Catastrophic failure condition * … A failure condition that would result in multiple fatalities, usually

with the loss of the airplane.

Terms related to latent failures

Significant latent failure * … A latent failure that, in combination with one or more specific

failures or events, would result in a hazardous or catastrophic

failure condition. Catastrophic single latent failure plus A catastrophic failure condition that results from a combination of two

one (CSL+1). failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight.

Failure conditions in order of decreasing probability

Probable failure condition * … A failure condition that is anticipated to occur one or more times

during the entire operational life of each airplane of a given type.

Remote failure condition * … A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane

of a given type during its entire operational life, but which may

occur several times during the total operational life of a number of

airplanes of a given type. Extremely remote failure condition *... A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane

of a given type during its entire operational life, but which may

occur a few times during the total operational life of all airplanes

of a given type. Extremely improbable failure condition* A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur during the total

operational life of all airplanes of a given type.

* These terms are also defined in proposed new § 25.4 Definitions.

Contents

Contents

I. Overview of Proposed Rule II. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

B. Related Actions

1. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Recommendations

2. FAA Review of Service Difficulty Reports

3. Commercial Aviation Safety Team Task Force Study Regarding Gaps in Maintenance Process

I. Overview of Proposed Rule II. Background

4. Equivalent Level of Safety Findings and Special Conditions

5. Harmonization with European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Standards

6. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act

C. NTSB Recommendations III. Discussion of the Proposed Rule

A. Consistent Safety Assessment Criteria for Airplane Systems

1. Average Risk Criteria (§ 25.1309(b)(1), (2), and (3))

2. Latent Failures in System Designs

B. Consistent Application and Interpretation of Requirements for Equipment, Systems, and Installations

1. Applicability of § 25.1309

2. Exceptions From Applicability of § 25.1309

3. Flightcrew Alerting and Errors

C. Interaction of Systems and Structures (New § 25.302)

1. Applicability of New § 25.302

2. Normal Operation

3. Failure Condition Effect on Structural Performance

4. Dispatch in a System Failed State

5. Differences Between Proposed § 25.302 and EASA CS 25.302

D. Turbojet Thrust Reversing Systems

E. Flight Control Systems Safety Assessment Criteria

1. Changes to § 25.671(c) Failure Criteria

2. Other Changes to § 25.671

F. Certification Maintenance Requirements

G. Miscellaneous Amendments

1. Method of Compliance With § 25.1309(b)

2. Failure Examples Related to Flutter

3. Other Changes to § 25.629

4. EWIS Requirements

5. Removal of Redundant Requirements

H. Petitions for Rulemaking

I. Advisory Material IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Evaluation

1. Costs and Benefits of this Proposed Rule

2. Who is potentially affected by this Proposed Rule?

3. Assumptions and Sources of Information

4. Costs of the Proposed Specific Risk Rule

5. Benefits of the Proposed Specific Risk Rule

6. Summary of Costs and Benefits of Specific Risk Rule

7. Section 25.1309: Equipment, Systems, and Installations

8. Section 25.671: General Control Systems

9. Section 25.901: Installation Engines

10. Section 25.933: Reversing Systems

11. Section 25.302: Interaction of Systems and Structures

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

G. Environmental Analysis V. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation VI. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents

I. Overview of Proposed Rule

I. Overview of Proposed Rule

The FAA proposes to revise regulations in title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes) related to the safety assessment \1\ of airplane systems. The proposed changes to part 25 would affect applicants for type certification and operators of transport category airplanes. Applicants for type certification would be required to conduct their SSAs in accordance with the revised regulations. Proposed changes to the ICA would affect operators of newly certified airplanes, although the impact on those operators would not be significant.

\1\ A system safety assessment is a structured process intended to systematically identify the risks pertinent to the design of aircraft systems, and to show that the systems meet safety requirements.

The FAA proposes revised and new safety standards to reduce the likelihood of potentially catastrophic risks due to latent failures in critical systems. The standards would require the elimination of such risks as far as practical. When it is not practical to eliminate such a risk, the standards would require the reduction and management of any remaining risk. The proposed standards would also improve the likelihood that operators discover latent failures and address them before they become an unsafe condition, rather than discovering them after they occur and the FAA addressing them with airworthiness directives (ADs).

Because modern aircraft systems (for example, avionics and fly-by-wire systems) are much more integrated than they were when the current safety criteria in § 25.1309 and other system safety assessment rules were established in 1970,\2\ the new standards proposed in this rule would be consistent for all systems of the airplane, reducing the chance of a hazard falling into a gap between the different regulatory requirements for different systems.

\2\ 35 FR 5665 (Apr. 8, 1970).

Consistent criteria for conducting SSAs would also provide predictability for applicants by reducing the number of issue papers and special conditions necessary for airplane certification projects.\3\

\3\ Special conditions are rules of particular applicability that the FAA issues to address novel or unusual design features. See 14 CFR 21.16, and section 2-4(j)(3) of FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification. The latter is available at drs.faa.gov, and as noted therein, the FAA uses the issue paper process to develop the terms of these special conditions. See FAA Order 8110.112A, Standardized Procedures for Usage of Issue Papers and Development of Equivalent Levels of Safety Memorandums, and Advisory Circular 20-166A, Issue Paper Process, available at drs.faa.gov.

Specifically, the proposed rule would--

• Require that applicants limit the likelihood of a catastrophic failure condition that results from a combination of two failures, either of which could be latent. In this proposal, the FAA refers to this particular failure condition as a Catastrophic Single Latent Failure Plus One (CSL+1) because it consists of the catastrophic condition that results from a single latent failure plus one additional failure. See proposed § 25.1309(b)(5).

• Revise safety assessment regulations to eliminate ambiguity in, and provide consistency between, the safety assessments that applicants must conduct for different types of airplane systems. Section 25.1309 would continue to contain the safety assessment criteria applicable to most airplane systems. Sections 25.671(c) (flight control systems) and 25.901(c) (powerplant installations) would be amended to remove general system safety criteria. Instead, the systems covered in these sections would be required to comply with § 25.1309 (system safety criteria). Section 25.933(a) (thrust reversing systems) would allow compliance with § 25.1309 as an option. Sections 25.671, 25.901, and 25.933 would continue to contain criteria for safety assessments specific to flight control systems, powerplant installations, and thrust reversing systems, respectively.

• Require applicants to assess and account for any effect that the failure of a system could have on the structural performance of the airplane. See proposed § 25.302.

• Define the different types of failure of flight control systems, including jams, and define the criteria for safety assessment of those types of failures. See proposed § 25.671.

• Require applicants to include, in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the airplane's Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA), necessary maintenance tasks that applicants identify during their SSAs. See proposed § 25.1309(d).

• Remove the "function properly when installed" criterion in § 25.1301(a)(4) for installed equipment whose function is not needed for safe operation of the airplane.

II. Background

II. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

This proposed action is necessary because airplane accidents, incidents, and service difficulties have occurred as a result of failures in airplane systems. Some of these occurrences were caused, in part, by insufficient design standards for controlling the risk of latent failures. Current FAA regulations do not prevent the unintended operation of an airplane with a latent failure that, when combined with another failure, could cause an accident. For example, in 1991, a Boeing Model 767 series airplane operated by Lauda Air took off with a contaminated thrust reverser control valve. This contamination was "latent" because it was undetected. The accident investigation found that a short circuit occurred, and together with the contaminated control valve, caused the thrust reverser to unintentionally deploy in flight. As a result, the airplane subsequently crashed, resulting in 223 fatalities.\4\

A. Statement of the Problem

\4\ Lauda Air B767 Accident Report by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Thailand, is available in the docket and at https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/Lauda/LaudaAccidentReport.pdf.

Also, current regulations do not require establishment of mandatory inspections for significant latent failures that may pose a risk in maintaining the airworthiness of the airplane design. Such inspections may be necessary to reduce an airplane's exposure to these latent failures, so airplanes continue to meet safety standards while in service.

Additionally, current regulations do not adequately address new technology in flight control systems and the effects these systems can have on controllability and structural capability. For example, on airplanes equipped with fly-by-wire control systems, there is no mechanical link between the flightdeck control and the control surface, so the flightcrew may not be aware of the actual control surface position. Also, on some flight control system designs, there may be submodes of operation that change or degrade the normal handling or operational characteristics of the airplane. Flightcrew awareness of both the operational mode of the airplane and the control surface positions are necessary design features to ensure safety of flight but are not required by current regulations.

This action is also necessary to address flight control systems whose failure can affect the loads imposed on the airplane structure. As an example, some airplanes are equipped with rudder limiters, which reduce the maximum deflection of the rudder at higher airspeeds, thereby reducing the maximum loads on the rudder and vertical stabilizer. Failure of the rudder limiter can result in higher loads on these surfaces in the event of a significant rudder maneuver. Excessive loads can lead to structural damage and catastrophic failure. Current regulations do not require applicants to account for these potentially higher loads in the structural design of the airplane.

Lastly, certain system safety requirements are not standardized across airplane systems. Current regulations specify different safety assessment criteria for different systems, which can lead to inconsistent standards across the airplane. Also, when systems that traditionally have been separate become integrated using new technology, applicants may be unsure which standard to apply.

The FAA proposes to address these issues by revising the system safety assessment requirements in part 25.

B. Related Actions

1. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Recommendations

Advances in flight controls technology, increased airplane system integration, and certain incidents, accidents, and service difficulties related to system failures prompted the FAA to task the ARAC with developing recommendations for new or revised requirements and compliance methods related to the safety assessment of airplane and powerplant systems. The ARAC accepted tasks on various airplane systems issues and assigned them to the Powerplant Installation Harmonization Working Group (PPIHWG),\5\ Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG),\6\ Loads and Dynamics Harmonization Working Group (LDHWG),\7\ and System Design and Analysis Harmonization Working Group (SDAHWG).\8\ The FAA also tasked the ARAC to make recommendations for harmonizing the relevant part 25 rules with the corresponding European certification specifications for large airplanes.\9\ The ARAC accepted this task and assigned it to the relevant working groups.

1. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Recommendations

\5\ 57 FR 58844 (Dec. 11, 1992).

\6\ 63 FR 45554 (Aug. 26, 1998).

\7\ 59 FR 30081 (Jun. 10, 1994).

\8\ 61 FR 26246 (May 24, 1996).

\9\ As the FAA noted in the Federal Register in 1993: "The FAA announced at the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)-Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Harmonization Conference in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, (June 2-5, 1992) that it would consolidate within the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee structure an ongoing objective to "harmonize" the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) and the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). Coincident with that announcement, the FAA assigned to the ARAC those projects related to JAR/FAR 25, 33 and 35 harmonization which were then in the process of being coordinated between the JAA and the FAA." 58 FR 13819, 13820 (Mar. 15, 1993).

In developing their recommendations, the PPIHWG and FCHWG reviewed the investigations of two transport category airplane accidents. In the May 1991 Lauda Air accident, discussed previously, an unintentional thrust reverser deployment on a Boeing Model 767 series airplane caused a loss of airplane controllability.\10\ In the September 1994 USAir accident, the NTSB considered a malfunction of the rudder actuation system on a Boeing Model 737-300 series airplane, to have likely initiated a loss of airplane controllability that resulted in the airplane impacting the ground near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.\11\ The investigations of these two accidents identified hazards resulting from potential CSL+1 failure conditions in safety critical systems.

\10\ See footnote 4.

\11\ NTSB Accident Report NTSB/AAR-09/01, Uncontrolled Descent and Collision with Terrain, USAir Flight 427, Boeing 737-300, N513AU, Near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1994, is available in the docket and at https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/USAir427/usair427_ntsb_report.pdf.

The PPIHWG recommended revisions to § 25.901(c), to address failures and malfunctions of powerplant and auxiliary power unit (APU) installations, and to § 25.933, to address failures and malfunctions of thrust reversing systems. The FCHWG recommended changes to § 25.671 to address failures and jamming of flight control systems. The LDHWG recommended the addition of a new rule, § 25.302, to address systems that directly, or as a result of a failure or malfunction, would affect the structural performance of the airplane. The SDAHWG recommended revisions to Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309, and further changes to § 25.901(c). Each working group also recommended advisory material to accompany the recommended regulatory changes. The SDAHWG named their recommended revision to AC 25.1309-1A as the "Arsenal" version.\12\

\12\ The "Arsenal" version is a draft revision of AC 25.1309-1A, developed by the ARAC SDAHWG. Applicants can use it in conjunction with a request for an ELOS finding for, or exemption from, Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309, per FAA Policy PS-ANM100-00-113-1034, Use of ARAC (Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee) Recommended Rulemaking not yet formally adopted by the FAA, as a basis for equivalent level of safety or exemption to Part 25, dated January 4, 2001, available at https://drs.faa.gov. The "Arsenal" version is available in the docket as part of the SDAHWG recommendation, Task 2--System and Analysis Harmonization and Technology Update, pp. 61-99, and at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEsdaT2-5241996.pdf.

Although the working groups each addressed the subject of managing latent failures in safety critical systems, their recommendations were not consistent when defining the criteria for latent failures. After reviewing the relevant regulations, and the recommendations from the working groups, the FAA, along with the European, Canadian, and Brazilian civil aviation authorities, identified a need to standardize SSA criteria. These authorities were concerned that the safety criteria recommended by the working groups could result in differing safety assessments across various critical systems. Differing standards could result in an inappropriately low level of safety on some critical systems, or, conversely, unnecessarily apply the most stringent standard to every system in a set of integrated systems.

Therefore, in 2006, the FAA tasked ARAC, which assigned the task to the Airplane-Level Safety Assessment Working Group (ASAWG),\13\ with creating consistent SSA criteria and developing new criteria for "specific risk." "Specific risk" is the risk on a given flight resulting from the existence of a particular condition (for example, a latent failure) on that flight. It is differentiated from "average risk," which is the risk on a typical flight of all airplanes of a particular model for a typical duration.

\13\ 71 FR 14284 (Mar. 21, 2006).

The ASAWG completed its work in May 2010 and recommended a set of consistent requirements that would apply to all systems. Specific areas addressed in the recommendation report include latent failures, aging and wear, Master Minimum Equipment Lists, and flight and diversion time. The ASAWG recommended that the general system safety criteria for all airplane systems be governed by § 25.1309, and recommended adjustments to the regulations and advisory material addressed by the working groups mentioned previously, to implement consistent system safety criteria. All ARAC working group recommendation reports are available in the docket for this NPRM. 2. FAA Review of Service Difficulty Reports

One ASAWG recommendation responded to the need to prevent a catastrophic failure condition resulting from two failures, when either failure is latent (undetected) for more than one flight. In such a case, the first failure is latent, and thus persists undetected, and the second failure is active (detected) because its occurrence results in a catastrophic accident. In consideration of this recommendation, the FAA reviewed a number of past service difficulty reports \14\ that could have led to catastrophic accidents if the latent failure had been followed by another failure. These include:

\14\ Service difficulty reports are reports of occurrences or detection of failures, malfunctions, and defects, as required by 14 CFR 91.1415, 121.703, 125.409, 135.415 and 145.221, as applicable to the type of operation of the aircraft.

• A latent failure of a fire extinguisher control switch that, if coupled with an active failure such as an engine fire, could have resulted in an uncontrollable engine fire.\15\

\15\ A report of the failure of a certain engine fire shutoff switch led to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2005-01-13, Amendment 39-13938 (70 FR 2339, January 13, 2005).

• A latent failure of the high-lift system \16\ brake that, if coupled with an active failure such as a high-lift system transmission driveshaft failure, could have resulted in loss of control.\17\

\16\ A "high-lift" system is a system that increases the amount of lift produced by an airplane wing.

\17\ Multiple reports of failure of a certain high-lift system brake led to AD 2009-20-12, Amendment 39-16035 (74 FR 50686, October 1, 2009)

• A latent failure of a high-lift system proximity sensor that, if coupled with an active failure such as a high-lift drive system failure, could have resulted in loss of control.\18\

\18\ Multiple reports of failure of a certain high-lift system proximity sensor led to AD 2014-03-08, Amendment 39-17745 (79 FR 9398, February 19, 2014).

The FAA has determined that such service difficulties were, in part, a consequence of insufficient design standards for controlling the risk due to latent failures, and the FAA expects similar service difficulties in the future if the standards are not revised to manage such risks. 3. Commercial Aviation Safety Team Task Force Study Regarding Gaps in Maintenance Process

In 2009, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) \19\ chartered a task force, led by the FAA Flight Standards Service, Aircraft Maintenance Division, to conduct a study to identify and correct gaps in operators' maintenance processes. The objective of the task force was to ensure that the level of safety provided at certification would be sustained throughout the life of the airplane.

\19\ Founded in 1998, CAST is a cooperative government-industry initiative. CAST is co-chaired by a senior-level official of the air transport industry and by the FAA Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety.

In 2011, the task force reported on the gaps it found, and recommended mitigation strategies.\20\ One of the identified gaps (GAP 009) was that the current regulations do not require use of Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs),\21\ which identify inspections of systems for significant latent failures that are necessary to preserve the airplane's reliability. The FAA has been recommending in advisory circulars (AC 25.1309-1A and AC 25-19, and AC 25-19A) to establish the need for inspections of critical systems where latent failures could exist. Since CMRs are critical to safety, the task force recommended the FAA require their use.

\20\ More information on CAST and the task force findings is available in the docket and on the internet at https://www.skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/2553.pdf.

\21\ CMRs are defined in Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis, dated June 21, 1988; and AC 25-19A, Certification Maintenance Requirements, dated October 3, 2011. The FAA plans to revise AC 25.1309-1 as described in this document, and the CMR definition would conform to the definition provided in Table 2 and in new § 25.4, Definitions. The CMR definition in AC 25-19A already conforms to the definition provided in Table 2. That AC is not being revised as part of this rulemaking.

4. Equivalent Level of Safety Findings and Special Conditions

4. Equivalent Level of Safety Findings and Special Conditions

The FAA has applied most of the SSA criteria proposed in this NPRM to certification projects for the past 15 years, through equivalent level of safety (ELOS) findings under § 21.21. The topics of these findings include flight control systems (§ 25.671(c)) as recommended by the FCHWG; thrust reversers (§ 25.933(a)(1)) as recommended by the PPIHWG; and general SSA criteria (Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309) as recommended by the SDAHWG.

Modern transport category airplanes are equipped with systems that, directly or as a result of failure or malfunction, affect structural performance. However, current regulations do not require applicants to take into account loads on the airplane due to the effects of system failures on structural performance. Therefore, the FAA has applied special conditions that require the effects of system failures be taken into account in the design. The FAA based the provisions of these special conditions, titled "Interaction of Systems and Structures," on the criteria developed by the ARAC working groups, and propose to codify these special conditions in proposed § 25.302.

Finally, the FAA has applied the requirements in proposed § 25.671(a), (e), and (f) for fly-by-wire control systems to recent type certificate applications through means of compliance issue papers and special conditions. 5. Harmonization With European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Standards

EASA certification standards for large airplanes (CS-25) prescribes the airworthiness standards corresponding to 14 CFR part 25 for transport category airplanes certified by the European Union. Applicants for FAA type certification of transport category airplanes may also seek EASA validation of the FAA's type certificate. Where part 25 and CS-25 differ, an applicant must meet both airworthiness standards to obtain a U.S. type certificate and validation of the type certificate by foreign authorities, or obtain exemptions, ELOS findings or special conditions, or the foreign authority's equivalent to those, as necessary to meet one standard in lieu of the other. Where FAA and EASA can maintain harmonized requirements, applicants for type certification benefit by having a single set of requirements with which they must show compliance, thereby reducing the cost and complexity of certification and codifying a consistent level of safety.

EASA incorporated the SDAHWG-recommended changes to Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309, and associated guidance, in its initial issuance of CS-25 on October 17, 2003.\22\ EASA incorporated the criteria regarding interaction of systems and structures recommended by the LDHWG into its regulatory framework as CS 25.302 and appendix K of CS-25 at amendment 25/1 on December 12, 2005.\23\ EASA incorporated the ASAWG-recommended regulatory and advisory material implementing consistent SSA criteria, at amendment 25/24 to CS-25, on January 10, 2020.\24\ This proposed NPRM would harmonize FAA requirements with EASA to the extent possible, with differences described in the Discussion of the Proposed Rule.

\22\ https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/1516/en..

\23\ https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/certification-specifications/cs-25-amendment-1.

\24\ https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/108354/en.

6. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act

6. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act

This proposal would update the requirements and guidance for system safety assessments to support, in part, the requirements of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, Public Law 116-260 (the Act). Section 115(b)(1)(A) of the Act states that the Administrator of the FAA shall require an applicant for an amended type certificate for a transport airplane to perform a system safety assessment with respect to each proposed design change that the Administrator determines is significant, with such assessment considering the airplane-level effects of individual errors, malfunctions, or failures and realistic pilot response times to such errors, malfunctions, or failures. Currently, § 25.1309 requires this action, not just for significant design changes, but for all design changes affecting systems. Specifically, § 25.1309(b) requires applicants assess safety at the airplane level for airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems.

Section 25.1309(d) specifies that compliance to § 25.1309(b) must be shown by analysis and appropriate testing, and must consider possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and damage and also that the assessment consider crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults. In the context of § 25.1309, "corrective action" means flightcrew procedures for use after failure detection to enable continued safe flight and landing.\25\ The proposed § 25.1309 would remove the current content of § 25.1309(d), and place that content in draft AC 25.1309-1B, along with expanded guidance on the safety assessment process, because (1) the proposed § 25.1309 would be a performance-based regulation for which methods of compliance are more appropriately provided in guidance, and (2) the items for consideration listed in § 25.1309(d) constitute an incomplete method of compliance to § 25.1309(b), as explained in section III.G.1 of this preamble.

\25\ AC 25.1309-1A provides guidance on including flightcrew corrective action in showing compliance to § 25.1309. Draft AC 25.1309-1B, sections 5.3 and 5.4, would provide updated guidance.

Section 115(b)(1)(B) of the Act states that the system safety assessments required by section 115(b)(1)(A) of the Act be updated for each subsequent proposed design change that the Administrator determines is significant. As discussed, § 25.1309 already requires this action not just for significant design changes, but for all design changes affecting systems. This proposed rulemaking would update the analysis necessary for airplane-level effects of individual errors, malfunctions, or failures.

Section 115(b)(1)(C) of the Act states that applicants must provide to the FAA the data and assumptions underlying each assessment and amended assessment. Draft AC 25.1309-1B, which accompanies this rulemaking, states that a system safety assessment, to show compliance, should provide data such as component failure rates and their sources and applicability, and support any assumptions made. Section 7.9 of the draft AC provides detailed guidance on identification and justification of assumptions, data, and analytic techniques.

Section 115(b)(1)(D) of the Act states that applicants must provide for document traceability and clarity of explanations for changes to aircraft type designs and system safety assessment certification documents. Appendix C of Draft AC 25.1309-1B, describes the safety assessment process, and states that a system safety assessment, to show compliance, should include, among other things, a statement of the functions, boundaries, and interfaces of the system and a description that establishes correctness and completeness and traces the work leading to the conclusions of the SSA.

These updates to system safety assessment requirements, and to implementing guidance, would provide a foundation to address how human (flight crew) response is treated and validated within the context of the required analysis. As required by Section 126 of the Act, the FAA is researching pilot responses to errors, malfunctions and failures, and may use that research in the future to update guidance in this regard.

C. NTSB Recommendations

C. NTSB Recommendations

As a result of the aforementioned 1994 Pittsburgh accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued two safety recommendations relevant to this rulemaking, A-99-22 and A-99-23.\26\ In Safety Recommendation A-99-22, the NTSB recommends that the FAA ensure that future transport category airplanes provide a reliably redundant rudder actuation system. In Safety Recommendation A-99-23, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require type certificate applicants to show that transport category airplanes are capable of continued safe flight and landing after jamming of a flight control at any deflection possible, up to and including its full deflection, unless the applicant shows that such a jam is extremely improbable. This proposed rule would implement these recommendations by revising § 25.671(c).

\26\ NTSB Safety Recommendations A-99-22 and A-99-23 are available in the docket and at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A99_20_29.pdf.

The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-02-51 \27\ following an accident in January 2000, in which a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-83 airplane crashed into the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the jackscrew assembly of the horizontal stabilizer trim system. This failure was related to maintenance of this critical system; specifically, the excessive and accelerated wear of a critical part as a result of insufficient lubrication. In Safety Recommendation A-02-51, the NTSB recommends that the FAA review and revise airplane certification regulations, and associated guidance applicable to the certification of transport category airplanes, to ensure that applicants fully address wear-related failures so that, to the maximum extent possible, such failures will not be catastrophic. The proposed requirement to include CMRs in the ALS would respond to this safety recommendation, as would the draft ACs accompanying this NPRM that contain guidance on assessing wear-related failures as part of the SSA.

\27\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-02-51 is available in the docket and at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A02_36_51.pdf.

The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-14-119 \28\ following an incident in January 2013, in which the APU lithium-ion battery installed in a Boeing Model 787-8 airplane caught fire when the airplane was parked at a gate at Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts. In Safety Recommendation A-14-119 the NTSB recommends that the FAA to provide its certification engineers with written guidance and training to ensure that assumptions, data sources, and analytical techniques are fully identified and justified in applicants' safety assessments for designs incorporating new technology. Additionally, the NTSB recommends that an appropriate level of conservatism be included in the analysis or design, consistent with the intent of the draft guidance material that the SDAHWG recommended. Draft AC 25.1309-1B, accompanying this NPRM, would contain the recommended guidance.\29\

\28\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-14-119 is available in the docket and https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-14-113-127.pdf.

\29\ This advisory circular, and the other advisory circulars that accompany this proposal, are in the docket for review and comment.

III. Discussion of the Proposed Rule

III. Discussion of the Proposed Rule

After consideration of the issues in the Statement of Problem, the relevant NTSB recommendations, and ARAC recommendations, the FAA proposes to revise several regulations to change how applicants would conduct SSAs.

A. Consistent Safety Assessment Criteria for Airplane Systems

1. Average Risk Criteria (§ 25.1309(b)(1), (2), and (3))

1. Average Risk Criteria (§ 25.1309(b)(1), (2), and (3))

Current § 25.1309(b) requires applicants to design the systems and associated components (considered both separately and in relation to each other) of their proposed transport category airplane to meet two criteria. First, these systems must be designed so that the occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable (§ 25.1309(b)(1)). Second, each system must be designed so that the likelihood of any other failure condition which would reduce the capability of the airplane, or of its flightcrew, to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable (§ 25.1309(b)(2)).

The FAA proposes to revise § 25.1309(b) to establish risk criteria that can be used consistently across multiple airplane systems, harmonize FAA regulations with EASA Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes (CS) 25.1309(b), and codify commonly issued ELOS findings. The proposed revisions would require that type certificate applicants design and install airplane systems and associated components, evaluated both separately and in relation to other systems, so that--

• Each catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable and does not result from a single failure;

• Each hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and

• Each major failure condition is remote.

As noted previously, the current rule (§ 25.1309(b)(2)) requires any failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to be "improbable" (on the order of 10-9 < p <= 10-5, where p is probability of failure per flight hour). This condition is characterized by AC 25.1309-1A as "major," and it represents a broad spectrum of probability.

As previously discussed, the FAA has issued ELOS findings for more than a decade to accept use of the ARAC-recommended revision to Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309 in lieu of Sec. § 25.1301 and 25.1309, and the accompanying "Arsenal" version of AC 25.1309-1 as the method of compliance. In the "Arsenal" version, the "major" failure condition is divided into two categories: "hazardous" and "major", with corresponding probability requirements of "extremely remote" (on the order of 10-9 < p <= 10-7) and "remote" (on the order of 10-7 < p <= 10-5)." The granular assessment of failure conditions in the "Arsenal" version is beneficial because it allows for more accurate analysis of highly integrated systems and better differentiation of failure effects on flightcrew than the current requirements of § 25.1309(b). The "hazardous" category in the "Arsenal" version corresponds to the more severe end of the "major" category in current § 25.1309(b)(2), which is referred to as "severe major" in AC 25.1309-1A, "System Design and Analysis," dated June 21, 1988.

This proposal would codify current practice by adding the "hazardous" failure condition category and its probability requirement, replace the probability term "improbable" with "remote" for major failure conditions, and prohibit catastrophic single failure. a. Inclusion of Specific Failure Condition Categories and Probabilities

An objective of this proposal is to align the regulatory terms used in 14 CFR part 25 to describe failure condition categories and probabilities with the terms used in the most recent transport airplane certification projects (whose SSAs use the methods in the "Arsenal" version of AC 25.1309-1 and in EASA CS 25.1309 and accompanying guidance). Proposed § 25.1309(b) would use terms that are already used by the aviation industry to describe failure condition categories and probabilities. Additionally, since the FAA also uses these terms in other part 25 regulations, such as Sec. § 25.671, 25.981, and 25.1709, the FAA proposes to define them in a new § 25.4, "Definitions." Although the terminology in § 25.1309(b) would change from the current regulations, the intent and usage of those terms would not change as a result.

b. Prohibiting Catastrophic Single Failures

b. Prohibiting Catastrophic Single Failures

Proposed § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii) would prohibit a proposed design from allowing any single failure that could result in a catastrophic failure condition (i.e., a "fail-safe" design requirement). The requirement that applicants assume that any single failure could occur and that such failure not prevent continued safe flight and landing was codified in 1965 as § 25.1309. The FAA inadvertently removed from § 25.1309 the requirement for fail-safe design in 1970 at amendment 25-23,\30\ although the agency retained guidance on fail-safe design. The purpose of the FAA's guidance on fail-safe design, has been to convey the objectives of the fail-safe design concept, and provide principles and techniques for its usage by applicants.

\30\ 35 FR 5674 (Apr. 8, 1970).

Amendment 25-23 also amended § 25.671(c) to prohibit catastrophic single failures in flight control systems. At that time, § 25.901(c) applied § 25.1309 to powerplant installation, requiring applicants to assume in their safety assessments that any single failure could occur. With amendment 25-40 in 1977,\31\ the FAA amended § 25.901(c) to explicitly prohibit catastrophic single failures in systems associated with the powerplant installation because § 25.1309 did not prohibit catastrophic single failures.

\31\ 42 FR 15042 (Mar. 17, 1977).

This proposed rule would also make the requirements for safety assessments of flight control systems and powerplant installations consistent with the requirements for other systems in regard to prohibiting catastrophic single failures. Systems covered by the proposed Sec. § 25.671(c) and 25.901(c) would be required to comply with the § 25.1309 prohibition of catastrophic single failures under all operating and environmental conditions under which the airplane was approved to operate. Incorporation of fail-safe design requirements across all the critical systems of the airplane would ensure consistent safety objectives are implemented. Further discussion of proposed changes to Sec. § 25.671(c) and 25.901(c) is provided in sections III.E and III.B.2.d of this preamble, respectively. 2. Latent Failures in System Designs a. Proposed Criteria--§ 25.1309(b)(4)

The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph (b)(4) to § 25.1309 that would require applicants to avoid SLFs whenever practical. The purpose of proposed § 25.1309(b)(4) is to reduce an airplane's exposure to SLFs by establishing the following hierarchy of safety requirements. First, the applicant must eliminate SLFs. If the elimination of the SLF is not practical, then the applicant must limit the likelihood of that SLF to 1/1000 between inspections. If the applicant proves that it is not practical to comply with the 1/1000 criterion, then the applicant must design the system to minimize the failure's latency; that is, minimize the length of time the failure is expected to be present, and remain undetected.

The FAA intends the proposed rule to minimize the latency of SLFs and achieve the safety objective of the ASAWG's recommendation to avoid SLFs whenever practical. The FCHWG, PPIHWG, and ASAWG each recommended the 1/1000 value to limit the latency period in the failure conditions specific to that working group's technical area. The FAA proposes that application of the 1/1000 criterion to every system that may contain a SLF is a necessary safety measure that an applicant can apply. This 1/ 1000 criterion is necessary to reduce exposure of the airplane to latent failures that leave the airplane one failure away from a hazardous or catastrophic condition. This criterion is cost effective as described in the costs and benefits section of this NPRM.

An applicant may be able to show, in rare situations, that it is not practical to meet the 1/1000 criterion. One possible example is if compliance with the 1/1000 criterion would necessitate complex or invasive maintenance tasks on the flight line, increasing the risk of incorrect maintenance. In such situations, safety may be better served if the operator inspects for latent failures at a maintenance facility or at a longer inspection interval, even though the longer inspection interval could mean the probability of the latent failure exceeds 1/ 1000; however, the applicant must minimize the time the failure is expected to be present. The FAA expects that an applicant would likely integrate these steps into its normal design processes. During the FAA's review of an applicant's proposed demonstration of compliance with the other provisions of § 25.1309(b), if the FAA determines that it may be practical to eliminate or further reduce exposure to a SLF, then these proposed regulations would require the applicant to either redesign the system or demonstrate the impracticality of that redesign. b. Proposed Criteria--§ 25.1309(b)(5)

The FAA proposes a new standard for limiting the risk of a CSL+1 failure condition (a catastrophic failure combination that results from a single latent failure plus one additional failure). Under current regulations, an operator could unknowingly dispatch an airplane with a potential CSL+1 failure condition. Under this proposal, when conducting SSAs, an applicant would be required to apply additional criteria in proposed § 25.1309(b)(5) (pertaining to additional fault tolerance, residual risk, and probability of latent failures) to limit the specific risk of a CSL+1 failure condition, in addition to the requirement in § 25.1309(b)(1).\32\

\32\ The draft Regulatory Impact Analysis in the docket for this rulemaking refers to this part of the proposal as the "specific risk rule."

i. Additional Fault Tolerance

i. Additional Fault Tolerance

For each potential catastrophic failure condition that results from two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight, the applicant would be required by § 25.1309(b)(5)(i) to show that it is impractical to design the system with additional fault tolerance. For example, if practical, the applicant could add a failure monitor, thereby eliminating the latency of the first (undetected) failure. Or, the applicant could design additional redundancy in the system, so that the second failure would not be catastrophic. In either case, the condition resulting from the failure combination would no longer create a CSL+1 failure condition. ii. Limiting the Residual Risk to a "Remote" Probability

The FAA proposes § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii), which would adopt the ASAWG recommendation to limit the total probability that any single failure could lead to a catastrophe following a latent failure. This total probability could be no greater than "remote." The ASAWG recommended the "remote" criterion based on the reliability of components typically used in systems that have a redundant means to protect against catastrophic single failures. These components have demonstrated a level of reliability, on the order of 1x10-\5\ per flight hour, which was consistent with the SDAHWG's recommended probability guidelines (the "Arsenal" version of AC 25.1309, and EASA Acceptable Means of Compliance 25.1309) for showing "remote" probability. The ASAWG reasoned that establishing a higher standard than "remote" could require redesign of systems that have an acceptable in-service safety record, and the FAA agrees with this rationale.

Therefore, the FAA proposes that this "remote" criterion, in combination with the criterion to limit latency to a maximum probability of 1/1000, would establish an acceptable level of safety for potential CSL+1 failure conditions. Also, if a system has multiple potential failure combinations that lead to the same CSL+1 failure condition, each combination of which contains the same latent failure, the applicant would be required to sum the probabilities of the non-latent failures. The resulting sum of probabilities would also have to meet the "remote" criterion. iii. Limiting the Probability of Latent Failures to 1/1000

Proposed § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii) would limit the probability of occurrence of a latent failure in a CSL+1 combination to 1/1000. The 1/ 1000 value would be the proposed maximum allowable probability of a latent failure. To comply, the applicant would multiply the maximum time the latent failure is allowed to be present by the component failure rate, and show that the resultant value is less than or equal to 1/1000. The maximum time is typically the time between inspections. The ASAWG recommended limiting the probability of occurrence of a latent failure in a CSL+1 combination to be "on the order of" 1/1000 or less. The FAA and Transport Canada submitted dissenting opinions, documented in the ASAWG final report, that the phrase "on the order of" would defeat the purpose of establishing a clear criterion for limiting the likelihood of a latent failure; therefore, this proposal omits that phrase. Instead, the 1/1000 value would be the maximum allowable probability of a latent failure occurring between inspections.

To determine this 1/1000 limit, the ASAWG drew on the knowledge of the FCHWG and PPIHWG, both of which determined that 1/1000 was a practical limit on the probability of a latent failure in the flight control and thrust reversing systems. The ASAWG evaluated safety analysis data and found that the probability of a latent failure between inspections very rarely exceeded 1/1000.\33\ The FAA has accepted this numerical value in the certification of these particular systems through ELOS findings and determined that applicants can apply it across all systems.

\33\ The ASAWG recommendation report is available in the docket for this NPRM.

B. Consistent Application and Interpretation of Requirements for Equipment, Systems, and Installations

B. Consistent Application and Interpretation of Requirements for Equipment, Systems, and Installations

1. Applicability of § 25.1309

Applicants have raised numerous questions regarding the applicability of § 25.1309. The FAA therefore proposes to revise § 25.1309 as follows: a. Introductory Paragraph of § 25.1309

1. Applicability of § 25.1309

The FAA proposes to add an introductory paragraph to § 25.1309, which specifies that the rule applies to all systems and equipment on the airplane. Section 25.1309(a) currently requires that applicants design and show that only the equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by Subchapter C--Aircraft will perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition (amendment 25-123, dated December 10, 2007). This proposed rule would adopt the SDAHWG's recommendation to remove the limitation to Subchapter C, which would broaden the applicability of § 25.1309 to any system or equipment as installed on the airplane, regardless of whether it is required for type certification or by operating rules. b. Section 25.1309(a)--Criteria for Two Classes of Installed Equipment and Systems

The FAA proposes to remove § 25.1301(a)(4), which requires that installed equipment function properly when installed, and address that requirement through proposed § 25.1309(a), which would contain requirements for two different classes of equipment and systems installed in the airplane: (1) equipment and systems that are required for type certification or by operating rules, or whose improper functioning would reduce safety; and (2) all other systems. c. Section 25.1309(a)(1)--Airplane Equipment and Systems Whose Improper Functioning Would Reduce Safety

Proposed § 25.1309(a)(1) would apply to all installed airplane equipment and systems whose improper functioning would reduce safety, regardless of whether the equipment or system is required by type certification rules or operating rules. Such equipment and systems would be required to perform as intended under the airplane operating and environmental conditions. A failure or malfunction of equipment or systems reduces safety if the failure or malfunction results in a minor or more severe failure condition. The FAA recognizes, however, that failures may occur throughout the operational life of the airplane, and that a failed system may no longer perform as intended. The acceptability of failures and their associated risks are covered by the fail-safe regulations, such as Sec. § 25.901(c), 25.1309(b), 25.671(c), 25.735(b)(1), 25.810(a)(1)(v), 25.812, 25.903(d)(1), and 25.1316.

The FAA further proposes new § 25.1309(a)(1) to require that equipment and systems perform as intended not just under airplane operating conditions as required by current § 25.1309(a), but under environmental conditions as well. This change is needed to remove an ambiguity in the current regulations, and ensure that an applicant's safety assessment is complete.

Current § 25.1309(a) requires that each such item perform its intended functions under "any foreseeable operating condition," but does not mention "environmental conditions." The method of compliance to the rule in AC 25.1309-1A discusses both types of conditions. To perform the safety assessment using the method in that AC, the applicant must account for the airplane operating conditions (such as weight, center of gravity, altitudes, flap positions) and the environmental conditions that the airplane is reasonably expected to encounter (such as atmospheric turbulence, lightning, or precipitation).

The FAA has not required that systems and components perform as intended in foreseeable but easily avoidable environmental conditions, such as volcanic ash clouds. Thus, the FAA proposes to remove "any foreseeable" from § 25.1309(a)(1). This change would also harmonize with CS 25.1309(a)(1).

The intent of this change is to ensure that the applicant evaluates the continued function of equipment and systems--

• Throughout the airplane's normal operating envelope, as defined by the airplane flight manual (AFM), together with any modification to that envelope associated with abnormal or emergency procedures, and any anticipated crew action; and

• Under the anticipated external and internal airplane environmental conditions in which the equipment and systems must perform as intended.

The proposed language in § 25.1309(a)(1) is consistent with existing FAA guidance \34\ regarding environmental conditions because it would allow that, even if certain environmental conditions are foreseeable, performing as intended in those conditions is not always possible. For example, ash clouds from volcanic eruptions are foreseeable, but an applicant does not have to show that the airplane can safely operate in such clouds, relying instead on forecasting and air traffic control means to avoid such conditions.

\34\ AC 25.1309-1A, section 8.e. provides guidance on incorporation of environmental conditions in SSA.

d. Section 25.1309(a)(2--Equipment and Systems With No Effect on the Safety of the Airplane or Its Occupants

d. Section 25.1309(a)(2--Equipment and Systems With No Effect on the Safety of the Airplane or Its Occupants

Current § 25.1309(a) requires that all equipment, systems, and installations function properly when installed. However, the proper functioning of non-essential equipment is typically not necessary for safe operation of the airplane. These non-essential systems include passenger amenities such as entertainment displays, audio systems, in-flight telephones, non-emergency lighting, and food storage and preparation.

Proposed § 25.1309(a)(2) would require all equipment and systems not subject to proposed § 25.1309(a)(1) to not have an adverse effect on the safety of the airplane or its occupants, and would allow such equipment to be approved even if that equipment may not perform as intended. Consequently, this proposal would reduce the testing needed for those equipment and systems installations, because they would not need to meet the operational and environmental condition requirements of proposed § 25.1309(a)(1). The proposed § 25.1309(a)(2) would, however, require applicants to test such systems, equipment, and installations to show that their normal or abnormal functioning does not adversely affect the proper functioning of the equipment, systems, and installations covered by proposed § 25.1309(a)(1); and does not otherwise adversely affect the safety of the airplane or its occupants.

No safety benefit is derived from demonstrating that equipment performs as intended, if failing to perform as intended would not impact safety. Instead, the FAA would expect that an applicant perform a qualitative evaluation of the design and installation of such equipment and systems installed in the airplane to determine that neither their normal operation nor their failure would adversely affect crew workload, operation of other systems, or the safety of persons.

The FAA expects normal installation practices to result in sufficiently obvious isolation of the impacts of such equipment on safety that compliance can be based on a relatively simple qualitative installation evaluation. If the possible impacts, including failure modes or effects, are uncertain, or isolation between systems is provided by complex means, then more formal structured evaluation methods or a design change may be necessary. Guidance on performing qualitative evaluations is provided in draft AC 25.1309-1B.

This proposed change would reduce the cost of certification to airplane and equipment manufacturers and modifiers without reducing the level of safety provided by part 25. e. Applicability of § 25.1309 to In-Service and Out-of-Service Conditions

Applicants have questioned whether, when showing compliance with § 25.1309, they must consider out-of-service conditions or risks to persons other than the occupants of the airplane. Compliance with § 25.1309 applies to flight operating conditions as well as ground operating conditions, consistent with current practice. Draft AC 25.1309-1B, specifies that compliance is applicable to ground operating conditions when the airplane is in service. An airplane is in service from the time the airplane arrives at a gate or other location for pre-flight preparations, until it is removed from service. While ground operating conditions include conditions associated with line maintenance and refueling, dispatch determinations, embarkation and disembarkation, and taxi, they do not include periods of shop maintenance, storage, or other out-of-service activities. Applicants should also account for threats to people on the ground or adjacent to the airplane during ground operations, electric shock threats to mechanics, and other similar situations. f. Applicability of § 25.1309 to High Intensity Radiated Fields and Lightning Exposure

The ASAWG recommended that a future committee address how applicants should account for systems' exposure to high intensity radiated fields (HIRF) and lightning when showing compliance with § 25.1309(b). The FAA acknowledges that follow-on regulatory or policy action may be necessary to ensure this topic is addressed in a manner that is both effective and practical. This proposed rule and the associated advisory material are not intended to change how type certificate applicants account for systems' exposure to HIRF and lightning when demonstrating compliance with § 25.1309. Historically, considerations of lightning and HIRF in determining failure effects have been limited to specific potential failures of concern, such as failure of protection features, including critical isolation features, that are dedicated to protecting the airplane from the effects of lightning. Under the proposed changes to § 25.1309, applicants would continue to apply § 25.1309 in addressing the effects of HIRF and lightning as described in the prior sentence. Testing and qualitative evaluations may still be used as a means of compliance. Use of lightning and HIRF probabilities in quantitative analyses is also still allowed but not required. The proposed revision to § 25.1309 would not supersede the more specific requirements of Sec. § 25.1316 and 25.1317. 2. Exceptions From Applicability of § 25.1309 a. Flight Control Jams Addressed by § 25.671

Proposed § 25.1309(e) would exclude the flight control jams governed by § 25.671 from the proposed single-failure requirement in § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii). The FAA has historically used § 25.671(c) rather than § 25.1309 to regulate the risk of flight control jams. Proposed § 25.671(c) would continue this approach because flight control jams are an unusual failure condition in which the control position is critical to the outcome of the condition. Therefore, specifying a flight control jam as a "single failure" does not fully define the failure condition because the control position is not defined. The current and proposed § 25.671(c) specify that the applicant must evaluate flight control jams at "normally encountered" positions. Additionally, proposed § 25.671(c) would not require evaluation of flight control jams immediately before touchdown if the applicant shows that such jams are extremely improbable, as explained later in this preamble in the section entitled, "Changes to § 25.671(c)(3)." Therefore, this type of failure would be excluded from the prohibition on a single failure being the cause of a catastrophic failure condition under § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii). b. Brakes and Braking Systems, Addressed by § 25.735

Proposed § 25.1309(b) would not apply to single failures in the brake system. Those failures are adequately addressed by § 25.735(b)(1) at amendment 25-107, which limits the effect of a single failure of the brake system to doubling the stopping distance of the brake roll. The diverse circumstances under which such a failure could occur make any structured determination of its outcome or frequency indeterminate. The proposed § 25.1309 would apply to all other failures in the brake system. c. Emergency Egress Assist Means and Escape Routes, Addressed by § 25.810, and Emergency Lighting, Addressed by § 25.812

Proposed § 25.1309(f) would also exclude the failure effects addressed by Sec. § 25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812 from § 25.1309(b). The failure conditions relevant to the cabin safety equipment installations addressed by Sec. § 25.810(a)(1)(v) (escape slides) and 25.812 (emergency lighting) are associated with varied evacuation scenarios for which the probability of occurrence cannot be determined due to the multitude of factors that can lead to an evacuation. For these types of equipment, the FAA has not been able to define appropriate scenarios under which an applicant could demonstrate compliance with § 25.1309(b). The FAA considers it acceptable in terms of safety, to require particular design features or specific reliability demonstrations for these types of equipment and, therefore, the FAA proposes to exclude them from the requirements of § 25.1309(b). d. Powerplant--Installation, Addressed by § 25.901(c)

The FAA proposes to revise § 25.901(c) to state that the requirements of § 25.1309 apply to powerplant and APU installations and to list the failures that do not need to comply with § 25.1309(b). Those exceptions, which would be consistent with existing requirements, are engine case burn-through or rupture, uncontained engine rotor failure, and propeller debris release. The FAA specifies those exceptions in proposed Sec. § 25.901(c) and 25.1309(f). Excepting these failures from § 25.1309(b) would not degrade the level of safety from that required by current regulations. An applicant must already minimize the effects and occurrence rates of these failures when complying with:

• Part 33, "Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines."

• Part 35, "Airworthiness Standards: Propellers."

• Paragraph (d)(1) of § 25.903, "Engines."

• Paragraph (d) of § 25.905, "Propellers."

• Section 25.1193, "Cowling and nacelle skin."

This proposed revision would also harmonize § 25.901(c) with CS 25.901(c). 3. Flightcrew Alerting and Errors a. Categorization of Required Flightcrew Information

Section 25.1309(c) currently requires that warning information must be provided to the flightcrew to alert them to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. The FAA proposes to revise § 25.1309(c) to require information be provided to the flightcrew concerning unsafe system operating conditions, rather than requiring only warnings. The proposed revisions to § 25.1309(c) would make the provision compatible with the requirements of current § 25.1322 ("Warning, caution, and advisory lights"), which details requirements for the presentation of warning, caution, and advisory alerts installed on the flight deck. For example, § 25.1322 requires a warning indication if immediate action by a flightcrew member were necessary; however, the particular method of indication would depend on the urgency and need for flightcrew awareness or action that is necessary for the particular failure. The proposed revision to § 25.1309(c) (to remove the requirement for "alert") would remove an incompatibility with § 25.1322, which allows other sensory and tactile feedback from the airplane caused by inherent airplane characteristics to be used in lieu of dedicated indications and annunciations if the applicant can show such feedback is sufficiently timely and effective to allow the crew to take corrective action.\35\

\35\ See draft AC 25.1309-1B, sections 5.3.1.6 and 5.4.1.

b. Minimization of Crew Errors

Proposed § 25.1309(c) would require that applicants design "systems and controls, including indications and annunciations" to minimize crew errors that could create additional hazards. The proposed change would remove a reference to "warnings," which are addressed in § 25.1322, and instead use the broader phrase "indications and annunciations." The additional hazards that an applicant's proposed design must minimize, under this proposal, are those that could occur after a failure and those caused by inappropriate actions made by a crewmember in response to the failure. As specified in § 25.1585, any flightcrew procedures necessary to ensure continued safe flight and landing after the occurrence of a failure indication or annunciation must be described in the approved AFM, AFM revision, or AFM supplement, unless the FAA evaluates the procedures and accepts that the procedures are part of normal aviation abilities.

C. Interaction of Systems and Structures (New § 25.302)

C. Interaction of Systems and Structures (New § 25.302)

The FAA proposes a new section, § 25.302, that would require an applicant to account for systems, and their possible failure, when assessing the structural performance of its proposed design.

As a result of advances in flight control technology, the structure requirements in part 25 do not provide an adequate regulatory basis to establish an acceptable level of safety for airplanes equipped with systems that affect structural performance such as the electronic flight control system. Earlier automatic control systems usually had two failure states: loss of function and malfunction. Flightcrews could readily detect these conditions. The new electronic flight control systems are more sophisticated and offer advantages that include load limiting and load alleviation.\36\ Failures in these systems, however, may allow the system to function in degraded modes that flightcrews may not readily detect, and in which load alleviation may be lost or reduced.

\36\ "Load limiting and load alleviation" refer to the reduction of structural loads by automatic control surface limits or movements. For example, vertical tail loads may be reduced by a rudder limiter that automatically reduces the rudder deflection upper limit as speed increases. Wing load alleviation may be accomplished by automatic upward movements of the outboard ailerons during a pitch up maneuver, thereby reducing the loads on the outboard portion of the wing.

The LDHWG developed recommendations for design standards for airplanes equipped with systems that, directly or as a result of failure, affect the structural performance of the airplane. Structural performance is the capability of the airplane to meet the structural requirements of part 25.

While the FAA has applied the LDHWG recommendations for design standards to airplane certification programs since 1999 via special conditions, on December 12, 2005, EASA incorporated the design standards developed by the LDHWG into its regulatory framework as CS 25.302 and appendix K of CS-25 at amendment 25/1.\37\ Similarly, the FAA now proposes to adopt these criteria, with some modifications, as new § 25.302. The codification of these requirements in part 25 will eliminate the need for the FAA to issue special conditions on future certification projects. This will result in increased efficiency for both the FAA and the industry in certification programs, without impacting the level of safety.

\37\ https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/certification-specifications/cs-25-amendment-1.

1. Applicability of New § 25.302

1. Applicability of New § 25.302

Proposed § 25.302 would apply to all systems that affect structural performance of the airplane. A system affects structural performance if it can induce loads on the airframe, or change the response of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions, either when operating normally or as a result of failure. Examples of systems that can affect structural performance are load alleviation systems, modal suppression systems, stability augmentation systems, and fuel management systems, as well as hydraulic, electrical, and mechanical systems. 2. Normal Operation

Proposed § 25.302 would require that an applicant account for the influence of systems, operating normally, when showing compliance with subparts C and D of part 25. The proposed rule would require an applicant to derive limit loads for the conditions specified in subpart C and to account for any behavior or effect of the system on the structural performance of the airplane. This means that the applicant would need to account for any significant nonlinearity, including the rate of displacement of control surfaces, thresholds, or any other system nonlinearities, when deriving limit loads.

Proposed § 25.302 would also require that an applicant shows that the airplane meets the strength requirements of part 25 for static and residual strength, using specified factors to derive ultimate loads from the limit loads. The proposed rule would require the applicant to investigate the effect of nonlinearities beyond limit conditions to ensure that the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the system's behavior below limit conditions. 3. Failure Condition Effect on Structural Performance

Proposed § 25.302(a) through (e) would require an applicant to assess the effect of failure conditions on the airplane's structural performance. Proposed § 25.302 would require assessment of all failure conditions not shown to be extremely improbable, or that result from a single failure, as typically determined by the applicant's system safety assessment.

Proposed § 25.302(a) would require that the airplane's design be able to withstand the loads, including control system loads, resulting from failure conditions, at speeds up to VC/ MC, the design cruising speed. Such loads are limit loads as described in § 25.301, and an applicant then applies a safety factor \38\ of 1.5 to determine the airplane's ultimate loads. Proposed § 25.302(a) would require the applicant to determine the loads assuming "realistic scenarios, including pilot corrective actions." Draft AC 25.1309--1B and AC 25.671-X, "Control Systems--General," would provide guidance for applicants on means of determining these effects of failure conditions, including realistic effects. Under the proposed rule, the applicant would be responsible for developing scenarios that describe the response of the airplane and the response of the pilots following a failure condition, using the guidance in those ACs or another acceptable method.

\38\ A safety factor is a design factor used, in this instance, to provide for the possibility of loads greater than those anticipated in normal operating conditions, and for uncertainties in design.

Proposed § 25.302(b) would require that, in the system-failed state (i.e., after a particular system has failed), the airplane be able to withstand the limit flight and ground load conditions specified in subpart C. The applicant would only be required to assess flight conditions at speeds up to VC/MC or the speed limitation prescribed by the AFM for the remainder of the flight. An applicant must apply a safety factor of 1.5 to determine ultimate loads, with two exceptions.

The first proposed exception to § 25.302(b) would allow a safety factor of 1.0, rather than 1.5, if the failure condition would be immediately annunciated or otherwise obvious to the flightcrew. The proposed rule would also allow the applicant to take into account any relevant reconfiguration and flight limitations specified in the AFM. The FAA proposes a safety factor of 1.0 in this case because the probability is very low that a design load condition would occur after a system failure on the same flight. The probability of an extreme maneuver (i.e., a maneuver that would result in load levels approaching design limit loads) is further reduced because the pilot would be aware that a failure condition had occurred. If relying on annunciation as the method of informing the flightcrew, the applicant should show that the relevant annunciation system is reliable per § 25.1309(b).

The second proposed exception to § 25.302(b) would allow a safety factor of 1.25 if the failure condition would not be annunciated but the probability is extremely remote. The FAA proposes a safety factor of 1.25 in this case because the probability is very low that an extremely remote failure condition and a design load condition would occur on the same airplane, even if the failure condition would not be annunciated.

The FAA does not intend for proposed § 25.302 to require an applicant to evaluate every subpart C load condition under every possible failure condition and at each speed, altitude, and payload configuration for which the airplane is designed. Instead, the FAA anticipates that the applicant would first identify those failure conditions that could impact the loads analysis required by subpart C. The applicant would then select load conditions that the applicant presumes could be affected by those failure conditions. Given the appropriate safety factor (1.0, 1.25, or 1.5), the applicant would then determine whether any of these load conditions, when affected by a failure condition, would yield higher loads than the load conditions without the effects of the failure condition. If so, the applicant would expand its analysis, as necessary, to ensure that the requirement of proposed § 25.302 would be met.

Proposed § 25.302(c) would require that, when conducting the damage tolerance evaluation required by § 25.571, the applicant take into account the fatigue loads induced by any failure condition. The rule would require that these fatigue loads be included as part of the typical loading spectra \39\ at a rate commensurate with the probability of their occurrence.

\39\ "Typical loading spectra" is described in AC 25.571-1D, Damage Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure.

If a failure condition could affect the airplane's residual strength loads, proposed § 25.302(d) would require the applicant to conduct a residual strength evaluation as specified in § 25.571(b) under the assumption that the failure condition had occurred. The proposed rule would allow an applicant to calculate these loads using at least two-thirds of each of the safety factors specified for the static strength assessment. The applicant would conduct this residual strength evaluation, which assumes a system failure condition has occurred, separately from the normal residual strength evaluation required by § 25.571(b), which does not assume a system failure condition has occurred. The two-thirds factor in proposed § 25.302(d) is consistent with the method of determining residual strength loads in § 25.571(b).\40\

\40\ In § 25.571(b), residual strength loads are determined using a safety factor of 1.0, which is two-thirds of the typical safety factor of 1.5 required by § 25.303.

Proposed § 25.302 would not apply to the flight control jam conditions covered by proposed § 25.671(c), or the discrete source events already covered by § 25.571(e). Proposed § 25.671(c) and current § 25.571(e) establish criteria to address these specific failures, and the respective ACs, draft AC 25.671-X and current AC 25.571-1D, Damage Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure, would describe methods of compliance. Proposed § 25.302 would also not apply to any failure or event that is external to (not part of) the system being evaluated and that would itself cause structural damage. These conditions are already addressed by other rules, such as Sec. § 25.365, 25.571, 25.841, and 25.901. 4. Dispatch in a System-Failed State

Proposed § 25.302(e) would provide structural requirements for dispatch under the master minimum equipment list developed by the applicant. If the list would allow dispatch in a system-failed state, the airplane would need to continue to meet the design load requirements of subpart C in that system-failed state, without any reduction in safety factor. The applicant would be allowed to take into account any relevant operating limitations, including configuration changes, specified for the dispatched configuration. In addition, the airplane would also need to meet § 25.302(a) and (b), accounting for any subsequent single failure, and separately, any combination of failures not shown to be extremely remote. 5. Differences Between Proposed § 25.302 and EASA CS 25.302

As noted previously, EASA has incorporated the criteria regarding interaction of systems and structures criteria recommended by the LDHWG into its regulatory framework as CS 25.302 and appendix K of CS-25. Proposed § 25.302 differs from CS 25.302 and appendix K in a number of ways. i. Determination of Safety Factor

The most significant difference between the proposed § 25.302 and CS 25.302 is that the latter defines structural factors of safety and the flutter speed margin on a sliding scale based on probability, while the proposed § 25.302 specifies discrete safety factors and does not change the flutter speed margin currently specified in § 25.629, as described below. ii. Flutter Speed Margin

Proposed § 25.302 does not include any aeroelastic stability requirements and would only address the effect of systems on loads requirements. Section 25.629 and CS 25.302 both specify flutter speed margins for failure conditions. The margins in CS 25.302 are based on the probability of the condition's occurrence, while § 25.629 defines a single speed margin for every failure condition regardless of its probability. The FAA believes the current speed margin specified in § 25.629 is adequate, and there is no need to propose more specific failure criteria based on probability of occurrence. The current speed margin specified in § 25.629, which has been in place since Amendment 25-0 of 14 CFR part 25, has proven effective in service. iii. Regulatory Structure Differences

The FAA's proposal is contained entirely within § 25.302 and does not add a new appendix to part 25. Also, the FAA's proposal would not include the two paragraphs in appendix K of CS-25 that are general in nature and do not contain any specific requirements. These paragraphs, K25.1(a) and (b) of CS-25, discuss application of the requirements in the appendix. iv. Fully Operative Condition

Appendix K of CS-25 includes several paragraphs that require evaluation of the airplane in a system-fully-operative condition. The FAA's proposal would replace those paragraphs with a simpler requirement that the applicant account for the effects of systems when showing compliance with the requirements of subparts C and D. The FAA does not regard this as a substantive difference in the criteria. v. Safety Factor at the Time of Failure

For the applicant's assessment of the failure condition at the time the failure occurs, CS 25.302 allows a reduced safety factor, ranging from 1.5 to 1.25, based on the probability of the failure. The FAA's proposal would require a safety factor of 1.5, regardless of the probability of the failure. The FAA determined it's better to define structural strength capability using discrete factors of safety rather than a sliding scale based on probability because probability estimates are not that precise. The FAA also determined the proposed 1.5 safety factor requirement would be easily met by applicants for type certification because systems that affect structural performance are typically passive systems, which alleviate loads rather than initiate loads. vi. Safety Factor for Continued Flight After Initial Failure

For the assessment of continued flight, after the initial failure condition occurs, CS 25.302 requires the applicant to determine loads for several subpart C load conditions. In contrast, the FAA's proposal would require the applicant to determine loads for any subpart C load condition that would be affected by the failure condition. In addition, CS 25.302 allows a reduced safety factor, ranging from 1.5 to 1.0, based on the probability of the failure condition's occurrence. In contrast, the FAA's proposal would specify a safety factor of 1.5, unless the failure condition would be annunciated, in which case the rule would allow a safety factor of 1.0; or, if the failure condition was extremely remote, the rule would allow a safety factor of 1.25. As noted above, the FAA proposes to use discrete factors of safety rather than a sliding scale based on probability because probability estimates are not that precise. The FAA proposed rule would be simpler to apply than EASA's method because an applicant would use discrete safety factors, rather than sliding scales. For failures that are annunciated, this proposal would be less stringent than CS 25.302, since proposed § 25.302 would allow a safety factor of 1.0 regardless of the probability of failure. However, the FAA's proposal recognizes that annunciation of the failure would limit exposure to a subsequent design load condition to the remainder of the flight. Because of the very low probability of a system failure condition followed by a design load condition occurring on the same flight, the FAA believes a safety factor of 1.0 is appropriate. vii. Fatigue and Damage Tolerance

Both § 25.571 and CS 25.571 require a "residual strength evaluation" of the airplane that demonstrates structural strength capability in the presence of fatigue cracks and any other anticipated environmental or accidental damage. The residual strength loads used for those evaluations are limit loads (safety factor of 1.0). Proposed § 25.302 would mimic the requirement in CS 25.302 for an additional assessment of residual strength using two-thirds of the loads specified for the continuation of flight. However, these loads would vary between § 25.302 and CS 25.302, as described in the previous paragraph.

Proposed § 25.302 would also echo CS 25.302's requirement that the applicant evaluate the fatigue loads induced by any failure condition. However, the FAA proposal is more specific than CS 25.302 in how that evaluation would be accomplished. viii. Failure Annunciation

CS 25.302 outlines various failure annunciation criteria for affected system failure conditions. The FAA's proposal does not specify annunciation criteria, but instead determines the allowable safety factor based upon whether the failure condition would be annunciated. ix. Dispatch Configuration

CS 25.302 requires that anticipated dispatch configurations meet the strength and flutter aspects of CS 25.302, while accounting for the probability of the airplane being in that configuration. The FAA's proposal would require that the structural strength criteria in the proposed rule--§ 25.302(a) through (b)--be met for the airplane in the dispatch configuration while accounting for any subsequent single failure or any subsequent combination of failures not shown to be extremely remote.

D. Turbojet Thrust Reversing Systems

D. Turbojet Thrust Reversing Systems

The current regulation for thrust reversals in flight, § 25.933(a)(1), requires that, during any reversal in flight, the engine will produce no more than flight-idle thrust. Additionally, current § 25.933(a)(1) requires an applicant to show that each operable reverser can be restored to the forward thrust position, and that the airplane is capable of continued safe flight and landing under any possible position of the thrust reverser. Proposed § 25.933(a)(1)(ii) would allow an applicant to demonstrate compliance with § 25.1309(b) for these thrust reversing systems.

The application of the current standards has not precluded the loss of airplane control following the unwanted in-flight deployment of the thrust reverser. The investigation of the 1991 Lauda Air accident involving a Boeing Model 767 airplane revealed that an unwanted in-flight thrust reversal at high speeds and high power conditions on an airplane with wing-mounted, high-bypass turbofan engines can result in disruption of air flow over the wing and the loss of lift and controllability. Until this accident, the service history of in-flight thrust reverser deployment incidents indicated that an in-flight thrust reverser deployment at high power would not result in a catastrophic event. However, engine installations on modern transport category airplanes include high--bypass turbofan engines mounted close to the wing, and forward of the wing leading edge, to reduce aerodynamic drag and provide sufficient ground clearance. As a result, these airplanes do not have a sufficient control margin in the event of an unwanted in-flight thrust reversal and, therefore, cannot comply with the rule during all phases of flight.

To allow applicants for type certification flexibility in their design and achieve the intended level of safety, the FAA proposes to allow an applicant to demonstrate using a system safety assessment, per the proposed 14 CFR 25.1309(b), that unwanted deployment of the thrust reverser will not occur in flight. The FAA derived this option, known as the "reliability option," from the PPIHWG's recommendations.\41\

\41\ For more information about the PPIHWG's recommendations, see the PPIHWG report in the docket for this rulemaking.

The PPIHWG evaluated methods used by applicants to assure reliability of other critical systems to determine if applicants could effectively apply the same requirements to thrust reverser systems. The PPIHWG concluded that design features such as redundant locking mechanisms (eliminating catastrophic single failures) in conjunction with more rigorous design and maintenance assessments (reducing exposure to latent failures) can provide a level of safety equivalent to the current rule. The FAA agrees.

Allowing an applicant to develop thrust reversing systems in compliance with § 25.1309, especially by reducing those systems' exposure to SLFs, would improve the level of safety because unwanted in-flight thrust reverser deployments would not be expected to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one type, and eliminate the need for flightcrew procedures in response to an in-flight thrust reversal. Proposed § 25.1309 would provide a level of safety at least equivalent to current § 25.933(a)(1)(ii). This reliability option would allow an applicant to use a more practical approach to show compliance in all phases of flight for all known engine installations.

This proposal is consistent with the FAA's current practice because the FAA has been implementing the PPIHWG's recommendations through ELOS findings on specific projects since 1994. The FAA has accepted SSAs that show that in-flight thrust reverser deployment is extremely improbable as an alternative to flight tests that show full controllability across the entire flight envelope. The FAA has also accepted a combination of these two methods to allow applicants for type certification more flexibility when demonstrating an ELOS. For example, within that portion of the flight envelope where controllability cannot be shown, applicants have shown that the probability of an unwanted in-flight thrust reversal is extremely improbable. Conversely, applicants who have shown compliance primarily using the reliability option have shown that there are portions of the flight envelope where the airplane is controllable, and an unwanted in-flight deployment can be classified as less severe than catastrophic. This mixed approach has allowed applicants more flexibility in the thrust reverser system design and maintenance intervals than under the traditional rule. Under current ELOS determinations, applicants select either option, or combine them, to achieve the level of safety intended by the rule. With this proposal, the FAA regulations would continue to allow such combinations, but without the need for an ELOS. This will result in increased efficiency for both the FAA and the industry in certification programs, without impacting the level of safety established by § 25.933(a)(1).

Based on the PPIHWG's recommendations, the FAA also proposes that the current requirements in § 25.933(a)(1)--that each operable reverser can be restored to the forward thrust position, and that during any reversal in flight the engine will produce no more than flight-idle thrust--would no longer be necessary given the other proposed changes to this section. If a design can meet § 25.1309(b) without these features, then they need not be mandatory. Further, in accordance with proposed § 25.1309(a), any properly functioning thrust reverser would be required to respond appropriately to all anticipated flightcrew commands.

E. Flight Control Systems Safety Assessment Criteria

E. Flight Control Systems Safety Assessment Criteria

1. Changes to § 25.671(c) Failure Criteria a. Changes to § 25.671(c), (c)(1), and (c)(2)

The current design and failure criteria for flight control systems, in § 25.671(c), were largely derived from Civil Air Regulations 4b.320, which preceded the current 14 CFR part 25 standards established in 1965. The FAA updated those requirements in amendment 25-23 (35 FR 5674, April 8, 1970) to account for automatic and powered flight control technology improvements and to consolidate the failure criteria and make them applicable to the entire control system.

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