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Final Rule Current Issued Sep 27, 2021 27 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

86 FR 53508 Special Conditions: magniX USA, Inc., magni350 and magni650 Model Engines; Electric Engine Airworthiness Standards

These special conditions are issued for the magniX USA, Inc., (magniX), magni350 and magni650 model engines, which operate using electrical technology installed on the aircraft for use as an aircraft engine. These engines have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards applicable to aircraft engines. This design feature is an electric motor, controller, and high-voltage systems as the primary source of propulsion for an aircraft. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

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Vol. 86

Monday,

No. 184

September 27, 2021

Part III

14 CFR Part 33

Special Conditions: magniX USA, Inc., magni350 and magni650 Model Engines; Electric Engine Airworthiness Standards; Final Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Part 33

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0894; Special Conditions No. 33-022-SC]

Special Conditions: magniX USA, Inc., magni350 and magni650 Model Engines; Electric Engine Airworthiness Standards

Agency

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the magniX USA, Inc., (magniX), magni350 and magni650 model engines, which operate using electrical technology installed on the aircraft for use as an aircraft engine. These engines have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards applicable to aircraft engines. This design feature is an electric motor, controller, and high-voltage systems as the primary source of propulsion for an aircraft. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Dates

DATES: Effective October 27, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Bouyer, AIR-624, Propulsion and Energy, Technical Innovation Policy Branch, Aircraft Certification Service, 1200 District Avenue, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7755; [email protected].

Supplementary Information

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On April 18, 2019,\1\ magniX applied for a type certificate for its magni350 and magni650 model electric engines.\2\ The FAA has not previously type certificated an engine that primarily uses electrical technology for propulsion of the aircraft. Electric propulsion technology is substantially different from the technology used in previously certificated aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel; therefore, these engines introduce new safety concerns that need to be addressed in the certification basis.

Background

\1\ The Notice of Proposed Special Conditions, published on November 19, 2020 (85 FR 73644), inaccurately indicated June 4, 2019, as magniX's type certificate application date.

\2\ magniX submitted a comment which notified the FAA that the magniX engine model numbers were changed from magni250 and magni500 to magni350 and magni650, respectively. The model number change does not represent a change in the certification requirements of the engine.

As noted in the Notice of Proposed Special Conditions, the FAA used technical criteria from ASTM F3338-18, Standard Specification for Design of Electric Propulsion Units for General Aviation Aircraft,\3\ along with engine information from magniX and other information, to develop these special conditions. These special conditions establish a level of safety that is equivalent to the level of safety required by title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 33.

\3\ https://www.astm.org/DATABASE.CART/HISTORICAL/F3338-18.htm.

Type Certification Basis

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17(a)(1), generally, magniX must show that magni350 and magni650 model engines meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 33 in effect on the date of application for a type certificate.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (e.g., 14 CFR part 33) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the magni350 and magni650 model engines because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions may be prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other engine model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to the other engine model under § 21.101. The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance with § 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

Novel or Unusual Design Feature

Novel or Unusual Design Feature

The magni350 and magni650 model engines will incorporate the following novel or unusual design feature:

An electric motor, controller, and high-voltage systems is used as the primary source of propulsion for an aircraft.

Discussion

14 CFR Part 33 Developed for Aircraft Engines That Operate Using Aviation Fuel

14 CFR Part 33 Developed for Aircraft Engines That Operate Using Aviation Fuel

Aircraft engines make use of an energy source to drive mechanical systems that provide propulsion for the aircraft. The turbine and reciprocating aircraft engines certified under part 33 use aviation fuel as an energy source. The technology that the FAA anticipated in the development of 14 CFR part 33 converts oxygen and fuel to generate energy through an internal combustion system, which generates heat and mass flow of combustion products for turning shafts attached to propulsion devices such as propellers and ducted fans. Part 33 regulations set forth standards for these engines and mitigate potential hazards resulting from failures and malfunctions. The nature, progression, and severity of engine failures are tied closely to the technology that engine manufacturers use in designing and manufacturing aircraft engines. These technologies involve chemical, thermal, and mechanical systems. Therefore, the existing engine regulations in 14 CFR part 33 address certain chemical, thermal, and mechanically induced failures specific to air and fuel combustion systems operating with cyclically loaded high-speed, high-temperature, highly-stressed components.

magniX's Electric Engines Are Novel or Unusual

magniX's Electric Engines Are Novel or Unusual

The FAA's current airworthiness standards for aircraft engines, 14 CFR part 33, date back to 1964.\4\ The FAA based these airworthiness standards on aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel; such engines have mechanical systems that provide propulsion for aircraft. However, the magniX magni350 and magni650 model engines have a novel or unusual design feature which uses an electrical energy source instead of aviation fuel to drive the mechanical systems. The electric engine is exposed to chemical, thermal, and mechanical operating conditions that are unlike those observed in internal-combustion systems. Therefore, 14 CFR part 33 does not contain adequate safety standards for the magniX magni350 and magni650 model engines' novel or unusual design feature.

\4\ 29 FR 7452.

The two models of electric engine that have been proposed by magniX will use electrical power instead of air and fuel combustion to propel the aircraft. These electric engines will be designed, manufactured, and controlled differently than aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel. They will be built with an electric motor, controller, and high-voltage systems that draw energy from electrical storage or generating systems. The magniX motor, in both models, is a device that converts electrical energy into mechanical energy by electric current flowing through wire coils in the motor, producing a magnetic field that interacts with magnets on the rotating shaft. The controller is a system that consists of two main functional elements: the motor controller and an electric power inverter to drive the motor.\5\ The high-voltage system is a combination of wires and connectors that couple the motor and the controller.

\5\ Sometimes this entire system is referred to as an inverter. Throughout this document, the controller and inverter will be referred to as the controller.

In addition, the technology required to produce these high-voltage and high-current electronic components introduces potential hazards that do not exist in aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel. For example, high-voltage transmission lines, electromagnetic fields, magnetic materials, and high-speed electrical switches form the electric engine's physical properties. However, this technology also exposes the aircraft to potential failures that are not common to aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel, which could adversely affect safety.

magniX's Electric Engines Require a Mix of 14 CFR Part 33 Standards and Special Conditions

magniX's Electric Engines Require a Mix of 14 CFR Part 33 Standards and Special Conditions

Although magniX's proposed electric engines incorporate a novel or unusual design feature that the FAA did not envisage during the development of its existing 14 CFR part 33 airworthiness standards, these engines share some basic similarities, in configuration and function, to engines that use the combustion of fuel and air, and therefore they require similar provisions to prevent common hazards (e.g., fire, uncontained high-energy debris, and loss of thrust control). However, the primary failure concerns and the probability of exposure to common hazards are different for the electric engines. This probability creates a need to develop special conditions to ensure the engine's safety and reliability.

14 CFR part 33 does not fully address aircraft engines like magniX's, which use electrical technology as the primary means of propelling the aircraft. This necessitates the development of special conditions to provide adequate airworthiness standards for these aircraft engines.

The requirements in 14 CFR part 33, subparts B through G, apply to aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel. Subpart B applies to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines. Subparts C and D apply to reciprocating aircraft engines. Subparts E through G apply to turbine aircraft engines. As such, subparts B through G do not adequately address aircraft engines that operate using electrical technology. This necessitates the development of special conditions to ensure a level of safety commensurate with these subparts, as those regulatory requirements do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for aircraft engines that primarily use electrical technology to propel the aircraft.

Discussion of Special Conditions and Comments

Discussion of Special Conditions and Comments

The FAA issued Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 33-19-01-SC (the Notice) for these proposed engines. This document was published in the Federal Register on November 19, 2020 (85 FR 73644). The FAA received comments from eleven organizations and two individuals.

The organizations that commented were Wisk Aero (Wisk), Rolls-Royce North America (Rolls-Royce), GE Aviation (GE), Ampaire Inc. (Ampaire), Textron Aviation (Textron), Associacao Das Industrias Aeroespaciais Do Brasil (AIAB), Safran Electrical & Power (Safran), Airbus Commercial Aircraft (Airbus), magniX USA, Inc. (magniX), Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

The following summarizes each special condition proposed by the FAA; the pertinent comments, and the FAA's response, including whether the FAA made any changes in these final special conditions.

Special Condition No. 1, Applicability

Special Condition No. 1, Applicability

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 1 would require magniX to comply with 14 CFR part 33, except for those airworthiness standards specifically and explicitly applicable only to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines.

Comment Summary: TCCA commented that proposed Special Condition no. 1 could be read in different ways regarding which sections of 14 CFR part 33 apply directly to electric engines and that applicants might disagree when assessing the appropriate airworthiness requirements for their engine designs. TCCA also suggested a manner in which to reformat this special condition.

FAA Response: These special conditions are not intended for all electric engine projects, only for the two models of engine proposed by magniX. Addressing the 14 CFR, part 33 applicability portion of the comment, the requirements in part 33, subpart B, are applicable to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines. Subparts C and D are applicable to reciprocating aircraft engines. Subparts E through G are applicable to turbine aircraft engines. As the magni350 and magni650 model engines are not reciprocating or turbine engines, subparts B through G of part 33 are not applicable to these engines unless these special conditions expressly require compliance, as set forth herein. The FAA did not change the special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA requested that Special Condition no. 1 include an additional requirement. TCCA asked that the FAA require the applicant to specify, within the engine installation manual, the electrical bonding for the installation of the engine and its control system. TCCA explained that proper bonding is required to protect the engine and the control system from the effects of lightning and electrostatic electricity, noting that 14 CFR 33.5(a) does not explicitly require electrical bonding instructions to be included in the engine installation manual.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 10(e) addresses environmental limits for the magniX engines, which include electromagnetic interference, high-intensity radiated fields, and lightning. The assessments that verify environmental limits account for the effects of electrical bonding. A special condition for electrical bonding is not required to establish proper electrical bonding. Special Condition no. 1 mandates compliance with § 33.5(a), which addresses all physical and functional interfaces with the aircraft, including TCCA's recommendation to specify electrical bonding details in the engine installation instructions. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Wisk stated the inclusion of the high voltage and high current electrical system within the system covered by the engine OEM introduces aspects of 14 CFR 23.2525 that have not typically been addressed by engine OEMs before. Wisk added that consideration within the proposed SC for these aspects would ensure a safer product during the development, flight test, and service lifecycle. Wisk proposed the FAA consider applying § 23.2525(a) and (b), and possibly other relevant regulations to the components between the controller and motor in the engine system.

FAA Response: The requirements Wisk identifies in their comment apply to system power generation, storage, and distribution. These special conditions apply only to the magniX engine designs, which do not include the power systems addressed in 14 CFR 23.2525. These power systems are normally approved as part of the airplane. Therefore, any other relevant part 23 airplane requirements would also be addressed during the airplane certification program. The FAA did not change this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Wisk acknowledged that the high voltage and current electrical system is analogous to the traditional fuel system. As such, omitting regulations that are equivalent to all, or parts of 14 CFR 33.67 from these special conditions may result in a loss of a critical interface boundary, resulting in a lack of clear ownership between the airframe and engine OEM. Wisk requested that the FAA clarify within the proposed SC the analogous aspects of § 33.67 for the interface between the engine controller and the airframe electrical system as it relates to voltage and current.

FAA Response: 14 CFR 33.67 includes requirements for features that do not exist in the magniX engine electrical system. However, the analogous aspects of § 33.67 are included Special Condition no. 2, which requires magniX to establish and declare ratings and operating limits based on power-supply requirements for the engine. Therefore, Special Condition no. 2 addresses Wisk's comment. The FAA did not change this special condition as a result of this comment.

Special Condition No. 2, Engine Ratings and Operating Limits

Special Condition No. 2, Engine Ratings and Operating Limits

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 2 would require magniX, in addition to compliance with 14 CFR 33.7(a), to establish engine operating limits related to the shaft horsepower, torque, speed, and duty cycle(s). The duty cycle is an engine rating that declares a performance capability for the load(s) that will be imposed on the engine, including, if applicable, starting, no-load and rest, and de-energized periods, including their durations or cycles and sequence in time.

Comment Summary: Wisk recommended that the FAA expand the ratings and operating limits required by Special Condition no. 2 to include maximum temperature, maximum and minimum voltage, current, and power; and, if applicable, coolant and/or lubrication temperatures & pressures for safe operation.

FAA Response: It is not necessary to impose voltage and current limits to ensure that these magniX engines achieve the same level of safety intended by 14 CFR part 33. The FAA has changed final Special Condition no. 2 to add temperature and power (power-supply) requirements to the engine ratings and operating limits.

Comment Summary: Wisk stated that proposed Special Condition no. 2(a)(1) (Rated Maximum Continuous Power) should not have a time limit as it is continuous. Wisk suggested deleting the word "time" from proposed Special Condition no. 2(a).

FAA Response: The FAA agrees that the power at the "Rated Maximum Continuous Power" rating is not time limited. The FAA has modified final Special Condition no. 2 to remove the time constraint from the rating.

Comment Summary: Wisk suggested that the FAA specify coolant and lubrication temperatures and pressures for safe operation.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with Wisk's suggestion. A special condition is not required for coolant and lubrication (operating) temperatures. Special Condition nos. 6 (Engine cooling) and 14 (Lubrication system) address Wisk's suggestion. No changes were made to this special condition as a result of Wisk's comment.

Comment Summary: Rolls-Royce commented that, by placing a duty cycle on the engine's type certificate data sheet, proposed Special Condition no. 2 would be overly prescriptive when compared to the FAA's requirements for aircraft engines that operate using aviation fuel. Rolls-Royce stated that Special Condition no. 2(b) should be removed, and the FAA should require the applicant to define a duty cycle in the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Operating Manual.

FAA Response: The magni350 and magni650 electric engines have different operating characteristics than conventional reciprocating or turbine engines. The performance capability of electric engine designs is defined, in part, by a duty cycle. Therefore the FAA did not change this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: GE recommended that the FAA modify Special Condition no. 2 to require the applicant to list the engine's cooling fluid as an engine operating limitation, similar to 14 CFR 33.7(b)(3), which requires, for reciprocating engines, established ratings and operating limitations related to oil grade or specification.

FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the comment and has modified final Special Condition no. 2 to require a cooling fluid grade or specification as an operating limit.

Comment Summary: Ampaire commented that the term "power," as used in proposed Special Condition no. 2, is not the most relevant metric for electric machinery and power electronics. Ampaire stated that it understood "power," as used in that condition, to be the electrical power output delivered by the magniX engine. Ampaire recommended that the FAA change the requirement to specify current and voltage.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. As used in Special Condition no. 2, "power" describes the mechanical shaft horsepower supplied by the engine to propel the aircraft and not the electrical power delivered by the engine. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: Ampaire asked that the FAA include more details from ASTM F3338-18, such as those listed in sections 5.3.1-5.3.8, EPU Operating Limitations and Ratings, in Special Condition no. 2.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. ASTM F3338-18 contains technical criteria that the FAA used in developing these special conditions. The airworthiness requirements for these engines include paragraphs from the ASTM specification and from 14 CFR part 33. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Textron recommended that the FAA add engine temperature to the ratings and operating limits mandated by Special Condition no. 2.

FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the comment. The FAA has changed final Special Condition no. 2 to add temperature to the engine ratings and operating limits.

Comment Summary: Textron stated the term "speed," as used in Special Condition no. 2(a), could be misleading and mistaken for aircraft speed or gearbox output-shaft speed. Textron stated the term "speed" should instead be "RPM."

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. Engine speed is typically measured in units that describe a rate of mechanical rotation. In Special Condition no. 2, the word "speed," used in the context of "rotational speed," applies to the output-shaft rotation rate. The applicant can express engine speed using various units, so the measurement unit of the engine shaft rotation does not need to be prescribed in Special Condition no. 2. The FAA did not change the special condition based on the comment.

Comment Summary: Textron recommended that the FAA add rated takeoff power to the required engine ratings and operating limits in Special Condition no. 2.

FAA Response: The FAA agrees and has added "rated takeoff power" to the engine ratings and operating limits in final Special Condition no. 2.

Comment Summary: TCCA suggested that the engine ratings and operating limits not be limited to those proposed in Special Condition no. 2(a). TCCA recommended adding a statement that requires magniX to include any other ratings or limitations that are necessary for the safe operation of the engine.

FAA Response: The engine ratings and operating limits that Special Condition no. 2 requires are based on existing aircraft engine technologies. However, electric engine technology is new to aviation. The FAA has modified Special Condition no. 2 to require additional ratings if they are determined to be necessary for the safe operation of the engine.

Comment Summary: TCCA asked why the FAA did not mandate that the applicant comply with 14 CFR 33.7(d) within Special Condition no. 2. Similarly, AIAB commented that Special Condition no. 2 should mandate compliance with 14 CFR 33.7(d), since the electric motor can be affected by the accuracy of the engine control system and instrumentation.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. Special Condition no. 1 requires that the proposed design complies with Sec. § 33.7(a), 33.7(d), as those requirements are not expressly and explicitly applicable only to reciprocating and turbine engines. The FAA did not change Special Condition no. 2 as a result of these comments.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated that Special Condition no. 2, as proposed, provided requirements "in addition to § 33.7(a)," and then proceeds to replace all of the § 33.7 details with Special Condition no. 2 requirements. TCCA stated the replacement of § 33.7 with Special Condition no. 2, as proposed, removes the determination by the FAA, as well as the concept of "any other information found necessary for the safe operation of the engine." TCCA indicated that § 33.7, combined with § 33.8, should be referenced in the special condition to provide the essential cornerstone for establishing aircraft performance based on installed rated power.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. Special Condition no. 1 requires that the proposed design complies with Sec. § 33.7(a), 33.7(d), and 33.8. Special Condition no. 2 provides requirements in addition to those in § 33.7(a). The concern stated by TCCA is remedied by the inclusion of Sec. § 33.7(a), 33.7(d), and 33.8 within Special Condition no. 1. No change was made to this special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: Regarding the reference to "duty cycle" in proposed Special Condition no. 2(b), and the rating (singular) at that duty cycle, TCCA recommended that the FAA clarify whether the duty cycle corresponds to a flight cycle, a series of flights, or an engine test cycle.

FAA Response: The term duty cycle in Special Condition no. 2 is an engine rating that declares a performance capability for the load(s) that will be imposed on the magniX engines. These capabilities are determined by tests that may include starting, no-load and rest, de-energized periods and their durations (or cycles), and sequence. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA commented that proposed Special Condition no. 2 omitted consideration of electric engines' capability to regenerate electrical power. TCCA recommended that the special conditions provide design, construction, and testing that demonstrate this new capability, while acknowledging that this issue is partially addressed by Special Condition no. 31 (Operation with a variable pitch propeller).

FAA Response: Although electric engines are capable of regenerating electrical power, these special conditions apply only to the magniX engine designs, which are not intended to provide electrical power to an aircraft. Therefore the FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA suggested that the Special Condition no. 10 should be modified to include the following: "If any electrical power is supplied from the aircraft to the engine control system for powering on and operating the engine, the need for and the characteristics of this electrical power, including transient and steady-state voltage limits, must be identified and declared in the engine installation manual."

FAA Response: The FAA modified Special Condition no. 2 as a result of Wisk's comment and TCCA's comment for Special Condition no. 10. The change requires the applicant to establish ratings and operating limits for power-supply requirements, which include voltage and current, to be included in the type certificate data sheet.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated that Special Condition nos. 2(a)(1) and 2(a)(2) address power and time limits and asked if the limits are based on an expected power supply and whether the power supply will be part of the baseline configuration. TCCA recommended including another special condition explaining how the power-supply characteristics will be addressed in the declaration of power ratings and operational limits.

FAA Response: The term "power," as used in Special Condition nos. 2(a)(1) and 2(a)(2), refers to engine shaft horsepower. Special Condition no. 2 has been modified to include the terms "shaft power" and "rated takeoff power."

Comment Summary: TCCA suggested that the FAA modify Special Condition no. 2 to require the propeller overspeed limit to be defined in the engine installation manual for situations involving propeller control malfunctions. TCCA recommended that the FAA add a special condition that requires a "get-home" capability.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. The propeller has its own type certificate, documented ratings, and operating limits, including an overspeed limit. These engines will also have their own ratings and operating limits, including an overspeed limit. Propeller overspeed protection will be managed using the engine and propeller installation manuals' declared ratings and operating limits. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended incorporating the following text to the special conditions: "Each selected rating must be for the lowest power that all engines of the same type may produce under the conditions used to determine that rating at all times between overhaul periods or other maintenance."

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 1 includes a requirement for magniX to comply with 14 CFR 33.8, so the existing requirement in part 33 is applicable to these engines. Special Condition no. 29 (Teardown inspection) requires the engine to be within service limits and eligible for continued operation in accordance with the information submitted for showing compliance with § 33.4, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Therefore, these special conditions address the recommendation by TCCA. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 3, Materials

Special Condition No. 3, Materials

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 3 would require the design of these engines to comply with 14 CFR 33.15, which sets requirements for the suitability and durability of materials used in the engine, and which would otherwise be applicable only to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines.

Comment Summary: Textron highlighted the potential hazards from certain electronic components, such as aging electrolytic capacitors. Textron recommended that the FAA require periodic testing of electrolytic capacitors to determine an appropriate replacement interval to avoid hazardous effects at altitude such as breakdown, corona, flashover, creep, strike distance, and cooling.

FAA Response: These special conditions address the hazards that may result from failure or malfunction of electronic components. Special Condition no. 27 (System and component tests) is a performance-based requirement in which the applicant must show that systems and components will perform their intended functions in all declared environmental and operating conditions. This requirement addresses all types of component failures, including those referenced in Textron's comment. Special Condition no. 13 (Critical and life-limited parts) requires the applicant to show, by a safety analysis or means acceptable to the Administrator, whether rotating or moving components, bearings, shafts, static parts, and non-redundant mount components should be classified, designed, manufactured, and managed throughout their service life as critical or life-limited parts, including electronic parts and components. Special Condition no. 10(g) (Engine control systems) requires the applicant to conduct a control system safety assessment to identify the hazards resulting from control system failures and malfunctions, such as those in Textron's comment. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that these special conditions address the potential for manufacturing errors by appending the following text: "In addition, manufacturing methods and processes must be such as to produce sound structure and mechanisms, and electrical systems that retain the design properties under assumed service conditions declared in the engine installation manual. This includes the effects of deterioration over time, e.g., corrosion."

FAA Response: The 14 CFR part 33 airworthiness requirement for materials (§ 33.15) applies to these engines. The existing part 33 materials requirement is adequate and appropriate for the certification basis for these engines. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 4, Fire Protection

Special Condition No. 4, Fire Protection

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 4 would require the design of these engines to comply with 14 CFR 33.17, which sets requirements to protect the engine and certain parts and components of the airplane against fire, and which would otherwise be applicable only to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines. Additionally, this special condition proposed to require magniX to ensure the high-voltage electrical wiring interconnect systems that connect the controller to the motor are protected against arc faults. An arc fault is a high power discharge of electricity between two or more conductors. This discharge generates heat, which can break down the wire's insulation and trigger an electrical fire. Arc faults can range in power from a few amps to thousands of amps and are highly variable in strength and duration.

Comment Summary: GE proposed that the special conditions include a provision for non-protected electrical wiring interconnects that requires the applicant to conduct an analysis to show that arc faults do not cause hazardous engine effects. GE stated that if electrical wiring interfaces with aircraft parts or components, the potential for arc faults should be communicated to the aircraft manufacturer. In addition, GE recommended that the FAA require the applicant to declare potential arc faults in the engine installation manual.

FAA Response: This special condition has provisions to prevent arc faults in high-voltage wire interconnecting systems from causing hazardous engine effects. Additionally, Special Condition no. 17 (Safety analysis) will have the effect of requiring magniX to account for the intended aircraft application in the engine installation manual. 14 CFR 33.5(c), "Instruction manual for installing and operating the engine," applies to the two magniX engines. These requirements will generate the recommended documentation, such as installation instructions. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated that no special conditions provide standards for the electrical connectors supplied with the motor. TCCA requested clarification of the FAA's intent.

FAA Response: The special condition is a performance-based requirement, which allows flexibility for magniX to design and substantiate components (such as connectors) that they use in their engine design. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 5, Durability

Special Condition No. 5, Durability

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 5 would require the engine design and construction to ensure safe engine operation between maintenance intervals, overhaul periods, and mandatory actions described in the applicable ICA.

Comment Summary: Textron noted that the proposed wording of Special Condition no. 5 matched the intent of 14 CFR 33.19(a) but omitted the requirements of § 33.19(b). Textron suggested that Special Condition no. 5 include the following: "Each component of the propeller-blade pitch control system which is part of the engine type design must meet the requirements of Sec. § 35.21, 35.23, 35.42 and 35.43."

TCCA provided a similar comment, asking why § 33.19(b) was omitted and seeking its inclusion in Special Condition no. 5.

FAA Response: These special conditions apply only to the two magniX engine designs, which do not include a propeller-blade pitch control system. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comments.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the FAA include the requirements from 14 CFR 33.5(b) into these special conditions, as the controller may include propeller control functions.

FAA Response: These special conditions apply only to the proposed magniX engine designs, which do not include propeller controls and controllers. In addition, Special Condition no. 1 mandates compliance with § 33.5(b), Instruction manual for installing and operating the engine, which addresses this comment. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated the requirements from 14 CFR 33.4 are missing from these special conditions, but noted that including all instructions for off-wing maintenance that were contained in the ICA, would not be appropriate.

FAA Response: These special conditions are not intended for all electric engine certification projects. As provided in Special Condition no. 1, § 33.4, Instructions for continued airworthiness, and its appendix, apply to the magniX engines. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 6, Engine Cooling

Special Condition No. 6, Engine Cooling

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 6 would require the engine design and construction to comply with 14 CFR 33.21. That regulation requires the engine design and construction to provide necessary cooling under conditions in which the airplane is expected to operate and would otherwise be applicable only to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines. Additionally, this special condition proposed to require the applicant to document the cooling system monitoring features and usage in the engine installation manual, if cooling is required to satisfy the safety analysis described in Special Condition no. 17. Loss of adequate cooling to an engine that operates using electrical technology can result in rapid overheating and abrupt engine failure with critical consequences to safety.

Comment Summary: GE suggested that Special Condition no. 6 is redundant to Special Condition no. 17 (Safety analysis) because it includes 14 CFR 33.75(d) Safety analysis, and should be deleted.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the suggested change. The reference to § 33.75(d) in Special Condition no. 17 does not explicitly address cooling systems that are necessary for the engine to comply with the safety analysis. Special Condition no. 6 requires additional information about the cooling system that is not specified in § 33.75(d). The FAA made no change to Special Condition no. 6 as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Ampaire suggested that, given certain assumptions, the electric engine manufacturer may need to specify cooling limits that cannot be exceeded at the aircraft and engine interface to ensure safe operation.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. These special conditions are applicable only to the magniX magni350 and magni650 model engines. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: Rolls-Royce stated that the cooling system monitoring and documentation requirements in proposed Special Condition no. 6 are already covered in 14 CFR 33.29(h), "Instrument connection." Rolls-Royce recommended that the FAA modify § 33.29(h) to include a statement of applicability to electric engines.

TCCA recommended adding, "The cooling system monitoring must be made available to enable the flight crew or the automatic control system to monitor the functioning of the engine cooling system."

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree to amend 14 CFR 33.29(h) as a result of Rolls-Royce's comment, as these special conditions are of particular applicability to the magni350 and magni650 model engines only. However, as a result of Rolls-Royce's and TCCA's comments that recommend applying cooling system monitoring to the magniX engines, the FAA has added paragraph (b) to final Special Condition no. 11 to incorporate the requirements of 14 CFR 33.29(h), except for those provisions specifically applicable to turbine aircraft engines.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended adding, "If aspects of the engine cooling system require the installer to ensure that the temperature limits are met, those limits must be specified in the installation manual."

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with TCCA's comment. Special Condition no. 24 requires magniX to establish a temperature limit. If the temperature limit is necessary for the safe operation of the engine, these special conditions require the limit to be documented in the installation manual. Therefore, a special condition is not needed to mandate information specified in TCCA's comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended adding, "Any reliance placed upon the assumed installed conditions, or installation requirements must be declared in the instructions for installation."

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with TCCA's comment. Special Condition no. 1 requires magniX to comply with 14 CFR 33.5. Therefore, these special conditions already require the information specified in TCCA's comment to be documented in the instructions for installing the engine.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended adding "magniX must prepare and make available to the Agency prior to the issuance of the type certificate, and to the installer at the time of delivery of the engine, approved instructions for installing and operating the engine."

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with TCCA's comment. Special Condition no. 1 requires magniX to comply with 14 CFR 33.4, which requires magniX to prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness in accordance with appendix A to that part. Appendix A requires the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness include instructions for installing and operating the engine. Special Condition no. 1 also mandates compliance with 14 CFR 33.5, which requires magniX to prepare and make available to the Administrator, prior to the issuance of the type certificate, and to the owner at the time of delivery of the engine, approved instructions for installing and operating the engine. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 7, Engine Mounting Attachments and Structure

Special Condition No. 7, Engine Mounting Attachments and Structure

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 7 would require these engines to comply with 14 CFR 33.23, which requires the applicant to define the proposed design to withstand certain load limits for the engine mounting attachments and related engine structure. These requirements would otherwise be applicable only to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines.

Comment Summary: Textron stated that a propeller could be a much higher percentage of the total propulsion system mass in electric systems than for reciprocating or turbine engine propulsion systems and suggested that an electric motor's rotating components can be nearly instantly coupled to the non-rotating components due to FOD, internal failure, rotor growth, and commutation errors. Textron proposed additional requirements to Special Condition no. 7 related to sudden stoppage and bearing protection to ensure the engine mounting system can absorb the load or mitigate the effect of the load on aircraft.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. The certification basis for the proposed engines includes 14 CFR 33.23, Engine mounting attachments and structure, which is a performance-based requirement. The regulation doesn't specify how maximum and ultimate loads are determined because these load conditions are determined by magniX. Also, Special Condition no. 2 requires magniX to establish a torque limit and Special Condition no. 21 requires magniX to establish a maximum overtorque limit. These requirements address the conditions described in Textron's comment. magniX's engines must be designed to accommodate the load at these limit values. These special conditions address high engine mount load conditions, including the conditions described in Textron's comment, except for loads from the failure considerations that are normally addressed by Special Condition no. 17 (Safety Analysis). The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: Textron recommended adding a requirement for bearing protection that states, "Engine bearings must be protected from rotor voltage or a periodic replacement interval shall be determined as defined in Special Condition no. 13."

FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the technical content of this comment, but there is no requirement in these special conditions to add rotor shaft grounding technology in the magniX engines. Bearings could experience accelerated wear-out from ungrounded shafts, but the failure should not present a safety issue because the failure is predictable with sufficient testing. Requirements such as § 33.4, Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, Special Condition no. 3 (Materials), Special Condition no. 5 (Durability), Special Condition no. 13 (Critical and life-limited parts), and Special Condition no. 29 (Teardown inspection) will all have a role in managing the consequences of potential bearing wear from electrical effects. magniX may assess the impact to product support at the predicted bearing replacement frequency and decide to include rotor shaft grounding technology.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the FAA add a requirement to this special condition, requiring the applicant to demonstrate that the engine mounts and mounting features are fireproof if flammable fluids are used within the engine.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. The fire protection requirements in 14 CFR 33.17 apply to the magniX engines. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 8, Accessory Attachments

Special Condition No. 8, Accessory Attachments

The FAA received no comments for Special Condition no. 8, and it is adopted as proposed. It requires the engine to comply with 14 CFR 33.25, which sets certain design, operational, and maintenance requirements for the engine's accessory drive and mounting attachments, and which would otherwise be applicable only to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines.

Special Condition No. 9, Overspeed

Special Condition No. 9, Overspeed

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 9 would require magniX to establish by test, validated analysis, or a combination of both, that: (1) The rotor overspeed not result in a burst, rotor growth, or damage that results in a hazardous engine effect; (2) rotors possess sufficient strength margin to prevent burst; and (3) operating limits of the engine not be exceeded in-service.

Comment Summary: GE stated that proposed Special Condition no. 9(c) was duplicative of Special Condition no. 10(b) and (h) (Engine control systems), and requested the special condition be removed.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. The special conditions referenced by GE accomplish different safety objectives. Special Condition no. 9(c) requires that the engine must not exceed the rotor speed operational limitations that could affect rotor structural integrity. This requirement results in an overspeed limit. Special Condition no. 10(b) requires the engine control system must ensure the engine does not experience any unacceptable operating characteristics or exceed its operating limits, including in failure conditions where the fault or failure results in a change from one control mode to another, from one channel to another, or from the primary system to the back-up system, if applicable. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: Ampaire stated that Special Condition no. 9 (Overspeed) should include more information from ASTM F3338-18.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. ASTM F3338-18 section 5.9, EPU Rotor Overspeed, contains technical criteria that the FAA used in developing these special conditions. It also contains information that the applicant can use to propose means of compliance to these special conditions. The FAA did not change this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Textron recommended that the FAA modify Special Condition no. 9, paragraphs (a) and (c), replacing "speed" with "RPM." Textron reasoned that the term "speed" could be misleading.

FAA Response: The units used for rotational speed in the limitations section of the engine manual can be expressed using various units. The FAA recognizes that "rpm" is used in 14 CFR 33.88, Engine overtemperature test and § 33.201, Design and test requirements for Early ETOPS eligibility, but speed units are not specified in all regulations that mention engine rotor speed. Therefore, the FAA will maintain the term "speed" in these special conditions. The FAA did not change this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated that proposed Special Condition no. 9 suggested that the controller will provide the engine overspeed protection and commented that the FAA should ensure that the overspeed protection will function as intended when exposed to high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF), lightning environments, and threats. TCCA stated that verification of this protection might require the electric motor and engine control system to be included in the test setup when conducting the HIRF and lightning transient system tests and recommended that these special conditions clarify this topic in the discussion section of these special conditions.

FAA Response: This special condition is a performance-based requirement, and test details will be established as part of the demonstration of compliance. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the FAA modify "Rotors must possess" as stated in Special Condition no. 9(b), to "Rotors, including any integral fan rotors used for cooling, must possess."

FAA Response: These special conditions are not generally applicable to all electric engines; they apply only to the applicant's proposed engines. The magniX engines do not use integral fan rotors to cool the engine. The FAA did not change this special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 10, Engine Control Systems

Special Condition No. 10, Engine Control Systems

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 10 would impose several requirements.

Special Condition no. 10(a) proposed that the requirements of that special condition apply to any engine system or device that controls, limits, monitors, or protects engine operation and is necessary for the continued airworthiness of the engine.

Special Condition no. 10(b) proposed to require that an engine control system ensure that the engine does not experience any unacceptable operating characteristics (such as unstable speed or torque control) or exceed any of its operating limits.

Special Condition no. 10(c) proposed to require magniX to systematically design, develop, and verify the software and complex electronic hardware, including programmable logic devices. RTCA DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, dated April 19, 2000,\6\ distinguishes between complex and simple electronic hardware.

\6\ https://my.rtca.org/NC__Product?id=a1B36000001IcjTEAS.

Special Condition no. 10(d) proposed to require the applicant to substantiate all functional aspects of the control system to show that it performs its intended functions throughout the declared operational envelope.

Special Condition no. 10(e) proposed to require the system and component tests in Special Condition no. 27 to demonstrate the control will function as intended at environmental limits that magniX cannot otherwise substantiate. These limits include temperature, vibration, HIRF, and other limits addressed in RTCA DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Electronic/Electrical Equipment and Instruments \7\ (DO-160G) or other appropriate industry standards for airborne environmental-conditions testing, such as Mil-STD-810 "Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests," Mil-STD-202 "Test Method Standard for Electronic and Electrical Component Parts," Mil-461 "Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment," and those listed in Advisory Circular 21-16G, RTCA Document DO-160 versions D, E, F, and G, "Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment," Special Condition no. 10(e) also requires magniX to document the environmental limits to which the system has been qualified in the engine installation manual.

\7\ https://my.rtca.org/NC__Product?id=a1B36000001IcnSEAS.

Special Condition no. 10(f) proposed to require the engine control system not to exceed a maximum rate of Loss of Power Control (LOPC) for the aircraft types that will use the magniX engines, be single-fault tolerant in the full-up configuration, not have any single failure that results in hazardous engine effects, and not have any likely failure or malfunction that lead to local events in the intended installation.

The FAA issued Advisory Circular AC 33.28-3, Guidance Material For 14 CFR 33.28, Engine Control Systems, on May 23, 2014.\8\ Paragraph 6-2 of this AC provides applicants with guidance about defining an engine control system failure when showing compliance with the requirements of § 33.28. It also explains the safety objectives of the requirements, provides criteria for a loss of thrust control (LOTC)/ LOPC events for reciprocating and turbine engines. However, the guidance in AC 33.28-3 may not have sufficient information to identify failure modes and establish acceptable LOTC/LOPC rates for the magniX electric engines because electric engines did not exist when the FAA issued this AC.

\8\ https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_33_28-3.pdf.

The phrase "in the full-up configuration" used in Special Condition no. 10(f)(2) refers to a system without any fault conditions present. When in the full-up configuration, the electronic control system must be single fault tolerant for electrical, electrically detectable, and electronic failures involving LOPC events.

The term "local events" used in Special Condition no. 10(f)(4) means failures or malfunctions that could lead to hazardous effects such as fire, overheat, or failures causing damage to engine control system components.

Special Condition no. 10(g) proposed to require magniX to conduct a system safety assessment to support the safety analysis in Special Condition no. 17.

Special Condition no. 10(h) proposed to require that the design and function of the engine control devices and systems, together with the engine instruments, operating instructions, and maintenance instructions, ensure that engine operating limits will not be exceeded in-service.

Special Condition no. 10(i) proposed to protect the airplane and engine from single failures relating to the aircraft-supplied data by mandating that the control system is able to detect and accommodate such failures, and not result in a hazardous engine effect.

The term "independent," as it is used in "fully independent engine systems," means that the controllers should be either self-sufficient and isolated from other aircraft systems or provide redundancy. In the case of loss, interruption, or corruption of aircraft-supplied data, the engine must continue to function without hazardous engine effects.

The term "accommodated" means that when a fault has been detected, the system must continue to function safely.

Special Condition no. 10(j) proposed to require magniX to show that the loss, malfunction, or interruption of the control system electrical power source will not result in a hazardous engine effect, the unacceptable transmission of erroneous data, or continued engine operation in the absence of the control function.

Comment Summary: Rolls-Royce asked that the FAA clarify the requirements contained in Special Condition nos. 10(f)(1) and (f)(2). The commenter expressed concern that the single fault tolerance requirement in Special Condition no. 10(f)(2) would be applied to both historical electrical elements of the engine control system and to the new high-voltage electrical/electronic elements required to motivate an electric motor. Rolls-Royce commented that it was possible the wording of this condition would be extended to cover loss of power (LOP) events due to the difficulties of establishing the boundary between the control and the motor drive in an electric engine. Rolls-Royce asked the FAA to modify this special condition to clarify that the degree of fault tolerance in the high-voltage electrical/electronic elements will be governed by the LOP reliability requirement of Special Condition no. 10(f)(1), and not the single fault tolerance requirement of LOPC of Special Condition no. 10(f)(2). AIAB articulated a similar concern and recommended the FAA delete Special Condition no. 10(f)(2) in these final special conditions. AIAB stated a loss of thrust control (LOTC)/ LOPC event could be considered minor in aircraft with distributed propulsion, and therefore may not require electrical redundancy.

FAA Response: The comments from Rolls-Royce and AIAB describe the potential dependency between the electric engine safety analysis and certain aircraft configurations, and the potential effect the aircraft design could have on the need for engine design redundancy. However, magniX designed these engines for certain aircraft configurations that do not have special flight control capabilities, which is why the LOPC and single fault tolerance criteria from 14 CFR part 33 are adopted in these special conditions. The FAA also included "suitable for the intended aircraft application" in Special Condition no. 10(f)(1), and "as determined by the Administrator" in Special Condition no. 10(f)(2) "Engine control system failures" to constrain the use of these engines to aircraft that are designed with compatible engine safety assumptions. Therefore, the FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA commented that the FAA's introductory text to proposed Special Condition no. 10(e), "Environmental limits," indicated that the environmental limits are addressed in DO-160G. However, TCCA suggested that some of the test specifications, methods, and categories in DO-160G might not be adequate for high-voltage systems such as the high-voltage components of this engine. TCCA suggested that the FAA modify Special Condition no. 10(e) to require that the applicant establish and demonstrate the environmental limits of the engine for those circumstances when the standards in DO-160G may not be adequate.

FAA Response: These special conditions are applicable to this applicant's project and are not generally applicable requirements. As such, the FAA will evaluate the approach that the applicant proposes to substantiate the compliance of their design's high-voltage systems. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA noted that in the introduction to proposed Special Condition no. 10(f), the FAA stated that "As with other topics within these proposed special conditions, the failure rates that apply to electric engines were not established when the FAA issued this AC" [referring to AC 33.28-3]. TCCA stated that the referenced FAA guidance document might not have sufficient data to allow an applicant to substantiate the selected failure modes and failure rates applicable to the electrical engine and associated high-voltage systems. TCCA recommended that the FAA clarify the statement in the discussion and note that the applicant has the responsibility to substantiate the failure modes and rates to show compliance to these special conditions.

FAA Response: The FAA added clarification to the discussion of Special Condition no. (10)(f).

Comment Summary: TCCA asked the FAA to clarify whether the engine cockpit controls are part of the configuration discussed in Special Condition no. 10. TCCA also recommended that the FAA require the applicant to conduct a human error assessment to mitigate the effects of crew mistakes due to electric engine cockpit controls if they are different from conventional engine cockpit controls.

FAA Response: The engine cockpit controls are not part of the engine configuration. No changes to these final special conditions are required to address TCCA's comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA requested that Special Condition no. 10(a) use similar wording as 14 CFR 33.28(a). TCCA stated that such wording could affect the applicant's understanding of the requirement because the proposed words indicate Special Condition no. 10(a) could also be applicable to a system or a device that is not part of the engine type design.

FAA Response: In these final special conditions, the FAA has modified Special Condition no. 10(a) to incorporate the purpose of 14 CFR 33.28(a).

Comment Summary: TCCA stated proposed Special Condition no. 10(j) requires that the loss, malfunction, or interruption of the electrical power to the engine control system not result in a hazardous engine effect, the unacceptable transmission of erroneous data, or continued engine operation in the absence of the control function. TCCA stated that this special condition does not require the engine control system to be capable of resuming normal operation when the electrical power returns to a normal state. TCCA commented that the electrical power source could be subject to transients resulting in a temporary effect on the output power and shut down the control system and/or engine. TCCA explained once the temporary transients cease, the engine control system should be capable of resuming normal operation when the power characteristics return to the normal range (similar to the requirements of (14 CFR) 33.28(i)(4). TCCA proposed adding a subparagraph to Special Condition no. 10(j) to require, "Voltage transients outside the power-supply voltage limitations declared in SC 10(j)(2) must meet the requirements of SC no. 10(j)(1). The engine control system must be capable of resuming normal operation when electrical power returns to within the declared limits."

FAA Response: A special condition is not required to specify requirements for voltage transients that are outside the power-supply voltage limitations declared in Special Condition no. 10(j)(2), "Engine control system electrical power" because exceedances to these limitations are addressed by Special Condition no. 10(h), "Protection systems." Special Condition no. 10(j)(1) corresponds to 14 CFR 33.28(i), which includes the additional requirement TCCA recommended. The FAA added, "The engine control system must be capable of resuming normal operation when aircraft-supplied power returns to within the declared limits" to Special Condition no. 10(j)(1) as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated Special Condition no. 10 is similar to the current 14 CFR 33.28 requirement. TCCA suggested modifying Special Condition no. 10 to state, "The engine design must comply with 14 CFR 33.28."

FAA Response: 14 CFR 33.28 is applicable to reciprocating and turbine aircraft engines. The airworthiness regulations in 14 CFR 33.28 do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the magni350 and magni650 model engines because of a novel or unusual design feature (use of electrical energy source instead of aviation fuel to drive the mechanical systems). Section 33.28 contains design requirements that do not apply to the proposed engines. The FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that Special Condition no. 10(j) require the applicant to define and declare, in the engine installation manual, the characteristics of the electrical power supplied to the engine control system, as required by 14 CFR 33.28(i)(3).

FAA Response: The FAA has added a subparagraph to Special Condition no. 10(j) "Engine control system electrical power," which requires magniX to identify and declare the characteristics of any electrical power supplied from the aircraft to the engine control system for starting and operating the engine, including transient and steady-state voltage limits, and any other characteristics necessary for the safe operation of the engine in the engine installation manual.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that Special Condition no. 10 require a means to shut the engine down rapidly.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 17(d)(2) incorporates 14 CFR 33.75(g)(2)(vii), which includes, as a hazardous engine effect, the complete inability to shut the engine down. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA commented that the proposed special conditions do not address the emerging issue of cybersecurity. Since the FAA is currently addressing this issue with an issue paper, TCCA recommended incorporating the issue paper into Special Condition no. 10 by reference.

TCCA also recommended that the FAA address cybersecurity by adding a special condition that states, "Information system security protection. Engine control systems, including networks, software, and data, must be designed and installed so that they are protected from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI) that may result in adverse effects on the safety of the aircraft. The security risks and vulnerabilities must be identified, assessed, and mitigated as necessary. The applicant must make procedures and instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) available that ensure that the security protections of the engine controls are maintained."

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. A special condition for cybersecurity is not needed for the magniX engine design. Cybersecurity issues are not specific to these magniX engines and will be addressed by other compliance determinations. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Wisk stated that the change in wording from 14 CFR 33.28 from "Operating limits" to "Operating limitations" could have uncertain impacts, as "limits" are typically parametric-based and mostly achievable by a control system if so required. Wisk noted that operating limitations are more aligned to what is found in an airplane flight manual, so this expands the scope of what the control system may be expected to do.

FAA Response: The FAA has changed "operating limitations" to "operating limits" in Special Condition no. 10(b).

Comment Summary: Wisk asked what the FAA meant by "be single fault tolerant, as determined by the Administrator" in proposed Special Condition no. 10(f)(2).

FAA Response: The term "single fault tolerant" describes an engine control system's ability to experience single failures and not result in a hazardous engine effect while operating without any fault conditions present and in all dispatchable configurations. Special Condition no. 10(f)(2) requires the engine control system to be single fault tolerant for electrical, electrically detectable, and electronic failures involving LOPC events. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Wisk asked that the FAA clarify the meaning of "local events" as used in proposed Special Condition no. 10(f)(4) "Engine control system failures."

FAA Response: The term "local events" used in Special Condition no. 10(f)(4) means failures or malfunctions that could lead to hazardous effects such as fire, overheat, or failures causing damage to engine control system components. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Wisk suggested that the FAA not impose proposed Special Condition no. 10(g), "System safety assessment." Wisk stated that the condition was unnecessary and could lead to uncertainty because 14 CFR 33.75(a), Safety analysis, is more rigorous. Wisk suggested incorporating § 33.75(a)(1) into Special Condition no. 10, or linking Special Condition no. 17 to Special Condition no. 10(g).

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 17 (Safety Analysis), incorporates 14 CFR 33.75(a)(1), which requires the applicant to analyze the engine, including the control system, to assess the likely consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. Special Condition no. 10, which is adopted as proposed, contains a separate requirement for the engine control, including the frequency of occurrence of faults or failures. The linkage requested by Wisk between the engine safety analysis and control system safety assessment exists in these special conditions. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Wisk stated they understood the initial intent of § 33.28(i) around engine controllers being reliant on electrical power for function, whereby fuel was used for the production of useful thrust/power. Wisk commented that by stating the engine control must accommodate any `malfunction' of the electrical supply forces the engine control to accommodate overvoltage, overcurrent, etc., that may drive unnecessary cost and weight on the engine manufacturer. Wisk recommended consideration is given to the high-voltage electrical source used for thrust/power generation such that it is treated more like fuel, which is under the control of the airframe OEM.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 10(j) does not require the magniX engine controller to accommodate malfunctions of the electrical supply. The special condition requires the engine control system to be designed such that a loss, malfunction, or interruption of the control system electrical power source will not result in hazardous engine effects. However, Special Condition no. 2 requires magniX to establish and declare ratings and operating limits based on power-supply requirements for the engine, which addresses the suggestion proposed by Wisk. The FAA did not change this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Ampaire asked the FAA to incorporate additional information from ASTM F3338-18 section 5.10, EPU Controls, into Special Condition no. 10(g), system safety assessment, and Special Condition no. 10(h), protection systems.

FAA Response: ASTM F3338-18 contains technical criteria that the FAA incorporated in these special conditions. It also contains information that the applicant can use to develop a means of compliance to these special conditions. The FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: AIAB proposed that the FAA mandate compliance with 14 CFR 33.28(h)(2). AIAB stated that the accommodation strategy could depend on the aircraft that use the engines because the aircraft's response to a change to thrust or power will determine if the accommodation strategy is acceptable. AIAB asked that the FAA require the applicant to evaluate the effects of aircraft-supplied data failures and document them in the engine installation manual.

FAA Response: As a result of this and other comments, the FAA modified Special Condition no. (10)(g) by adding, "The intended aircraft application must be taken into account to assure the assessment of the engine control system safety is valid." Therefore, the applicant's fault accommodation strategies will need to account for the aircraft's capabilities. If the accommodation strategy meets any criteria in 14 CFR 33.5, that regulation will prompt magniX to document the details in the Instruction manual for installing and operating the engine. The FAA has changed the special condition to include additional requirements for aircraft-supplied data consistent with the recommendation.

Comment Summary: An anonymous commenter inquired if these special conditions would address electromagnetic interference potential, which, the commenter states, has caused issues with onboard radios and equipment.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 10(e), Environmental limits, addresses potential engine effects from HIRF and lightning, as well as electromagnetic compatibility between the engine and aircraft systems. This special condition also requires the applicant to document the environmental limits to which the system has been qualified and the electromagnetic emissions from the engine. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Textron stated the proposed Special Condition no. 10(h) matches the requirements of § 33.28(f)(1), but the requirements of § 33.28(f)(2) and (f)(3) are not included. Textron also stated there is no obvious reason why the same requirements for overspeed protection would not also apply to an electric engine, so those requirements should be added to the proposed special condition.

FAA Response: These special conditions are applicable only to the magniX magni350 and magni650 model engines. Special condition 10(h) ensures the magniX operating limits will not be exceeded in-service. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Textron recommended that the FAA add the following to the end of Special Condition no. 10(b), "including in failure conditions where the fault or failure results in a change from one control mode to another, from one channel to another, or from the primary system to the back-up system." Textron reasoned that 14 CFR 33.28(c) addresses failures resulting in changes to the operation of the engine and that regulatory requirements should be applicable to electric engines.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 10 (Engine control systems) addresses the potential for all control system failures and failure effects, including failure or malfunction during control system transitions during a rotor overspeed. However, in these final special conditions, the FAA has changed Special Condition no. 10(b) as a result of this comment to include failure conditions where the fault or failure results in a change from one control mode to another, from one channel to another, or from the primary system to the back-up system, if applicable.

Special Condition No. 11, Instrument Connection

Special Condition No. 11, Instrument Connection

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 11 would require magniX to comply with 14 CFR 33.29(a), (e), (f), and (g), and, as part of the required system safety assessment, assess the possibility and subsequent effect of incorrect fit of instruments, sensors, or connectors.

Comment Summary: Wisk referred to the statement, "In addition, as part of the system safety assessment of Special Condition no. 10(g)" and recommended that the FAA replace the citation in Special Condition no. 11 with reference to Special Condition no. 17 or 14 CFR 33.75(a)(1).

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 10(g) requires a separate safety assessment for the engine control system. The engine control system safety assessment is not addressed by Special Condition no. 17 or 14 CFR 33.75(a)(1), which requires an engine-level safety analysis. The engine-level safety analysis does not go into enough detail to address the effects of control system failures and malfunctions. The FAA did not modify this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Textron stated, Special Condition no. 11 mandates compliance with 14 CFR 33.29(f), thereby requiring the applicant to assess the possibility and subsequent effects of incorrect fit of instruments, sensors, or connectors. Textron considered this requirement to repeat the assessments required by Special Condition no. 10(g) (Engine control systems). For this reason, Textron recommended removing the provisions in Special Condition no. 11 that are adopted by reference to § 33.29(f).

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 10(g) corresponds to § 33.28(e), which requires an engine control systems safety assessment. However, § 33.29(f) requires that, as part of the System Safety Assessment of § 33.28(e), the applicant must assess the possibility and subsequent effect of incorrect fit of instruments, sensors, or connectors. Therefore, Special Condition no. 11 does not repeat the requirements in Special Condition 10(g). After reviewing Textron's comment, the FAA removed reference to § 33.29(f) because the content of that regulation is captured within Special Condition no. 11(a). The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the FAA add a provision requiring that instrument or sensor connections be designed or labeled to ensure a correct connection.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. Special Condition no. 11 applies 14 CFR 33.29(a) to the magniX engines, so this special condition already requires that the connections meet the criteria specified in TCCA's comment. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended adding the following to Special Condition no. 11: "Any instrumentation on which the Safety Analysis (see special condition no. 17) depends must be specified and declared mandatory in the engine installation manual."

FAA Response: The certification basis for the proposed engines includes 14 CFR 33.5(a)(6), 33.5(c), and Special Condition no. 17(c), which encompasses § 33.75(d) and § 33.75(e). These requirements will achieve the desired results recommended in this comment. The FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Special Condition No. 12, Stress Analysis

Special Condition No. 12, Stress Analysis

14 CFR 33.62 requires a stress analysis be performed on each turbine engine. The requirement is applicable only to turbine engines and turbine engine components, and therefore, is not appropriate for the magni350 and magni650 Model engines. The FAA proposed this special condition due to the need for a stress analysis of similar components used in these proposed engines.

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 12 would require a mechanical, thermal, and electromagnetic stress analysis that showed a sufficient design margin to prevent unacceptable operating characteristics. Also, the condition proposed to require the applicant to determine the maximum stresses in the engine by tests validated analysis, or a combination thereof and show that they do not exceed minimum material properties.

Comment Summary: Wisk asked the FAA to clarify this special condition by declaring the types of failure effects that the special condition addresses. Wisk stated that Special Condition no 12 refers to "unacceptable operating characteristics" and that this term, coupled with Special Condition no. 9, may leave a gap where no analysis is required for static structural components (mounts, casings, etc.), which would not affect operating characteristics but could still be hazardous.

FAA Response: The corresponding 14 CFR part 33 airworthiness requirement for this special condition is § 33.62 Stress analysis. The corresponding part 33 airworthiness requirement for Special Condition no. 9 (Overspeed) is § 33.27, Turbine, compressor, fan, and turbosupercharger rotor overspeed. These special conditions are intended to apply similar requirements to the magniX engines but with additional provisions to account for electric engine technology. The additional analysis suggested in Wisk's comment is already required by Special Condition no. 13 (Critical and life-limited parts). It requires a stress analysis of static engine parts, so no changes were made to this special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the FAA require the applicant to provide an analysis of electromagnetic stresses.

FAA Response: The FAA concurs with this comment. The FAA has modified Special Condition no. 11 to require the analysis to assess the impact of electromagnetic interference on stress.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended adding, "The sufficient design margin must be established in the means of compliance" to Special Condition no. 12(a).

FAA Response: Design margin is already required by Special Condition no. 12 (Stress Analysis), which will require magniX to develop the compliance documents suggested by TCCA. In addition, design margins are also required by Special Condition nos. 9 (Overspeed), 12 (Stress Analysis), 19 (Liquid Systems), 24 (Temperature Limit), and 30 (Containment). No changes have been made to this special condition as a result of this comment.

Special Condition No. 13, Critical and Life-Limited Parts

Special Condition No. 13, Critical and Life-Limited Parts

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 13 would require magniX to show whether rotating or moving components, bearings, shafts, static parts, and non-redundant mount components should be classified, designed, manufactured, and managed throughout their service life as critical or life-limited parts.

Special Condition no. 13 corresponds to 14 CFR 33.70, Engine life-limited parts, which is a complex requirement. Accordingly, additional information is provided in this discussion. In this context, the engineering plan referenced in Special Condition no. 13(b)(1) requires magniX to establish activities for managing documents, practices, and procedures that govern essential design criteria essential to part airworthiness. The engineering plan contains methods for verifying the characteristics and qualities assumed in the design data. The methods must be suitable for the part criticality. The engineering plan communicates information from engineering to manufacturing about the criticality of design features that affect airworthiness. In accordance with 14 CFR 21.137, Quality system, the plan must include a reporting system that flows problematic issues that develop while operating in-service so the applicant's design process can address them. The engineering plan is established during pre-certification activities and executed during post-certification activities.

For example, the effect the environment has on engine performance might not be consistent with the design assumptions. The impact of ice slab ingestion on engine parts might not be fully understood until the engine response is evaluated during testing the specific ice quantities and shapes that the airplane sheds.

The term "low-cycle fatigue," as referenced in Special Condition no. 13(a)(2), is a decline in material strength from exposure to cyclic stress at levels beyond the stress threshold the material can sustain indefinitely. This threshold is known as the material endurance limit. Low-cycle fatigue typically causes a part to sustain plastic or permanent deformation during the cyclic loading and can lead to cracks, crack growth, and fracture. Engine parts that operate at high-temperatures and high-mechanical stresses simultaneously can experience low-cycle fatigue coupled with creep. Creep is the tendency of a metallic material to permanently move or deform when exposed to the extreme thermal conditions created by hot combustion gasses and substantial physical loads such as high rotational speeds and maximum thrust. Conversely, high-cycle fatigue is caused by elastic deformation, small strains caused by alternating stress, and a much higher number of load cycles compared to the number of cycles that cause low-cycle fatigue.

The term "manufacturing definition," as referenced in Special Condition no. 13(b)(2), means the collection of data required to translate documented engineering-design criteria into physical parts and verify that the parts comply with the design data properties. Because FAA regulations do not require parts to fail during a certification program, the documents and processes have outcome expectations, required by 14 CFR 21.137, Quality system and 14 CFR 21.138, Quality manual, to result in parts with the integrity and reliability assumed in the design data. These production and quality systems limit the potential manufacturing outcomes to parts that are consistently produced within physical design constraints.

The manufacturing plan and service management plan ensure essential information from the engineering plan, such as the design characteristics that ensure the integrity of critical and life-limited parts, is consistently produced and preserved over the lifetime of those parts. The manufacturing plan includes special processes and production controls to prevent manufacturing-induced anomalies, which can degrade the part's structural integrity. Examples of manufacturing-induced anomalies are material contamination, unacceptable grain growth, heat affected areas, and residual stresses. The service management plan has provisions for enhanced detection and reporting of service-induced anomalies that can cause the part to fail before reaching its life-limit or service limit. Abnormalities can develop in-service from improper handling, unforeseen operating conditions, and long-term environmental effects. The service management plan ensures important information that might affect the design process's assumptions is incorporated into the design process to remove unforeseen potential unsafe features from the engine.

Comment Summary: Wisk stated it is more appropriate to use "The Applicant" than the Company name "magniX" in Special Condition no. 12(b)(1). Wisk recommended changing the reference to the engine manufacturer reference from "magniX" to "the applicant."

FAA Response: The FAA understands Wisk's comment to be relevant to Special Condition no. 13(b)(1) because Special Condition no. 12(b)(1) does not exist. These special conditions are not applicable to all electric engine manufacturers. As stated in this preamble, these special conditions apply to the magniX magni350 and magni650 model engines. No change to this special condition is necessary as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: Textron recommended that the post-certification activities described in the Discussion section of the proposed special conditions be included in the text of Special Condition no. 13.

FAA Response: The Discussion for this special condition is based on its similarity to 14 CFR 33.70, Engine life-limited parts. No change to this special condition is necessary as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: An individual commenter suggested there might be unique questions regarding low-cycle fatigue (LCF) of components used in electric engines. The commenter explained that if the core rotor speed is low, the risk of a rotor burst might not be significant. However, a core rotor assembly that uses windings or embedded permanent magnets (if applicable) may have some LCF/thermal/electrical (refer to corona effect on motor windings) cycling challenges and the electrically powered electronics driving the motor. The individual also stated that they have learned through experience about the significance of thermal effects resulting from a broad range of operating conditions, especially during quick power transients.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 13 requires magniX to determine the parts and components that should be classified designed, manufactured and managed throughout their service life as critical or life-limited parts. Therefore, Special Condition no. 13 provides the requirements for magniX to address the unique issues that arise when identifying and managing life-limited and critical electric engine parts. The FAA made no changes to these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA stated that 14 CFR 33.70 is similar enough to proposed Special Condition no. 13 that the FAA should replace the proposed special condition with reference to the 14 CFR part 33 requirement and modify it. EASA suggested the FAA remove the term "Critical Parts" from this special condition.

FAA Response: Section 33.70 prescribes a mandatory replacement interval for turbine engine parts that are likely to fail from fatigue if they are not removed from service. The failure can cause a hazardous engine effect. Section 33.70 does not address parts that have a different primary failure mode than fatigue but can still fail in a way that causes a hazardous engine condition. Electric engine technology operates using electromagnetic technology and physical properties that are different than those of turbine engines. This is why the special condition has requirements for "critical" parts. Therefore, there is a need for a special condition that addresses failures of parts and components caused by the properties related to the novel technology used in these proposed engines. Further, the FAA currently uses the term "critical parts" to describe certain parts approved under 14 CFR part 21 subpart K, Parts Manufacturer Approval and in 14 CFR part 35, Airworthiness Standards: Propellers. The use of the term "critical parts" in these special conditions is consistent with the FAA's use of the term as it applies to conventional engines. The FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of these two comments.

Comment Summary: TCCA asked that these special conditions define "primary failure" as failures that are not the result of a prior failure of another part or system.

FAA Response: The term "primary failure" is used in 14 CFR 33.70, and this special condition is based on the requirements in that section. The FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment, but the suggested clarification is adopted in the discussion to Special Condition no. 17.

Comment Summary: AIAB proposed that the FAA require the assumptions used by the applicant in the life-limited parts analysis to be declared in the engine installation manual, should the FAA certify the engine with no associated aircraft.

FAA Response: Final Special Condition nos. 10(g) and 17(e) require magniX to account for the intended aircraft application for the engine safety analysis and engine control systems safety assessment to be valid, so there will be no need to account for engines with no associated aircraft. Special Condition no. 13, Critical and life-limited parts, requires magniX to show, by safety analysis or means acceptable to the Administrator, whether rotating or moving components, bearings, shafts, static parts, and non-redundant mount components should be classified, designed, manufactured, and managed throughout their service life as critical or life-limited parts. The assumptions used by magniX in the life-limited parts analysis are design data that provide information for compliance to Special Condition no. 13. The installers and operators of the magniX engines do not use these assumptions, and therefore, the assumptions do not need to be included in the installation manual. The FAA made no changes to this special condition as a result of this comment.

Special Condition No. 14, Lubrication System

Special Condition No. 14, Lubrication System

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 14 would require that the lubrication system of these engines be designed to function properly between scheduled maintenance intervals and prevent engine bearing and lubrication system contamination. The FAA also proposed to require magniX to demonstrate the unique lubrication attributes and functional capability of the magni350 and magni650 Model engines.

Comment Summary: Wisk recommended removing the reference to "particle debris" from Special Condition no. 14(b), and replacing it with "The lubrication system must be designed to prevent unacceptable contamination of the engine bearings."

FAA Response: The FAA has changed Special Condition no. 14 to specify the lubrication system must prevent any unacceptable contamination of the engine bearings. The FAA has changed the special condition as a result of this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that Special Condition no. 14 require magniX to declare, in the engine installation manual, any reliance upon assumed installation conditions or installation requirements.

FAA Response: Special Condition no. 1 requires magniX to comply with14 CFR 33.5, Instruction manual for installing and operating the engine. Section 33.5(a)(5) includes the additional requirement recommended by TCCA. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 15, Power Response

Special Condition No. 15, Power Response

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 15 would require the design and construction of these engines and their control systems to enable an increase (1) from the minimum power setting to the highest-rated power without detrimental engine effects and (2) from the minimum obtainable power while in-flight and on the ground to the highest-rated power within a time interval for the safe operation of the aircraft.

Comment Summary: Wisk recommended including the engine control system as part of the engine in these requirements. They suggest adding "and its control system" to this special condition to read, "The design and construction of the engine and its control system must enable an increase."

FAA Response: The FAA has modified Special Condition no. 15 in these final special conditions to incorporate "including its control system" in response to the comment.

Comment Summary: Ampaire recommended that the FAA add a requirement to these special conditions that correspond to ASTM F3338-18, section 5.20.9.

FAA Response: The FAA added Special Condition no. 15(c) in the final special condition, which incorporates criteria from ASTM F3338-18, section 5.20.9.

Comment Summary: Textron commented that electrical motors could produce significantly more torque than reciprocating or turbine engines. Textron said that unregulated application of torque could be detrimental to the flight characteristics of the aircraft or the structural components of the aircraft. Textron recommended supplementing this special condition with the following requirement: "(c) of torque without detrimental engine or aircraft effects. Aircraft components must be designed to withstand the unregulated application of torque, or the application of torque should be controlled to ensure aircraft structural integrity or aircraft aerodynamic characteristics are not exceeded."

FAA Response: The FAA agrees that electric engines produce torque differently than turbine engines. The potential for high torque values is attributable to the novel technology used in magniX's proposed engines. Therefore, final Special Condition no. 15 has changed to include a requirement that prevents engine torque from causing detrimental aircraft effects.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the FAA revise Special Condition no. 15(b), from "a time interval for the safe operation of the aircraft" to "a time interval that is determined to be safe for aircraft operation."

FAA Response: The FAA finds that the recommended revision would be beneficial and consistent with the change the FAA made to Special Condition no. 10(g) and the addition to Special Condition no. 17(e), which requires magniX to take into account the intended aircraft application in the engine installation manual. The FAA has changed final Special Condition no. 15(b) in the manner requested by this comment.

Comment Summary: TCCA recommended that the special condition should state the power-lever movement interval, and that response times in 14 CFR 33.73 should apply to the magniX engines, unless magniX substantiates different values for the power-lever movement interval and response times for the aircraft that will use the engines. TCCA also recommended adapting the existing § 33.73 requirement to remove the condition only applicable to the turbine engine, such as surge, stall.

FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with the comment. These special conditions are applicable only to the magniX engines. Special Condition no. 10 (Engine control systems) and Special Condition no. 17 (Safety analysis) require magniX to account for the aircraft that can use these engines. Therefore, the required power-lever movement interval and response times account for the aircraft safety objectives. Also, Special Condition no. 15 was developed to be a performance-based version of § 33.73, so all requirements of § 33.73 are not part of the special condition. The FAA did not change these special conditions as a result of this comment.

Special Condition No. 16, Continued Rotation

Special Condition No. 16, Continued Rotation

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 16 would prohibit any hazardous engine effects to result from the continued rotation of engine rotating systems that the design allows to rotate after the engine is shut down.

Comment Summary: Textron stated that there is potential for electric engines to regenerate electric energy from continuing to freely rotate after the engine is shut down, and recommended an additional requirement to prevent hazardous electrical bus effects.

FAA Response: These special conditions apply only to the subject magniX engines, which are not intended to regenerate or otherwise direct electrical power to the aircraft. The FAA made no changes to the special condition as a result of the comment.

Special Condition No. 17, Safety Analysis

Special Condition No. 17, Safety Analysis

The FAA proposed that Special Condition no. 17 would require magniX to comply with 14 CFR 33.75(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), which require an applicant to conduct a safety analysis of the engine, and which would otherwise apply only to applications for turbine aircraft engines. Additionally, the proposed special conditions would require magniX to assess its engine design to determine the likely consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur, and state, in the safety analysis, the failure of such elements and associated prescribed integrity requirements.

As used in Special Condition no. 17, a primary failure is a manner in which a part fails if the engine is installed in the expected aircraft configurations and operated in accordance with operating conditions assumed in the design data such as the expected performance cycles, engine limits, and operating environments, and maintained using the declared instructions for continued airworthiness. A primary failure is not the result of the prior failure of another part or system.

Some engine parts can fail suddenly in their primary failure from prolonged exposure to the physical conditions in a normal engine environment, such as temperature, vibration, and stress. The probability of failure cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical terms, and failure will likely result in a hazardous engine effect. As a result, 14 CFR 33.70, Engine life-limited parts, and 14 CFR 33.75, Safety analysis, do not allow these parts to be managed by on-condition or probabilistic means. Therefore, requirements such as life limits, scheduled inspections, and inspection techniques are mandated to ensure the essential attributes are preserved throughout the part's service life. For example, if the number of engine cycles to failure is predictable and can be associated with specific design characteristics, such as material properties, then the applicant can manage the engine part with life limits.

The safety analysis requires magniX to identify hazards that are applicable to the electric technology used in their engine design. All the engine hazards that apply to turbine engines also apply to the magniX electric engines, in addition to possible exceedances of any new engine limits pursuant to Special Condition no. 2 (Engine ratings and operating limits) to prevent failure of electronic components that have a direct impact on safety.

The outcome of the safety analysis partially depends on the aircraft types that will use these engines. Therefore, final Special Condition nos. 17(e) and 10(g) require magniX to account for the intended aircraft application in the engine installation manual to ensure the magniX engine is installed only in aircraft with compatible safety assumptions. The term "intended aircraft application" means the aircraft that are expected to operate with the magniX engines.

Comment Summary: Regarding Special Condition no. 17(d)(3), Wisk recommended that the FAA classify a loss of partial thrust, or a thrust variation of a small amount, as a "major effect" which should be only considered when the impact is relevant at the aircraft level. Wisk also stated that the applicable 14 CFR part 23, 25, 27, and 29 regulations establish appropriate LOTC/LOPC classifications, so a special condition for 14 CFR 33.75 appears unnecessary. Wisk recommended that Special Condition no. 17(d)(1) use the existing words of § 33.75(g)(1), which state, "An engine failure in which the only consequence is partial or complete loss of thrust or power (and associated engine services) from the engine will be regarded as a minor engine effect."

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