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Proposed Rule Proposed Issued Nov 14, 2003 69 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

68 FR 64730 Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes

The FAA proposes to issue regulations governing the design, maintenance, and operation of airplanes and engines for flights that go beyond certain distances from an adequate airport. This proposal would extend some requirements that previously applied only to two-engine airplanes to airplanes with more than two-engines. The proposed rule implements existing policy, industry best practices and recommendations, and international standards to ensure that long-range flights will operate safely.

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Part IV

14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, 135

Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes; Proposed Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, 135

[Docket No. FAA-2002-6717; Notice No. 03-11] RIN 2120-AI03

Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes

Agency

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to issue regulations governing the design, maintenance, and operation of airplanes and engines for flights that go beyond certain distances from an adequate airport. This proposal would extend some requirements that previously applied only to two-engine airplanes to airplanes with more than two-engines. The proposed rule implements existing policy, industry best practices and recommendations, and international standards to ensure that long-range flights will operate safely.

Dates

DATES: Send your comments on or before January 13, 2004.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to DOT DMS Docket Number FAA-2002-6717 by any of the following methods:

[sbull] Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.

Addresses

[sbull] Fax: 1-202-493-2251.

[sbull] Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

[sbull] Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

[sbull] Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.

Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. For detailed instructions on submitting comments and additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change to http://dms.dot.gov. including any personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading under Regulatory Notices.

Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For Further Information Contact

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric vanOpstal, Flight Standards Service, Air Transportation Division, AFS-200, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3774; facsimile (202) 267-5229.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments Invited. The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written comments.

Supplementary Information

We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the Internet at the web address in the ADDRESSES section.

Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.

If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it to you.

Regulatory Notices

Regulatory Notices

Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the following steps:

(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).

(2) On the search page type in the last five digits of the Docket number shown at the beginning of this notice. Click on "search."

(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information for the Docket you selected, click on the document number of the item you wish to view.

You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal Register's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number of this rulemaking.

Background

Background

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has long-standing regulations that restrict the operations of two-engine air carrier airplanes operated under part 121, Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). Under current regulations these airplanes may not be operated on routes that lie more than sixty minutes from an airport unless authorized by the Administrator. The premise for these restrictions was that two-engine airplanes were less safe than three and four engine airplanes particularly over very long distances.

History of ETOPS

History of ETOPS

In the 1980s, a new generation of very reliable, two engine airplanes came into service and changed the underlying premise that restricted the operations of these airplanes. The airline industry sought to take advantage of the improvements in reliability, range, and payload capabilities that these new airplanes offered. Beginning in 1985, the FAA allowed air carriers to operate certain twin-engine airplanes on routes that included points more than sixty-minutes from an adequate airport under a formal program known as Extended Range Operation with Two Engine Airplanes ("ETOPS"). The regulatory basis of ETOPS was the deviation authority contained in 14 CFR section 121.161. With the cooperation of the airlines, manufacturers, and other interested groups, the FAA carefully controlled and monitored this new type of flight operation.

Historical Documents

Historical Documents

Advisory Circulars 120-42 and 120-42A

In support of ETOPS, the FAA issued two Advisory Circulars (AC) 120-42 and 120-42A in 1985 and 1988 respectively. These two AC documents have been the basis for type design and operational practices for ETOPS to date. Initially, the FAA set a maximum approval of 120 minutes from an airport for ETOPS. During the nascent stage of ETOPS, air carriers gained significant service experience; the safety and efficiency of ETOPS became apparent. In 1988, the FAA increased that approval to 180 minutes based on demonstrated safety record of these operations.

Deviation Authority From § 121.161 Prior to ETOPS

Deviation Authority From § 121.161 Prior to ETOPS

Since the 1970s, the FAA has authorized two-engine operations on routes up to 75 minutes away from an airport exclusively in the Caribbean. These were not considered ETOPS flights. These flights were approved by the FAA as deviations under section 121.161, but were authorized before a formal ETOPS program was developed. These deviations were approved after a safety evaluation of the areas of operation, the airplanes, and the operators conducting them.

207 Minute ETOPS

207 Minute ETOPS

In March 1999, the Air Transport Association (ATA) asked the FAA to extend the 180-minute ETOPS authorization an additional fifteen percent to 207-minutes. The FAA published the ATA letter and asked for comments (64 FR 22667, April 27, 1999). Several commenters suggested that the FAA should formalize ETOPS in the regulations rather than continuing to rely on the deviation authority in section 121.161 and advisory materials. In January 2000, the FAA approved 207 minute ETOPS and stated its intent to task an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Working Group to study the issues and to recommend regulations for ETOPS (65 FR 3522, January 21, 2000). In this same notice, the FAA solicited comments from the public on its decision to approve 207 minute ETOPS.

Polar Operations Letter

Polar Operations Letter

The increasing use of Polar flights, while creating economic benefits, has brought new challenges to extended operations such as climactic extremes. Due to these new challenges and to the increasing similarity among all long-range operations, experience began to show that ETOPS requirements and processes are generally applicable to all long-range operations including those by three and four engine airplanes and would improve their safety.

Harmonization With International Standards

Harmonization With International Standards

Related International Activity

Two related activities should be noted. First, the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of European nations has chartered a working group that is also developing standards and guidance material for extended operations. In ongoing efforts of both the FAA and JAA to coordinate regulatory requirements, one of the ARAC ETOPS Working Group tasks was to "harmonize * * * standardized requirements across national boundaries and regulatory bodies." Toward that end, there are representatives who are members of both the ARAC ETOPS Working Group and the JAA Working Group. Also, the two groups met together twice in Europe to facilitate joint action and harmonization. Second, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Air Navigation Commission (ANC) Operations Panel has decided to develop standards and recommended practices (SARPS) for extended range operations. In May of 2001, the ARAC ETOPS Working Group held one of its meetings in Montreal, Quebec, Canada (ICAO's headquarters city) for the purpose of briefing members of the ANC and ICAO Air Navigation Bureau staff.

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Task Statement

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Task Statement

The FAA established the ARAC ETOPS Working Group through a notice in the Federal Register at 65 FR 37447, dated June 14, 2000. It was given the following tasks:

1. Review the existing policy and requirements found in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-42A, applicable ETOPS special conditions, and policy memorandums and notices, for certification and operational regulations and guidance material for ETOPS approvals up to 180 minutes.

2. Develop comprehensive ETOPS airworthiness standards for 14 CFR parts 25, 33, 121, and 135, as appropriate, to codify the existing policies and practices.

3. Develop ETOPS requirements for operations in excess of 180 minutes up to whatever extent that may be justified. Develop those requirements such that incremental approvals up to a maximum may be approved.

4. Develop standardized requirements for extended range operations for all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, including all turbojet and turbopropeller commercial twin-engine airplanes (business jets), excluding reciprocating engine powered commercial airplanes. This effort should establish criteria for diversion times up to 180 minutes that is consistent with existing ETOPS policy and procedures. It should also develop criteria for diversion times beyond 180 minutes that is consistent with the ETOPS criteria developed by the Working Group.

5. Develop additional guidance and/or advisory material as the ARAC finds appropriate.

6. Harmonize such standardized requirements across national boundaries and regulatory bodies.

7. Any proposal to increase the safety requirements for existing ETOPS approvals up to 207 minutes must contain data defining the unsafe conditions that would warrant the safety requirements.

8. The Working Group will provide briefings to the Transport Airplane and Engine Issues group.

9. The recommendations should consider the comments received as a result of the April 27, 1999 and January 21, 2000 Federal Register notices.

10. Within one year of publication of the ARAC task in the Federal Register, submit recommendations to the FAA in the form of a proposed rule.

Formation and Membership of the ETOPS Working Group

Formation and Membership of the ETOPS Working Group

Formation

Following the formal tasking notice in the Federal Register, the ARAC organized an ETOPS Working Group. Membership

The ETOPS Working Group consisted of over 50 representatives of U.S. and foreign airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, pilots' unions, industry groups, air disaster support groups, and representatives from the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the FAA.

Formation

In accordance with the task statement and the Working Group's work plan approved by the ARAC Air Carrier Operations Issues Group on August 15, 2000, the Working Group reviewed existing ETOPS documents and developed a risk assessment method for ETOPS and other long-range flights. The risk assessment method is comprised of three parts: a loss of thrust model; a system safety analysis using the FAR/JAR 25.1309 process; and an operational assessment assuring that pertinent operational considerations are taken into account.

On the basis of the risk model and their review of long-range operations, the Working Group used the following general concepts as the basis for proposed regulations and advisory material.

[sbull] Special considerations must be given for extended range flights to prevent the need for a diversion and to protect the airplane and passengers during the diversion when it cannot be prevented;

[sbull] Airplanes must be designed and built for the intended mission.

[sbull] Airplanes must be designed, manufactured, and maintained at a level that ensures the original reliability throughout the life of the airplane.

[sbull] When engine reliability reaches a certain level, as measured by the In Flight Shut Down (IFSD) rate (IFSD=0.01/1,000 hours), the risk of independent failures leading to loss of all thrust is not significant enough to require limiting the allowed time from an airport and other limiting factors come into play.

[sbull] For part 121 air carrier operations, ETOPS should be defined as flights more than 60 minutes from an adequate airport for two-engine airplanes and more than 180 minutes from an adequate airport for air carrier airplanes with more than two engines. For part 135 operations ETOPS should be defined as flights more than 180 minutes from an adequate airport.

[sbull] Because of extreme climactic conditions certain ETOPS requirements should be applied to Polar operations even if those operations would not otherwise be considered ETOPS

[sbull] Part 135 operations have unique considerations

Improvements in airplane engine and system reliability have reached a point that they may no longer be the constraining factor on the long-range flight operations. The Working Group found, however, and the FAA agrees, that it would be prudent for two-engine airplanes to remain within 180 minutes of an adequate airport whenever possible. There is a positive correlation between risk and diversion length. Thus the FAA believes that diversion lengths should be kept to a minimum.

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Concept General Observations

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Concept General Observations

As already noted, the working group acknowledged that the reliability of aircraft engines and systems has improved to the point that it may not be limiting to the operation. The Working Group recommended that two-engine airplanes should be approved in many cases for 180 minutes ETOPS and ETOPS beyond 180 minutes may be appropriate in some situations. The Working Group recommended that airplanes with more than two engines should be approved for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes in many cases. Even though engine reliability has significantly improved, diversions are sometimes necessary for reasons that are unrelated to the number of engines on an aircraft and their reliability, such as passenger illness or other occurrences.

Regarding extended range operations by jet-powered airplanes under part 135, FAA policy for many years has permitted such flights up to 180 minutes from an airport, without additional ETOPS-like requirements. Operational experience has validated that policy, and the Working Group proposal continues existing policy and provides for flights with longer diversion times with appropriate additional requirements.

Regarding extended range operations by air carrier airplanes with more than two engines, those flights have been conducted without any ETOPS-like requirements since the air carrier jet era began. The Working Group's proposals would ensure the continued safety of those flights by adding requirements in areas that are not dependent upon the number of engines on the airplane, such as cargo fire protection duration.

The ETOPS Working Group has proposed regulations and guidance material in three specific areas: Type Design (parts 25 and 33); part 121 Operations; and part 135 Operations.

General Discussion of the Proposal

General Discussion of the Proposal

FAA Approach to the ARAC Recommendations

In developing this proposal the FAA has accepted ARAC recommendations without change where possible. The FAA made changes for clarity, to correct for incomplete ARAC recommendations, to ensure that requirements are legally sufficient, and to make improvements in style of presentation. The FAA provides explanation in this notice for any substantial differences with the ARAC recommendation.

General Issues

General Issues

Terminology--Extended Operations (ETOPS)

This proposal has two primary objectives: (1) To create new regulations and amend existing regulations for the design, maintenance, and operation of aircraft used in ETOPS; thus far ETOPS has been allowed by the FAA's discretionary authority and supported by an Advisory Circular and; (2) To apply the lessons learned from ETOPS to all airplanes that are operated in Extended Operations (ETOPS) regardless of the number of engines. The acronym ETOPS would apply to all airplanes in Extended Operations and not just twin-engine airplanes. These rules would apply equally to airplanes operating over oceanic areas or routes entirely over land. Risk Model

Terminology--Extended Operations (ETOPS)

Item 3 of the ARAC tasking was to "develop ETOPS requirements for operations in excess of 180 minutes up to whatever extent that may be justified." At the early ARAC ETOPS Working Group meetings, the FAA presented a new risk model for assessing risk on an ETOPS flight. The new approach for assessing the overall risk of critical thrust loss on an ETOPS flight considers such factors as the length of the flight and engine reliability in addition to the more traditional maximum diversion time.

The ARAC ETOPS Working Group adopted the FAA's proposed risk model and further developed it to apply it to three and four engine airplanes. It did this by including the corresponding engine failure rate that would be required to achieve an equivalent risk of critical thrust loss due to independent failures on three and four engine airplanes. We will now summarize the risk model used in the development of this proposed rule.

The basic premise that the FAA used in developing its risk model is that ETOPS service experience is excellent and that any changes to allow further expansion of ETOPS need to preserve this record. With this premise in mind, the basic objective is to define a risk model that would allow an expansion of two engine airplane operations to use the same routes as three and four engine airplanes with no substantial change in the overall risk.

Currently, we manage dual engine shut down risk on two engine airplanes by limiting the maximum allowable diversion distance and requiring a low engine in-flight shutdown rate. This is a one-dimensional risk model in that with a constant in-flight shutdown rate, the existing ETOPS requirements and policy consider only the maximum distance that an operator may plan a route from an enroute diversion airport. It assumes that there is a constant risk during the course of a flight with no consideration of how the actual diversion times vary along the track as different alternate airports come into and out of range of the airplane. This approach also does not consider the increase in overall risk that is created by increasing an airplane's range, and thus time aloft, by adding fuel. Further, this model provides no means to assess the effect on overall risk with changes with engine failure rates. Actual ETOPS involve continuously changing distances to alternates. Current ETOPS limits on maximum diversion time don't represent real world risk because diversions can occur anywhere along the track, not just at the maximum point. The new ETOPS risk model adopted for the development of this new proposed rule is based on the introduction of a "two dimensional" model to replace the "one dimensional" maximum diversion time/distance model currently in use.

The new ETOPS Exposure Index is a simplified form of several risk equations that have been developed over the past forty years. All share similar characteristics. The ARAC ETOPS Working Group compared several different mathematical representations for allowable risk versus engine failure rate. Each showed that an engine failure rate on the order of 0.01 per 1,000 engine flight hours was adequate to allow diversion times for two engine airplanes that for all practical purposes could be considered as unrestricted.

The new risk model consists of a comparative risk index based on a combination of range, average diversion distance, and engine failure rate. Independent cause dual engine shut down risk is driven by the footprint area of the route multiplied by the engine failure rate (E) squared. The footprint area is defined as the route length (L) multiplied by the average diversion distance (D). Note that the engine shut down rate is squared to account for loss of first engine and then loss of second engine. Therefore, we define "ETOPS Exposure Index" (EEI) as a function of:

[sbull] Footprint Area (Route Length x Average Diversion Distance) (L x D) and

[sbull] E2 (Engine Failure Rate Squared)

EEI = L x D x E2

The ETOPS Exposure Index can be used as an evaluation tool to assess risk of ETOPS operations due to independent engine failure causes. Assuming the following values for each of the terms of the equation:

EEI = L x D x E2

[sbull] Route Length = 5500 nautical miles,

[sbull] Average Distance for 180 minute ETOPS = 800 nautical miles, and

[sbull] Engine failure rate at the current required level = 0.02 shutdowns/1,000 engine-hours or 50,000 hours time between shutdowns.

The EEI would then be:

EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760

EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760

With the ETOPS Exposure Index fixed at this level, longer flights and greater maximum diversion distances can be offset by decreased engine failure rate. In other words, as E becomes smaller, L and/or D can increase appropriately. An engine failure rate of one-half the current requirement (E = 0.01/1,000 engine-hours) would allow a four times increase in "footprint" area.

EEI = L x D x E2 EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760 equals EEI = 5500 x 3200 x 0.012 = 1760 equals EEI = 11,000 x 1600 x 0.012 = 1760

EEI = L x D x E2 EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760 equals EEI = 5500 x 3200 x 0.012 = 1760 equals EEI = 11,000 x 1600 x 0.012 = 1760

In other words, with an engine failure rate that is one-half the current requirement for 180 minute ETOPS we could allow four times the average diversion distance or a combination of increased route length and average diversion distance with no change in the current ETOPS risk.

For a two engine airplane, engine failure rate has the biggest impact on ETOPS risk because the factor is squared. A reduction in the engine failure rate has a large impact on the size of an allowable footprint area for the same risk. Using the ETOPS Exposure Index concept with a reduction in the engine failure rate standard allows the development of ETOPS rules for two engine airplanes that minimize restrictions on airline operations while maintaining the current excellent ETOPS safety record.

Current in-service engines are capable of achieving better than 100,000 hours time between shutdowns (.01/1,000 engine-hours), or double the current ETOPS reliability standard. This represents two in-flight shutdowns in the entire life of a typical transport airplane. It is not reasonable to expect that two in-flight shutdowns due to independent causes in the entire life of a typical transport airplane would occur on the same flight.

With an IFSD rate of 0.01/1,000 hours, the probability of complete loss of thrust due to independent failures will be sufficiently low so that the main focus of long-range operational safety can be on reducing the possibility of other risk factors.

We emphasize that this risk model represents a good tool for evaluating the risk of critical thrust loss due to "independent" failure causes. The biggest threat to long-range operational safety continues to be the loss of thrust from multiple engines resulting from:

Common Cause Multiple Failures Cascading Multiple Failures Fuel Exhaustion

Common Cause Multiple Failures Cascading Multiple Failures Fuel Exhaustion

These threats are common to all long-range operations, regardless of the number of engines on the airplane.

Examples of common cause multiple failure events:

Eastern Airlines L1011 nearly lost all engines after improper installation of engine magnetic chip detectors. B-747 volcanic ash cloud encounter during volcanic eruption in Alaska--All engines severely damaged by ash.

Example of potential cascading failure: Worn-out second engine fails after application of higher power following failure of first engine

Examples of Fuel Exhaustion events:

Air Canada 767--No power landing into Gimli, Canada Air Transat A330--No power landing in the Azores

Air Canada 767--No power landing into Gimli, Canada Air Transat A330--No power landing in the Azores

Sources of Common Cause and Cascading Failures:

Common Design Faults

Hardware

Software Environmental Exposures

Weather

Volcanic Ash Clouds

Bird Strikes

High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

Common Design Faults

Lightning

Simultaneous Maintenance on More than One Engine

Contaminated Fuel

Sources of Fuel Exhaustion: Operational Errors

Fuel System Mismanagement

Fuel Loading Errors Misleading Fuel Quantity Indications Misleading Fuel Loading Procedures particularly during a non-normal (MEL) dispatch

Constant awareness of potential sources of common cause failures, cascading failures, and fuel exhaustion is the key to continued long-range operational safety. This awareness, growing from operating experience, is the basis for continued ETOPS safety. ETOPS safety enhancements focus on defining methods to prevent potential threats caused by known sources.

Examples of Common Cause/Cascading Failure Prevention Strategies:

1. No single person performing simultaneous engine maintenance or servicing 2. Conservative fuel loading requirements 3. Intense rain/hail ingestion engine design requirements 4. Constant adherence to established ETOPS procedures without exception 5. Robust engine condition monitoring program

The FAA incorporated prevention strategies for these types of failures into airworthiness requirements and ETOPS policy as we learned of them. This proposal would codify those prevention strategies for known sources of common cause, cascading and fuel exhaustion failures that have not been incorporated into the regulations.

The ARAC ETOPS Working Group also looked at how the new risk model could be applied to airplanes with more than two engines. For these types of airplanes, the working group had to decide what a critical loss of thrust was in order to determine the impact that engine failure rate would have on overall risk. For a two-engine airplane, the risk model assumes that a loss of both engines is a critical thrust loss. This is because there is a general expectation that the result of such an occurrence would be a catastrophic loss of the airplane; though there are examples of safe landings following the loss of both engines. The working group applied a similar approach to define a critical thrust loss for airplanes with more than two engines.

The operating rules contained in 14 CFR part 121 have minimum performance requirements with two engines inoperative for airplanes that have more than two engines. Using this as a guide, the working group assumed that critical thrust loss for both three and four engine airplanes would be three engines. If three engines fail on either kind of airplane, there is a general expectation that the result would be a catastrophic loss of the airplane. In other words, the risk model assumes the fourth engine on a four-engine airplane provides no additional safety benefit compared to the loss of all engines on a three-engine airplane. As is the case for two-engine airplanes, there are examples where a flight crew was able to safely land a four-engine airplane following the loss of three of the engines. However, the ETOPS risk model makes the conservative assumption that this would result in loss of the airplane.

This assumption for three and four engine airplanes changes the risk model equations so that for these types of airplanes, the probability of the loss of three engines would be much more remote than the loss of both engines on a two engine airplane. Under this assumption there is a higher probability of losing three engines on a four-engine airplane than on a three-engine airplane. The following example illustrates the concept. A three-engine and a four-engine airplane are in-flight. Both airplanes suffer the loss of two-engines due to independent causes but can reach a diversion airport. However the loss of an additional engine for either airplane at this point would be catastrophic for the airplane. The three-engine airplane has a single engine that could possibly fail while the four-engine airplane has two engines that could possibly fail. In this unlikely situation, the four-engine airplane is at greater risk because the probability of experiencing an engine failure event increases with the number of engines. Assuming that the engine failure rate is the same for each type of airplane, a four-engine airplane would have twice the probability of losing one of the two remaining engines than the three-engine airplane would have of losing the one remaining engine.

Using the available risk model equations with these considerations, the ARAC ETOPS Working Group determined that the in-flight shutdown rate for a three engine airplane would be approximately 0.2 shutdowns per 1,000 engine-hours to have an equivalent risk of critical thrust loss compared to a two engine airplane with an in-flight shutdown rate of 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours. On a four-engine airplane, the equivalent in-flight shutdown rate would be 0.1 per 1,000 engine-hours.

Because these rates are so high compared to the failure rates currently achieved by today's turbine engines, the FAA does not consider it necessary to specify in-flight shutdown rates for three and four engine airplanes other than as part of an operator's propulsion system monitoring program. Under these programs, the operator must notify the FAA and take corrective action if these rates are exceeded. In-flight Shutdown (IFSD) Rate

Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights. A propulsion system monitoring program is intended to detect adverse trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for when corrective action may be necessary. The certificate holder would have to ensure that its ETOPS airplanes have In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD) rates commensurate with the world fleet's operation for that airplane type. Propulsion system monitoring at the operator level has been accomplished via the guidance of AC 120-42A which defined specific IFSD rates for ETOPS.

Propulsion system problems and IFSD may be caused by type design deficiencies, ineffective maintenance or operational procedures. It is very important to identify the root cause of events so that appropriate corrective action may be determined. The diverse causes of propulsion system problems require different solutions. For example, type design problems may affect the world fleet of aircraft. If an individual certificate holder experiences a problem caused by a type design issue, it may not be appropriate for the FAA to reduce or withdraw the particular operator's ETOPS authority. However, maintenance or operational problems may be wholly, or partially, the responsibility of the certificate holder. If a certificate holder has an unacceptable IFSD rate risk attributed to maintenance or operational practices, then action carefully tailored to that certificate holder may be required.

The FAA does not use IFSD rate as the sole means to determine a certificate holder's ETOPS authority. The FAA considers the 12-month rolling average standard that occurs for a mature fleet after the commencement of ETOPS. A high IFSD rate could be due to the limited number of engine operating hours used as the denominator for the rate calculation or a small fleet. The effect may be an IFSD rate jump well above the standard rate due to a single IFSD event. The underlying causes for such a jump in the rate will have to be considered by the Administrator. Conversely, there may be occasions when a single ETOPS event may warrant corrective action even though the overall IFSD rate is not exceeded. In such a case, the cause would be certificate holder specific and may require changes to their operational, dispatch or maintenance procedures. Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) Document

The use of a CMP document has been in the ETOPS criteria from AC 120-42, and later 120-42A, from the very first ETOPS airplane approvals. The CMP document defines airplane and propulsion system design configurations, maintenance procedures, and operational procedures required to comply with the ETOPS requirements that are not already a part of the original type design approved by the original issuance of the airplane and engine type certificates.

The CMP document is comprised of service bulletins, service letters, maintenance manual references, and other pertinent documents which define the alterations, maintenance or operational requirements and limitations that the FAA requires to make an airplane type design suitable for ETOPS. The CMP is an amendment to the airplane type design defined in 14 CFR 21.31. The initial CMP approval, as a change to the type design, is analogous to other type design approvals for specific operations such as Category III autoland approval for autopilot systems that could involve design changes to a previously certified system.

After ETOPS approval, the CMP may be modified by any airworthiness directives (ADs) issued in accordance with part 39 that supersede existing CMP requirements. CMP document requirements will not increase except by AD.

Misconceptions about the criteria for revising CMP documents generated some of the biggest discussions in the ARAC ETOPS Working Group meetings. The FAA approved airplanes for ETOPS under the original AC 120-42 between 1985 and 1989 without a defined propulsion system reliability standard. The approach used in AC 120-42 to assess the suitability of an airplane-engine combination for ETOPS was to use a "fix all problems" approach. This process involved identifying the causes of propulsion system problems in service on the candidate airplane and including identified corrective actions into an approved CMP document as a condition for ETOPS approval. This was an ongoing process and the FAA conducted regular reviews to determine additional corrective actions as new problems occurred in service. As a result, the FAA routinely required the airplane manufacturer to revise the CMP documents during this period.

The "fix all problems" approach to airplane propulsion system assessment was carried over into the revised AC 120-42A at the end of 1988, and continues on in this notice in proposed part 25 Appendix L paragraph II(a)(ii). However, revision A of the AC added a propulsion system reliability standard as a provision for ETOPS type design approval that did not exist in the original AC. With an established propulsion system reliability standard, the FAA now had a gauge to monitor the safety of the approved ETOPS fleet without a need to continually update the CMP as new problems occurred. Also, several ETOPS operators began objecting to the FAA requiring them to continually upgrade existing ETOPS approved airplanes without any input to the changes being required.

The FAA recognized that our previous practice of requiring upgrades to already approved airplanes without prior public review created an undue burden on operators. As a result, the FAA changed its approval process for revisions to CMP documents. The FAA documented this change in an internal memorandum signed by the managers of the Transport Airplane Directorate, and the Engine and Propeller Directorate on April 3, 1990. In that memo, the directorate managers noted that the AC gave them the responsibility for the continuing airworthiness of the type design CMP standard and that the CMP should not be changed unless the reliability of the airplane-engine combination is not achieving or maintaining the reliability objective, or some other unsafe condition arises. As with any type design, the FAA permits manufacturers and operators to incorporate minor changes and routine enhancements by service bulletins or production design changes. However, the FAA will not mandate such enhancements in a revision to the CMP standard. The memo concludes by stating that the Transport Airplane and the Engine and Propeller Directorates plan to use the AD process to control the continuing airworthiness type design requirements of the ETOPS CMP standard.

As a result of the joint memo, the FAA established strict guidelines for CMP revisions to ensure that the requirements of the basic CMP standard originally approved for an airplane-engine combination are not increased without going through the AD process.

The FAA approves revisions to an airplane's CMP document for the following reasons:

1. When incorporating the CMP standard for a newly approved airplane-engine combination into an existing CMP document.

2. When correcting errors in previous revisions.

3. When ADs are issued that supersede existing CMP requirements.

4. When approving optional alternatives to existing requirements.

5. When mandating changes to the CMP by an AD.

The FAA aircraft certification offices have used these guidelines since issuance of the joint memo to approve CMP revisions. Because operators had already complied with several revisions to previously approved CMP documents in force at the time the FAA issued the new CMP guidelines, the FAA worked with the airlines and the manufacturers to establish "baseline" CMP requirements for each ETOPS approved airplane-engine combination. The affected operators agreed to ensure that all of the requirements of these baseline CMPs are incorporated into their ETOPS fleets. Thereafter, the new CMP revision guidelines would be the standard way of making subsequent revisions. Summary of the Proposed Changes

The following chart summarizes which operations would be affected by the proposed rule changes:

Current requirements Proposed rule

Beyond 60 min up to

Up to 60 minutes Beyond 60 minutes Up to 60 minutes 180 minutes Beyond 180 minutes

Part 121 two engine … Section 121.161 Advisory material and No change … Would apply (Would Would apply.

applies. policy letters. codify previous

practice).

Part 121 more than two engine … No current regulation. No current regulation No change … No change … Would apply.

Part 135 … No current regulation. No current regulation No change … No change … Would apply.

The chart below summarizes ETOPS regulations before and after the proposed changes.

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposal

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposal

We begin the discussion by clarifying the term "ETOPS". Since its inception eighteen years ago, the term "ETOPS" has described extended-range operations of two-engine air carrier airplanes under a deviation from 14 CFR 121.161. The term has gained broad acceptance among operators and regulators throughout much of the world.

This proposal would create regulatory requirements for extended operations for all air carrier airplanes. As described previously, the thresholds for applicability would vary by the number of engines and type of operation. In its deliberations, the Working Group stated that it struggled with the question of whether to use a new term to describe the operations of airplanes beyond 180 minutes from an adequate airport. Early on, the Working Group considered and agreed to the term "LROPS" which stands for Long Range Operations to describe flights beyond the 180-minute threshold. However, as their efforts progressed the Working Group found that the use of two terms (ETOPS and LROPS) for two-engine airplanes flying beyond 60 minutes and 180 minutes from an airport quickly became awkward and cumbersome. Further, the Working Group members representing the maintenance community expressed great concern that the introduction of the LROPS term would needlessly create confusion among the maintenance community and would also require painstaking and potentially expensive revisions to numerous maintenance manuals and programs. In order to avoid any potential confusion, the Working Group recommended the use of the term ETOPS for all air carrier extended range operations irrespective of the number of engines.

The FAA strongly agrees with this recommendation. The FAA also believes that the addition of a new term could needlessly create confusion. Further it would potentially dilute the intent of this proposal, which is to codify existing ETOPS standards and procedures and to extend those concepts to airplanes with more than two engines. The FAA believes that the introduction of a new term could be misinterpreted as creating a new operational concept as opposed to the extension of an existing one.

The proposed amendments to the Type Design Rules 14 CFR parts 25 and 33 and supporting advisory material are a consolidation of requirements taken from AC 120-42A, the 777 Special Conditions, and JAA Information Leaflet (IL) 20. The materials contained in the proposed Airplane Type Design Rule (part 25) and AC are a compilation of the existing AC120-42A, 777 Special Condition, and JAA IL20.

The following discussion takes each of the Rule sections and attempts to capture all of the comments and discussion from the ARAC activities.

Part 1

Part 1

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 1

Section 1.1--General Definitions

The proposed definitions were adopted directly from the ARAC recommendation. This proposal would establish three different definitions of ETOPS in three significant ways. In each case, the acronym would stand for "extended operations" for all airplanes regardless of the number of engines. The definition would vary in part 121, however, depending on whether the airplane involved has two engines or more than two engines. This proposal also would introduce ETOPS into part 135 for the first time, where ETOPS would have a third definition. The FAA believes the remainder of the proposed definitions for section 1.1 are self-explanatory.

Part 21

Part 21

The amendments to part 21 would create reporting requirements for the holders of type certificate for two-engine ETOPS airplanes and ETOPS eligible engines. This would require type certificate holders to closely monitor the performance of their products to ensure their continuing reliability. These amendments would also ensure that the FAA is kept apprised of any existing or potential problems in a timely manner.

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 21

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 21

Proposed New Section 21.4--ETOPS Reporting Requirements

This proposal would add a new regulation consisting of two parts, Early ETOPS Problem Reporting & Tracking for all ETOPS airplanes, and ETOPS Operational Service Reliability Reporting for two-engine airplanes. Explanation

Proposed New Section 21.4--ETOPS Reporting Requirements

1. Reporting for all ETOPS airplanes. The proposed rule is a codification of what the FAA considers to be one of the essential and objective elements of the early ETOPS Special Conditions (SC) for the B777 aircraft; specifically as they pertain to problem tracking and reporting. The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendation and proposes it as a new section 21.4. Section 21.4 would require the type certificate holder to establish an early ETOPS problem reporting system. The proposed system would contain a means for the prompt identification of those problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations in order that they may be resolved in a timely manner. The system would also contain the process for the timely notification to the responsible FAA office of all relevant problems encountered, and identification of corrective actions deemed necessary and provide for appropriate FAA review of all planned corrective actions. The system would be in place for the first 250,000 engine-hours of fleet operating experience after the airplane enters service.

For two-engine ETOPS airplanes the system would remain in effect beyond 250,000 engine-hours of fleet operating experience until the fleet has demonstrated a specified and stable IFSD rate consistent with the approved diversion time of the aircraft. For the service period, this system would define the sources and content of in-service data that will be made available to the type certificate holder in support of the problem tracking system. The content of the data provided would include the data necessary to evaluate the specific cause of all service events reportable under section 21.3(c) of part 21, in addition to any other failure or malfunction that could affect the safety of ETOPS operation. Ten event occurrences, specifically defined with respect to reliable, safe ETOPS operation that would require reporting are defined in the proposal.

2. Reporting for two engine ETOPS airplanes. Paragraph (b)(1) of the proposed section 21.4 would require engine and airplane manufacturers to report periodically on the reliability of their two-engine airplane fleets. Reporting would include: IFSD events, IFSD rates, and ETOPS fleet statistics. This reporting may be combined with the reporting required by section 21.3. The proposed rule also would require the identification of cause and appropriate corrective action to assure reliable, safe ETOPS operations.

The periodic reporting of the reliability required of the manufacturers of engines and airplanes approved for ETOPS service would begin at the introduction of the product into service and continue throughout its product life. The interval of the reporting would be more frequent early in its product cycle and generally longer later in its product service life, especially after the product has achieved maturity with regard to engine reliability. Reliability would be indicated by a stable engine shutdown event rate at or below the target values.

Generally, early product service life reporting on a quarterly basis is adequate, especially considering the fact that the manufacturers report engine failure events as they occur under the requirements of section 21.3. Event rates may fluctuate considerably early in the product's service life cycle because, although the fleet is growing in numbers of engine-airplane combinations in service, the accumulation of engine flight hours is generally slow. Typically, event rates are not very stable when the fleet cumulative time is less than 1 or 2 million engine flight hours. Therefore the focus should be on event occurrences, not failure rates, with a small fleet typical of early service time.

After maturity (a stable engine shutdown event rate at or below the target values) with a large fleet, reporting intervals continue on a quarterly basis. Regardless of fleet size, fleet age, and state of maturity, engine failures are reported under the requirements of section 21.3.

3. Paragraph (b)(2) of the proposed section 21.4 identifies world fleet IFSD rate/reliability requirements. The standards in section 21.4(b)(2)(i) are the IFSD rates compatible with the current FAA ETOPS AC and Policy for operation up to 180 minutes (including North Pacific operation). The standard in section 21.4(b)(2)(ii) is an IFSD rate compatible with operation beyond 180 minutes to 240 minutes and beyond, as contained in the proposed Operational rule and guidance material.

As discussed in this proposed NPRM, an IFSD rate of 0.01/1,000 Engine Flight Hours (EFH) is consistent with an extremely improbable risk of a dual in-flight power loss from independent causes for a two-engine airplane, even assuming a decision of practically unlimited duration. The rates given are not operator specific, but rather apply across the fleet of a given airplane-engine combination.

The FAA expects implementation of corrective action will maintain an acceptable in-flight shutdown rate below the required levels. This is borne out by the current ETOPS fleet in-flight shutdown rates, which have achieved and consistently maintained rates at or below 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours. If the normal airworthiness monitoring process is not sufficient by itself to maintain an acceptable propulsion system reliability for a particular airplane-engine combination, then the FAA may require additional corrective actions, or reduce or withdraw the ETOPS diversion authority as described in section 21.4(c), if the risk of dual power loss is unacceptably high. Before such action is taken, however, the certificate holder and the FAA will assess the fleet-wide risk based upon the risk model developed for ETOPS presented in this preamble.

Part 25

Part 25

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 25

Proposed Change to Paragraph 25.857(c)(2)--Cargo Fire Suppression

The proposed change to section 25.857(c)(2) would require that the applicant furnish the certified time capability of a Class C cargo fire suppression system in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) in accordance with section 25.1581(a)(2). The time capability of a system is the maximum length of time a system can suppress a fire. Explanation

Proposed Change to Paragraph 25.857(c)(2)--Cargo Fire Suppression

The proposed new section 121.633 and part 135, Appendix H, paragraph E would specify that the time that an operator needs to fly to a planned ETOPS alternate may not exceed the maximum time capability specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's most time limited system. This change to section 25.857(c)(2) and a similar requirement in the new Appendix L, section I, paragraph (e)(4) will ensure that the Airplane Flight Manual provides the information that the operators will need regarding the fire suppression system to comply with the operating requirements. The justification for these changes is further discussed in the explanations for those proposed operating rules. Proposed New Section 25.1535--ETOPS Approval

A proposed new section 25.1535 would prescribe the requirements for obtaining ETOPS type design approval. Explanation

This new rule in the body of part 25 is effectively a pointer to a new Appendix L, which sets out additional design, analysis and test requirements for ETOPS type design approval. This rule also requires that in showing compliance with part 25 rules the applicant must consider the maximum length ETOPS mission. The applicant must also consider the effects of airplane system failure on crew workload and passenger physiological needs during a diversion of the maximum time considered. The system safety assessment required by section 25.1309 is an example of a rule where the ETOPS mission profile would be considered in an analysis to determine compliance. The ETOPS mission profile (including the maximum diversion time) could also affect the compliance analysis for section 25.1011(b) concerning oil endurance, and section 25.571 governing structural fatigue and damage tolerance.

This proposed rule is crucial to ensure that throughout the airplane design, the ETOPS mission profile is properly considered, and the standard of compliance is high because of it. The "ETOPS Scenario" diagram and the ETOPS significant systems definition that would be provided in the associated advisory circular for this rule are good tools that system designers can use to assess all conditions although they are not regulatory. There are also additional requirements in Appendix L to provide focus on those airplane systems that have, historically, been important to ETOPS operations such as electrical power, APU, and fuel systems. The emphasis on these specific airplane systems does not mean that these are the only airplane systems that are important to ETOPS. The section 25.1535 and Appendix L requirements along with the advisory circular guidance for ETOPS significant systems and the ETOPS mission profile provide the basis for assessing other airplane systems for ETOPS approval. Proposed New Part 25 Appendix L--Extended Operations

A proposed new appendix L to part 25 defines additional airworthiness requirements for ETOPS approval. Explanation

Appendix L would codify the airworthiness standards unique to ETOPS from Advisory Circular 120-42A, the Boeing 777 ETOPS special conditions, and the 207-minute ETOPS Policy Letter EPL 20-01. The requirements of Appendix L would go beyond simply considering the ETOPS mission in applying the basic part 25 requirements.

Since we would not require an applicant to comply with these ETOPS requirements in order to receive a basic part 25 type certificate, we decided that a separate appendix to part 25 would be the best location for these additional requirements for ETOPS. Appendix L Format

Appendix L is organized into three sections. Section I sets out design requirements that all airplanes must comply with for ETOPS approval. Section II prescribes specific requirements for two engine airplanes. Section III prescribes specific requirements for airplanes with more than two engines.

The proposed numbering system and organization of Appendix L is a significant departure from the ARAC recommendation. As an aid to readers familiar with the original ARAC proposal, Tables 1 and 2 cross-reference the original Appendix L paragraph numbers recommended by ARAC to the reorganized appendix proposed in this notice.

Table 1.--Cross-Reference of ARAC Proposed and New Appendix L Paragraph Numbers

Original ARAC Proposal New

L25.1 … … Appendix L … Applicability

L25.2 … (a) … Section I … (a)

(a)(i) … Section I … (a)(1)

(a)(i)(1) … Section I … (a)(1)(i)

(a)(i)(2) … Section I … (a)(1)(ii)

(a)(ii) … Section I … (a)(2)

(a)(ii)(1) … Section I … (a)(2)(i)

(a)(ii)(2) … Section I … (a)(2)(ii)

(a)(ii)(3) … Section I … (a)(2)(iii)

(a)(iii) … Section I … (a)(3)

(b) … Section I … (b)

(b)(i) … Section I … (b)(1)

(b)(i)(1) … Section I … (b)(1)(i)

(b)(ii) … Section I … (b)(1)

(b)(iii) … Section I … (b)(1)(ii)

(b)(iv) … Section I … (b)(2)

(b)(iv)(1) … Section I … (b)(2)(i)

(b)(iv)(2) … Section I … (b)(2)(ii)

L25.3 … (i) … Section II … (b)(1)

(ii) … Section II … (b)(2)(ii)

(iii) … Section I … (c)

L25.4 … Section II, Section …

III

(a) … Section II, Section (a)

III.

(a)(i) … Section II, Section (a)(1)

III.

(a)(ii) … Section II, Section (a)(1)

III.

(a)(iii) … Section II … (a)(2), (a)(3)

Section III … (a)(2)

(a)(iv) … Section II … (a)(4)

(a)(iv)(a) … Section II … (a)(4)(i)

(a)(iv)(b) … Section II … (a)(4)(ii)

(a)(iv)(c) … Section II … (a)(4)(iii)

(a)(v) … Section II … (a)(3)

Section III … (a)(2)

(a)(vi) … Section II … (a)(5)

Section III … (a)(3)

(a)(vii) … Section I … (d)

(b) … Omit …

(b)(i) … Section II … (b)(9)

Section III … (b)(6)

(b)(i)(1) … Section II … (b)(4)

(b)(i)(1)(a) … Section II … (b)(4)(i)

(b)(i)(1)(b) … Section II … (b)(4)(ii)

(b)(i)(2) … Section II … (b)(6)

(b)(i)(2) … Section III … (b)(3)

(b)(i)(3) … Section II … (b)(7)

(b)(i)(3) … Section III … (b)(4)

(b)(i)(3)(a) … Section II … (b)(7)(i)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)

(b)(i)(3)(a)(i) … Section II … (b)(7)(i)(1)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)(1)

(b)(i)(3)(a)(ii) … Section II … (b)(7)(i)(2)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)(2)

(b)(i)(3)(a)(iii).... Section II … (b)(7)(i)(3)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)(3)

(b)(i)(3)(a)(iv) … Section II … (b)(7)(i)(4)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)(4)

(b)(i)(3)(a)(v) … Section II … (b)(7)(i)(5)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)(5)

(b)(i)(3)(a)(vi) … Section II … (b)(7)(i)(6)

Section III … (b)(4)(i)(6)

(b)(i)(3)(b) … Section II … (b)(7)(ii)

Section III … (b)(4)(ii)

(b)(i)(3)(c) … Section II … (b)(7)(iii)

Section III … (b)(4)(iii)

(b)(i)(3)(d) … Section II … (b)(7)(iv)

Section III … (b)(4)(iv)

Table 1.--Cross-Reference of ARAC Proposed and New Appendix L Paragraph Numbers--Continued

Original ARAC Proposal New

(b)(i)(3)(e) … Section II … (b)(7)(v)

Section III … (b)(4)(v)

(b)(ii) … Section II … (b)(8)

Section III … (b)(5)

(b)(ii)(a) … Section II … (b)(8)(i)

Section III … (b)(5)(i)

(b)(ii)(b) … Section II … (b)(8)(ii)

Section III … (b)(5)(ii)

(b)(ii)(c) … Section II … (b)(8)(iii)

Section III … (b)(5)(iii)

(b)(ii)(d) … Section II … (b)(8)(iv)

Section III … (b)(5)(iv)

(b)(iii) … Section II … (b)(3)

Section III … (b)(1)

(c) … Section II, Section (c)

III.

(c)(i) … Section II, Section (c)(1)

III.

(c)(ii) … Section II, Section (c)(2)

III.

L25.5 … Section I … (e)(4)

Table 2.--Cross-Reference of New and ARAC Proposed Appendix L Paragraph Numbers

New Original ARAC Proposal

Appendix L … Applicability … L25.1 …

Section I … … L25.2 …

(a) … L25.2 … (a)

(a)(1) … L25.2 … (a)(i)

(a)(1)(i) … L25.2 … (a)(i)(1)

(a)(1)(ii) … L25.2 … (a)(i)(2)

(a)(1)(iii) … New …

(a)(2) … L25.2 … (a)(ii)

(a)(2)(i) … L25.2 … (a)(ii)1

(a)(2)(ii) … L25.2 … (a)(ii)(2)

(a)(2)(iii) … L25.2 … (a)(ii)(3)

(a)(3) … L25.2 … (a)(iii)

(b) … L25.2 … (b)

(b)(1) … L25.2 … (b)(i), (b)(ii)

(b)(1)(i) … L25.2 … (b)(i)(1)

(b)(1)(ii) … L25.2 … (b)(iii)

(b)(2) … L25.2 … (b)(iv)

(b)(2)(i) … L25.2 … (b)(iv)(1)

(b)(2)(ii) … L25.2 … (b)(iv)(2)

(b)(3) … New …

(c) … L25.3 … (iii)

(d) … L25.4 … (a)(vii)

(e) … New …

(e)(1) … New …

(e)(2) … New …

(e)(3) … New …

(e)(4) … L25.5 …

(e)(5) … New …

Section II … … L25.4 …

(a) … L25.4 … (a)

(a)(1) … L25.4 … (a)(i), (a)(ii)

(a)(2) … L25.4 … (a)(iii)

(a)(3) … L25.4 … (a)(iii), (a)(v)

(a)(4) … L25.4 … (a)(iv)

(a)(4)(i) … L25.4 … (a)(iv)(a)

(a)(4)(ii) … L25.4 … (a)(iv)(b)

(a)(4)(iii) … L25.4 … (a)(iv)(c)

(a)(5) … L25.4 … (a)(vi)

(b)(1) … L25.3 … (i)

(b)(2)(i) … New …

(b)(2)(ii) … L25.3 … (ii)

(b)(3) … L25.4 … (b)(iii)

(b)(4) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(1)

(b)(4)(i) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(1)(a)

(b)(4)(ii) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(1)(b)

(b)(5) … New …

Table 2.--Cross-Reference of New and ARAC Proposed Appendix L Paragraph Numbers--Continued

New Original ARAC Proposal

(b)(6) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(2)

(b)(7) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)

(b)(7)(i) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)

(b)(7)(i)(1) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(i)

(b)(7)(i)(2) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)

(b)(7)(i)(3) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)

(b)(7)(i)(4) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)

(b)(7)(i)(5) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(v)

(b)(7)(i)(6) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)

(b)(7)(ii) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(b)

(b)(7)(iii) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(c)

(b)(7)(iv) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(d)

(b)(7)(v) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(e)

(b)(8) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)

(b)(8)(i) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(a)

(b)(8)(ii) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(b)

(b)(8)(iii) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(c)

(b)(8)(iv) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(d)

(b)(9) … L25.4 … (b)(i)

(c) … L25.4 … (c)

(c)(1) … L25.4 … (c)(i)

(c)(2) … L25.4 … (c)(ii)

Section III … … L25.4 …

(a) … L25.4 … (a)

(a)(1) … L25.4 … (a)(i), (a)(ii)

(a)(2) … L25.4 … (a)(iii), (a)(v)

(a)(3) … L25.4 … (a)(vi)

(b)(1) … L25.4 … (b)(iii)

(b)(2) … New …

(b)(3) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(2)

(b)(4) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)

(b)(4)(i) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)

(b)(4)(i)(1) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(i)

(b)(4)(i)(2) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)

(b)(4)(i)(3) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)

(b)(4)(i)(4) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)

(b)(4)(i)(5) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(v)

(b)(4)(i)(6) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)

(b)(4)(ii) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(b)

(b)(4)(iii) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(c)

(b)(4)(iv) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(d)

(b)(4)(v) … L25.4 … (b)(i)(3)(e)

(b)(5) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)

(b)(5)(i) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(a)

(b)(5)(ii) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(b)

(b)(5)(iii) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(c)

(b)(5)(iv) … L25.4 … (b)(ii)(d)

(b)(6) … L25.4 … (b)(i)

(c) … L25.4 … (c)

(c)(1) … L25.4 … (c)(i)

(c)(2) … L25.4 … (c)(ii)

We discuss each paragraph of the proposed new Appendix L below.

Section I--Design Requirements

I(a) Airplane Systems

I(a)(1) Operation in Icing Conditions I(a)(1)(i)

ETOPS airplanes would have to comply with the requirements of section 25.1419 for operation in icing conditions. Explanation

I(a)(1) Operation in Icing Conditions I(a)(1)(i)

Section 25.1419 sets out the requirements for certifying a transport category airplane for flight into icing conditions. This requirement is optional in that an applicant may choose to not apply for approval in icing conditions. However, from a practical standpoint no one would request certification of an airplane that did not meet this requirement. This proposed new regulation makes this approval mandatory for ETOPS approval. I(a)(1)(ii)

The airframe and propulsion system ice protection would have to be capable of continued safe flight and landing at engine-inoperative and decompression altitudes in icing conditions. Following the loss of an engine at cruising altitude, an airplane will drift down to a lower (engine-inoperative) altitude. A decompression altitude is an altitude to which an airplane must descend following the loss of cabin pressure. Decompression altitudes are 10,000 feet MSL and below. Explanation

This paragraph would codify AC 120-42A, paragraph 8(b)(11) for airframe ice protection. The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane is capable of continued safe flight and landing at the decompression altitudes. This rule would require the applicant to demonstrate to the FAA that the anti-icing systems on the airplane will assure the airplane's capability to continue to operate during a worst-case diversion. The ARAC Working Group recommended a standard that would require the capability to safely divert if anti-icing cannot be shown available for all scenarios. This recommended standard tacitly assumes that airplane ice protection is not necessarily required during an ETOPS diversion. We disagree with this recommendation. Paragraph 8(b)(11) of AC 120-42A says that the airframe and propulsion ice protection should be shown to provide adequate capability for the intended operation. The AC says that this should account for prolonged exposure to lower altitudes associated with the engine-out diversion, cruise, holding, approach and landing. We do not interpret this paragraph as allowing circumstances where anti-icing would not normally be available during an ETOPS diversion. An applicant would have to address any failure conditions where the ice-protection systems would not be available during an ETOPS diversion as part of the safety analysis required by section 25.1309.

The preamble justification provided in the ARAC proposal stated that this rule "will also require the applicant to demonstrate that the non-heated (or "non-deiced") areas of the airplane will not pick up a load of ice that would make the airplane uncontrollable or create too much drag to complete the diversion." This statement is consistent with how the FAA has applied the criteria of AC 120-42A paragraph 8.(b)(11) for all airplanes certified using that policy. However, the ARAC recommendation did not include this specific provision. We have added this requirement into the proposed rule as a new paragraph I(a)(1)(iii). It is consistent with ARAC's recommendation and consistent with what has been standard ETOPS type certification practice to consider the accumulation of ice on the non-heated or non-deiced areas of the airplane.

The associated advisory material for this proposed requirement will describe the conditions and assumptions that an applicant may use in simulating a diversion icing environment for showing compliance with the proposed rule. The advisory material will also provide guidance for developing analyses or testing that would justify not having to assume that the entire diversion would be in icing conditions. I(a)(2) Electrical Power Supply I(a)(2)(i) and (ii)

These paragraphs would establish reliability requirements for the electrical power supply system on an ETOPS flight. Explanation

Paragraphs I(a)(2)(i) and (ii) are basically a restatement of section 25.1309 for the electrical power supply system in consideration of the ETOPS mission. We agree with the ARAC's apparent intent that these paragraphs, in conjunction with the new sections 25.1535(a) and (b), codify paragraphs 8(b)(1), 8(b)(6), 8(b)(7) and 8(c)(4) of AC 120-42A for the electrically powered ETOPS significant systems. These paragraphs establish the overall system safety objectives for these systems in extended operations.

The proposed rule is not as explicit as AC 120-42A in stating the types of functions that an applicant would need to consider in applying the safety objectives of section 25.1309 for an ETOPS mission. The general philosophy of the proposed rule is to let the existing policy associated with section 25.1309 compliance determine the design analysis for ETOPS. This philosophy is consistent with paragraph (c)(1) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions, which requires the applicant to comply with part 25 with regards to the ETOPS mission. Although we discuss this regulatory philosophy here in reference to the specific electrical power supply system requirements, it also applies to other ETOPS significant systems that are not specifically addressed in the proposed rule.

The FAA's intent for paragraphs I(a)(2)(i) and (ii) is to assure that the applicant properly focuses on electrical power redundancy and reliability when considering ETOPS mission scenarios in showing compliance with section 25.1309. On a two-engine airplane, the potential lack of redundancy available for electrical power generation makes this requirement especially important. However, the new emphasis is in paragraph (ii). It will be up to the applicant to demonstrate which functions would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. It is not realistic, for instance, for an applicant to state that operating for an extended period of time on suction feed would not reduce the capability of the airplane to cope with adverse operating conditions (for example, negative g or turbulence). Additionally, the applicant would have to determine what navigation and communication systems must be powered by emergency generation sources during a worst case ETOPS diversion. I(a)(2)(iii)

This paragraph would require at least three independent electrical generation sources for airplanes being certified for greater than 180 minutes. Explanation

Paragraph I(a)(2)(iii) would codify the three generator requirement of paragraph 8.(b)(8) in AC 120-42A. However, the ARAC recommendation only applies this requirement to airplanes being certified for greater than 180-minute ETOPS. The AC specifies three generators for any ETOPS approval. This specific requirement created much discussion within the ARAC ETOPS Working Group. Paragraph I(a)(2)(iii) as proposed in this notice represents the compromise position that allowed working group consensus. The following paragraphs are the ARAC's recommended justification for this requirement. The FAA is publishing them without comment.

This topic is inextricably linked to the discussion about MMELs. The MMEL or Master Minimum Equipment List allows an airplane operator to fly without equipment not on this fully functioning. There is concern that without a specific number of generators required in the rule, the MMEL could strip away some of the redundancy required for long-range flight. The arguments against a prescriptive number are generally as follows:

(1) Defining a number of generators would not assure proper system reliability (for example, is it better to have three generators with a Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 20,000 hours each, or four generators with an MTBF of 3,000 each?)

(2) Defining a number of generators would either artificially constrain or give a "pass" to future airplane designs. For instance, if a new airplane had a system architectural need for 8 generating systems, requiring three in the ETOPS rule would not assure an adequately safe design.

(3) Trying to address the formation of the MMEL in part 25 is impractical and inconsistent with agreed-to policies for MMEL development.

"Nonetheless, it was agreed that there should be a tie-in between the analysis performed for Part 25 ETOPS approval and the analysis the Flight Operations Evaluation Review Board (FOEB), who develop the MMEL, used in determining dispatch criteria. This is almost always the case in today's process, but formalizing the process would be a positive step.

"Therefore, an additional paragraph has been added to the ETOPS regulation to require a minimum number of electrical generators. This requirement codifies the existing AC 120-42A electrical generator redundancy criteria. The intent of this requirement is to ensure future airplanes to be certified for ETOPS have an electrical generation system architecture equivalent to the 737, 757, 767, 777 and A310, 320, A330 era airplanes. Future airplane electrical system architectures may be significantly different from today's airplanes, but the architecture must be equivalent from the perspective of robustness to independent failure scenarios." I(a)(3) Time Limited Systems

This paragraph would require that the applicant state the capability of most time limiting ETOPS significant system in the airplane flight manual. Explanation

As stated previously for the revised paragraph 25.857(c)(2), this requirement would provide the information that the operators would need to comply with the applicable operating requirements. Advisory Circular 120-42A has two main categories of ETOPS approval (120 minutes and 180 minutes) based on demonstrated propulsion system reliability. The ETOPS approval, as stated in the airplane flight manual in currently approved ETOPS airplanes, identifies the maximum approved diversion time based as one of these two times. In order to qualify for the ETOPS type design approval, the applicant must design the airplane time-limited systems to support this maximum approved diversion time with an additional 15 minutes capability to allow for airplane holding, approach and landing.

In the context of proposed paragraph I(a)(3), we do not consider the propulsion system as a time-limited ETOPS significant system. Proposed Appendix L, section II(a), codifies the service experience method for ETOPS approval from AC 120-42A. Paragraph II(a)(4) of this section defines the required world fleet in-flight shutdown rate with each level of ETOPS operational approval. In this particular case, the level of ETOPS approval refers to the operational approval authority defined in the operating rules, not the time-limited system capability required in paragraph I(a)(3).

I(b) Propulsion System

I(b) Propulsion System

I(b)(1) Fuel System Design

This paragraph would require design features to ensure that fuel necessary to complete an ETOPS mission will be available at the flow and pressure required for the engine, during a diversion for the longest time being approved for the airplane. The proposed rule includes a requirement for alerts to the crew when the fuel available to the engines falls below the level required to complete the mission which can occur because of fuel mismanagement, abnormal transfer between tanks, and fuel loss. Explanation

I(b)(1) Fuel System Design

Fuel system design and the ability of the crew to properly deal with fuel system malfunctions are arguably the most important issues facing the designer of ETOPS airplanes. The proposed rule (with corresponding AC guidance) addresses the need for:

(1) Positive fuel pressure at the engine fuel pump (no suction feed);

(2) Fuel availability following system failures (no hidden/trapped fuel, functional crossfeed valves, etc.); and

(3) Flight deck alerts when fuel available to the engines falls below the level required to complete the mission.

The proposed requirements would codify the intent of paragraph 8.(b)(2)(iii) of AC 120-42A, paragraph (c)(3)(i)(C) of the Boeing 777 ETOPS special conditions, and items 7 and 8 of the type design provisions of the 207 minute ETOPS Policy Letter EPL 20-1.

There has been some discussion regarding newer generation airplanes (B777) and their system architecture being the standard by which operations beyond 180 minutes will be judged. Currently, all transport category aircraft are required to perform suction feed testing as part of basic part 25 certification, which requires the applicant to simulate an all Alternating Current (AC) power loss at the highest altitude the airplane is used in service ("service ceiling"). The testing is performed to demonstrate that in the event of an all AC power loss, there is still ability (at some safe altitude) to re-start the engines after flameout on suction feed and generate thrust to a safe landing. This demonstration does not, however, provide any assurance that the engines can operate on suction feed for the long duration diversion times envisioned for ETOPS. The engines are certified with a minimum engine fuel pump inlet pressure limit of typically one-half pound per square inch (0.5 psi) above the ambient air pressure, or the fuel vapor pressure, whichever is higher. Section 25.955 requires that the airplane fuel system deliver fuel to the engine at this minimum pressure for the maximum fuel flow required by the engine. Without the fuel boost pressure, airplanes cannot comply with § 25.955. The fuel system design requirements proposed in this notice are intended to ensure that continued operation on suction feed is not a practical possibility on ETOPS airplanes. Paragraph I(b)(1) would be applicable to all ETOPS airplanes irrespective of the number of engines.

Loss of normal electrical power to the boost pumps is the primary cause of the loss of fuel system boost pressure. A specific fuel feed capability requirement has been added for twin-engine ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes that is intended to address the concerns about loss of fuel boost pressure raised in the development of the 207 minute ETOPS policy. The 207-minute policy included a provision to also address fuel cross-feed capability following the failure of normal electrical power. Proposed paragraph I(b)(1)(i) would require that the applicant design the airplane fuel system with a fuel boost pump in each main tank and the capability to operate at least one crossfeed valve by a back-up electrical generation source other than the primary engine driven or APU driven generators. There is an exception in the proposed rule for fuel system designs for situations when electrical power does not provide required fuel boost pressure or crossfeed valve actuation. Although this is a specific design requirement applicable to two engine airplanes for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the overall design objective underlying paragraph I(b)(1) is applicable to all ETOPS airplanes. The applicant may use the same design features required by paragraph I(b)(1)(i) as part of their compliance with paragraph I(b)(1) for airplanes not specifically covered by this subparagraph.

The other possible source of the loss of fuel boost pressure is mechanical failure of fuel system components. These include pump failures or performance degradation, valve failures, and plumbing failures causing internal or external fuel leaks that result in significant fuel pressure loss. Possible design alternatives to address mechanical failures as a source of loss of fuel system boost pressure are:

1. Redundancy (additional boost pumps, cross-feed valves, etc.)

2. Improved component reliability (including any instructions for continued airworthiness necessary to maintain that level of reliability)

3. Enlarged main fuel tank capacity (to minimize the effect of loss of boost pressure in other fuel tanks)

4. A time-limited engine fuel inlet pressure limit at which the engine can demonstrate acceptable operation and integrity for the longest diversion time for which the airplane manufacturer is requesting approval.

Each of these design alternatives has advantages and disadvantages that the manufacturer would need to consider in designing an airplane to comply with the proposed rule.

We intend that the proposed paragraph I(b)(1) would preclude all causes of loss of system boost pressure in extended operations. This is consistent with the overall safety objectives established by the part 25 airworthiness standards for potentially catastrophic failure conditions.

Proposed paragraph I(b)(1)(ii) would require flight deck alerts when the fuel available to the engines falls below that required to complete the mission. The FAA's intent is that the required flight deck alerts would give flight crews clear warning of impending fuel exhaustion with enough time to safely land the airplane before the condition becomes critical. As a minimum, the manufacturer would have to design the flight deck alerts to address the types of failures or human errors that have resulted in airline fuel exhaustion events in service.

Examples of fuel exhaustion events include an Air Canada Boeing 767 that landed on an abandoned runway after both engines flamed out from fuel exhaustion. In this case, the normal low fuel alerts did not function because of a fuel quantity indication system failure. The fuel exhaustion was caused by the crew not receiving a low fuel alert, in combination with an unapproved airplane dispatch and a fueling error. An Air Tran Airbus A330 landed in the Azores following flameout of both engines caused by fuel exhaustion due to an unrecognized engine fuel leak. The AC provides guidance on critical fuel system alerts derived from these types of fuel loss events that have occurred in the current generation of aircraft. I(b)(2) APU design

If operation of an auxiliary power unit (APU) were needed to comply with the ETOPS requirements, the applicant would have to demonstrate that the APU has adequate reliability for that operation. Also, if in-flight start and run capability is necessary, the APU in-flight operating envelope would have to extend to the maximum operating altitude of the airplane or 45,000 feet, whichever is lower. Explanation

The electrical system reliability standard contained in AC 120-42A envisions three independent alternating current (AC) electrical generators. Besides the two engine driven generators, an auxiliary power unit (APU) could drive a third generator to meet this standard. Auxiliary power units are separately controlled small engines that are installed on an aircraft to power services when the main aircraft engines are not running. Airlines normally use an airplane APU at the gate to provide electrical power for onboard lighting and an air source for the air conditioning system between flights. Besides this normal function, the FAA may allow an airline to use an APU powered electrical generator during a revenue flight when a main engine generator is not working.

The electrical system reliability requirements proposed in this notice do not specifically require three independent generators except for airplanes being certified for ETOPS diversion times greater than 180 minutes. Current two engine aircraft that the FAA has approved for ETOPS would only be able to comply with the proposed requirement for electrical system reliability by having three independent generators. Other required aircraft system functions also may be powered by an APU. Proposed paragraph I(b)(2) of the rule would require that if the applicant is going to rely on the APU for compliance with the ETOPS requirements:

(1) The APU has to have adequate reliability; and

(2) If it must be started and run in-flight, the APU must demonstrate that it has the capability to start and perform its intended function up to the maximum operating altitude of the airplane, or 45,000 feet, whichever is lower.

The major reason for wanting high altitude APU in-flight start capability is to avoid having flight level changes that would cause the flight to have to cross through established flight track systems just to start the APU. Also, once the flight leaves the established track system it can be very difficult, or impossible to re-enter the track system, reducing the pilot's flexibility to fly the optimum flight plan. Having an in-flight start capability up to 45,000 feet mitigates these concerns.

"Adequate" reliability consumed much of the Working Group's discussion time during development of the rule. This term can only be placed in context by understanding the overall electrical and pneumatic system architecture of the airplane. For instance, if an applicant has installed generators with inadequate reliability, their mean time between failure (MTBF) may require an extremely reliable APU generator in order to comply with the electrical system reliability objectives of § 25.1309. This would drive the applicant into a significant APU reliability demonstration program. The reverse could also be true. An electrical system may have generators with an excellent MTBF of 100,000 hours with additional non-APU back-up sources. In this case, the "required" reliability of the APU would be less than for current airplane electrical systems with APU driven generators. However, the applicant would have to present a convincing system level reliability analysis backed by validated component reliability data before the FAA would accept an assumption of lower APU reliability from that required for today's airplanes.

An APU has traditionally been used only to "back-up" the electrical system, and the proposed new regulatory and advisory material focuses on this function. No current aircraft utilizes an APU to provide "back-up" pneumatic system capability to meet ETOPS significant system reliability standards. However, the associated advisory circular addresses the possible operational need for APU pneumatics on the ground to power the cabin air conditioning system following an airplane diversion. If the APU is necessary as a bleed source to comply with section 25.1309 or the new section 25.1535, the applicant would have to define the operating envelope of where it can perform this intended function. The FAA requires this for any APU required function under the existing airworthiness standards of part 25. Currently most APUs can only provide both bleed air and electrical power at lower cruise altitudes, and cannot provide enough bleed air to power an air conditioning pack at the airplane service ceiling. The applicant would have to fully account for the use of a "limited" ETOPS APU operating envelope in substantiating compliance with section 25.1309 or section 25.1535. In accounting for a limited APU operating envelope, the applicant would have to address the operational implications, including air traffic control, of having to descend to a lower altitude in order to use the required APU function.

ARAC recommended the following language for paragraph I(b)(2): "If operation of the APU installation is required to comply with this appendix, the applicant must * * *". Except for the electrical system, which has specific requirements in proposed Appendix L, all other potential airplane system functions that could be powered by an APU are addressed by the overall ETOPS requirement contained in section 25.1535(a). Examples include the cabin pressurization and hydraulic systems, which may be powered by an APU. The ARAC recommended proposed rule and preamble states the intent that this requirement should not be limited to just electrical system reliability. We have corrected this oversight by replacing "this appendix" with section 25.1535 in proposed paragraph I(b)(2). I(b)(3) Engine Oil Tank Design

The engine oil filler cap design would have to comply with a proposed change to section 33.71(c)(4), which will require oil tank cap designs that prevent hazardous oil loss in the event of an oil tank cap installation error. Explanation

See the proposed change to section 33.71(c)(4) for an explanation of the reasons for this change. We added paragraph I(b)(3) to Appendix L to ensure that engines installed on ETOPS airplanes comply with the part 33 requirement. I(c) Engine Condition Monitoring

The applicant would have to define and validate, as required, an engine condition monitoring process in accordance with part 33, Appendix A, paragraph A33.4. Explanation

This requirement would codify paragraph a(5) of Appendix A of AC 120-42A and paragraph (b)(2) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.

With the propulsion system reliabilities existing on today's long range airplanes, the FAA is very concerned that the biggest threat to ETOPS safety is the risk associated with common cause, cascading failures and fuel exhaustion. Several of the proposed requirements in this notice would address these threats. The engine condition monitoring process requirement specifically addresses the potential of additional engine failure or failures resulting from the increased thrust or service demands on the remaining engine or engines.

Operators would be required, in the proposed changes to parts 121 and 135, to have an engine condition monitoring program as part of their ETOPS maintenance program. Paragraph I(c) of Appendix L and paragraph A33.4 in part 33 would require the airplane and engine manufacturer to provide the instructions necessary for an operator to develop this program.

Since the potential for a catastrophic loss of thrust is greater on a two engine airplane than on airplanes with more than two engines, this proposed rule would require that the applicant validate the engine condition monitoring process for use on two engine airplanes before ETOPS approval. For airplanes with more than two engines, the applicant would need only to define the process. I(d) Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures

The applicant would have to identify configuration, maintenance, or operational standards necessary to maintain appropriate reliability or to obtain required capability for ETOPS in a Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) document. Explanation

Paragraph I(d) of the proposed rule would codify material AC 120-42A. All existing policy on revising CMP documents would remain in force under the new rule. This is discussed more fully previously under general issues in the general discussion of the proposal. I(e) Airplane Flight Manual

This paragraph would specify certain information that the airplane flight manual (AFM) must contain for ETOPS approval. Explanation

This proposed requirement would codify paragraph 8(f)(1) of AC 120-42A. ARAC did not include this paragraph in their proposed rule draft. However, there are provisions within the AC paragraph that the FAA has required in all ETOPS type design approvals issued since 1985. The ETOPS approval statement contained in AC subparagraph 8(f)(1)(vi) is particularly important as applicants have based their airplane flight manual ETOPS approval statements on this wording. We are proposing to add the relevant provisions from AC paragraph 8(f)(1) into this notice in order to maintain continuity with the historical AFM ETOPS requirements.

The two provisions from AC 120-42A that we are not proposing to incorporate directly into proposed paragraph I(e) are subparagraphs 8(f)(1)(iii) and (v). Subparagraph 8(f)(1)(iii) addresses inclusion of the performance data used to comply with the engine-inoperative diversion criteria of the flight dispatch considerations in the operational approval section of the advisory circular. Contrary to this advisory circular provision, the FAA has not required that the performance data be included in the approved parts of the AFM and have not included this provision in the proposed rule. Subparagraph 8(f)(1)(v) asks for a description or reference to a document containing the approved airplane configuration CMP standard. The CMP document identification has traditionally been included in the ETOPS approval statement defined in subparagraph 8(f)(1)(vi) for ETOPS airplanes approved under the existing policy. Therefore, we have combined subparagraphs 8(f)(1)(v) and 8(f)(1)(vi) from the AC into the new proposed paragraph I(e)(5).

We are also proposing to add the original AFM requirement from the ARAC proposal into paragraph I(e)(4). This proposed requirement is not in AC 120-42A. This proposed paragraph would require the applicant to define the maximum ETOPS diversion time capability required by paragraph I(a)(3) into the airplane flight manual in accordance with § 25.1581(a)(2), "Furnishing Information." This proposed requirement provides a cross-reference to proposed paragraph I(a)(3), which would require that the ETOPS capability defined by most limiting ETOPS significant system capability be stated in the airplane flight manual.

Section II--Two Engine Airplanes

Section II--Two Engine Airplanes

In addition to the requirements of section I, an applicant for a two engine airplane would have to also show compliance with one of three proposed requirements of section II.

II(a) Service Experience Method

The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane and engine combination for which approval is sought has the required airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS mission with the maximum diversion for which approval is sought, and has achieved required airframe and propulsion system reliability based upon fleet in-service experience. Explanation

II(a) Service Experience Method

Proposed sub-section II(a) would codify part of the existing approval process based on service experience, as contained in AC 120-42A for two engine airplanes. This includes the most significant aspect of this process, the propulsion system assessment contained in Appendix 1 of the advisory circular. The AC process is predicated on having a sufficient amount of service experience to give the FAA enough data to assess the overall suitability of a two-engine airplane for ETOPS approval.

The AC type design assessment criteria are divided into two parts. The first part defines specific system design capability and safety objectives in order to provide a minimum design standard for airplanes operating in ETOPS. This part of the AC criteria is addressed in proposed section 25.1535(a) and (b), and section I of proposed part 25 appendix L.

The second part of the AC process is a review of in-service problems and identification of appropriate corrective actions to prevent problems that could have an adverse effect on ETOPS safety. Part of this review is to establish that the airplane and propulsion systems have an appropriate level of reliability to meet the safety objectives defined in the AC. Appendix 1 of the AC defines an amount of service experience that would normally be required in order to give a sufficient database to evaluate propulsion system reliability. We are proposing to address this second part of the AC type design assessment process in sub-section II(b) of this notice. II(a)(1) Required Service Experience

This paragraph would require that an applicant who desires to obtain ETOPS type design approval using service experience conduct a reliability review after accumulating 250,000 worldwide fleet engine hours on the airplane and engine combination for which approval is being sought. The number of hours could be reduced if adequate compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable equivalent database. A significant portion of the 250,000 engine hours would have to be obtained on the candidate airplane. Explanation

Proposed paragraph II(a)(1) would codify the service experience eligibility criteria from paragraph a(1) of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A. II(a)(2) Propulsion System Assessment

Paragraph II(a)(2)(i) would require an applicant to conduct a propulsion system assessment based on data collected from the entire fleet of the specific airplane and engine combination for which approval is sought. Paragraph II(a)(2)(ii) would require an applicant to identify corrective actions to prevent future occurrences of engine in-flight shutdowns or loss of thrust control. Explanation

Paragraph II(a)(2)(i) would codify the reliability data base criteria from paragraph b. of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A. ARAC did not include the reliability data base criteria in their proposed rule draft, but did have it in their associated draft advisory material. In paragraph 10(a)(iii) of the draft part 25 advisory circular, ARAC stated "A propulsion system assessment must be based on the following data, collected from the entire fleet of the specific airplane/engine combination type for which approval is sought* * *". Since ARAC clearly stated its intent that an applicant "must" conduct a propulsion system assessment on the specific list that follows, and based on the clear reference to the existing policy from Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A, we have incorporated this section from the ARAC draft advisory circular into proposed paragraph II(a)(2)(i) of this notice.

Paragraph II(a)(2)(ii) would codify the intent of the propulsion system assessment criteria from paragraph 3 of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A. This is the so-called "fix-all-problems" requirement that has been the practice for all ETOPS type design approvals that the FAA has given using the service experience approval process defined in AC 120-42A.

The corrective actions that the applicant identifies in compliance with proposed paragraph II(a)(2) would be included in the approved configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document as a condition of the ETOPS approval. II(a)(3) Airplane systems assessment

The applicant would have to show compliance with section 25.1535(a) using available in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant systems. The applicant would have to identify corrective actions to prevent future occurrences of ETOPS significant system failures occurring in service. Explanation

The first part of this paragraph would codify the intent of paragraph 8(c)(1) of AC 120-42A for those ETOPS significant airplane systems addressed in proposed § 25.1535(a). This AC paragraph states that the analysis and demonstration of airframe and propulsion system failure effects and reliability provided by the applicant should be based on in-service experience and the longest diversion time for the airplane.

The second part of proposed paragraph II(a)(3) is an extension of the "fix-all-problems" approach used in the propulsion system assessment that we are proposing in paragraph II(a)(2). For all airplanes approved using the policy contained in AC 120-42A, the FAA has required an applicant to define effective corrective actions for all in-service problems known to result in, or potentially result in, airplane diversions. The FAA has required this in order to enter ETOPS service with the highest quality airplane. An applicant rarely considers known system failure conditions to be acceptable occurrences in service that they account for in their system failure analyses submitted for compliance with section 25.1309. Therefore, this fix all problems approach is appropriate in reassessing compliance with the applicable airworthiness requirements of proposed section 25.1535(a).

The corrective actions that the applicant identifies in compliance with proposed paragraph II(a)(3) would be included in the approved configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document as a condition of the ETOPS approval. II(a)(4) In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD) Rates

This proposed paragraph defines propulsion system reliability standards for three levels of ETOPS type design approval.

(i) For operations up to 120 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.05 or less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with a CMP intended to bring the rate down to 0.02.

(ii) For operations up to 180 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.02 or less per 1,000 engine hours with an existing 120 minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.

(iii) For operations greater than 180 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.01 or less per 1,000 engine hours with an existing 120 minute or 180 minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate. Explanation

This proposed paragraph would codify the propulsion system reliability standards from Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A. In addition, we are proposing to add the reliability standard of 0.01 per 1,000 engine hours for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes that ARAC proposed in their recommended draft ETOPS rule.

The original ARAC recommendation refers to "target threshold" or "target" rate. These terms do not adequately define what would constitute an acceptable or unacceptable in-flight shutdown rate for showing compliance with this proposed requirement. The FAA has similar concerns about the term "approximately" as used in this proposal, but this term is in the existing AC 120-42A policy and has been applied successfully since issuance of the AC. Therefore, the FAA has tentatively chosen to retain the term "approximately" as used in the existing AC policy in this proposed rule.

We have added the qualifier "or less" to the proposed in-flight shutdown rate requirement. Without this term, the rule could be interpreted to mean that the in-flight shutdown rate "must" be the approximate value specified. We clearly do not intend that an applicant with an in-flight shutdown rate well below the requirement would not be in compliance with the rule. We have added this additional qualifier in order to clarify this intent.

The original ARAC recommendation for operations up to 120 minutes was written in the following manner: "with a required list of corrective actions that would result in continuing improvement toward an IFSD rate of 0.02 per 1000 fleet engine-hours." We have added "in the CMP document" in order to clarify where the list of corrective actions must be contained.

For the proposed requirements for both operations up to 180 minutes and operations greater than 180 minutes we have added a provision that considers the effect that existing or new CMP standards have on compliance with the required in-flight shutdown rate. In the past, we granted ETOPS approvals using a 180-minute CMP standard developed from the 120 minute ETOPS CMP documents. This has occurred when the applicant has substantiated, through service experience, additional requirements that would achieve the desired in-flight shutdown rate for those airplanes incorporating the additional requirements. The added provision proposed in this notice is a statement of existing practice for granting 180-minute ETOPS approval where the 120-minute standard had to be modified. This notice proposes to codify this existing practice into the rule as noted above. II(a)(5) Airplane Flight Test Requirements

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