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Final Rule Current Issued May 7, 2001 46 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

66 FR 23086 Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction, and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

This rule requires design approval holders of certain turbine-powered transport category airplanes, and of any subsequent modifications to these airplanes, to substantiate that the design of the fuel tank system precludes the existence of ignition sources within the airplane fuel tanks. It also requires developing and implementing maintenance and inspection instructions to assure the safety of the fuel tank system. For new type designs, this rule also requires demonstrating that ignition sources cannot be present in fuel tanks when failure conditions are considered, identifying any safety-critical maintenance actions, and incorporating a means either to minimize development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks or to prevent catastrophic damage if ignition does occur. These actions are based on accident investigations and adverse service experience, which have shown that unforeseen failure modes and lack of specific maintenance procedures on certain airplane fuel tank systems may result in degradation of design safety features intended to preclude ignition of vapors within the fuel tank.

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Part II

14 CFR Part 21 et al.

Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements; Final Rule

Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 91, 121, 125, and 129

[Docket No. FAA-1999-6411; Amendment Nos. 21-78, 25-102, 91-266, 121-282, 125-36, 129-30] RIN 2120-AG62

Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction, and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

Agency

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule requires design approval holders of certain turbine-powered transport category airplanes, and of any subsequent modifications to these airplanes, to substantiate that the design of the fuel tank system precludes the existence of ignition sources within the airplane fuel tanks. It also requires developing and implementing maintenance and inspection instructions to assure the safety of the fuel tank system. For new type designs, this rule also requires demonstrating that ignition sources cannot be present in fuel tanks when failure conditions are considered, identifying any safety-critical maintenance actions, and incorporating a means either to minimize development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks or to prevent catastrophic damage if ignition does occur. These actions are based on accident investigations and adverse service experience, which have shown that unforeseen failure modes and lack of specific maintenance procedures on certain airplane fuel tank systems may result in degradation of design safety features intended to preclude ignition of vapors within the fuel tank.

Effective Date

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 6, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael E. Dostert, FAA, Propulsion/ Mechanical Systems Branch, ANM-112, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2132, facsimile (425) 227-1320; e-mail: [email protected].

Supplementary Information

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Final Rules

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the following steps:

(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).

Availability of Final Rules

(2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket number shown at the beginning of this notice. Click on "search."

(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information for the Docket you selected, click on the final rule.

(4) To view or download the document click on either "Scanned Image (TIFF)" or "Adobe PDF."

You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this final rule.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a question regarding this document may contact their local FAA official, or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us at [email protected].

Background

Background

On October 26, 1999, the FAA issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 99-18, which was published in the Federal Register on October 29, 1999 (64 FR 58644). That notice proposed three separate requirements:

First, a requirement was proposed for the design approval holders of certain transport category airplanes to conduct a safety review of the airplane fuel tank system and to develop specific fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions for any items determined to require repetitive inspections or maintenance.

Second, a requirement was proposed to prohibit the operation of those airplanes beyond a specified time, unless the operators of those airplanes incorporated instructions for maintenance and inspection of the fuel tank system into their inspection programs.

Third, for new designs, the proposal included a requirement for minimizing the flammability of fuel tanks, a requirement concerning detailed failure analysis to preclude the presence of ignition sources in the fuel tanks and including mandatory fuel system maintenance in the limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.

Issues Prompting This Rulemaking Activity

Issues Prompting This Rulemaking Activity

On July 17, 1996, a 25-year old Boeing Model 747-100 series airplane was involved in an inflight breakup after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport in New York, resulting in 230 fatalities. The accident investigation conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) indicated that the center wing fuel tank exploded due to an unknown ignition source. The NTSB issued recommendations intended to:

• Reduce heating of the fuel in the center wing fuel tanks on the existing fleet of transport airplanes,

• Reduce or eliminate operation with flammable vapors in the fuel tanks of new type certificated airplanes, and

• Reevaluate the fuel system design and maintenance practices on the fleet of transport airplanes.

The accident investigation focused on mechanical failure as providing the energy source that ignited the fuel vapors inside the tank.

The NTSB announced their official findings of the TWA 800 accident at a public meeting held August 22-23, 2000, in Washington, DC. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the explosion was ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the center wing fuel tank. Although the ignition source could not be determined with certainty, the NTSB determined that the most likely source was a short circuit outside of the center wing tank that allowed excessive voltage to enter the tank through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS). Opening remarks at the hearing also indicated that:

"* * * This investigation and several others have brought to light some broader issues regarding aircraft certification. For example, there are questions about the adequacy of the risk analyses that are used as the basis for demonstrating compliance with many certification requirements."

This accident prompted the FAA to examine the underlying safety issues surrounding fuel tank explosions, the adequacy of the existing regulations, the service history of airplanes certificated to these regulations, and existing maintenance practices relative to the fuel tank system.

Flammability Characteristics

Flammability Characteristics

The flammability characteristics of the various fuels approved for use in transport airplanes results in the presence of flammable vapors in the vapor space of fuel tanks at various times during the operation of the airplane. Vapors from Jet A fuel (the typical commercial turbojet engine fuel) at temperatures below approximately 100 deg.F are too lean to be flammable at sea level; at higher altitudes the fuel vapors become flammable at temperatures above approximately 45 deg.F (at 40,000 feet altitude).

However, the regulatory authorities and aviation industry have always presumed that a flammable fuel air mixture exists in the fuel tanks at all times and have adopted the philosophy that the best way to ensure airplane fuel tank safety is to preclude ignition sources within fuel tanks. This philosophy has been based on the application of fail-safe design requirements to the airplane fuel tank system to preclude ignition sources from being present in fuel tanks when component failures, malfunctions, or lightning encounters occur.

Possible ignition sources that have been considered include:

• Electrical arcs,

• Friction sparks, and

• Autoignition. (The autoignition temperature is the temperature at which the fuel/air mixture will spontaneously ignite due to heat in the absence of an ignition source.)

Some events that could produce sufficient electrical energy to create an arc include:

• Lightning,

• Electrostatic charging,

• Electromagnetic interference (EMI), or

• Failures in airplane systems or wiring that introduce high-power electrical energy into the fuel tank system.

Friction sparks may be caused by mechanical contact between certain rotating components in the fuel tank, such as a steel fuel pump impeller rubbing on the pump inlet check valve. Autoignition of fuel vapors may be caused by failure of components within the fuel tank, or external components or systems that cause components or tank surfaces to reach a high enough temperature to ignite the fuel vapors in the fuel tank.

Existing Regulations/Certification Methods

Existing Regulations/Certification Methods

The current 14 CFR part 25 regulations that are intended to require designs that preclude the presence of ignition sources within the airplane fuel tanks are as follows:

Section 25.901 is a general requirement that applies to all portions of the propulsion installation, which includes the airplane fuel tank system. It requires, in part, that the propulsion and fuel tank systems be designed to ensure fail-safe operation between normal maintenance and inspection intervals, and that the major components be electrically bonded to the other parts of the airplane.

Sections 25.901(c) and 25.1309 provide airplane system fail-safe requirements. Section 25.901(c) requires that "no single failure or malfunction or probable combination of failures will jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane." In general, the FAA's policy has been to require applicants to assume the presence of foreseeable latent (undetected) failure conditions when demonstrating that subsequent single failures will not jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane.

Certain subsystem designs must also comply with § 25.1309. That section requires airplane systems and associated systems to be:

"* * * designed so that the occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and the occurrence of any other failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable."

Compliance with § 25.1309 requires an analysis, and testing where appropriate, considering possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and damage from external sources, the probability of multiple failures and undetected failures, the resulting effects on the airplane and occupants, considering the stage of flight and operating conditions, and the crew warning cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults.

This provision has the effect of mandating the use of "fail-safe" design methods, which require that the effect of failures and combinations of failures be considered in defining a safe design. Detailed methods of compliance with §§ 25.1309(b), (c), and (d) are described in Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A, "System Design Analysis," and are intended as a means to evaluate the overall risk, on average, of an event occurring within a fleet of aircraft. The following guidance involving failures is offered in that AC:

• In any system or subsystem, a single failure of any element or connection during any one flight must be assumed without consideration as to its probability of failing. This single failure must not prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

• Additional failures during any one flight following the first single failure must also be considered when the probability of occurrence is not shown to be extremely improbable. The probability of these combined failures includes the probability of occurrence of the first failure.

As described in the AC, the FAA fail-safe design concept consists of the following design principles or techniques intended to ensure a safe design. The use of only one of these principles is seldom adequate. A combination of two or more design principles is usually needed to provide a fail-safe design (i.e., to ensure that catastrophic failure conditions are not expected to occur during the life of the fleet of a particular airplane model).

• Design integrity and quality, including life limits, to ensure intended function and prevent failures.

• Redundancy or backup systems that provide system function after the first failure (e.g., two or more engines, two or more hydraulic systems, dual flight controls, etc.)

• Isolation of systems and components so that failure of one element will not cause failure of the other (sometimes referred to as system independence).

• Detection of failures or failure indication.

• Functional verification (the capability for testing or checking the component's condition).

• Proven reliability and integrity to ensure that multiple component or system failures will not occur in the same flight.

• Damage tolerance that limits the safety impact or effect of the failure.

• Designed failure path that controls and directs the failure, by design, to limit the safety impact.

• Flightcrew procedures following the failure designed to assure continued safe flight by specific crew actions.

• Error tolerant design that considers probable human error in the operation, maintenance, and fabrication of the airplane.

• Margins of safety that allow for undefined and unforeseeable adverse flight conditions.

These regulations, when applied to typical airplane fuel tank systems, are intended to prevent ignition sources inside fuel tanks. The approval of the installation of mechanical and electrical components inside the fuel tanks was typically based on a qualitative system safety analysis and component testing which showed that:

• Mechanical components would not create sparks or high temperature surfaces in the event of any failure; and

• Electrical devices would not create arcs of sufficient energy to ignite a fuel-air mixture in the event of a single failure or probable combination of failures.

Section 25.901(b)(2) requires that the components of the propulsion system be "constructed, arranged, and installed so as to ensure their continued safe operation between normal inspection or overhauls." Compliance with this regulation is typically demonstrated by substantiating that the propulsion installation, which includes the fuel tank system, will safely perform its intended function between inspections and overhauls defined in the maintenance instructions.

Section 25.901(b)(4) requires electrically bonding the major components of the propulsion system to the other parts of the airplane. The affected major components of the propulsion system include the fuel tank system. Compliance with this requirement for fuel tank systems has been demonstrated by showing that all major components in the fuel tank are electrically bonded to the airplane structure. This precludes accumulation of electrical charge on the components and the possible arcing in the fuel tank that could otherwise occur. In most cases, electrical bonding is accomplished by installing jumper wires from each major fuel tank system component to airplane structure. Advisory Circular 25-8, "Auxiliary Fuel Tank Installations," also provides guidance for bonding of fuel tank system components and means of precluding ignition sources within transport airplane fuel tanks.

Section 25.954 requires that the fuel tank system be designed and arranged to prevent the ignition of fuel vapor within the system due to the effects of lightning strikes. Compliance with this regulation is typically shown by incorporation of design features such as minimum fuel tank skin thickness, location of vent outlets out of likely lightning strike areas, and bonding of fuel tank system structure and components. Guidance for demonstrating compliance with this regulation is provided in AC 20-53A, "Protection of Aircraft Fuel Systems Against Fuel Vapor Ignition Due to Lightning."

Section 25.981 requires that the applicant determine the highest temperature allowable in fuel tanks that provides a safe margin below the lowest expected autoignition temperature of the fuel that is approved for use in the fuel tanks. No temperature at any place inside any fuel tank where fuel ignition is possible may then exceed that maximum allowable temperature. This must be shown under all probable operating, failure, and malfunction conditions of any component whose operation, failure, or malfunction could increase the temperature inside the tank. Guidance for demonstrating compliance with this regulation has been provided in AC 25.981-1A, "Guidelines For Substantiating Compliance With the Fuel Tank Temperature Requirements." The AC provides a listing of failure modes of fuel tank system components that should be considered when showing that component failures will not create a hot surface that exceeds the maximum allowable fuel tank component or tank surface temperature for the fuel type for which approval is being requested. Manufacturers have demonstrated compliance with this regulation by testing and analysis of components to show that design features, such as thermal fuses in fuel pump motors, preclude an ignition source in the fuel tank when failures such as a seized fuel pump rotor occur.

Airplane Maintenance Manuals and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

Airplane Maintenance Manuals and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

Historically, manufacturers have been required to provide maintenance-related information for fuel tank systems in the same manner as for other systems. Prior to 1970, most manufacturers provided manuals containing maintenance information for large transport category airplanes, but there were no standards prescribing minimum content, distribution, and a timeframe in which the information must be made available to the operator.

Section 25.1529, as amended by Amendment 25-21 in 1970, required the applicant for a type certificate (TC) to provide airplane maintenance manuals (AMM) to owners of the airplanes. This regulation was amended in 1980 to require that the applicant for type certification provide Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) prepared in accordance with Appendix H to part 25. In developing the ICA, the applicant is required to include certain information such as a description of the airplane and its systems, servicing information, and maintenance instructions, including the frequency and extent of inspections necessary to provide for the continuing airworthiness of the airplane (including the fuel tank system). As required by Appendix H to part 25, the ICA must also include an FAA-approved Airworthiness Limitations section enumerating those mandatory inspections, inspection intervals, replacement times, and related procedures approved under § 25.571, relating to structural damage tolerance. Before this amendment, the Airworthiness Limitations section of the ICA applied only to airplane structure and not to the fuel tank system.

One method of establishing initial scheduled maintenance and inspection tasks is the Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) process, which develops a Maintenance Review Board (MRB) document for a particular airplane model. Operators may incorporate those provisions, along with other maintenance information contained in the ICA, into their maintenance or inspection program.

Section 21.50 requires the holder of a design approval, including a TC or supplemental type certificate (STC) for an airplane, aircraft engine, or propeller for which application was made after January 28, 1981, to furnish at least one set of the complete ICA to the owner of the product for which the application was made. The ICA for original type certificated products must include instructions for the fuel tank system. A design approval holder who has modified the fuel tank system must furnish a complete set of the ICA for the modification to the owner of the product.

Type Certificate Amendments Based on Major Change in Type Design

Type Certificate Amendments Based on Major Change in Type Design

Over the years, design changes have been introduced into fuel tank systems that may affect their safety. There are three ways in which major design changes can be approved:

1. The TC holder may be granted an amendment to the type design.

2. Any person, including the TC holder, wanting to alter a product by introducing a major change in the type design not great enough to require a new application for a TC, may be granted an STC.

3. In some instances, a person may also make an alteration to the type design and receive a field approval. The field approval process is a method for obtaining approval of relatively simple modifications to airplanes. In this process, an authorized FAA Flight Standards Inspector can approve the alteration by use of FAA Form 337.

Maintenance and Inspection Program Requirements

Maintenance and Inspection Program Requirements

Airplane operators are required to have extensive maintenance or inspection programs that include provisions relating to fuel tank systems.

Section 91.409(e), which generally applies to other than commercial operations, requires an operator of a large turbojet multiengine airplane or a turbopropeller-powered multiengined airplane to select one of the following four inspection programs:

1. A continuous airworthiness inspection program that is part of a continuous airworthiness maintenance program currently in use by a person holding an air carrier operating certificate, or an operating certificate issued under part 119 for operations under parts 121 or 135, and operating that make and model of airplane under those parts;

2. An approved airplane inspection program approved under § 135.419 and currently in use by a person holding an operating certificate and operations specifications issued under part 119 for part 135 operations;

3. A current inspection program recommended by the manufacturer; or

4. Any other inspection program established by the registered owner or operator of that airplane and approved by the Administrator.

Section 121.367, which is applicable to those air carrier and commercial operations covered by part 121, requires operators to have an inspection program, as well as a program covering other maintenance, preventative maintenance, and alterations.

Section 125.247, which is generally applicable to operation of large airplanes, other than air carrier operations conducted under part 121, requires operators to inspect their airplanes in accordance with an inspection program approved by the Administrator.

Section 129.14 requires a foreign air carrier and each foreign operator of a U.S. registered airplane in common carriage, within or outside the U.S., to maintain the airplane in accordance with an FAA-approved program.

In general, the operators rely on the TC data sheet, MRB reports, ICA's, the Airworthiness Limitations section of the ICA, other manufacturers' recommendations, and their own operating experience to develop the overall maintenance or inspection program for their airplanes.

The intent of the rules governing the inspection and/or maintenance program is to ensure that the inherent level of safety that was originally designed into the system is maintained and that the airplane is in an airworthy condition.

Historically, for fuel tank systems these required programs include:

• Operational checks (e.g., a task to determine if an item is fulfilling its intended function);

• Functional checks (e.g., a quantitative task to determine if functions perform within specified limits);

• Overhaul of certain components to restore them to a known standard; and

• General zonal visual inspections conducted concurrently with other maintenance actions, such as structural inspections.

However, specific maintenance instructions to detect and correct conditions that degrade fail-safe capabilities have not been deemed necessary because it has been assumed that the original fail-safe capabilities would not be degraded in service.

Design and Service History Review

Design and Service History Review

The FAA has examined the service history of transport airplanes and performed an analysis of the history of fuel tank explosions on these airplanes. While there were a significant number of fuel tank fires and explosions that occurred during the 1960's and 1970's on several airplane types, in most cases, the fire or explosion was found to be related to design practices, maintenance actions, or improper modification of fuel pumps. Some of the events were apparently caused by lightning strikes. Extensive design reviews were conducted to identify possible ignition sources, and actions were taken that were intended to prevent similar occurrences. However, fuel tank system-related accidents have occurred in spite of these efforts.

On May 11, 1990, the center wing fuel tank of a Boeing Model 737-300 exploded while the airplane was on the ground at Nimoy Aquino International Airport, Manila, Philippines. The airplane was less than one year old. In the accident, the fuel-air vapors in the center wing tank exploded as the airplane was being pushed back from a terminal gate prior to flight. The accident resulted in 8 fatalities and injuries to an additional 30 people. Accident investigators considered a plausible scenario in which damaged wiring located outside the fuel tank might have created a short between 115-volt airplane system wires and 28 volt wires to a fuel tank level switch. This, in combination with a possible latent defect of the fuel level float switch, was investigated as a possible source of ignition. However, a definitive ignition source was never confirmed during the accident investigation. This unexplained accident occurred on a newer airplane, in contrast to the July 17, 1996, accident that occurred on an older Boeing Model 747 airplane that was approaching the end of its initial design life.

The Model 747 and 737 accidents indicate that the development of an ignition source inside the fuel tank may be related to both the design and maintenance of the fuel tank systems.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendations

Since the July 17, 1996, accident, the FAA, NTSB, and aviation industry have been reviewing the design features and service history of the Boeing Model 747 and certain other transport airplane models. Based upon its review, the NTSB has issued the following recommendations to the FAA intended to reduce exposure to operation with flammable vapors in fuel tanks and address possible degradation of the original type certificated fuel tank system designs on transport airplanes.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendations

The following recommendations relate to "Reduced Flammability Exposure":

"A-96-174: Require the development of and implementation of design or operational changes that will preclude the operation of transport-category airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tanks:

LONG TERM DESIGN MODIFICATIONS:

(a) Significant consideration should be given to the development of airplane design modification, such as nitrogen-inerting systems and the addition of insulation between heat-generating equipment and fuel tanks. Appropriate modifications should apply to newly certificated airplanes and, where feasible, to existing airplanes."

"A-96-175: Require the development of and implementation of design or operational changes that will preclude the operation of transport-category airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tanks:

NEAR TERM OPERATIONAL

(b) Pending implementation of design modifications, require modifications in operational procedures to reduce the potential for explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tanks of transport-category aircraft. In the B-747, consideration should be given to refueling the center wing fuel tank (CWT) before flight whenever possible from cooler ground fuel tanks, proper monitoring and management of the CWT fuel temperature, and maintaining an appropriate minimum fuel quantity in the CWT."

"A-96-176: Require that the B-747 Flight Handbooks of TWA and other operators of B-747s and other aircraft in which fuel tank temperature cannot be determined by flightcrews be immediately revised to reflect the increases in CWT fuel temperatures found by flight tests, including operational procedures to reduce the potential for exceeding CWT temperature limitations."

"A-96-177: Require modification of the CWT of B-747 airplanes and the fuel tanks of other airplanes that are located near heat sources to incorporate temperature probes and cockpit fuel tank temperature displays to permit determination of the fuel tank temperatures."

The following recommendations relate to "Ignition Source Reduction":

"A-98-36: Conduct a survey of fuel quantity indication system probes and wires in Boeing Model 747's equipped with systems other than Honeywell Series 1-3 probes and compensators and in other model airplanes that are used in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 service to determine whether potential fuel tank ignition sources exist that are similar to those found in the Boeing Model 747. The survey should include removing wires from fuel probes and examining the wires for damage. Repair or replacement procedures for any damaged wires that are found should be developed."

"A-98-38: Require in Boeing Model 747 airplanes, and in other airplanes with fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wire installations that are co-routed with wires that may be powered, the physical separation and electrical shielding of FQIS wires to the maximum extent possible."

"A-98-39: Require, in all applicable transport airplane fuel tanks, surge protection systems to prevent electrical power surges from entering fuel tanks through fuel quantity indication system wires."

Service History

Service History

The FAA has reviewed service difficulty reports for the transport airplane fleet and evaluated the certification and design practices utilized on these previously certificated airplanes. An inspection of fuel tanks on Boeing Model 747 airplanes also was initiated. Representatives from the Air Transport Association (ATA), Association of European Airlines (AEA), the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA), the Aerospace Industries Association of America, and the European Association of Aerospace Industries initiated a joint effort to inspect and evaluate the condition of the fuel tank system installations on a representative sample of airplanes within the transport fleet. The fuel tanks of more than 800 airplanes were inspected. Data from inspections conducted as part of this effort and shared with the FAA have assisted in establishing a basis for developing corrective action for airplanes within the transport fleet.

In addition to the results from these inspections, the FAA has received reports of anomalies on in-service airplanes that have necessitated actions to preclude development of ignition sources in or adjacent to airplane fuel tanks.

The following provides a summary of findings from design evaluations, service difficulty reports, and a review of current airplane maintenance practices.

Aging Airplane Related Phenomena

Aging Airplane Related Phenomena

Fuel tank inspections initiated as part of the Boeing Model 747 accident investigation identified aging of fuel tank system components, contamination, corrosion of components and sulfide deposits on components as possible conditions that could contribute to development of ignition sources within the fuel tanks. Results of detailed inspection of the fuel pump wiring on several Boeing Model 747 airplanes showed debris within the fuel tanks consisting of lockwire, rivets, and metal shavings. Debris was also found inside scavenge pumps. Corrosion and damage to insulation on FQIS probe wiring was found on 6 out of 8 probes removed from one in-service airplane.

In addition, inspection of airplane fuel tank system components from out-of-service (retired) airplanes, initiated following the accident, revealed damaged wiring and corrosion buildup of conductive sulfide deposits on the FQIS wiring on some Boeing Model 747 airplanes. The conductive deposits or damaged wiring may result in a location where arcing could occur if high power electrical energy was transmitted to the FQIS wiring from adjacent wires that power other airplane systems.

While the effects of corrosion on fuel tank system safety have not been fully evaluated, the FAA has initiated a research program to better understand the effects of sulfide deposits and corrosion on the safety of airplane fuel tank systems.

Wear or chafing of electrical power wires routed in conduits that are located inside fuel tanks can result in arcing through the conduits. On December 23, 1996, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-26-06, applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes, which required inspection of electrical wiring routed within conduits to fuel pumps located in the wing fuel tanks and replacement of any damaged wiring. Inspection reports indicated that many instances of wear had occurred on Teflon sleeves installed over the wiring to protect it from damage and possible arcing to the conduit.

Inspections of wiring to fuel pumps on Boeing Model 737 airplanes with over 35,000 flight hours have shown significant wear to the insulation of wires inside conduits that are located in fuel tanks. In nine reported cases, wear resulted in arcing to the fuel pump wire conduit on airplanes with greater than 50,000 flight hours. In one case, wear resulted in burnthrough of the conduit into the interior of the 737 main tank fuel cell. On May 14, 1998, the FAA issued a telegraphic AD, T98-11-52, which required inspection of wiring to Boeing Model 737 airplane fuel pumps routed within electrical conduits and replacement of any damaged wiring. Results of these inspections showed that wear of the wiring occurred in many instances, particularly on those airplanes with high numbers of flight cycles and operating hours.

The FAA also has received reports of corrosion on bonding jumper wires within the fuel tanks on one in-service Airbus Model A300 airplane. The manufacturer investigating this event did not have sufficient evidence to determine conclusively the level of damage and corrosion found on the jumper wires. Although the airplane was in long-term storage, it does not explain why a high number of damaged/corroded jumper wires were found concentrated in a specific area of the wing tanks. Further inspections of a limited number of other Airbus models did not reveal similar extensive corrosion or damage to bonding jumper wires. However, they did reveal evidence of the accumulation of sulfide deposits around the outer braid of some jumper wires. Tests by the manufacturer have shown that these deposits did not affect the bonding function of the leads. Airbus has developed a one-time-inspection service bulletin for all its airplanes to ascertain the extent of the sulfide deposits and to ensure that the level of jumper wire damage found on the one Model A300 airplane is not widespread.

On March 30, 1998, the FAA received reports of three recent instances of electrical arcing within fuel pumps installed in fuel tanks on Lockheed Model L-1011 airplanes. In one case, the electrical arc had penetrated the pump and housing and entered the fuel tank. Preliminary investigation indicates that features incorporated into the fuel pump design that were intended to preclude overheating and arc-through into the fuel tank may not have functioned as intended due to discrepancies introduced during overhaul of the pumps. Emergency AD 98-08-09 was issued April 3, 1998, to specify a minimum quantity of fuel to be carried in the fuel tanks for the purpose of covering the pumps with liquid fuel and thereby precluding ignition of vapors within the fuel tank until such time as terminating corrective action could be developed.

Unforeseen Fuel Tank System Failures

Unforeseen Fuel Tank System Failures

After an extensive review of the Boeing Model 747 design following the July 17, 1996, accident, the FAA determined that during original certification of the fuel tank system, the degree of tank contamination and the significance of certain failure modes of fuel tank system components had not been considered to the extent that more recent service experience indicates is needed. For example, in the absence of contamination, the FQIS had been shown to preclude creating an arc if FQIS wiring were to come in contact with the highest level of electrical voltage on the airplane. This was shown by demonstrating that the voltage needed to cause an arc in the fuel probes due to an electrical short condition was well above any voltage level available in the airplane systems.

However, recent testing has shown that if contamination, such as conductive debris (lock wire, nuts, bolts, steel wool, corrosion, sulfide deposits, metal filings, etc.) is placed within gaps in the fuel probe, the voltage needed to cause an arc is within values that may occur due to a subsequent electrical short or induced current on the FQIS probe wiring from electromagnetic interference caused by adjacent wiring. These anomalies, by themselves, could not lead to an electrical arc within the fuel tanks without the presence of an additional failure. If any of these anomalies were combined with a subsequent failure within the electrical system that creates an electrical short, or if high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) or electrical current flow in adjacent wiring induces EMI voltage in the FQIS wiring, sufficient energy could enter the fuel tank and cause an ignition source within the tank.

On November 26, 1997, in Docket No. 97-NM-272-AD, the FAA proposed a requirement for operators of Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes to install components for the suppression of electrical transients and/or the installation of shielding and separation of fuel quantity indicating system wiring from other airplane system wiring. After reviewing the comments received on the proposed requirements, the FAA issued AD 98-20-40 on September 23, 1998, that requires the installation of shielding and separation of the electrical wiring of the fuel quantity indication system. On April 14, 1998, the FAA proposed a similar requirement for Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes in Docket No. 98-NM-50-AD, which led to the FAA issuing AD 99-03-04 on January 26, 1999. The action required by those two airworthiness directives is intended to preclude high levels of electrical energy from entering the airplane fuel tank wiring due to electromagnetic interference or electrical shorts. Several manufacturers have been granted approval for the use of alternative methods of compliance (AMOC) with these AD's that permit installation of transient suppressing devices in the FQIS wiring that prevent unwanted electrical power from entering the fuel tank. All later model Boeing Model 747 and 737 FQIS's have wire separation and fault isolation features that may meet the intent of these AD actions. This rulemaking will require evaluation of these later designs and the designs of other transport airplanes.

Other examples of unanticipated failure conditions include incidents of parts from fuel pump assemblies impacting or contacting the rotating fuel pump impeller. The first design anomaly was identified when two incidents of damage to fuel pumps were reported on Boeing Model 767 airplanes. In both cases objects from a fuel pump inlet diffuser assembly were ingested into the fuel pump, causing damage to the pump impeller and pump housing. The damage could have caused sparks or hot debris from the pump to enter the fuel tank. To address this unsafe condition, the FAA issued AD 97-19-15. This AD requires revision of the airplane flight manual to include procedures to switch off the fuel pumps when the center tank approaches empty. The intent of this interim action is to maintain liquid fuel over the pump inlet so that any debris generated by a failed fuel pump will not come in contact with fuel vapors and cause a fuel tank explosion.

The second design anomaly was reported on Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. The reports indicated that inlet adapters of the override/jettison pumps of the center wing fuel tank were worn. Two of the inlet adapters had worn down enough to cause damage to the rotating blades of the inducer. The inlet check valves also had significant damage. An operator reported damage to the inlet adapter so severe that contact had occurred between the steel disk of the inlet check valve and the steel screw that holds the inducer in place. Wear to the inlet adapters has been attributed to contact between the inlet check valve and the adapter. Such excessive wear of the inlet adapter can lead to contact between the inlet check valve and inducer, which could result in pieces of the check valve being ingested into the inducer and damaging the inducer and impellers. Contact between the steel disk of the inlet check valve and the steel rotating inducer screw can cause sparks. To address this unsafe condition, the FAA issued an immediately adopted rule, AD 98-16-19, on July 30, 1998.

Another design anomaly was reported in 1989 when a fuel tank ignition event occurred in an auxiliary fuel tank during refueling of a Beech Model 400 airplane. The auxiliary fuel tank had been installed under an STC. Polyurethane foam had been installed in portions of the tank to minimize the potential of a fuel tank explosion if uncontained engine debris penetrated those portions of the tank. The accident investigation indicated that electrostatic charging of the foam during refueling resulted in ignition of fuel-air vapors in portions of the adjacent fuel tank system that did not contain the foam. The fuel vapor explosion caused distortion of the tank and fuel leakage from a failed fuel line. Modifications to the design, including use of more conductive polyurethane foam and installation of a standpipe in the refueling system, were incorporated to prevent reoccurrence of electrostatic charging and a resultant fuel tank ignition source.

Review of Fuel Tank System Maintenance Practices

Review of Fuel Tank System Maintenance Practices

In addition to the review of the design features and service history of the Boeing Model 747 and other airplane models in the transport airplane fleet, the FAA also has reviewed the current fuel tank system maintenance practices for these airplanes.

Typical transport category airplane fuel tank systems are designed with redundancy and fault indication features such that single component failures do not result in any significant reduction in safety. Therefore, fuel tank systems historically have not had any life-limited components or specific detailed inspection requirements, unless mandated by airworthiness directives.

Most of the components are "on condition," meaning that some test, check, or other inspection is performed to determine continued serviceability, and maintenance is performed only if the inspection identifies a condition requiring correction. Visual inspection of fuel tank system components is by far the predominant method of inspection for components such as boost pumps, fuel lines, couplings, wiring, etc. Typically, these inspections are conducted concurrently with zonal inspections or internal or external fuel tank structural inspections. These inspections normally do not provide information regarding the continued serviceability of components within the fuel tank system, unless the visual inspection indicates a potential problem area. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to detect certain degraded fuel tank system conditions, such as worn wiring routed through conduit to fuel pumps, debris inside fuel pumps, corrosion to bonding wire interfaces, etc., without dedicated intrusive inspections that are much more extensive than those normally conducted.

Listing of Deficiencies

Listing of Deficiencies

The list provided below summarizes fuel tank system design deficiencies, malfunctions, failures, and maintenance-related actions that have been determined through service experience to result in a degradation of the safety features of airplane fuel tank systems. This list was developed from service difficulty reports and incident and accident reports. These anomalies occurred on in-service transport category airplanes despite regulations and policies in place to preclude the development of ignition sources within airplane fuel tank systems.

1. Pumps:

• Ingestion of the pump inducer into the pump impeller and generation of debris into the fuel tank.

• Pump inlet case degradation, allowing the pump inlet check valve to contact the impeller.

• Stator winding failures during operation of the fuel pump. Subsequent failure of a second phase of the pump resulting in arcing through the fuel pump housing.

• Deactivation of thermal protective features incorporated into the windings of pumps due to inappropriate wrapping of the windings.

• Omission of cooling port tubes between the pump assembly and the pump motor assembly during fuel pump overhaul.

• Extended dry running of fuel pumps in empty fuel tanks, which was contrary to the manufacturer's recommended procedures.

• Use of steel impellers that may produce sparks if debris enters the pump.

• Debris lodged inside pumps.

• Arcing due to the exposure of electrical connections within the pump housing that have been designed with inadequate clearance to the pump cover.

• Thermal switches resetting over time to a higher trip temperature.

• Flame arrestors falling out of their respective mounting.

• Internal wires coming in contact with the pump rotating group, energizing the rotor and arcing at the impeller/adapter interface.

• Poor bonding across component interfaces.

• Insufficient ground fault current protection capability.

• Poor bonding of components to structure.

2. Wiring to pumps in conduits located inside fuel tanks:

• Wear of Teflon sleeving and wiring insulation allowing arcing from wire through metallic conduits into fuel tanks.

3. Fuel pump connectors:

• Electrical arcing at connections within electrical connectors due to bent pins or corrosion.

• Fuel leakage and subsequent fuel fire outside of the fuel tank caused by corrosion of electrical connectors inside the pump motor which lead to electrical arcing through the connector housing (connector was located outside the fuel tank).

• Selection of improper materials in connector design.

4. FQIS wiring:

• Degradation of wire insulation (cracking), corrosion and sulfide deposits at electrical connectors

• Unshielded FQIS wires routed in wire bundles with high voltage wires.

5. FQIS probes:

• Corrosion and sulfide deposits causing reduced breakdown voltage in FQIS wiring.

• Terminal block wiring clamp (strain relief) features at electrical connections on fuel probes causing damage to wiring insulation.

• Contamination in the fuel tanks causing a reduced arc path between FQIS probe walls (steel wool, lock wire, nuts, rivets, bolts; or mechanical impact damage to probes).

6. Bonding straps:

• Corrosion to bonding straps.

• Loose or improperly grounded attachment points.

• Static bonds on fuel tank system plumbing connections inside the fuel tank worn due to mechanical wear of the plumbing from wing movement and corrosion.

7. Electrostatic charge:

• Use of non-conductive reticulated polyurethane foam that holds electrostatic charge buildup.

• Spraying of fuel into fuel tanks through inappropriately designed refueling nozzles or pump cooling flow return methods.

Fuel Tank Flammability

Fuel Tank Flammability

In addition to the review of potential fuel tank ignition, the FAA has undertaken a parallel effort to address the threat of fuel tank explosions by eliminating or significantly reducing the presence of explosive fuel air mixtures within the fuel tanks of new type designs, in-production, and the existing fleet of transport airplanes.

On April 3, 1997, the FAA published a notice in the Federal Register (62 FR 16014) that requested comments concerning the 1996 NTSB recommendations regarding reduced flammability listed earlier in this notice. That notice provided significant discussion of service history, background, and issues relating to reducing flammability in transport airplane fuel tanks. Review of the comments submitted to that notice indicated that additional information was needed before the FAA could initiate rulemaking action to address the recommendations.

On January 23, 1998, the FAA published a notice in the Federal Register that established and tasked an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) working group, the Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG), to provide additional information prior to rulemaking. The ARAC consists of interested parties, including the public, and provides a public process to advise the FAA concerning development of new regulations.

Note: The FAA formally established ARAC in 1991 (56 FR 2190, January 22, 1991), to provide advice and recommendations concerning the full range of the FAA's safety-related rulemaking activity.

The FTHWG evaluated numerous possible means of reducing or eliminating hazards associated with explosive vapors in fuel tanks. On July 23, 1998, the ARAC submitted its report to the FAA. The full report is in the docket created for this ARAC working group (Docket No. FAA-1998-4183). This docket can be reviewed on the U.S. Department of Transportation electronic Document Management System on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. The full report is also in the docket for this rulemaking.

The report provided a recommendation for the FAA to initiate rulemaking action to amend § 25.981, applicable to new type design airplanes, to include a requirement to limit the time transport airplane fuel tanks could operate with flammable vapors in the vapor space of the tank. The recommended regulatory text proposed, "Limiting the development of flammable conditions in the fuel tanks, based on the intended fuel types, to less than 7 percent of the expected fleet operational time, or providing means to mitigate the effects of an ignition of fuel vapors within the fuel tanks such that any damage caused by an ignition will not prevent continued safe flight and landing." The report discussed various options of showing compliance with this proposal, including managing heat input to the fuel tanks, installation of inerting systems or polyurethane fire suppressing foam, and suppressing an explosion if one occurred, etc.

The level of flammability defined in the proposal was established based upon comparison of the safety record of center wing fuel tanks that, in certain airplanes, are heated by equipment located under the tank, and unheated fuel tanks located in the wing. The FTHWG concluded that the safety record of fuel tanks located in the wings was adequate and that if the same level could be achieved in center wing fuel tanks, the overall safety objective would be achieved. Results from thermal analyses documented in the report indicate that center wing fuel tanks that are heated by air conditioning equipment located beneath them contain flammable vapors, on a fleet average basis, for up to 30 percent of the fleet operating time.

During the ARAC review it was also determined that certain airplane types do not locate heat sources adjacent to the fuel tanks. These airplanes provide significantly reduced flammability exposure, near the 5 percent value of the wing tanks. The group therefore determined that it would be feasible to design new airplanes such that fuel tank operation in the flammable range would be limited to near that of the wing fuel tanks. The primary method of compliance with the requirement proposed by the ARAC would likely be to control heat transfer into and out of fuel tanks such that heating of the fuel would not occur. Design features such as locating the air conditioning equipment away from the fuel tanks, providing ventilation of the air conditioning bay to limit heating and cool fuel tanks, and/or insulating the tanks from heat sources, would be practical means of complying with the regulation proposed by the ARAC.

In addition to its recommendation to revise § 25.981, the ARAC also recommended that the FAA continue to evaluate means for minimizing the development of flammable vapors within the fuel tanks to determine whether other alternatives, such as ground based inerting of fuel tanks, could be shown to be cost effective.

To address the ARAC recommendations, the FAA initiated research and development activity to determine the feasibility of requiring ground-based inerting. The results of this activity are documented in report No. DOT/FAA/AR-00/19, "The Cost of Implementing Ground-Based Fuel Tank Inerting in the Commercial Fleet." A copy of the report is in the docket for this rulemaking. In addition, on July 14, 2000 (65 FR 43800), the FAA tasked the ARAC to conduct a technical evaluation of certain fuel tank inerting methods that would reduce the flammability of the fuel tanks on both new type designs and in-service airplanes.

The FAA is also evaluating the potential benefits of using directed ventilation methods to reduce the flammability exposure of fuel tanks that are located near significant heat sources.

Discussion of the Final Rule

The FAA review of the service history, design features, and maintenance instructions of the transport airplane fleet indicates that aging of fuel tank system components and unforeseen fuel tank system failures and malfunctions have become a safety issue for the fleet of turbine-powered transport category airplanes. The FAA is amending the current regulations in four areas.

Discussion of the Final Rule

The first area of concern encompasses the possibility of the development of ignition sources within the existing transport airplane fleet. Many of the design practices used on airplanes in the existing fleet are similar. Therefore, anomalies that have developed on specific airplane models within the fleet could develop on other airplane models. As a result, the FAA considers that a one-time safety review of the fuel tank system for transport airplane models in the current fleet is needed.

The second area of concern encompasses the need to require the design of future transport category airplanes to more completely address potential failures in the fuel tank system that could result in an ignition source in the fuel tank system.

Third, certain airplane types are designed with heat sources adjacent to the fuel tank, which results in heating of the fuel and a significant increase in the formation of flammable vapors in the tank. The FAA considers that fuel tank safety can be enhanced by reducing the time fuel tanks operate with flammable vapors in the tank and is therefore adopting a requirement to provide means to minimize the development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks, or to provide means to prevent catastrophic damage if ignition does occur.

Fourth, the FAA considers that it is necessary to impose operational requirements so that all required maintenance or inspection actions will be included in each operator's FAA-approved maintenance or inspection program.

These regulatory initiatives are being codified as a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (14 CFR part 21), amendments to the airworthiness regulations (14 CFR part 25), and amendments to the operating requirements (14 CFR parts 91, 121, 125, 129)

Part 21 Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR)

Part 21 Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR)

Historically, the FAA works with the TC holders when safety issues arise to identify solutions and actions that need to be taken. Some of the safety issues that have been addressed by this voluntary cooperative process include those involving aging aircraft structure, thrust reversers, cargo doors, and wing icing protection. Although some manufacturers have aggressively completed these safety reviews, others have not applied the resources necessary to complete these reviews in a timely manner, which delayed the adoption of corrective action. Although these efforts have frequently been successful in achieving the desired safety objectives, a more uniform and expeditious response is considered necessary to address fuel tank safety issues.

While maintaining the benefits of FAA-TC holder cooperation, the FAA considers that a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) provides a means for the FAA to establish clear expectations and standards, as well as a timeframe within which the design approval holders and the public can be confident that fuel tank safety issues on the affected airplanes will be uniformly examined.

This final rule is intended to ensure that the design approval holder completes a comprehensive assessment of the fuel tank system and develops any required inspections, maintenance instructions, or modifications.

Safety Review

Safety Review

The SFAR requires the design approval holder to perform a safety review of the fuel tank system to show that fuel tank fires or explosions will not occur on airplanes of the approved design. In conducting the review, the design approval holder must demonstrate compliance with the new standards adopted for § 25.981(a) and (b) (discussed below) and the existing standards of § 25.901. As part of this review, the design approval holder must submit a report to the cognizant FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) that substantiates that the fuel tank system is fail-safe.

The FAA intends that those failure conditions identified earlier in this document, and any other foreseeable failures, should be assumed when performing the safety review needed to substantiate that the fuel tank system design is fail-safe. The safety review should be prepared considering all airplane inflight, ground, service, and maintenance conditions, assuming that an explosive fuel air mixture is present in the fuel tanks at all times, unless the fuel tank has been purged of fuel vapor for maintenance. The design approval holder is expected to develop a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for all components in the fuel tank system. Analysis of the FMEA would then be used to determine whether single failures, alone or in combination with foreseeable latent failures, could cause an ignition source to exist in a fuel tank. A subsequent quantitative fault tree analysis should then be developed to determine whether combinations of failures expected to occur in the life of the affected fleet could cause an ignition source to exist in a fuel tank system.

Because fuel tank systems typically have few components within the fuel tank, the number of possible internal sources of ignition is limited. The safety review required by this final rule includes all components or systems that could introduce a source of fuel tank ignition. This may require analysis of not only the fuel tank system components, (e.g., pumps, fuel pump power supplies, fuel valves, fuel quantity indication system probes, wiring, compensators, densitometers, fuel level sensors, etc.), but also other airplane systems that may affect the fuel tank system. For example, failures in airplane wiring or electromagnetic interference from other airplane systems that were not properly accounted for in the original safety assessment could cause an ignition source in the airplane fuel tank system under certain conditions and therefore would have to be included in the system safety analysis.

The intent of the safety review is to assure that each fuel tank system design that is affected by this action will be fully assessed and that the design approval holder identifies any required modifications, added flight deck or maintenance indications, and/or maintenance actions necessary to meet the fail-safe criteria. Maintenance Instructions

The FAA anticipates that the safety review will identify critical areas of the fuel tank and other related systems that require maintenance actions to account for the affects of aging, wear, corrosion, and possible contamination on the fuel tank system. For example, service history indicates that sulfide deposits may form on fuel tank components, including bonding straps and FQIS components, which could degrade the intended design capabilities by providing a mechanism by which arcing could occur. Therefore, it might be necessary to provide maintenance instructions to identify and eliminate such deposits.

The SFAR requires the design approval holder to develop any specific maintenance and inspection instructions necessary to maintain the design features required to preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tank system. These instructions must be established to ensure that an ignition source will not develop throughout the remaining operational life of the airplane.

Possible Airworthiness Directives

Possible Airworthiness Directives

The safety review may also result in identification of unsafe conditions on certain airplane models that would require issuance of airworthiness directives. For example, the FAA has required or proposed requirements for design changes to the following airplanes:

• Boeing Models 737, 747, and 767;

• Boeing Douglas Products Division (formerly, McDonnell Douglas) Model DC-9 and DC-10;

• Lockheed Model L-1011;

• Bombardier (Canadair) Model CL-600;

• Airbus Models A300-600R, A319, A320, and A321;

• CASA Model C-212;

• British Aerospace (Jetstream) Model 4100; and

• Fokker Model F28.

Design practices used on these models may be similar to those of other airplane types; therefore, the FAA expects that modifications to airplanes with similar design features may also be required.

The number and scope of any possible AD's may vary by airplane type design. For example, wiring separation and shielding of FQIS wires on newer technology airplanes significantly reduces the likelihood of an electrical short causing an electrical arc in the fuel tank; many newer transport airplanes do not route electrical power wiring to fuel pumps inside the airplane fuel tanks. Therefore, some airplane models may not require significant modifications or additional dedicated maintenance procedures.

Other models may require significant modifications or more maintenance. For example, the FQIS wiring on some older technology airplanes is routed in wire bundles with high voltage power supply wires. The original failure analyses conducted on these airplane types did not consider the possibility that the fuel quantity indication system may become degraded, allowing a significantly lower voltage level to produce a spark inside the fuel tank. Causes of degradation observed in service include aging, corrosion, or undetected contamination of the system. As previously discussed, the FAA has issued AD actions for certain Boeing Model 737 and 747 airplanes to address this condition. Modification of similar types of installations on other airplane models may be required to address this unsafe condition and to achieve a fail-safe design.

It should be noted that any design changes might, in themselves, require maintenance actions. For example, transient protection devices typically require scheduled maintenance in order to detect latent failure of the suppression feature. As a part of the required safety review, the manufacturer is expected to define the necessary maintenance procedures and intervals for any required maintenance actions.

Applicability of the SFAR

Applicability of the SFAR

The requirements of the SFAR are applicable to holders of TC's, and STC's for modifications that affect the fuel tank systems of turbine-powered transport category airplanes, for which the TC was issued after January 1, 1958, and the airplane has either a maximum type certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a maximum type certificated payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.

The SFAR is also applicable to applicants for type certificates, amendments to a type certificate, and supplemental type certificates affecting the fuel tank systems for those airplanes identified above, if the application was filed before the effective date of the SFAR and the certificate was not issued before the effective date of the SFAR.

The FAA has determined that turbine-powered airplanes, regardless of whether they are turboprops or turbojets, should be subject to the rule, because the potential for ignition sources in fuel tank systems is unrelated to the engine design. This results in the coverage of the large transport category airplanes where the safety benefits and public interest are greatest. This action affects approximately 7,000 U.S. registered airplanes in part 91, 121, 125, and 129 operations.

The date January 1, 1958, was chosen so that only turbine-powered airplanes, except for a few 1953-1958 vintage Convair 340s and 440s converted from reciprocating power, will be included. No reciprocating-powered transport category airplanes are known to be used currently in passenger service, and the few remaining in cargo service would be excluded. Compliance is not required for those older airplanes because their advanced age and small numbers would likely make compliance impractical from an economic standpoint. This is consistent with similar exclusions made for those airplanes from other requirements applicable to existing airplanes, such as the regulations adopted for flammability of seat cushions (49 FR 43188, October 24, 1984); flammability of cabin interior components (51 FR 26206, July 21, 1986); cargo compartment liners (54 FR 7384, February 17, 1989); access to passenger emergency exits (57 FR 19244, May 4, 1992); and Class D cargo or baggage compartments (63 FR 8032, February 17, 1998).

In order to achieve the benefits of this rulemaking for large transport airplanes as quickly as possible, the FAA has decided to limit the applicability of the SFAR to airplanes with a maximum certificated passenger capacity of at least 30 or at least 7,500 pounds payload. Compliance is not required for smaller airplanes because it is not clear at this time that the possible benefits for those airplanes would be commensurate with the costs involved. For now, the applicability of the rule will remain as proposed in the notice. The FAA will need to conduct the economic analysis to determine if the rule should be applied to smaller airplanes. Should the results of the analysis be favorable, the FAA will develop further rulemaking to address the smaller transports.

Applicability of SFAR to Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Holders

Applicability of SFAR to Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Holders

The SFAR applies to STC holders as well, because a significant number of STC's effect changes to fuel tank systems, and the objectives of this rule would not be achieved unless these systems are also reviewed and their safety ensured. The service experience noted in the background of this rule indicates modifications to airplane fuel tank systems incorporated by STC's may affect the safety of the fuel tank system.

Modifications that could affect the fuel tank system include those that could result in an ignition source in the fuel tank. Examples include installation of auxiliary fuel tanks and installation of, or modification to, other systems such as the fuel quantity indication system, the fuel pump system (including electrical power supply), airplane refueling system, any electrical wiring routed within or adjacent to the fuel tank, and fuel level sensors or float switches. Modifications to systems or components located outside the fuel tank system may also affect fuel tank safety. For example, installation of electrical wiring for other systems that was inappropriately routed with FQIS wiring could violate the wiring separation requirements of the type design. Therefore, the FAA intends that a fuel tank system safety review be conducted for any modification to the airplane that may affect the safety of the fuel tank system. The level of evaluation that is intended would be dependent upon the type of modification. In most cases a simple qualitative evaluation of the modification in relation to the fuel tank system, and a statement that the change has no effect on the fuel tank system, would be all that is necessary. In other cases where the initial qualitative assessment shows that the modification may affect the fuel tank system, a more detailed safety review would be required.

Design approvals for modification of airplane fuel tank systems approved by STC's require the applicant to have knowledge of the airplane fuel tank system in which the modification is installed. The majority of these approvals are held by the original airframe manufacturers or airplane modifiers that specialize in fuel tank system modifications, such as installation of auxiliary fuel tanks. Therefore, the FAA expects that the data needed to complete the required safety review identified in the SFAR would be available to the STC holder.

Compliance With SFAR

Compliance With SFAR

This rule provides an 18-month compliance time from the effective date of the final rule, or within 18 months after the issuance of a certificate for which application was filed before the effective date of this SFAR, whichever is later, for design approval holders to conduct the safety review and develop the compliance documentation and any required maintenance and inspection instructions. (Applicants whose applications have not been approved as of the effective date would be allowed 18 months after the approval to comply.) The FAA expects each design approval holder to work with the cognizant FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) and Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG) to develop a plan to complete the safety review and develop the required maintenance and inspection instructions within the 18-month period. The plan should include periodic reviews with the ACO and AEG of the ongoing safety review and the associated maintenance and inspection instructions.

During the 18-month compliance period, the FAA is committed to working with the affected design approval holders to assist them in complying with the requirements of the SFAR. However, failure to comply within the specified time would constitute a violation of the requirements and may subject the violator to certificate action to amend, suspend, or revoke the affected certificate in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44709. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 46301, it may also subject the violator to a civil penalty of not more than $1,100 per day until the SFAR is complied with.

Changes to Operating Requirements

Changes to Operating Requirements

This rule requires the affected operators to incorporate FAA-approved fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions in their maintenance or inspection program required under the applicable operating rule within 36 months of the effective date of the rule. If the design approval holder has complied with the SFAR and developed an FAA-approved program, the operator can incorporate that program, including any revisions needed to address any modifications to the original type design, to meet the proposed requirement. The operator also has the option of developing its own program independently, and is ultimately responsible for having an FAA-approved program, regardless of the action taken by the design approval holder.

The rule prohibits the operation of certain transport category airplanes operated under parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 beyond the specified compliance time, unless the operator of those airplanes has incorporated FAA-approved fuel tank maintenance and inspection instructions in its maintenance or inspection program, as applicable. The rule requires approval of the maintenance and inspection instructions by the FAA ACO, or office of the Transport Airplane Directorate, having cognizance over the type certificate for the affected airplaneThe operator would need to consider the following five issues:

1. The fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions that would be incorporated into the operator's existing maintenance or inspection program must be approved by the FAA ACO having cognizance over the type certificate or supplemental type certificate. If the operator can establish that the existing maintenance and inspection instructions fulfill the requirements of this rule, then the ACO may approve the operator's existing maintenance and inspection instructions without change.

2. The means by which the FAA-approved fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions are incorporated into a certificate holder's FAA-approved maintenance or inspection program is subject to approval by the certificate holder's principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or other cognizant airworthiness inspector. The FAA intends that any escalation to the FAA-approved inspection intervals will require the operator to receive approval of the amended program from the cognizant ACO or office of the Transport Airplane Directorate. Any request for escalation to the FAA approved inspection intervals must include data to substantiate that the proposed interval will provide the level of safety intended by the original approval. If inspection results and service experience indicate that additional or more frequent inspections are necessary, the FAA may issue AD's to mandate such changes to the inspection program.

3. This rule does not impose any new reporting requirements; however, normal reporting required under 14 CFR 121.703 and 125.409 still applies.

4. This rule does not impose any new FAA recordkeeping requirements. However, as with all maintenance, the current operating regulations (e.g., 14 CFR 121.380 and 91.417) already impose recordkeeping requirements that apply to the actions required by this rule. When incorporating the fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions into its approved maintenance or inspection program, each operator should address the means by which it will comply with these recordkeeping requirements. That means of compliance, along with the remainder of the program, are subject to approval by the cognizant PMI or other cognizant airworthiness inspector.

5. The maintenance and inspection instructions developed by the TC holder under the rule generally do not apply to portions of the fuel tank systems modified in accordance with an STC, field approval, or otherwise, including any auxiliary fuel tank installations. Similarly, STC holders are required to provide instructions for their STC's. The operator, however, is still responsible for incorporating specific maintenance and inspection instructions applicable to the entire fuel tank system of each airplane that meets the requirements of this rule. This means that the operator must evaluate the fuel tank systems and any alterations to the fuel tank system not addressed by the instructions provided by the TC or STC holder, and then develop, submit, and gain FAA approval of the maintenance and inspection instructions to evaluate changes to the fuel tank systems.

The FAA recognizes that operators may not have the resources to develop maintenance or inspection instructions for the airplane fuel tank system. The rule therefore requires the TC and STC holders to develop fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions that may be used by operators. If however, the STC holder is out of business or otherwise unavailable, the operator will independently have to acquire the FAA-approved inspection instructions. To keep the airplanes in service, operators, either individually or as a group, could hire the necessary expertise to develop and gain approval of maintenance and inspection instructions. Guidance on how to comply with this aspect of the rule will be provided in AC 25.981-1B.

After the PMI having oversight responsibilities is satisfied that the operator's continued airworthiness maintenance or inspection program contains all of the elements of the FAA-approved fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions, the airworthiness inspector will approve the maintenance or inspection program revision. This approval has the effect of requiring compliance with the maintenance and inspection instructions.

Applicability of the Operating Requirements

Applicability of the Operating Requirements

This rule prohibits the operation of certain transport category airplanes operated under 14 CFR parts 91, 121, 125, and 129 beyond the specified compliance time, unless the operator of those airplanes has incorporated FAA-approved specific maintenance and inspection instructions applicable to the fuel tank system in its approved maintenance or inspection program, as applicable. The operational applicability was established so that all airplane types affected by the SFAR, regardless of type of operation, are subject to FAA approved fuel tank system maintenance and inspection procedures. As discussed earlier, this rule includes each turbine-powered transport category airplane model, provided its TC was issued after January 1, 1958, and it has either a maximum type certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a maximum type certificated payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.

Affect on Field Approvals

Affect on Field Approvals

A significant number of changes to transport category airplane fuel tank systems have been incorporated through field approvals issued to the operators of those airplanes. These changes may also significantly affect the safety of the fuel tank system. The operator of any airplane with such changes is required to develop the fuel tank system maintenance and inspection program instructions and submit it to the FAA for approval, together with the necessary substantiation of compliance with the safety review requirements of the SFAR.

Compliance With Operating Requirements

Compliance With Operating Requirements

This rule establishes a 36-month compliance time from the effective date of the rule for operators to incorporate FAA-approved, long-term, fuel tank system maintenance and inspection instructions into their approved program. The FAA expects each operator to work with the airplane TC holder or STC holder to develop a plan to implement the required maintenance and inspection instructions within the 36-month period. The plan should include periodic reviews with the cognizant ACO and AEG responsible for approval of the associated maintenance and inspection instructions.

The fuel tank safety review may result in maintenance actions that are overdue prior to the effective date of the operational rules. The plan provided by the operator should include recommended timing of initial inspections or maintenance actions that are incorporated in the long term maintenance or inspection program. An analysis of and supporting evidence for the proposed timing of the initial action should be provided to the FAA. For example, it may be determined that an inspection of a certain component should be conducted after 50,000 flight hours. Some airplanes within the fleet may have accumulated over 50,000 flight hours. The timing of the initial inspection must be approved by the FAA and would be dependent upon an evaluation of the safety impact of the inspection. It is desirable to incorporate these inspections in the current heavy maintenance program, such as a "C" or "D" check, without taking airplanes out of service. However, it may be determined that more expeditious action is required, which may be mandated by AD.

Changes to Part 25

Changes to Part 25

Currently, § 25.981 defines limits on surface temperatures within transport airplane fuel tank systems. In order to address future airplane designs, § 25.981 is revised to address both prevention of ignition sources in fuel tanks, and reduction in the time fuel tanks contain flammable vapors. The first part explicitly includes a requirement for effectively precluding ignition sources within the fuel tank systems of transport category airplanes. The second part requires minimizing the formation of flammable vapors in the fuel tanks.

Fuel Tank Ignition Source--Section 25.981

Fuel Tank Ignition Source--Section 25.981

The title of § 25.981 is changed from "Fuel tank temperature" to "Fuel tank ignition prevention." The substance of existing paragraph (a), which requires the applicant to determine the highest temperature that allows a safe margin below the lowest expected auto ignition temperature of the fuel, is retained. Likewise, the substance of existing paragraph (b), which requires precluding the temperature in the fuel tank from exceeding the temperature determined under paragraph (a), is also retained. These requirements are redesignated as (a)(1) and (2) respectively.

Compliance with these paragraphs requires the determination of the fuel flammability characteristics of the fuels approved for use. Fuels approved for use on transport category airplanes have differing flammability characteristics. The fuel with the lowest autoignition temperature is JET A (kerosene), which has an autoignition temperature of approximately 450 deg.F at sea level. The autoignition temperature of JP-4 is approximately 470 deg.F at sea level. Under the same atmospheric conditions, the autoignition temperature of gasoline is approximately 800 deg.F. The autoignition temperature of these fuels increases at increasing altitudes (lower pressures). For the purposes of this rule, the lowest temperature at which autoignition can occur for the most critical fuel approved for use should be determined. A temperature providing a safe margin is at least 50 deg.F below the lowest expected autoignition temperature of the fuel throughout the altitude and temperature envelopes approved for the airplane type for which approval is requested.

This rulemaking also adds a new paragraph (a)(3) to require that a safety analysis be performed to demonstrate that the presence of an ignition source in the fuel tank system could not result from any single failure, from any single failure in combination with any latent failure condition not shown to be extremely remote, or from any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable.

These new requirements define three scenarios that must be addressed in order to show compliance with paragraph (a)(3). The first scenario is that any single failure, regardless of the probability of occurrence of the failure, must not cause an ignition source. The second scenario is that any single failure, regardless of the probability occurrence, in combination with any latent failure condition not shown to be at least extremely remote (i.e., not shown to be extremely remote or extremely improbable), must not cause an ignition source. The third scenario is that any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable must not cause an ignition source.

For the purpose of this rule, "extremely remote" failure conditions are those not anticipated to occur to each airplane during its total life, but which may occur a few times when considering the total operational life of all airplanes of the type. This definition is consistent with that proposed by the ARAC for a revision to FAA AC 25.1309-1A and that currently used by the JAA in AMJ 25.1309. "Extremely improbable" failure conditions are those so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one type. This definition is consistent with the definition provided in FAA AC 25.1309-1A and retained in the draft revision to AC 25.1309-1A proposed by the ARAC.

The severity of the external environmental conditions that should be considered when demonstrating compliance with this rule are those established by certification regulations and special conditions (e.g., HIRF), regardless of the associated probability. The rule also requires that the effects of manufacturing variability, aging, wear, and likely damage be taken into account when demonstrating compliance.

These requirements are consistent with the general powerplant installation failure analysis requirements of § 25.901(c) and the systems failure analysis requirements of § 25.1309, as they have been applied to powerplant installations. This additional requirement is needed because the general requirements of §§ 25.901 and 25.1309 have not been consistently applied and documented when showing that ignition sources are precluded from transport category airplane fuel tanks. Compliance with § 25.981 requires an analysis of the airplane fuel tank system using analytical methods and documentation currently used by the aviation industry in demonstrating compliance with §§ 25.901 and 25.1309. In order to eliminate any ambiguity as to the necessary methods of compliance, the rule explicitly requires that the existence of latent failures be assumed unless they are extremely remote, which is currently required under § 25.901, but not under § 25.1309. The analysis should be conducted assuming design deficiencies listed in the background section of this document, and any other failure modes identified within the fuel tank system functional hazard assessment.

Based upon the evaluations required by § 25.981(a), a new requirement is added to paragraph (b) to require that critical design configuration control limitations, inspections, or other procedures be established as necessary to prevent development of ignition sources within the fuel tank system, and that they be included in the Airworthiness Limitations section of the ICA required by § 25.1529. This requirement is similar to that contained in § 25.571 for airplane structure. Appendix H to part 25 is also revised to add a requirement to provide any mandatory fuel tank system inspections or maintenance actions in the Airworthiness Limitations section of the ICA.

Critical design configuration control limitations include any information necessary to maintain those design features that have been defined in the original type design as needed to preclude development of ignition sources. This information is essential to ensure that maintenance, repairs, or alterations do not unintentionally violate the integrity of the original fuel tank system type design. An example of a critical design configuration control limitation for current designs discussed previously would be maintaining wire separation between FQIS wiring and other high power electrical circuits. The original design approval holder must define a method to ensure that this essential information will be evident to those that may perform and approve repairs and alterations. Visual means to alert the maintenance crew must be placed in areas of the airplane where inappropriate actions may degrade the integrity of the design configuration. In addition, this information should be communicated by statements in appropriate manuals, such as Wiring Diagram Manuals.

Flammability Requirements

Flammability Requirements

The FAA agrees with the intent of the regulatory text recommended by the ARAC. However, due to the short timeframe that the ARAC was provided to complete the tasking, a sufficient detailed economic evaluation was not completed to determine if practical means, such as ground based inerting, were available to reduce the exposure below the specified value of 7 percent of the operational time included in the ARAC proposal. The FAA is adopting a more objective regulation that is intended to minimize exposure to operation with flammable conditions in the fuel tanks.

As discussed previously, the ARAC has submitted a recommendation to the FAA that the FAA continue to evaluate means for minimizing the development of flammable vapors within the fuel tanks. Development of a definitive standard to address this recommendation will require additional effort that will likely take some time to complete. In the meantime, however, the FAA is aware that historically certain design methods have been found acceptable that, when compared to readily available alternative methods, increase the likelihood that flammable vapors will develop in the fuel tanks. For example, in some designs, including the Boeing Model 747, air conditioning packs have been located immediately below a fuel tank without provisions to reduce transfer of heat from the packs to the tank.

Therefore, in order to preclude the future use of such design practices, § 25.981 is revised to add a requirement that fuel tank installations be designed to minimize the development of flammable vapors in the fuel tanks. Alternatively, if an applicant concludes that such minimization is not advantageous, it may propose means to mitigate the effects of an ignition of fuel vapors in the fuel tanks. For example, such means might include installation of fire suppressing polyurethane foam.

This rule is not intended to prevent the development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks because total prevention has currently not been found to be feasible. Rather, it is intended as an interim measure to preclude, in new designs, the use of design methods that result in a relatively high likelihood that flammable vapors will develop in fuel tanks when other practicable design methods are available that can reduce the likelihood of such development. For example, the rule does not prohibit installation of fuel tanks in the cargo compartment, placing heat exchangers in fuel tanks, or locating a fuel tank in the center wing. It does, however, require that practical means, such as transferring heat from the fuel tank (e.g., use of ventilation or cooling air), be incorporated into the airplane design if heat sources were placed in or near the fuel tanks that significantly increased the formation of flammable fuel vapors in the tank, or if the tank is located in an area of the airplane where little or no cooling occurs. The intent of the rule is to require that fuel tanks are not heated, and cool at a rate equivalent to that of a wing tank in the transport airplane being evaluated. This may require incorporating design features to reduce flammability, for example cooling and ventilation means or inerting for fuel tanks located in the center wing box, horizontal stabilizer, or auxiliary fuel tanks located in the cargo compartment. At such time as the FAA has completed the necessary research and identified an appropriate definitive standard to address this issue, new rulemaking will be considered to revise the standard adopted in this rulemaking.

Applicability of Part 25 Change

Applicability of Part 25 Change

The amendments to part 25 apply to all transport category airplane models for which an application for type certification is made after the effective date of the rule, regardless of passenger capacity or size. In addition, as currently required by the provisions of § 21.50, applicants for any future changes to existing part 25 type certificated airplanes, including STC's, that could introduce an ignition source in the fuel tank system are required to provide any necessary Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, as required by § 25.1529 and the change to the Airworthiness Limitations section, paragraph H25.4 of Appendix H. In cases where it is determined that the existing ICA are adequate for the continued airworthiness of the altered product, then it should be noted on the STC, PMA supplement, or major alteration approval.

FAA Advisory Material

FAA Advisory Material

In addition to the amendments presented in this rulemaking, the FAA is continuing development of AC 25.981-1B, "Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines" (a revision to AC 25.981-1A), and a new AC 25.981-2, "Fuel Tank Flammability Minimization."

AC 25.981-1B includes consideration of failure conditions that could result in sources of ignition of vapors within fuel tanks, and provides guidance on how to substantiate that ignition sources will not be present in airplane fuel tank systems following failures or malfunctions of airplane components or systems. This AC also includes guidance for developing any limitations for the ICA that may be generated by the fuel tank system safety review.

AC 25.981-2 provides information and guidance concerning compliance with the new requirements identified in this rulemaking pertaining to minimizing the formation or mitigation of hazards from flammable fuel air mixtures within fuel tanks.

Discussion of Comments

Discussion of Comments

Thirty four commenters responded to Notice 99-18, including private citizens, foreign aviation authorities, manufacturers of inerting equipment, individual airplane manufacturers and operators (both foreign and domestic), an organization representing the interests of manufacturers of general aviation airplanes, an airline pilots representative, an organization representing the consolidated interests of the aviation industry worldwide, and the National Transportation Safety Board. The majority of commenters agree in principle with the proposals. A discussion of these comments follows, including FAA's response, grouped by subject matter.

Discussion of Comments on Proposed SFAR

Discussion of Comments on Proposed SFAR

For ease of reference, throughout the following discussion, the term "designer" is used to refer to all persons subject to the requirements of the Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR).

General Favorable Comments

Several commenters, including representatives of manufacturers and operators, agree in principle with the safety review that would be required by the proposed new SFAR to part 21 and have, in fact, already engaged in an industry-wide initiative in this area. These commenters state that they believe firmly that the objective of the proposed safety review will enhance the level of safety that already exists in the transport fleet.

Request to Include Smaller Part 25 Airplanes, Rotorcraft, and Part 23 Airplanes in SFAR Applicability

Request to Include Smaller Part 25 Airplanes, Rotorcraft, and Part 23 Airplanes in SFAR Applicability

Several commenters disagree with the proposal to limit applicability of the SFAR to larger airplanes (30 or more passengers) due to the time needed to conduct a thorough economic analysis and the possible impact it would have on small businesses. However, the commenters request that this evaluation be completed and that smaller transport airplanes be included because of the design similarities of the smaller airplanes to larger airplanes.

Additionally, one commenter notes that, because the proposal excludes a significant portion of the fleet, the proposal is not in keeping with the FAA's stated goals of the "One level of Safety" initiative. This commenter also notes that the FAA stated in the notice that applying the proposed requirements to certain regional airliners would not significantly increase the expected quantitative benefits of the rule because there have been no in-flight fuel tank explosions on those airplanes. The commenter is concerned that the FAA may be using "faulty reasoning" to eliminate the need for any follow-on action to address this segment of the fleet.

Another commenter strongly recommends that the SFAR be extended to include part 23 aircraft and part 27 rotorcraft because these types of aircraft may be susceptible to fuel tank system problems similar to those addressed in the proposed rule.

FAA's Response: The FAA agrees that, even though the fuel tank systems of smaller transport category airplanes may be simpler, similarities in the designs of the fuel systems of those airplanes may result in a need to apply the standard to them. As discussed in the notice, we plan to conduct the appropriate economic analysis to determine if the rule should be applied to smaller transport airplanes. Should the results of that analysis indicate that the SFAR requirements should be applied to smaller transports, we will consider developing further rulemaking to address those airplanes. For now, the applicability of the final rule will remain as proposed in the notice.

We do not agree that the proposed SFAR should be applied to part 23 aircraft and part 27 rotorcraft at this time. Service experience has not indicated that immediate action is necessary to address the fuel tank systems of those types of aircraft at this time. However, we may reconsider this action if future service experience indicates that it is warranted.

Request to Exclude Mitsubishi YS-11 Airplanes and Lockheed Electra Airplanes

Request to Exclude Mitsubishi YS-11 Airplanes and Lockheed Electra Airplanes

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., requests that the Mitsubishi Model YS-11 airplane be excluded from the SFAR applicability. The commenter's justification for this exclusion is that none of these airplane models is currently being operated in the U.S. and none are likely to be operated in the future. The commenter further states that there has never been a fuel tank-related incident or accident on any of these airplane models. The commenter refers to the FAA's statement in the preamble to the notice that certain older reciprocating engine-powered and converted turbine-powered transport airplanes should be excluded from the rule because:

"* * * the few remaining such airplanes are in cargo service and because their advanced age and small numbers would make compliance impractical from an economic standpoint."

The commenter asserts that the same rationale should be applicable to the Model YS-11 because not one such airplane is currently operating in the U.S. and the possibility of such airplanes ever returning to cargo service, much less passenger service, in the U.S. is virtually non-existent. Therefore, there are no benefits to be achieved by the design review.

Similarly, Lockheed Martin also requests that its airplane model, the Lockheed Model L-188 Electra airplane, be excluded from the applicability of the SFAR. Like the first commenter, this commenter refers to the statement in the preamble to the notice that certain older reciprocating and turbine-powered airplanes should be excluded because compliance would be impractical from an economic standpoint. The commenter suggests that the Model L-188 Electra also falls into this category and should be excluded from the rule's applicability. The commenter further suggests that the retroactive application of the new requirements to any older model include provisions in the rule that would permit favorable service experience to be submitted instead of extensive failure analysis. The commenter refers to a safety study conducted of the Model L-188 Electra fuel system which shows that the fuel system service experience is excellent.

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