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Advisory Circular Current Issued Sep 19, 2008 ANM-112 76 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 25.981-2A Fuel Tank Flammability

This advisory circular (AC) provides information and guidance on compliance with the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes about limiting the time a fuel tank may be flammable or mitigation of hazards from flammable fuel air mixtures within fuel tanks. This guidance is applicable to transport category airplanes for which a new, amended, or supplemental type certificate is requested, and for which Amendment 25-125 applies. It is also applicable to certain existing design approval holders and certain pending applications for new type certificates, supplemental type certificates and amended type certificates where required by §§ 26.33, 26.35, 26.37, and 26.39, contained in a subpart D to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 26, “Fuel Tank Flammability.” Guidance on compliance with the associated requirements for operators of affected airplanes that must comply with requirements in 14 CFR parts 121, 125 and 129, to incorporate flammability reduction or ignition mitigation means by specified dates, will be contained in a separate document.

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U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: FUEL TANK FLAMMABILITY REDUCTION MEANS

Date: 9/19/08

Initiated by: ANM-112

AC No. 25.981-2A

1. Purpose. This advisory circular (AC) provides information and guidance on compliance with the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes about limiting the time a fuel tank may be flammable or mitigation of hazards from flammable fuel air mixtures within fuel tanks. This guidance is applicable to transport category airplanes for which a new, amended, or supplemental type certificate is requested, and for which Amendment 25-125 applies. It is also applicable to certain existing design approval holders and certain pending applications for new type certificates, supplemental type certificates and amended type certificates where required by §§ 26.33, 26.35, 26.37, and 26.39, contained in a subpart D to Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 26, “Fuel Tank Flammability. Guidance on compliance with the associated requirements for operators of affected airplanes that must comply with requirements in 14 CFR parts 121, 125 and 129, to incorporate flammability reduction or ignition mitigation means by specified dates, will be contained in a separate document. 2.

Applicability. a. This guidance provided in this document is for design approval applicants and holders, airplane manufacturers, modifiers, foreign regulatory authorities, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) transport category airplane type certification engineers and their designees. b. This material is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. It describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations. The FAA will consider other methods of demonstrating compliance that an applicant may elect to present. While these guidelines are not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience in demonstrating compliance with the relevant regulations. On the other hand, if we become aware of circumstances that convince us that following this AC would not result in compliance with the applicable regulations, we will not be bound by the terms of this AC, and we may require additional substantiation or design changes as a basis for finding compliance.

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25…

c. This material does not change, create any additional, authorize changes in, or permit deviations from, regulatory requirements. 3. Cancellation. Advisory Circular (AC) 25.981-2, Fuel Tank Flammability Minimization, dated 4/18/01, is cancelled. 4. Related Documents.

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25 that prescribe the design requirements for the substantiation and certification about prevention of ignition sources within the fuel tanks of transport category airplanes include: § 25.863 Flammable fluid fire protection. § 25.901 Installation. § 25.954 Fuel system lightning protection. § 25.981 Fuel tank ignition prevention. b. Advisory Circulars (AC). You can get the following FAA ACs from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution Office, M-30, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785, or on the internet at: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/rgl. (1) AC 25-8 Auxiliary Fuel System Installations. (2) AC 20-53B Protection of Aircraft Fuel Systems Against Fuel Vapor Ignition Caused by Lightning. (3) AC 25.981-1B Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines. (4) AC 120-27 Aircraft Weight and Balance Control. (5) AC 26-1 Part 26, Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements (6) AC 25-26 Development of Standard Wiring Practices Documentation c. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Documents. You can get the following documents from the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, Pennsylvania, 15096. (1) SAE AIR 5128, “Electrical Bonding of Aircraft Fuel System Plumbing Systems” (January 1997). (2) SAE AIR 4170A, “Reticulated Polyurethane Safety Foam Explosion Suppressant Material for Fuel Systems and Dry Bays” (November 1998).

(3) SAE AIR 1662, “Minimization of Electrostatic Hazards in Aircraft Fuel Systems” (October 1984). d. Military Specifications (MIL). (1) MIL-B-83054, Baffle and Inerting Material, Aircraft Fuel Tank (March 1984). (Note: this reference provides an extensive list of military specifications about the use of polyurethane foam. You can get a copy of this document from the Department of Defense, Document Automation and Production Service, Building 4/D, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, or on the internet at http://assist.daps.dla.mil/online/start/. e. Other. (1) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-98/26, "A Review of the Flammability Hazard of Jet A Fuel Vapor in Civil Transport Aircraft Fuel Tanks" (June 1998). (You can get a copy of this report from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161, or at the following web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/ar98-26.pdf. (2) Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group, Final Report (July 1998).

You can get a copy of this report at the following web site address: http://www.regulations.gov, by inserting the associated docket number (Docket No. FAA-1998-4183) into the advanced docket search function. You can also get a copy of this report at the following web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/systems/fueltank/papers.stm. (3) “Effects of Fuel Slosh and Vibration on the Flammability Hazards of Hydrocarbon Turbine Fuels Within Aircraft Fuel Tanks,” Technical Report AFAPL-TR- 70-65 (November 1970), Edwin E. Ott. Contact the Air Force Aero Propulsion Laboratory, Airforce Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Ohio. (4) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-99/65, "Mass Loading Effects on Fuel Vapor Concentrations in an Aircraft Fuel Tank Ullage. You can get a copy of this report from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161, or at the following web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/tn99-65.pdf. (5) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-00/19, “The Cost of Implementing Ground- Based Fuel Tank Inerting in the Commercial Fleet.

DOT/FAA/AR-00/19 (May 2000). You can get a copy of this report from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161, or at the following web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/00-19.pdf. (6) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-01/6, “Inerting of a Vented Aircraft Fuel Tank Test Article with Nitrogen Enriched Air” (December 2000). You can get a copy of

this report from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161, or at the following web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/01-6.pdf. (7) “The Effectiveness of Ullage Nitrogen-Inerting Systems against 30-mm High-Explosive Incendiary Projectiles,” China Lake Naval Weapons Center, J. Hardy Tyson and John F. Barnes, May 1991. You can get a copy of this report at the following web site address: http://www.regulations.gov, by inserting the docket number associated with this AC (FAA-2005-22997) into the advanced docket search function. (8) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-TN02/79, “Limiting Oxygen Concentrations Required to Inert Jet Fuel Vapors Existing at Reduced Fuel Tank Pressures” (April 2003). You can get a copy of this report from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161, or at the following web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/TN02-79.pdf.

(9) FAA Special Condition, “Boeing Model 747- 100/200B/200F/200C/SR/SP/100B/300/100B SUD/400/400D/400F Airplanes; Flammability Reduction Means (Fuel Tank Inerting),” Docket No. NM270; Special Conditions No. 25-285-SC. You can get a copy of these special conditions at the following web site address: http://www.regulations.gov, by inserting the docket number associated with this AC (FAA-2005-22997) into the advanced docket search function. (10) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-07/30, “Jet A Volatility Survey,” July 2007. A copy of this report is available through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161, or at the following web site address: http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar0730.pdf.

(11) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-05/8, “Fuel Tank Flammability Assessment Method User’s Manual” (May 2008), web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/systems/fueltank/FTFAM.stm (12) FAA Document DOT/FAA/AR-04/41, “Evaluation of Fuel Tank Flammability and the FAA Inerting System on the NASA 747 SCA” (December 2004), web site address: http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/04-41.pdf. (13) Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), Fuel Tank Inerting Harmonization Working Group, Final Report (February 2002). You can get a copy of this report at the following web site address: http://www.regulations.gov, by inserting the associated docket number (U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) electronic dockets, Docket No. FAA-2005-22997) into the advanced docket search function. You can also get a copy of this report, at the following web site address: http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/arac/media/ec/EC_FT_ T2.pdf (14) FAA Order 8110.104, Responsibilities and Requirements for Implementing Part 26 Safety Initiatives, Effective Date 12/3/07, You can get FAA Orders from the

U.S. Department of Transportation, Subsequent Distribution Office, M-30, Ardmore East Business Center, 3341 Q 75th Avenue, Landover, MD 20785, or available on the internet at: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/rgl. (15) FAA Memo No. ANM-08-113-001, Policy Statement on Clarification of Maximum Payload Capacity Definition in Design Approval Holder Rules, dated September 12, 2008. You can get a copy on the internet at: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/rgl. 5. Definitions. a. Auxiliary Fuel Tank is a tank installed to make additional fuel available for increasing the flight range of that airplane. The term “auxiliary” means that the tank is secondary to the airplane’s main fuel tanks, i.e., the functions of the main tanks are immediately available and operate without immediate supervision by the flightcrew in the event of failure or inadvertent depletion of fuel in an auxiliary tank. Auxiliary tanks are usually intended to be emptied of usable fuel during flight and have been installed in various locations including center wing structure, horizontal stabilizers, wings and cargo compartments.

Therefore, auxiliary fuel tanks are “normally emptied” fuel tanks as defined below. b. Main Fuel Tank is defined in § 25.981(b)(3)(iii) as “a fuel tank that feeds fuel directly into one or more engines and holds required fuel reserves continually throughout each flight. The functions of the main tanks are immediately available and operate without immediate supervision by the flightcrew in the event of failure or inadvertent depletion of fuel in an auxiliary tank. Generally, main tanks are those dedicated to the feed of the engines during engine feed isolation. c. Normally Emptied, with respect to fuel tanks, is defined in § 26.31(b) as “a fuel tank other than a Main Fuel Tank. Main Fuel Tank is defined in § 25.981(b), and expanded above. d. Bulk Average Fuel Temperature is defined in paragraph N25.2(a) of appendix N to part 25 as “the average fuel temperature within the fuel tank, or different sections of the tank if the tank is subdivided by baffles or compartments.” e. Center Wing Tank (CWT) is a fuel tank located partially or entirely in the center of an airplane's wing box. f.

Design Approval Holder (DAH) is defined in AC 26-1 as the holder of any design approval, including type certificate, amended type certificate, supplemental type certificate, amended supplemental type certificate, parts manufacturer approval, Technical Standard Order (TSO) authorization, letter of TSO design approval, and field approvals. The definition in AC 26-1 adds that in particular contexts, the term DAH may also refer to applicants for design approvals. In the context of this AC, the term DAH applies to applicants for new design approvals and for changes to existing designs, and it

applies to holders of design approvals and applicants for design approvals affected by part 26, subpart D. g. Flammable, with respect to a fluid or gas, means susceptible to igniting readily or to exploding (14 CFR part 1, Definitions). A non-flammable ullage is one where the fuel-air vapor is too lean or too rich to burn or is inert as defined below. As defined in paragraph N25.2(c) of appendix N to part 25, “a fuel tank that is not inert is considered flammable when the bulk average fuel temperature within the tank is within the flammable range for the fuel type being used. For any fuel tank that is subdivided into sections by baffles or compartments, the tank is considered flammable when the bulk average fuel temperature within any section of the tank, that is not inert, is within the flammable range for the fuel type being used. h.

Fleet Average Flammability Exposure is defined in paragraph 25.2(e) of appendix N to part 25 as “the percentage of the flammability exposure evaluation time (FEET) each fuel tank ullage is flammable for a fleet of an airplane type operating over the range of flight lengths in a world-wide range of environmental conditions and fuel properties as defined in this appendix” (appendix N to part 25). Section 25.981(b)(3)(ii) explains this term “means the percent of time each fuel tank ullage is flammable for a fleet of an airplane type operating over the range of flight lengths. Fleet average flammability exposure is the total time the tank is flammable divided by the total FEET. i. Flammability Exposure Evaluation Time (FEET) is defined in paragraph N25.2(b) of appendix N to part 25 as “the time from the start of preparing the airplane for flight, through the flight and landing, until all payload is unloaded and all passengers and crew have disembarked.

In the Monte Carlo program, the flight time is randomly selected from the Flight Length Distribution (Table 2), the pre-flight times are provided as a function of the flight time, and the post-flight time is a constant 30 minutes. Table 2 referenced in this definition is Table 2 of appendix N to part 25. j. Flammability Envelope is the pressure (i.e., altitude)/temperature domain where the fuel vapor/air mixture is flammable. This flammability envelope is defined in appendix N to part 25, by the upper flammability limit (UFL) and the lower flammability limit (LFL). These flammability limits are dependent on the type of fuel used and vary for different fuel batches that meet the fuel specification. For Jet-A fuels the variation of flash points that are to be used in the analysis are defined in appendix N to part 25. Appendix N also defines the LFL and UFL as a function of altitude and fuel flash point.

The flammability envelope for the fuel is defined by the UFL and LFL as follows: (1) LFL at sea level is the flash point temperature of the fuel at sea level minus 10 degrees F. LFL decreases from sea level value with increasing altitude at a rate of 1 degree F per 808 feet. (2) UFL at sea level is the flash point temperature of the fuel at sea level plus 63.5 degrees F. UFL decreases from the sea level value with increasing altitude at a rate of 1 degree F per 512 feet.

k. Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) is any system intended to meet the flammability exposure criteria in appendix M to part 25. l. Flash Point of a flammable fluid is defined in paragraph N25.2(d) of appendix N to part 25 as “the lowest temperature at which the application of a flame to a heated sample causes the vapor to ignite momentarily, or “flash. The flash point of a fuel is determined using the standardized test method(s) permitted by the fuel specification. Table 1 of appendix N to part 25, provides the Gaussian (or “normal”) distribution for the flash point of the standard (Jet-A) fuel to be used in the analysis. m. Fuel Types approved for use for a given airplane type are listed in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and the type certificate data sheet. Each fuel type has its own properties; those directly related to flammability are “flash point” and “distillation” characteristics. Property differences can occur in different batches of a given fuel type because of variations in the properties of the source crude oil and the refining process used to produce the fuel.

The most widely used fuel types are JET-A or JET-A1, per ASTM International Specification D1655, “Standard Specification for Aviation Turbine Fuels. Older airplanes have been approved for use of JET-B (JP-4), per ASTM Specification D6615, “Specification for Jet B Wide-Cut Aviation Turbine Fuel.” n. Gaussian Distribution is defined in paragraph N25.2(f) of appendix N to part 25 as “another name for the normal distribution, a symmetrical frequency distribution having a precise mathematical formula relating the mean and standard deviation of the samples. Gaussian distributions yield bell-shaped frequency curves having a preponderance of values around the mean with progressively fewer observations as the curve extends outward.” o. Hazardous Atmosphere is defined in paragraph N25.2(g) of appendix N to part 25 as “an atmosphere that may expose maintenance personnel, passengers or flightcrew to the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue (that is, escape unaided from a confined space), injury, or acute illness.” p.

Inert is defined in paragraph N25.2(h) of appendix N to part 25. It states “the tank is considered inert when the bulk average oxygen concentration within each compartment of the tank is 12 percent or less from sea level up to 10,000 feet altitude, then linearly increasing from 12 percent at 10,000 feet to 14.5 percent at 40,000 feet altitude, and extrapolated linearly above that altitude.” q. Inerting is is defined in paragraph N25.2(i) as “a process where a noncombustible gas is introduced into the ullage of a fuel tank so that the ullage becomes non-flammable.” r. Lean Fuel Vapor/Air Mixture is a fuel vapor/air mixture that contains a concentration of fuel molecules below that which will support combustion.

s. Monte Carlo Analysis is defined in paragraph N25.2(j) of appendix N to part 25 as “the analytical method that is specified in this appendix (appendix N to part 25) as the compliance means for assessing the fleet average flammability exposure time for a fuel tank. Paragraph N25.3(a) requires analysis be performed in accordance with the methods and procedures defined in the User’s Manual referenced in paragraph 4e(11) of this AC. t. Oxygen evolution is defined in paragraph N25.2(k) of appendix N to part 25. It “occurs when oxygen dissolved in the fuel is released into the ullage as the pressure and temperature in the fuel tank are reduced.” u. Rich Fuel Vapor/Air Mixture is a fuel vapor/air mixture that contains a concentration of fuel molecules above that which will support combustion. v.

Warm Day Case is that portion of the Monte Carlo Analysis during ground or takeoff/climb phases of flights that begin with a sea level ground ambient temperature of 80 degrees F (standard day plus 21 degrees F) or above, from the flammability analysis done for overall ground operations or warm day takeoff/climb phases. w. Standard Deviation is defined in paragraph N25.2(l) of appendix N to part 25 as “a statistical measure of the dispersion or variation in a distribution, equal to the square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the deviations from the arithmetic means.” x. Transport Effects is defined in paragraph N25.2(m) of appendix N to part 25 as “the change in fuel vapor concentration in a fuel tank caused by low fuel conditions and fuel condensation and vaporization. The change caused by low fuel conditions is also referred to as “mass loading” (see paragraph 4(e)(4)). y. Ullage is defined in paragraph N25.2(n) of appendix N to part 25 as “the volume within the fuel tank not occupied by liquid fuel.” z.

Equivalent Conventional Unheated Aluminum Wing Tank is defined in § 25.981(b)(3)(i) as “an integral tank in a unheated semi-monocoque aluminum wing of a subsonic airplane that is equivalent in aerodynamic performance, structural capability, fuel tank capacity and tank configuration to the designed wing.” aa. Body Tank is a fuel tank installed entirely inside the fuselage of an airplane in a compartment with no tank surface exposed to outside air flow during flight, e.g., an auxiliary fuel tank installed in the cargo compartment of an airplane. See paragraph 4e(11), “Fuel Tank Flammability Assessment Method User’s Manual. 6. Regulatory Background. a. Amendment 25-11 to part 25 introduced the requirements of § 25.981 about limiting temperatures in fuel tanks to prevent ignition of fuel vapors in the fuel tanks from hot surfaces. Advisory Circular 25.981-1A, which was issued in 1972 (now

canceled), provided guidance that included failure modes that should be considered when determining compliance with the fuel tank surface temperature requirements defined in § 25.981. b. Other sections of part 25 require prevention of ignition sources from lightning (§ 25.954) and from failures in the fuel tank system (§§ 25.901 and 25.1309). Sections 25.901 and 25.1309 set forth the provisions to evaluate the fuel tank system and show that “no single failure or malfunction or probable combination of failures will jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane.…” However, service history has shown that ignition sources have developed in airplane fuel tanks because of external ignition sources, and internal ignition sources resulting from unforeseen failure modes, manufacturing and maintenance errors or factors that were not considered at the time of original certification of the airplane. c.

Section 25.981, as amended by Amendment 25-102, was adopted to provide improved standards for preventing ignition sources within fuel tanks and minimizing the exposure to operation of transport category airplanes with flammable vapors in the fuel tanks. Under Amendment 25-102, the title of § 25.981 was revised to “Fuel tank ignition prevention,” and paragraphs (a) and (b) were revised to address the prevention of ignition sources within the fuel tanks. Guidance on these paragraphs is provided in AC 25.981- 1B, Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines (or latest revision). Amendment 25-102 also added a new paragraph (c), which requires minimization of the formation of flammable vapors in the fuel tanks, or mitigation of any hazards if ignition does occur. This provision was included in § 25.981(c), which was intended to require design practices that reduce exposure to operation with flammable vapors in transport category airplane fuel tanks to the lowest practical level.

7. Current Requirements. The Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule titled “Reduction of Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport Category Airplanes” is effective as of September 19, 2008. The 2008 FTFR rule included an amendment to part 25 fuel tank flammability requirements, part 26 (Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements for Transport Category Airplanes) by adding a new subpart D, Fuel Tank Flammability, and amendments to certain operational rules associated with the subpart D requirements. This AC provides guidance for § 25.981, as amended by Amendment 25-125, and the continuous airworthiness requirements of part 26, subpart D. These rules apply to new certification and to certain existing type design approval holders (DAH). The 2008 FTFR also included operational requirements related to the part 26, subpart D, requirements. Guidance for affected operators will be issued later. The following table summarizes the amendments and the applicability of each amendment. Because of the complexity of these requirements, you should refer to the specific regulations for complete details.

TABLE 1

Summary of Regulatory Changes that were made by the 2008 Fuel Tank

Flammability Reduction rule

Summary of Rules

14 CFR Description of Requirement Applies To § 25.5 Incorporation by Reference

Incorporates the Fuel Tank Flammability Users’s Manual by reference

§ 25.981, Fuel Tank Explosion Prevention

Paragraph (a) provides ignition prevention requirements; (b) specifies flammability exposure limits for different fuel tank types and mandates use of fuel tank flammability assessment method; (c) provides the option of using Ignition Mitigation Means (IMM) instead of meeting the paragraph (b) flammability limits; and (d) contains requirements for airworthiness limitation items (ALI), including critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCL), for ignition prevention means, IMM or FRM.

Applicants for TCs for transport category airplanes and design changes to those certificates.

Appendix M, Fuel Tank System Flammability Reduction Means

Establishes performance, reliability and reporting requirements for flammability reduction means (FRM). Applicants for approval of FRM.

Appendix N, Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure and Reliability Analysis

Defines the fuel tank flammability exposure analysis model (Monte Carlo) including definitions, input variables and data tables that must be used in the analysis.

Any person required to perform flammability exposure analysis. Part 26 Continued Airworthiness and Safety Improvements for Transport Category Airplanes

§ 26.5 Applicability Table

Provides an overview of the applicability of part 26. It provides guidance in identifying what sections apply to various types of entities. The specific applicability of each subpart and section is specified in the regulatory text. Subpart D addresses fuel tank flammability.

Applicants for TCs, and changes to those TCs for transport category airplanes. Manufacturers of certain airplane models. Part 26, subpart D

Fuel Tank Flammability. TCs, and design changes to those TCs for transport category airplanes. Manufacturers of certain airplane models.

§ 26.31, Definitions Provides definitions of certain terms used in part 26, subpart D.

TCs, and design changes to those TCs for transport category airplanes. Manufacturers of certain airplane models. § 26.33, Holders of Type Certificates: Fuel tank safety

Require flammability exposure analysis of all fuel tanks within 150 days after September 19, 2008. If below 7 percent, no flammability reduction required. If above 7 percent, normally emptied, and any portion of tank is located in fuselage, must develop service instructions for installation of an IMM or FRM that meets appendix M to part 25 and must submit ALI by September 20, 2010. If above 7 percent, and other tank type, must develop service instructions to incorporate an IMM (meet § 25.981(c)) or FRM to reduce flammability exposure to 7 percent and must submit ALI by September 20, 2010. Service instructions are required by September 20, 2010.

TC holders. Large transport category passengercarrying airplanes, with passenger capacity of 30 or more or a payload of 7500 lbs. or more (original TC or later increase). § 26.35, Changes to type certificates affecting fuel tank flammability

STC and field approval holders: Require flammability exposure analysis of all normally emptied fuel tanks installed under STC or field approval by September 19, 2009. Require impact assessment of normally emptied fuel tanks installed by STC and field approval on all Airbus airplane models and certain Boeing airplane models (those with normally emptied heated center wing tanks) on IMM or FRM developed by TC holder to determine if any ALI has been compromised by March 21, 2011. Require development of service instructions to correct designs that compromise ALI defined by TC holder by September 19, 2012. Applicants for STCs or amendments to TCs: Require flammability exposure analysis of affected fuel tanks by September 19, 2009, or before certification, whichever occurs later. For changes to existing fuel tank capacity and application made on or after September 19, 2008, must comply with § 26.33. For changes that may increase the flammability exposure of a tank for which § 26.33 requires FRM or IMM and application made on or after September 19,

STC and field approval holders for normally empty fuel tanks for large transport category airplanes, with passenger capacity of 30 or more or a payload of 7500 lbs. or more (original TC or later increase). Applicants for future STCs or amendments to TCs that affect fuel tank system or IMM/FRM on passenger-

2008, requires impact assessment of fuel tanks and other STCs, on IMM or FRM developed by TC holder to determine if any ALI has been violated by March 21, 2011, or before certification, whichever is later. Applicants for any pending and future fuel tank that is normally empty must comply with the requirements of § 25.981, Amendment 25-125. Require development of service instructions to correct designs that compromise ALI defined by TC holder by March 19, 2012 or before certification, whichever is later.

carrying airplanes.

§ 26.37, Pending type certification projects: Fuel tank flammability

Requires compliance with § 25.981, Amendment 25-125, if the application was made on or after June 6, 2001.

Pending certification projects for large transport category passenger- carrying airplanes. § 26.39, Newly produced airplanes: Fuel tank flammability

Requires fuel tanks on affected airplanes (produced under FAA production certificates) for which application is made for original certificates of airworthiness or for export airworthiness approval after September 20, 2010, meet the flammability requirements as stated above for § 26.33.

Certain Boeing airplane models, both passenger carrying and cargo.

b. Section 25.981 together with appendices M and N to part 25 and the Fuel Tank Flammability User’s Manual incorporated by reference (see § 25.5), Amendment 25-125, provide flammability limits and the method for determining the flammability of fuel tanks. The flammability limits for fuel tanks that are normally emptied and have any portion of the tank located within the fuselage contour must meet the 3 percent average and 3 percent warm day flammability exposure limits in appendix M to part 25, as required by § 25.981(b)(2). Section 25.981(b) limits the flammability exposure of all other fuel tanks to either 3 percent average, or that of a fuel tank within the wing of the airplane model being evaluated, whichever is greater. If the wing is not a conventional unheated aluminum wing, § 25.981(b) requires the analysis be based on that of an assumed Equivalent Conventional Unheated Aluminum Wing Tank. If a flammability reduction means (FRM), such as nitrogen inerting, is used, additional reliability requirements are provided in appendix M to part 25. Appendix N specifies the requirements for conducting the flammability exposure analysis required to show compliance to § 25.981 and appendix M. Appendix N provides the ability to perform a qualitative analysis for fuel tanks installed in aluminum wings provided it substantiates the fuel tank is a conventional unheated wing tank. Section 25.981(c) retains the option

of using ignition mitigation means (IMM), for example reticulated polyurethane foam, to address fuel tank flammability requirements of § 25.981. It also extends the existing requirements for development of critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCL) for ignition prevention, that were formerly in paragraph (b), to any FRM or IMM and places the amended requirement in § 25.981(d). c. The amendment also includes continued airworthiness and safety improvement requirements that are contained in a new subpart D to part 26. The new subpart D includes §§ 26.33, 26.35, 26.37 and 26.39. These sections specify different compliance requirements for the affected DAHs. The affected airplanes include those with a seating capacity of 30 passengers or more, or a payload of 7500 pounds or more. Appendix 1 of this AC provides a list of affected models, and Appendix 3 of this AC provides guidance on compliance with these requirements. The intent of § 25.981(b) is to require that the exposure to the formation or presence of flammable vapors is limited to specific values for fuel tanks located within the wing and fuselage contour. The flammability limits for the specific tank type are summarized in the following table:

TABLE 2

Summary of Flammability Limits for the Specific Tank Type

Fleet Flammability Exposure

(Percent Exposure Time) Airplanes

Affected

Category of Action

(Cert. Projects Include TCs, ATCs,

& STCs)

Applicable Regulations

Normally Emptied & Any Portion Inside Fuselage

All Other Fuel

Tanks

All part 25

transports

Future applications for

new TCs § 25.981(b)

Pending TC applied on

or after June 6, 2001 § 26.37

Pending or Future STC

or ATC for normally

emptied tanks

§ 26.35(d)(2)

Appendix M

(Flam ≤ 3% Plus

3% warm day limit)

3 percent or equal to conventional

unheated aluminum wing tank, whichever

is greater

Future STC or ATC If changes existing fuel

tank capacity

§ 26.35(d)(3)

Production cut-in (After September 19,

2010)

§ 26.39 (Boeing)

& Ops Rules

(Airbus)

Turbine powered

large transports

with

Max Pass ≥ 30

or

Max Payload ≥

7500 Lb (* See note) See appendix 1 for

list of airplane

models Fleet retrofit

§ 26.33(c) & Ops Rules

If Flam > 7%, Do appendix M

Reduce flammability to:

≤ 3% average

and ≤ 3% warm day

limit

Flammability

≤ 7%

* Applies to transport category, passenger carrying airplanes for which the state of manufacture issued the original certificate of airworthiness or export airworthiness approval on or after January 1, 1992. Section 26.39 production cut-in applies to both cargo and passenger airplanes.

8. Compliance Demonstration. a. Showing Compliance with § 25.981(b) or (c). Section 25.981 provides two options for addressing the hazards associated with fuel tank flammability:

• Controlling fuel tank flammability to specified levels, and • Mitigating the hazards if ignition of the fuel vapors occurs. (1) The first means, as provided in § 25.981(b), shows that the flammability of a fuel tank does not exceed the limits defined in the regulation. When this method of compliance is used, a flammability analysis is required to establish the flammability of the fuel tank, and incorporation of an FRM in any fuel tank to reduce the flammability of any tank that exceeds the applicable flammability limit. Guidance for determining the flammability of a fuel tank is provided in paragraph 10 of this AC. Guidance for incorporating an FRM, including pressurization of a fuel tank, temperature control of a fuel tank, limiting fuel properties and fuel tank inerting, are provided in paragraph 9 of this AC. (2) Compliance with § 25.981(b) is not required if the hazards of ignition of fuel vapors are mitigated by use of an Ignition Mitigation Means (IMM) meeting the requirements of § 25.981(c).

Guidance for demonstrating compliance using IMM is provided in paragraph 12 of this AC. Examples of IMM include filling the tank with polyurethane foam, metallic foils, demonstrating the structure can withstand an explosion, or explosion suppression systems. Since IMM mitigates the effects of ignition so that it is not hazardous, there is no requirement to determine the fuel tank flammability, if this method is used to demonstrate compliance. b. Showing Compliance with § 25.981(d). Appendix 2 of this AC includes guidance for establishing CDCCL relating to FRM or IMM for the fuel tank system. c. Showing Compliance with §§ 26.33 and 26.35. Specific guidance for compliance with the continued operational safety requirements contained in part 26, subpart D is provided in appendix 3 of this AC.

9. General Considerations – Fuel Tank Flammability. a. Formation of Flammable Vapors. The critical considerations in controlling exposure to operation with flammable mixtures in the tank include the control of formation of flammable vapors and/or oxygen concentration. Factors influencing the formation of flammable vapors include fuel type and properties, fuel temperature, pressure in the tank, and any design feature that significantly increases the potential for fuel mists to be created. The time a fuel tank is flammable determined by the Monte Carlo analysis is based upon the assumption that design features needed to prevent spraying and misting of fuel in the tank have been incorporated into the design so these factors are not considered. Rather, the fuel properties and temperature and pressure in the fuel tank are used to determine when the fuel tank is flammable. General design practices that affect the overall flammability risk are described below. Airplane designs submitted for FAA evaluation will be evaluated against these practices. b.

Design Practices to Minimize Flammability Exposure. (1) Misting and sloshing. The flammability of fuel vapors in a fuel tank can be dramatically influenced by agitation, sloshing, spraying, or misting of fuel. These processes increase the surface area of the fuel allowing more fuel vapors to evolve from the fuel, which results in a higher concentration of fuel molecules in the ullage space. Design practices that reduce the potential for fuel agitation, sloshing, spraying and misting should be incorporated into the design so that flammability is minimized. Examples of proven design practices include installation of sufficient baffling in the tanks to reduce sloshing, and returning any fuel used to cool fuel pumps to the bottom of the tank. Section 6 of SAE Document AIR 1662 describes recommended design practices for minimizing hazards associated with electrostatic charging in fuel tanks.

Several of these practices relate to minimizing the formation of flammable vapors, including: (a) Introducing fuel at low velocity near the bottom of fuel tanks so that the inlet is covered early in the refueling or fuel transfer process. (b) Directing the fuel flow onto a grounded conducting surface to reduce electrostatic charge build-up. (c) Using a balanced distribution system to make sure that all fuel tank bays are filled to equal levels to assist in reducing fuel velocity (this minimizes charge relaxation time and mist formation). These practices greatly reduce the presence of fuel mist that will broaden the flammability range of the fuel at the lean end and cause flammable vapors at temperatures well below the flash point. Appendix N to part 25, paragraph N25.4(3)(ii), defines the flammability envelope that must be used for the flammability exposure analysis. The flammability envelope is a function of the flash point of the fuel selected by the Monte Carlo flammability assessment methodology defined in paragraph 4e(11) of

this AC. This determination if the fuel tank is flammable is based upon the assumption that design precautions described in this paragraph have been implemented. (2) Fuel temperature is one of the key factors that determine fuel tank flammability in unpressurized fuel tanks approved for use with common Jet A type fuels. The most effective methods for controlling fuel tank temperature may differ between different fuel tanks, according to their exposure to the risk. For instance, fuel tanks located in conventional unheated aluminum wings of subsonic transport category airplanes, with little or no heat input from airplane systems or from other adjacent fuel tanks that have large surface areas that allow cooling of the fuel, have been analyzed and shown to meet the intent of the regulation. Fuel tanks located within the fuselage contours or other tanks located within the wing that do not cool require more design attention.

For example, auxiliary fuel tanks located in the cargo compartment or pressurized areas, tanks located in the center wing box, horizontal stabilizer tanks, tanks with small surface areas exposed to airflow, and tanks made from materials that act as insulators, may have less ability to reject heat to ambient air, both on the ground and in flight, and may be subject to heat sources from equipment located nearby in the fuselage such as the air conditioning packs that supply cool air to the cabin. For fuel tanks that, because of installation location and/or other factors, do not meet the applicable flammability limits, an FRM or IMM is needed to comply. (3) Fuel types. The proposal for fuels for an airplane type is submitted to the FAA by the applicant for approval, and once approved the fuels are shown in the AFM. The definitions of LFL and UFL define the fuel temperature at which a fuel tank can be expected to be flammable. From the definitions, it can easily be seen that fuel flash point is key. Currently, Jet-A and Jet-A1 are the predominant fuels used in commercial aviation.

Because of this, wing tanks are commonly not flammable as the fuel temperature is typically below the LFL. However, the heat input to any tank can push tanks fueled with Jet-A/A1 into the flammable range. A fuel such as JP-4 has the reverse effect. The flash point is below normal ambient temperatures during ground operations, resulting in more flammability exposure for typical wing tanks and less for tanks that are insulated from outside air, such as CWT. The higher temperature tanks are less flammable because the fuel temperature is above the UFL more of the time, resulting in an over-rich condition. (a) Appendix N to part 25 defines a typical transport category airplane fuel based upon a survey of fuels drawn from operating airplanes as shown in paragraph 4e(10) of this AC. The fuels include Jet A/A1 flash point distribution and also lower flash point fuels commonly used in China and Russia. This distribution is also included in appendix N to part 25 and the Monte Carlo analysis in the paragraph 4d(11) of this AC.

For consistency across applicants, and for simplicity, each applicant is required to apply the distribution defined in appendix N unless the FAA finds that this distribution is not representative of the fuels that could be expected to be used on the particular airplane being evaluated.

(b) If the use of low flash point fuels, such as JP-4, is proposed as an approved fuel, the fuel properties defined in the User’s Manual may not provide a representative flammability exposure analysis. Use of JP-4 type fuels on a typical transport category airplane may significantly increase operational exposure to flammable vapors. Therefore, modification of the flammability analysis and incorporation of additional flammability reduction capability, such as improved FRM performance, may be required to mitigate the increased exposure created by continuous use of such fuels. (4) Fuel tank ullage sweeping is the introduction of air into a fuel tank and dumping the fuel vapor overboard to reduce the concentration of fuel vapors in the ullage. This means would result in significant emission of fuel vapors into the atmosphere and would likely not meet emissions standards, unless these vapors were removed prior to dumping the air into the atmosphere.

Ullage sweeping would not likely have a significant effect on the bulk average fuel temperature of the affected fuel tank and it would not decrease the oxygen content of the ullage. Therefore, it would not provide a significant reduction in the flammability exposure as determined by the flammability assessment method required by part 25, appendix N. (5) Controlling oxygen concentration. The accepted level for tank inerting used by the military is to reduce the oxygen concentration in the tank ullage to less than 9 percent. This is the standard established in the 1950s for a zero flammability risk design because ignition sources (hostile munitions) are a likely event in military missions. The standard precludes “cool flame” ignition, where the pressure rise is relatively low. The actual oxygen concentration needed to prevent a catastrophic fuel tank rupture during an ignition event per FAA testing (reference 4(e)(8)), and military live fire testing using incendiary rounds (reference 4 (e)(7)), is higher.

The higher the oxygen concentration, the higher the pressure that is developed in the fuel tank during a combustion event. Therefore, the applicant may establish the acceptable oxygen concentration based upon evaluation of the structural capability and maximum peak pressure of the fuel tank. The oxygen concentration defined in the definitions paragraph of this AC is an acceptable benchmark for transport category airplane fuel tanks inerted with nitrogen, without additional substantiation. The oxygen concentration limit was established using nitrogen enriched air to displace oxygen. The allowable oxygen concentration varies with the type of inerting gas used. If another inerting gas such as carbon dioxide is used the applicant must substantiate the allowable oxygen concentration needed to show compliance. c. STC and amended TC applicants for design changes to install a Normally Emptied fuel tank must comply with § 25.981 at Amendment 25-125. The guidance in this AC primarily addresses means of compliance with the new tank itself.

However, these applicants must also comply with all applicable CDCCLs established by the TC holder.

10. Determining Fuel Tank Flammability. a. Acceptable Means of Determining the Flammability Exposure. There are two means of establishing the flammability of a fuel tank. The method that is acceptable depends upon the flammability level that the tank is required to meet. Paragraph N25.1(a) of appendix N to part 25 allows for using a qualitative method if it substantiates the fuel tank is a conventional unheated aluminum wing tank. The criteria listed below describe the characteristics of conventional unheated aluminum wing tanks. For all other fuel tanks, the Monte Carlo Model defined in paragraph 4e(11) of this AC must be used as required by appendix N. (1) Qualitative flammability assessment. (a) A conventional unheated aluminum wing tank is a conventional aluminum structure, integral tank of a subsonic transport airplane wing, with minimal heating from airplane systems or other fuel tanks and cooled by ambient airflow during flight.

Heat sources that have the potential for significantly increasing the flammability exposure of a fuel tank would preclude the tank from being considered “unheated. Examples of such heat sources that may have this effect are heat exchangers, adjacent heated fuel tanks, transfer of fuel from a warmer tank, and adjacent air conditioning equipment. Thermal anti-ice systems and thermal anti-ice blankets typically do not significantly increase flammability of fuel tanks.

For these tanks, a qualitative assessment showing equivalency to the unheated aluminum wing fuel tank may be acceptable when considered with the following: 1 A description of the airplane configuration, (including subsonic, wing construction, etc.), 2 A listing of any heat sources in or adjacent to the fuel tank, 3 The type of fuel approved for the airplane, 4 The tank operating pressure relative to ambient static pressure, 5 The tank is uninsulated and made of aluminum, and 6 The tank has a large aerodynamic surface area exposed to outside air to transfer heat from the tank. (b) Fuel tanks with an aerodynamic surface area to volume ratio (surface area/volume) greater than 1.0 have been shown to meet these criteria. Fuel tanks with a ratio less than 1 are not considered conventional unheated aluminum wing tanks. The aerodynamic surface area includes the area of the integral aluminum wing fuel tank that is exposed to outside air.

It does not include any portion of a fuel tank that is shielded from free stream airflow, such as the front and rear spar, or an area under a fairing or wing thermal blanket.

(c) Wing tanks that do not meet the criteria above for use of the qualitative method must use the Monte Carlo analysis (ref. appendix N). For example, if a fuel tank were made of composites, the applicant would need to show compliance using one of the two alternatives provided in § 25.981(b) for wing tanks. One alternative would require the applicant to conduct an assessment of the fleet average flammability exposure for an equivalent conventional unheated aluminum wing tank meeting the criteria above, on the airplane type for which approval is sought. This would establish the maximum allowable flammability level for the actual composite wing fuel tanks. The second alternative provided in § 25.981(b) is to conduct an assessment of the actual composite wing tanks and demonstrate the fleet average flammability exposure of any tanks does not exceed three percent.

(2) Monte Carlo Analysis. When the compliance demonstration requires demonstrating a fuel tank meets a specific fuel tank flammability or the tank does not meet the qualitative assessment criteria previously discussed, both § 25.981(b)(1) and paragraph N25.3(a) of appendix N to part 25 require the flammability assessment be conducted in accordance with the methods and procedures in the FAA document, “Fuel Tank Flammability Assessment Method User’s Manual,” (User’s Manual) dated May 2008, which is incorporated by reference in § 25.5 for § 25.981 and Appendix N. This document may be obtained from the following web site: (http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/systems/fueltank/FTFAM.stm). Section 25.5 includes a provision permitting use of later FAA versions of the User’s Manual when FAA publishes a notice of the change in the Federal Register. (a) This analytical method is based upon predicting the fleet average flammability exposure, and the warm day fleet average flammability exposure as applicable, to operation with flammable fuel air vapors in the fuel tank.

The fuel tank flammability exposure for the tank being evaluated is calculated for the specific fleet of airplanes of interest for which approval is sought using certain standardized parameters for all airplane models and certain airplane model specific parameters. The flammability exposure calculated by the analysis is then compared to the flammability limits defined in the regulations to determine compliance. The analysis method is therefore a standardized analysis method. (b) The fuel flash point at a given temperature and pressure is used to determine when the ullage in the tank is flammable. When the fuel temperature at a given altitude is in the range between the LFL and the UFL, the ullage is assumed to instantaneously become flammable. When using a Monte Carlo analysis, that transition is considered to occur instantaneously as pressure and temperature changes. The Monte Carlo Model is based on the assumption that any fuel being loaded during refuel is at ambient outside temperature when determining flammability exposure.

Appendix N to part 25 defines the fuel properties used in the Monte Carlo Model. This includes the fuel flash point distribution and the flammability envelope of the fuel that is required to be used for the analysis.

(c) Appendix N to part 25 requires the flammability exposure be determined independently for each fuel tank. For fuel tanks that are subdivided by baffles or compartments, N25.3(a) requires an analysis be performed for each section of the tank. Alternatively, if the applicant can show that one section of the tank always has higher flammability exposure than any other section, the applicant may perform the analysis only of that one section. Within each tank where barriers or walls prevent mixing of the fuel/air mixtures, separate volumes or compartments should be treated independently to determine the worst case flammability exposure for that tank because of temperature variations within different portions of the tank. If FRM based upon inerting is used, oxygen concentration in those compartments of the tank can differ significantly from other compartments in the tank (such as an airplane model that has a center wing box that extends out into the wing, or a compartment in a fuel tank where vent inlets may create differences in temperature or oxygen concentration (if an FRM based on inerting is used)). (d) It is possible for the critical compartment to change from one compartment of the tank to another compartment during different portions of the flight. In this case, the flammability of the individual compartments would need to be determined throughout the flight and the times when any compartment of the tank is flammable would be included in the overall average flammability calculation.

(e) If a fuel tank is determined to exceed the applicable flammability requirements, the holder may control fuel tank flammability by incorporation of an FRM or IMM. Guidance for FRM is provided in paragraph 11 of this AC.

(3) Developing inputs to the Monte Carlo Model. The Monte Carlo Model, which randomly generates values for uncertain variables over and over, is used to simulate a process where the variables are random within defined distributions. The results of a large number of cases can then be used to approximate the results of the real world conditions. Appendix N to part 25 provides standard distributions and values that must be used when determining fuel tank flammability. Figure 1 shows the parameters that are used by the Monte Carlo Model to determine fuel tank flammability. The outlined, non-shaded boxes identify inputs that are dependent on the fuel tank design and operation and on the FRM design. The shaded boxes identify parameters that are fixed in the Monte Carlo Model.

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25… › Monte Carlo Parameters to Determine Fuel Tank Flammability

Fuel Tank Thermal Model

Flammability

Reduction Means on/off

Fuel Properties

Airplane Climb Descent Rates

Ambient Temperature

Gate Time

Post Landing

Taxi Time

Mission Length

Distribution

Fuel Quantity

in Tank

Overnight Temp Drop

Gaussian Distribution

Oxygen Evolution

Flash Point Distribution

UFL and

LFL

Initial Fuel

Loaded Temperature

12 HR Overnight

Time

Average Flammability Exposure Determination

FIGURE 1

Monte Carlo Parameters to Determine Fuel Tank Flammability (4) Monte Carlo Parameters. The fuel tank thermal model and fuel quantity in the fuel tank are user inputs needed to determine the fuel tank flammability for a fuel tank without an FRM. The performance of an FRM must also be provided by the user if an FRM is installed. User inputs to the Monte Carlo Model and standardized parameters include the following as defined in appendix N to part 25 and in the User’s Manual (defined in paragraph 4e(11) of this AC): (a) Standardized parameters used in the Monte Carlo Model. 1 Cruise ambient temperature, N25.3(b)(1), N25.4 and Table 1 of appendix N. 2 Ground ambient temperature, N25.3(b)(2), N25.4 and Table 1 of appendix N. 3 Fuel flash point, N25.3(b)(3), N25.4 and Table 1 of appendix N. 4 Flight length distribution, in conjunction with the airplane utilization information submitted under Airplane specific inputs below. 5 Airplane climb and descent profiles (paragraph N25.3(b)(5) requires the applicant use the climb and descent profiles defined in the User’s Manual. 6 Preflight and post flight gate times; the preflight times are provided as a function of the flight time by the Monte Carlo Model in the User’s Manual and the post-flight time is a constant 30 minutes, both as defined by N25.2(b).

7 Oxygen evolution rate (included in model when FRM used, based upon User’s Manual as required by N25.3(d)(5)). 8 Overnight temperature change (when FRM is added). (b) Airplane specific inputs: The airplane specific inputs should reflect the most severe airplane operating conditions or configuration with respect to fuel tank flammability exposure. 1 Airplane cruise altitude. 2 Fuel tank quantities. As discussed in the User’s Manual, the FAA Monte Carlo Model has a feature that allows the user to input times when the tank is full and empty so that the fuel quantity in the tank can be modeled. The model assumes a constant rate of fuel use between the specified tank full and empty times and does not account for unique fuel management techniques such as fuel transfer systems that may be incorporated for purposes such as center of gravity (C.G.) management.

If fuel quantity affects fuel tank flammability, inputs to the Monte Carlo analysis may need to be modified by the user if the standard model does not provide a realistic representation of the actual fuel quantity within the fuel tank or compartment of the fuel tank throughout each of the flights being evaluated. Input values for this data must be obtained from ground and flight test data or the FAA approved fuel management procedures in the AFM. 3 Airplane cruise mach number. 4 Airplane maximum range. This parameter should be determined assuming a payload equivalent to a load factor of 75 percent for a typical two class passenger configuration for the airplane model, using year-around average passenger weights and standard average baggage and carry-on weights per AC 120-27, "Aircraft Weight and Balance Control," standard day atmosphere, zero wind, long range cruise speed and domestic or international reserves as would apply to the typical operation of the airplane. 5 Fuel tank thermal characteristics.

If fuel temperature affects fuel tank flammability, the rule requires that inputs to the Monte Carlo analysis be provided that represent the actual bulk average fuel temperature within the critical compartment of the fuel tank throughout each of the flights being evaluated. For fuel tanks that are subdivided by baffles or compartments, bulk average fuel temperature inputs should be developed for each section of the tank. The temperature in any compartment that results in the highest flammability at any given time should be used in the tank flammability analysis. If one compartment in the tank always has the highest flammability exposure, the temperature in that compartment should be used in the analysis. The rule requires that input values for these data be obtained from ground and flight test data or a thermal model of the tank that has been validated by ground and flight test data. The thermal input data should reflect the most severe airplane operating conditions or configuration.

For example, for fuel tanks located near heat sources such as the airplane environmental conditioning system (ECS), also called air conditioning packs (packs), the maximum allowable number of packs should be running during test and modeling conditions. 6 Maximum airplane operating temperature limit as defined by any limitations in the AFM. This value is obtained from the flight manual for the specific airplane type. 7 Airplane Utilization. The rule requires that the applicant provide data supporting the number of flights per day and the number of hours per flight for the specific airplane model under evaluation. If there is no existing airplane fleet data to support the airplane being evaluated, the applicant must provide substantiation that the number of flights per day and the number of hours per flight for that airplane model is consistent with the existing fleet data they propose to use. (aa) Fuel tank thermal model.

A computer simulation, validated by flight test data, is one way to provide inputs for the model that simulates the thermal behavior of the tank throughout the airplane operating envelope. This model must be provided by the applicant based on the particular characteristics of the particular fuel tank that is being evaluated. The applicant may use the thermal modeling tool incorporated into the Monte Carlo Model if flight test data show that this modeling technique provides conservative prediction of fuel tank temperatures. The Monte Carlo Model includes a feature to use exponential time constants to define the heating and cooling characteristics of a fuel tank. This feature has the capability to input 6 different constants for various conditions that may be present on typical aluminum fuel tanks. While this feature is one method of modeling the fuel tank thermal characteristics so that fuel tank temperatures can be predicted, it is not an acceptable method of modeling the fuel tank if it does not provide accurate results.

It may be necessary for the applicant to develop a separate fuel tank temperature model that accurately predicts fuel tank temperatures. Appendix 4 of this AC provides further guidance regarding developing a validated fuel tank thermal model for use in showing compliance for fuel tanks. This guidance will be helpful for use in developing a thermal model for a fuel tank with an FRM. (bb) Simplified fuel tank thermal model. To simplify the certification process and avoid the need to develop a fuel tank thermal model, if an applicant so chooses, it is acceptable to determine the flammability exposure of a tank with an inerting system added by assuming the fuel temperature is otherwise always between the LFL and UFL. (cc) Body fuel tank thermal model. If the tank is located entirely inside the fuselage of the airplane in a compartment and no tank surface is exposed to outside air flow during flight, e.g., an auxiliary fuel tank installed in the cargo compartment of an airplane, it is considered a “Body Tank.

For these fuel tanks, the Monte Carlo model defined in paragraph 4e(11) allows the calculated temperatures of the fuel tank to be controlled by the temperature of the compartment in which the fuel tanks is installed.

b. Fuel Tank FRM Model. If FRM is used, the rule requires an FAA-approved Monte Carlo Model be used to show compliance with the flammability requirements of § 25.981 and appendix M of part 25. The program must determine the time periods during each flight phase when the fuel tank or compartment with the FRM would be flammable. The following factors must be considered in establishing these time periods: (1) Any time periods throughout the FEET and under the full range of expected operating conditions, when the FRM is operating properly but fails to maintain a nonflammable fuel tank because of the effects of the fuel tank vent system or other causes. (2) The effect of any inerting system may be included in this analysis. The applicant should present a description of the system including its control logic, and data to substantiate its performance at lowering the ullage oxygen content to below the inert level defined in appendix N to this part to comply with the applicable average flammability level.

Where the system does not provide continuous protection such as a ground based inerting system as described in paragraph 4e(5) of this AC, the degradation of the ullage inerting level with time, altitude, oxygen evolution from the fuel, air inhalation with fuel use or altitude reduction, and possible effects from vent system operation must be addressed. c. Compliance Report. The results of the analysis described above, together with substantiation data for the assumptions used in the analysis, including test data validating the thermal analysis used, would be included in the compliance report presented to the FAA. If the tank in question requires a demonstration of equivalence, an analysis of a real or hypothetical unheated wing tank on the same airplane must also be presented. d. Documentation and Validation of Monte Carlo Model. As discussed earlier in paragraph 10, modifications to the Monte Carlo model are limited to the additional features needed to model an FRM, tank thermal characteristics, and fuel management.

All modifications to the model’s code must be thoroughly documented and validated both through detailed analysis and flight test. The compliance report should include a summary section that lists all modifications. 11. Flammability Reduction Means. The available methods of limiting exposure to operation with a flammable ullage space in the tank include preventing the formation of flammable vapors and/or controlling the oxygen concentration. Factors that directly influence the formation of flammable vapors include the fuel type properties, fuel temperature, pressure within the fuel tank, and any design feature that increases the potential for fuel mists to be created. Design precautions described earlier within this AC to limit misting or sloshing of fuel within a fuel tank should be taken. Demonstrating compliance when an FRM is used requires modification to the Monte Carlo Model to include a simulation of the FRM performance. The simulation must determine the times during the flight when the FRM is effective at maintaining a non-

flammable fuel tank. Factors that need to be considered when developing the simulation are discussed within this section. a. Managing Heat Transfer to the Fuel Tank. In general, heat sources should not be located in or near fuel tanks, and heating from other sources, such as hydraulic heat exchangers or rejection of heat from engine systems, should be avoided unless features are incorporated to maintain fuel tank flammability equivalent to an unheated wing fuel tank. Locating heat-producing systems away from the tanks should be considered. If this is not a practical solution, installation of an FRM using thermal control may be another option. Possible technical solutions include the use of thermal insulation blankets, and/or providing ventilation and/or dedicated cooling to remove excess heat from the fuel tank or areas adjacent to the tank. b. Cooling/Ventilation of Fuel Tanks.

If the fuel tank is located in an area of the airplane where little or no cooling occurs, such as the center wing box, certain horizontal stabilizers, or auxiliary fuel tanks located in the cargo compartment, ventilation or dedicated cooling may also be an effective means of demonstrating compliance. The cooling/ventilation means should be effective under all operating conditions, including ground and flight operation, considered necessary to achieve the desired goal of showing the tank flammability is equivalent to the unheated wing tanks. Adequate cooling/ventilation may be provided for certain airplane types by means such as installation of an air gap in spaces adjacent to fuel tanks and utilizing cold air source during ground operation to cool the tank, and the use of ram air inlets for in-flight operation to transfer heat from the tank. Other means (e.g., bleeding cool air from the ECS packs into the air gap) may also be effective at providing adequate cooling/ventilation of the tank. c. Controlling Fuel Tank Pressure.

The flammability of the fuel tank is affected by the pressure in the tank. Typical transport category airplane fuel tanks are vented to the atmosphere and operate at or slightly above local ambient pressure. Fuel tanks located within the wing typically operate with a pressure equal to the local static pressure unless features are incorporated to increase the fuel tank operating pressure. Designs have been developed that use pressurization of the wing fuel tanks as a means to transfer fuel. Pressurization of the fuel tanks also provides reduced flammability. Manufacturers have also incorporated National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) scoops on the vent outlets of some airplane fuel tank systems to enhance engine suction feed performance. The pressure recovery factor of these scoops varies but in general is in the range of .4 to .6. Therefore fuel tank pressure during flight may be between .5 to 1.25 psi above local static pressure. The increase in tank pressure results in a reduction in fuel tank flammability.

Many recently designed auxiliary fuel tanks, located in pressurized cargo compartments, incorporate structural features that allow utilization of pneumatic pressure to transfer fuel from the fuel tank to the airplane fuel tank system. These tanks typically are designed to operate at the airplane cabin pressure which is normally equivalent to approximately 8000 feet pressure altitude. This results in a significant reduction in fuel

tank flammability. Controlling fuel tank pressure is one means of reducing fuel tank flammability. The Body Tank model in the Monte Carlo Model defined in paragraph 4e(11) of this AC has features that allow the user to input a pressure differential relative to ambient pressure so that fuel tank flammability under these conditions can be evaluated. d. Fuel Tank Ullage Sweeping. A positive ventilation system has been studied to be used to “sweep” the ullage of flammable fuel vapor/air mixtures at a rate that keeps the ullage lean when the fuel temperature and pressure in the tank would otherwise define the tank as being flammable. It is discussed in the ARAC Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group Final Report in paragraph 4e(2) of this AC. The rule requires that the fuel tank flammability be determined based upon the Monte Carlo analysis, which determines if the fuel tank ullage is flammable based on the fuel temperature and fuel tank altitude (or pressure altitude). e. Higher Flash Point Fuels.

One method of reducing fuel tank flammability is to restrict the fuel type specified in the AFM to higher flash point fuels (e.g., JP-5, 140 degrees F flash point). This method, in combination with other means, may be effective at reducing the exposure. However, as discussed in the ARAC Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group Final Report in paragraph 4e(2) of this AC, this approach is not considered to be practical at this time. If this method were considered, the applicant would need to request FAA approval for use of a fuel type with a different flash point when conducting the flammability assessment than that required by appendix N to part 25. f. Oxygen Concentration. (1) Fuel Tank Inerting. Fuel tank inerting is a highly effective means of reducing or eliminating the flammability exposure within a given tank. This method eliminates flammable vapors by displacing oxygen from the ullage space of the tank with inert gas (reducing the oxygen concentration below the level that would support combustion of flammable vapors).

The military has used this method to prevent fuel tank explosions of combat airplanes. While system requirements for commercial applications are different, the development of technology for separation of nitrogen gas from air has allowed the size and weight of inerting systems to be significantly reduced for commercial applications. Additional size and weight reductions may be achieved by new approaches such as catalytic conversion of fuel vapors in fuel tanks to produce carbon dioxide for use as the inert gas that is under development. (2) Recent technology developments have made it possible to develop inerting systems that use optimized air sources that are part of the initial airplane design. These systems are capable of inerting a fuel tank during normal airplane operating conditions. Older technology airplanes that have limited bleed air sources are less efficient and it may not be practical to provide an inerting system that inerts the tank throughout the flight envelope. On these airplanes a flammability assessment based upon the time the

inerting system is effective, as well as consideration of the fuel tank flammability, may be part of the overall compliance demonstration. (3) The applicant may show that inerting is only needed for certain missions, for example during warmer days when the fuel ullage would be flammable, or parts of a particular flight to lower the fuel tank vapor/air mixture average exposure to a level that meets the flammability limit. Inerting may be achieved by supplying inert gas from onboard storage bottles, holding either gas or liquid inerting agent, on board inert gas generation systems (OBIGGS), or from a ground storage system if the tank is inerted only on the ground. Nitrogen is currently the inert gas of choice for inerting fuel tanks and the requirements in the § 25.981 address the requirements for use of nitrogen based inerting systems. Use of other gases, such as carbon dioxide, to inert a fuel tank would include many of the same considerations for markings and maintenance procedures.

However there may be other considerations that need to be addressed in the certification plan, such as gas absorbed by the fuel and the effect of the gas absorbed on the fuel system performance, such as suction feed performance. (4) FRM designs that reduce the oxygen concentration to very low levels during cruise and increase the flow of nitrogen enriched air (NEA) into the fuel tank during decent have been found to optimize the design. One nitrogen inerting system designed for retrofit into airplanes with limited air sources has a dual flow mode that takes into consideration the performance of the air separation modules (see paragraph 4e(12) of this AC). During cruise the system operates at low flow mode where high nitrogen concentration NEA is introduced into the fuel tank to lower the oxygen concentration to very low levels. During decent the system is operated in high flow mode where the flow rate of NEA is increased. At high flow rates the nitrogen concentration of the NEA is lower. (5) Oxygen Level.

The accepted practice for tank inerting used by the military for a nitrogen based system is to reduce the oxygen concentration in the tank ullage to less than 9 percent. Data obtained from military testing that was conducted in 1991 (see paragraph 4e(7) of this AC), as well as FAA testing (see paragraph 4e(8) of this AC), shows that 12 percent oxygen concentration at sea level, will provide sufficient protection for transport category airplanes when using nitrogen based systems. As stated in the definitions paragraph of this AC, a fuel tank is considered to be inert when the bulk average oxygen concentration within each compartment of the fuel tank is 12 percent or less from sea level up to 10,000 feet altitude, then linearly increasing from 12 percent at 10,000 feet to 14.5 percent at 40,000 feet altitude, and extrapolated linearly above that altitude. g. Oxygen Evolution. Fuel loaded on the airplane from sources vented to the atmosphere contains dissolved oxygen.

Systems added to inert fuel tanks must take into account the dissolved and entrained oxygen in the fuel when loaded onto the airplane. The applicant can either design the system to allow and compensate for the evolution of the oxygen or include provisions to remove or “scrub” the oxygen from the fuel during refueling. The effect of oxygen that may rapidly evolve from the fuel during pressure reduction conditions, such as during climb, must be accounted for in the Monte Carlo

Model. Section 4.3 of the User’s Manual discusses how oxygen evolution should be treated in the Monte Carlo analysis when an FRM using inerting is developed. NOTE: An FAA ground and flight test program evaluated the effectiveness of inerting a center wing fuel tank with a ground based nitrogen enriched air supply without a closed vent system. The testing included measuring the effects of oxygen evolution. The results of the test program are contained in FAA Report, Ground and Flight Testing of a Boeing 737 Center Wing Fuel Tank Inerted with Nitrogen Enriched Air, Report # DOT/FAA/AR-01/63, (July 2001). The report is available on the internet at http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/01-63.pdf. h. Overnight Temperature Change. As the airplane sits overnight, the temperature will change accompanied by an associated density change of the fuel tank ullage. Usually, the change in temperature is downward from the last flight of the day to the first flight the next day. The result is that the fuel tank will “breathe in” additional air as the ullage density increases.

The applicant must take this effect into consideration. Appendix N defines the required distribution the applicant must use in a Monte Carlo analysis to determine the change in temperature. The starting temperature is the temperature of the ullage at the end of the last flight as determined by the validated thermal model. The ending temperature is the ambient outside temperature before the next flight after an overnight temperature change. The applicant must substantiate the number of flights per day for a particular airplane and apply the overnight temperature change effect once “per day” in the FRM module developed by the applicant for the Monte Carlo analysis. Some airplane operations (such as executive jets) result in routine operations with consecutive days of overnight temperature changes that may cause the oxygen concentration in the fuel tanks to be elevated so the tank is no longer inert. The effects of consecutive overnight temperature changes on FRM performance should be provided by the DAH in the airplane operating and maintenance instructions. i.

Other Considerations Related to Oxygen. The applicant should consider any other environmental conditions or airplane system that may have an effect on the oxygen concentration within the fuel tank in question. Some existing fuel tank vent systems are designed to vent to both wing tips. For a fuel tank that may be vented to both sides of the airplane, the applicant must consider the effects of pressure differences across the wing and the resulting cross flow through the tank. Differential pressures created during maneuvers, between the vents located near each wing tip result in significant flow of air through the fuel tank and can result in adverse effects on an FRM that is based upon limiting oxygen concentrations. Installation of check features, such as a lightly loaded check valve in the vent system, or limiting the venting to one vent outlet have been shown to limit cross-flow. Any changes to an existing airplane vent system must meet the associated regulations (e.g., §§ 25.975 and 25.979).

For example, one factor that needs to be considered is possible increases in fuel tank bottom pressures during refueling conditions due to any additional pressure losses resulting from modifications to the vent system. When inerting is used as the means of compliance, the inert gas distribution system must be shown to be effective in all compartments of a fuel tank. The

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25… › j. Compliance Demonstration. Flight test demonstration and analysis…

design may be optimized by incorporation of features to maintain even distribution of the inerting gas. j. Compliance Demonstration. Flight test demonstration and analysis will be required to demonstrate the effectiveness of the inerting system (see appendix 5 for information on measurement of oxygen concentrations in airplane fuel tanks). The demonstration should include critical conditions and demonstration that the inerting system reduces the oxygen concentration in the tank to an acceptable level, without leaving pockets of oxygen concentrations above the maximum level within the tank. Where the applicant uses inerting as one part of an overall method to reduce flammability (for example inerting in combination with tank temperature control), the applicant should demonstrate the effectiveness of each part of the overall method independently, as well as in combination to show overall effectiveness at meeting the flammability requirements. (1) The amount of flight testing that is acceptable for showing compliance depends upon the proposed method of compliance.

For example, an applicant may choose to develop an FRM performance model and then substantiate by airplane testing that the model accurately predicts the system performance. An applicant may also choose to define the critical points in the airplane operating envelope and then conduct flight test conditions at the critical points to show compliance. (2) For an inerting-based FRM that is effective at preventing fuel tank flammability during normal airplane operating conditions, the demonstration that would be needed may be limited to providing substantiation that the distribution system is effective at inerting all sections of the tank, that the system provides adequate flow, and that the reliability of the system meets the overall requirements. (3) In addition, the applicant must substantiate that the added system meets the installation requirements of part 25. k. System Reliability Considerations.

(1) The overall time the fuel tank is flammable cannot exceed 3 percent of the Flammability Exposure Evaluation Time (FEET), which is the total time, including both ground and flight time, considered in the flammability assessment defined in appendix N. As a portion of this 3 percent, if flammability reduction means (FRM) are used, each of the following time periods cannot exceed 1.8 percent of the FEET: (a) when any FRM is operational but the fuel tank is not inert and the tank is flammable; and (b) when any FRM is inoperative and the tank is flammable. (2) Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) Interval. Inerting systems designed as a flammability reduction means are considered part of a balanced fuel tank safety approach together with design features incorporated to prevent ignition sources in fuel tanks. These FRM are not considered flight critical and airplanes may be eligible for dispatch under the MMEL with the FRM inoperative. The FAA Flight Operations Evaluation Board (FOEB) will establish the MMEL dispatch relief interval for the FRM

based on data submitted by the applicant to the FAA. This value should reflect the value the applicant uses in the reliability analysis and the requirements of appendix N25.3(d)(2), which states that if dispatch with the system inoperative under the MMEL is requested, the time period assumed in the reliability analysis must be 60 flight hours for a 10-day MMEL dispatch limit unless an alternative period has been approved by the Administrator. The FOEB may accept a system reliability analysis using the Monte Carlo Model. As shown in section 3.2 of the User’s Manual, inputs needed to conduct an analysis include, mean time between failures (MTBF) of the FRM, average time to restore the system function after it is placed on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), and the number of flights before a failed FRM would be detected. These inputs are discussed in more detail in the User’s Manual. (3) Reliability Reporting.

The regulation requires that the applicant demonstrate effective means to ensure collection of FRM reliability data so that the effects of component failures can be assessed on an on-going basis. The reporting requirement is contained in appendix M, paragraph M25.5, and applies to applicants and DAH. (4) The rule requires the TC or STC holder to provide the FAA with summaries of the FRM reliability data in compliance with appendix M to part 25 on a quarterly basis for the first five years after the FRM is installed and operational. After that time, continued quarterly reporting requirements may be replaced with other reliability tracking methods approved by the FAA Oversight Office. The requirement for quarterly reports may be eliminated if the FAA determines that the reliability of the FRM meets, and will continue to meet, the requirements of the rule. (5) Operators are not required to report FRM reliability information.

Type certificate holders are required to gather the needed data and may use existing reporting systems that are currently used for airplane maintenance, reliability, and warranty claims to gather the data from operators using existing business arrangements between the TC holders and the airlines. (6) The reliability report should include information regarding overall system dispatch reliability, including identification of the component that caused the failure of the system, and the number of days on average the system was placed on the MMEL. The report should be submitted to the FAA Oversight Office by a letter on a quarterly basis as required by the regulation. l. Indications. (1) Since inerting systems are considered a safety enhancing system, similar to a flight data recorder, no indication to the flightcrew of the flammability of the fuel tank, and associated flightcrew procedures for fuel tank flammability or oxygen concentration are specifically required by the regulation. The need to provide indication of the FRM status will depend on the particular FRM design.

Various design methods may be used to make sure an FRM meets the reliability and performance requirements. These may

include a combination of system integrity monitoring and indication, redundancy of components, and maintenance actions. A combination of maintenance indication or maintenance check procedures could be used to limit exposure to latent failures within the system, or high inherent reliability may be used to make sure the system will meet the fuel tank flammability exposure requirements. (2) The need for FRM indications and the frequency of checking system performance (maintenance intervals) must be determined as part of the FRM fuel tank flammability exposure analysis. The determination of a proper maintenance interval and procedure will follow completion of the certification testing and demonstration of the system’s reliability and performance prior to certification or as part of the FAA review process for airplanes manufactured under existing TC or auxiliary fuel tanks under existing STC. (3) Appropriate maintenance level indications and limitations should be placed in the MMEL to maintain the reliability of the inerting system to the level required by the regulations. For example, maintenance level messages would likely be needed to meet the reliability requirements for an FRM to show when the system is not functioning properly so the inoperative interval that goes into the reliability analysis can be limited to short periods. Installation of an oxygen sensor to measure the oxygen concentration, and appropriate maintenance messages may be needed to meet reliability requirements or may be a desirable feature that may eliminate the need for frequent maintenance checks.

m. Inerting System Safety Considerations. (1) For inerting systems that generate NEA on board, the waste gas may create additional fire hazards or change the hazards within certain areas of the airplane. Therefore, these effects should be considered a potential hazard to the airplane. By the very nature of the process of separating nitrogen from air, the waste gas will be of a higher concentration of oxygen than normal air. Since higher concentrations of oxygen may lead to a greater likelihood of ignition, given the availability of fuel vapor and a spark, safety assessment and special precautions may be required. (2) Inerting systems that use combustion or catalytic processes to produce inerting gas typically operate at elevated temperatures that may introduce hazards into the airplane design. These systems must be located and designed such that they comply with airplane fire protection regulations, such as § 25.863, etc. (3) Special maintenance procedures may be required to meet the reliability and performance requirements for fuel tanks that utilize nitrogen inerting. Maintenance actions that require entry into a fuel tank that contains inert gas or an area adjacent to an inerted fuel tank may be hazardous if appropriate safety precautions are not utilized. The fuel tank should be ventilated and appropriate air source provided. Appropriate warning information should be included in the maintenance manuals and placards placed at fuel tank entry points warning maintenance personnel.

(4) Confined spaces are compartments or enclosures with limited openings for entry and exit, not intended for continuous human occupancy, and only suitable for temporary work such as inspections, maintenance, or repairs. A fuel tank has potential hazards that include toxic chemicals, insufficient oxygen with a concentration that is below 19.5 percent or excess oxygen that is above 23.5 percent, and a flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its LFL. (Reference U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), 29 CFR §1910.146(b)). Specific procedures must be in place that identify, control, or eliminate these hazards prior to maintenance personnel entering into fuel tanks. (5) A large percentage of the work involved in properly inspecting and modifying airplane fuel tanks and their associated systems must be done in the interior of the tanks. Performing the necessary tasks requires inspection and maintenance personnel to physically enter the tank, where environmental hazards exist.

These hazards exist in any fuel tank (regardless of whether a nitrogen inerting system is installed) and include fire and explosion, toxic and irritating chemicals, oxygen deficiency, and the confinement to the fuel tank itself. To prevent related injuries, operator and repair station maintenance organizations have developed specific procedures for identifying, controlling, or eliminating the hazards of fuel-tank entry. In addition, government agencies have adopted safety requirements for use when entering fuel tanks and other confined spaces. These same procedures along with additional markings would be applied to the reduced oxygen environment likely to be present in and adjacent to an inerted fuel tank. (6) Confined and Adjacent Space Markings. The addition of a system that utilizes inerting to reduce the flammability of a fuel tank may result in reduced oxygen concentrations due to leakage of the inert gas in locations in the airplane where service personnel would not expect it.

(7) A worker is considered to have entered a confined space just by putting his or her head across the plane of the opening. If the confined space contains high concentrations of inert gases, workers who are simply working near the opening may be at risk. These gases may be under pressure because of the design of the inerting system, and any hazards associated with working in adjacent spaces near the opening, should be identified in the marking of the opening to the confined space. (8) Introduction of NEA within the fuel tanks creates additional risks because of the possibility of NEA leaking into compartments adjacent to the fuel tanks. Lack of oxygen in these areas could be hazardous to maintenance personnel, and in some cases could affect the passengers, or flightcrew. Existing certification requirements address these hazards. Appendix M25.3(c) requires markings to emphasize the potential hazards associated with confined spaces and areas where a hazardous atmosphere could be present as a result of the addition of FRM.

That paragraph requires that the access doors and panels to the fuel tanks with FRMs and to any other enclosed areas that could contain hazardous atmosphere under either normal conditions or failure conditions be permanently stenciled, marked, or placarded to warn of hazards.

(9) Fuel tanks are confined spaces and contain high concentrations of fuel vapors that must be exhausted from the fuel tank before entry. Other precautions such as measurement of oxygen concentrations before entering a fuel tank are already required. (10) Designs currently being implemented locate the FRM in the fairing below the center wing fuel tank. Access to these areas is obtained by opening doors or removing panels which allow some ventilation of the spaces adjacent to the FRM. Leakage of NEA into areas adjacent to the FRM equipment or tanks may create a hazard for maintenance personnel. Confined space hazards in the areas adjacent to the fuel tanks should be assumed unless it can be shown that adequate ventilation is provided so air quality for maintenance personnel is assured. Unless the design eliminates this hazard, markings should be provided to warn service personnel of possible hazards associated with the reduced oxygen concentrations in the areas adjacent to the FRM.

Appropriate markings would be required for all inerted fuel tanks, tanks adjacent to inerted fuel tanks and all fuel tanks connected to the inerted tanks via plumbing. The plumbing includes, but is not limited to, plumbing for the vent system, fuel feed system, refuel system, transfer system and cross-feed system. The markings should also be stenciled on the external upper and lower surfaces of the inerted tank adjacent to any openings to ensure maintenance personnel understand the possible hazards of fuel vapors and lack of oxygen in and adjacent to the fuel tank. (11) Markings/placards. The regulation requires that if an inerting system is installed on an airplane, the access doors and panels to the fuel tank(s) and any other enclosed areas that could contain hazardous atmosphere under either normal conditions or failure conditions must be permanently stenciled, marked, or placarded to warn of hazards. These placards would be considered CDCCL and should be included in the required markings section of the maintenance instructions.

The following is an example of wording that may be used:

• Low oxygen content possible during nitrogen generation system operation. • Obey employer safety procedures. • Failure to obey may cause injury.

FIGURE 2

Low Oxygen Level Placard

FIGURE 3

Confined Space Placard

12. Ignition Mitigation Means (IMM). The following are acceptable means to mitigate the effects of an explosion. a. One means to meet § 25.981 is to protect a tank from structural and systems damage that could prevent continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. This alternative recognizes that an applicant may choose to accept a high flammability exposure in a given tank and to provide additional protection to extinguish or suppress an explosion in a tank if an ignition occurs. b. The use of appropriate foams to fill the fuel tank and thereby control the pressure rise following an ignition of the fuel vapor/air mixture has been demonstrated to be effective by the United States Air Force (USAF) and other military forces. Foams are in use on several civilian transport category airplane types. Detailed design information regarding use of reticulated polyurethane safety foam for explosion suppression is provided in the report referenced in paragraph 4d(1) of this AC. The applicant may use such a foam installation to satisfy the requirement of § 25.981.

The foam type should be demonstrated to be effective in suppressing explosions to a level where structural and system damage is prevented. The applicant should: (1) Provide data on the foam, including material, pore size, and intended method for installing the foam in the tank. (2) Address the potential for, and the effects of, degradation of the foam, from any environmental effects and long term aging, on both the airplane and engine fuel systems. If the foam has a limited useful life, particular installation requirements, or other features that are essential for the IMM to perform its intended function, they should be defined as CDCCLs. (3) Address the effects of the foam installation on fuel system performance, including engine feed, venting, unusable fuel, sump capacity, expansion space capacity, fueling, and defueling, including the effect of the foam on electrostatic buildup in the tank.

(4) Address the effect of the foam installation on the airplane fuel system, as well as the auxiliary power unit (APU) and engine fuel systems, and develop maintenance procedures to ensure the foam is correctly installed, both initially and when reinstalled, if removed for access to the tank. /s/ Ali Bahrami Ali Bahrami Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25… › LIST OF § 26.33(a) AFFECTED MODELS/FAA OVERSIGHT OFFICES

Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF § 26.33(a) AFFECTED MODELS/FAA OVERSIGHT OFFICES

TABLE 1-1

Section 26.33(a) Applicable Airplane Models The following list represents the airplane models determined to meet the applicability criteria of § 26.33(a). This list only represents our best determination at this time and may not be complete. Design approval holders are responsible for identifying all of their airplane models meeting the applicability criteria.

Aerospatiale

:

ATR 42, ATR 72

Airbus: A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A380

BAE: BAe-146, BAe Jetstream 4100, ATP, Avro 146

Boeing: 717, 737, 747, 757, 767, 777, MD-80, MD-90, MD-11

Bombardier: CL-600-2B19 (CRJ-100/200/440),

CL-600-2C10 (CRJ-700), CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24 (CRJ-900), DHC-8

CASA: CN-235, C-295

Dornier: 328-100, 328-300

Embraer: EMB-120, EMB-135, EMB-145, ERJ-170, ERJ-190

Fokker: F.27 Mk 50, F.28 Mk 0070 and Mk 0100

Saab: 340 (or SF-340), 2000

Appendix 1

TABLE 1-2

FAA Oversight Offices

Airplane manufacturer FAA Oversight Office Aerospatiale Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 Airbus Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 BAE Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 Boeing Seattle Aircraft Certification Office Bombardier New York Aircraft Certification Office CASA Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 deHavilland New York Aircraft Certification Office Dornier Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 Embraer Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 Fokker Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116 Lockheed Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office McDonnell-Douglas Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office SAAB Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM-116

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25… › DEVELOPING CRITICAL DESIGN CONFIGURATION CONTROL LIMITATIONS - FUEL…

Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2

DEVELOPING CRITICAL DESIGN CONFIGURATION CONTROL

LIMITATIONS - FUEL TANK FLAMMABILITY

1. Introduction. This appendix provides guidance for developing Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) for fuel tank systems to prevent the fuel tank from exceeding the applicable flammability exposure limits established in the 2008 Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule. Guidance for developing CDCCLs to maintain ignition prevention features is located in AC 25.981-1B, Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines, or the latest revision. 2. Definitions.

a. Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). A manual developed by the manufacturer of a particular airplane that contains information necessary for the continued airworthiness of that airplane.

b. Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI). Mandatory maintenance of the fuel system that can include CDCCL, inspections, or other procedures determined necessary to ensure, with respect to this AC, the fuel tank flammability exposure does not increase above the certification limits as a result of maintenance actions, repairs, or alterations throughout the operational life of the airplane.

c. Component Maintenance Manual (CMM). A manual developed by a manufacturer that contains information necessary for the continued airworthiness of a particular component.

d. Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL). A limitation requirement to preserve a critical design feature of a flammability reduction system or of the fuel system design that is necessary for the design to meet the performance standards of § 25.981 throughout the life of the airplane model. The purpose of the CDCCL is to provide instructions to retain the critical features during configuration changes that may be caused by alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions.

e. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). The information documented in accordance with 14 CFR 25.1529 and 14 CFR part 25, appendix H that includes the applicable methods, inspections, processes, procedures, and airworthiness limitations required to keep the airplane airworthy throughout its operational life.

3. Discussion. a. Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations include those features of the design that must be present and maintained to achieve the safety level intended by § 25.981 for the operational life of the airplane. Changes to the airplane, such as installing a fuel re-circulation system, hydraulic heat exchanger in the fuel tank, or a heat source adjacent to the fuel tank, may affect fuel tank flammability exposure. A CDCCL would be necessary in this example to prohibit the addition of heat to the fuel tank.

Appendix 2

Another example of a CDCCL might be limits on operation with certain fuel types such as JP-4. The CDCCL would also control or prohibit the kinds of modifications to airplanes, like modifications that affect the vent system of a fuel tank that has an FRM installed or the addition of auxiliary fuel tanks that vent into a fuel tank that has an FRM installed, that could adversely change the flammability exposure of fuel tanks to which it may be connected. All fuel tanks subject to the requirements of Amendment 25-125, even those in airplanes that do not have high flammability fuel tanks, will need to have CDCCL defined so that future modifications do not increase the flammability above the regulatory limit. Under part 26, CDCCL must also be provided for fuel tanks required to be modified by FRM or IMM. The application of CDCCL under the FTFR rule is similar to the requirements already applied to fuel tank ignition source prevention in Amendment 25-102 to § 25.981. b. The FTFR also includes the requirement that visible means identifying CDCCL be present.

This is required to prevent alterations to critical features of the system. As the visible identifications are critical to the FRM or IMM system, they are also considered to be CDCCL. Any tampering or removal would be in violation of the CDCCL. These CDCCLs, inspections, or other procedures would be documented as airworthiness limitations in the ICA. c. The CDCCLs for fuel tank flammability include any information necessary to maintain those design features that have been determined by analysis of the fuel tank system (e.g., fault tree analysis, failure modes and effects analysis) as needed to maintain the performance of the FRM or IMM, or maintain the fuel tank flammability within the limits established by the applicable regulations. AC 25-981-1B (or latest revision) contains additional guidance on how to perform the analysis for ignition prevention CDCCLs.

CDCCLs are intended to preclude the occurrence of any maintenance or inspection task or procedure that could result in a failure, malfunction, or defect that would compromise the intended function of the critical part, component or design feature that ensures the fuel tank flammability exposure does not exceed the regulatory limits. This information is essential to ensure that maintenance, repairs, or alterations do not unintentionally violate the integrity of the original type design of the fuel tank system. CDCCLs may be required that define the critical features, such as:

• Flammability exposure of the unheated aluminum wing tank, and associated cooling rate, • Limits on heat input such as adding heat blankets or additional hydraulic heat exchangers, • Limits on how an auxiliary fuel tank is integrated with an existing airplane fuel tank system, such as limiting venting into a tank with FRM based upon inerting or transferring warm fuel from the auxiliary tank, • Limits on airplane systems such as minimum quantity of engine bleed air flow or electricity that is required to supply power to an FRM, • Limits on use of high volatility fuels such as JP-4, • Quantity of engine bleed air flow that is used for inerting,

Appendix 2

• Limits on penetrations of the fuel tank, • Limits on any changes to fuel management that may affect FRM, • Limits on changes to any placards or means used to visibly identify critical design features of the fuel tank system that must not be compromised for the operational life of the airplane, • Life limits on parts such as polyurethane foam used as an IMM, and the air separation modules used in an inerting system. d. Airworthiness limitations are part of the ICA. Design approval holders (DAH) need to make available to affected parties pertinent changes to the ICAs. (The term “make available” is used in the same sense that it is used in § 21.50.) The rule is not intended to alter or interfere with the existing commercial relationships between TC holders and these other persons. The FAA anticipates that DAHs would be able to be reasonably compensated for developing these documents, as they are under current practice.

e. The rule requires creation of an Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS), unless previously established. The ALS is required by current part 25 and includes those items that have mandatory inspection or replacement times related to fuel systems and structure. The ALS is included in the ICA, approved as part of type certification, and distributed with an airplane on delivery. In this way the ALS is visible to all who need it and who would be required to comply with it under §§ 121.917, 125.509 and 129.117. For those airplanes that currently do not have an ALS, the rule requires an ALS only for fuel tank safety related limits. This rule does not require that the ALS for these airplanes include the other requirements for an ALS established under Amendment 25-54 to part 25, or a later amendment. For those DAH or applicants with airplanes certified to Amendment 25-54 or later, the existing ALS would be revised to include the fuel tank system ALI.

f. The ICA developed by the DAH using the guidance in this advisory circular must be approved by the responsible FAA Oversight Office. Those approved instructions are required by related operational rules to be used by operators to develop and propose changes in their maintenance programs and incorporate design changes needed to maintain the fuel tank flammability within the approved limits and to ensure continued airworthiness of certain features of the FRM and IMM for the operational life of the airplane. These changes to the maintenance programs must be reviewed and approved by the operator’s designated FAA inspector or Principal Inspector.

4. Development of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations.

a. The CDCCLs, which are a type of Airworthiness Limitation, are the primary means of managing and controlling the configuration of the FRM, IMM or design features that affect the flammability of any fuel tank that does not require an FRM or IMM. In the context of this AC, CDCCLs provide limitation requirements for configuration management to preserve the integrity of certain critical flammability features of the fuel tank system design. These critical features are essential to ensure fuel

Appendix 2

tank flammability does not increase above limits defined in the regulations as a result of configuration changes caused by maintenance action, repair, or alteration of those critical features. While initial inspections may be necessary to ensure that a CDCCL has not been compromised (e.g., because of aging, wear, maintenance, alterations, etc.), they are not intended to require repetitive inspections. Rather the intent of the CDCCL is to ensure that all affected maintenance personnel are aware of the need to make sure the configuration identified by the CDCCL is preserved for the operational life of the airplane.

b. The DAH may determine that the CDCCLs are applicable at the individual part level or at the component level. In the context of this guidance, components are assembled from parts. Design approval holders may elect to identify a CDCCL that applies to the component for the purposes of reducing tracking of ALIs that may apply to individual parts of the component. If the component level is used, the design approval holder is responsible for revising the CMM instructions to identify all of the critical features of the component design for approval by the FAA Oversight Office. c. To identify the parts or components to which the CDCCLs are applicable, the DAH must first conduct a configuration assessment of the fuel tank system design. The purpose is to identify any foreseeable maintenance or inspection actions or other causes that could compromise the configuration of a critical feature of the fuel tank system. In the context of this guidance, foreseeable causes are those that have occurred in service in the past or those that engineering judgment predicts could compromise the critical feature of a part or component of a fuel tank system. The DAH must develop maintenance and inspection instructions to prevent those foreseeable changes to the design configuration of the critical ignition source prevention features.

d. Airworthiness Limitations Section Content. The ALIs should include the following:

• The Limitation Statements shown below, • A brief description of the flammability reduction, ignition mitigation means features, • The flammability issue associated with inadvertent changes to the configuration of each of those design features, and • The reference to maintenance instructions, if applicable, and other information in manuals (such as airplane maintenance, standard wire practices manual, etc.,) that have been revised or created to advise affected personnel of the CDCCLs. e. Limitation Statement: The Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation statements are as follows:

Appendix 2

LIMITATIONS. (1) The critical features of the parts or components identified in the CDCCLs must be maintained in a configuration identical to an approved type design for the airplane. (2) Any repairs or overhauls to the critical features of the parts or components that are identified must be maintained in accordance with the design approval holder’s maintenance manual or with other acceptable repair or overhaul specifications and parts approved by the FAA Oversight Office specifically for that part or component.

(3) In cases where the critical features of a component are specified, any test equipment or tooling utilized to repair or overhaul the component must be in accordance with the CMM or otherwise comply with 14 CFR 43.13(a) and be substantiated and documented as equivalent. 5. Identification and Awareness of CDCCLs.

a. The DAH should list the parts components or features to which the CDCCLs are applicable for a particular airplane in the service information (e.g., maintenance planning document or special certification item document) documenting the CDCCL. This is the mechanism for identifying critical features and requiring their control. To ensure that the operator introducing a modification or the mechanic is aware of the need to consider these critical features, it will be necessary to insert cross-references in certain documents to comply with the CDCCLs.

(1) The DAH should identify a task with WARNING or CAUTION notes for a component or part that has a critical design feature in the AMM. The operator should incorporate acceptable procedures to ensure compliance with the CDCCLs.

(2) The DAH should include information in standard practices manuals to ensure the CDCCL information is provided to those making modifications or maintaining the type design. (see AC 25-26, Development of Standard Wiring Practices Documentation (11/14/07) for guidance on preparation of these manuals).

(3) The DAH should identify the appropriate CMM. In addition, the design approval holder should ensure that a statement is inserted into both the CMM and the Airplane Maintenance Manual that the component is controlled by the CDCCL and, therefore, that it may be repaired or overhauled only in accordance with the CMM or other acceptable maintenance procedures and parts approved by the FAA Aircraft Certification Office.

(4) These documents should include a statement that the part, component or design feature component is controlled by the CDCCL and, therefore, that it may be

Appendix 2

repaired or overhauled only in accordance with the CMM or other acceptable maintenance procedures approved by the FAA Oversight Office.

1. Section 26.33 Holders of type certificates: Fuel tank flammability.… › Compliance Timeline for TC Holders (§ 26.33)

APPENDIX 3

COMPLIANCE WITH PART 26, SUBPART D, SECTIONS 26.33 AND 26.35

1. Section 26.33 Holders of type certificates: Fuel tank flammability. This section requires TC holders of certain large transport category airplanes described below to analyze the flammability exposure of all their affected airplanes’ fuel tanks and develop service instructions for those tanks that exceed limits defined in the rule. For example, a TC holder of an affected airplane with any fuel tank that is determined by the analysis to have high flammability exposure (over 7 percent) is required to develop service instructions for IMM or FRM to reduce the flammability exposure of the fuel tank. If the fuel tank is normally emptied and any portion of the fuel tank is located within the fuselage contour, § 26.33(c)(1)(i) requires the FRM meet the flammability exposure criteria of appendix M of part 25. For all other fuel tanks with a flammability exposure over 7 percent, § 26.33(c)(1)(ii) requires the FRM meet the flammability criteria of appendix M except instead of complying with paragraph M25.1 of the appendix the fleet average flammability exposure may not exceed 7 percent. The affected TC holders would also be required to submit compliance plans for the flammability analysis and the development of service instructions for an FRM or IMM. The due dates for items required by this regulation are as follows:

Rule effective

9/19/08

Compliance

plan for

flam. analysis 12/18/08

Flam. analysis completed

2/16/09

Compliance

plan for

design change and

service instructions

4/17/09

FRM/IMM

service instructions,

ICAs, ALS

9/20/10

Draft of compliance

items 7/22/10

90 days

60 days

60 days

15 months

60 days

FIGURE 3-1

Compliance Timeline for TC Holders (§ 26.33)

a. Federal Aviation Regulations. The applicable sections of part 25… › (3) Foreign Type Certificate Holders.

a. Applicability. Section 26.33(a) states that this rule applies to “U.S. type certificated transport category, turbine-powered airplanes, other than those designed solely for all-cargo operations, for which the State of Manufacture issued the original certificate of airworthiness or export airworthiness approval on or after January 1, 1992, that, as a result of original type certification or later increase in capacity have: (1) A maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more, or (2) A maximum payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or more.”

(1) The reference to the originally certificated capacity, or later increase in capacity, is intended to address two situations:

(a) In the past, some designers and operators have gotten design change approval for a slightly lower capacity to avoid applying requirements mandated only for airplanes over specified capacities. By referencing the capacity resulting from original certification, this rule removes this possible means of avoiding compliance. (b) It is also possible that an airplane design could be originally certified with a capacity slightly lower than the minimum specified in this section, but through later design changes, the capacity could be increased above this minimum. The reference to later increases in capacity ensures that, if this occurs, the design would have to meet the requirements of this section.

(2) Maximum payload capacity is defined in 14 CFR 119.3, Definitions. Also see the reference in paragraph 4e(15) of this AC.

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