65 FR 56618 Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations
The FAA amends the commercial space transportation licensing regulations by establishing operational requirements for launches of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and the authorized conduct of commercial space reentry activities. The final rules implement the FAA's reentry licensing authority by prescribing requirements for obtaining a license to launch and reenter an RLV, to reenter a reentry vehicle, and to operate a reentry site. Issuance of licensing rules is necessary to respond to advancements in the development of commercial RLV and reentry capability. The final rules fulfill the FAA's safety mandate by limiting risk to the public from RLV and reentry operations.
Part II
14 CFR Parts 400, 401, 404, et al.
Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations; Final Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Parts 400, 401, 404, 405, 406, 413, 415, 431, 433, and 435
[Docket No. FAA-1999-5535; Amdt. Nos. 400-1, 401-1, 404-1, 405-1, 406-1, 413-1, 415-1, 431-1, 433-1 and 435-1] RIN 2120-AG71
Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations
Agency
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The FAA amends the commercial space transportation licensing regulations by establishing operational requirements for launches of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and the authorized conduct of commercial space reentry activities. The final rules implement the FAA's reentry licensing authority by prescribing requirements for obtaining a license to launch and reenter an RLV, to reenter a reentry vehicle, and to operate a reentry site. Issuance of licensing rules is necessary to respond to advancements in the development of commercial RLV and reentry capability. The final rules fulfill the FAA's safety mandate by limiting risk to the public from RLV and reentry operations.
Dates
DATES: Effective November 20, 2000.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stewart W. Jackson, AST-100, Space Systems Development Division, Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, (202) 267-7903; or Ms. Esta M. Rosenberg, Attorney-Advisor, Regulations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, (202) 366-9320.
Supplementary Information
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Availability of Final Rules
You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the following steps:
(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
Availability of Final Rules
(2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket number shown at the beginning of this final rule. Click on "search."
(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information for the Docket you selected, click on the final rule.
You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this final rule.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a question regarding this document may contact their local FAA official, or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us [email protected].
Background
Background
General
The Commercial Space Act of 1998 (CSA), Public Law 105-303, extends the Secretary of Transportation's licensing authority under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701 (known as the Commercial Space Launch Act or CSLA) to reentry vehicle operators and operation of reentry sites by non-Federal entities. In addition to launch of a launch vehicle and the operation of a non-Federal launch site, the Secretary licenses reentry of a reentry vehicle and the operation of a reentry site when those activities are conducted within the United States or by U.S. citizens abroad. The Secretary's licensing authority has been delegated to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and further assigned to the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (AST). AST carries out the Secretary's regulatory responsibilities and safety mandate under the CSLA to ensure that public health and safety and the safety of property are not jeopardized by licensed operations. AST exercises its licensing authority consistent with national security and foreign policy interests, as well as treaty obligations, of the United States.
General
Reentry vehicles, as defined by the recently amended CSLA, include reusable launch vehicles, or RLVs, that are designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, substantially intact. Not all reentry vehicles are RLVs, although all of the reentry concepts currently identified to the FAA by prospective operators involve RLVs. RLV development by U.S. commercial space launch providers responds to increasing demand for lower cost and reliable access to space. Reduced cost of space access will facilitate greater commercial use of the space environment along with research and exploration that would otherwise remain unaffordable. Benefits from medical and microgravity research would be realized at potentially greater rates, and commercial services such as telecommunications and data relay would become increasingly available to the world market at lower cost. New markets in consumer services, including same day international package delivery as well as space tourism, could quickly develop with reliable reusable space vehicles.
In the mid 1990's, prospective RLV operators identified absence of adequate regulatory oversight over RLV operations, particularly their reentry, as an impediment to technology development. The need for a stable and predictable regulatory environment in which reusable launch vehicles could operate was considered critical to the ultimate ability of the emerging RLV industry to obtain the capital investment necessary for research and development and ultimately vehicle operations. Limitations on the Secretary's licensing authority and ability to adequately regulate reentry activities was identified by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space as early as 1992, accompanied by continuing commitment of each successive Congress to enactment of authorizing legislation addressing reentry operations. The 1998 Commercial Space Act (CSA), signed into law on October 28, 1998, provides a crucial first step in removing regulatory obstacles to RLV development. This final rule provides yet another step by establishing the framework and basis for licensing the next generation of reusable launch vehicles, as well as other types of reentry vehicles.
Another factor critical to commercial RLV development is the commitment expressed by the U.S. Government in the CSA to share in the risks of RLV and reentry technology and to extend to operators of those vehicles the financial responsibility and risk sharing regime that has proven crucial to commercial operators of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) in achieving a dominant share of the U.S. launch market and increasing international competitiveness. Since 1988, ELV launch providers and the U.S. Government have mutually enjoyed the substantial benefits of statutory risk allocation requirements. Through enactment of the CSA, a comparable regime would extend to RLV operators who are expected to enjoy benefits comparable to those currently enjoyed by ELV launch services providers. The Reentry Financial Responsibility final rules implement the FAA's regulatory program for assuring financial responsibility and risk allocation for licensed reentry operations, including those performed by RLVs, and remove yet another potential hindrance to RLV developers. Taken together, the comprehensive RLV and Reentry Licensing Regulations and Reentry Financial Responsibility final rules provide a stable, yet flexible, regulatory environment in which commercial RLV and reentry technology may reside. The FAA remains committed to designing air and space regulations to accommodate all of its customers, including the regulated space transportation industry, traveling public, persons on the ground, and users of air and space resources.
In furtherance of its commitment, the FAA has been working towards development of an integrated concept of operations involving the National Airspace System, or NAS, that contemplates shared use of airspace by aircraft and commercial space vehicles. In addition, the FAA has formed an integrated product team to examine issues of common heritage and concern to various FAA business sectors. Working with industry partners, the FAA plans to further evolve its regulatory approach to RLVs by defining operations and maintenance plans that assure safe, continued use of reusable space vehicles and by identifying human factors that will affect crew and passenger-bearing RLVs. Addressing those aspects of RLV operations and space flight are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. A working group of the FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) dedicated to RLV operational issues provides advice, information and recommendations at the request of the FAA Administrator and AST for use in support of further development of the agency's regulatory and standards development program for RLV operations.
Following enactment of the CSA, the FAA initiated this rulemaking to define and implement the licensing process, inclusive of safety standards, that would apply to authorized RLV missions (launch and reentry) and other reentry operations. For an RLV, both its launch and reentry require licensing under the amended CSLA and although the FAA has had a regulatory program in place for years governing launch licensing, the FAA determined that licensing regulations developed to address existing ELV commercial launch capability were not adequate to address the unique safety issues posed by launch vehicles that are reusable. ELVs rely upon destructive flight termination systems (FTS) that assure flight safety by destroying a vehicle traveling beyond approved limits. Timely activation of an FTS assures that vehicle debris will impact within a designated and unpopulated area so as to avoid all injury to the public.
Unlike an ELV, an RLV may rely upon non-destructive means of ending vehicle flight, such as returning to the launch site or use of an alternative landing site, in the event of a vehicle malfunction or anomalous circumstance affecting the ability to conclude a mission as planned. Non-destructive means of terminating flight contemplate the ability to correct a problem and, if possible, reuse the vehicle in future flight. Although a number of factors influencing public safety are common to both ELV and RLV launches, the FAA determined it preferable to commence rulemaking dedicated to RLVs. Accordingly, on April 21, 1999, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (64 FR 19626) proposing licensing requirements for the conduct of RLV missions as well as reentry of reentry vehicles that are not RLVs. In addition, on the same day, the FAA issued final launch licensing rules addressing, for the most part, launches of ELVs from Federal launch ranges (64 FR 19586, April 21, 1999).
Notice and comment rulemaking can take months, and sometimes years, to complete because of the need to consider carefully public input on an agency proposal before issuance of final rules. To accommodate those RLV developers requiring regulatory guidance before rulemaking would be completed, the FAA engaged the space transportation industry and the interested public in the development of draft interim safety guidance for RLV operators. In the absence of final rules, interim guidance would serve to inform the emerging RLV industry of safety issues identified by the FAA that would require resolution by an applicant before a license would be granted. The FAA would work closely with each applicant in constructing an application that would ensure safety issues presented by an RLV mission proposal were adequately addressed. Interim guidance has been utilized effectively and efficiently by prospective launch site operators in the absence of detailed licensing requirements.
As noted in the supplementary information portion of the NPRM, the FAA convened a meeting with industry representatives in May 1998, with participation by each RLV developer and prospective operator then known to the FAA. A spokesperson from each entity was invited to provide feedback to the FAA on the draft guidance and its effects on mission design for the purpose of refining mutual understanding of safety considerations presented by RLVs. As a result of this effort, the FAA released revised draft interim safety guidance and convened a public meeting in February 1999, to solicit oral and written comments from all interested persons on the revised guidance material. Written comments and a transcript of the meeting are available for public review in the FAA Docket Office under Docket No. 29140.
The NPRM issued on April 21, 1999 (64 FR 19626), differs in some respects from the revised draft interim safety guidance. Where safety criteria included in the draft interim safety guidance differ materially from that proposed in the NPRM, the FAA utilized comments on the draft guidance document as one means of assessing alternative approaches to achieving RLV mission safety.
In May 1999, the COMSTAC adopted a consensus-based report of the RLV working group addressing the draft interim safety guidance for RLV operators. The COMSTAC report was likewise considered by the FAA in developing the regulatory framework applicable to RLVs and is contained in the public docket under docket number 29140. It may also be obtained by accessing AST's web site, located at http://ast.faa.gov.
NPRM Overview: Three-Pronged Public Safety Strategy for RLV and Other Reentry Missions
NPRM Overview: Three-Pronged Public Safety Strategy for RLV and Other Reentry Missions
The public accepts a certain amount of risk when utilizing or being exposed to various modes of transportation. For example, the traveling public accepts certain risks from air travel or when driving a car. The public is also exposed to transportation risk resulting from aircraft flying overhead or when crossing the street. Safety regulations are intended to assure that public risk is maintained at an acceptable level. For purposes of this rulemaking, the FAA is concerned with risk posed to the public on the ground or in airspace, as well as to property on the ground or on orbit, as a result of space launch and reentry events. Passenger and crew safety standards are beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a three-pronged approach, outlined below, to assure that public health and safety and the safety of property would not be jeopardized by the conduct of an RLV mission, defined to include ascent and descent flight of an RLV that has been authorized under an FAA license. Safety standards proposed by the FAA were intended to ensure that RLVs would not pose greater risk to public safety in accomplishing a flight mission than would be posed by more conventional ELV technology. Consistent application of the FAA's three-pronged approach to RLVs would mean that all RLVs would be treated similarly in terms of allowable risk to the public, with no distinction between vehicles that achieve and reenter from Earth orbit or outer space and those intended to operate suborbitally inasmuch as they never enter a closed path or complete an orbit in a closed path. Accordingly, it has not been necessary to define or delimit outer space. Consistent application to RLVs of FAA safety requirements would also ensure that launch concepts involving multi-stage vehicles, comprised of wholly or partially reusable stages, would not expose the public to greater risk than that defined as acceptable by the FAA in other commercial space transportation regulations.
The three safety-related elements reflected in the FAA's safety strategy for RLV mission and reentry vehicle licensing are: establishing limitations on the measure of acceptable public risk, use of a system safety process to identify hazards and mitigate risk and imposition of operational restrictions. These three elements are interrelated and together ensure that risks are sufficiently contained at an acceptable level. Just as system redundancy compensates for failure or flawed design or performance, interrelated safety elements assure that actual hazards from vehicle operation, whether anticipated in analytical assessments or unforeseen, will not increase risk to the public beyond an acceptable level. The following chart appeared in the NPRM to illustrate the interrelationship of the three elements of the agency's public safety strategy and is repeated in this rulemaking to reflect the FAA's final rule approach to RLV mission and reentry safety.
1. Calculation of Ec (Acceptable Public Risk)
1. Calculation of Ec (Acceptable Public Risk)
The FAA proposed a collective risk measure, known as expected number of casualties or Ec, commonly used within the aerospace community. A collective risk calculation yields the consequences, measured in terms of human casualties, of the probability or frequency of occurrence of all events multiplied by the severity of impacts on public safety. Ec is a statistical estimation of risk used in the absence of empirical performance data.\1\ Because launches are still relatively infrequent events, this probabilistic assessment is used to measure acceptable risk.
\1\ To the extent it is available, empirical data on safety systems, materials and components may be used as an input in determining Ec.
Federal ranges employ an Ec standard of 0.00003 casualties per ELV launch or Ec <ls-thn-eq> 30 x 10-6. Through application of this requirement as well as other range safety requirements and practices, Federal ranges have enjoyed 40 years of ELV launch experience with no public casualty. Under 14 CFR 415.91, the FAA would issue a safety approval for a launch from a non-Federal launch site if equivalent safety is demonstrated.
The FAA proposed to apply to RLV missions and other missions involving reentry of a reentry vehicle the same risk threshold as that used by Federal launch ranges in approving ELV launches and endorsed by the National Academy of Sciences Study on Federal Ranges: Ec <ls-thn-eq> 30 x 10-6. The FAA proposed to adopt a single Ec risk threshold applicable to all portions of licensed RLV flight for a particular mission. For other licensed reentries, the FAA proposed to assess reentry risk of a reentry vehicle in combination with its associated launch risk, that is, the launch that placed the reentry vehicle in space. As described in the NPRM, the FAA had also considered whether to apply Ec risk thresholds separately to each licensed flight phase of an RLV mission such that there would be an Ec allowance for launch or ascent flight and another Ec allowance for reentry or descent flight. The FAA determined that doing so would (or could depending upon the risk thresholds selected) expose the public to greater risk per mission without sufficient justification for doing so.
In the FAA's view, neither the commercial objective of placing a payload in space nor scientific and technological goals of other commercial RLV ventures would justify increased jeopardy to the public as a general rule. Accordingly, the FAA proposed to apply the ELV launch risk threshold of Ec <ls-thn-eq> 30 x 10-6 to RLVs on a per mission basis, and would allow an applicant for an RLV mission license to apportion or allocate flight risk among flight phases without regulatory direction from the FAA. An advisory circular, AC No. 431.35-1, provides guidance on an acceptable means of calculating the Ec that would result from debris dispersion upon explosion or other vehicle break-up and is available from the FAA.
2. System Safety Process and Risk Analysis
2. System Safety Process and Risk Analysis
A system safety process relies upon methods and techniques for identifying: (i) Hazards that result from vehicle operation, (ii) effects on or consequences to public safety as a result of identified hazards, (iii) means of controlling or mitigating effects on or consequences to public safety, and (iv) means of verifying the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. A system safety process and calculation of expected casualties are interrelated because the former is used to determine potential failure events, the probabilities of failures, and to estimate consequences of those failures, all of which affect the expected casualty rate.
The system safety process is used to define the operating envelope that ensures a proposed mission will remain within the acceptable risk threshold and also to define operating rules and constraints for remaining within that envelope. The FAA maintains guidance material describing an acceptable system safety process; however, an applicant may employ another process as long as it accomplishes the intended purpose. Examples of acceptable failure identification techniques are identified in the NPRM and include: Preliminary Hazards Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis Methodology for Hazard Assessment.
3. Operational Restrictions
3. Operational Restrictions
Commercially operated RLVs will pose technological challenges and unique safety issues to the government and industry. Other than the partially reusable Space Transportation System (STS), of which the Shuttle is the best known and reusable part, there is no vehicle known to the FAA currently capable of entering Earth orbit and returning, substantially intact, to Earth. Once commercial RLVs are fully designed and "metal is bent," operational concepts may undergo significant ground testing and some may undergo incremental and experimental flight testing in controlled airspace and possibly the upper atmosphere. However, absent any real world launch and reentry experience with the emerging generation of reusable launch vehicles, and until sufficient experience is gained, system data recorded and performance verified, the analytical processes that comprise system safety and that generate the calculation of Ec do not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that public risk is sufficiently contained and mitigated. Given uncertainties of performance, the FAA proposed to impose operating restrictions on RLV flight and other reentry missions pending proof of reliability and system performance, either through operational use or conduct of a flight test program.
Operating restrictions are intended to limit the consequences of a failure where vehicle reliability cannot be ascertained with a sufficient level of confidence. Risk is a function of the probability of a failure and the magnitude of its consequences. Where the probability of a failure cannot be accurately determined but merely assumed using engineering judgment and analytical techniques, risk is appropriately managed by limiting consequences. Hazard analysis and other quantitative risk analyses are extremely important to vehicle design and operating concepts; however, absent real time flight performance data the FAA cannot rely exclusively on analytical constructs when public safety is at stake. Moreover, thousands of hours of flight data may be required to prove system reliability, particularly when the effects of the space environment and launch stress on continued use through re-flight of a reusable vehicle are not yet fully identified and understood. In this regard, the FAA notes that industry representatives have acknowledged that the STS is still undergoing a flight test program. Accordingly, the FAA proposed in the NPRM to impose operational restrictions based on probable system failures and to require adherence to those restrictions for all RLVs. Some additional restrictions would apply to vehicles that remain unproven, at least until such time as sufficient vehicle performance data is obtained to justify relief from restrictions.
The NPRM highlighted four categories of operational restrictions applicable to RLV flight and reentry of a reentry vehicle other than an RLV, as follows: (i) Restricting flight over populated areas; (ii) requirements for monitoring critical systems; (iii) positive enabling of fail-safe reentry; and (iv) use of a sufficiently large reentry site as to contain the vehicle upon landing. Each of these restrictions is discussed in greater detail below.
Proposed Scope of RLV Mission and Reentry Licensing
Proposed Scope of RLV Mission and Reentry Licensing
Although the FAA proposed to incorporate both launch and reentry authorizations in a single license that would authorize an RLV mission, it remains necessary to differentiate between activities that are licensed by the FAA and those that are not covered by FAA licensing authority. Delimiting the extent of licensed activity is particularly important because activities that are not licensed by the FAA would not be covered by the statutory financial responsibility and risk allocation regime and liability risks resulting from those activities must be managed privately as a matter of business judgment rather than Federal regulation.
Definitions of the terms "launch" and "reentry" are proposed and discussed in the RLV and Reentry Licensing Regulations NPRM; however, as signaled in the NPRM, the notice of proposed rulemaking, 64 FR 54448-54472, issued October 6, 1999, concerning reentry financial responsibility addresses in greater detail the scope of launch and reentry authorizations that would be contained in an RLV mission license because of the direct relationship between the scope of licensed RLV activity and applicability of risk sharing devices, including indemnification, under the CSLA. Accordingly, although some comments submitted to the NPRM docket addressed the appropriate scope of launch and reentry licensing, more extensive discussion and analysis of this issue appears in comments submitted in response to the Reentry Financial Responsibility NPRM. Final rules governing reentry financial responsibility are likewise accompanied by more extensive analysis and discussion by the FAA of the appropriate extent of FAA licensing authority over RLV missions and the interested public is referred to the rulemaking governing financial responsibility for licensed reentry activities for a more comprehensive treatment of the issue.
The NPRM described the need to define the extent of FAA launch licensing authority over launch of an RLV differently from that used to define launch of an ELV. Launch licenses for ELV launches authorize activities beginning upon arrival of a launch vehicle (or a major component) at a U.S. launch site and ending, for purposes of ground operations, once the launch vehicle leaves the ground. In terms of flight activity, launch ends at the point after payload separation when the last action of control over the launch vehicle is exercised by the licensee. For liquid fueled vehicle stages, the last action of control is typically exercised when the vehicle's upper stage is rendered inert or safe from explosive risk. For a solid rocket motor, that point may occur when upper stage fuel is exhausted or the stage is otherwise rendered inert.
The FAA proposed no change with respect to commencement of licensed launch of an RLV from that of an ELV because pre-flight hazards expose the public to risk and must be regulated regardless of the one-time use or reusable nature of the vehicle. However, the FAA pointed out that defining the end of a licensed launch based upon the last act of control over the vehicle would not be appropriate for an RLV because doing so would suggest that launch continues through vehicle reentry and landing. This is an illogical result, in the FAA's view, in light of congressional direction that reentry of an RLV is subject to, and in fact requires, reentry licensing by the agency. Instead, the FAA proposed to use payload deployment as the point at which launch concludes for those RLVs having that as their mission. At the time the NPRM was issued, the FAA considered that in defining the end of launch in this manner it was addressing the vast majority of RLV concepts and launch missions under consideration. Market projections in support of RLV development focused on deployment and replenishment of satellite constellations, chiefly in low Earth orbit. Although this distinction was discussed in the Supplementary Information portion of the NPRM, the proposed definition of the term "launch" that appears in the regulatory text failed, due to an oversight, to include this regulatory distinction between ELV and RLV launches.
Reentry licensing, as proposed in the NPRM, would commence upon initiation of operations necessary to assure reentry readiness and safety, that are uniquely associated with reentry and that are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry. The NPRM addressed the absence of licensing authority over on orbit operation of an RLV but noted that most of the RLV concepts briefed by developers to the FAA would deploy a payload and spend minimal time on orbit in order to minimize risk to the vehicle and to take advantage of rapid turnaround for the next mission. Therefore, for most RLVs under development or contemplation, there would be minimal, or no, on-orbit activity not subject to FAA licensing.
Under the proposed mission approach to RLV licensing, only vehicle flight would be evaluated against the mission risk criterion of Ec <ls-thn-eq> 30 x 10-\6\. Licensed ground operations preceding ascent flight and following reentry landing would not be factored into the Ec analysis. Unlicensed on-orbit operations also would not enter into the equation.
The FAA proposed an application process and structure similar to that traditionally applied to requests for ELV launch licenses, and the section-by-section analysis of the proposed regulatory text explains the purpose and content of each of the reviews performed by the FAA before a license may be issued. Policy and safety reviews and approvals are necessary elements of RLV mission licensing, as well as the satisfactory completion of any required payload review. A payload review may be required for launch and also for reentry of a payload. An environmental review of the impacts associated with proposed operation of an RLV, including activities to be performed at a planned reentry site, is also an element of RLV mission licensing and requirements for conducting the review are described in the NPRM. Where the reentry vehicle is not an RLV, the same kinds of reviews would be required to support a reentry licensing determination; however, the information required of the applicant would be limited to that pertaining to the reentry or descent flight. Rather than reiterating all of the application requirements applicable to reentry flight, the NPRM proposed a new part limited to reentry of a reentry vehicle that is not an RLV. That part refers an applicant for reentry licensing to reentry-related elements of RLV mission licensing requirements and contains additional regulatory requirements that are unique to reentry vehicles other than RLVs.
Public Response to Three-Pronged Public Safety Strategy for RLV and Reentry Safety
Public Response to Three-Pronged Public Safety Strategy for RLV and Reentry Safety
Twenty entities submitted comments to the docket during the 90-day comment period provided by the FAA. Comments were submitted chiefly by developers of RLVs and entities involved in technology development intended for use in reentry concepts. In general, the comments commended the FAA for swift issuance of a clear, yet flexible, regulatory framework in response to a statutory mandate and the growing need for a predictable licensing regime for RLVs.
A number of observations or general themes can be discerned from the comments. Among them is the sense of some RLV developers that the FAA adheres too closely to ELV-based regulations in its proposed approach to mission safety and that aircraft regulation, including the FAA's certification authority, provides a better model for RLVs. This view was espoused by developers of passenger-bearing concepts, in particular. Some suggest commencing FAA licensing of flight test operations under an experimental certification, use of a transport category certification having design criteria and flight test standards for passenger and cargo bearing vehicles, and the equivalent of flightworthiness certification once design reliability has been established. Several comments pointed out the need to begin addressing, through regulations, safety criteria for RLVs that will transport passengers in addition to a payload or cargo and the need for operations and maintenance (O&M) standards that will facilitate re-flight approval. The FAA has already begun examining human factors in space, as previously noted, and is engaged with the RLV working group of the COMSTAC on O&M considerations that may facilitate future rulemaking on these important matters.
Where an RLV incorporates aircraft technology, some comments recommend use of existing Federal Aviation Regulations codified at 14 CFR parts 1-198, either exclusively during subsonic or low supersonic flight, or in combination with FAA licensing under the CSLA. Although the FAA does not intend to impose certification requirements on RLVs for a number of reasons, the agency agrees that aircraft certification may play a role in approving certain vehicle systems for launch. For example, although it is an ELV, the Pegasus launch system which is subject to 14 CFR 1-198 certification requirements contained in the Federal Aviation Regulations referenced above governing operation of the L-1011 aircraft, and FAA licensing of flight operations commencing upon take-off of the L-1011, in accordance with the Commercial Space Transportation Regulations, 14 CFR Ch. III, illustrates how the two regulatory programs may be combined to assure public safety.
Certification suggests design approval based on compliance with standards developed after years of flight history and experience. Given that RLVs are still in conceptual and developmental stages, the FAA considers it premature to impose standards other than those necessary to protect the safety of persons and property on the ground, in airspace or on orbit. With additional knowledge of RLV technology, the FAA may utilize newly granted authority to issue safety approvals for vehicles or safety systems in order to gain the economic benefits and efficiencies of standardizing approvals. A safety approval would signify that a vehicle, when operated within a defined envelope, may be operated in a manner that does not expose the public to unreasonable risk. However, unique characteristics of a mission, such as the proposed launch site, reentry site and trajectories for each flight phase, would have to be examined for impacts on public safety resulting from vehicle flight. The FAA anticipates that several years of experience in licensing RLV missions would be required before it is prepared to issue proposed safety approval standards.
Kistler Aerospace Corporation (Kistler) commented that licensing requirements proposed in the NPRM may be used as a regulatory framework from which the FAA and the applicant would, in essence, negotiate a licensing plan consisting of requirements tailored to the applicant's proposed operations. Documentation, analyses, methodologies and tests, along with a schedule, would be agreed upon by the applicant and the agency, leaving the applicant free to propose an assessment methodology and criteria. This licensing arrangement was identified in the COMSTAC Report on RLVs. Although the FAA does not embrace the notion of binding license negotiation, per se, the agency intends to engage in pre-application consultation with license applicants to accomplish a number of the objectives outlined in Kistler's proposal. For example, elements of a license application would be identified during pre-application consultation to address the unique aspects of a proposed RLV or reentry mission.
The FAA agrees in principle with Space Access's comments suggesting use of an incremental licensing approval plan whereby the FAA would approve or provide formal feedback to an applicant on its submissions. Pre-application consultation is designed to accomplish the objectives outlined in Space Access's comments. It also provides an applicant early indication as to whether a proposed mission is eligible for licensing or poses unreasonable risk that may never be sufficiently mitigated as to warrant safety approval. As detailed more extensively in the section-by-section analysis, a number of different approvals comprise a licensing determination by the FAA, and these may be requested by an applicant in any order. In this manner, an applicant may obtain early indication from the FAA as to whether obstacles to a favorable licensing determination exist because of national security or foreign policy interests of the U.S. Government, safety concerns, or environmental considerations.
In addition, the licensing approach outlined in the NPRM and codified in this final rule would allow an applicant to utilize a methodology of the applicant's choosing as long as it satisfies the performance goals stated in the rule. For example, an acceptable system safety process is one that identifies and assesses the probability and consequences of reasonably foreseeable hazardous events and safety-critical system failures during a mission. The FAA has issued an advisory circular illustrating an acceptable system safety process in addition to an advisory circular on expected casualty calculation. Advisory circulars are available from the FAA and, where applicable to activities licensed under the CSLA, may be obtained by accessing the AST web site at http://ast.faa.gov. An applicant could follow the advisory circular guidance or propose another equivalent methodology. One comment applauded the use of advisory circulars in RLV mission licensing and the flexibility it affords an applicant. Another suggested that the FAA continue to refine them.
Taken together, these elements of the FAA's licensing program afford an applicant great flexibility in seeking a license and optimize opportunities for fashioning an acceptable application.
One comment not incorporated by the FAA in this final rule would require the FAA to license an RLV mission unless the FAA could document reasons to believe the reentry would be unsafe. Shifting the burden in this manner would reduce costs and paperwork burdens for an applicant, as the comment points out. Nevertheless, the FAA maintains that the burden of demonstrating safe operating capability remains on the applicant and makes no change in its licensing procedure on the basis of the comment.
The aircraft analogy previously discussed regarding the L-1011 aircraft used as part of the Pegasus launch system informs comments objecting to FAA's proposed flight phase approach to licensing an RLV mission whereby the FAA would assess ascent and descent flight risk without regulation of on-orbit activity. Vela Technology Development, Inc. (Vela) plans a passenger-bearing vehicle and objected to the FAA's proposed licensing approach. Vela stated that licensing launch and reentry is akin to licensing take-off and landing of an aircraft without regard to en route flight operations. According to Vela, this philosophy is an inappropriate hold-over from ELV-based regulations and that only entry into and operations within controlled airspace require FAA licensing.
Unlike the statutory authority over aircraft granted to the FAA, the CSLA limits FAA licensing jurisdiction to the launch of a launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry vehicle. For this reason, the FAA is unable to abandon the flight phase approach to calculating and regulating mission risk. The FAA's flight phase approach to assessing mission risk is explained in greater detail below. Also summarized in this supplementary information under the heading, "Scope of RLV Mission and Reentry Licensing Under the Final Rule," is the legal basis upon which the FAA has determined that it does not license all RLV operations, wherever conducted.
Vela further commented that only an unpredictable or uncontrolled reentry poses a risk to public safety requiring safety regulation and yet Vela understands that ELV "reentry" is not subject to FAA licensing. The FAA agrees with Vela's comments that suggest an uncontrolled reentry poses certain risk to public safety; however, unless an object has been designed to survive reentry in substantially intact condition, risks to public safety should be non-significant if not negligible and its reentry need not be regulated.\2\ For this reason, the FAA's licensing jurisdiction is limited to reentry of a reentry vehicle. "Reentry," as defined by the CSLA, means to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth. 49 U.S.C. 70102(12). A "reentry vehicle" means a vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, or an RLV likewise designed to return, substantially intact. 49 U.S.C. 70102(13).
In other words, when survivability by design is combined with the purposeful act of reentry, risks to public safety rise to a sufficient level as to warrant regulatory oversight. Most debris is expected to burn up due to heating caused by movement through the atmosphere during descent; however, on occasion, pieces of debris such as the Delta II second stage may survive in deteriorated condition and land on Earth. Although the return to Earth of vehicle debris is not a licensable event under the CSLA, the FAA does consider vehicle staging impacts as part of the mission review for a launch license and their associated risks in assessing financial responsibility requirements when licensing a launch involving vehicle stages that may impact populated areas during a nominal launch or in the event of catastrophic failure and vehicle break-up.
\2\ As noted in the NPRM, risk to public safety from a reentry that is essentially random or otherwise non-nominal would be assessed as part of the licensing process and an applicant would have to demonstrte that reentry will not exceed aceptable risk criteria for the mission. Assessing the risk of non-nominal reentry using mission risk criteria avoids the need for a regulatory requirement that an operator incapacitate its vehicle in the event of an abort to orbit situation. (See 46 FR 19639).
The Experimental Rocket Propulsion Society (ERPS) commented that licensing should be based on vehicle design, not operator intent, so that a vehicle designed to reenter substantially intact would require reentry licensing by the FAA whether or not its operator intended it to reenter. Doing so would avoid potential abuse by vehicle operators, according to ERPS. Presumably, this abuse would be failure to obtain a reentry license claiming lack of intent to reenter. For reasons related to concerns cited by ERPS, the FAA noted in the notice of proposed rulemaking governing financial responsibility requirements for licensed reentry activities that the term "purposefully" in the statutory definition of "reentry" would not necessarily exclude a premature reentry or suborbital activities from reentry licensing coverage merely because reentry occurs through physical forces or ballistically. Designed-in capability and intent to reenter would subject an operator to reentry licensing as long as other statutory thresholds triggering FAA licensing authority are met. (See "Financial Responsibility Requirements for Licensed Reentry Activities;" October 6, 1999, 64 FR 54448-54472, at p. 54454, n.8.)
1. Comments on Mission Risk and Ec Calculation
1. Comments on Mission Risk and Ec Calculation
The NPRM proposed a single, per mission risk criterion of Ec <ls-thn-eq> 30 x 10-\6\ for an RLV mission. The combined risk of RLV flight covered by a license for a single mission, both ascent and descent, would have to satisfy this criterion in order for the FAA to issue a favorable safety approval, a necessary ingredient for an RLV mission license. A general explanation of how casualty expectation is formulated is provided in the NPRM at 64 FR 19634, and an FAA Advisory Circular, AC No. 431.35-1, offers guidance on an acceptable methodology for calculating the expected number of casualties. Although the methodology addresses debris dispersion and its contribution to expected casualty estimation, the NPRM notes that the casualty area of a vehicle used in calculating Ec must also account for casualties related to secondary explosions, hazardous material exposure such as toxic substances, and lateral debris movement following impact.
Under the final rule, acceptable per mission risk for an RLV launch and reentry may not exceed 30 in a million missions or .00003 casualties per mission. The FAA adopts the Federal range standard applied to ELV launches on a per launch basis to ensure risk to the public is maintained at an acceptable level and not increased by virtue of a vehicle's return flight capability. Although licensed activity includes pre-flight ground operations and reentry-readiness operations conducted in space before vehicle descent, only ascent and descent flight during which an instantaneous impact point, or instantaneous impact point (IIP) debris footprint, exists on Earth is considered in calculating expected casualty.\3\ Pre-flight hazards and operations conducted on orbit, whether or not subject to FAA licensing, would not contribute to the expected casualty calculation.
\3\ Existence of an IIP creates risk to public safety inasmuch as it reflects the projected impact point on the surface of the Earth where the vehicle or vehicle debris would land in the event the vehicle fails or breaks up. Generally, the IIP is located ahead of the vehicle because momentum and atmospheric forces cause the vehicle to impact in a downrange location rather than directly underneath the vehicle at the moment of failure or break-up.
Several comments endorsed use of expected casualty in assessing mission risk and the FAA's determination not to allocate, or define, the total risk "budget," applicable to each flight phase. United Space Alliance (USA) disagreed with imposition of a single risk criterion on all RLV mission flights particularly when launch and reentry events are separated by an extended length of time. TGV Rockets, Inc. (TGV) argued that use of the single Ec criterion of .00003 for an RLV mission is too stringent and urged application of an Ec limit of .00003 for launch and another Ec limit of .00003 for reentry.
Kistler opposed use of a casualty expectation criterion stating that it is unjustifiable, too subjective, and would stifle innovation. Instead, Kistler urged the FAA to utilize a more system-oriented approach to RLV licensing focused more upon hardware and engineering. That said, Kistler suggested that a combined risk assessment criterion may be justified for a suborbital RLV because, once created, the instantaneous impact point (IIP) of the vehicle exists continuously, whereas for reentry from orbit, an IIP exists during launch, ceases upon achieving orbit, and is recreated during reentry flight. In support of its position, Kistler notes that attaining orbit suggests that launch resulted in zero risk exposure to the public. Hence, combining launch and reentry risk is a mathematical abstract with no bearing on public safety, according to Kistler. Lang Engineering, Regulatory and Program Support (Lang) stated that casualty expectation should be used as a guiding principle for now but that the FAA should explore use of accepted practices and empirical data that can be used to support a safety demonstration as the regulatory program for RLVs evolves.
The FAA disagrees with Kistler and has determined to retain use of casualty expectation, determined in advance of the conduct of a mission, as a means of limiting RLV mission risk to public safety to an acceptable level. The level of acceptable risk, defined as not exceeding 30 casualties in a million missions or .00003 casualties per mission, has been successful in preserving public safety as evidenced by Federal range history. The final rules do not allocate a risk quota for RLV flight phases but allows an applicant maximum flexibility to design an RLV and operational plan that satisfies the single risk criterion for mission flight. Limiting mission risk, in combination with other elements of the FAA's safety strategy, will foster confidence in RLV operations among the general public as well as ensure that licensing determinations are made in a manner that is consistent with the paramount public safety concerns of the agency.
2. Comments on System Safety Process and Risk Analysis
2. Comments on System Safety Process and Risk Analysis
In the NPRM, the FAA invited public comment on proposed use of a system safety process and risk analysis as part of the FAA's overall public safety strategy for RLV and reentry vehicle licensing. No opposition to use of a system safety process appears in the comments and some affirmatively endorse its benefits. A number of comments expressed appreciation for the flexible approach to system safety outlined in the NPRM and use of an advisory circular to provide guidance on an acceptable methodology. Consistent with remarks made by Kistler at the February 11, 1999 public meeting, the FAA would not require all of the studies listed in the draft interim safety guidance as examples of system safety analyses but would allow industry flexibility to select a system safety process appropriate for its vehicle and concept of operations.
Kelly Space & Technology, Inc. (Kelly) commented that the documentation used for vehicle development should be used to support the system safety process to the maximum extent possible to reduce costs and burdens on the applicant. The FAA agrees and notes that use of a system safety process much like that embodied in 14 CFR 25.1309 for aircraft should not impose an additional regulatory burden on an applicant because it is substantially similar to the engineering analysis a vehicle developer would utilize in assessing vehicle performance for its own developmental purposes.
Kistler and Applied Science & Technology, Inc. (ASTi) objected to a statement in the NPRM Supplementary Information to the effect that a conservative risk assessment is appropriate for a vehicle lacking an adequate flight history and therefore risk analysis must assume one hundred percent probability of failure. Kistler commented that the FAA should define adequacy of flight history based upon experience gained within the system's design envelope, as opposed to statistical analysis of launch history, such that a system that demonstrates integrity in some acceptable portion of its design envelope would qualify as having an adequate flight history.
The FAA responds to Kistler's and ASTi's comments in two parts. First, the FAA does not mandate, without provision for relief from the requirement, that risk analysis assume a one hundred percent probability of a catastrophic failure. Under an alternative noted in the NPRM, an applicant could prepare a detailed risk analysis using traditional system safety methodologies as described in the system safety process advisory circular. Acceptable risk assessment techniques for determining failure conditions include Preliminary Hazards Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis Methodology for Hazard Assessment. Methodologies such as those listed here include failure modes and probability rates affecting risk to public safety and safety of property without necessarily assuming a one hundred percent failure rate.
Under this regulation, an applicant may select any system safety analysis methodology that assesses the probability and consequences of reasonably foreseeable hazardous events and safety-critical system failures that could cause a casualty to the public. It is therefore not a requirement that an applicant's risk analysis assume the probability of a catastrophic failure of 1.0 for purposes of the hazard identification and risk assessment required under the final rule, § 431.35(c). Rather, probabilistic tools may be utilized by an applicant as long as they address nominal and non-nominal vehicle operation during flight. Second, with regard to adequacy of flight history, the FAA is not prepared to define in this regulation the criteria by which a vehicle may be deemed "proven" as opposed to "unproven." \4\ However, the FAA will accept a record of past performance of a safety system under comparable operating circumstances as an indication of reliability and will accept the use of historical reliability data in an applicant's risk assessment.
\4\ A distinction between "unproven" RLVs and all others appears in regulatory text governing operational restrictions.
3. Comments on Operational Restrictions for RLV and Other Reentry Missions
Operational restrictions, particularly those imposed on vehicles without a proven flight safety record, proved to be the most controversial aspect of this rulemaking. ACTA, Inc. (ACTA) commented that the FAA should expect opposition to proposed requirements from the RLV industry because they are inconsistent with RLV operational concepts. The Rotary Rocket Company (Rotary Rocket) stated that the proposed operational restrictions have no factual or analytical basis and are therefore arbitrary. According to Rotary Rocket, vehicle reliability and satisfaction of the expected casualty criterion for a mission are sufficient to limit public risk. Rotary Rocket further stated that the proposed operational restrictions will distort operating concepts and are detrimental to the RLV industry.
3. Comments on Operational Restrictions for RLV and Other Reentry Missions
Comments on each of the four categories of operational restrictions are summarized and addressed below. A. Restricting Flight Over Populated Areas.
Proposed restrictions, but not a ban, on population overflight would apply to all RLV missions and reentries; however, additional restrictions were proposed for unproven vehicles. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that for any RLV mission or reentry, the projected IIP of the vehicle shall not have substantial dwell time over densely populated areas during flight. Seven comments objected to the restriction on any RLV or reentry that the IIP of the vehicle must not have substantial dwell time over a densely populated area. Some comments expressed concern that, unless defined more specifically, the terms "substantial" and "densely" remain vague and ambiguous and will complicate mission planning for operators. Others objected on the basis that this additional requirement is overly restrictive and that remaining within the permissible limits of the expected casualty threshold should be the sole criterion by which the FAA would allow or disallow population overflight because the criterion takes into consideration population density, casualty area and probability of failure. One comment noted that the proposed regulation would place more value on the lives of persons living in densely populated areas since overflight of such areas is limited, whereas overflight of merely populated areas is not so limited. Another comment stated that the FAA should dispense with the restriction arguing that an adequate flight history is sufficient to allow such overflight as long as the vehicle will remain within its demonstrated flight envelope.
For the following reason, in this final rule as in the NPRM, the FAA declines to define the terms in issue using quantitative measures opting instead to apply a qualitative measure on a case-by-case basis. In response to the comments regarding the projected IIP associated with substantial dwell time over densely populated areas, the FAA believes that substantial dwell time applies in a cumulative manner, such that multiple instances of dense population overflight of the IIP during a mission could amount to substantial dwell time. Substantial dwell time is a relative term when applied as a qualitative measure because the consequences of failure early in flight when the IIP passes slowly over a densely populated area are far greater than the consequences would be later in flight just before the vehicle attains orbital velocity. It is the consequences of failure that prompts the FAA to forbid substantial dwell time of the IIP over a densely populated area.\5\ When failure consequences may be too great to be tolerated then population overflight would be barred.
The approach utilized by the FAA in the NPRM and retained in the final rule regarding population overflight by any vehicle resembles that applied to ELV launches from Federal ranges. The IIP of ELVs launched from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station may, for example, fly over portions of Africa for a few seconds. Some population overflight is tolerated in such circumstances because it contributes little to the expected casualty calculation. It is perhaps with that in mind that some comments advocated that the Ec criterion alone should be sufficient to safeguard public safety interests. However, unlike ELVs, RLV trajectories may cover inland areas where population centers may be affected early in flight. For this reason, the FAA considers it necessary to make explicit in the regulations a restriction against dense population overflight when the consequences of failure, regardless of how remote the risk of its occurrence, would be intolerably severe.
\5\ Similarly, § 91.319(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations provides that unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator in special operating limitations, no person may operate an aircraft under an experimental certificate over a densely populated area or in a congested airway. Generally speaking a minimum of 1,000 hours of flight testing would be performed before the FAA would issue a type certification for new aircraft and remove flight restrictions.
The FAA further notes that, unlike aircraft, there is no operational experience with commercial RLVs or reentry vehicles on which to assess actual risk from population overflight of a vehicle's IIP. With experience in RLV regulation and operation, the FAA anticipates that it may re-examine the need for an absolute restriction of this nature.
Restrictions proposed in the NPRM in Sec. § 431.43(d)(1) and (2) on the planned flight trajectory of an unproven vehicle proved even more controversial than those affecting all RLV and reentry vehicle flight. Under the first alternative, flight operations would be limited such that IIP of the vehicle does not have substantial dwell time over a populated area. Under the second alternative, some population overflight would be tolerated as long as the expected average number of casualties to the public would not exceed 30 x 10--6 assuming a vehicle failure at any time the IIP is over a populated area.
The two alternatives are not mutually exclusive. The FAA clarifies in this final rule that in planning a mission an applicant may plan a trajectory that satisfies one restriction during some portion of flight and the other restriction during other portions of flight. Applied in combination, operational restrictions for unproven vehicles will not preclude vehicles from utilizing inland launch and reentry sites as long as the vehicle flight trajectory is carefully planned and controlled to comply with rule requirements.
One commenter asked for clarification as to whether the term "IIP" used in this context refers to an intact vehicle or the debris pattern that would result from vehicle breakup. The FAA intends the term "IIP" to refer to the debris footprint of the vehicle, or casualty area, inclusive of the debris dispersion pattern that would result, depending on the catastrophic failure mode.
In addition to comments seeking more precise definition of the term "substantial" dwell time or proposing quantitative measures, some comments noted that a restriction of this nature unfairly burdens RLVs in favor of ELV technology because unproven ELVs are not held to comparable restrictions. The FAA disagrees. Restrictions on unproven RLVs were developed to ensure that operators of unproven RLVs are granted similar latitude to that afforded ELV operators. ELVs typically are not operated such that there exists substantial dwell time of a vehicle's IIP over any populated area.
As with proven vehicles, the term "substantial" is applied on a case-by-case basis using a qualitative approach to risk assessment. Expected casualty is a function of the probability of a failure event and its consequences. If both the probability of failure and the consequences of vehicle failure are high, then it is reasonable to envision a high expected casualty rate. By reducing either the probability of failure or the consequences of failure, the resulting expected casualty determination is lowered. Because unproven vehicles have an unknown or uncertain failure rate, the FAA considers it reasonable to ensure that risk is most effectively mitigated by controlling the consequences of a failure. The FAA does so by limiting opportunities for high consequence events and therefore retains flexibility to determine on a case-by-case basis whether dwell time over a populated area is too significant to allow because the consequences of a failure would be unacceptably high.
Alternatively, an applicant may assume a vehicle failure while the IIP is over a populated area and obtain approval for flight as long as the Ec threshold of 30 x 10-6 is not exceeded. Rotary Rocket commented that it would be impossible to design a flight trajectory that would satisfy this criterion. In addition, Rotary Rocket protested in its comment that a regulatory authority could conjure up failure scenarios that, in combination, would make it impossible to fly over any populated area. Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin) suggested replacing the absolute probability of failure with a 1/250 probability of failure for RLVs that are substantially aircraft-like.
In contrast, ERPS suggests that the proposed criterion be used during all phases of flight because the allowable population density under the IIP is inversely proportional to the casualty area of the vehicle and the result would be that no RLV would be allowed to fly over a large population center.
The FAA disagrees with comments suggesting that unproven ELVs are unfairly subject to more lenient regulations than tolerated under this rule. As described above, the IIP of ELVs, proven and unproven, are allowed over some populated areas late in flight when the probability of failure and its consequences are relatively low.
The FAA also disagrees with those comments opposed to proposed operational restrictions on unproven vehicles that argue that the restrictions could only be satisfied by the smallest of vehicles launching from coastal sites and reentering to coastal areas. With the restrictions on population overflight by the IIP of an unproven vehicle, an applicant would be able to plan a flight path that allows for overflight of a sparsely populated area early in flight when vehicle failure would not exceed the allowable expected casualty criterion of 30 x 10 -\6\ and overflight of a populated area for a brief period later in flight when the contribution to Ec of failure consequences during that stage of flight are sufficiently small such that the mission Ec does not exceed the mission risk criterion of Ec <ls-thn-eq> 30 x 10-\6\. Also, as pointed out by Space Access, upon firing of retrorockets to deorbit an RLV, the vehicle's IIP is expected to pass rapidly over about half the circumference of the Earth, perhaps passing over populated areas for mere seconds. Population overflight under such circumstances is not likely to contribute significantly to the Ec calculation and is not necessarily prohibited under the final rule.
Unproven vehicles may fail for any number of reasons and aircraft history suggests that some failure-causing events may be unforeseen or unpredicted during risk analysis. Therefore, the FAA determines it prudent to apply conservative operational limits on unproven vehicles in order to limit risk to public safety.
For these reasons, the FAA retains the operational restrictions pertaining to population overflight of the IIP of an unproven vehicle in the final rule with the clarification offered above regarding the combined applicability of the two restrictions. An applicant need not limit itself to one or the other operational restriction for the duration of an RLV or reentry mission. An applicant may plan a flight trajectory for the mission that utilizes both restrictions as long as allowable mission risk (Ec 30 x 10-\6\) is not exceeded. B. Monitoring Critical Systems.
Under the proposed rules, an operator would be required to monitor and verify the status of launch and reentry safety-critical systems both before and during launch flight as well as before initiating reentry flight, and must maintain procedures for doing so. Because the FAA also proposed that reentry flight from orbit could not be initiated without issuance of a command enabling the vehicle's descent to Earth, the ability to monitor safety-critical systems before initiating reentry flight is a necessary component of the FAA's public safety strategy. Monitoring capability would ensure that both launch and reentry flight would be initiated only under nominal conditions or under non-nominal conditions assessed in accordance with the licensee's system safety process and demonstrated to be within acceptable risk criteria. The proposed rules would not require real-time monitoring of data used for other purposes, such as system validation, system reuse or post-flight anomaly investigation. Under the NPRM, an applicant for an RLV mission license would be required to submit procedures for monitoring and verifying the status of safety-critical systems immediately before and during mission operations.
At the February 11, 1999 public meeting, concerns were raised that requiring real-time data may be cost prohibitive or impossible to obtain. In response to industry concerns, the NPRM did not include a requirement that data be obtained in real-time fashion. Rather, some delay in data relay would be acceptable as long as an applicant's procedures are adequate to accomplish the regulatory objective of ensuring reentry flight is initiated only under nominal conditions or non-nominal circumstances evaluated and approved for safety impacts. However, the FAA cautions that, as for ELVs, should data be lost due to an event before it can be recovered, it will be more difficult to address and resolve potential safety issues before the next flight may be conducted.
Some misunderstanding appears in the comments because the terms "launch" and "reentry" by definition include operations other than flight. However, the regulatory text reflecting the requirement to monitor safety-critical systems, proposed § 431.43(a)(4) and (e)(1), refers to the "mission" and to flight, respectively. Under § 431.35(a) of this final rule, the FAA defines the term "mission" for purposes of part 431 to mean licensed flight. For purposes of clarity, the monitoring requirements that appear in § 431.43 of the final rule are modified to reflect mission flight and not pre-or post-flight ground operations.
A number of comments objected to the perceived requirement that the ability to monitor safety-critical systems necessarily means that telemetry must be fed to a manned control center, and the attendant costs of such a requirement. The COMSTAC report also indicates that the FAA should not assume that RLVs will be limited to ground control systems. Prospective operators of piloted RLVs questioned whether monitoring must be performed on the ground or whether crew members on the vehicle could function as data monitors and fulfill the regulatory requirement. The FAA does not specify in the final rule the precise means or the form in which data is received by a vehicle operator in order to remain compliant with the regulations, nor where data must be received. Although telemetry is the typical means of accessing data, particularly for unmanned systems, the FAA would consider acceptable other means of monitoring data that satisfy the regulation.
For example, the crew of an RLV may be an adequate means of monitoring status of safety-critical systems and the applicant's procedures, submitted in accordance with § 431.43(a)(4), must demonstrate that using on board personnel will be adequate to perform the intended purpose of the requirement. However, the crew would also be a safety-critical system inasmuch as their performance would be essential to safe operation and, through the system safety process, an applicant would need to show that risks to public safety are sufficiently mitigated in the event the crew became incapacitated. An applicant's system safety process would address the adequacy of medical qualifications of crew members in the performance of safety-related responsibilities. Advisory guidance offered by the agency, Advisory Circular AC No. 431.35-2, refers to 14 CFR part 67, first-class airman medical certification requirements, in providing guidance on medical qualifications of crew members that, if satisfied, may be relied upon by an applicant as part of its system safety process.
The results of hazard identification and risk assessment analyses would determine whether, and the extent to which, deviations from such medical qualifications would contribute to mission risk, and whether those contributions are acceptable because risk criteria for the mission are not exceeded or are sufficiently mitigated.
One commenter noted that there may exist safety-critical systems whose integrity and performance cannot be monitored when an RLV is on orbit. For example, the vehicle's heat shield may have been impaired or compromised during launch flight or while the vehicle is on orbit. The FAA acknowledges that there are some systems that may be critical to safe reentry flight of an RLV for which it is impossible to gather flight data prior to initiating the descent from orbit to Earth. For those systems, the applicant would seek relief from the requirement, or a waiver, to conduct monitoring of such systems after the RLV has been launched. A grant of relief from the requirement would be conditioned upon a determination by the FAA that public safety is not compromised as a result. For example, if an applicant has performed testing and analysis during development and before launch of an RLV that supports a finding that a system, not otherwise subject to monitoring, is sufficiently reliable then the requirement to monitor that system may be removed or waived.
Another comment questioned the requirement to monitor safety-critical system status "immediately" before enabling reentry flight. The FAA revises this requirement in the final rule to reflect the need for monitoring of such systems, proximate in time to initiation of reentry flight, in order to verify readiness and capability to accomplish safe return to Earth. For some vehicles, data obtained one or perhaps more than one orbit before de-orbit burn is initiated will be sufficient to achieve the regulatory objective of mitigating risk to public safety. C. Positive Enabling of Fail-Safe Reentry
The proposed rules require an operator to issue a command enabling reentry of an RLV from orbit. The rationale provided in the NPRM explains that positive control over reentry flight is necessary to ensure that reentry occurs under the conditions necessary to ensure that risks to public safety do not exceed acceptable levels.
Safety-critical systems must be verified for status and proper configuration, airspace may need to be cleared in the reentry corridor, and vehicle operational constraints must be satisfied, among other things, before reentry flight may be initiated. An applicant would be required to submit procedures as part of an application that ensure conformance with this restriction.
The operational restriction prohibiting a totally autonomous reentry of an RLV from orbit generated numerous comments and objections. Kistler, in particular, objected to requirements that expressly require a person in the loop stating that such requirements would amount to a design, rather than a performance, standard and that autonomous systems should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The FAA disagrees with Kistler's characterization of the requirement. Although positive enabling is required, the FAA does not dictate how enabling would be accomplished.
At the February 11, 1999 public meeting and as reflected in the COMSTAC report, industry representatives argue that on board autonomous systems can be made equally effective and reliable as systems relying on personnel on the ground. The FAA agrees that this may be so and does not intend to preclude or inhibit development of RLVs incorporating innovation in autonomous control. Current ELV functions utilize autonomy in the separation and ignition of upper stages, fairing separation and payload deployment, and for non-nominal situations where human response is inadequate, such as autonomous engine shutdown to avoid imminent catastrophic failure. The FAA supports continued use and development of autonomous systems.
One comment observed that placing a human in the loop creates opportunities for other systems to fail. Even so, the FAA maintains that it is preferable from a safety validation standpoint to assure an opportunity exists to confirm conditions for safe reentry. Kelly suggested that each developer be allowed to propose a reentry initiation approach that ensures public safety while enabling the vehicle developer to capitalize on the unique operational characteristics of the developer's concept of operations. Notwithstanding the benefits of Kelly's proposed approach to ensuring safe reentry, the FAA has great concern over the complexity of autonomous RLV systems and their reaction to a nearly infinite number of system failure combinations that may occur.
The FAA is aware that even with a positive enabling command problems may still occur, particularly if the command is based on poor quality or inaccurate information. For example, a Chinese reentry capsule was commanded to fire its descent motor at the proper time; however, it was in reality pointing about 90 degrees off of its planned attitude. As a result, the vehicle did not reenter but instead went into an orbit from which it decayed about two and a half years later. The FAA's regulatory approach to reentry safety is intended to avoid problems of this nature, to the extent they are foreseeable and predictable.
Lockheed Martin commented that the proposed rule appears contrary to current expendable launch vehicle practice where many critical activities, such as ignition of an upper stage, may be controlled autonomously within the vehicle. In place of the proposed requirement, Lockheed Martin recommended changing the requirement such that a positive command disabling an RLV would be required instead of a positive enabling command. The FAA declines to adopt the recommendation because it would not allow for the positive control that the FAA considers necessary. Lockheed Martin's suggestion would not adequately address a situation where, for example, a communications failure results causing the vehicle to begin reentry without an opportunity to independently check and verify the status of safety-critical systems.
The FAA retains the requirement for positive enabling of reentry flight in the final rule. and does so In the final rule, the FAA imposes a requirement for positive enabling of reentry for public safety assurance purposes in fulfillment of its statutory responsibility for safety. The FAA believes that there must be an opportunity to abort reentry flight and leave an RLV on orbit when conditions for safe reentry cannot be verified. Sole reliance by an operator on an autonomous system would not be sufficient from a public safety standpoint where safe limits on public risk exposure cannot otherwise be assured and public safety could be compromised. The final rule does not prohibit some autonomous operation of an RLV or reentry vehicle. Rather, the FAA requires that an operator verify the status of safety-critical systems prior to enabling the reentry process. Human intervention to issue a command enabling reentry of a vehicle is not limited to initiating de-orbit burn. The reentry process that is enabled may, in fact, be an autonomous one. Human intervention may be accomplished by flight crew, as Pioneer Rocketplane (Pioneer) intends. The FAA envisions that the requirement for a person in the loop to positively enable reentry might possibly be relaxed in the future as RLV performance and flight history develops. By establishing regulatory requirements for human control for functions critical to public safety at this early stage of RLV development, the FAA does not intend to exclude or inhibit development and use of autonomous control systems for RLV nominal flight.
Comments pointed out the corresponding need to assure safe return to Earth of vehicle stages, other than RLVs from orbit, such as an expendable upper stage of a vehicle where a multi-stage vehicle is used. The FAA agrees. Where a vehicle stage operates ballistically as part of an RLV launch system, but is not itself a reentry vehicle, the flight trajectory for launch must be designed such that expected casualty criteria for the mission are not exceeded. Despite Vela's objection, this requirement is not qualitatively different than that applicable to an ELV. Although the de-orbit of an ELV upper stage is not a licensed event, its contribution to expected casualty, historically an extremely small amount, is considered as part of an FAA licensing determination. D. Reentry Sites
To further mitigate risk to public safety, the FAA proposed a size suitability restriction on the landing area designated for an RLV or other reentry vehicle. The size suitability restriction would apply to those areas designated by a license applicant for a vehicle landing under nominal and non-nominal circumstances. It would also be used to determine whether a reentry site operated under an FAA license could be designated by an RLV or reentry vehicle operator as a proposed location for reentry of its vehicle.
The size of the site selected as the landing area would have to be sufficiently large such that the vehicle would land within its boundaries with a .997 probability rate, assuming no major system failure that would make reentry essentially an entirely random event. The NPRM referred to the three-sigma dispersion of a vehicle as the basis upon which to calculate the necessary size of the landing area. The term "three-sigma" refers to three standard deviations from the mean, or average point, assuming a standard normal distribution. Atmospheric, meteorologic and other external conditions assumed in calculating the three-sigma dispersion of a vehicle would become conditions of the authorization granted to reenter at that location. Alternatively, the area designated could be adjusted to accommodate different conditions or variables.
Reference to the three-sigma dispersion of an RLV appears in two provisions of the regulatory text governing launch and reentry of an RLV (§§ 431.35(d)(8) and 431.43(b)(1)). Additionally, a licensed operator of a reentry site would be limited to offering its site for use in support of vehicle reentries for which the three-sigma dispersion footprint of the vehicle would be wholly contained within the site. For an RLV mission license, an applicant would be required as part of the system safety process that includes hazard identification and risk assessment to provide flight trajectory analyses for launch flight through orbital insertion and reentry flight through landing. Flight trajectory analyses must include the three-sigma dispersion of the vehicle.
An applicant for an RLV mission license would also have to designate the area in which its vehicle and any vehicle stage would land under nominal circumstances, and if an applicant relied upon the use of pre-designated contingency abort locations to satisfy acceptable risk criteria for the mission then those locations would also need to be identified. A designated landing location, whether for nominal operations or in the event of reliance by an applicant upon contingency abort capability, would be of suitable size under the proposed restriction if 997 times out of 1,000 attempts, vehicle or vehicle stage landing would be wholly contained within the designated location and if the location is sufficiently large that it would contain all landing impacts, including debris dispersion, any toxic release, and overpressure resulting from an explosion.
The latter requirement means that a location designated to support reentry of an RLV or other reentry vehicle must be far enough away from a populated area such that debris, toxic release, and overpressure effects from an explosion would not jeopardize public safety if splatter or wind effects cause hazardous materials to pass beyond the boundary of the designated location, even though a vehicle's landing point was within its boundary. As an example, for a reentry site that utilizes a runway for vehicles that land horizontally, the three-sigma landing footprint includes the point of touchdown and the vehicle rollout. In all cases, based on the three-sigma footprint, any toxic fumes released from the vehicle after landing, in the case of normal operations (e.g., at end of rollout) or in the event of vehicle failure, should remain within the reentry site as well as any debris or adverse overpressure effects from an explosion.
The supplementary information provided in the NPRM to explain the three-sigma site suitability criterion referred to vehicle maneuverability in defining the area that comprises a designated reentry location. In doing so, the FAA improperly referred to an elliptical contour, rather than a footprint, prompting comments on the accuracy of the .997 probability rate utilized by the FAA. The FAA did not intend to refer to within-track and cross-track error, necessarily a bivariate calculation of the probability of landing accuracy. Rather, the FAA intends to apply a univariate measure of acceptability under which a reentry location may be of suitable size if the vehicle will land within it at a .997 probability rate. Statistically, the three-sigma dispersion limitation means that no more than 3 out of 1000 landings from an RLV reentry would lie outside of the designated location.
Kistler commented that the FAA needs to identify the contributors to the three-sigma dispersion of a vehicle or agree to negotiate them with an applicant. Dispersion factors may vary for different vehicles; therefore, the FAA declines to list them in this regulation. Instead, dispersion factors would be identified by an applicant as part of its hazard identification and risk assessment and evaluated by the FAA through the licensing process. As part of that process, the FAA would determine whether all significant contributors to a vehicle's three-sigma dispersion have been identified.
From the perspective of ensuring aeronautical operations are not jeopardized by RLVs, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) observed that RLV controllability during launch flight is much better than during reentry flight and that vehicle design and technology should accommodate the impacts of meteorological conditions on a vehicle's three-sigma dispersion. The FAA understands that RLVs will be of varying controllability during reentry flight, depending upon the technology employed. RLVs that can be controlled more precisely should exhibit smaller dispersion patterns along their trajectory because of the operator's ability to maneuver them and lessen the effects of perturbing atmospheric forces. Vehicles need not have wings to be maneuverable. A capsule that is a reentry vehicle could act as a lifting body during reentry flight and gain some degree of maneuverability.
AOPA commented and NorthStar Spaceport Corporation (NorthStar) echoed concern that meteorologic forces may affect three-sigma trajectory dispersion. The FAA agrees and notes that other contributors to trajectory dispersion must also be identified as part of an applicant's hazard identification and risk assessment. These may include the duration and angle of de-orbit burn, as well as the accuracy with which dispersion modeling is performed. Variables such as those listed in this paragraph may become part of the conditions under which reentry would be authorized. For example, if vehicle operational characteristics were assessed assuming certain wind conditions, reentry would not be allowed at a time when those conditions did not exist.
Trajectory dispersion modeling for RLVs and other reentry vehicles during nominal and non-nominal flight may also be useful to the FAA in determining appropriate airspace clearances. Comments to the NPRM suggested that use of a reentry corridor or box within which an RLV reenters controlled airspace, and the three-sigma dispersion of a vehicle would assist in defining that area. Vela commented that aircraft-like RLVs that are controlled through reentry flight would require clearance comparable to similar aircraft, whereas a ballistic reentry of a capsule-like vehicle would likely require a larger clearance zone.
Operation of RLVs within the national airspace system is under review by the FAA as the agency develops its concept of operations for an integrated air and space traffic management system. It is beyond the scope of this rulemaking to stipulate how airspace clearances will be designed and implemented by the FAA to accommodate emerging RLV and reentry vehicle traffic.
Kistler expressed concern over the three-sigma dispersion size suitability requirement of a reentry site, as expressed in the draft interim safety guidance, noting the cost of preparing an entire site for vehicle landing. The FAA imposes no requirement that an entire location be leveled or otherwise prepared to "host" the landing of an RLV or other reentry vehicle. The manner in which a landing site is prepared may affect mission success in terms of the ability of a vehicle to withstand landing impacts but is not dictated by the FAA in this rule. The size requirement imposed upon a landing site is determined for the purpose of protecting the public, not the vehicle, from landing effects.
In summary, and in response to AOPA's and Kistler's comments, the FAA's concern with respect to the three-sigma dispersion of an RLV or other reentry vehicle is two-fold. First, the risk of a non-nominal trajectory and the resultant dispersion of a vehicle in the event of failure must be addressed as part of the system safety process employed by an applicant, typically through hazard identification and risk assessment, to ensure that risk to public safety is contained at an acceptable level. Second, risk of an errant, off-site landing must be limited in the interest of public safety. Accordingly, an applicant must designate an appropriate location at which its vehicle will land with a sufficient degree of predictability, established by this final rule as 997 out of 1,000 landing attempts. Size of the location is not the sole determinant of suitability. The consequences of a vehicle landing in a designated location must also be contained within the site or sufficiently removed from public exposure for the site to be suitably located.
As illustrated above, an RLV that lands on a runway touches down in one spot but continues to roll. The area required for continuing roll of the vehicle must be controlled area that does not expose the public to risk or it must be part of the designated location itself. Similarly, a narrow landing location may not be appropriate if toxic fumes released upon landing could be blown outside of the location or a controlled area such that the public is exposed to them. The final rules retain the operational restrictions proposed with respect to suitability of a location designated for an RLV or other reentry vehicle landing, including contingency abort locations in the event a licensee designates one or more such locations as part of its application.
Scope of RLV Mission and Reentry Licensing Under the Final Rule
Scope of RLV Mission and Reentry Licensing Under the Final Rule
The FAA's proposed approach to combining launch and reentry authorization in a single license covering an RLV mission was endorsed by a number of comments. However, the scope of licensed activity, as described in the NPRM, prompted a good deal of discussion in the comments. Many more detailed comments on the appropriate scope of FAA licensing authority were received in response to proposed rules governing reentry financial responsibility. Accordingly, a more complete discussion of RLV launch and reentry licensing coverage appears in the companion rulemaking.
1. Comments on Scope of RLV Launch Authorization.
The NPRM proposed to continue inclusion of pre-flight ground operations beginning with the arrival of a launch vehicle or payload at a U.S. launch site in the definition of launch, as codified at 14 CFR 401.5, for purposes of licensing an RLV mission. USA took issue with the definition of "launch" codified in final rules at 14 CFR 401.5, despite statutory direction that the term "launch" includes activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle and payload for launch, when those activities take place at a launch site in the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70102(3). USA recommended that launch begins when an operator places a vehicle at the launch pad with the intent to launch the vehicle. B-G commented against licensing of pre-flight ground operations before the launch vehicle is loaded with propellants or other hazardous materials because worker safety during the conduct of such operations is otherwise regulated by the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA). Moreover, including such operations as part of a launch would subject them to additional environmental scrutiny, according to B-G. B-G recommended that launch begins when the vehicle is loaded with propellants or other hazardous materials.
Lockheed Martin and NorthStar specifically endorsed inclusion of ground operations, before and after RLV flight, as part of licensed launch activity; however, NorthStar would not be particular about whether post-flight ground operations and vehicle remediation, if any, would be considered part of licensed reentry or the next licensed launch. ERPS similarly viewed pre-flight operations and post-flight operations after an RLV returns to Earth as properly within the FAA's licensing authority; however, maintenance unrelated to a particular flight would not be licensed activity in its view.
In this final rule, the FAA does not intend to redefine the commencement of a licensed launch for purposes of an RLV mission. Pre-flight operations at a launch site are regulated by the FAA as part of launch, consistent with the CSLA definition, because of the risks posed to public safety and the safety of property. For purposes of pre-flight safety and risk, the FAA makes no distinction between an RLV and an ELV launch.
Comments on the definition of launch included a number of recommendations governing the end of launch flight for purposes of FAA licensing jurisdiction. B-G suggested retaining the licensee's last exercise of control over its launch vehicle for a suborbital launch vehicle. For an orbital vehicle, B-G suggested that launch ends when a vehicle is placed in a long-lived orbit, defined as 30 days or more or the last exercise of control, whichever comes first. Vela commented that using the ELV definition of launch is inappropriate for an RLV because an RLV may rely upon autonomous systems, such that the vehicle is no longer under the operator's control although flight continues, and because an RLV would be "launched" when it lands as part of a reentry because it has arrived at the launch site.\6\ ERPS recommends a three-phased approach to an RLV mission consisting of a launch, on orbit and reentry phase. The launch phase would be defined as ending at the conclusion of powered flight, when the vehicle has attained its intended initial orbit, or its intended suborbital trajectory. Under the ERPS definition of launch, payload deployment, the event proposed by the FAA as marking the end of licensed launch of a typical RLV, would be an on-orbit operation not subject to FAA licensing.
\6\ The companion rulemaking governing reentry financial differentiates between vehicle landing at a reentry site and arrival of a launch vehicle at the gate of a launch site for purposes of implementing FAA launch licensing authority.
The FAA disagrees with B-G's and Vela's comments and agrees to some extent with the phased approach suggested by ERPS for an RLV mission. However, as explained in greater detail in the companion rulemaking governing reentry financial responsibility, the FAA explains that the end of an orbital RLV launch is defined at payload deployment for RLVs having payload deployment as a mission objective. For other RLV missions, the launch phase concludes upon completion of one orbit in steady-state condition at the location intended by the licensee.
TGV sought clarification of the definition of the term launch such that it would exclude low energy test flights that remain within the atmosphere below an altitude of 50,000 feet. The FAA will not prejudge whether a flight test requires FAA licensing or may be accomplished under an experimental airworthiness certificate. Such decisions will be made on an individual basis to ensure consistency with FAA statutory authority and direction.
2. Comments on Scope of Reentry Authorization.
The NPRM proposed to define "reentry" to include those on-orbit activities conducted to determine reentry readiness and that are unique to reentry and critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry.
Kistler commented that the definition of reentry is unnecessarily broad and could lead to licensing of all on-orbit activities. Kistler proposes two alternative definitions. The first would define reentry to begin upon creation of an IIP. The second alternative would include checkout for the deorbit maneuver. ERPS commented that for an RLV in low Earth orbit, reentry begins at preparation for retrofire. For other vehicles, reentry begins at preparation for atmospheric interface. Examples of such other vehicles include those on suborbital trajectories that do not require retrofire to reenter, vehicles in geosynchronous orbit for which retrofire occurs hours before atmospheric interface, and vehicles returning from the Moon for which retrofire would occur days before atmospheric interface.
To summarize the FAA's response to comments on the appropriate scope of FAA reentry licensing, the FAA has determined that its licensing authority must cover reentry readiness activities conducted on orbit in order to ensure that the FAA fulfills its public safety mandate. The definition of reenter codified in this final rule includes those activities and the licensing process would be utilized to identify when those activities begin for a particular vehicle or reentry proposal. A more complete discussion of FAA licensing authority over reentry appears in the companion rulemaking governing reentry financial responsibility.
The FAA understands that there are activities conducted on orbit that are part of reentry readiness and would fall within the definition of reentry except that they may also be performed for other mission purposes and are therefore not "unique" to reentry. Accordingly, as explained in greater detail in the companion rulemaking, the FAA modifies the definition of reentry in the final rule to more accurately delimit those activities that may be comprehended by the FAA's licensing authority and has removed reference to "unique" activities.
The FAA requested public comment on the appropriate commencement of licensed reentry when reentry has been delayed by design for an extended duration. For delayed reentry by design, Kelly suggested that reentry begins with initiation of procedures for reentry preparation. The FAA considers that Kelly's suggestion is qualitatively consistent with the definition proposed in the NPRM under which reentry includes activities conducted in space to determine reentry readiness.
Kelly urged that licensed reentry ends when an RLV touches down on Earth. However, the FAA has determined that ground operations performed to secure a vehicle upon its return to Earth would properly be part of licensed activity to ensure that public safety is not jeopardized by an RLV that has landed. Securing a vehicle would include activities performed to ensure that hazardous materials on board the vehicle will not be inadvertently released and expose the public to risk. Propellants may need to be removed from the vehicle and other hazardous or toxic substances must be contained. The definition of the term "reenter" is clarified in the final rule to include post-flight ground operations necessary to render an RLV or other reentry vehicle safe to the public.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Summary of Additional Comments
Section-by-Section Analysis and Summary of Additional Comments
Summarized in this section are comments addressing particular provisions of the proposed rule and additional analysis of some alternatives considered by the FAA in issuing final rules. Additional explanation and clarification of certain provisions of the rule is are also provided. Sections are described and discussed in numerical order; however, nonsubstantive changes in the regulatory text of the final rule are not specifically identified.
Section 400.2 Scope
Section 400.2 Scope
Section 400.2 identifies the scope of regulations presented in 14 CFR Chapter III as commercial space transportation activities subject to 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, chapter 701. As proposed, § 400.2 would exclude "exempted-class rocket activities" from coverage under 14 CFR Chapter III. Reference to "exempted-class" was intended to mean those activities not subject to FAA licensing. Since 1988, activities not subject to FAA licensing under 14 CFR 400.2 have been identified as amateur rocket activities and space activities carried out by the United States Government on behalf of the United States Government. Instead of adding a new term to the regulations, the final rule reverts to the 1988 formulation of activities for which an FAA license is not required.
Section 401.5 Definitions
Section 401.5 Definitions
These following new terms are the same as those introduced in the NPRM in § 401.5. They are "contingency abort," "emergency abort," "flight safety system," "operation of a reentry site," "reenter," "reentry accident," "reentry incident," "reentry operator," "reentry site," "reentry vehicle," "reusable launch vehicle," "safety-critical," and "vehicle safety operations personnel." The term "mishap" is revised to include reentry events.
The NPRM inadvertently failed to make a distinction in the definition of "launch" between the end of ELV flight and RLV flight, although it was described in the supplementary information. In the final rule, the FAA clarifies that for purposes of an ELV launch, flight ends after the licensee's last exercise of control over its launch vehicle. For purposes of an orbital RLV launch, flight ends after deployment of a payload for an RLV having payload deployment as a mission objective. For other orbital RLVs, flight ends upon completion of the first sustained, steady-state orbit, at the intended location of the RLV.
The final rule defines the term "reenter" differently from that proposed. For purposes of clarity, the term defined also includes the noun form, "reentry." "Reenter; reentry" includes activities conducted to determine reentry readiness that are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry flight. However, reentry readiness activities need not be unique to reentry in order to be included as part of a licensed reentry. They must, however, be performed for the express purpose of initiating reentry and must be safety-critical from a public safety perspective to be included as licensed activity. "Reenter; reentry" consists of those on-orbit activities just described, reentry or descent flight and certain ground operations after landing on Earth to ensure a reentry vehicle will not pose a threat to public health and safety and the safety of property. The definition of "reenter; reentry" is clarified to remove reference to activities unique to reentry and include specific reference to post-landing ground operations. The interested public is referred to the comprehensive discussion of activities comprehended by the term "reentry" that appears in the companion rulemaking governing reentry financial responsibility.
"Flight safety system" is a defined term, abbreviated as FSS for ease of reference in the supplementary information portion of the NPRM. The AOPA recommends use of another abbreviation to avoid confusion with "flight service station," a term used in the Federal Aviation Regulations codified at 14 CFR parts 1-198. The FAA makes no change to the final rule on the basis of the comment because no confusion in terminology has been evidenced to date. The FAA will reconsider this terminology if a problem becomes apparent.
"Hazardous materials" is defined to mean those identified as hazardous materials in 49 CFR 172.101. B-G commented that the definition should be limited to hazardous materials under 49 CFR 172.101, as applied to cargo aircraft. 49 CFR 172.101 contains a table of hazardous materials for the purpose of transportation of those materials. Materials are identified by hazard class and the table further references requirements applicable to labeling, packaging, and quantity limits of those materials aboard aircraft. However, any materials listed in the table are considered hazardous for purposes of 14 CFR chapter III and no change is made to the definition in the final rule.
The NPRM defined "operation of a reentry site" in a manner similar to "operation of a launch site." NorthStar suggested removing reference to "safety operations" from both definitions and replacing it with the phrase "licensed operations." The FAA uses the term "safety operations" to denote those activities conducted at a launch or reentry site that may pose a risk to public health and safety and the safety of property and for which licensing is therefore required. Other activities, although conducted at a launch or reentry site, may not require regulatory oversight by the FAA. Reference to "safety operations" is therefore retained in the final rule definitions.
ACTA suggested that the term "safety-critical" in the context of demonstrating acceptable RLV mission risk should be limited to that which has a direct potential effect on public safety. The FAA agrees and has adjusted the definition to clarify that safety-critical means critical to public safety.
Kelly and ERPS proposed additional terms for possible inclusion in § 401.5. Kelly suggested adding a definition of "exempted-class rocket activities." The FAA has removed reference to exempted class rocket activities that appeared in proposed § 400.2 and there is no longer a need to define the term. Kelly also suggested adding definitions for "expectation of casualty" and "impacted landmass." The final rule refers to acceptable risk, which is measured in terms of the expected average number of casualties to the collective members of the public exposed to debris impact hazards. An FAA Advisory Circular, AC No. 431.35-1, provides detailed guidance on how casualty expectation may be calculated for purposes of operating a launch or reentry vehicle. Accordingly, the FAA does not agree that further definition of the term "expectation of casualty" is required. The FAA also does not find a need to define "impacted landmass," as that term appears only in explanatory information and not the regulatory text.
ERPS, Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital Sciences) and Pioneer Rocketplane suggested delimiting where "outer space" begins. The CSLA defines "launch" as "to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and any payload from Earth--(A) in a suborbital trajectory; (B) in Earth orbit in outer space; or (C) otherwise in outer space, * * *" 49 U.S.C. 70102(3). "Reenter" and "reentry" means to return or attempt to return, purposefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to Earth. 49 U.S.C. 70102(10). The reference to "otherwise, in outer space" may include interplanetary missions or travel to the Moon. A suborbitally operated RLV may be regarded solely as launch of a launch vehicle, although for licensing and regulatory purposes the FAA has determined to license suborbital RLVs under the RLV mission licensing regulations in order to ensure a consistent approach to safety issues presented by intact landing of a vehicle designed to survive atmospheric forces. Thus, for purposes of safety regulation and licensing, the difference between an RLV reentry that is conducted suborbitally from one that begins on Earth orbit is a distinction without a difference. As RLVs develop, the FAA would evolve a regulatory program that accommodates deep space exploration and transportation. For the near term, RLV missions chiefly target low Earth orbit and the final rule focuses principally on safety issues posed by such mission. Accordingly, it is not necessary to propose a delimitation of outer space in the final rule.
In a similar vein, NorthStar suggested defining "payload" to mean an object that a person undertakes to place in space, rather than outer space. Although the FAA may agree with the suggestion, the agency retains the current definition of "payload" in the final rule simply to reflect the statutory definition that appears at 49 U.S.C. 70102(8).
Orbital Sciences pointed out that because the definition of "reentry site" refers to reentry vehicles, the landing site of booster stages of an RLV that do not reach Earth orbit are not regulated. The final rule does, in fact, provide criteria for suitable and attainable locations for vehicle staging impacts under § 431.43(b). Therefore, a separate license is not required for a person to offer use of a location at which a vehicle stage may land although the location must satisfy safety and environmental criteria under RLV mission or reentry licensing criteria.
Section 404.1 Scope
Section 404.1 Scope
As in § 400.2 of the final rule, the FAA replaces reference to "launch" with "transportation" in describing the extent of activities to which part 404 applies. Part 404 provides the agency's procedures for issuing implementing regulations.
Section 404.3 Filing of Petitions to the Associate Administrator
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