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Handbook Current Issued 2022 Testing Standards Section 80 pages Copy saved Nov 19, 2026

FAA-H-8083-2A Risk Management Handbook

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FAA-H-8083-2A

Risk Management

Handbook

PAVE identifies hazards Perceive Pilot Aircraft EnVironmental External Pressures

U.S. Department of Transportation CARE identifies which hazards are risks Process Federal Aviation Administration Consequences Alternatives Reality External Pressures

Herform TEAM suggests ways to manage risks Transfer nate Accept Mitigate Flight Ris Assy R22

Hazard Risk Severity Com bsit

Not IFR proficient LOC remote catastrophic serious Alcohol and lack of sleep Fatigue related errors occasional critical serious

carry full fuel for known ice Anticipateuel exhaustion remote catastrophic serious

pertformance Verify Overuct LOC or CFIT Aeronautical (Perceive) P occasiona ccasional critical catastrophic serious high

Decisionow ceilings Making (Perform) (Process)

Risk Management

Handbook

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Flight Standards Service

2022

This handbook is a tool designed to help recognize and manage risk. It provides a higher level of training to the pilot in command (PIC) who wishes to aspire to a greater understanding of the aviation environment and become a better pilot. This handbook is for pilots of all aircraft from weight-shift control (WSC) to a Piper Cub, a Twin Beechcraft, or a Boeing 747. A pilot's continued interest in building skills is paramount for safe flight and can assist in rising above the challenges which pilots of all backgrounds and experience levels face.

Some basic tools are provided in this handbook for developing a competent evaluation of one’s surroundings that allows for assessing risk and thereby managing it in a positive manner. Risk management is applied by identifying, monitoring, and managing potential components that affect risk thereby allowing the pilot to be better prepared to mitigate risk.

The pilot's work requirements vary depending on the phase of flight. As for a driver transitioning from an interstate onto the city streets of New York, the tasks increase significantly during the landing phase, creating greater risk to the pilot and warranting actions that require greater precision and attention. This handbook attempts to bring forward methods that a pilot can use in managing workload, making the environment safer for the pilot and the passengers.

Occasionally, the word “must” or similar language is used where the desired action is deemed critical. The use of such language is not intended to add to, interpret, or relieve a duty imposed by Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). This handbook is available for download, in PDF format, from www.faa.gov.

This handbook is published by the United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Airman Testing Standards Branch, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125.

Comments regarding this publication should be emailed to [email protected].

Preface

Preface

i

According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) statistics, in the last 20 years, approximately 85 percent of aviation accidents have been caused by “pilot error. Many of these accidents are the result of the tendency to focus flight training on the physical aspects of flying the aircraft by teaching the student pilot enough aeronautical knowledge and skill to pass the written and practical tests. In this scenario, risk management is ignored, which can potentially lead to fatal results. The certificated flight instructor (CFI) who integrates risk management into flight training teaches aspiring pilots how to proactively identify safety-related hazards pertaining to the flight and mitigating the associated risks of the identified hazards. A key element of risk decision-making is determining if the risk is justified. The risks involved with flying are quite different from those experienced in daily activities. Managing these risks requires a conscious effort and established standards (or a maximum risk threshold).

Pilots who practice effective risk management have predetermined personal minimums and have formed habit patterns and checklists to incorporate them. If the procedures and techniques described in this handbook are taught and employed, pilots will have tools to identify potential hazards of a flight and successfully mitigate the risks associated with the identified hazards. The goal is to reduce the general aviation accident rate involving poor risk management. Pilots who make a habit of using risk management tools will find their flights considerably more enjoyable and less stressful for themselves and their passengers. In addition, some aircraft insurance companies reduce insurance rates after a pilot completes a formal risk management course. This Risk Management Handbook makes available recommended tools for identifying hazards and assessing risk in order to conduct the safest flight possible with the least amount of risk. The appendices at the end of this handbook contain checklists and scenarios to aid in risk management consideration, flight planning, and training.

Introduction

Introduction

ii

• This version of the handbook reorganizes risk management concepts in a sequence that pilots use in real world flying.

• Chapter 1 explains the difference between risk management exercised by pilots versus a global corporate risk management system, defines the role of the FAA and NTSB, and acknowledges limits in which regulatory compliance can influence safety. This leads to the discussion of personal minimums.

• The discussion of personal minimums moved from chapter 8 to chapter 2 and is now the subject of that chapter. Since the handbook cites personal minimums throughout, the initial presentation of this concept comes earlier.

• Chapter 2 also briefly discusses the FAA’s WINGS program and has a video link that explains the advantages.

• Several FAASTeam video links are included throughout the book, which explain and summarize the concepts presented.

• A unified scenario in chapters 3, 4, and 5 shows how to apply risk management concepts before flight begins and explains and demonstrates the use of a flight risk assessment tool (FRAT) in combination with the PAVE checklist.

• The discussion of identification of hazards, risk analysis, and risk mitigation has been separated into three chapters (instead of two) to clarify each step and preserve the difference between hazard and risk.

• The chapter on hazard identification (chapter 3) discusses pilot attitudes and that discussion continues throughout the book, where relevant.

• Chapter 6 begins the discussion of risk as pilots encounter it during actual flying, in terms of threat and error management, with detailed definitions and examples, and an explanation of defenses.

• Chapter 7 takes a classic look at what automation is and does, and how pilots should anticipate, act, and verify when using automation. The chapter also includes discussion of flight path management.

• Chapter 8 specifically describes ADM training. This chapter focuses on the 3P risk analysis system while in flight and moves more complex models to the appendices. This chapter also contains a real example of naturalistic decisionmaking and addresses CRM and SRM in more detail.

• The appendices describe and analyze accident scenarios and some provide for the reader to make an analysis.

• The appendices contain instructions for how readers may use them for maximum benefit.

• Specific descriptions of makes and models were removed since a generic description broadens the applicability of concepts presented throughout the book.

Major Enhancements

Major Enhancements

iii

Table of Contents

Preface … i

Introduction … ii

Major Enhancements … iii

Chapter 1: Introduction to Risk Management

Introduction … 1-1 Safety Management Systems in Aviation … 1-1 Accident Causality & Responsibility … 1-1 Risk Management Analysis Using the PAVE Checklist … 1-2 Chapter Summary … 1-3

Chapter 2: Personal Minimums

Introduction … 2-1 Personal Minimums … 2-1

Step 1—Review Weather Flight Categories … 2-1 Step 2—Assess Experience and Comfort Level … 2-1 Step 3—Consider Other Conditions … 2-3 Step 4—Assemble and Evaluate … 2-4 Step 5—Adjust for Specific Conditions … 2-5 Step 6—Stick to the Plan … 2-5 Using the FAA WINGS Program for Risk Mitigation & Safety … 2-5 Chapter Summary … 2-6

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks

Introduction … 3-1

Hazard Exposure … 3-1 Why Hazards Result in Aviation Accidents … 3-1

Understanding the Risks Posed by Hazards … 3-2 Leading Accident Causes … 3-3

Identifying Hazards … 3-4 Using the PAVE Checklist to Identify Hazards … 3-4

Pilot Hazards … 3-4

Aeromedical … 3-5 Aircraft Hazards … 3-6

Performance … 3-6 Equipage … 3-6 Environmental Hazards … 3-7

Weather … 3-7 Terrain … 3-7 Facilities … 3-7 Airspace, Air Traffic Control, and Other Aircraft … 3-8 Night Operations … 3-8 External Pressure Hazards … 3-8 Hazard Combinations … 3-8 Hazards and Associated Risks … 3-9

Using a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT) … 3-10

Numerical FRATs … 3-10 Narrative FRATs … 3-11 Case Study … 3-11

Background and Setting … 3-11 Data … 3-13

Pilot and Passengers … 3-13

iv

Aircraft … 3-13 Environment … 3-14 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis … 3-14

Pilot … 3-14 Aircraft … 3-14 Environment … 3-15 External Pressures … 3-15 Chapter Summary … 3-15

Chapter 4: Assessing Risk

Introduction … 4-1

Risk Assessment Components … 4-1

Risk Likelihood … 4-1 Risk Severity … 4-1 Using a Risk Assessment Matrix … 4-2

Matrix Errors … 4-2

Accuracy … 4-2 Skewing … 4-2 Obsolescence … 4-2 Case Study … 4-3

Risk Assessment Analysis … 4-3

Pilot … 4-3 Aircraft … 4-3 Environment … 4-3 Chapter Summary … 4-5

Chapter 5: Mitigating Risk

Introduction … 5-1 Preflight Risk Mitigation Strategies … 5-1

Mitigating Pilot Risks … 5-1 Mitigating Aircraft Risks … 5-1 Mitigating Environmental Risks … 5-2

Circumnavigate the Hazard … 5-2 Go Above or Below the Hazard … 5-2 Change Departure Time or Date … 5-2 Cancel the Flight … 5-2 Mitigating External Pressure Risks … 5-2

Local Versus Transportation Flights … 5-2 Personal Versus Business Flights … 5-2 Case Study … 5-2

Risk Mitigation Analysis … 5-2 Balanced Approach to Risk Management … 5-4 Chapter Summary … 5-5

Chapter 6: Threat and Error Management

Introduction … 6-1 Threats … 6-1 What is an Error? … 6-1

Causes of Errors … 6-1

Insufficient Training & Experience … 6-1 Inadequate Flight Planning or Preparation … 6-2 Physiological Effects … 6-2 Psychological Effects … 6-2 What is an Undesired Aircraft State? … 6-3 Defenses against Threats, Errors, and Undesired Aircraft States … 6-3

Defenses Provided to the Pilot or Crew … 6-3

Checklists, Standard Operating Procedures, and Best Practices … 6-3 Utilizing a Second Pilot or Person … 6-3

v

External Resources … 6-3 Defenses Provided by the Pilot or Crew … 6-4

Clear Communication and Briefings … 6-4 Effective Situational Awareness … 6-4 Planning for What Comes Next … 6-4 Time Management … 6-4 Teamwork … 6-4 Automation Management … 6-4 Flying Skills (The Last Resort) … 6-4 Chapter Summary … 6-5

Chapter 7: Automation & Flight Path Management

Introduction … 7-1 Reliance on Automation … 7-2 Balancing Automated & Manual Flight … 7-2 Interacting with Automation … 7-2 Failure to Anticipate, Act, & Verify … 7-3 Integrated Flight Path Automation Systems … 7-3 Chapter Summary … 7-4

Chapter 8: Aeronautical Decision-Making in Flight

Introduction … 8-1 ADM Background … 8-1 Analytical Decision-Making … 8-1 Naturalistic Decision-Making … 8-3 Single-Pilot Resource Management … 8-3 Chapter Summary … 8-4

Appendix Introduction

Scope … AI-1 How to Use … AI-1 Using Appendices as a Workbook … AI-1

Appendix A: Risk Management Training

Integrating Risk Management Training and Other Training Requirements … A-1

Appendix B: Risk Management Tools

Risk Assessment Tools Identifying, Assessing, & Mitigating Risk … B-1

Risk Identification Tools … B-1 Additional Risk Assessment Tools … B-3

Risk Mitigation Tools … B-3

Appendix C: Accident Case Studies

General Information … C-1 Accident Profile 1: Fatal Accident in a Single-Engine Airplane with a Piston Engine … C-1

NTSB Probable Cause … C-1 NTSB Factual Summary Excerpts (edited) … C-1 Risk Identification, Assessment, and Mitigation … C-1 Accident Profile 2: Fatal Accident, Turboprop-Powered, Transportation … C-2

NTSB Probable Cause … C-2 NTSB Factual Summary Excerpts (edited) … C-2 Risk Identification, Assessment, and Mitigation … C-3 Accident Profile 3: Fatal Accident, Helicopter, Personal Flight … C-3

NTSB Probable Cause … C-3 NTSB Factual Summary Excerpts (edited) … C-3 Risk Identification, Assessment, and Mitigation … C-4 Accident Profile 4: Fatal Turbojet-Powered Airplane Accident … C-4

NTSB Probable Cause … C-4 NTSB Factual Summary Excerpts (edited) … C-4

vi

Risk Identification, Assessment, and Mitigation … C-4

Appendix D: Risk Management Exercises

Four Scenarios … D-1

Scenario 1: Recreational Aviation … D-1 Scenario 2: Turboprop-Powered, Personal Transportation … D-2 Scenario 3: Turbine Helicopter … D-2 Scenario 4: Turbojet-Powered Airplane … D-3

Glossary … G-1

Index … I-1

vii

Introduction 11765 Pilots experience the joy of taking an aircraft and passengers on flights that are visually pleasing and productive. However, most pilots also know people who have had accidents or died while flying. 20849 By following the principles discussed in this handbook, pilots can: 20851 • Make safety of flight their top priority. 20852 • Fly with confidence. 20850 • Enjoy each trip to the fullest extent possible.

Safety Management Systems in Aviation 11772 This Risk Management Handbook focuses on the individual and not on safety management systems (SMS). SMS addresses risk management from an organizational perspective as an ongoing activity. Interested persons may obtain information about SMS here.

Accident Causality & Responsibility 11777 Both the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigate aviation accidents. The NTSB determines the probable cause(s) of accidents and makes recommendations, while the FAA determines if accidents reveal deficiencies in pilot training, aircraft certification, air traffic control, or other areas of FAA responsibility. During accident investigations, the two government entities usually receive assistance from other interested parties, such as aircraft manufacturers and operators. 20854 A review of the following accident report illustrates the role of the NTSB. The sidebar in Figure 1-1 is an excerpt from an NTSB final report of a fatal accident involving a single-engine airplane with a reciprocating engine. 11778

Figure 1-1. Sample NTSB final report.

11782 Key findings of the NTSB aviation accident final report, highlighted above in yellow, emphasize the pilot's inadequate in-flight planning/decision to continue flight into known adverse weather conditions after the engine’s dry air vacuum pump failed and

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Chapter 1: Introduction to Risk Management › Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction to Risk Management

the pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during approach. The NTSB report, available here, also contains information about this pilot’s decision-making and risk management.

11779 Many incidents and accidents occur as a result of poor risk management. The following accident review illustrates the importance of risk-based decision-making, as a means to prevent a negative outcome.

Chapter 1: Introduction to Risk Management › Risk Management Analysis Using the PAVE Checklist

Risk Management Analysis Using the PAVE Checklist 11780 The accident described above contains risk factors included in the PAVE checklist. As shown in Figure 1-2, the acronym “PAVE” represents hazards that relate to the pilot, the aircraft, the environment, and external pressures. The sample analysis below describes how PAVE items may relate to the accident.

A pilot must continually make decisions about competency, condition of health, mental and emotional state, level of fatigue, and many other variables. For example, a pilot may be called early in the morning to make a long flight. If a pilot has had only a few hours of sleep and is concerned that the sinus congestion being experienced could be the onset of a cold, it would be prudent to consider if the flight could be accomplished safely.

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A pilot had only 4 hours of sleep the night before being asked by the boss to fly to a meeting in a city 750 miles away. The reported weather was marginal and not expected to improve. After assessing fitness as a pilot, it was decided that it would not be wise to make the flight. The boss was initially unhappy, but was later convinced by the pilot that the risks involved were unacceptable.

Pilot

The environment encompasses many elements that are not pilot or airplane related, including such factors as weather, air traffic control (ATC), navigational aids (NAVAIDS), terrain, takeoff and landing areas, and surrounding obstacles. Weather is one element that can change drastically over time and distance.

A pilot was landing a small airplane just after a heavy jet had departed a parallel runway. The pilot assumed that wake turbulence would not be a problem since landings had been performed under similar circumstances. Due to a combination of prevailing winds and wake turbulence from the heavy jet drifting across the landing runway, the airplane made a hard landing. The pilot made an error when assessing the flight environment.

Environment

A pilot frequently bases decisions on evaluation of the airplane, such as performance, equipment, or airworthiness.

During a preflight, a pilot noticed a small amount of oil dripping from the bottom of the cowling. Although the quantity of oil seemed insignificant at the time, the pilot decided to delay the takeoff and have a mechanic check the source of the oil. The pilot’s good judgment was confirmed when the mechanic found that one of the oil cooler hose fittings was loose.

Aircraft

The interaction between the pilot, airplane, and the environment is greatly influenced by the purpose of each flight operation. The pilot must evaluate the three previous areas to decide on the desirability of undertaking or continuing the flight as planned. It is worth asking why the flight is being made, how critical it is to maintain the schedule, and if the trip is worth the risks.

On a ferry flight to deliver an airplane from the factory, the pilot calculated the groundspeed and determined he would arrive at the destination with only 10 minutes of fuel remaining. A check of the weather revealed he would be flying into marginal weather conditions. By asking himself whether it was more critical to maintain the schedule or to arrive with an intact aircraft, the pilot decided to schedule a refuel stop even though it would mean he would not be able to keep to the schedule. He chose not to “stretch” the fuel supply in marginal weather conditions which could have resulted in an emergency landing.

External Pressures

Figure 1-2. The PAVE checklist.

12855 The pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that the vacuum pump failed while in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). As a result, the attitude indicator and directional gyro became inoperative. Rather than divert to an airport while in VMC, the pilot decided to continue toward the destination and into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). This elevated the risks associated with an “A” hazard because of the inoperative instruments and a “V” hazard because of the IMC. After the vacuum

pump failure, the pilot communicated with ATC that IMC would not be a problem, which may indicate a hazardous attitude or “P” hazard. It is unknown if an external pressure or “E” hazard factored in the pilot’s apparent desire to get to the destination. 20855 In this case, the pilot had the opportunity to change the outcome of the flight by diverting to an airport while still in VMC. Several reasons explain why pilots do not make appropriate decisions. Pilot error often results from an over-estimate of capability, a lack of preparation for flight, or a failure to prioritize safety. Varying levels of risk tolerance, or even intentional disregard of risk, may be a factor. 11784 Risk management training includes a variety of measures that change the way pilots perceive and deal with hazards both before and during a flight. This handbook will emphasize using risk management as a process to avoid situations and decisions that might lead to an aircraft accident.

Chapter 1: Introduction to Risk Management › Chapter Summary

Chapter Summary 11780 Poor risk management is a cause of many accidents. Accordingly, pilots should emphasize risk management in all types of operations, from recreational flying to using aircraft for business.

Introduction 11815 Federal regulations that apply to aviation do not cover every situation nor do they guarantee safety. For example, a pilot may legally fly in marginal VFR conditions at night even though low visibility and night hazards increase the risk for an incident or accident. Therefore, pilots should consider non-mandatory self-regulation in the form of personal minimums.

Personal Minimums 12391 Pilots who understand the difference between what is “smart” or “safe” based on pilot experience and proficiency establish personal minimums that are more restrictive than the regulatory requirements. The following six steps allow pilots to establish a set of personal minimums in order to reduce risk and fly with greater confidence.

Step 1—Review Weather Flight Categories 12392 Establishing personal minimums normally begins with weather, and pilots should know the range of ceiling and visibility that defines each category. [Figure 2-1] 12393

Visual Flight Rules

VFR

Marginal Visual Flight Rules

MVFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IFR

Low Instrument Flight Rules

LIFR

Category Ceiling Visibility

and/or

and/or

and/or

and Greater than 3,000 feet AGL

1,000 to 3,000 feet AGL

500 to below 1,000 feet AGL

below 500 feet AGL

Greater than 5 miles

3 to 5 miles

1 mile to less than 3 miles

less than 1 mile

Figure 2-1. Weather category values for ceiling and visibility.

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Step 2—Assess Experience and Comfort Level 12394 Pilots should also take a few minutes to complete the certification, training, and experience summary in Figure 2-2 by filling in the right column. Some pilots fly different aircraft categories and classes and may develop different personal minimums based on the specific aircraft flown. For example, many pilots will have a different set of personal minimums when flying a single-engine airplane versus a multiengine airplane. Depending on pilot experience, the minimums in a multiengine airplane could be higher than the single-engine airplane minimums. Pilots may use the information entered in Figure 2-2 to set personal minimums for a variety of situations using tables in Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4, and Figure 2-5.

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Personal Minimums › Step 2—Assess Experience and Comfort Level

Chapter 2: Personal Minimums

12396

Certificate level (e.g., private, commercial, ATP)

Ratings (e.g., instrument, multiengine)

Endorsements (e.g., complex, high performance, high altitude)

Total flying time

Years of flying experience

Flight review (e.g., certificate, rating, wings)

Instrument Proficiency Check

Time since checkout in aircraft 1

Time since checkout in aircraft 2

Time since checkout in aircraft 3

Variation in equipment (e.g., GPS navigators, autopilot)

Hours

Hours in this aircraft (or identical model)

Landings

Night hours

Night landings

Hours flown in high density altitude

Hours flown in mountainous terrain

Crosswind landings

IFR hours

IMC hours (actual conditions)

Approaches (actual or simulated)

Experience

Recent Experience (last 12 months)

Training Summary

Certification Level

Certification, Training, and Experience Summary

Figure 2-2. Certification, training, and experience summary.

12397 The tables in Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4, and Figure 2-5 layout a sample assessment. Figure 2-3 shows how entries might look in the Experience & Comfort Level Assessment VFR & MVFR table. Suppose a pilot’s flying takes place in a part of the country where clear skies and visibilities of 30 miles or more are normal. The entry might specify the lowest VFR ceiling as 7,000 feet, and the lowest visibility as 15 miles. A pilot may never experience MVFR conditions and would leave the dash in place. However, in this example and as shown in Figure 2-3, the pilot regularly flies in an area where normal summer flying involves hazy conditions over relatively flat terrain and is more experienced and comfortable in MVFR. The pilot used the MVFR column to record personal minimums of a 2,500-foot ceiling and 4 miles visibility for daytime operations. 12399 For night flight, a ceiling under 3,000 feet or visibility less than 5 miles may create an unnecessary risk, so the pilot decided to record a 5,000-foot ceiling and 8 miles visibility in the VFR column.

12401

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Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment

VFR & MVFR

Weather Condition

Ceiling

Day Night

Visibility

Day Night

VFR

> 3,000 — 5,000

> 5 miles — 8 miles

MVFR

1,000–3,000 2,500 —

3–5 miles 4 miles —

Figure 2-3. A sample pilot experience and comfort level assessment for VFR and MVFR.

12400 For IFR, Figure 2-4 shows how a pilot recorded the lowest IFR conditions recently and regularly experienced. Although a pilot may have successfully flown in low IFR (LIFR) conditions, it does not mean the pilot was “comfortable” in these conditions. In this example, the pilot did not fill in the LIFR boxes for known “comfort level” in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) after deciding to avoid flight in those conditions. 12402 Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment

IFR & LIFR

Weather Condition

Ceiling

Day Night

Visibility

Day Night

IFR

500–999 800 999

1–3 miles 1 mile 3 miles

LIFR

< 500

— —

< 1 mile

— —

Figure 2-4. A sample pilot experience and comfort level assessment for IFR and LIFR.

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12403 If combined into a single table, the summary of a pilot’s known “comfort level” for VFR, MVFR, IFR, and LIFR weather conditions might appear as shown in Figure 2-5. 12404 Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment

Combined VFR & IFR

Weather Condition

Ceiling

Day Night

Visibility

Day Night

VFR MVFR IFR LIFR

2,500 5,000

4 miles 8 miles

800 999

1 mile 3 miles

Figure 2-5. Experience and comfort level assessment for combined VFR and IFR.

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Personal Minimums › Step 3—Consider Other Conditions

Step 3—Consider Other Conditions 12405 Pilots should also have personal minimums for wind and turbulence and record the most challenging wind conditions comfortably experienced during the last six to twelve months. As shown in Figure 2-6, a pilot may record these values for category and class, or for a specific aircraft.

12406

Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment

Wind & Turbulence

Surface wind speed Surface wind gusts Crosswind component

Turbulence

15 knots 8 knots 7

10 knots 5 knots 7

SE ME Make/ Model

Figure 2-6. A sample pilot experience and comfort level assessment for wind and turbulence.

12407 In addition to winds, “comfort level” inventory should also include factors related to aircraft performance. Completing the table with reference to the aircraft type and terrain typical for most flying [Figure 2-7] will establish a safety buffer. If the pilot has never operated an airplane from a runway shorter than 5,000 feet, the shortest runway box should say 5,000 feet. 12408

Experience and “Comfort Level” Assessment

Performance Factors

Shortest runway Highest terrain Highest density altitude

Performance

4,500 3,000 3,000

2,500 6,000 3,000

SE ME Make/ Model

Figure 2-7. Sample experience and comfort level assessment for performance factors.

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Personal Minimums › Step 4—Assemble and Evaluate

Step 4—Assemble and Evaluate 12409 Combining all these numbers results in a baseline personal minimums table as shown in Figure 2-8.

12410

Baseline Personal Minimums

Weather Condition

Ceiling

Day Night

Visibility

Day Night

VFR MVFR IFR LIFR

2,500 5,000

4 miles 8 miles

800 999

1 mile 3 miles

Surface wind speed Surface wind gusts Crosswind component

Turbulence

SE ME Make/ Model

15 knots 8 knots 7

10 knots 5 knots 7

Shortest runway Highest terrain Highest density altitude

Performance

SE ME Make/ Model

4,500 3,000 3,000

2,500 6,000 3,000

Figure 2-8. Sample baseline personal minimums.

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Personal Minimums › Step 5—Adjust for Specific Conditions

Step 5—Adjust for Specific Conditions 12411 Any flight a pilot makes involves an infinite combination of pilot skill, experience, conditions, and proficiency. Aircraft equipment and performance, environmental conditions, and external influences vary considerably. Both individually and in combination, these factors can compress or expand the safety buffer provided by baseline personal minimums. Consequently, a pilot should develop a practical way to adjust baseline personal minimums to accommodate specific conditions or aircraft. 12412 Note that the example situations and additional safety margins [Figure 2-9] only provide a starting point. Pilots may develop their own adjustment factors based on experience, aircraft capabilities, and operation. If flying experience is limited or infrequent, the adjustment magnitude could increase. If multiple special conditions apply, a pilot could make an adjustment for each factor. For example, suppose a pilot plans a night cross-country flight to an unfamiliar airport, departing after a full workday. The table in Figure 2-9 suggests raising baseline personal minimums by adding 1,000 feet to the ceiling value, one mile to visibility, and 1,000 feet to required runway length. 12413

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Pilot

Aircraft

enVironment

External Pressures

Illness, use of medication, stress, or fatigue; lack of currency (e.g., have not flown for several weeks)

An unfamiliar airplane or an aircraft with unfamiliar avionics or other equipment

Unfamiliar airports and airspace; different terrain or other unfamiliar characteristics

“Must meet” deadlines, pressures from passengers, etc.

If you are facing Adjust baseline personal minimums by

Adding at least 500 feet to ceiling

Adding at least 1/2 mile to visibility

Adding at least 500 feet to runway length

Subtracting at least 5 knots from winds

Figure 2-9. Examples of additional safety margins from baseline personal minimums.

12414 Here are several important cautions regarding personal minimums. The pilot should: 12415 1. Not adjust personal minimums to complete a specific flight. The time to consider adjustments is not while under pressure to fly, but rather when time and objectivity permits an honest self-analysis about skill, performance, and comfort level during the last few flights. 12416 2. Make adjustments to one variable at a time. For example, if the goal is to lower baseline personal minimums for visibility; the ceiling, wind, or other values should not change at the same time. 20842 3. Seek training and consult with a flight instructor before making a significant adjustment to personal minimums.

Personal Minimums › Step 6—Stick to the Plan

Step 6—Stick to the Plan 12417 As many pilots know, adhering to personal minimums sometimes creates an ethical dilemma, especially when pressures exist to make a flight. Professional pilots live by the numbers, and so should general aviation pilots. Established personal minimums enable the pilot to make a no-go or divert decision rather than departing with a sense of unease regarding the outcome of a flight. In addition, a written set of personal minimums can also make it easier to explain tough decisions to passengers who depend on the pilot’s judgment.

Chapter 2: Personal Minimums › Using the FAA WINGS Program for Risk Mitigation & Safety

Using the FAA WINGS Program for Risk Mitigation & Safety 20856 The FAA maintains a safety program that provides courses on a variety of topics as a means to enhance safety. The WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program is based on the premise that pilots who maintain currency and proficiency will enjoy a safer and more stress-free flying experience. As an added bonus, completion of a phase of the WINGS Program can count for a flight review and participants may receive a discount on certain flight insurance policies. Pilots may create an account and watch a WINGS video using the following links: 12856 • FAA WINGS Program

20871 • WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program Video

Chapter 2: Personal Minimums › Chapter Summary

Chapter Summary 12418 Many GA pilots have freedom to choose when and where they fly. However, this freedom may also lead pilots to situations where lack of proficiency and equipment capability become a factor. Responsible pilots set personal minimums to help reduce the probability of experiencing an encounter that could lead to an incident or accident. 12419 A copy of the charts used in this chapter can be found in Appendix B, Risk Assessment Tools. Pilots are encouraged to copy and use the charts in the appendix or use comparable tools on an electronic flight bag (EFB) before each flight.

Introduction 11788 The words “hazard” and “risk” seem simple, but these words are easily confused. 14 CFR part 5, section 5.5 defines these two terms as follows: 11789 • Hazard – a condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR part 830, section 830.2. 11790 • Risk – the composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard. 14611 Simply put, a hazard is a condition that could cause an accident. The probability and predicted severity of the consequences that may result from any hazard is the risk. Identifying, analyzing, and responding appropriately to hazards decreases the risks and increases the margin of safety.

Hazard Exposure 11787 The example of a person crossing a street helps explain the relationship between hazard and risk. The traffic is always a hazard, but it does not usually create a significant risk for a pedestrian until the actual street crossing takes place. 11793 Some people may lack the experience needed to understand the hazards and risks associated with crossing a busy street and need to learn the procedures used to cross streets safely. In a similar way, pilots need to identify aviation hazards and associated risks and learn to deal with them appropriately. However, when assuming pilot-in-command duties, pilots encounter a variety of hazards, and they may not recognize the potential for an accident in a given situation. Pilots need the ability to perceive relevant hazards, understand and analyze potential consequences, and exercise judgment when responding to any hazard.

Why Hazards Result in Aviation Accidents 14612 Pilots learn to recognize hazards during ground and flight training. While instructors normally include the learner in the decisionmaking process, training does not teach the learner how to manage every hazard. A saying goes that new pilots have a cup of luck and an empty cup of experience, and they should fill the cup of experience before their cup of luck runs out. However, all pilots should understand that any situation involving a hazard may present a significant risk to their safety. Rather than relying on luck, the correct response to a given hazard often depends on many variables and calls for a disciplined analysis and response. The following case studies illustrate this point. 14613 A pilot with approximately 233 hours of total time rented an unfamiliar airplane for a round-trip VFR cross-country flight. The pilot had about 2.6 hours of time in the specific make and model.

The NTSB narrative indicates the following: 14614 According to the operator of the airplane, the pilot had difficulty starting the engine prior to departing for Erie International/Tom Ridge Field (KERI), and requested assistance. The operator proceeded out to the airplane, and showed the pilot how to start the engine. The operator then suggested the pilot leave Erie with enough time to return to Waterbury-Oxford Airport (KOXC) before sunset. Later in the day, the pilot called the operator and informed him that the airplane operated fine on the flight to Erie, and he would be back at Waterbury-Oxford by 19:00. 14615 The pilot actually departed Erie at night. There was a fatal crash and the NTSB probable cause states: 14616 The loss of partial engine power for undetermined reasons, and the pilot’s loss of control after performing an evasive maneuver to avoid trees during a forced landing at night. Factors related to the accident were a rough running engine and the pilots inability to see the trees due to the nighttime conditions. The NTSB accident details are available here.

14618 While not common, even professionally trained pilots sometimes fail to recognize and respond to hazards and associated risks. An airline accident involving a transport category turbojet taken to its maximum operating altitude resulted in both engines flaming out after an aerodynamic stall. The flight ended in a crash and two fatalities. The NTSB probable cause(s) follows: 14619 The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: (1) the pilots’ unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the pilots’ inadequate training; (2) the pilots’ failure to prepare for an emergency landing in a timely manner, including communicating with air traffic controllers immediately after the emergency about the loss of both engines and the availability of landing sites; and (3)

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Why Hazards Result in Aviation Accidents

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks

the pilots’ improper management of the double engine failure checklist, which allowed the engine cores to stop rotating and resulted in the core lock engine condition. Contributing to this accident were (1) the core lock engine condition, which prevented at least one engine from being restarted, and (2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating. The NTSB accident details are available here.

Why Hazards Result in Aviation Accidents › Understanding the Risks Posed by Hazards

Understanding the Risks Posed by Hazards 4045 A predisposition to respond to persons, situations, or events in a given manner reveals a person’s attitude. Studies have identified five hazardous attitudes that can affect a pilot’s ability to make sound decisions and exercise authority properly. [Figure 3-1] 4046

The Five Hazardous Attitudes

Anti-authority: “Don’t tell me.” This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. In a sense, they are saying, “No one can tell me what to do.” They may be resentful of having someone tell them what to do or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures as silly or unnecessary. However, it is always pilot prerogative to question authority if it seems to be in error.

Impulsivity: “Do it quickly.” This is the attitude of people who frequently feel the need to do something—anything—immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are about to do; they do not select the best alternative; and they do the first thing that comes to mind.

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Invulnerability: “It won’t happen to me.” Many people believe that accidents happen to others, but never to them. They know accidents can happen, and they know that anyone can be affected. They never really feel or believe that they will be personally involved. Pilots who think this way are more likely to take chances and increase risk.

Macho: “I can do it.” Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are better than anyone else are thinking, “I can do it, I’ll show them.” Pilots with this type of attitude will try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male characteristic, women are equally susceptible.

Resignation: “What’s the use?” Pilots who think, “What’s the use?” do not see themselves as being able to make a great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things go well, the pilot is apt to think that it is good luck. When things go badly, the pilot may feel that “someone is out to get me,” or attribute it to bad luck. The pilot will leave the action to others, for better or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along with unreasonable requests just to be a “nice guy.”

Figure 3-1. Pilots should examine their decisions carefully to ensure that their choices have not been influenced by a

hazardous attitude.

14620 Most pilots sincerely believe that they will respond to hazards appropriately and take actions necessary to avoid accidents. However, a pilot’s attitude affects perception of hazards, the analysis of the potential threat, and performance of an appropriate response. 14621 Since attitude influences behavior, pilots should consider their own attitude and the antidote to any hazardous attitude. [Figure 3-2] The pilots in the two fatal accidents described above exhibited several of these hazardous attitudes. If they had recognized their attitude toward the hazards and associated risks and considered that their behavior could result in an accident, it is very likely that they would have acted differently (invulnerability). If the general aviation pilot had waited and returned the next day, he might be alive today (impulsivity). The commercial pilots wanted to claim they had flown the aircraft at its maximum altitude (macho). Pilot attitudes regarding hazard analysis clearly play a role in decision-making.

Hazardous Attitude Antidotes

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Macho Steve often brags to his friends about his skills as a pilot and how close to the ground he flies. During a local pleasure flight in his singleengine airplane, he decides to buzz some friends barbecuing at a nearby park.

Anti-authority Although he knows that flying so low to the ground is prohibited by the regulations, he feels that the regulations are too restrictive in some circumstances.

Invulnerability Steve is not worried about an accident since he has flown this low many times before, and he has not had any problems.

Impulsivity As he is buzzing the park, the airplane does not climb as well as Steve had anticipated, and without thinking, he pulls back hard on the yoke. The airspeed drops, and the airplane is close to stalling as the wing brushes a power line.

Resignation Although Steve manages to recover, the wing sustains minor damage. Steve thinks to himself, “It doesn’t really matter how much effort I put in—the end result is the same whether I really try or not.”

Taking chances is foolish.

Follow the rules. They help prevent accidents.

It could happen to me.

Not so fast. Think first.

I’m not helpless. I can make a difference.

Figure 3-2. Antidotes to hazardous attitudes.

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Leading Accident Causes

Leading Accident Causes 11800 The aviation accident record has improved considerably in recent years, but the reduction in accident rates has not been uniform across the aviation community. For example, the accident rate for air carriers operating under 14 CFR part 121 was reduced by nearly 80 percent in the ten-year period beginning in the mid-1990s. In contrast, general aviation aircraft operating under 14 CFR part 91 maintained a static accident rate of about one fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours. 11801 The FAA and the general aviation community collaborate through the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), to suggest safety enhancements that could reduce accidents. As part of this effort, the GAJSC analyzed hundreds of general aviation accidents and evaluated the causal factors. The FAA Fact Sheet on General Aviation Safety ranks the following ten leading causes of general aviation fatal accidents during the period 2001-2016: 11802 1. Loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) 14624 2. Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) 14625 3. System component failure–powerplant 14626 4. Fuel related 14627 5. Unknown or undetermined 14628 6. System component failure–non powerplant 14629 7. Unintended flight into IMC 14630 8. Midair collisions

14631 9. Low-altitude operations 14632 10. Other 11803 The top four causes of general aviation fatal accidents include loss of control in-flight (LOC-I), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), system component failure of the powerplant (SCF-PP), and fuel-related issues. These causes often signify the final result of a chain of events. However, an in-depth analysis of these accidents will often reveal inadequate risk management as a common thread. To begin with, pilots should recognize hazards linked to causes of aircraft accidents as presented below: 11806 1. Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I)–Examples of loss of control scenarios include continued VFR into IMC, wake turbulence upsets, thunderstorm encounters, instrument failure, improper aircraft loading, loss of outside references during flight at night or over water, and conditions that exceed the pilot’s capability. 11807 2.

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)–CFIT often results from continued VFR flight into areas with a low ceiling or low visibility, flight at night, incorrect interpretation of a chart, flight at high density altitude, flight in mountainous terrain, or intentionally flying too low. 11808 3. System Component Failure Powerplant (SCF-PP)–This category includes a variety of hazards, some which the pilot or operator may not easily identify. If a pilot experiences difficulty with an engine run-up or experiences an engine issue after maintenance, a significant hazard may exist. 11805 4. Fuel-Related–Pilots still experience fuel starvation or fuel exhaustion. Misunderstanding or mishandling the aircraft's fuel system, a lack of adequate planning, trying to stretch aircraft fuel range, or an unwillingness to take the time or make the effort to stop for fuel contributes to this type of accident.

Leading Accident Causes › Identifying Hazards

Identifying Hazards 11809 There are several ways pilots can detect hazards. Pilots should use combinations of methods to detect hazards, including the following: 11810 • Visual Observation–A pilot’s observations provide a primary means to identify hazards. For example, a pilot can visually observe thunderstorms and maintain a safe distance from them. A pilot who can see terrain can maneuver to avoid it. 11811 • Preflight Planning–Many hazards can be detected through preflight planning. Weather briefings identify hazards. Aircraft performance calculations, preflight inspections, and other routine procedures may identify hazards. 11812 • On-board Equipment–The availability of lower-cost modern avionics has improved situational awareness in many general aviation aircraft. Technologies such as GPS-based moving map navigation, datalink weather, traffic displays, terrain displays, and synthetic vision help pilots recognize different hazards. 11813 • Radio Communication–Voice radio provides an effective means to find out about hazards. Communication with air traffic controllers and flight service specialists can provide real-time information on weather, air traffic, airspace activity, and other hazards. 11814 • Postflight Inspections–Inspecting the aircraft following the completion of a flight may identify aircraft hazards before the next person flies the aircraft. Common items include condition of tires and brakes, security of access panels and latches, and leaking operating fluids. Properly securing the aircraft may prevent damage, which could affect the next flight.

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Using the PAVE Checklist to Identify Hazards

Using the PAVE Checklist to Identify Hazards 11816 As described in Chapter 1, the PAVE checklist provides a means to identify hazards using four convenient hazard “buckets.” Using all four checklist categories before a flight captures most hazards normally encountered. This section discusses hazards associated with each category.

Using the PAVE Checklist to Identify Hazards › Pilot Hazards

Pilot Hazards 11818 “P” hazards can be classified in terms of both capability and aeromedical factors as follows: 11819 1. Qualification–Does the pilot possess the appropriate pilot certificate, category, class, and type rating needed to operate a specific aircraft under the given set of conditions? Some accidents have occurred when pilots have attempted to operate under IFR without holding an instrument rating. A few accidents occur every year when the pilot did not possess any airman certificate.

11820 2. Currency–Has the pilot logged the minimum number of takeoffs and landings and instrument approaches, flight reviews, or other currency events required by 14 CFR? Are the currency requirements sufficient to guarantee that the pilot will be able to handle the flight requirements? 11821 3. Proficiency–Does the pilot have the ability to manage the conditions expected during flight? For example, suppose a pilot plans an IFR flight with forecast of low ceilings. Under 14 CFR part 61, the pilot needs to have logged six instrument approaches, holding, and tracking within the previous six calendar months to be IFR current. However, if these currency events occurred five months ago, the pilot may lack the proficiency to make the flight safely. If a pilot flies an unfamiliar aircraft, does the pilot have the ability to use the avionics and systems efficiently and properly?

Pilot Hazards › Aeromedical

Aeromedical 11822 Aeromedical hazards relate to physical and emotional readiness for flight including: 11823 • Illness–Does a pilot suffer from initial symptoms, ongoing illness, or any aftereffects? Even mild symptoms may be sufficiently debilitating to create a “P” hazard. 11824 • Medication–Could any medications the pilot takes affect the flight? Both prescription and non-prescription over-thecounter (OTC) drugs have side effects that can affect a pilot’s physical and mental performance. The FAA provides information regarding OTC drugs here. 11825 • Stress–Has a stressful life situation affected the pilot? Many personal or business events and activities can cause stress. Stress has many manifestations and affects thinking, behavior, and health. 11826 • Alcohol–Has the pilot consumed alcohol recently? The CFRs include a time limit (no consumption within eight hours before a flight), a quantity limit (blood alcohol must be below 0.04 percent), and a performance limit (flight duty prohibited while under the influence of alcohol).

Aftereffects of alcohol consumption (dehydration, hangover, and headaches, etc.) may trigger a “P” hazard for longer than eight hours after consumption. 11827 • Fatigue–How alert is the pilot? Fatigue may result from insufficient sleep. However, sufficient sleep only corrects acute fatigue. Chronic fatigue may involve multiple factors and requires additional analysis and remedy. Fatigue can be intensified by hypoxia as well as emotional state. While fatigued pilots have fallen asleep while flying, the effects of fatigue may be subtle. For example, fatigue may degrade cognitive skills and decision-making ability. 11828 • Emotion–Has the pilot experienced an event or received information that creates strong feelings? Emotions may affect normal pilot ability to focus.

11829 The IMSAFE checklist, which is an acronym for Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, and Emotion, can help a pilot identify these hazards. [Figure 3- 3] Note that some publications combine Emotion with Stress as the “S” in IMSAFE and leave the “E” to remind pilots about “Eating.” Since proper nutrition and hydration affects wellness and safety, a pilot planning a long flight should consider appropriate food and water intake and supply.

11830

Illness—Do I have any symptoms? Medication—Have I been taking prescription or

over-the-counter drugs? Stress—Am I under psychological pressure from

the job? Worried about financial matters, health

problems, or family discord? Alcohol—Have I been drinking within 8 hours?

Within 24 hours? Fatigue—Am I tired and not adequately rested? Emotion—Am I emotionally upset?

I'M SAFE CHECKLIST

Figure 3-3. IMSAFE checklist.

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Aircraft Hazards › Performance

Aircraft Hazards 11831 “A” hazards can be classified in terms of both performance and equipage.

Performance 11832 Aircraft performance hazards may include: 11833 • Fuel and Range–As previously described, fuel issues continue to be a leading cause of general aviation accidents. Planning a flight to the aircraft’s maximum range magnifies this “A” hazard. Inaccurate calculations, changing conditions, or the aircraft’s failure to achieve “book” speeds and fuel consumption can lead to an incident or accident. 11834 • Takeoff and Landing Performance– Takeoffs and landings become more hazardous when the calculated performance approaches the available runway length. 11835 • Altitude Performance–Operating to or from high altitude airports or cruising at high altitudes may result in a lack of performance. In some cases, this lack of performance may not allow for a safe departure. In situations where a climb could avoid a weather or terrain hazard, the lack of performance might contribute to an incident or accident. 11836 • Payload–Does an aircraft have the capability to carry the passengers, baggage, cargo, and fuel for a planned flight? In addition, operating near maximum takeoff weight reduces climb performance. 11837 • Weight and Balance–Pilots who do not check center of gravity limits may experience difficulty trimming or controlling the aircraft, which could lead to a loss of control in-flight.

Aircraft Hazards › Equipage

Equipage 11838 The avionics and other equipment installed in an aircraft affect both utility and the ease with which a pilot can identify hazards. Equipment considerations include: 11839 • Redundancy–Could equipment failure affect the type of flight contemplated? For example, on a day VFR flight in Class E airspace, having only a single navigation/communication radio is not a major concern. However, for a flight in IMC, having one radio could be considered an “A” hazard. Instrument failure is also a concern in IMC or at night, and backup systems could prevent an accident. 11840 • Autopilot–Operating an aircraft in IMC without an autopilot increases pilot workload. A pilot flying an aircraft in these conditions might consider aircraft without an autopilot an “A” hazard.

11841 • Inoperative Equipment–Inoperative equipment triggers an “A” hazard. For example, an inoperative landing light may make night operation more hazardous, even though a landing light is not required for Part 91 operations when not for hire. A pilot should consider the effect of inoperative equipment in relation to expected flight conditions.

Environmental Hazards › Weather

Environmental Hazards 11842 The environment or “V” hazard encompasses weather, terrain, airports, airspace, time of day, and other factors.

Weather 11843 Of all the environmental hazards, weather is the most variable. However, improvements in aviation weather forecasts and improvements in technology make it easier to identify weather hazards. 11844 • Thunderstorms and Convective Activity–Thunderstorms and their associated weather represent a severe hazard to all aviation activities. Severe turbulence, hail, and other phenomena can create the potential for loss of control and may result in structural failure of the aircraft. 11845 • Icing–Icing conditions constitute a hazard, and in-flight ice accretion has resulted in numerous loss of control accidents. Frost, ice, or snow adhering to the aircraft on the ground, if not removed, can also be a hazard. 11846 • Low Ceilings and Visibility–At times, conditions below minimums can extend beyond the range of an IFR flight. Continued VFR flight into IMC continues to cause accidents. 11847 • Turbulence and Winds–Severe turbulence aloft, although not common, can result in loss of control and may lead to aircraft structural failure. Surface winds also constitute a hazard. For example, a crosswind that exceeds an aircraft’s demonstrated maximum crosswind component or the pilot’s ability may result in loss of control on the ground (LOC-G).

Environmental Hazards › Terrain

Terrain 11848 Terrain and surface features are a significant hazard to all aircraft. In extreme cold or high pressure, height above ground and obstacles may be less than indicated. Pilots following instrument approach procedures have also been involved in CFIT accidents. 11849 • Mountains, Hills, and Elevated Terrain–Mountainous terrain affects departure, en route, and arrival operations. Numerous airports in the western United States require the use of special procedures. 11850 • Density Altitude–The combination of high temperature and high elevation affects aircraft performance. High density altitude is a “V” hazard that affects takeoffs, climbs, and landings. 11851 • Over-water Operation–Takeoff at night over a large body of water can create a “black hole” effect and require the pilot to immediately shift to control by instruments. Operating over water may not provide a suitable surface for an emergency landing.

Environmental Hazards › Facilities

Facilities 11852 The departure and arrival facilities pilots use contain various hazards, and these can be aggravated by other environmental factors. 11853 • Airports–Runway dimensions may not be sufficient such that a takeoff or landing can be performed safely under the given conditions. 11855 • Runway Contamination–Wet or snow-covered runways are an environmental hazard. Some airplane flight manuals (AFM) provide little or no guidance on how to modify takeoff and landing distances for contaminated runways. 15089 • Heliports–The aircraft rotor diameter may exceed the space available. 15092 • Seaplane Bases–Conditions that allow for landing may not be sufficient for takeoff. Obstructions may exist below the water and could be affected by tides. Rough water or glassy water conditions may exist.

11854 • Approach Aids and Lighting–A facility without working approach aids and lighting for a given set of operating conditions is a “V” hazard.

Environmental Hazards › Night Operations

Airspace, Air Traffic Control, and Other Aircraft 11856 Airspace requirements and ATC services facilitate safe and efficient operations. However, under some circumstances, their presence or absence constitutes a “V” hazard. 11857 • Prohibited and Restricted Airspace–Different airspace designations and restrictions are meant to protect pilots and aircraft from hazards. For example, entering a prohibited or restricted area without permission can result in conflicts with military aircraft. 11858 • ATC Delays and Service Availability–The ATC system may require route changes or holding, which may require more fuel than expected. 11859 • Air Traffic Density and Collision Hazards–Pilots are responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft when flying under VFR or in VMC while flying under IFR. However, under certain conditions, it is difficult to see other aircraft because of haze, sunlight, aircraft position, blind spots, and other factors. Night Operations 11860 Night operations make it more difficult to see and identify other hazards. 11861 • VFR operations–Visual operations are often hampered by visibility restrictions at night. This restricts a pilot’s ability to see and avoid terrain and obstacles, other aircraft, precipitation, and other hazards. 11862 • Single-engine operations–A forced landing at night may require a pilot to deal with unexpected terrain hazards. In addition, the failure of engine accessories, such as an alternator, may lead to total electrical failure.

Using the PAVE Checklist to Identify Hazards › External Pressure Hazards

External Pressure Hazards 11863 External pressures or “E” hazards originate from a variety of personal and business reasons. The pressure to get to a particular destination or to leave at the conclusion of a planned stay can affect a pilot’s judgment. Pilots subject to external pressures sometimes fail to consider the other three major categories of hazards. 11865 • Why does the pilot need to fly to a particular destination at a given time? Wanting to be present at a family celebration, wishing to see a terminally ill relative, or the need to be at an important meeting can affect pilot motivation. It may be a simple matter of not wanting to disappoint someone waiting at the destination. It could also include a condition that arises during a flight, such as a sick passenger. 11866 • If a general aviation aircraft is used for business travel, a pilot may experience time pressure after committing to be somewhere at a given time. Business flights place additional pressure on the pilot to conduct the “mission,” regardless of the hazards and conditions.

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Hazard Combinations

Hazard Combinations 15201 Pilots often need to consider the effect of interactions with several hazards at the same time. 11794 Imagine that a pilot operates from the Elkins-Randolph County airport in Elkins, West Virginia (KEKN). This airport sits in a valley at an elevation of 1,987 feet. The terrain and obstacles on the east and west sides rise to as high as 3,631 feet. The images in Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 show a photograph and a sectional aeronautical chart excerpt of the Elkins airport.

11795

Figure 3-4. Elkins, WV airport.

11796

Figure 3-5. Sectional chart excerpt of Elkins, WV airport.

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11797 The mountains and obstructions on both sides of the Elkins airport are a hazard. However, on a day with good visibility, few clouds, and light winds, the associated risks are low for most aircraft engaged in visual flight rules (VFR) operations. 11798 If the Elkins airport scenario changes to a night operation, the level of risk associated with the combination of hazards increases, and an accident becomes more likely. Pilots exposed to these multiple hazards need to consider the equipment, skill, and experience necessary to operate safely.

Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Hazards and Associated Risks

Hazards and Associated Risks 11867 While interaction with a hazard can cause an accident, the level of risk associated with the hazard depends on composite of the likelihood for the type of accident and the expected severity of injury as a result of such an accident. Depending on a particular flight mission, each individual risk may be acceptable or unacceptable. In general aviation operations, the tolerance for risk is

generally low, and pilots should use risk assessment and management tools to mitigate any unacceptable risk before embarking on a flight.

Using a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT) › Numerical FRATs

Using a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT) 11868 Identifying hazards and associating them with risks can be accomplished using a simple spreadsheet or form during flight planning. The form used to record each hazard is known as a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT).

Numerical FRATs 11870 A numerical FRAT lists different hazards and an associated number, which indicates the significance of each hazard. The pilot selects the relevant hazards, and derives a total score. Typically, the score falls into three ranges. If the total score is below a certain minimum, the FRAT indicates low risk. If it is in an intermediate range, the pilot is advised to “exercise caution.” If the score is above an upper threshold, the FRAT indicates danger. [Figure 3-6] 15200

RISK ASSESSMENT

Column total

Column total

SLEEP

1. Did not sleep well or less than 8 hours 2. Slept well 2 0

HOW DO YOU FEEL?

1. Have a cold or ill 2. Feel great 3. Feel a bit off

4 0 2

WEATHER AT TERMINATION

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1. Greater than 5 miles visibility and 3,000 feet ceilings 2. At least 3 miles visibility and 1,000 feet ceilings, but less than 3,000 feet ceilings and 5 miles visibility 3. IMC conditions

1

3 4

HOW IS THE DAY GOING?

1. Seems like one thing after another (late, making errors, out of step) 2. Great day 3 0

IS THE FLIGHT

1. Day? 2. Night? 1 3

PLANNING

1. Rush to get off ground 2. No hurry 3. Used charts and computer to assist 4. Used computer program for all planning Yes No 5. Did you verify weight and balance? Yes No 6. Did you evaluate performance? Yes No 7. Do you brief your passengers on the Yes ground and in flight? No

3 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 2

Pilot’s Name Flight From To

TOTAL SCORE

0 10 20 30 Not complex flight Exercise caution Area of concern

Endangerment

Low risk

Figure 3-6. Example of a numerical FRAT.

25487/11871 The FAA provides a numerical FRAT here. While this type of FRAT is easy to use, it has several drawbacks, including:

11872 1. The form may not cover all the hazards for a particular flight. 11873 2. The range of scores for each risk level may appear arbitrary, leading a pilot to question the results. 11874 3. The form does not encourage the pilot to analyze each hazard. For example, what is the likelihood the condition will lead to an accident and what is the potential accident severity? 11875 4. The form may indicate an overall low level of risk, leading the pilot to ignore the implications of a particular hazard.

Using a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT) › Narrative FRATs

Narrative FRATs 11876 This type of FRAT asks the user to identify hazards and associate each hazard with risk. While taking more time to complete, it addresses many of the disadvantages of a numerical FRAT. After identifying the hazards, the process includes a thorough analysis and management of each risk. 11877 The following example of a narrative FRAT has the pilot determine the likelihood and severity for each hazard identified using the PAVE checklist [Figure 3-6]. After further analysis, the pilot can determine how to manage each risk. This concept will be explored further in the next chapter. 11878

Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results

Pilot “P”

Aircraft “A”

Environment “V”

External Pressure “E”

Capability

Aeromedical

Fuel/Range/Payload

Equipment

Performance

Personal

Business

Weather

Terrain

Airspace, ATC, Airports

Night/Over Water

Figure 3-7. Example Flight Risk Assessment Tool.

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Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Case Study

Case Study 11883 One way to understand the risk management process is to put it in a real-world context using a case study. The following example will be used in this chapter, as well as Chapters 4 and 5, to illustrate a process to identify hazards, assess the associated risks, and mitigate the risks as needed.

Case Study › Background and Setting

Background and Setting 11884 It is early on Friday, July 1, and Tricia just finished a successful week of consulting for clients in Portland, Boise, Dallas, and Albuquerque. She flew to these locations from her home base in Santa Rosa, California (KSTS) using her single-engine airplane. She had planned to return directly to Santa Rosa, but yesterday evening, her friends from Santa Rosa, Matt and Martha Smith, invited her to spend the weekend in Durango, Colorado where they have a condominium. She gladly accepted their invitation because she would enjoy seeing them. 11885 The flight from Albuquerque to Durango during the day on Friday goes smoothly. Tricia lands at the Animas Air Park (00C), rather than the Durango-La Plata County Airport (KDRO) because the Smith’s condo is less than a mile from Animas Air Park, toward town. Figure 3-8 shows a sectional chart excerpt from the Durango area.

11886

Figure 3-8. Aeronautical chart excerpt showing Durango, CO.

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11887 Tricia and the Smiths are enjoying the warm-weather weekend with rafting, cycling, and hiking as featured activities. The Smiths are well-established in the Durango social scene, and the three friends go to parties on Friday and Saturday night, with another one scheduled for Sunday night. Finally, on Monday, July 4, there will be a city-sponsored Independence Day celebration where the Smiths will officiate. 11888 It is now late afternoon on Sunday. Tricia and the Smiths are back in their condo relaxing and discussing the weekend. Coincidentally, both Tricia and Martha Smith just received urgent emails from their separate home offices in Santa Rosa, CA, alerting them to critical meetings that are scheduled for Tuesday afternoon–Tricia’s at 4 pm and Martha’s at 3 pm. Matt tries to book airline tickets from Durango to Santa Rosa for Tuesday morning, and with a worried look, he announces that there are no airline seats available until Wednesday, at the earliest. 11889 Martha Smith then asks Tricia, “Would you be willing to fly us home in your airplane on Tuesday morning? This would allow us all to enjoy the Monday celebration and the party Monday night before taking off early on Tuesday.” Tricia replies, “I need to review the weather and do some other planning first, and we can all meet in a couple of hours.” 11890 Tricia goes back to her room and begins her analysis. First, she looks at the route that she might take home. Originally, she planned a direct VFR flight back to Santa Rosa, a nonstop flight of 711 nautical miles, as depicted in the sectional chart excerpt in Figure 3-9.

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11891

Figure 3-9. The direct route from Durango to Santa Rosa.

11892 Tricia makes a quick analysis and figures she can fly this trip nonstop in just under five hours, with 6 hours and 45 minutes of endurance with full tanks. She then evaluates the weather and immediately foresees some challenges. 11893 A low-pressure system with a trailing cold front is moving south into northwest Colorado. The front is triggering severe convective activity as it collides with moist air in the southwest. Low ceilings and poor visibility are widespread behind the front, with mountain obscuration and icing in clouds above 8,000 feet. The weather in Durango should remain good VFR on Monday, but change to IMC early Tuesday morning as the weather system slowly moves southeast.

Data › Pilot and Passengers

Data 11894 Tricia needs to organize, consider, and evaluate all the information.

Pilot and Passengers 11895 The pilot and passenger data is as follows: 11896 • Current under 14 CFR part 61 for VFR and IFR 11897 • Last instrument time logged four months ago 11898 • Tricia's weight is 130 pounds, the Smiths weigh 340 pounds together 11899 • Tricia has 40 pounds of baggage, the Smiths have 80 pounds

Data › Aircraft

Aircraft 11900 The aircraft data is as follows: 11901 • Not certificated for flight in known icing conditions 11902 • Empty weight: 1903 pounds, Maximum gross weight 2,740 pounds 11903 • Luggage compartment carries 120 pounds 11904 • Current fuel 25 gallons (150 pounds) Fuel capacity 64 gallons (384 pounds) 11905 • Average fuel consumption at 10,000 feet: 8.6 gallons per hour

11906 • Average true airspeed at 10,000 feet: 152 knots 11907 • Calculated takeoff distance at 25º C, 6,700 feet pressure altitude, no wind, and 2,740 pounds: 4,700 feet over a 50foot obstacle 11908 • Calculated takeoff distance at 25º C, 6,700 feet pressure altitude, no wind, and 2,500 pounds: 3,600 feet over a 50foot obstacle

Data › Environment

Environment 11909 The following is in addition to weather data mentioned earlier: 11910 • Temperatures at Animas Air Park (00C): 25º C mornings, 35º C afternoons, calm winds 11911 • California weather forecast: Good VFR except morning fog on the coast 11912 • Arizona weather forecast: Good VFR weather on Monday, marginal VFR Tuesday

Case Study › Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis 11913 Tricia decides to begin her risk analysis by identifying the potential hazards and associated risks for the flight to Santa Rosa, using the PAVE checklist. The various hazards and risks may overlap in more than one checklist category, but she wants to identify all the hazards and risks and may consolidate them later in the process.

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis › Pilot

Pilot 11914 • She is IFR current, but it has been four months since her last proficiency event. This hazard could increase the risk of loss of control in IMC. 11915 • If she consumes alcohol, she needs to allow for a minimum of eight hours prior to the planned departure on Tuesday to be legal. She also needs to be free from any aftereffects from alcohol, which could be magnified by the altitude and result in dehydration. This hazard could increase errors. 11916 • She has been going to bed late and getting up early in Durango. This fatigue hazard could increase the risk of making errors.

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis › Aircraft

Aircraft 11918 • She is concerned about the range/payload trade-off for her airplane. Reducing the range by trading fuel weight for payload could increase the risk of fuel exhaustion. 16110 • Tricia also knows that her aircraft is not approved for flight in known icing conditions and that an icing encounter could lead to loss of control. 11917 • She is concerned about the takeoff from Animas Air Park at gross weight, considering the runway length. This potential hazard could create a risk for an overrun or stall after takeoff. Her personal minimums include a 20 percent additional margin over calculated runway takeoff distance.

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis › Environment

Environment 11919 • The weather system moving in from northwest Colorado is the main environmental hazard affecting the flight to Santa Rosa. The presence of both convection and icing could increase the risk of loss of control, or if attempting to stay underneath the clouds in VFR, the risk of CFIT. 11920 • The high, rough terrain in this part of the southwest United States presents a hazard on the route to Santa Rosa. This requires relatively high cruising altitudes which may approach the performance limits of her airplane. 16111 • The departure airport has no ATC services, although fuel is available. ATC may limit the altitude selection en route, which could limit an escape from icing conditions.

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis › External Pressures

External Pressures 11921 • The scheduled meetings back in Santa Rosa on Tuesday generate external pressures. The need to be present in Durango on Monday narrows the departure window to Tuesday morning only. If these pressures are not mitigated, a forced departure on Tuesday morning will mean dealing with the hazards and associated risks related to the pilot, the aircraft, and the environment. 11922 As Tricia tallies up the hazards and associated risks for the planned flight to Santa Rosa, she records them on the FRAT, as shown in Figure 3-10. She needs to assess these risks in terms of their likelihood and severity. She strives to complete the risk analysis so she can return and discuss the situation with the Smiths. 11924

Figure 3-10. Case study FRAT with risks identified.

11923 The risk assessment and mitigation for this case study will continue in Chapters 4 and 5.

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Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards & Associated Risks › Chapter Summary

Chapter Summary 11925 Poor risk management is a common factor in many general aviation accidents. Pilots can use the PAVE checklist before flight to identify hazards. Pilots can use a FRAT to organize identified hazards and associated risks for additional analysis.

Introduction 12063 Once hazards and their associated risks have been identified, they should be assessed to determine the overall risk level presented by each hazard. This process begins before the flight using the process outlined in the previous chapter. While risk assessment may seem subjective at first, pilots can learn effective risk-management through routine practice and application.

Risk Assessment Components 12064 Risk is the composite of the likelihood (probability) and the severity (consequences) of a particular outcome. Both likelihood and severity can vary in magnitude.

Risk Likelihood 12066 The following terms describe the likelihood of an outcome: 12067 • Probable–An event may occur several times. 12068 • Occasional–An event may occur sometime. 12069 • Remote–An event is unlikely to occur but is possible. 12070 • Improbable–An event is highly unlikely to occur. 12071 To illustrate, consider the likelihood of exceeding airframe structural limits if penetrating a thunderstorm. It is likely that the airframe’s structural limits would be exceeded each time this occurs, making the likelihood “probable.” 12072 As another example, consider a case where a pilot operates at an airport surrounded by rough terrain. The runways are just long enough to accommodate the aircraft. The possibility exists for a runway overrun on each landing. Given this data, an overrun could occur sometime, and the likelihood is “occasional.”

Risk Severity 12073 The following terms describe the severity of an outcome. 12074 • Catastrophic–Results in fatalities and/or total airframe loss. 12075 • Critical–Severe injury or major airframe or property damage. 12076 • Marginal–Minor injury or minor airframe or property damage. 12077 • Negligible–Less than minor injury or damage. 12078 To illustrate, consider the example of penetrating a thunderstorm. A loss of control event exceeding airframe structural limits could result in either severe injuries or fatalities and airframe loss, creating either a “critical” or a “catastrophic” outcome. 12079 In the example of the marginal runway length, an overrun could cause major damage to the aircraft and possible severe injuries, or a “critical” outcome.

Chapter 4: Assessing Risk › Using a Risk Assessment Matrix

Chapter 4: Assessing Risk

Using a Risk Assessment Matrix 12080 Once risk likelihood and severity have been determined, the pilot may use a tabular matrix to find the composite of these two parameters. [Figure 4-1] 12081

Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible

Improbable

Remote

Occasional

Probable

Risk Assessment Matrix

Likelihood

Severity

Serious Low Medium

Serious

Serious High High

High

Figure 4-1. Risk Assessment Matrix.

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12082 Cross-matching the likelihood and severity on the matrix determines the composite risk. A thunderstorm penetration, with “catastrophic” severity and either “probable” or “occasional” likelihood, constitutes a high (red) risk level. The runway overrun, with “critical” severity and “occasional” likelihood, constitutes a serious (yellow) risk level. 12088 The medium (green) risk level implies a “go” decision for a planned or ongoing flight. However, in this case, risk should still be mitigated if possible. 12089 The high (red) or serious (yellow) categories imply “no-go” unless the pilot finds a means to reduce the risk, such that the next iteration of risk assessment indicates a medium or low risk. 12094 Risk analysis should begin hours, days, or even weeks before a flight. For a simple flight, hours in advance may suffice. However, for a complex flight with multiple legs or a series of flights over several days, a pilot should begin to consider hazards and associated risks over an extended time period.

Matrix Errors › Accuracy

Matrix Errors 12109 When assigning a risk level to a hazard using a matrix, the results could be subject to certain errors.

Accuracy 12111 The matrix provides discrete results that depend on the accurate assignment of likelihood and severity. While conducting a risk assessment, a pilot may be unsure of the likelihood or severity for a particular risk or find it difficult to choose between adjacent parameters. In such cases, pilots should apply the more conservative parameter(s), which place the risk at a higher level. Pilots learning risk analysis should seek the opinion of a more experienced pilot or an instructor if there is any doubt as to the accuracy of inputs.

Matrix Errors › Skewing

Skewing 12110 Pilots sometimes use inputs that skew the risk toward a lower level due to the desire to complete a flight.

Obsolescence 12112 The matrix results lose relevance if the hazards change before a flight departs. Pilots should verify and reevaluate their risk assessment based on current information and conditions before flight.

Case Study › Risk Assessment Analysis

Case Study 12113 Note: Refer to the case study section of Chapter 3 if needed.

Risk Assessment Analysis 12114 The pilot, Tricia, identified nine separate hazards and associated risks that will affect a direct non-stop flight from Animas Air Park (00C) in Colorado to the Santa Rosa, California airport (KSTS). Now, she begins the process of assessing these risks using PAVE checklist elements.

Risk Assessment Analysis › Pilot

Pilot 12115 Tricia identified both capability and aeromedical risks. She concludes that reduced IFR proficiency means that a loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) event is possible although unlikely. A LOC-I event, especially in convection or icing conditions, could result in a fatal accident. A combination of “remote” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicates a serious (yellow) risk on the risk assessment matrix. 12116 She also self-assessed her aeromedical risks using the IMSAFE checklist and identified alcohol and fatigue as potential hazards. The risks associated with these hazards could lead to multiple in-flight errors that could result in major damage or injury. Collectively, she assesses these risks as having “occasional” likelihood and “critical” severity. On the risk assessment matrix, this combination indicates a serious (yellow) risk. [Figure 4-2] 16112

Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results

Pilot “P”

Capability

Aeromedical

Not IFR proficient

Alcohol and lack of sleep

LOC

Fatigue related errors

remote

occasional

catastrophic

critical serious

serious

Figure 4-2. FRAT excerpt for pilot hazards and associated risks.

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Risk Assessment Analysis › Aircraft

Aircraft 12117 She identified three areas that pertain to aircraft-related risk. During a non-stop flight, the likelihood of fuel exhaustion increases if extensive deviation around weather is needed. Fuel exhaustion over rugged western terrain could result in a fatal accident. Her assessment results in a “remote” likelihood with “catastrophic” consequences, which indicate a serious (yellow) risk on the risk assessment matrix. 12118 Tricia also noted that her aircraft is not approved for flight in known icing conditions and that a flight along the planned route might encounter icing conditions at some point. Even with an “occasional” likelihood, this could generate a CFIT or LOC-I event with fatalities, or “catastrophic” consequences, thus indicating a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix. 12119 Finally, the aircraft may lack the performance needed to depart from the 5,000-foot runway at Animas Air Park. Having the Smiths on board, everyone’s baggage, and a reduced fuel load would result in a takeoff at the aircraft's maximum gross weight of 2,740 pounds. The calculated takeoff distance would be 4,700 feet, and using her 20 percent safety factor produces a desired runway length of 5,640 feet, which exceeds the available runway distance. Under these conditions, Tricia determines that an overrun is possible at least some of the time and could cause major damage or severe injuries. This “occasional” likelihood and “critical” severity produces a serious (yellow) risk level from the risk assessment matrix. [Figure 4-3] 16113

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Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results

Aircraft “A”

Fuel/Range/Payload

Equipment

Cannot carry full fuel

Not certified for known ice

Fuel exhaustion

LOC

remote

occasional

catastrophic

catastrophic

Performance Marginal takeoff performance Overrun, LOC, or CFIT occasional critical

high

serious

serious

Figure 4-3. FRAT excerpt for aircraft hazards and associated risks.

Risk Assessment Analysis › Environment

Environment 12120 She identified three areas with environment-related risk. The weather hazards on the direct route to Santa Rosa include thunderstorms, icing, and low ceilings. There could be severe turbulence in the convective activity, which covers most of the route and poses at least an upset potential at some time, producing an “occasional” likelihood. An upset in severe turbulence

could result in a LOC-I event and “catastrophic” fatal accident. The “occasional” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicate a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix. 12122 Tricia’s original proposed route traverses some very high and rugged terrain. If she were to attempt to fly under the low ceilings and weather, the terrain would be a hazard with an associated CFIT risk. A CFIT event, while unlikely for a pilot with her experience, would still be possible and could result in fatalities. This “remote” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicate a serious (yellow) risk on the risk assessment matrix. 12121 The Animas Air Park elevation of 6,684 feet combined with July temperatures result in a high density altitude, which constitutes a hazard. The combination of high density altitude and high terrain in the area could lead to a “catastrophic” CFIT accident. This could occur at least sometime or with “occasional” likelihood. The combination of “occasional” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity indicate a high (red) risk on the risk assessment matrix. 16114

Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results Environment “V”

high

high

high Weather

Terrain

Thunderstorms, icing, low ceilings

High terrain

LOC and CFIT

CFIT

occasional

occasional

catastrophic

catastrophic

Airspace, ATC, Airports

Night/Over Water

High density altitude

N/A

CFIT

N/A

occasional catastrophic

Figure 4-4. FRAT excerpt for environment hazards and associated risks.

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12124 Both Tricia and Martha face pop-up business events that appear to be critical, and Tricia has agreed to provide a solution to their transportation requirement. 12125 Tricia feels the pressure to get to Santa Rosa before the Tuesday meeting. The Smiths are good friends, and she does not want to disappoint them. She feels additional pressure because the Smiths are expected to officiate at the Independence Day festivities and wish to attend parties that night. They may not be aware of any reason why Tricia could not depart early on Tuesday and get to Santa Rosa in time for their meetings using a single-engine GA airplane. 12126 She concludes that external pressures are magnifying the identified risks, indicating a “probable” likelihood and “catastrophic” severity with high (red) risk levels. 12127

Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results

External Pressure “E”

Personal

Business

N/A

Meeting deadlines for myself and Ms. Smith

N/A

Increased risk in all other categories probable catastrophic high

Figure 4-5. FRAT Excerpt for external pressure hazards and associated risks.

16115 She finishes recording her risk assessment analysis [Figure 4-6] and begins determining ways to mitigate the risks (see the case study section in Chapter 5, Mitigating Risk). She will soon need to discuss the next steps with the Smiths.

16116

Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results

Pilot “P”

Aircraft “A”

Environment “V”

External Pressure “E”

Capability

Aeromedical

Not IFR proficient

Alcohol and lack of sleep

LOC

Fatigue related errors

remote

occasional

catastrophic

critical

Fuel/Range/Payload

Equipment

Cannot carry full fuel

Not certified for known ice

Fuel exhaustion

LOC

remote

occasional

catastrophic

catastrophic

Performance Marginal takeoff performance Overrun, LOC, or CFIT occasional critical

Personal

Business

N/A

Meeting deadlines for myself and Ms. Smith

N/A

Increased risk in all other categories probable catastrophic high

high

high

high

high

serious

serious

serious

serious

Weather

Terrain

Thunderstorms, icing, low ceilings

High terrain

LOC and CFIT

CFIT

occasional

occasional

catastrophic

catastrophic

Airspace, ATC, Airports

Night/Over Water

High density altitude

N/A

CFIT

N/A

occasional catastrophic

Figure 4-6. FRAT hazards and associated risks.

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Chapter 4: Assessing Risk › Chapter Summary

Chapter Summary 12128 Risk assessment is a critical element in the risk analysis process. To determine overall risk levels, the pilot assesses both risk likelihood and risk severity for all identified hazards. The primary tools for this process are the FRAT and the risk assessment matrix. A pilot’s risk assessment accuracy should improve with practice.

Introduction 12129 Risk mitigation reduces the likelihood or predicted severity of potential effects of hazards. As discussed in Chapter 4, Assessing Risk, high (red) and serious (yellow) risks should be mitigated. High risks the pilot cannot mitigate should lead to a no-go decision. Departing with serious risks is also an abnormal situation that calls for additional mitigation. The risk mitigation process may start days or weeks before a flight and depends on the complexity of the plan. 12090 Air carrier, charter, and fractional operations conducted under 14 CFR parts 121, 135, and 91 Subpart K normally preclude operations in the serious and high-risk categories. Corporate turbojet operators also typically adhere to this standard. In addition to regulatory requirements, these operators utilize concepts, procedures, and tools such as safety management systems (SMS) to ensure risks are identified, assessed, and managed appropriately. General aviation pilots can manage risk in a professional manner as well. Risks should be managed such that they are mitigated to medium (green) levels or lower. 12130 Risk mitigation may also allow a pilot to undertake or complete a flight that would otherwise be subject to unacceptable risks. Conversely, the pilot should not depart if the same process reveals safe flight is not possible under the given conditions. 12096 If having a doubt about risk mitigation, a pilot should consider the value of mitigation against the potential cost of property damage and loss of life. A saying goes, safety costs a lot less than an accident. In fact, risk mitigation makes long-term economic sense.

Preflight Risk Mitigation Strategies 12143 Pilots choose from a variety of strategies to mitigate risks, and different strategies may apply to different hazards. Nevertheless, there are a few general strategies that are effective for each area on the PAVE checklist. Pilot, aircraft, and external pressure risks respond well to early, direct action. On the other hand, the scope of many environmental hazards often favors avoidance as a mitigation strategy.

Mitigating Pilot Risks 12144 Personal minimums that account for pilot experience and proficiency mitigate some risks. Pilots flying unfamiliar aircraft may need to raise their personal minimums for that aircraft. When training, pilots can take advantage of scenarios that include risk management in addition to pilot skill elements. Self-evaluation after a flight may alert a pilot of the need for additional training, which may also decrease future risk. If there is any doubt concerning the outcome of a flight, the pilot should consider hiring an instructor or a mentor pilot and making the trip a learning experience. 12145 Use of and careful consideration of the IMSAFE checklist (illness, medication, stress, alcohol, fatigue, emotion) reduces aeromedical risk.

Mitigating Aircraft Risks 12146 Factoring performance data to create safety margins mitigates some risks. Using an aircraft with redundant systems or an aircraft with automation that reduces pilot workload also lowers accident risk. Additionally, addressing discrepancies and conducting proper maintenance can increase reliability and reduce risk. Thorough preflight and postflight inspections also mitigate aircraft risks. 17393 Carrying enough fuel with a sufficient reserve reduces the likelihood of a low-fuel emergency or a forced landing. On some flights, planning for a fuel stop reduces that risk. 21906 If the pilot has a choice, the selection of aircraft may reduce risk. The decision may consider the aircraft performance, the number of engines, known icing capability, and avionics or automation available.

Chapter 5: Mitigating Risk

Chapter 5: Mitigating Risk

Mitigating Environmental Risks 12148 Flight in the proximity of some environmental hazards may lead to serious or catastrophic accidents. Avoidance strategies reduce the risk by lowering the accident likelihood. This requires pilots to plan, exercise patience, remain flexible, and be creative.

Mitigating Environmental Risks › Circumnavigate the Hazard

Circumnavigate the Hazard 12149 For some hazards, such as convective activity and very high terrain, a possible mitigation may be a plan to circumnavigate the hazard.

Go Above or Below the Hazard 12151 Sometimes a plan to fly at a different altitude reduces accident likelihood. Pilots can plan for altitudes that keep the aircraft above or below icing conditions. Many instrument pilots who operate aircraft that are not approved for flight in known icing conditions apply personal minimums to avoid conditions below certain temperatures or where the freezing level is at or below the minimum en-route altitude.

Mitigating Environmental Risks › Change Departure Time or Date

Change Departure Time or Date 12152 Advancing or delaying a departure may reduce risk likelihood. For example, on a day when a line of afternoon thunderstorms is forecast, a pilot could plan for an early morning departure or wait until the thunderstorms dissipate and depart late in the afternoon. For some meteorological hazards, such as an incoming low-pressure system, the pilot might choose to depart the day before originally planned.

Mitigating Environmental Risks › Cancel the Flight

Cancel the Flight 12153 Canceling a flight is necessary if the pilot cannot mitigate risk sufficiently by other means. The cancellation option is easier if another means of transportation is available or if long-term rescheduling is an option.

Mitigating External Pressure Risks 12154 External pressures can be either subtle or overt. Because it may involve passengers or others waiting for the arrival, it is best to inform them of the need for flexibility.

Mitigating External Pressure Risks › Local Versus Transportation Flights

Local Versus Transportation Flights 12155 A local pleasure flight can still be subject to external pressures, but it is easier to cancel than a scheduled flight related to transportation to an event. When planning a local flight with friends, for example, the pilot can reduce external pressures by telling them in advance that the flight could be canceled at the last minute due to weather or other reasons. For an IFR transportation flight, persons meeting the flight can use an application to know if the flight will arrive as planned. For a VFR flight anyone meeting the flight may wait at home and get notified after the flight arrives.

Mitigating External Pressure Risks › Personal Versus Business Flights

Personal Versus Business Flights 12156 Pilots who fly business associates may feel significant external pressures. The pilot should manage passenger expectations and may plan for alternative travel options as a means to reduce risk.

Case Study 12157 Note: Refer to the case study supporting data in Chapter 3, Identifying Hazards and Associated Risks, and the risk assessment matrix in Chapter 4, Assessing Risk, to continue the risk mitigation phase of the case study.

Case Study › Risk Mitigation Analysis

Risk Mitigation Analysis 12158 Tricia diligently identified the hazards and assessed the risks of her proposed flight from Durango, CO to Santa Rosa, CA. She should now mitigate the high and serious risks that she identified during the assessment phase. She identified four high and five serious risks that she should attempt to mitigate by reducing risk likelihood, severity, or both. 12159 Tricia starts by reconsidering the overall plan for this flight. She rules out making a non-stop flight because carrying the Smiths and their baggage would require a reduced fuel load, which in this case is a serious (yellow) risk. In addition, the direct route could lead to encounters with thunderstorms, icing conditions, areas of low ceilings, and high terrain. Furthermore, she realizes they should leave Monday morning, rather than Tuesday, because of the incoming front and low-pressure area. She also notes

that there may be an issue with fog and low ceilings at Santa Rosa due to the coastal marine layer. This may dissipate by noon, but it is not yet possible to predict. 12160 Tricia starts by calculating the allowable fuel load. With an empty weight of 1,903 pounds and a maximum allowable gross weight of 2,740 pounds, the useful load works out to 837 pounds. Tricia weighs 130 pounds, the Smiths together weigh 340 pounds. Together Tricia and the Smiths have 120 pounds of baggage. Tricia also has an electronic flight bag (EFB) and pilot gear totaling seven pounds. This leaves 240 pounds for fuel, which is 40 gallons. The airplane currently has 25 gallons on board. 12161 There is a serious (yellow) hazard if making a gross weight takeoff from the Animas Air Park (00C). She decides to ask the Smiths to take a taxi to the Durango – La Plata County Airport (KDRO), which is about a ten-mile ride for them and a 7-nautical mile flight for her. It has a 9,200-foot runway.

She can add 18 gallons of fuel before the short flight to Durango – La Plata County Airport, and can depart from there at gross weight, which includes 40 gallons of fuel. She plans to make one additional fuel stop. 12162 After a thorough analysis and weather briefing, she elects to fly a southern route to avoid hazardous weather. She plans to refuel at the Barstow-Daggett, CA airport (KDAG). The 490 NM route from Durango – La Plata County Airport uses the Winslow, AZ (INW) VOR as a waypoint and should take 3 hours and 15 minutes. She will have 4 hours and 30 minutes endurance. From there, she will fly to Santa Rosa using the Palmdale, CA (PMD) VOR as a waypoint. This route is 390 NM and should take 2 hours 45 minutes with a 4 hour and 30 minute endurance. [Figure 5-1] 12163

Figure 5-1. Modified route.

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12164 The total distance along this route is 880 NM, versus the straight-line distance of 711 NM. The additional 169 NM adds about 1 hour and 15 minutes to the total flight time. 12165 She mitigated the aircraft and environmental risks using this plan. She should also deal with the external pressure risks associated with leaving a day early, given the need for the Smiths to forgo the Monday festivities in Durango. An early departure also reduces the external pressures associated with making the Tuesday afternoon meetings on time. Tricia needs to explain the risk analysis to the Smiths and show them why a Monday departure is necessary. 12166 She has concerns related to her instrument proficiency. To compensate, she decides to add 500 feet to her personal minimums for an instrument approach into Santa Rosa. This might require landing at a suitable alternate airport. With the predicted fuel load, she calculates that Sacramento Executive Airport (KSAC), 62 NM from KSTS and well inland, would be a good alternate. 12167 She also considers pilot aeromedical risks. She will consume no alcohol, have an early dinner, and go to bed early. She also increases her intake of water. These actions should help avoid dehydration. 12168 Having addressed all the previously identified risks, she completes the FRAT for the proposed trip, listing all of her mitigations. The completed FRAT in Figure 5-2 shows all the risks mitigated to medium or low levels. For illustrative purposes, the

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recalculated risk levels are shown on one sheet showing the before and after. When the conditions change significantly, such as for rescheduling or a change of aircraft, the pilot would normally redo the risk analysis using a fresh worksheet. 12169

Flight Risk Assessment Tool

PAVE Area Hazard Risk Likelihood Severity Composite Risk Mitigation Results

Pilot “P”

Aircraft “A”

Environment “V”

External Pressure “E”

Capability

Aeromedical

Not IFR proficient

Alcohol and lack of sleep

LOC

Fatigue related errors

remote

occasional

catastrophic

critical

Fuel/Range/Payload

Equipment

Cannot carry full fuel

Not certified for known ice

Fuel exhaustion

LOC

remote

occasional

catastrophic

catastrophic

Performance Marginal takeoff performance Overrun, LOC, or CFIT occasional critical

Personal & Business Meeting deadlines for myself and Ms. Smith Increased risk in all other categories probable catastrophic high

high

high

high

high

serious

serious

serious

serious

Weather

Terrain

Thunderstorms, icing, low ceilings

High terrain

LOC and CFIT

CFIT

occasional

occasional

catastrophic

catastrophic

Airspace, ATC, Airports High density altitude CFIT occasional catastrophic

Add 500' to minimums improbable/catastrophic now medium No alcohol/adequate rest remote/marginal now medium

Avoid icing conditions remote/marginal now medium

Add fuel stop improbable/negligible now low

Brief Smiths, depart Monday AM, shuttle Smiths to KDRO, Add fuel stop improbable/negligible now low

Depart from KDRO remote/marginal now medium

Deviate south improbable/critical now medium

Fly well south of front remote/critical now medium

Depart from KDRO remote/marginal now medium

Figure 5-2. Case study FRAT with risks mitigated.

12170 Of the nine risks assessed, she originally assessed four as high (red) and five as serious (yellow). According to her analysis and mitigations, the risk for the current plan has seven medium (green) and two low (white) risks. 12171 Tricia meets with the Smiths. They agree with the early departure from Durango and the other mitigations. Matt Smith makes a few phone calls and returns with word that all of Monday’s festivities will go forward, but without the Smiths in attendance. 12172 This risk mitigations used for the flight include the following: 12173 1. Adding a safety margin to personal minimums for instrument approaches; 12174 2. Abstaining from alcohol consumption, eating properly, and getting sufficient sleep; 12175 3. Reducing the departure fuel load and adding a fuel stop; 12176 4. Rescheduling to depart a day early; 12177 5. Departing with passengers from the Durango – La Plata County Airport, rather than from Animas Air Park; and 12178 6. Flying along a more southerly route to avoid weather hazards.

12180 While on the ground in Daggett, CA for the planned fuel stop, Tricia checks the weather, which shows that the fog and low ceilings are persisting at Santa Rosa. She understands the potential consequences of slightly elevated risk if making an ILS approach with a 200- to 300-foot ceiling, and confirms her risk analysis remains valid by noting that her alternate, Sacramento Executive Airport, is reporting clear skies as forecast. She prepares her EFB for the possible diversion to Sacramento and reviews the airport information. This preparation alleviates the stress she may feel about diverting. She relieves external pressures by discussing a potential diversion with the Smiths, who indicate they will accept whatever decision she makes. 12181 Within an hour after departure, the fog at Santa Rosa has lifted, and she executes a routine landing. 12182 Several days later, Tricia receives a complementary note from the Smiths praising her consideration for safety.

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