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Advisory Circular Current Issued Oct 20, 2023 AST-1 89 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 450.45-1 Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this AC is to guide applicants through the launch and reentry licensing process when SNS are present on a launch or reentry vehicle. This AC provides a means of compliance and guidance for applicants proposing to launch or reenter SNS for meeting the requirements for a safety review under § 450.45. This AC also applies to applicants seeking a payload determination for SNS under 14 CFR § 450.43. In accordance with § 450.45(e)(6), the FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The guidance in this AC can also be used for reference by mission planners and operators in the commercial space industry, designers and manufacturers of launch vehicles or reentry vehicles that may transport SNS, and designers, manufacturers, and operators of SNS, to assist them in understanding the safety analysis and regulatory processes that the FAA will apply in reviewing applications for commercial launches or reentries involving SNS. Spaceports may also find portions of this AC useful for understanding the public safety and regulatory concerns with SNS.

Official source ↗ Open PDF

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Launch and Reentry of Space Nuclear Date: 10/20/2023 AC No: AC 450.45-1 Systems Initiated By: AST-1

This Advisory Circular (AC) guides applicants through the launch and reentry licensing process when space nuclear systems (SNS) are present on a launch or reentry vehicle. This AC provides a means of compliance and guidance for applicants proposing to launch or reenter SNS for meeting the requirements for a safety review under § 450.45. This AC also applies to applicants for a payload determination for SNS under 14 CFR § 450.43.

This AC provides an accepted means of compliance with the regulatory requirements of §§ 450.43 and 450.45 related to SNS. It presents one, but not the only, acceptable means of compliance with the associated regulatory requirements. The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. The document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.

If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the Advisory Circular Feedback form at the end of this AC.

Minh A. Nguyen Executive Director, Office of Strategic Management Commercial Space Transportation

MINH A. NGUYEN

Digitally signed by MINH A. NGUYEN Date: 2023.10.20 16:38:47 -04'00'

Contents

Paragraph Page

ii

1 Purpose … 5

2 Applicability … 6

3 Applicable Regulations and Related Documents … 7

4 Definition of Terms … 11

5 Acronyms and Symbols … 14

6 Pertinent Regulations for Space Nuclear Systems … 16

6.1 Safety Challenges … 16

6.2 FAA Launch and Reentry License Regulations … 16

6.3 Other Agency Regulations … 21

7 Tier Levels and Safety Guidelines … 23

7.1 NSPM-20 Tier Level Definitions … 23

7.2 SNS Safety Guidelines … 26

7.3 Notes on the Tier Level Definitions … 27

8 Space Nuclear System Licensing Process … 30

8.1 Overview of Licensing Process … 30

8.2 Licensing Process for the Launch of an SNS … 31

8.3 Nuclear Safety Analyses to Demonstrate Acceptable Public Health and Safety … 31

8.4 Space Nuclear System Design … 34

8.5 Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board … 34

8.6 Application Determination … 35

Appendix A. Nuclear Safety Information and Analyses … 36

A.1 Scope … 36

A.2 SNS Device and Mission Description … 36

A.3 Radiological Material Report … 37

A.4 Criticality Hazard Analysis … 39

A.5 Criticality Safety Analysis … 40

A.6 Optional Comparison to Existing Nuclear Analyses … 42

A.7 Radiological Hazard Analysis … 44

A.8 High Fidelity Radiological Safety Analysis … 45

A.9 Radiological Emergency Response Plan … 50

Contents

Paragraph Page

iii

A.10 Tier Level Determination … 51

A.11 Safety Analysis Report … 51

Appendix B. Guideline Safety Recommendations … 53

B.1 Scope … 53

B.2 Nuclear Safety Themes … 53

Appendix C. Historical SNS Accident … 81

C.1 Cosmos 954 … 81

Appendix D. References … 82

Appendix E. Radiological Units … 88

iv

Figures

Number Page

Figure 1– NSPM-20 Tier Level Determination Aid … 25

Figure 2 – Considerations Given to Various PER’s … 27

Figure 3 – License Evaluation Process … 30

Figure 4 – Nuclear Safety Analysis Flow Chart … 32

Figure 5 – SNS Mission Risk Drivers … 55

Figure 6 – Cosmos 954 Debris Map (Gummer, et al. 1980) … 81

Tables

Number Page

Table 1– Partner Agencies … 19

Table 2 – Additional Government Agencies Consulted for SNS Policy or Payload Review … 20

Table 3 – Government Agencies with Roles in SNS Licensing … 22

Table 4 – Nuclear Material Disposal Options … 34

Table 5 – Sample Radiological Material Report … 38

Table 6 – Accident Environments for HFRSA Consideration … 46

Table 7 – Information Produced by a HFRSA … 47

Table 8 – Design Considerations for All SNS … 57

Table 9 – Guidelines for SNS Designed to Operate in Earth Orbit … 59

Table 10 – Guidelines for Designing Fission Based SNS … 62

Table 11 – Guidelines Applicable to Design of SNS Host Spacecraft … 64

Table 13 – SNS Analysis Guidelines … 68

Table 14 - Guidelines for SNS Validation, Verification, and Testing … 70

Table 15 – Guidelines for SNS Launch Planning … 72

Table 16 – Guidelines for Planning SNS Operations in Space … 74

Table 17 – Guidelines for Planning SNS EOM … 75

Table 18 – Guidelines for SNS Launch Operations … 77

Table 19 – Guidelines for SNS Operations in Space … 79

Table 20 – Guidelines for EOM Disposal … 80

1 PURPOSE.

1 PURPOSE. The purpose of this AC is to guide applicants through the launch and reentry licensing process when SNS are present on a launch or reentry vehicle. This AC provides a means of compliance and guidance for applicants proposing to launch or reenter SNS for meeting the requirements for a safety review under § 450.45. This AC also applies to applicants seeking a payload determination for SNS under 14 CFR § 450.43. In accordance with § 450.45(e)(6), the FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The guidance in this AC can also be used for reference by mission planners and operators in the commercial space industry, designers and manufacturers of launch vehicles or reentry vehicles that may transport SNS, and designers, manufacturers, and operators of SNS, to assist them in understanding the safety analysis and regulatory processes that the FAA will apply in reviewing applications for commercial launches or reentries involving SNS. Spaceports may also find portions of this AC useful for understanding the public safety and regulatory concerns with SNS.

1.1 Level of Imperatives. This AC presents one, but not the only, acceptable means of compliance with the associated regulatory requirements. The FAA will consider other means of compliance that an applicant may elect to present. In addition, an operator may tailor the provisions of this AC to meet its unique needs, provided the changes are accepted as a means of compliance by the FAA. Throughout this document, the word “must” characterizes statements that directly follow from regulatory text and therefore reflect regulatory mandates. The word “should” describes an option that, if used would constitute a means to comply with the regulation; variation from the provisions of this AC is possible, but must satisfy the regulation to constitute a means of compliance. The word “may” describes variations or alternatives allowed within the accepted means of compliance set forth in this AC. The term “applicant” is used throughout this AC to describe any party seeking any approval, determination, or license from the FAA under 14 CFR Chapter III for commercial space operations involving an SNS.

2 APPLICABILITY. › 2.3 The material in this AC does not change or create any additional…

2 APPLICABILITY.

2.1 The guidance in this AC is for launch and reentry vehicle applicants and operators required to comply with 14 CFR part 450. The guidance in this AC is for those seeking a launch or reentry vehicle operator license, licensed operators seeking to renew or modify an existing vehicle operator license, and FAA commercial space transportation evaluators.

2.2 The material in this AC is advisory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. This guidance is not legally binding in its own right and will not be relied upon by the FAA as a separate basis for affirmative enforcement action or other administrative penalty. Conformity with this guidance document (as distinct from existing statutes and regulations) is voluntary only, and nonconformity will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations. This AC describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations.

2.3 The material in this AC does not change or create any additional regulatory requirements, nor does it authorize changes to, or deviations from, existing regulatory requirements.

3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS.

The documents referenced in this chapter refer to the current revisions or regulatory authorities’ accepted revisions.

3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS. › 3.4 Related Department of Energy Regulations.

3.1 Related United States Office of the President Documents.

• Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, dated January 4, 1979. https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/codification/executive-order/12114.html.

• Executive Order 13972, Promoting Small Modular Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration, dated January 5, 2021; https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/14/2021-01013/promotingsmall-modular-reactors-for-national-defense-and-space-exploration.

• Memorandum on Space Policy Directive -5, Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems, dated September 4, 2020; https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-spacepolicy-directive-5-cybersecurity-principles-space-systems/.

• Memorandum on Space Policy Directive -6, Memorandum on the National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion, dated December 16, 2020; https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-nationalstrategy-space-nuclear-power-propulsion-space-policy-directive-6/.

• NSPM-20, Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems, dated August 20, 2019; https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialmemorandum-launch-spacecraft-containing-space-nuclear-systems/.

3.2 Related Council on Environmental Quality Regulations.

• Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Chapter V, Subchapter A, National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations, last amended May 20, 2022.

3.3 Related Department of Defense (DOD) Manual.

• Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 91-110, Nuclear Safety Review and Launch Approval for Space or Missile Use of Radioactive Material, dated February 24, 2022.

3.4 Related Department of Energy Regulations.

• Title 10 CFR part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection, last amended October 11, 2022.

3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS. › 3.8 Related Federal Emergency Management Agency Programs.

3.5 Related Department of Transportation Orders and Regulations.

• Department of Transportation (DOT) Order 5610.1C, Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, dated September 18, 1979. https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Procedures_Considering_En vironmental_Impacts_5610_1C.pdf.

• Transportation of Radioactive Materials; Memorandum of Understanding Between the NRC and DOT, (44 FR 38690, dated July 2, 1979). https://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/enforcement/moudot.pdf.

• Title 49 CFR part172, Hazardous Materials Table, Special Provisions, Hazardous Materials Communications, Emergency Response Information, Training Requirements, And Security Plans.

• Title 49 CFR 173 Subpart I – Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials.

3.6 Related Environmental Protection Agency Regulations and Reports.

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Federal Guidance Report No. 11, EPA-520/1-88-020, Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion, dated September 1988. https://www.epa.gov/radiation/federal-guidance-radiationprotection.

• EPA, Federal Guidance Report No. 15, EPA-402-R19-002, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water and Soil, revised August 2019. https://www.epa.gov/radiation/federal-guidance-radiation-protection.

• EPA, Revision to the PAG Manual: Protective Action Guide (PAG) for Drinking Water After a Radiological Incident, revised January 19, 2017. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/19/2017-01230/revision-to-thepag-manual-protective-action-guide-pag-for-drinking-water-after-a-radiological

• EPA, Protective Action Questions & Answers for Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies: A companion document to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Protection Action Guide (PAG) Manual,” EPA-402/K-22/002, January 2022. https://www.epa.gov/radiation/pag-public-communication-resources.

3.7 Related FAA Order and Regulations.

• FAA Order 1050.1F Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures, dated July 16, 2015.

• Title 14 CFR Chapter III, Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation.

3.8 Related Federal Emergency Management Agency Programs.

• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Incident Management System, dated October 10, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020- 07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf.

3.10 Related Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Definitions and… › 3.10.1 Related International Atomic Energy Agency Report and Regulations.

• FEMA National Response Framework, dated October 28, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020- 04/NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf.

• FEMA Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans, dated May 2023. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_incident-annex_nuclearradiological.pdf.

• FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, FEMA P-1028, dated December 23, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020- 06/FEMA_REP_Program_Manual_Dec_2019.pdf.

3.9 Related NASA Standards and Documents.

• National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Nuclear Safety, Procedural Requirements, NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, dated February 3, 2023.

• NASA Standard 8719.24B, NASA Payload Safety Requirements Table, https://standards.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/standards/NASA/B//NASA-STD- 871924B-Annex.pdf.

3.10 Related Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Definitions and Regulations.

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Full Text Glossary. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary.html.

• Title 10 CFR, Chapter I. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

3.10.1 Related International Atomic Energy Agency Report and Regulations.

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition, SSG-26. Revision 1. https://www.iaea.org/publications/14685/advisory-material-for-the-iaearegulations-for-the-safe-transport-of-radioactive-material-2018-edition.

• IAEA, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, updated 2002. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1986/infcirc 335a11-infcirc336a12.pdf.

• IAEA, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, SSR-6 Rev.1. 2018 edition, https://www.iaea.org/publications/12288/regulations-for-the-safetransport-of-radioactive-material.

• IAEA, The Role of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Propulsion in the Peaceful Exploration of Space, 2005. https://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1197_web.pdf.

3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS. › 3.11 Related U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and…

• IAEA, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, GSG-2 General Safety Guide, 2011. https://www.iaea.org/publications/8506/criteria-for-use-in-preparedness-andresponse-for-a-nuclear-or-radiological-emergency.

• IAEA, Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies and Methodology for their Derivation, EPR-NPP-OILs, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/publications/11093/operational-intervention-levels-for-reactoremergencies

3.10.2 Related United Nations Conventions, Documents, Resolution and Treaties.

• United Nations Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/

• United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Resolution 222, dated 1966. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.ht ml

3.11 Related U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration Program Alignment Recommendation.

• United States Food and Drug Administration, Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: Recommendations for State and Local Agencies, dated August 13, 1998. https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdaorganization/fda-program-alignment.

4 DEFINITION OF TERMS. For this AC, the terms from 14 CFR § 401.7 and the following definitions apply:

4 DEFINITION OF TERMS.

4.1 Anticipated Operational Occurrences Those conditions of normal operation, which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of an SNS, including single failures that can be anticipated to occur during its operational life.

4.2 Biosphere Also known as the ecosphere, this is the worldwide sum of the earth’s ecosystems including its hydrosphere, and lithosphere. It is the life-supporting stratum of the Earth’s surface, extending from a few kilometers into the atmosphere to the deep-sea vents of the ocean. The biosphere is a global ecosystem composed of living organisms (biota) and the abiotic (nonliving) factors from which the organisms derive their energy and nutrients.

4.3 Collision Physical contact between two objects at a relative speed greater than 1 kilometer per hour, or any physical contact between two objects that can cause physical damage to either object.

4.4 Critical or Criticality The normal operating condition of a fission reactor, in which nuclear fuel sustains a fission chain reaction and each fission event releases enough neutrons to sustain an ongoing series of reactions.

4.5 Criticality Accident The release of energy that is a result of accidentally producing a critical or supercritical fission chain reaction.

4.6 Decay Heat The heat produced by the decay of radioactive fission products after a reactor has been shut down.

4.7 Delayed Critical State of a reactor that is critical based on the contribution of delayed neutrons to the overall neutron flux, i.e., a reactor with a controllable fission chain reaction.

4.8 Delayed Neutrons Neutrons from nuclei produced by beta decay following fission. They follow fission by intervals of seconds to minutes.

4 DEFINITION OF TERMS. › 4.12 High-fidelity Radiological Safety Analysis (HFRSA)

4.9 Dose Equivalent A measure of the biological damage to living tissue because of radiation exposure. Calculated as the product of the absorbed dose in tissue multiplied by a quality factor and other necessary modifying factors.

4.10 Exposure Absorption of ionizing radiation or ingestion of a radioisotope.

4.11 Fission The splitting of an atom, which releases a considerable amount of energy, usually in the form of heat, radiation, at least two lighter elements, and neutrons. Fission may occur spontaneously but is commonly neutron-induced for nuclear reactors.

4.12 High-fidelity Radiological Safety Analysis (HFRSA) A high-fidelity radiological safety analysis applies probabilistic risk assessment methods and calculates the risk to the public for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures of safety-critical systems during normal and malfunction operations in all mission phases.

4.13 Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Uranium fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20%.

4.14 Prompt Critical A fission reactor that is critical only due to the prompt neutrons and is therefore supercritical due to the additional presence of delayed neutrons.

4.15 Prompt Neutrons Neutrons emitted immediately during the fission process.

4.16 Shutdown Margin The instantaneous amount of reactivity by which a reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming the reactivity control system is fully activated to minimize reactivity, except the single reactivity control device of highest reactivity worth is fully maximizing reactivity.

4.17 Single Failure An occurrence that results in the loss of capability of a component to perform its intended safety functions. Multiple failures resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure.

4.18 Source Term The magnitude, composition, form (physical and chemical), and mode of release (puff, intermittent, or continuous) of radioactive elements (including source isotope, fission, and activation products) released during a reactor accident.

4.19 Space Nuclear System A nuclear system intended to operate in space, including any radioactive fuel and associated structures, systems, and components that are required to operate the nuclear power system. Space nuclear systems would include radioisotope power systems (RPSs), such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and radioisotope heater units (RHUs), and fission reactors used for power and propulsion.

4.20 Supercritical or Supercriticality A state of a nuclear reactor core during which fission neutron production exceeds all neutron losses, causing an increase in the number of fissions occurring and resulting in rising power.

4.21 Uncontrolled Release A release of any radioactive material that cannot be terminated on command by the operator. An example of uncontrolled release is a material fracture resulting in a direct pathway for nuclear fuel or fission products to reach the environment with no way for the operator to stop the release.

5 ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS.

5 ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS. AC – Advisory Circular

ALARA – As Low as Reasonably Achievable

ANS – American Nuclear Society

ANSI – American National Standards Institute

APNSA – Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ASME – American Society of Mechanical Engineers

AST – FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation

CEc – Conditional Expected Casualty

CFR – Code of Federal Regulations

d/dt – Differential Operator

DBTT – Ductile-to-Brittle Transition Temperature

DOD – Department of Defense

DOE – Department of Energy

DOT – Department of Transportation

EA – Environmental Assessment

Ec – Expected Casualty

EIS – Environmental Impact Statement

EOM – End of Mission

EPA – Environmental Protection Agency

EPZ – Emergency Planning Zone

ERP – Emergency Response Plan

FAA – Federal Aviation Administration

FCC – Federal Communications Commission

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency

FGR – Federal Guidance Report

FHA – Functional Hazard Assessment

HALEU – High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium

HEU – Highly Enriched Uranium

HFRSA – High-Fidelity Radiological Safety Analysis

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP – International Commission on Radiological Protection

INSRB – Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board

ISO – International Organization for Standardization

LEO – Low Earth Orbit

LEU – Low Enriched Uranium

MM – Mission Multiple

MPL – Maximum Probable Loss

NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NEPA – National Environmental Policy Act

NRC – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSPM-20 – Presidential Memorandum on the Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems, dated August 20, 2019

NUREG – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission technical report designation

P – Linear Momentum

PER – Probability of Exposure to Radiation

PoC – Probability of Collision

REM – Roentgen Equivalent in Man (rem)

REP – Radiological Emergency Preparedness

RERP – Radiological Emergency Response Plan

RHA – Radiological Hazard Analysis

RHUs – Radioisotope Heater Units

RMR – Radioactive Materials On-Board Report

RPSs – Radioisotope Power Systems

RTGs – Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators

SAR – Safety Analysis Report

SI – System International, i.e., meter, kilogram, second units

SNS – Space Nuclear System

SSG – Specific Safety Guide

SSR – Safety Series Requirement

TBq – Tera-Becquerel

TED – Total Effective Dose

U.S.C. – United States Code

U.S. – United States

USD – United States Dollars

6 PERTINENT REGULATIONS FOR SPACE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

6.2.1 Safety Review and Approval. › 6.2.1.2 For nuclear hazards specifically, § 450.45(e)(6) states that…

6.1 Safety Challenges. Commercial space activities involving SNS introduce unique public safety challenges. For example, various radionuclides carried on SNS emit radiation which can be harmful to human health. Some radionuclides are long-lived, emit high-energy radiation, or are difficult to decontaminate if released into the environment. Some radionuclides present all these characteristics simultaneously. Additionally, radioactive decay and nuclear fission inevitably change the isotopic composition of the nuclear fuel, producing isotopes which were not present at the start of the licensed activity, thereby changing the risk characteristics of the device. Appendix C provides an example of a past mishap involving an SNS. Due to the unique public health and safety hazards posed by the use of SNS in commercial space activities, the FAA will carefully review proposals to launch or reenter SNS for compliance with the following regulations.

6.2 FAA Launch and Reentry License Regulations. This AC provides a means of compliance for assessing radionuclide safety within the context of 14 CFR part 450. Part 450 calls for a case-by-case approach to address hazards from SNS, as discussed in this section.

Note: The FAA has the authority to license the launch and reentry of commercial SNS, but it does not license possession of nuclear material in the U.S. Obtaining the appropriate licenses to legally possess nuclear material on the ground is an applicant responsibility and must be completed before the SNS launch or reentry can be licensed. Issuance of a part 450 license does not relieve a licensee of its obligation to comply with all applicable requirements of law or regulation (14 CFR § 450.13).

6.2.1 Safety Review and Approval.

6.2.1.1 In accordance with § 450.45, the FAA issues a safety approval to an applicant if it determines that an applicant can conduct a launch or reentry without jeopardizing public health and safety or the safety of property. The focus of the safety review is to ensure that an applicant can meet the safety requirements in subpart C, including the safety criteria in § 450.101. The safety criteria and other safety requirements in subpart C are primarily focused on three hazards: impacting inert and explosive debris, toxic release, and far field blast overpressure. The FAA included certain provisions in part 450 to cover other hazards such as radionuclides, as discussed below.

6.2.1.2 For nuclear hazards specifically, § 450.45(e)(6) states that the FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any radionuclide on a case-by-case basis and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. For any radionuclide on a launch or reentry vehicle, an applicant must:

6.2.1 Safety Review and Approval. › 6.2.1.5 During the safety review, the FAA will review the applicant’s…

• Identify the type and quantity of any radionuclide,

• Include a reference list of all documentation addressing the safety of its intended use, and

• Describe all approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for pre-flight ground operations.

6.2.1.3 Paragraphs 7.2 and 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC provide an acceptable means of compliance for § 450.45(e)(6) and will allow an applicant proposing to use SNS to demonstrate to the FAA that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety. Use of the safety guidelines in paragraph 7.2, in addition to the analyses described in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A, is one way to demonstrate that the launch or reentry of the SNS is consistent with public health and safety.

6.2.1.4 The means of compliance that the FAA sets forth in this AC generally follows the guidelines outlined in Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems (NSPM-20). NSPM-20 addresses the authorization process for government and commercial launches of spacecraft containing SNS, and categorizes launches of spacecraft containing SNS in three Tiers based upon the characteristics of the system, the level of potential hazards, and national security considerations.

6.2.1.5 During the safety review, the FAA will review the applicant’s submitted information looking for ways that:

• The SNS might jeopardize the function or safety of the launch or reentry vehicle;

• The launch or reentry vehicle might jeopardize the function or safety of the SNS; and

• Interactions between the SNS and the launch or reentry vehicle that might have public safety implications.

6.2.1 Safety Review and Approval. › 6.2.2.4 Section 450.43(i) outlines specific application requirements,…

6.2.2 Payload Review and Determination.

6.2.2.1 In accordance with § 450.43, the FAA issues a favorable payload determination for a launch or reentry to a license applicant or payload owner or operator if it has obtained all required licenses, authorizations, and permits (§ 450.43(a)(1)), and its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States (§ 450.43(a)(2)).

6.2.2.2 Under its payload review and determination authority, the FAA may prevent the launch or reentry of a payload that will conduct novel space activities if it determines that its launch or reentry would jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to a launch or reentry operator, a payload owner or payload operator may request a payload review and determination.

6.2.2.3 Similar to the safety review, paragraphs 7.2 and 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC provide an acceptable means of compliance for the safety aspects of § 450.43(a)(2) and will allow an applicant to demonstrate to the FAA that launch or reentry of a SNS will not jeopardize public health and safety. Use of the safety guidelines in paragraph 7.2, coupled with the analyses in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A, will allow an applicant to show that the launch or reentry of the SNS is consistent with public health and safety.

6.2.2.4 Section 450.43(i) outlines specific application requirements, including paragraph (i)(1)(ii), which requires an applicant to describe the physical dimensions, weight, and composition of the payload for launch, paragraph (i)(1)(v), which requires an applicant to identify radioactive materials and their amount for launch, and paragraph (1)(2)(iv), which requires an applicant to identify the type, amount, and container of radioactive materials in the payload. Section 450.43(i)(1)(xi) requires an applicant to identify any other information necessary to make a determination based on public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. For applicants using this AC as a means of compliance, Appendix A identifies other information unique to SNS.

6.2.1 Safety Review and Approval. › 6.2.3.2 The interagency review is an important component of the policy…

6.2.3 Policy Review and Approval.

6.2.3.1 In accordance with § 450.41, the FAA issues a policy approval to an applicant unless the FAA determines that a proposed launch or reentry would jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. The launch or reentry of SNS may very well implicate U.S. national security, foreign policy interests or international obligations due to the unique hazards posed by SNS and the potential for release of nuclear material outside the United States.

6.2.3.2 The interagency review is an important component of the policy and payload review process that provides other Federal agencies with the opportunity to examine the proposed activity from their unique perspectives. Table 1 of this AC indicates the FAA’s primary partner agencies and their primary areas of responsibility. For applicants proposing to launch or reenter SNS, the FAA may also consult with other agencies as shown in Table 2 of this AC, as appropriate.

Table 1– Partner Agencies

Agency Primary Area of Responsibility

Department of Defense Issues related to US national security

Department of State Issues related to US foreign policy

Federal Communications Commission

US commercially owned communications satellites and frequency issues involving FCC licensing of transmitters, including those on launch/reentry vehicles for telemetry

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The effect of commercial space activities on NASA programs and Center operations

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

US commercially owned remote sensing satellites

United States Coast Guard Overflight of navigable waterways

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Issues related to US national security

6.2.4 Environmental Review. › 6.2.5.1 In 14 CFR part 440, the FAA prescribes the amount of liability…

Table 2 – Additional Government Agencies Consulted for SNS Policy or Payload Review

Additional Government Agencies

Reason for Participation in the Policy Review

Department of Energy Nuclear material sourced from the DOE

Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration

Material in the SNS poses a nuclear proliferation concern

Department of State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Material in the SNS poses a nuclear proliferation concern; NNSA provides critical capabilities to USG response in the case of a nuclear or radiological incident.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

National Response Framework, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Commercial use or possession of nuclear material

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Radiation emissions from the space nuclear system have potential to interfere with national assets

6.2.4 Environmental Review. The FAA is responsible for complying with the procedures and policies of the National Environmental Policy Act and other applicable environmental laws prior to issuing a launch or reentry license, and an applicant must provide the FAA with information needed to comply with such requirements. As specified in § 450.47, when directed by the FAA, an applicant must prepare an Environmental Assessment with FAA oversight; assume financial responsibility for preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement by an FAA-selected and managed consultant or contractor; or submit information to support a written re-evaluation of a previously submitted Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement.

6.2.5 Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) Determination.

6.2.5.1 In 14 CFR part 440, the FAA prescribes the amount of liability insurance required by the launch or reentry license applicant to compensate for the total of covered third-party claims for bodily injury or property damage, including Government personnel and property. This amount cannot exceed $500 million US dollars (USD), or the maximum liability insurance available on the world market at reasonable cost. Subject to Congressional appropriation, the Federal government indemnifies the launch or reentry operator for claims above the insured amount up to $1.5 billion USD, adjusted for inflation from January 1989.

6.3 Other Agency Regulations. › 6.3.1 Launch or reentry of SNS may be subject to regulation by other…

6.2.5.2 MPL is the greatest dollar amount of loss for bodily injury or property damage that is reasonably expected to result from a licensed or permitted activity. Third parties are people, including government personnel, other than those involved in a licensed or permitted launch or reentry activity.

6.2.5.3 Property damage is the partial or total destruction, impairment, or loss of tangible property, real or personal. Radiological contamination can cause partial or total destruction of tangible property. Property damage includes the cost of radiological clean-up and remediation activities performed to limits required by the U.S. government, which can be substantial.

6.2.5.4 The FAA conducts a maximum probable loss analysis based on information provided by an applicant in accordance with § 450.31(a)(6), which refers to information requirements in part 440.

6.3 Other Agency Regulations.

6.3.1 Launch or reentry of SNS may be subject to regulation by other Federal agencies. The NRC is the terrestrial nuclear regulator, and the FAA expects that most commercial SNS missions will use commercial SNS devices that are under the regulatory authority of the NRC while on the ground. In some cases, the DOE or DOD may be the nuclear safety regulator. In these situations, the DOE or DOD will perform terrestrial nuclear safety regulation, while the FAA will remain responsible for protecting public safety during the launch and reentry. When ground transportation of the SNS occurs, the DOT PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) is involved as the nuclear material transportation safety regulator. Applicants should be aware of the appropriate terrestrial nuclear safety regulator for their SNS and operate in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Table 3 provides government agencies with roles in SNS licensing.

Table 3 – Government Agencies with Roles in SNS Licensing

Agency Responsibilities

Department of Defense Responsible for national security and critical asset protection, including federal launch ranges, launch sites, and national security missions (Department of the Air Force & FAA 2021).

Department of Energy Produces certain nuclear materials and space nuclear systems, will be involved if the DOE is the source of the nuclear fuel (DOE 2021). DOE provides indemnification for nuclear mishaps.

Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration

Works globally to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons-usable nuclear or radiological materials and technology (National Nuclear Security Administration 2021). NNSA Nuclear Emergency Response Teams (NEST) are the lead response teams when responding to accidents involving nuclear material.”

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Planning for severe (worst-case credible) accident with release of radioactive material in populated areas (FEMA REP Program Manual 2019).

Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Prevents the spread of weapons of mass destruction, tracks, develops, and implements effective responses to proliferation threats (Department of State 2021)

Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

Regulates transportation using large trucks or busses, as described in Title 49 CFR parts 300-399 (Title 49 CFR Chapter I 2021).

Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

Transportation of hazardous (including radioactive) materials (Title 49 CFR Chapter I 2021).

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Licenses the commercial possession and use of nuclear material (Title 10 CFR Chapter I 2021). Authorizes Type B and fissile material packages for its licensees, as well as for NRC agreement state licensees use.

7.1 NSPM-20 Tier Level Definitions. › 7.1.1 NSPM-20 categorizes launches and reentries involving SNS into…

7 TIER LEVELS AND SAFETY GUIDELINES.

7.1 NSPM-20 Tier Level Definitions.

7.1.1 NSPM-20 categorizes launches and reentries involving SNS into three Tiers of radiological risk based upon the PER, the level of total activity, and national security considerations of the SNS. NSPM-20 assigns SNS to the highest Tier for which they satisfy any criteria and, for commercial launches and reentries, directs the FAA to coordinate with other Federal agencies, based on the Tier. Because these tiers impact the FAA’s level of government coordination, and so may impact the timing and depth of any review, the FAA provides the following descriptions from NSPM-20.

a. Tier I. Applies to launches of spacecraft containing radioactive sources of total

quantities up to and including 100,000 times the A21 value listed in Table 2 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Specific Safety Requirements (SSR) No. SSR–6 (Rev. 1), Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition.2

b. Tier II. Applies to:

(i) Launches of spacecraft containing radioactive sources in excess of 100,000 times the A2 value referenced above;

(ii) Any Tier I launches where the associated safety analyses determine that the probability of an accident during launch or subsequent operation resulting in an exposure in the range of 5 rem to 25 rem TED to any member of the public is equal to or greater than 1 in 1,000,000; and

(iii) Any launches of spacecraft containing nuclear fission systems and other devices with a potential for criticality3 when such systems utilize low-enriched uranium.4

c. Tier III. Applies to launches of any spacecraft containing a space nuclear system

for which the associated safety analyses determine that the probability of an accident during launch or subsequent operation resulting in an exposure in excess of 25 rem TED to any member of the public is equal to or greater than 1 in 1,000,000. Due to potential national security considerations associated with nuclear nonproliferation, Tier III also applies to launches of spacecraft containing nuclear fission systems and other devices with a potential for criticality when such systems utilize any nuclear fuel other than low-enriched uranium.

1 A2 is an activity value, i.e., a level of radioactivity, in System International (SI) units of Tera-Becquerel (TBq) listed in the IAEA SSR-6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition, Table 2. Note: 1 TBq is approximately = 27 Ci. 2 Small amounts of nuclear materials such as those present in instrumentation may not necessarily result in an extensive review. 3 The condition in which a nuclear fission chain reaction becomes self-sustaining. 4 Less than 20 percent uranium-235 enrichment.

7.1 NSPM-20 Tier Level Definitions. › 7.1.4 A flowchart to aid applicants in determining the Tier level of an…

7.1.2 Tier II and Tier III can include low enriched Uranium (LEU) systems capable of criticality, as determined by the results of a probabilistic risk assessment. Only the Tier III definition includes SNS capable of criticality that employ other than LEU fuels, including highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and other fissile radionuclides.

7.1.3 Per NSPM-20, the FAA will consult with the heads of appropriate Federal agencies for commercial activities in Tier II or Tier III.

7.1.4 A flowchart to aid applicants in determining the Tier level of an SNS is provided in Figure 1 of this AC.

Figure 1– NSPM-20 Tier Level Determination Aid

7.2 SNS Safety Guidelines. › 7.2.2 Figure 2 of this AC was created to help applicants visualize…

7.2 SNS Safety Guidelines.

7.2.1 As noted earlier, in accordance with § 450.45(e)(6), the FAA will evaluate the launch or reentry of any SNS on a case-by-case basis and issue an approval if the FAA finds that the launch or reentry is consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Use of the following criteria (in terms of Probability of Exposure to Radiation (PER)), in conjunction with the analyses set forth in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC, is one way to demonstrate that the launch or reentry of the SNS is consistent with public health and safety:5

a. An accident resulting in exposure in excess of 25 millirem but less than 5 rem

Total Effective Dose (TED), as defined in 10 CFR § 835.2, to any member of the public is unlikely, such that the probability of such an event does not exceed 1 in 100;

b. An accident resulting in exposure in the range of 5 rem to 25 rem TED to any

member of the public is extremely unlikely, such that the probability of such an event does not exceed 1 in 10,000; and

c. The probability of an accident resulting in exposure in excess of 25 rem TED to

any member of the public does not exceed 1 in 100,000.

7.2.2 Figure 2 of this AC was created to help applicants visualize potential PERs, the NSPM-20 Tier level based on PER, and the Safety Guidelines, and to identify any unique considerations based on the PER. Because Figure 2 of this AC considers only the PER, it does not capture the full scope of the Tier levels specified above, which can also be impacted by the quantity or type of nuclear material. The Tier levels are the grey, yellow, and gold boxes, while the black line capping the Tier boxes illustrates the SNS Safety Guidelines.

5 These safety guidelines are stated in terms of probability of occurrence for a member of the public receiving ionizing radiation exposure—specifically, the probability of occurrence of a Total Effective Dose of threshold magnitudes. Radiation exposure within these criteria is not expected to cause death or serious injury. However, consistent with the linear no-threshold model of radiation exposure, any amount of radiation is assumed to increase the risk of stochastic radiation effects (e.g. cancer in the exposed individual). To distinguish that SNS radiation exposure is not normally expected to cause casualties, the FAA uses the term Probability of Exposure to Radiation, PER, to describe the probabilistic risks to the public associated with an SNS. The PER is a two-part term, specifying both the probability and magnitude of the dose to the most exposed member of the public.

7.2 SNS Safety Guidelines. › 7.3.1 Subsequent Operation.

Figure 2 – Considerations Given to Various PER’s

7.2.3 To ensure the individual risk requirements of 14 CFR § 450.101(a)(2) are met, the applicant should select and justify to the FAA a TED value above which a casualty from their operation may occur. In situations where the PER exceeds 1x10-6 of a dose greater than this specified TED value, the FAA considers that the Pc exceeds the individual risk limit of § 450.101(a)(2). Figure 2 symbolizes this by the light blue box. The FAA considers exposure above that TED level a casualty for the purposes of evaluating the risk limit in § 450.101(a)(2). Therefore, such an exposure would violate the regulatory safety criteria defined in § 450.101(a)(2).

7.3 Notes on the Tier Level Definitions.

7.3.1 Subsequent Operation. Embedded in the definition for the various Tier levels is an important detail: the Tier level for an SNS is defined not only by the risk to the public during launch and reentry, but also by the risk to the public during subsequent operation, such as uncontrolled reentry.6 Uncontrolled reentry can be initiated in a variety of ways, including malfunction, collision, hacking, deliberate signal

6 Note that NSPM-20 uses the term “reentry” in a generic sense and is not limited to the reentry of a reentry vehicle as defined in 14 CFR § 401.7.

7.3.3 Quantities of Radioactive Material. › 7.3.3.1 The amount of radioactive material is referenced to the A2…

interference, operator error, etc. Applicants are encouraged to be mindful of how these initiation scenarios might result in inadvertent reentry, and the changes they might have on the SNS prior to, during, or after the uncontrolled reentry to create a robust assessment of potential consequences to a maximally exposed individual member of the public in accident scenarios.

7.3.2 Criticality. Criticality related to an SNS refers to an achievable state of sustained nuclear fission chain reactions (Paxton 1989). Radiological activity is greatly increased for radioactive materials during and after critical or supercritical chain reactions (American Nuclear Society 2018). Criticality depends upon several isotopic and physical or geometrical considerations related to neutron production, moderation, reflection, capture, and leakage. These factors can be changed by changing environmental conditions outside the SNS (Knief 2013). An applicant should consider the specifics of its SNS and all environments their SNS may encounter during normal and abnormal operating conditions to determine if the device is capable of criticality or unintended criticality. This is addressed further in Appendix A of this AC.

7.3.3 Quantities of Radioactive Material.

7.3.3.1 The amount of radioactive material is referenced to the A2 activity level, a level of activity for a specific radionuclide in SI units of TBq, listed in Table 2 of the IAEA SSR-6. This comparison is analogous to the mission multiple (MM), which was used in historical government launches. Applicants choosing to use MM to describe the activity of their SNS should use the standard definition as shown in the following equation:

𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴= ෍( 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒏𝒏

(𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽)𝒏𝒏 𝒏𝒏

Mission Multiple Equation (NASA 2022)

7.3.3 Quantities of Radioactive Material. ›  IAEA, Regulations for the Safe transport of Radioactive Material,…

7.3.3.2 MM is a dimensionless integer coefficient that scales a value of the activity level A2. For example, if total activity equals 100,000 × A2, MM equals 100,000. Additional information on specific A2 values, their combination and derivation can be found in:

• IAEA Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-26, Rev 1, (2018 Edition).

• IAEA, Regulations for the Safe transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6 (Rev.1), 2018.

8.1 Overview of Licensing Process › 8.1.2 Because of the unique public safety issues raised by use of SNS…

8 SPACE NUCLEAR SYSTEM LICENSING PROCESS.

8.1 Overview of Licensing Process

8.1.1 The launch and reentry license process is illustrated in Figure 3 of this AC. Any launch or reentry with an SNS will follow this process. As noted earlier, the FAA will address the unique safety aspects of SNS on a case-by-case basis during the licensing process.

8.1.2 Because of the unique public safety issues raised by use of SNS in commercial launch or reentry activity, the FAA encourages applicants to begin pre-application consultation for launches or reentries involving SNS as early as possible. The pre-application engagement with the FAA provides guidance for the applicant on developing an acceptable application, the roadmap to engaging with other government agencies, and the administrative and technical requirements for the application. This enables a timely and effective licensing evaluation and determination when the application package is complete enough for review.

Figure 3 – License Evaluation Process

8.3 Nuclear Safety Analyses to Demonstrate Acceptable Public Health and… › 8.3.1 The scope and content of the nuclear safety analyses…

8.2 Licensing Process for the Launch or Reentry of an SNS.

8.2.1 The FAA issues a vehicle operator license if it determines that the launch or reentry operator can launch or reenter without jeopardizing public health and safety, the safety of property, or the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. All the data requirements and licensing stages for a conventional launch or reentry, as described in 14 CFR part 450, apply for the launch or reentry of an SNS.

8.2.2 To show compliance with § 450.45(e)(6) specifically, an applicant can provide the information and conduct the analyses described in paragraph 8.3 below and Appendix A of this AC.

8.3 Nuclear Safety Analyses to Demonstrate Acceptable Public Health and Safety.

8.3.1 The scope and content of the nuclear safety analyses demonstrating compliance with the public health and safety criteria should be commensurate with the level of mission radiological risk incurred. Figure 4 provides applicants a way to determine which nuclear safety analyses could be used to demonstrate acceptable level of public health and safety for various SNS, and Appendix A provides details on the scope and intent of the various analyses.

Figure 4 – Nuclear Safety Analysis Flow Chart

8.3 Nuclear Safety Analyses to Demonstrate Acceptable Public Health and… › 8.3.5 The EOM should include safe disposal of the radionuclide.

8.3.2 All applicant-developed nuclear safety analyses for payloads should consider the entire mission lifetime. Depending on mission specifics, the mission lifetime may include:

• Pre-Launch;

• Launch;

• Ascent, Early and Late;

• Suborbital, including staging;

• Orbital, including temporary on-orbit operations;

• Earth escape;

• Earth return, including flyby;

• Reentry; and

• End of Mission (EOM), including disposal.

8.3.3 The mission phases for nuclear space launch should cover all launch vehicle or payload potential for any planned or accidental Earth reentry of nuclear material. For example, Earth return scenarios would include considerations for nuclear material launched to:

• Other planetary bodies capable of a free return trajectory to Earth;

• Earth gravity assist fly-by trajectory; or

• Earth orbit intersecting trajectories where planned or accidental Earth reentry of nuclear material is possible.

8.3.4 If reasonably foreseeable scenarios exist that would pose a safety hazard to the public and environment, the nuclear safety analyses performed for licensing should quantify the radiological risk to the public from that scenario and include it in determining the overall mission risk.

8.3.5 The EOM should include safe disposal of the radionuclide. The long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel on Earth has been a problem since the advent of the nuclear industry (GAO 2021). SNS have disposal options at EOM not available to terrestrial nuclear devices, as summarized in Table 4 of this AC, with varying levels of government review required.7 For example, a disposal option for an on-orbit nuclear reactor that has reached criticality might be to boost it into a high disposal orbit to allow sufficient time for radioactive decay of fission products, which could take hundreds or thousands of years (SPD-6 2020). Failure of the vehicle to boost itself or to eject the hot core into a safe disposal orbit could result in an inadvertent public safety reentry hazard (Gummer, et al. 1980). Alternately, if the core were boosted to escape velocity for disposal, it

7 Because spent nuclear fuel is a significant hazard, the disposal plan is evaluated before licensing the launch of the system, even though the ultimate disposal may be years out. Terrestrial disposal will be high risk for systems that have operated critically.

might pose a reentry risk to future public generations should third-body orbital forces cause an eventual inadvertent return. Nuclear safety analyses take into consideration all of these potential scenarios and calculate the PER for each.

8.5 Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board. › 8.5.2 Under NSPM-20, the Secretary of Transportation can request no…

Table 4 – Nuclear Material Disposal Options

Disposal Location Possibility of Return to Earth

Interplanetary Space, No Free- Return Trajectory to Earth

None or Extremely Low

Lagrange Point L1, L2 and L3 Extremely Low; L4 and L5 None

A Sufficiently High Altitude in Earth Orbit

Low within the period of concern for radiation exposure to the public

On Earth Will happen

8.4 Space Nuclear System Design. Whether or not an applicant uses the means of compliance outlined in paragraph 8.3 and Appendix A of this AC, the design and any safety analyses conducted by an applicant will be evaluated by the FAA during the license evaluation process to assess public health and safety. SNS designs satisfy a variety of unique, competing design constraints. The performance guidelines in Appendix B give guidance on space specific performance characteristics the FAA has identified to reduce the baseline risk of the SNS.

8.5 Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board.

8.5.1 When an applicant prepares a SAR, as detailed in Appendix A of this AC, to show compliance with § 450.45(e)(6), applicants should be aware that SARs prepared for commercial launches are distinctly different than those prepared for government launches in that SARs for a Tier II or Tier III government launch must go through an Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board (INSRB) evaluation, while a SAR for a commercial launch of any Tier may, at the Secretary of Transportation’s discretion, be evaluated by the INSRB. This distinction is important and streamlines the FAA’s ability to license commercial SNS launch and reentry.

8.5.2 Under NSPM-20, the Secretary of Transportation can request no review, a partial review, or a full INSRB evaluation of the SAR. In these cases, the role of the INSRB will be to review the SAR and supporting nuclear safety analyses, to evaluate the quality of the analyses, and to identify specific gaps. This evaluation is then documented in a safety evaluation report, which may include recommendations for how to improve the analyses. The INSRB recommends approvals, and the FAA issues approvals.

8.6 Application Determination. › 8.6.1 If applying for a license, after accepting the application and…

8.5.3 The INSRB information is available at https://sma.nasa.gov/sma-disciplines/nuclearflight-safety. Applicants may consider reviewing the INSRB guidance provided to government agencies seeking to launch SNS and other reports related to nuclear technology and safety.

8.6 Application Determination.

8.6.1 If applying for a license, after accepting the application and performing the policy review, safety review, payload review, environmental review, and financial responsibility determination, the FAA makes a licensing determination on the SNS on a case-by-case basis, per §450.45(e)(6). If applying for a payload determination, the FAA issues a favorable payload determination if the applicant has obtained all required licenses, authorizations, and permits and its launch or reentry would not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States.

A.2 SNS DEVICE AND MISSION DESCRIPTION. › A.2.1 The following information is foundational to the nuclear safety…

Appendix A. Nuclear Safety Information and Analyses

A.1 SCOPE.

An applicant using this AC as a means of compliance to § 450.45(e)(6) or § 450.43(a)(2) should provide to the FAA the information and conduct the analyses in this appendix.

A.2 SNS DEVICE AND MISSION DESCRIPTION.

A.2.1 The following information is foundational to the nuclear safety analyses and ultimately the public safety risks of the SNS mission. The applicant should provide the following information to the FAA such as:

• SNS owner and operator;

• SNS type;

• SNS purpose;

• SNS physical dimensions and weight;

• Structural design of SNS components;

• SNS physical barriers to radioactive release;

• SNS instrumentation, monitoring, and control system characteristics;

• SNS fuel design;

• SNS orbital parameters for parking, transfer, and final orbits;

• Hazardous material quantities, including the radioactive material via the RMR;

• Mission stages for the SNS;

• Intended SNS operations during the entire mission;

• Delivery point in flight at which the SNS will no longer be under the launch licensee’s control;

• Methods to prevent and terminate criticality during launch and reentry, as applicable;

• Shielding design and materials used;

• Decay heat generation rates expected during launch or reentry, as applicable;

• Decay heat removal methods, as applicable;

• Decay heat removal capability, as applicable;

• Signal paths from SNS to the operator;

• SNS control system design and operational parameters; and

• SNS and host spacecraft software design, configuration control, and performance.

A.3 RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL REPORT. › A.3.1 All applications for SNS should include a RMR, as the type and…

A.2.2 The purpose of the SNS device and mission description is for applicants to communicate to the FAA what the SNS mission is and how the SNS will be operated. This information enables the FAA to determine the completeness of subsequent nuclear safety analyses. If the applicant considers other information relevant to the overall SNS design or mission, that information may also be included in the SNS device and mission description. There is no need to include nuclear safety analyses or public safety calculations in the SNS design and mission description, as this information is included in subsequent nuclear safety analysis reports.

A.3 RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL REPORT.

A.3.1 All applications for SNS should include a RMR, as the type and quantity of radioactive material onboard is the foundation for determining the public safety risk of the SNS and the Tier level of the SNS. For every radionuclide on a launch or reentry vehicle, the RMR:

• Identifies the specific isotope, quantity, total activity and A2 value;8

• Specifies the moment in time at which the activity was measured for each source;

• Describes any NRC or agreement state approval for pre-flight ground testing involving that isotope;

8 Applicants may choose to use MM to describe the activity of the isotope.

Table 5 – Sample Radiological Material Report

A.3 RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL REPORT. › A.3.2 NSPM-20 specifies that the Tier level determination considers…

Source Description Element Symbol

E Z A

Half- Life (Years) (IAEA 2021)

Activity per Source (Ci) as Measured on (date)

Number of Sources

Total Activity (Ci)

IAEA A2 (Ci) (IAEA 2018)

Mission Multiple MM

Material Supplier

General purpose

heat source fuel clads (Contained

in 3 Spacecraft

Radioisotope Thermoelectric

Generators)

Pu 94 238

as

PuO2 94 238

87.7

1,908 As measured

on 8-20-2019

216 412,128 0.027 1.53x107 DOE

Radioisotope Heater Unit Fuel

Clads (Onboard

Payload)

Pu 94 238

as

Pu 94 238 O2

87.7

33.6 As measured

on 12-16-2020

129 4,334 0.027 1.61x105 DOE

Instrument Calibration

Source (Encapsulated)

Co 27 60 5.27

6x10-6

As measured

on 2-15-2021

2 1.2x10-5 10.8 1.1x10-6 Commercial

Source

Total 416,462 1.53x107

A.3.2 NSPM-20 specifies that the Tier level determination considers both launch and “subsequent stages when accidents may result in radiological effects to the public or environment” (NSPM-20 2019), which drives the potential need for RMR addendums to determine the Tier level of the SNS. For example, a fission reactor may meet Tier II criteria at launch, but after operation the resulting risk of the SNS and mission may meet the Tier III criteria, making it a Tier III system. Robust computer codes exist to model the burnup of nuclear fuel and aid in developing the RMR addendums (Argonne National Laboratory 2016), (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2018). Table 5 of this AC shows a sample RMR for a mission using multiple radioactive devices, applicants may develop their own format that displays the essential information in a clear manner.

• Includes a RMR addendum addressing the safe terrestrial handling, use, and storage of all the isotopes in the SNS;

• Includes a RMR addendum showing the isotopic makeup of the SNS at the following times:

a. Launch;

b. During all planned flybys;

c. During planned reentry, as applicable for the mission.

• If the SNS can over time develop an isotopic composition more harmful than that at launch, the RMR also includes an addendum for the worst time in life that the SNS will have potential to return to Earth.

A.4 CRITICALITY HAZARD ANALYSIS.

A.4 CRITICALITY HAZARD ANALYSIS. › A.4.2 If a criticality hazard analysis is required, the analysis is…

A.4.1 From the RMR, applicants will be able to quickly identify whether their SNS contains fertile material, fissionable material, or fissile material, as defined by the NRC or the IAEA (IAEA 2002), (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2020). If these isotopes are present, or will become present as the SNS operates, then a criticality hazard analysis is needed to determine if the SNS has potential for criticality during normal SNS operations or off-nominal events in all mission phases (NSPM-20 2019). The criticality hazard analysis step is included even for an SNS with small amounts of fertile, fissionable, or fissile material because critical mass limits have not been established for space environments, since fission can dramatically change the public safety profile of the SNS, including nuclear proliferation concerns and ionizing radiation exposure potential (Connell and Trost 1994).

A.4.2 If a criticality hazard analysis is required, the analysis is conducted by first identifying all reasonably foreseeable hazards which may contribute to fission occurring in the SNS, using valid scientific principles and statistical methods. Examples of relevant information for completing a criticality hazard analysis include:

• The mass of material relative to the theoretical minimum mass limits for criticality emergencies on Earth, as discussed in various standards including American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ANS-8.1-2014;

• Moderators and reflectors that are inherent to the SNS or spacecraft;

• Deliberate design features of the SNS to control form, shape, or collocation;

• Spacecraft operation, including launch, staging, and release;

• System, subsystem, and component failures or faults;

• Severe physical deformation of the SNS and spacecraft;

• Software operations or malfunctions;

• External environmental changes for all anticipated operational or malfunction environments;

• Interactions with space radiation;

• Proximity to other sources of radioactivity;

• Procedure deficiencies;

• Design inadequacies;

• Human factors;

• Functional and physical interfaces between subsystems; and

• Interactions of any of the above.

A.4.3 There are two possible outcomes for the criticality hazard analysis:

1. Criticality is not possible for the SNS under any reasonably foreseeable criticality hazard scenarios, or;

A.5 CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS. › A.5.1 If the criticality hazard analysis finds that criticality is…

2. Criticality is possible within reasonably foreseeable criticality hazard scenarios, including deliberately designed capabilities for fission reactors.

A.4.4 When the criticality hazard analysis shows that criticality is possible, the analysis catalogs the scenarios and conditions necessary for criticality. The analysis also identifies and describes the criticality risk mitigation measures used to preclude unintended criticality. Much like a flight hazard analysis, criticality hazard analyses are continually updated throughout the lifecycle of the SNS to ensure the potential for the SNS to achieve criticality is known at all times under all foreseeable operating conditions.

A.5 CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS.

A.5.1 If the criticality hazard analysis finds that criticality is possible within foreseeable criticality hazard scenarios in any mission phase, a criticality safety analysis is performed to calculate the likelihood and effects of fission in the SNS under each of the foreseeable criticality hazard scenarios that can result in fission. The criticality safety analysis considers scenarios where the SNS is intact, as well as the scenarios that result in uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment. The criticality safety analysis is performed with sufficient fidelity to:

• Determine the conditions and associated probability factors impacting the prompt neutron population and the ability of the SNS to become prompt critical;

• Determine the conditions and associated probability factors impacting the delayed neutron population and the ability of the SNS to become delayed critical;

• Determine the extent to which the SNS can remain subcritical in all reasonably foreseeable environments, including malfunction environments, i.e., the shutdown margin of the device;

• Quantify the performance of the system and radiation emissions for the criticality accidents that could occur;

• Quantify the performance of the system and radiation emissions for various power excursions, including short duration dramatic power excursions and long duration marginal power excursions;

• Quantify the risk of ionizing radiation exposure to the public if criticality were to occur within the Earth’s biosphere;

• Quantify the probability of criticality occurring;

• Quantify the expected rate of energy release and duration of criticality;

• Quantify the maximum possible activity in the SNS;

A.5 CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS. › A.5.2 Criticality safety analysis may require applicants to apply a…

• Quantify the length of time for the fission products to decay to a level of radioactivity comparable to that of U-235 by the time it reenters the Earth’s atmosphere (per Sec. 3(a)(iii) of SPD-6).

• Quantify the radiation types and exposure pathways if the intact SNS were in proximity to a member of the public with the maximum SNS activity.

• Quantify the expected radiation dose rate at various points and distances around the intact SNS, from on-contact to the distance at which the dose rate is 25 mrem per hour TED for various scenarios, including:

a. During fission;

b. Immediately after shutdown;

c. At the time of maximum SNS activity;

d. Hourly for the first 24 hours after shutdown;

e. Daily for the first 7 days after shutdown;

f. Weekly for the first month after shutdown;

g. Monthly for the first year after shutdown;

h. If deliberate reentry is planned:

i. Hourly for the first 24 hours after reentry;

ii. Daily for the first 7 days after reentry;

iii. Weekly for the first month after reentry;

iv. Monthly for the first year after reentry;

• Quantify how the temperature of the SNS would behave over time if the SNS returned to Earth after fission, considering fission product decay heat; and

• Quantify how containing a critical chain reaction in the space operating environment will alter the material properties of the physical barriers to radioactive release.

A.5.2 Criticality safety analysis may require applicants to apply a combination of computer models from the NRC or DOE national labs and analytical techniques described by various standards setting organizations, as applicable to the specific technologies and isotopes present in the SNS. As commercial SNS use increases and the technology matures, the FAA anticipates that standards will be developed that are uniquely applicable to commercial SNS, however those do not exist at the time of this AC. Until then, applicants should take care to use analysis methods with sound underlying scientific principles and valid statistical methods.

A.6 OPTIONAL COMPARISON TO EXISTING NUCLEAR ANALYSES. › A.6.3 References that may be useful for SNS applicants include but are…

A.6 OPTIONAL COMPARISON TO EXISTING NUCLEAR ANALYSES.

A.6.1 Quantifying the ionizing radiation dose from various isotopes has been an ongoing field of research for decades, and practices continue to evolve and adapt. Some analyses have shown long-standing acceptance and may be suitable for SNS applicants to leverage to shorten their own nuclear safety analysis efforts. Some of these analyses have reached final conclusions on the mass or activity of an isotope required for certain dose thresholds to be met, a particularly useful conclusion for assessing the radiation exposure risk of an SNS. For a small SNS, it may be possible to compare the mass or activity of the isotopes to these pre-established values to establish the public safety risk of the SNS. Applicants have the option to compare their SNS and mission to these existing analyses, or to perform the more comprehensive analysis, which still may be required even if the comparison method is attempted.

A.6.2 If this route is utilized, care should be taken to ensure that rigorous analysis without biases that may prove to be non-conservative are used, as the release, exposure, or inhalation fractions used in the existing analyses may not be appropriate for the accident environments an SNS might experience. To meet or exceed the maximum quantity of radioactive material allowed in the existing analyses, evidence is needed that the release and exposure fractions for the SNS in any hazardous scenario will be equivalent to or less than the release and exposure fractions used in the existing analyses. If evidence is not provided, then FAA conservatively assumes the release and exposure fractions for an SNS accident are 1.0, this effectively reduces the threshold quantities of radioactive material to achieve a given maximum dose listed in the established analyses.

A.6.3 References that may be useful for SNS applicants include but are not limited to:

• DOE publications. The DOE may cancel, revise, or publish a new document at any time, when this AC was written the following series were germane to an SNS safety analysis:

a. DOE-HDBK-3010(series), Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable

Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.

b. DOE-STD-1196(series), Derived Concentration Technical Standard.

c. DOE-STD-1027(series), Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities.

• EPA publications. The EPA may cancel, revise, or publish a new publication at any time. When this AC was written, the following publications were germane to SNS safety analysis:

a. FGR No. 11: Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and

Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion, September 1988.

b. FGR No. 15, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water and Soil, revised

August 2019.

A.6 OPTIONAL COMPARISON TO EXISTING NUCLEAR ANALYSES. › A.6.4 Based on the RMR and comparison to the existing analyses…

• IAEA Publications. Because NSPM-20 is linked to a specific IAEA document, these references will remain valid unless national policy is updated:

a. IAEA Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-6 (Rev.1), Regulations for the

Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, (2018 edition).

b. IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-26, Advisory Material for the IAEA

Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 Edition).

• International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) publications. The ICRP may cancel, revise, or publish a new publication at any time. When this AC was written, the following publications were germane to an SNS safety analysis:

a. ICRP Publication 60, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission

on Radiological Protection, 1990.

b. ICRP Publication 103, The 2007 Recommendations of the International

Commission on Radiological Protection, 2007.

c. ICRP Publication 107, Nuclear Decay Data for Dosimetric Calculations, 2008.

d. ICRP Publication 119, Compendium of Dose Coefficients based on ICRP

Publication 60, 2012.

e. ICRP Publication 133, The ICRP Computational Framework for Internal Dose

Assessment for Reference Adults: Specific Absorbed Fractions, 2016.

• NRC Regulatory Guides (RG) and Technical Reports (NUREG), including:

a. NUREG-1140, January 1988, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency

Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees, reprinted August 1991.

b. NRC Regulatory Guide 7.9, Revision 2, Standard Format and Content of

Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material.

• United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, annual report to the General Assembly Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation series. At the time of this AC, the following reports were of particular interest for SNS:

a. 2016 Report Annex A – Methodology for estimating public exposures due to

radioactive discharges.

b. 2008 Report Volume II Annex C – Radiation exposure in accidents.

c. 2000 Report Volume I Annex A – Dose assessment methodologies.

A.6.4 Based on the RMR and comparison to the existing analyses mentioned above, it may be possible for applicants to quickly establish that their SNS is Tier I or Tier II without performing an elaborate nuclear safety analysis. The FAA expects that trace amounts of nuclear materials such as that which is typically used in instrumentation may not require any additional analyses.

A.7 RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS. › A.7.1 When the comparison of existing analysis is unable to establish…

A.7 RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS.

A.7.1 When the comparison of existing analysis is unable to establish the public safety risk of the SNS, when fission is possible in the SNS, or for applicants who opt not to compare to existing nuclear safety analyses, a radiological hazard analysis (RHA) is needed. The purpose of the RHA is to identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety resulting from the launch, operation, or reentry of an SNS in all mission phases. Like a flight hazard analysis, the RHA is updated continually throughout the lifecycle of the SNS, as events may occur that change the performance of the SNS. Functionally, the RHA provides applicants an opportunity to identify hazards and develop hazard control strategies to minimize the public safety risk of the SNS. The FAA does not mandate the specific type of analysis used to perform the RHA so long as the method:

• Considers all mission phases;

• Identifies all reasonably foreseeable hazards, and the corresponding failure mode for each hazard associated with the launch or reentry of the SNS relevant to public safety, including those relevant from:

a. Ionizing radiation;

b. SNS operation;

c. Scenarios where the boundaries to radioactive release remain intact;

d. Scenarios where the boundaries to radioactive release fail;

e. System, subsystem, and component failures or faults; including launch and

reentry vehicle failures, flight abort system failure or activation, etc.;

f. Software operations;

g. Environmental conditions;

h. Human factors;

i. Design inadequacies;

j. Procedure deficiencies;

k. Functional and physical interfaces between subsystems, including SNS

interaction with the launch or reentry vehicle and other payloads, if applicable; and

l. Interactions of any of the above.

• Includes known failure modes, such as those addressed in Advisory Circular (AC) 450.101-1 High Consequence Event Protection; and,

• Has sound underlying scientific principles and statistical validity.

A.8 HIGH FIDELITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS. › A.8.4 Specific accident environments that may need to be considered…

A.8 HIGH FIDELITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS.

A.8.1 The high-fidelity radiological safety analysis (HFRSA) process involves applying probabilistic risk assessment methods and calculating the risk to the public for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures of safety-critical systems during normal and malfunction operations in all mission phases. The HFRSA should be complete enough for the FAA to validate the accuracy and findings of the HFRSA to make a licensing decision. For SNS, it is the consequence analysis side that introduces the greatest challenges and highest uncertainty in the HFRSA because of the complexities of radiation transport, exposure, biokinetics, and dosimetry. The end conclusions of the HFRSA are the PER for the most exposed individual for each event and failure.

A.8.2 The guidance provided in ACs 450.115-1 and -1A, High Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis provide applicants a good starting point for performing the HFRSA, but lacks the specific information needed to calculate the ionizing radiation exposure risks. To compute this additional information, applicants are encouraged to utilize computer codes developed by the NRC, the DOE national labs, or the computational methods underpinning the existing nuclear safety analyses. If none of these options are viable, applicants could make bounding assumptions without biases that may prove to be conservative using the worst-case radioactivity characteristics of the SNS, as identified in the RMR addendums. For all HFRSA, applicants should clearly demonstrate the accuracy of the fundamental scientific principles and statistical validity underpinning the analysis.

A.8.3 The purpose of HFRSA is to calculate the PER for all reasonably foreseeable events the SNS could experience, so the SNS risks can be accurately assessed. Doing this will necessitate determining the probability, location, accident type, radioactive material composition, dispersion, exposure pathways, and exposure magnitudes for ionizing radiation exposure to members of the public. This includes scenarios where the SNS remains intact, and those that result in uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment at some point. The HFRSA is a significant undertaking and will be more involved than the flight safety analysis for a non-SNS mission.

A.8.4 Specific accident environments that may need to be considered when performing the HFRSA include but are not limited to those shown in Table 6 of this AC.

A.8 HIGH FIDELITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS. › A.8.7 These accident scenarios may, in and of themselves, pose hazards…

Table 6 – Accident Environments for HFRSA Consideration

Accident Environment Physical Mechanisms

Dynamic Acceleration, Shock, Vibration

Explosive Overpressure

Kinetic ΔP, dP/dt

Thermal T, ΔT, ∇T, dT/dt

Nuclear Radiation Fluence

Chemical Chemical Reactivity

A.8.5 Where P is Linear Momentum, T is the Temperature, t is the Time, Δ is the Difference Operator, ∇ is the Gradient Operator, d/dt is the Differential Operator.

A.8.6 Accident environments include fireball temperatures, explosive debris fragment velocities, and speeds for ground impact. Other accident environments include pressure gradient, atmospheric lapse rate, wind, and precipitation, which can affect the transport of released radioisotopes on the ground and in the atmosphere. Break-up state vectors – position (location and altitude), velocity, and acceleration are important initial conditions for the transport equations of motion.

A.8.7 These accident scenarios may, in and of themselves, pose hazards to people and property. They are addressed in non-nuclear portions of launch and reentry licensing. From a nuclear safety perspective, they also impose hazards to the physical barriers to radioactive release that can result in radiological release and dispersal resulting in a PER that must be determined by the HFRSA to satisfy acceptable levels of risk in Chapter 7 of this AC. When complete, the HFRSA provides the information shown in Table 7 of this AC. An iterative process may be beneficial to develop this information by considering the results of safety analyses required for non-nuclear and nuclear missions. In some cases, the results of the HFRSA may inform decisions regarding the performance of safety mitigations employed by the launch or reentry vehicle. Like all nuclear safety analyses, the HFRSA should be based on sound underlying scientific principles and valid statistical methods.

Table 7 – Information Produced by a HFRSA

Information Produced by a HFRSA Rationale

Normal operational occurrences analysis for each stage of the mission, including launch, ascent, on orbit, departure from orbit, reentry, and end of mission (EOM).

This information quantifies the baseline risk of the SNS and is used to develop the environmental review.

The PER to the most exposed member of the public during normal operations.

This information quantifies the baseline risk of the SNS and is used to develop the environmental review.

Histograms showing the number of people expected to receive various TEDs above background radiation levels up to the highest dose for normal operations.

This information quantifies the baseline risk of the SNS and is used to develop the environmental review.

Normal operations analysis for return to orbit, on orbit, and EOM disposal, if applicable.

This information is used to assess whether a commercial SNS might impact national assets with radiation detection capabilities. It is also used during the safety and payload reviews, and potentially to develop the environmental review.

A radiation emission heatmap showing the maximum expected radiation from the SNS out to 100 km from the vehicle when operating in space.

This information is used to assess whether a commercial SNS might impact national assets with radiation detection capabilities. It is also used during the safety and payload reviews, and potentially to develop the environmental review.

Accident analysis for each stage of the mission, including launch, ascent, on orbit, departure from orbit, reentry, uncontrolled reentry, and EOM disposal.

This information is used to validate the calculated SNS Tier level, to develop the environmental review, and to calculate the maximum probable loss (MPL).

The PER to the most exposed member of the public for each failure chain with a probability greater than 1x10-7.

This information is used to validate the calculated SNS Tier level, to develop the environmental review, and to calculate the MPL.

A.8 HIGH FIDELITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS. › A.8.8 Additional information on performing probabilistic risk…

Information Produced by a HFRSA Rationale

Histograms showing the number of people expected to receive various TEDs above background up to the highest dose for each scenario with a probability greater than 1x10-7.

This information is used during the safety and payload reviews, and potentially to develop the environmental review.

Severe accident analysis for each stage of the mission, including launch, ascent, on orbit, departure from orbit, reentry, uncontrolled reentry, and EOM disposal.

This information is used to determine the risk to the public and to assist in the development of the environmental review.

The PER to members of the public for the failure chain that produces the highest PER to a member of the public, and the probability of that failure.

This information is used to determine the risk to the public and to assist in the development of the environmental review.

A histogram showing the number of people expected to receive various TEDs for the failure chain with the highest PER to a member of the public, for various TEDs from background up to the highest dose.

This information is used to determine the risk to the public and to assist in the development of the environmental review..

A.8.8 Additional information on performing probabilistic risk assessment and public exposure calculations for nuclear systems is also available from various nuclear agencies and organizations. Some of these documents are listed in chapter 3 of this AC, but more specific probabilistic risk assessment guidance and standards are available elsewhere. This information may be very useful to applicants where the SNS merits an RHA or HFRSA. The following is a brief list of some, but not all, of the references available at the time of this AC which may aid applicants in performing their nuclear safety analyses:

A.8.8.1 American Nuclear Society (ANS).

• ANS RA-S-1.4-2021, Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Advanced Non-Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants.

• ANS 6.1.1-2020, Photon and Neutron Fluence-to-Dose Conversion Coefficients.

• ANS 8.23-2019 Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response.

• ASME/ANS RA-S-1.3-202x, “Standard for Radiological Accident Offsite Consequence Analysis (Level 3 PRA) to Support Nuclear Installation Application” (revision of trial-use standard ASME/ANS RA-S-1.3-2017)

A.8.8.2 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME).

• ASME RA-S-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications.

Note: ASME/ANS RA-S-1.3-202x, “Standard for Radiological Accident Offsite Consequence Analysis (Level 3 PRA) to Support Nuclear Installation Application” (revision of trial-use standard ASME/ANS RA-S-1.3-2017) ANS RA-S-1.3-2017 and ASME/ANS RA-S-1.3-2017 refer to a joint standard under trial use development by ASME and ANS. It has not been made a final standard.

A.8.8.3 Department of Energy

• DOE-STD-1628(series), Development of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Safety Applications.

A.8.8.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document.

• NUREG-2201, Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Regulatory Decision-making: Some Frequently Asked Questions.

• NUREG-2199, An Integrated Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) for Nuclear Power Plant Internal Events At-Power Application.

• Regulatory Guide 1.200, Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities.

• Regulatory Guide 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors.

• Regulatory Guide 1.247, Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Non-Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed Activities.

Note: This regulatory guide was issued for trial use at the time of this AC publication. A final version may now be available.

A.8 HIGH FIDELITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS. › A.9.5 RERP’s can be created by applying the principles and process of…

A.9 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN.

A.9.1 Consistent with DOE and NRC practices, a radiological emergency response plan (RERP) is needed when an SNS contains sufficient material to have off-site safety implications (Title 10 CFR Chapter I 2021). This determination is made when the amount of radioactive material, as indicated in the RMR, exceeds the thresholds of Title 10 CFR 30.72 Schedule C (Title 10 CFR Chapter I 2021). For the accident environments the SNS may experience, the release fractions stated in Title 10 CFR 30.72 Schedule C may not be appropriate. To avoid making a non-conservative assumption, the FAA uses a default assumption that the SNS release fraction is 1.0, unless evidence is presented to show that the release fraction is lower. This has the net effect of reducing the threshold quantities listed in Title 10 CFR part 30.72 Schedule C unless evidence is provided.

A.9.2 In cases where there are multiple isotopes present, an RERP is required when the sum of all the ratios on any RMR or RMR addendum between SNS isotopes and Title 10 CFR 30.72 Schedule C thresholds exceeds 1.0 (Title 10 CFR Chapter I 2021). For example: consider an SNS with only two isotopes, A and B, where the release fractions of Title 10 CFR 30.72 Schedule C are shown to be correct:

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝐴𝐴 (10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 30.72 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝐴𝐴

= 0.55

And

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝐵𝐵 (10 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 30.72 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝐵𝐵

= 0.9

A.9.3 The combined value of all isotopes on this SNS would be:

0.55 + 0.9 = 1.45

A.9.4 Because the combined value 1.45 is greater than 1.0, an RERP would be required for this SNS.

A.9.5 RERP’s can be created by applying the principles and process of NUREG 0654/FEMA (Radiological Emergency Preparedness) REP-1 Rev. 2 Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness dated December 2019. The RERP is not itself an analysis, but rather a response plan that provides the FAA assurance that the applicant and involved government entities are prepared to respond in the event of a radiological emergency. RERPs contain contingencies to address scenarios addressing fixed facilities where a member of the public may be exposed to ionizing radiation, as identified in the RHA, HFRSA and criticality safety analysis if applicable. Thus, while the RMR determines whether an RERP is needed, the subsequent analyses may need to be completed before the RERP can be completed.

A.2.2 The purpose of the SNS device and mission description is for… › A.11 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT.

A.9.6 RERPs for SNS that will operate or linger in Earth orbit include how the radiological risks have been discussed with other nations, and the procedures and governmental collaboration that will be used to recover, mitigate, and decontaminate the area if a SNS has an uncontrolled reentry in another nation.

A.9.7 RERPs can be incorporated in an applicant’s overall mishap plan as required by § 450.173.

A.10 TIER LEVEL DETERMINATION. After the HFRSA process is complete, the final Tier level of the SNS can be determined, unless it was previously determined due to satisfying automatic criteria. The applicant will utilize the results of their HFRSA to determine the Tier level, and the FAA will evaluate both the analysis and the final Tier level conclusion.

A.11 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT. An application for launch or reentry of an SNS requires a SAR (NSPM-20 2019). The SAR provides sufficiently detailed and complete enough documentation to support the FAA’s evaluation of the applicant’s safety analysis as applicable for that SNS. The SAR documents the detailed and complete results of all analysis performed to assess the safety of the SNS and elaborates on the comparison to existing analyses for the SNS that are assessed using this method. Additional information might be warranted in the SAR as determined by SNS mission parameters on a case-by-case basis. Creating the SAR provides the applicant an opportunity to communicate to the FAA how the risks of the SNS are being properly assessed and addressed to protect public health and safety and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. A SAR should include the following:

• Evidence of technical peer review for all hazard analyses and safety analyses;

• A concise, high-level summary of key risk information:

a. The likelihood of an accident resulting in an exposure more than 5 rem TED to

any member of the public;

b. The number of individuals who might receive exposure more than 5 rem TED in

an accident scenario;

c. Comparisons of the potential exposure levels to other meaningful measures:

i. Space nuclear system launch safety guidelines;

ii. Average public exposure from natural and human made sources; and

iii. Other relevant public safety standards.

A.11 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT. › A.11.1 In some cases, it may be appropriate to include a…

A.11.1 In some cases, it may be appropriate to include a system-specific SAR within a mission

SAR. This could be advantageous when multiple launches of the same space nuclear system are planned, as the first system-specific SAR could specify the safety basis envelope for the system. The safety basis envelope would set the conditions under which the nuclear safety analyses are valid and provide assurance of safe operation of the SNS. This would limit the scope of the applicant produced nuclear safety analysis for future missions with the same SNS. If a system-specific SAR is used, the mission SAR either:

1. Demonstrates that the mission is within the safety basis envelope established in the system-specific SAR.

a. No additional safety analysis is required for the space nuclear system in this case

because the safety of the system has already been established within the safety basis envelope.

2. Includes supplemental safety analysis for deviations outside the established safety basis envelope where safety has not yet been demonstrated.

a. Additional analysis is required to ensure public safety is not adversely impacted

by the planned operations outside the initial safety basis envelope.

Appendix B. Guideline Safety Recommendations

B.1 SCOPE.

This appendix provides recommendations for an applicant to consider to minimize the public safety risk of an SNS. This appendix also provides recommendations to applicants that, if incorporated, will increase the likelihood that the FAA will be able to issue a safety approval or a favorable payload determination.

B.2 NUCLEAR SAFETY THEMES. › B.2.1.1 From the comprehensive reviews performed to develop this AC,…

B.2 NUCLEAR SAFETY THEMES.

B.2.1.1 From the comprehensive reviews performed to develop this AC, several overarching

themes emerged for commercial SNS safety including but not limited to:

• Sustained successful use of nuclear technology requires a license applicant to have a strong safety culture developed in their organization;

• Preventing failure of an SNS does more to protect the public than responding to failures;

• The risk to the public increases if the radioactive material escapes from the SNS;

• The larger the ionizing radiation potential from an SNS, the less likely failures must be to achieve an acceptable overall risk to the public;

• The initial design of the SNS determines the baseline radiation exposure risk that an SNS can pose to the public;

• SNS may increase the risk to the public above the baseline radiation exposure risk any time there is potential for an SNS to return to Earth, including launch, orbit, reentry, and Earth flyby.

• Spacecraft maneuvers can change the risk of the SNS to the public relative to the baseline radiation exposure risk;

• Operation of the SNS can increase the risk to the public from the baseline radiation exposure risk, sometimes significantly;

• The risk to the public increases as the operating time increases for a fission based SNS;

• The risk to the public for any SNS is much higher when a critical chain reaction is in progress than when the chain reaction is sub-critical;

• The uncontrolled reentry of a fission reactor with a critical chain reaction in progress poses a significant risk to the public;

• The risk to the public increases the closer the SNS operates to Earth; and

• EOM disposal decisions can change the risk of the SNS to the public.

B.2.2 Minimizing Public Safety Risks. › B.2.2.3 The overall risk of radiation exposure to the public is a…

B.2.1.2 From reviewing the designs, licensing requirements, and standards that were in place

for terrestrial nuclear reactors, it became clear that SNS have unique characteristics that will require additional consideration beyond what has been developed to this point. For example, the sophisticated computer models for analyzing terrestrial nuclear accidents currently lack the flexibility to analyze a radioactive release that begins in orbit and results in an uncontrolled reentry, which will make reactor accident analysis for on-orbit SNS challenging (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2017), (Sandia National Laboratories 2021). The guidelines in this appendix were developed to help bridge those gaps.

B.2.1.3 These guidelines are intended to reduce the public safety risk of all SNS. The guidelines

outlined in this appendix use an engineering approach without biases, and a narrow focus for each guideline, which can lead to apparent redundancy for mission concepts that include multiple guideline categories. Collectively, the guidelines in this appendix provide useful direction for a wide variety of nuclear technologies. In some instances, specific guidelines are applicable only to a specific technology or operational concept to address specific identified vulnerabilities. Applicants should use their judgement to identify the guidelines that do not apply to their SNS or mission. Applicants should also use sound engineering judgement and risk mitigation for their mission and implement these guidelines in a manner that reduces the overall public safety risk of the SNS mission.

B.2.2 Minimizing Public Safety Risks.

B.2.2.1 SNS pose a radiological risk to the public any time there is potential for an SNS to

return to Earth, this includes launch, orbit, reentry, and Earth flyby. During the development of this AC, the FAA identified topics that each had the ability to significantly increase the overall risk of the system. Summarized below are vulnerabilities in the form of guidelines, recommending selection of lower risk alternatives, with rationale in italics. Some of the guidelines focus on reducing the mission risk, while others focus on reducing the SNS risk.

B.2.2.2 When assessing the risk of an SNS, operators should consider the risks of the system

itself, and how the risks of the overall mission impact the risk of the SNS. This is because the public safety impact of an SNS depends not only on the potential failures, but also on the potential locations and interactions of those failures.

B.2.2.3 The overall risk of radiation exposure to the public is a combination of both risks,

taking into consideration that the failure of either the SNS or the spacecraft may induce a subsequent failure in the other component. To stay within public risk range requires using lower risk SNS for higher risk missions or performing lower risk missions for higher risk SNS. The guidelines in this appendix address both the mission risk and the SNS risk to aid applicants in staying below the maximum risk threshold regardless of whether the mission development process is started from the perspective of fulfilling a specific mission (fixed initial mission risk) or using a specific SNS (fixed initial SNS risk).

B.2.2 Minimizing Public Safety Risks. › B.2.2.5 The risk drivers, and guidelines to minimize risk, fall into…

B.2.2.4 Figure 5 of this AC was developed to aid applicants in understanding the different risk

drivers for both mission and SNS risk. The colors assigned to various options are indicators of relative risk within that column, and not indicators of absolute risk, or relative risk between columns. For example, the relative risk between disposal on Earth and a fission system operating close to material limits cannot be definitively stated without knowing additional information about the SNS and the mission. Likewise, the absolute risk for disposal on Earth and operating close to material limits cannot be quantified without additional information about the SNS and mission. What can be definitively stated is that disposal on Earth is riskier than disposal in interplanetary space with no free return trajectory to Earth, and that operating with significant margin to material limits reduces risk compared to operating at material limits.

Figure 5 – SNS Mission Risk Drivers

B.2.2.5 The risk drivers, and guidelines to minimize risk, fall into these broad categories:

• SNS Design

o Any SNS, appendix B.2.3;

o SNS with Potential to Return to Earth, appendix B.2.4;

o Fission-Based SNS, appendix B.2.5;

o SNS Host Spacecraft, appendix B.2.6;

o SNS Cybersecurity, appendix B.2.7;

o SNS Analysis, appendix B.2.8; and

o SNS Validation, Verification and Testing, appendix B.2.9.

B.2.3 Guidelines Applicable to All SNS Designs. › B.2.3.1 All SNS should be designed to survive the uniquely challenging…

• SNS Mission Planning

o Launch and Launch Sites, appendix B.2.10;

o Operations, appendix B.2.11; and

o EOM, appendix B.2.12.

• SNS Operations

o Launch, appendix B.2.13;

o Operations, appendix B.2.14; and

o EOM, appendix B.2.15.

B.2.2.6 These guidelines are not requirements or licensing criteria, as it may be possible to

design a system that disregards one or more of these guidelines while still meeting an acceptable overall risk level for licensing. Rather, these guidelines give ways to minimize the overall risk to the public from any given SNS and aid applicants who are unfamiliar with either the risks of radioactive material, commercial space operations, or both.

B.2.3 Guidelines Applicable to All SNS Designs.

B.2.3.1 All SNS should be designed to survive the uniquely challenging space environment,

including the conditions identified in Table 8 of this AC. SNS should be designed to have a low probability of releasing radionuclides in the event of a launch mishap, in space collision, or uncontrolled reentry impact. To meet this objective, designs should use materials that are able to withstand the operating environmental conditions without failure. Material failure can create a direct path for radioactive material release to the environment or lead to a subsequent SNS or space vehicle failure that results in a direct path for radioactive release to the environment. Of note, the FAA does not regulate SNS designs. Per the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the commercial use of nuclear material in the U.S. is regulated under the authority of the NRC (Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 2021), (Energy Reorganization Act 1974).

Table 8 – Design Considerations for All SNS

Consideration Rationale

SNS are designed with the ability to prevent uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment during anticipated operational occurrences.

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