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Advisory Circular Current Issued Jul 21, 2017 AIR-100 94 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 20-151C Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II), Versions 7.0 & 7.1 and Associated Mode S Transponders

We wrote this advisory circular (AC) to guide applicants seeking airworthiness approval for TCAS II version 7.1 (V7.1) certified to technical standard order (TSO) C119c, TSO-C119d or TSO-C119e, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II with Hybrid Surveillance. This AC also provides guidance for applicants seeking airworthiness approval for stand-alone Mode S transponders certified to TSO-C112e, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment. You can also use the guidance in this AC for seeking airworthiness approval for TCAS II version 7.0 (V7.0) certified to TSO-C119b, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II and associated Mode S transponders.

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U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II), Versions 7.0 & 7.1 and Associated Mode S Transponders

Date: 07/21/2017

Initiated by: AIR-100

AC No: 20-151C

Change:

FOREWORD

This AC provides guidance for applicants seeking airworthiness approval for TCAS II certified to technical standard order (TSO) C119c, TSO-C119d or TSO-C119e, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II with Hybrid Surveillance.

If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the form at the end of this document.

Susan J. M. Cabler Manager, Design, Manufacturing, & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. General Information … 1-1

1.1 Purpose of this Advisory Circular … 1-1 1.2 Who this AC applies to … 1-1 1.3 Cancellation … 1-1 1.4 Significant Changes … 1-1 1.5 Scope … 1-2

Chapter 2. TCAS II SYSTEM … 2-1

2.1 System Description … 2-1

2.1.1 Description of a TCAS II System … 2-1

2.1.2 System Advisories … 2-1

2.1.3 System Flight Deck Displays … 2-1

2.1.4 Mode S Transponder … 2-2

2.1.5 Hybrid Surveillance … 2-2

2.2 System Components and Requirements … 2-2

2.2.1 Mode S Transponder … 2-2

2.2.2 Pilot Control … 2-3

2.2.3 Antennas … 2-4

2.2.4 Structural analysis … 2-5

2.2.5 The TCAS Processor … 2-5

2.2.6 Traffic Display … 2-5

2.2.7 Resolution Advisory Display … 2-6

2.2.8 Caution/Warning Lights … 2-7

2.2.9 Aural Alert Requirements … 2-7

2.2.10 Failures, TCAS and Transponder … 2-9

2.3 Airworthiness Considerations … 2-10

2.3.1 Certification Program … 2-10

2.3.2 Certification plan … 2-10

2.3.3 Equipment Compatibility Requirements … 2-10

2.3.4 Aircraft Performance Considerations … 2-12

2.3.5 Evaluating Aircraft Performance … 2-12

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2.3.6 How Aircraft Systems Should Interface with TCAS II … 2-18

2.3.7 Verifying and Validating TCAS II Software … 2-20

2.3.8 Failure Conditions System Safety Assessment and Design Assurance … 2-22

2.3.9 Maintenance Considerations for Hybrid Surveillance Functionality (TSO-C119d and later) … 2-23

2.3.10 Populating Mode S Transponder registers 4016 and 6216 (if implemented). ... 2-24

Chapter 3. Test and Evaluation (Initial Approval) … 3-1

3.1 General … 3-1 3.2 Create a Test Plan … 3-1

3.2.1 Basic Ground Tests … 3-1

3.2.2 Basic Flight Tests … 3-3

3.2.3 Planned Encounter Flight Tests … 3-5

3.2.4 Mode S Transponder Tests … 3-6

Chapter 4. Follow-on Approvals … 4-1

4.1 General … 4-1 4.2 Ground Tests and Evaluations … 4-1 4.3 Flight Tests … 4-3 4.4 Upgrading an Existing TCAS II Installation … 4-5 4.5 Upgrading an Existing Mode S Transponder Installation … 4-5

Chapter 5. Airplane Flight Manual Supplement … 5-1

5.1 Content of an AFMS … 5-1 5.2 TCAS V7.1 AFMS Example … 5-1

Appendix A. Example TCAS II V7.1 AFMS … A-1

Appendix B. Transponder Ground Tests & Evaluations … B-1

Appendix C. Historical Information on Development of TCAS … C-1

Early TCAS … C-1 Recent TCAS Developments … C-1 Accident history related to the development and evolution of TCAS … C-3

Appendix D. Related Documents … D-1

14 CFR Parts … D-1 FAA ACs … D-2 FAA TSOs … D-2 FAA Other … D-3 RTCA Inc. Publications … D-3 SAE International … D-3 AERONAUTICAL RADIO, INC. (ARINC) … D-4

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International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) … D-4 JAA … D-4 EASA … D-4

Appendix E. Definitions and Acronyms … E-1

Definitions. - … E-1 Acronyms … E-3

Appendix F. Interfacing the Transponder to Aircraft Systems to Support Transmission of Short- Term Intent … F-1

General … F-1 Populating Selected Vertical Intention Register BDS 4016 … F-2 Populating Target State and Status Information Register BDS 6216 … F-3

Appendix G. Advisory Circular Feedback Information … G-1

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure A-1. TCAS II/Transponder Control Panel (Example) … A-4

Figure A-2. TCAS II – Traffic Display (Example) … A-5

Figure A-3. TCAS II Traffic Display (Example) … A-6

Figure A-4. TCAS II Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (Example) … A-9

Figure A-5. TCAS II Examples – Preventive RAs … A-11

Figure A-6. TCAS II Examples – Initial Corrective RAs … A-12

Figure A-7. TCAS II Examples – Modifications to Initial Corrective RAs … A-13

Figure F- 1: Aircraft Flight Path … F-5

Figure F- 3. Format of BDS register 6216, Target State and Status Information (Subtype 1; Compatible with ADS-B Version Number = 2) … F-15

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1. Maneuvers … 2-15

Table 2 System Inhibits … 2-18

Table A- 1. TCAS II/Transponder Function Selector … A-4

Table A- 2. Displayed Aircraft Symbols (Examples) … A-5

Table A- 3. REL ALT/FL Switch … A-7

Table A- 4. Above/Norm/Below Switch … A-8

Table A- 5. Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator … A-9

Table F- 1. BDS 4016 Parameters … F-6

Table F- 2: BDS 6216 Parameters … F-6

1.4.3 Elaborates on and clarifies the failure condition classification…

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INFORMATION.

1.1 Purpose of this Advisory Circular. We wrote this advisory circular (AC) to guide applicants seeking airworthiness approval for TCAS II version 7.1 (V7.1) certified to technical standard order (TSO) C119c, TSO-C119d or TSO-C119e, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II with Hybrid Surveillance. This AC also provides guidance for applicants seeking airworthiness approval for stand-alone Mode S transponders certified to TSO-C112e, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment. You can also use the guidance in this AC for seeking airworthiness approval for TCAS II version 7.0 (V7.0) certified to TSO-C119b, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II and associated Mode S transponders.

This AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. In it, we describe an acceptable means, but not the only means, to gain airworthiness approval of TCAS II versions 7.0 and 7.1 systems. However, if you use the means described in the AC, you must follow it in all important respects. The term “must” is used to indicate mandatory requirements when following the guidance in this AC. The terms “should” and “recommend” are used when following the guidance is recommended but not required to comply with this AC.

1.2 Who this AC applies to. Applicants seeking a type certificate (TC), amended type certificate, or supplemental type certificate (STC) under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 for initial approval and follow-on approvals of TCAS II systems or stand-alone Mode S transponder systems. References to 14 CFR part 25 are appropriate when TCAS II is installed on transport category airplanes. When TCAS II is to be certified for non-transport category airplanes, use the equivalents to the above 14 CFR part 25 sections in other parts of the regulations. Although this AC is intended for TCAS II installed on transport category airplanes, it provides useful guidance for part 23 installations if you refer to the equivalent ACs and sections of 14 CFR part 23.

1.3 Cancellation. This revision cancels AC 20-151B, dated March 18, 2014.

1.4 Significant Changes. This revision of the AC does the following:

1.4.1 Mitigates spurious RAs with installation of TSO-C119e TCAS II units.

1.4.2 Adds guidance for implementing select functionality associated with extended squitter, elementary and enhanced Mode S surveillance messaging.

1.4.3 Elaborates on and clarifies the failure condition classification of TCAS II systems, particularly with regard to missing RAs (failure to provide an RA, or providing one late, when a threat is present).

1.5.7 This advisory circular provides applicants with guidance for…

1.4.4 Sets policy and provides guidance to annunciate TCAS and transponder failures in the primary field of view as an advisory level alert.

1.5 Scope. What this AC Covers.

1.5.1 In this AC, we cover design aspects, characteristics, mechanization, testing, and the criticality of system failure cases for TCAS II V7.0 and V7.1 and associated Mode S transponders. Our guidance focuses on systems that provide traffic advisories (TA) and resolution advisories (RA) in the vertical sense only (TCAS II), and where operational performance standards are defined in technical documents developed by a joint air transport industry-government group (the RTCA, Inc. Special Committee SC-147).

1.5.2 We also cover TCAS II hybrid surveillance, which is now included in a TCAS II system.

1.5.3 We do not cover traffic symbology for traffic displays in systems that integrate TCAS and Airborne Separation Applications System (ASAS). Guidance for airworthiness approvals of ADS-B Out and ADS-B In can be found in Advisory Circulars 20-165B and 20-172B respectively.

1.5.4 We also cover implementation of certain messaging capability of extended squitter and ELS/EHS Mode S Transponders, specifically, Selected Vertical Intention (BDS register 4016) and Target State and Status Information (BDS register 6216).

1.5.5 For more thorough guidance on Mode S Elementary surveillance, refer to Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Temporary Guidance Leaflet (TGL) 13 Revision 1, Certification of Mode S Transponder Systems for Elementary Surveillance, and EASA Certification Specification and Acceptable Means of Compliance – Airborne Communication Navigation and Surveillance, (CS-ACNS).

1.5.6 For more thorough guidance on Mode S Enhanced surveillance, refer to Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 20-13, Certification of Mode S Transponder Systems for Enhanced Surveillance, and EASA CS-ACNS.

1.5.7 This advisory circular provides applicants with guidance for obtaining an airworthiness approval for TCAS II. Integration with flight guidance systems in an aircraft is out of scope for this document. For guidance on integration with an aircraft’s flight guidance system, refer to Advisory Circular 25.1329-1C, Approval of Flight Guidance Systems.

2.1.3 System Flight Deck Displays.

CHAPTER 2. TCAS II SYSTEM

2.1 System Description.

2.1.1 Description of a TCAS II System. TCAS II is an airborne traffic alert and collision avoidance system that interrogates air traffic control (ATC) transponders in nearby aircraft and uses computer processing to identify and display potential and predicted collision threats. The system is designed to protect a volume of airspace around the TCAS II equipped aircraft. The system will provide appropriate aural and visual advisories to the flight crew to take action to ensure adequate separation when the computer analysis of the intruding aircraft transponder replies predict a penetration of the protected airspace.

The TCAS II system can only generate RAs for intruders equipped with responding Mode S or Mode C transponders, which provide information on the altitude of the threat aircraft. Traffic advisories can be generated for any aircraft equipped with an operative Mode S or an ATCRBS transponder, regardless of its ability to provide information on the intruder aircraft’s altitude.

We view TCAS II systems as a supplement to the pilot who has the primary responsibility for avoiding midair collisions. The TCAS II system provides no protection from threat aircraft without operative transponders. TCAS II does not alter or diminish the pilot’s basic authority and responsibility to ensure safe flight.

Nevertheless, TCAS II is a safety-enhancing system that has been introduced and refined in response to accident experience, and it is required by operating rules for certain aircraft. Therefore, we consider it important for TCAS II systems to perform their intended function with adequate reliability, and for flight crews to be made aware promptly and conspicuously when TCAS failure or loss of function occurs. It is important to note that own-ship and intruder aircraft transponders are a vital part of the system.

2.1.2 System Advisories. The system provides two types of advisories:

2.1.2.1 TAs indicate the relative positions of intruding aircraft that are approximately 20 - 48 seconds from the closest point of approach (CPA), depending on the sensitivity level (SL), and may a short time later require a RA. TAs also give the flight crew the opportunity to visually acquire the intruding aircraft out-the-window.

2.1.2.2 RAs provide a vertical avoidance maneuver to increase separation when the computer predicts the threat aircraft is between 15-35 seconds from the closest point of approach, depending on the SL.

2.1.3 System Flight Deck Displays. The system provides two types of flight deck displays:

2.1.3.1 A traffic display depicts the relative position of ATC transponderequipped aircraft.

2.2.1 Mode S Transponder.

2.1.3.2 An RA display for each pilot indicates the appropriate vertical maneuver to avoid a threat. The RA display provides the pilot with information on the vertical speed or pitch angle to fly in order to avoid a threat. The RA display is typically implemented on an instantaneous vertical speed indicator (IVSI), a vertical speed tape that is part of a Primary Flight Display (PFD), or using pitch cues displayed on the PFD.

2.1.4 Mode S Transponder.

2.1.4.1 The TCAS II aircraft must be equipped with a Mode S ATC transponder, which provides air-to-air communications for coordinating the resolution maneuvers between TCAS II equipped aircraft.

2.1.4.2 The Mode S transponder also provides discrete-address replies to interrogations from ground stations and other aircraft equipped with TCAS II.

2.1.5 Hybrid Surveillance. Hybrid surveillance is a function of TCAS used as a means to decrease Mode S interrogations. Aircraft may use passive surveillance instead of active surveillance to track intruders that meet validation criteria and are not projected to be near-term collision threats. Active surveillance uses the standard TCAS transponder interrogation that provides range, bearing and altitude to the intruder. Passive surveillance uses automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data broadcast from other aircraft. The passive surveillance data is broadcast and received through the use of Mode S Extended Squitter, that is, 1090 megahertz (MHz) ADS-B. Hybrid surveillance does not degrade the performance of TCAS active surveillance. This is a requirement and is tested by ensuring active surveillance performs as specified by the TCAS II performance standards.

2.2 System Components and Requirements.

2.2.1 Mode S Transponder.

2.2.1.1 A Mode S transponder is required for TCAS II operation. It is an enhanced version of the ATCRBS transponder design that is interoperable and compatible with ATCRBS. Each aircraft equipped with a Mode S transponder is assigned a discrete address code. Mode S also provides the air-to-air data link between TCAS II-equipped aircraft to coordinate resolution maneuvers. This ensures the RA displayed in one TCAS IIequipped aircraft is compatible with the maneuver displayed in the other TCAS II equipped aircraft. For example, two TCAS equipped aircraft involved in a conflict may coordinate with each other so that the aircraft at the higher altitude issues a “climb” command, while the aircraft at the lower altitude issues a “descend” command, to prevent the two aircraft’s flight paths from crossing. The Mode S transponder has the capability to provide a data link between the equipped aircraft and the ground, in addition to all of other transponder functions. A Mode S transponder may

2.2.2 Pilot Control.

be installed independently or with a TCAS II installation. The performance standard for Mode S installed independently of TCAS is provided in TSO-C112e, Requirements, paragraph 3.

2.2.1.2 For each aircraft in which a Mode S transponder is installed, the discrete aircraft address for the Mode S transponder must be obtained from the appropriate airworthiness authority of the country in which the aircraft is registered. For U.S. registered aircraft, obtain the discrete aircraft address from the Federal Aviation Administration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, Aircraft Registration Information, AFS-750, PO Box 25504, Oklahoma City, OK 73125, Telephone: (405) 954-3116.

Note: The ICAO 24-bit aircraft address is a uniquely assigned aircraft identification that also identifies the country of registration. For civil aircraft registered in the U.S., the ICAO 24-bit aircraft address is established as a function of the aircraft’s registration number (for example, N1234A). There have been occurrences where two airplanes report identical ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses. This problem can happen when a change in registration numbers occurs. When you change an airplane’s registration number, you should verify that the ICAO 24-bit aircraft address and the new registration number have a one-to-one correspondence.

2.2.2 Pilot Control. A pilot control for the TCAS and transponder equipment must be provided.

2.2.2.1 Provide a means to select the following:

2.2.2.1.1 Operation of TCAS II in the TA/RA mode and Mode S transponder simultaneously.

2.2.2.1.2 Operation of TCAS II in the TA mode and Mode S transponder simultaneously.

2.2.2.1.3 Operation of TCAS II in the standby mode.

2.2.2.2 Also, provide the following additional features:

2.2.2.2.1 A means to select the assigned ATCRBS (MODE A 4096) code.

2.2.2.2.2 A means to initiate the transponder “IDENT” function.

2.2.2.2.3 A means to initiate the TCAS II self-test.

2.2.2.2.4 A means to suppress transponder altitude (Mode C) reporting.

2.2.2.3 The following optional controls may be provided:

2.2.2.3.1 Selection of the weather radar only.

2.2.3 Antennas.

2.2.2.3.2 Control to select the display of traffic within selected altitude bands.

2.2.2.3.3 Selection of the weather radar and traffic display simultaneously.

2.2.2.3.4 Selection of actual flight level (FL) or relative altitude of traffic.

2.2.2.3.5 Selection of TCAS traffic information on multi-function displays.

Note: AC 20-172 ( ), Airworthiness Approval for ADS-B In Systems and Applications, provides guidance addressing integration of controls for TCAS and ADS-B In installations.

2.2.3 Antennas. The Mode S transponder must have a top and bottom omnidirectional antenna (also known as diversity antennas) when installed in an aircraft with TCAS II. The TCAS II must have a top directional antenna and a bottom omnidirectional or directional antenna.

2.2.3.1 Directional antennas.

2.2.3.1.1 For an aircraft installation, locate the TCAS II directional antenna on the top, forward fuselage as close to the centerline as possible.

2.2.3.1.2 If the TCAS II has more than one directional antenna, locate the second antenna in a similar manner on the lower fuselage.

2.2.3.1.3 Mount the TCAS II antennas on the aircraft with at least 20 decibel (dB) isolation from other L-band antennas.

2.2.3.1.4 Since the antenna diameter may be large, some structural considerations may be necessary and a centerline offset resulting in an angular offset of up to 5 degrees is acceptable.

2.2.3.1.5 The maximum height of the directional antenna is approximately 1 inch, and therefore should not be susceptible to icing effects in the general area of the proposed installation. If the antenna height is more than approximately 1 inch, consider anti-icing provisions. RTCA/DO-185, Section 3, Volume I, provides antenna selection and performance criteria.

2.2.3.1.6 For propeller-driven aircraft, investigate the location and performance of the directional antenna for minimum blockage and to ensure that the propellers do not interfere with system operation.

2.2.3.2 Omni-directional antennas.

Mount the TCAS II omni-directional antenna on the bottom of the aircraft fuselage as close to the centerline as possible with at least 20 dB isolation from other L-band antennas. Mount the Mode S transponder antennas at locations chosen for adequate isolation and signal coverage.

2.2.6 Traffic Display.

2.2.4 Structural analysis. Submit a structural analysis of the antenna installations showing compliance with the applicable regulations of 14 CFR to the FAA.

2.2.5 The TCAS Processor. The TCAS II processor unit uses both transponder reply information and information from the aircraft to identify and to display potential and predicted collision threats, and to issue RAs to avoid the threat aircraft. The TCAS II processor unit must comply with the environmental qualification requirements and minimum performance standards specified in TSO-C119( ). A manufacturer of TSO equipment can obtain authorization to produce equipment that deviates from the detailed criteria of the TSO as provided for in 14 CFR § 21.609. The FAA ACO approving the initial installation of the TCAS II equipment must verify that the TCAS II processor design does not differ from the criteria specified in RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B as applicable. The TCAS II processor also includes hybrid surveillance functionality which only applies to TSO C119c/d/e (optional for TSO- C119c, required for TSO-C119d and TSO-C119e).

2.2.6 Traffic Display.

2.2.6.1 Purpose.

The primary purpose of the traffic display is to aid the flight crew in the out-the-window visual acquisition of transponder-equipped aircraft. This is accomplished by displaying the intruder aircraft’s horizontal and, if altitude information is available, vertical position relative to the TCAS II equipped aircraft. The TCAS II systems provide traffic information on Mode A (no altitude data available), Mode C, and Mode S transponderequipped aircraft. A secondary purpose of the traffic display is to give the flight crew confidence in proper system operation and time to prepare to maneuver the aircraft if TCAS II issues a RA.

2.2.6.2 Description.

Traffic displays may take several forms. They may be independent, stand alone, integrated and time-shared with digital color radar, integrated with IVSI, or integrated with other displays such as electronic horizontal situation indicators (EHSI), navigation, or other multifunction displays. If the traffic display uses a multifunction display shared with other services such as aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS), the traffic display function must be immediately available for display by a single selection accessible to both pilots.

2.2.6.3 Symbology/feature criteria.

The FAA worked closely with the Air Transport Association (ATA), now known as Airlines for America (A4A), National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA), and both the SAE S-7 and G-10 Committees to standardize TCAS II symbology and features. The consensus we reached for TCAS II symbols is provided in RTCA/DO-185(). You can use other symbology and features if you use human factors methodology to

2.2.7 Resolution Advisory Display.

demonstrate that a clear and substantial benefit can be derived. Otherwise, the traffic display must depict or provide the symbology, features, or information provided in RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B, Section 2.2.6 as applicable.

2.2.7 Resolution Advisory Display.

2.2.7.1 Purpose.

The purpose of the RA display is to give each pilot the information to readily correct the aircraft flight path or to prevent a maneuver that would significantly reduce the vertical separation between the pilot’s aircraft (own-ship) and a threat aircraft.

2.2.7.2 Description.

You may integrate the RA display with the two primary IVSIs on the flight deck, or integrate it into the PFD, or incorporate it into a head-up display (HUD). Refer to RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B Section 2.2.6 as applicable for descriptions and requirements for the various resolution advisory display implementations.

2.2.7.3 Symbology.

We worked closely with A4A, NASA, and both the SAE S-7 and G-10 Committees to standardize TCAS II RA features. The consensus we reached for TCAS II RA displays is in RTCA/DO-185(). You can use other symbology and features if you use human factors methodology to demonstrate that a clear and substantial benefit can be derived. Otherwise, the RA display must depict or provide the symbology, features, or information shown in RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B Section 2.2.6 as applicable. The use of new TCAS symbology will require testing throughout the flight envelope to determine accuracy, over/under shoot tendencies, flight technical error, and potential confusion resulting from the proposed symbology. If you are using new symbology, contact the appropriate FAA ACO early in the development cycle.

2.2.7.4 Failures.

2.2.7.4.1 Provide indications for TCAS II failures (specifically including TCAS II unable to generate RAs), as specified in Section 2.2.10 below. Provide annunciation for the TA only mode. Electrical IVSI failures must also be annunciated.

2.2.7.4.2 Design the TCAS II system to prevent incorrect RAs, missing RAs (including late issuance of an RA, i.e. not within nominal timing parameters for the CAS logic declaring and posting an RA), and false RAs, as defined in Appendix E, Section E.1, Definitions. Section 2.3.8

2.2.9 Aural Alert Requirements.

contains system safety assessment standards for the TCAS II system design.

2.2.8 Caution/Warning Lights.

2.2.8.1 You may install discrete caution and/or warning lights that are separate from the traffic display. The purpose of these additional indicators is to annunciate the presence of potentially threatening intruder aircraft at times when the pilot’s attention may be diverted from the primary TCAS display. You can use two different discrete TCAS II annunciators:

2.2.8.1.1 A discrete amber (or yellow) caution annunciator, which indicates the presence of a TCAS II TA. Installation of this discrete caution annunciator is optional. When installed, it must be in each pilot’s primary field of view and be inhibited below 400 feet above ground level (AGL).

2.2.8.1.2 A discrete red warning annunciator that indicates the presence of a TCAS II RA. This red warning must be in each pilot’s primary field of view and be inhibited below 900 feet AGL. An IVSI with a lighted red arc or an alphanumeric message on the electronic attitude display indicator (EADI) is acceptable instead of this discrete warning annunciator.

2.2.8.2 Because of the number of TCAS II advisories expected in service, you should not interface the basic aircraft master caution and warning system with TCAS II caution/warning alerts provided for intruder and threat aircraft. Overuse of the primary aircraft caution and warning system tends to reduce its effectiveness in annunciating non-TCAS II system failures.

2.2.8.3 Discrete visual alerts should remain on until the pilot cancels them or until TCAS II no longer considers the aircraft an intruder or a threat.

2.2.9 Aural Alert Requirements.

2.2.9.1 Annunciate each TCAS II aural alert by a dedicated voice message over a cockpit speaker at a volume adequate for clear understanding at high cockpit noise levels, but not excessively loud at low noise levels. The evaluation includes the case where a flight crew member is wearing a headset, covering the outboard ear when appropriate. In turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew utilizes headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural messages should hold the same acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels.

2.2.9.2 Annunciate TCAS II TAs by the voice message “TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC” stated once for each TA.

2.2.9.3 Annunciate TCAS II RAs by the following voice messages, as appropriate:

2.2.9.3.1 “CLIMB, CLIMB”-- climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator.

2.2.9.3.2 “DESCEND, DESCEND”-- descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator.

2.2.9.3.3 “MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED”-- ensure that vertical speed is out of the illuminated IVSI red arc or line, or other suitable indication.

2.2.9.3.4 “ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST”-- modify the vertical speed to a value within the illuminated green arc or line, or outside the prohibited area on other suitable indications. Only V7.0 TCAS II units provide this aural.

2.2.9.3.5 ”LEVEL OFF, LEVEL OFF” -- reduce vertical speed to zero feet per minute. A green arc or line will be illuminated beginning at zero feet per minute. The system can issue this as the initial RA or as a subsequent RA. Only V7.1 TCAS II units provide this aural.

2.2.9.3.6 “CLEAR OF CONFLICT”-- range is increasing, and separation is adequate; expeditiously return to the applicable clearance, unless ATC directs otherwise.

2.2.9.3.7 “CLIMB, CROSSING CLIMB, CLIMB, CROSSING CLIMB”-- climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. The aircraft will best achieve safe separation by climbing through the threat’s flight path.

2.2.9.3.8 “DESCEND, CROSSING DESCEND, DESCEND, CROSSING DESCEND”--descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. The aircraft will best achieve safe separation by descending through the threat’s flight path.

2.2.9.3.9 “MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED, MAINTAIN”-- maintain the existing climb or descent rate as depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. The aircraft will best achieve safe separation by not altering the existing vertical speed.

2.2.9.3.10 “MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED, CROSSING MAINTAIN”-- maintain the existing climb or descent rate as depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. The aircraft will best achieve safe separation by not altering the existing vertical speed and climbing or descending through the threat’s flight path.

2.2.9.4 The TCAS II must provide the following voice messages to annunciate enhanced TCAS II maneuvers when the initial RA does not provide sufficient vertical separation. The tone and inflection must connote increased urgency.

2.2.9.4.1 “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB”--climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after “CLIMB” advisory, and indicates the aircraft needs to climb faster to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

2.2.10 Failures, TCAS and Transponder.

2.2.9.4.2 “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT”--descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after “DESCEND” advisory, and indicates the aircraft needs to descend faster to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

2.2.9.4.3 “CLIMB - CLIMB NOW, CLIMB - CLIMB NOW”--climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after a “DESCEND” RA and indicates the aircraft needs to reverse its vertical direction to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

2.2.9.4.4 “DESCEND - DESCEND NOW, DESCEND - DESCEND NOW”--- descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after a “CLIMB” RA and indicates the aircraft needs to reverse its vertical direction to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

2.2.9.4.5 The system must inhibit all TCAS II aural alerts below 400 ft AGL while descending and below 600 ft AGL while climbing.

2.2.9.4.6 The system must aurally annunciate both increases and decreases in the threat level.

2.2.9.4.7 In general, we will evaluate other messages that are clear and unambiguous on an individual basis. Do not use messages that contain negatives (for example, “DON’T CLIMB”).

2.2.10 Failures, TCAS and Transponder. 14 CFR Sections 25.1302, 25.1309(c), and 25.1322 contain requirements for flight crew alerting. For purposes of compliance with Sec. 25.1322(b) with regard to a TCAS II and or Mode S transponder system, accident experience has shown that loss of TCAS II or Mode S transponder functionality requires flight crew awareness and may require subsequent flight crew response. This response includes checking for proper TCAS II system settings and operation as well as Mode S transponder settings and operation. Therefore, for new installations of TCAS II and/or transponders, to meet Sec. 25.1322 requirements for the TCAS II installation, the following failures must be annunciated in yellow/amber in the pilots’ primary field of view, and are recommended to be interfaced with the aircraft’s master caution and warning system to provide alerts for:

2.2.10.1 A transponder failure.

2.2.10.2 Transponder in the standby mode.

2.2.10.3 A TCAS II failure.

2.2.10.4 TCAS II in the standby mode.

Note 1: Guidance for compliance with 14 CFR Sections 25.1302, and 25.1322 is contained in AC 25.1302-1, Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew and AC 25.1322-1, Flightcrew Alerting.

2.3.3 Equipment Compatibility Requirements.

Note 2: For the purposes of this subsection, a new installation is considered to be: 1) Installation of a Mode S transponder in an aircraft that does not currently have one fitted; 2) Installation of a TCAS II system in an aircraft that does not currently have one fitted or 3) A new aircraft, i.e. one that has not received a type certificate.

2.3 Airworthiness Considerations.

2.3.1 Certification Program. This AC will guide your installation of TCAS II V7.0 or V7.1 systems and Mode S transponder systems. TCAS II system installations include the TCAS, the Mode S system, antennas, control panel and display components. Mode S transponder installations include the Mode S transponder, antennas, and control panel. These components are all certified initially as a single installed system with a defined configuration. Any change to the defined configuration requires either a new Initial Approval or a Follow-On Approval. The system displays information and provides advisories in a number of formats. The degree of system integration to perform these functions is extensive and as a result, you must direct your program toward airworthiness approval through the type certification or supplemental type certification process.

2.3.2 Certification plan. Develop a comprehensive certification plan. Include how you’ll comply with the applicable certification requirements, and list the substantiating data and necessary tests in your plan. Include a system description and an estimated time schedule. A well-developed certification plan will be of significant value both to you (the applicant) and the appropriate FAA certification office.

2.3.3 Equipment Compatibility Requirements.

2.3.3.1 Make an evaluation to show that the TCAS II system communicates with other manufacturers’ approved TCAS II systems. Include a TCAS II to TCAS II coordination demonstration, or equivalent, with at least one other manufacturer’s approved TCAS II system in your evaluation. If you can show for a specific design that communication link failures are no more hazardous than encountering a Mode C intruder, then these tests are not necessary. Also, after completing mature bench tests, future certification experience may show that these tests are no longer necessary. Submit evidence to show that you performed TCAS/transponder interoperability bench tests using the same TCAS/transponder pairing (the same part

numbers) as the installation seeking certification. You can satisfy interoperability bench tests by either of the following:

2.3.3.2 Conduct the following RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B tests as applicable, using the actual TCAS unit and Mode S transponder seeking certification:

 2.4.2.2.3.1

 2.4.2.2.3.2,

 2.4.2.2.4.1,

 2.4.2.2.4.2.1,

 2.4.2.2.4.2.3,

 2.4.2.2.4.2.5,

 2.4.2.2.4.2.6,

 2.4.2.2.4.2.7,

 2.4.2.2.4.2.8, and,

 2.4.2.2.5.

2.3.3.3 Conduct the following tests in RTCA/DO-181E as applicable, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment, using the actual TCAS unit and Mode S transponder seeking certification:

 Procedure 30,

 Procedure 31 a-d,

 Procedure 32a-c and d (1 & 2),

 Procedure 34,

 Procedure 36 a and c, and,

 Procedure 37 a and b.

2.3.3.4 In addition, conduct the following RTCA/DO-181E tests as applicable, using a TCAS simulator coupled with the actual Mode S transponder:

 Procedure 31e,

 Procedure 32d (3-16),

 Procedure 33,

 Procedure 35,

 Procedure 36b,

2.3.5 Evaluating Aircraft Performance.

 Procedure 37c and,

 Procedure 38.

Note: These equipment compatibility requirements are only necessary for the initial approval.

2.3.4 Aircraft Performance Considerations. Use paragraphs 2.3.4 through 2.3.5 and Table 1 of this AC to help you evaluate the need to inhibit TCAS II CLIMB and/or INCREASE CLIMB RAs resulting from inadequate aircraft climb performance. The collision avoidance maneuvers the TCAS II commands as RAs assume an aircraft’s ability to safely achieve them. If it’s likely the required response to CLIMB and INCREASE CLIMB RAs are beyond the performance capability of the aircraft, then TCAS II must know beforehand so it can change strategy and issue an alternative RA. The aircraft interface and discrete settings relative to altitude and/or aircraft configuration must provide these performance limits to TCAS II. However, carefully consider the need to inhibit TCAS II CLIMB or INCREASE CLIMB RAs since the alternative RAs may not provide the optimum solution to the encounter. Inhibiting these RAs will increase the likelihood of TCAS II:

2.3.4.1 Issuing crossing maneuvers (crossing through an intruder’s altitude), thus increasing the probability that an RA may be thwarted by the intruder maneuvering,

2.3.4.2 Causing an increase in DESCEND RAs at low altitude, and

2.3.4.3 Providing no RAs if below the descend inhibit altitude of 1200 feet AGL during takeoff and 1000 feet AGL on approach.

2.3.5 Evaluating Aircraft Performance. The configuration interface may need switches or sensors, besides the basic airplane flap position switches, to prevent unnecessary TCAS II inhibits. For example, if you need to inhibit CLIMB RAs for the maximum takeoff flap setting only, and no switch exists to sense that position, install an additional switch instead of simply using one that may exist at lesser flap angle settings.

2.3.5.1 Because TCAS II can only accept a limited number of inputs related to airplane performance, it’s not possible to automatically inhibit CLIMB and INCREASE CLIMB RAs in all cases where it may be appropriate to inhibit such RAs. In these cases, TCAS II may command maneuvers that may significantly reduce stall margins or result in stall warnings. Conditions where this may occur include bank angles greater than 15 degrees, weight/altitude/temperature combinations outside the envelope shown in Table 1, initial speeds below those shown in Table 1, one engine inoperative, leaving the aircraft configuration fixed for climb RAs on landing transition to go-around, and abnormal configurations such as landing gear not retractable. Provide information concerning this aspect of TCAS in the airplane flight manual (AFM) or airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS) so that flight crews may take appropriate action.

2.3.5.2 Aircraft configuration, true airspeed available during initial climb (to safely trade for climb rate if needed), and the initial airspeed margin from the current stall speed all significantly affect an aircraft’s low altitude climb capability during takeoff, approach, or landing.

2.3.5.2.1 Table 1, Conditions 1 through 3 apply to the takeoff and initial climb configuration analysis.

2.3.5.2.2 Table 1, Conditions 4 through 6 apply to the approach flap configuration analysis when operating in the terminal area with the flaps set at less than the landing flaps.

2.3.5.2.3 Table 1, Conditions 7 through 9 apply to the landing flight regime analysis. To be consistent with normal operation, indicate in the AFM or AFMS that when a climb RA occurs with the aircraft in the landing configuration, the pilot should initiate the normal go-around procedure when complying with the TCAS II RA. Therefore, you can assume that the flaps are retracted from the landing position to the go-around position when evaluating Table 1, Conditions 7 through 9.

2.3.5.3 To prevent very unlikely combinations of events, such as weight/altitude/temperature limiting conditions, in conjunction with low airspeed, high drag configurations, and unusual encounter geometries causing climb inhibits when the aircraft’s performance is more than adequate, Table 1 places the entry and exit conditions and RAs into two classes of encounters.

2.3.5.3.1 Maneuvers A and B represent reasonably severe combinations of entry conditions and RAs, and restricts the exit conditions to an airspeed of 1.2VS1 (or 1.13VSR1 for those airplanes that use reference stall speed (VSR) in lieu of stalling speed (VS)).

2.3.5.3.2 Maneuver C represents reasonably worst-case combinations of entry conditions and RAs, and this very unlikely event may require flying near stall warning conditions through the recovery.

2.3.5.3.3 Airspeeds between 1.2VS1 (or 1.13VSR1 for those airplanes that use reference stall speed (VSR) in lieu of stalling speed (VS)) and stall warning represent a range of usable airspeeds that the flight crew can trade for climb performance (the same as current wind shear recovery procedures recommend) for evaluation of this low probability event. The altitude/temperature envelope represents a range of values that exist at busy airports in the continental United States. Operations outside this envelope may require special crew procedures if the normal AFM weight, altitude, temperature, and configuration limitations are not sufficiently compensating, such as operation at Mexico City.

2.3.5.4 For those airplanes that may routinely operate at low climb airspeeds during the clean configuration, enroute phase of flight, such as propeller commuter airplanes, consider providing a discrete to the TCAS II based on airspeed. Such an input, derived from a TCAS II interface system, would provide for CLIMB or INCREASE CLIMB RA inhibits when the airplane is in the clean configuration and operating below a certain airspeed. We consider such a scheme appropriate instead of an across-the-board inhibit for the clean configuration regardless of flight regime (which does not provide the best overall level of safety for other configurations).

2.3.5.5 Excess power (propeller-driven) or excess thrust (turbojet) and true airspeed (that may be available to safely trade for climb rate) are also significant factors in aircraft’s climb capability when operating at or near maximum approved operating altitude. The system should not inhibit climb RAs if the aircraft has adequate performance available or because it may exceed its maximum certificated altitude by several hundred feet during an RA. Table 1, Conditions 10 and 11, shows configurations that you should evaluate in this flight regime. If the aircraft has approval for significant alternative configurations, (such as spare engine pod and gear down operation,) then the initial airspeed you use for the analysis should be appropriate for them. In the analysis of the aircraft’s ability to accelerate and return to the initial speed and altitude following the RA, an undershoot of approximately 200 feet is permissible.

2.3.5.6 In icing conditions, the aircraft limited performance weights are lower, and sometimes the operating speeds are higher, to account for icing system bleeds and residual ice drag on the unprotected surfaces. Therefore, the capability to perform the TCAS II maneuvers remains essentially unchanged, eliminating the need to provide additional RA inhibits under these circumstances. However, if a particular aircraft design shows marginal capability to operate in the icing environment, consider additional RA inhibits enabled by icing system activation.

2.3.5.7 If Table 1, Maneuver A causes operation at airspeeds below the minimum, then inhibit the CLIMB RA. If Table 1, Maneuver B or C causes operation at airspeeds below the minimum, then inhibit the INCREASE CLIMB RA. However, early recovery of 1 to 2 seconds is of little or no consequence on the collision avoidance maneuver and the system will achieve a higher overall level of safety if it does not provide inhibits under these circumstances, as this AC has previously discussed in paragraph 2.3.4.

Table 1. Maneuvers

CONDITION

FLIGHT

REGIME

WEIGHT

ALTITUDE,

TEMPERATUR

E1

THRUST FLAPS GEAR INITIAL AIRSPEED2

MINIMUM AIRSPEED2

MANEUVER3

1 Takeoff Part 25 climb limit

Maximum rated takeoff All takeoff Up V2+204 1.2VS15 thru RA A

2 Takeoff Part 25 climb limit

Maximum rated takeoff All takeoff Up V2+204 1.2VS15 thru RA B

3 Takeoff Part 25 Climb limit

Maximum rated takeoff All takeoff Up AFM allengine takeoff speed6

15° bank to stall warning7 thru recovery

C

4 Approach Part 25 Climb limit

Spin up to max go-around thrust during maneuver from thrust for level flight

Less than landing

Up 1.6VS1 1.2VS15 thru RA A

5 Approach Part 25 Climb limit

Spin up to max go-around thrust during maneuver from thrust for level flight

Less than landing

Up 1.6VS1 1.2VS15 thru RA B

6 Approach Part 25 Climb limit

Spin up to max go-around thrust during maneuver from thrust for level flight

Less than landing

Up, or

down

to up

Min. maneuver speed from training procedures

15° bank to stall warning7 thru recovery

C

CONDITION

FLIGHT

REGIME

WEIGHT

ALTITUDE,

TEMPERATUR

E1

THRUST FLAPS GEAR INITIAL AIRSPEED2

MINIMUM AIRSPEED2

MANEUVER3

7 Landing, Transition to Go-Around at RA

Part 25 Climb limit

Spin up to max go-around thrust during maneuver from thrust required for 3° glideslope

Transition from landing flap to goaround flap

Down

to up

VREF + 10 1.2VS15 thru RA A

8 Landing, Transition to Go-Around at RA

Part 25 Climb limit

Spin up to max go-around thrust during maneuver from thrust required for 3° glideslope

Transition from landing flap to goaround flap

Down

to up

VREF + 10 1.2VS15 thru RA B

9 Landing, Transition to Go-Around at RA

Part 25 climb limit

Spin up to max go-around thrust during maneuver from thrust required for 3° glideslope

Transition from landing flap to goaround flap

Down

to up

VREF + airspeed addition from training procedures

15° bank to stall warning7 thru recovery

C

10 En Route Critical Wt/Alt giving 0.3g to buffet onset

Thrust for level flight increased to max continuous, if required

Up Up Long-range cruise

Higher of 1.2VS5 if defined or buffet onset

A

11 En Route Critical Wt/Alt giving 0.3g to buffet onset

Thrust for level flight increased to max continuous, if required

Up Up Long-range cruise

Higher of 1.2VS5 if defined or buffet onset

B

Notes:

1. Weight = Lesser of climb limit or structural; Airport Pressure Altitude = sea level to 5300 ft; Temperature = ISA ± 50 °F; Evaluate conditions 1 through 3 700 ft above airport; evaluate conditions 4 - 9 1700 ft above airport.

2. For those airplanes that use reference stall speed (VSR) in lieu of stalling speed (VS), replace 1.2 VS1 with 1.13 VSR1, 1.2VS with 1.13VSR and 1.6 VS1 with 1.5 VSR1.

3. Maneuvers:

a. Maneuver A evaluates the TCAS II CLIMB RA. From the initial steady-state condition, after a 3-second pilot-reaction time

delay, rotate the aircraft at 1.25 g to attain +1500 feet per minute climb. Hold until the total duration of the RA of 25 seconds has elapsed. Recover to attain the initial trim airspeed.

b. Maneuver B evaluates the TCAS II INCREASE CLIMB RA following a CLIMB RA. From the initial steady-state condition,

after a 3-second pilot-reaction time delay, rotate the aircraft at 1.25 g to attain +1500 feet per minute climb. Hold until 15 seconds has elapsed from when the CLIMB RA was issued. Then, after a 1-second pilot reaction time-delay to the INCREASE CLIMB RA, rotate the aircraft again at 1.25 g to attain +2500 feet per minute climb and hold until the total duration of the RA of 25 seconds has elapsed. Recover to attain the initial trim airspeed.

c. Maneuver C evaluates a maximum duration TCAS II INCREASE CLIMB RA following a minimum duration CLIMB RA.

From the initial steady-state condition, after a 3-second pilot-reaction time delay, rotate the aircraft at 1.25 g targeting +1500 feet per minute climb until 6 seconds has elapsed from when the the system issued the CLIMB RA. Then, after a 1-second pilot-reaction time delay to the INCREASE CLIMB RA, rotate the aircraft again at 1.25 g to attain +2500 feet per minute climb and hold until the total duration of the RA of 25 seconds has elapsed. Recover to attain the initial trim airspeed.

4. VY + 10 for nontransport category aircraft without a defined V2.

5. For those airplanes where the power-on stalling speed is significantly lower than the power-off stalling speed, use 1.1VS or 1.08VSR for those airplanes that use reference stall speed (VSR) in lieu of stalling speed (VS).

6. VY for nontransport category aircraft without a defined V2

7. For those airplanes where the power-on stalling speed is significantly lower than the power-off stalling speed, use VS1 or 0.94VSR1 for those airplanes that use reference stall speed (VSR) in lieu of stalling speed (VS).

2.3.6 How Aircraft Systems Should Interface with TCAS II.

2.3.5.8 A summary of the system inhibits (limitations) programmed into the TCAS II computer is given in Table 2 below.

Table 2 System Inhibits

INHIBIT PARAMETERS

Increase Descent RA Inhibited below 1650 ft AGL while climbing and inhibited below 1450 ft AGL while descending.

Descend RA Inhibited below 1200 ft AGL while climbing and inhibited below 1000 ft AGL while descending.

TA Voice Messages Inhibited below 400 ft AGL while descending and inhibited below 600 ft AGL while climbing.

RAs

Inhibited below 1100 ft AGL while climbing, and inhibited below 900 ft AGL while descending. (TCAS automatically reverts to TA only).

Self-Test Can be inhibited when airborne.

Advisory Priority Automatically reverts to TA only when higher priority advisories (such as GPWS/TAWS and windshear) occur.

Climb RA Can be inhibited, based upon aircraft performance capability.

Increase Climb RA Can be inhibited, based upon aircraft performance capability.

2.3.6 How Aircraft Systems Should Interface with TCAS II.

2.3.6.1 Pressure altitude information.

The pressure altitude data must be from the most accurate source available in the aircraft and it must be the same data the associated Mode S transponder transmits. The accuracy of the altitude data must be at least that specified in RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B, paragraph 3.2.8 as applicable. You must show that the resolution of the altimetry source is compatible with TCAS II. The altitude source with the finest compatible resolution must be used. When available, the resolution should be in increments of 10 feet or less. Also provide information to indicate when the pressure altitude information is invalid.

2.3.6.2 Radio altitude information.

2.3.6.2.1 Provide radio altitude information to the TCAS II to inhibit:

2.3.6.2.2 INCREASE DESCENT RAs below 1650 ft AGL while climbing and below 1450 ft AGL while descending,

2.3.6.2.3 DESCEND RAs below 1200 ft AGL while climbing and below 1000 ft AGL while descending,

2.3.6.2.4 All TA voice messages (aural traffic advisories) below 400 ft AGL while descending and below 600 ft AGL while climbing, and

2.3.6.2.5 All RAs below 1100 ft AGL while climbing and below 900 ft AGL while descending, to allow automatic sensitivity level selection when close to the ground, and to determine that individual targets are on the ground.

2.3.6.2.6 Also provide information to indicate when the radio altitude information is invalid.

2.3.6.3 Aircraft configuration.

Use discrete information from flaps, slat, landing gear, and/or other aircraft configuration sensors to ensure that TCAS II appropriately inhibits CLIMB and INCREASE CLIMB RAs to the airplane performance limits as described in paragraph 2.3.4 and 2.3.5.

2.3.6.4 Aircraft identification.

Provide discrete information to the Mode S transponder for the unique aircraft Mode S identification code and its maximum airspeed capability.

2.3.6.5 Attitude.

The system may provide aircraft pitch and roll attitude to assist with stabilization of the directional antenna function to assure surveillance and to ensure normal aircraft maneuvers don’t affect TA display data. If TCAS II uses attitude information, provide information to indicate when the attitude data are invalid.

2.3.6.6 Heading.

The system may provide aircraft heading for the TA display reference presentation. If it does, it must also indicate when the heading data are invalid.

2.3.6.7 System failure display.

Provide an appropriate level alert in accordance with Section 2.2.10 to indicate when RAs are not possible due to failure of the TCAS II equipment or any of its sensors or displays.

Note: Section 2.3.8.2 has system safety analysis requirements for failure to provide an RA when required without indication of loss of RA capability.

2.3.7 Verifying and Validating TCAS II Software.

2.3.6.8 Altitude alerter data.

You may provide the current clearance altitude from the altitude alerter to enable TCAS II to select RAs that are more consistent with the aircraft’s altitude clearance once it resolves the immediate collision threat.

Note: Altitude alert functionality is optional per RTCA/DO-185A and RTCA/DO-185B. Not all TSO-C119( ) TCAS II units will have this option available.

2.3.6.9 Mode S Transponder Gillham altitude input requirements.

The Gillham format uses 11 discrete wires that, depending on which wires are turned off or on, represent an altitude value. The Gillham format is sometimes called a blind encoder, as there is no error detection and/or correction on the wires. For this reason, ARINC 718, Mark 3 Air Traffic Control Transponder (ATCRBS/MODE S), dated December 1989, states: “Pins have been reserved to permit the direct application of Gillham code data to the transponder. This practice is not encouraged because of concerns that a “stuck bit” in the coded input could be the cause of serious errors in TCAS II resolution advisories.” This is a failure mode peculiar to the Gillham code against which protection is virtually impossible. If you cannot avoid using Gillham coded altitude for the TCAS II installations, you must connect two sources of altitude information to the transponder and compare their values. The system must annunciate all transponder altitude comparator failures.

2.3.6.10 Hybrid surveillance failure annunciations (TSO-C119d and later units).

For aircraft equipped with centralized alert and warning system and or an onboard maintenance system, you should consider integrating the hybrid surveillance alerting functionality into the system so as to alert the crew with an appropriate failure annunciation. Refer to section 2.3.9 for more information.

2.3.7 Verifying and Validating TCAS II Software. For the first installation of a manufacturer’s TCAS II equipment, you must verify and validate TCAS II software using the procedures below. Also, apply these procedures to subsequent software changes to a manufacturer’s TCAS II equipment. A manufacturer may provide a design that partitions the software that affects RAs from other software, such as that necessary for the traffic display. The TCAS II manufacturer may not use the minor change authority of the TSO system to change any software in the same partition as the software that affects RAs.

2.3.7.1 Verification and validation of TCAS II software represents a unique challenge. A formal statechart representation in the CAS requirements specification (CRS) in RTCA/DO-185A, Volume II and RTCA/DO-185B, Volume II, specifies collision avoidance algorithms, commonly called “the CAS logic,” in detail. In addition, Attachment A of Volume II provides a

software design specification in pseudocode that meets these requirements. We require this level of detail because the coordination algorithms in the CAS logic assume that the software that all manufacturers implement will have exactly the same CAS logic. However, the manufacturer of the TCAS II equipment must develop the surveillance software necessary to establish and maintain the relative tracks of nearby transponder-equipped aircraft and the software necessary to provide the interface with the Mode S transponder and with other aircraft sensors and displays. This hybrid approach to the specification of the software requirements means that the FAA and our contractors have satisfied the application of the software criteria in RTCA/DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, dated December 1, 1992, for the detailed CAS requirements and the pseudocode software design, while the remaining requirements of RTCA/DO-178B (considering any applicable provisions of AC 20-115C, Airborne Software Assurance, dated July 19, 2013) or DO-178C, dated December 13, 2011, as applicable, are the responsibility of the manufacturer.

2.3.7.2 If the system uses software for the display of TCAS II RAs or in the operation of the Mode S transponder data link, you must do the verification and validation of this software to Level B requirements, as defined in RTCA/DO-178B/C. Also, apply these procedures when the TCAS II manufacturer develops the software requirements for the TCAS II processor associated with functions other than surveillance or the CAS logic. With the software design specified in RTCA/DO-185A, Volume II or RTCA/DO-185B, Volume II, the manufacturer of the TCAS II processor should conduct code walk-throughs and develop and perform module tests and module integration tests to verify that the implementation of the specified software design is correct. This includes the surveillance software necessary to establish and maintain the relative tracks of nearby transponder-equipped aircraft.

2.3.7.3 The functional tests required by TSO-C119b and TSO-C119c/d/e, as described in RTCA/DO-185A, Volume I and RTCA/DO-185B, Volume I respectively, do not provide complete testing for the TCAS II processor software. However, coverage analysis performed on the CAS test suite, described in Volume I, demonstrated that the CAS test suite tests each column of every transition table and macro, and each identity transition in the CAS requirements specification in RTCA/DO-185A, Volume II or RTCA/DO-185B, Volume II. Thus, the CAS test suite provides more than full decision coverage (but not full condition coverage) as defined in RTCA/DO-178B. TCAS II manufacturers must develop additional functional tests that correspond to the detailed requirements that they develop for the TCAS II processor. The potential consequences of software errors in the TCAS II processor or resolution display require the manufacturer to provide a structural coverage analysis showing single

2.3.8 Failure Conditions System Safety Assessment and Design Assurance.

condition test coverage of all instructions at the source code that can affect the generation and display of RAs. These tests may be a combination of module tests, module integration tests and functional tests.

2.3.7.4 Equipment produced under a TSO has obtained FAA concurrence that the software for the equipment was developed in accordance with RTCA/DO- 178B/C to the software level the TSO specifies. Subsequent installations of the same TCAS II equipment on other aircraft types do not require any additional verification if the software and the interface is not changed.

2.3.8 Failure Conditions System Safety Assessment and Design Assurance. Unannunciated failures of the TCAS II equipment, its associated transponder, or sensors or displays that could generate an incorrect or false RA, or result in a missing RA, must be improbable. This can be accomplished using the methods described in AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis. A functional hazard assessment (FHA), a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and a quantitative probability analysis of the TCAS II equipment, Mode S transponder, displays, and sensors (including altitude information sources) will normally be necessary to show that the system design meets the probabilities specified for the following failure conditions.

Note: Appendix E, Section E.1, Definitions, gives the definitions of a missing RA, incorrect RA, and false RA.

2.3.8.1 The probability of failure of the installed system to perform its intended function from a reliability and availability perspective should be shown to be no greater than 1.0 x10-3 per flight hour.

2.3.8.2 The probability of a missing RA, without indication of loss of capability to generate an RA, should be shown to be no greater than 1.0 x 10-4 per flight hour in the terminal environment and 1.0 x 10-5 per flight hour in the enroute environment.

2.3.8.3 The probability of a false RA aural and visual alert due to a failure of the system should be shown to be no greater than 1.0 x 10-4 per flight hour in the terminal environment and 1.0 x 10-5 per flight hour in the enroute environment.

2.3.8.4 Software that presents incorrect RA aural and visual alerts, or results in a missing RA, is considered a hazardous failure condition. Develop software involved in generating RAs to RTCA/DO-178B/C, Level B standards.

2.3.8.5 The probability of an incorrect RA aural and visual alert due to a failure of the hardware should be shown to be no greater than 1.0 x 10-4 per flight hour in the terminal environment and 1.0 x 10-5 per flight hour in the enroute environment.

2.3.9 Maintenance Considerations for Hybrid Surveillance Functionality…

2.3.8.6 The frequency of encounters where another aircraft could present a potential threat depends on the density of aircraft in the airspace. In terminal airspace, you may assume the frequency to be once every 10 hours and, in enroute airspace, it may be once every 200 hours. You may establish different frequencies based on operational data. Provide these analyses for the first installation of TCAS II equipment on a new model aircraft. For subsequent installations of the same equipment in other aircraft, you may use some of the same analyses paying particular attention to the differences in the altitude sensors that are used.

2.3.9 Maintenance Considerations for Hybrid Surveillance Functionality (TSO-C119d and later).

2.3.9.1 RTCA/DO-300A section 2.2.10, Monitoring Requirements, provides a means for annunciation or recording of failures of own-ship latitude, longitude and/or ground speed inputs. Note that a failure of any of these inputs will not cause TCAS to fail, but it will disable the hybrid surveillance functionality.

2.3.9.2 To ensure that latent failures don’t exist in airborne TCAS II units for long periods of time, the system must annunciate failures of hybrid surveillance to the flight crew, or there must be periodic scheduled maintenance tasks to check hybrid surveillance functionality. The instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) must also require operators to periodically report reliability of the hybrid surveillance functionality. Depending on the level of avionics integration in the aircraft, you can use different methods to ensure the continued airworthiness of the hybrid surveillance such as:

2.3.9.2.1 For those aircraft equipped with an engine indicating and crew alerting (EICAS) system (or other similar annunciation system) integrate the failure information into the warning system such that a failure of hybrid surveillance is annunciated to the flight crew.

2.3.9.2.2 For aircraft equipped with an onboard maintenance computer interfaced with TCAS, add a scheduled maintenance task to the aircraft’s maintenance program to check for presence of any existing or past failures of hybrid surveillance. Take corrective action as specified by the TCAS manufacturer.

2.3.9.2.3 For aircraft without a centralized warning system and/or an onboard maintenance computer, add a scheduled maintenance task to the aircraft’s maintenance program to check for presence of any existing or past failures of hybrid surveillance and to ensure hybrid surveillance is functional. Take corrective action as specified by the TCAS manufacturer.

2.3.9.2.4 If a scheduled maintenance task is employed, the installer must establish the initial frequency of the task in conjunction with the manufacturer of

2.3.10 Populating Mode S Transponder registers 4016 and 6216 (if implemented).

the TCAS equipment but on a frequency not to exceed two calendar years between tasks. Operators can use normal maintenance escalation procedures later to extend the maintenance frequency if they provide adequate justification to do so to the responsible ACO. Coordinate any such extension request with the ACO prior to implementation of changes.

2.3.9.3 The ICA must require operators of TCAS equipment with hybrid surveillance to report hybrid surveillance maintenance history to the TCAS manufacturer periodically but not to exceed 18 calendar months between reports.

2.3.10 Populating Mode S Transponder registers 4016 and 6216 (if implemented).

Some airspace regulations require the transponder to report short term intent data, such as the Selected Altitude data, in transponder replies or via ADS-B. For example, 14 CFR § 91.225 requires that by Jan 1, 2020 specific message elements must be broadcast. Some of those elements are contained in the BDS 6216 register, such as SIL and NACP. Refer to AC 20-165B, Airworthiness Approval of ADS-B Out Systems, for more information on compliance with the requirements of 14 CFR 91.225 and 14 CFR § 91.227. When complying with either the EU Enhanced Surveillance rule or the U.S. ADS-B rule, the short term intent fields are only required to be implemented if the data is available on the aircraft via a digital interface. For example, there is no expectation that a new autopilot must be installed to comply with reporting Selected Altitude if it is not available from the existing system on the aircraft. Any data that is not available on the aircraft should be reported as zero.

2.3.10.1 Selected Vertical Intention (BDS register 4016). If available, interface the transponder to the aircraft systems that provide vertical intention information for the various subfields in register 4016 e.g. MCP/FCU selected altitude, FMS selected altitude, etc. Appendix F provides guidance for interfacing to these systems.

2.3.10.2 Target State and Status Information (BDS register 6216). If available, interface the transponder to the aircraft systems that provide the transponder with state and status information for the various subfields in register 6216 e.g. SIL supplement, NACP, NICBARO, barometric pressure setting, selected heading, etc. Appendix F provides guidance for interfacing to these systems.

3.2.1 Basic Ground Tests.

CHAPTER 3. TEST AND EVALUATION (INITIAL APPROVAL).

3.1 General. Test the first installation of a manufacturer’s TCAS II or Mode S transponder system. This will verify the design and installation performs its intended function under the expected operating conditions, and that there are no adverse interactions between the TCAS II or Mode S transponder and existing aircraft systems. The test will also show that other aircraft equipment has not been adversely affected.

3.2 Create a Test Plan. Provide a test plan that includes adequate testing to perform this verification. This test plan will generally require a combination of ground tests, basic flight tests, and flight tests involving planned encounters with another TCAS II equipped aircraft. You can use an aircraft other than a transport category aircraft for either the TCAS II installation or for the air-to-air cooperative flights. The rest of this chapter lists and explains the minimum elements of the test plan.

3.2.1 Basic Ground Tests.

3.2.1.1 Bearing accuracy.

Demonstrate the bearing estimation accuracy of the TCAS II system as installed in the aircraft. Measure the bearing accuracy using a calibrated antenna range that allows precise echo controlled, far field, angle-of-- arrival measurements at or slightly above zero degrees elevation and over 360 degrees in azimuth. You may also measure the bearing accuracy using a fixed transponder location while rotating the test aircraft on a compass rose while measuring the bearing angles at 30-degree intervals. Alternately, you may keep the airplane in a fixed position and move the transponder (refer to Appendix B for cautionary note on testing). You may do a manual readout of the bearing estimate directly from a plan position display on the traffic advisory display. Alternatively, you may automatically record the bearing estimates or read them from a special test display. A maximum error of ±15 degrees in azimuth is acceptable; however, larger errors are acceptable in the area of the tail (for example, within ±45 degrees of the tail) when that area is not visible from the cockpit. In this case, aircraft structure may interfere with the signal path.

3.2.1.2 Sensor failures.

Evaluate simulated failures of the aircraft sensors integrated with TCAS II to determine that the resulting system failure state agrees with the predicted results. These tests should be part of the ground test plan.

3.2.1.3 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC).

Demonstrate that the TCAS II equipment is electromagnetically compatible with previously installed systems or equipment, and is not a source of adverse conducted or radiated interference, and that conducted or radiated interference from previously installed systems and equipment does not adversely affect operation of the TCAS II equipment. Specifically demonstrate that the TCAS II equipment is electromagnetically compatible with the weather radar, particularly if operating in the C-band.

3.2.1.4 Evaluate the general arrangement and operation of controls, displays, circuit breakers, annunciators, and placards of the TCAS II system. Conduct a human factors evaluation of the controls, displays and annunciators. Evaluate the TCAS controls and the controls of installed systems that interact with TCAS (for example, transponders) to determine that the control design and location prevents inadvertent actuation. Evaluate TCAS displays and annunciations to determine that they support flight crew awareness of TCAS status changes which could result from TCAS mode selections, intentional pilot actuation of other installed systems, or inadvertent pilot actions with TCAS or other installed systems. Evaluate TCAS displays to ensure all information is, at a minimum, legible, unambiguous, and attention-getting (as applicable). In particular, where transponder functions are integrated with other system controls, ensure that unintended transponder mode switching, especially switching to STANDBY or OFF, is not possible. Pay close attention to line select keys, touch screens or cursor controlled trackballs as these can be susceptible to unintended mode selection resulting from their location in the flight deck (for example proximity to a foot rest or adjacent to a temporary stowage area).

3.2.1.5 Evaluate the TCAS II self-test features and failure mode displays and annunciators.

Verify that a TCAS failure and TCAS in the standby mode are properly annunciated in accordance with sections 2.2.10 of this AC.

3.2.1.6 Verify proper interface of the pressure altitude source and radio altimeter with the TCAS II equipment.

3.2.1.7 Verify that the windshear and the ground proximity warning system/terrain awareness warning system (GPWS/TAWS) warnings along with any other higher priority alerts and TCAS II voice alerts are compatible. Also, verify that the flight crew can clearly understand windshear or GPWS/TAWS warnings and that TCAS II automatically switches to the TA Only mode when TCAS II and windshear voice or GPWS/TAWS announcements simultaneously occur. The alert priorities should be windshear, GPWS/TAWS and then TCAS II.

3.2.2 Basic Flight Tests.

3.2.1.8 Verify the performance of TCAS II traffic display by observing any available area traffic.

3.2.1.9 Evaluate the TCAS II system installation for satisfactory identification, accessibility, and visibility during both day and night conditions.

3.2.1.10 Determine that any configuration of discretes associated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb RAs, operate properly. (Changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed.)

3.2.1.11 Verify that the ICAO 24-bit aircraft address and maximum airspeed are correct. Additionally, verify that other features, which may be optional, such as extended squitter, aircraft identification reporting or other data link uses also function correctly. Verify that the transponder and data sources meet the requirements of the failure condition classifications associated with the features. For example, an unannunciated failure of the transponder extended squitter resulting in transmission of erroneous information is at least a major failure condition.

3.2.1.12 If connected, verify that the altitude alerter is providing correct data to TCAS and that the TCAS II V7.0 or V7.1 logic, as applicable, correctly weakens or strengthens the displayed RA using the altitude alerter input.

3.2.1.13 Verify that the air/ground inputs are connected properly.

CAUTION: When the aircraft is on the ground, the system must inhibit the Mode S transponder from replying to any Mode A, Mode C, Mode A/C/S all-call interrogations and Mode S-only all-call interrogations. You can usually accomplish this inhibit via an appropriate transponder pin connected through the weight-on-wheels switch, but you might also implement it through other automatic means (for example, velocity/altitude algorithm, etc.). You must verify the inhibit during ground testing.

Note: While on the ground, the transponder normally should stop output of acquisition squitters (short squits), and should continue output of extended squitters (known as long squits or ADS-B) in the surface format, and it should reply to any discretely-addressed aircraft interrogations. You should also verify this during ground testing. DO-181E section 2.2.18.2.6, Acquisition Squitter Protocols, specifies the exact conditions for transmission of acquisition squitter.

3.2.2 Basic Flight Tests.

3.2.2.1 During all phases of flight, determine if there is any mutual interference with any other aircraft system. Have all installed systems, including the weather radar, operating during the flight test.

3.2.2.2 Evaluate TCAS II aural messages for acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels (idle descent at low speed and high power at maximum operating limit speed Vmo) with headset covering outboard ear only (when appropriate) and without headsets. In the case of turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew utilizes headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural messages should hold the same acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels. If you use the TCAS II TEST to simulate voice announcements, ensure that use of the TEST function does not change the audio level.

3.2.2.3 Demonstrate that traffic information remains valid and usable when the aircraft is pitched ±15 degrees and rolled approximately 30 degrees during normal maneuvers by observing area traffic in the traffic advisory display.

3.2.2.4 Evaluate the effective surveillance range of the traffic display, including target azimuth reasonableness and track stability. Use of targets of opportunity or a non-transport category (low speed) aircraft as a target for these tests is permissible.

3.2.2.5 Determine that any configuration discretes (changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed) associated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb RAs, operate properly unless you have previously demonstrated them during ground tests.

3.2.2.6 Perform the additional flight tests in RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO- 185B, paragraph 3.4.4 as applicable, unless previously accomplished under TSO-C119b or TSO-C119c/d/e respectively.

3.2.2.7 Evaluate TCAS II for noninterference during coupled autopilot and flight director (FD) approaches to the lowest minimums approved for the aircraft.

3.2.2.8 Before any cooperative flight tests at any altitude involving the TCAS IIequipped aircraft and another aircraft, fly both aircraft in close formation to ensure matched altimetry readouts. You should fly these checks at the speeds and altitudes you will use for the tests.

3.2.2.9 Evaluate all selectable modes of the TCAS II to determine that they perform their intended function and that the system clearly and uniquely annunciates the operating mode.

3.2.2.10 Re-evaluate any previously installed aircraft systems that required changes as a result of the TCAS II installation. (For example, electronic flight instrument system (EFIS), FD, PFD, navigation displays (ND), IVSI, interface etc.)

3.2.3 Planned Encounter Flight Tests.

3.2.2.11 If you include hybrid surveillance functionality, perform the flight tests in RTCA/DO-300, dated December 13, 2006 (including Change 2, dated December 15, 2015) or DO-300A, dated March 20, 2013 (including Change 1, dated December 15, 2015), MOPS for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) Hybrid Surveillance, paragraph 3, as appropriate unless previously accomplished under TSO-C119c, TSO- C119d or TSO-C119e.

3.2.3 Planned Encounter Flight Tests. The objective of these flight tests is to demonstrate adequate TCAS II surveillance and to verify smooth, predictable TCAS II performance. First establish the appropriate safety rules, static system leak test (if needed due to having opened the system), and altimeter correlation between the encounter aircraft and the TCAS aircraft. You should fly the following encounters between the TCAS II aircraft and a dedicated intruder aircraft to assure that the TCAS II aircraft system performs its intended function by generating TAs and RAs, and is consistent with RTCA/DO-185A or RTCA/DO-185B as applicable, and RTCA/DO-300 (including Change 2) or RTCA/DO-300A (including Change 1) as appropriate. The intruder aircraft must have a previously approved transponder installation capable of Mode A, Mode C, and for those tests necessary, Mode S, TCAS II and ADS-B Mode S Extended Squitter if appropriate. These tests are also to expose the installed TCAS II system to a reasonable number of carefully controlled encounters that are likely to occur in service. This matrix covers the envelope of encounter speeds, altitudes, and geometries that have in the past identified flaws in surveillance, logic, and antenna mechanization that bench tests did not detect earlier. Fly the following encounters:

3.2.3.1 Intruder overtaking TCAS II aircraft (from the aft quadrants).

3.2.3.2 Head-on.

3.2.3.2.1 Low and high closure speeds.

3.2.3.2.2 Above climb limit, TCAS II to TCAS II.

3.2.3.2.3 TCAS II against Mode C with TCAS II above intruder and above climb limit (intent is to force TCAS II aircraft to descend.)

3.2.3.2.4 At 3000 feet over calm water to evaluate multipath protection.

3.2.3.3 Converging.

3.2.3.3.1 Crossing (intruder above TCAS II, descending or vice versa.)

3.2.3.3.2 Evaluate the TA-only mode during planned encounters.

3.2.3.3.3 Evaluate a mix of intruder transponder modes (A, C, S and S with extended squitter) but primary emphasis should be on

3.2.4 Mode S Transponder Tests.

TCAS II-to-TCAS II coordination, and on Mode C replies from the intruder aircraft.

3.2.3.3.4 Evaluate a mix of encounters with TCAS II both above and below the intruder.

3.2.3.3.5 If a flight test is necessary to ensure compatibility with other designs, verify correct air-to-air coordination between the test TCAS II and another manufacturer’s previously approved equipment (refer to paragraph 2.3.3).

3.2.3.3.6 Evaluate the effect of electrical transients (bus transfer) during encounters. The TCAS II should not experience adverse effects. Electrical transients should not result in generation of any false TAs or RAs. Normal TCAS II functions and displays should be restored within approximately three seconds.

3.2.4 Mode S Transponder Tests.

3.2.4.1 This section provides select guidance for certain extended squitter and ELS/EHS surveillance messaging. Refer to the EASA and JAA publications mentioned in paragraph 1.5 for guidance on ELS/EHS capabilities.

3.2.4.2 You can use the tests in these paragraphs to obtain the certification of a stand-alone Mode S transponder installation (an installation without TCAS II). You should also use these tests to evaluate a Mode S transponder installed as part of a TCAS II installation. The tests primarily verify the installed antenna(s) are compatible with the Mode S transponder and provide an adequate response to ground radar interrogations during normal aircraft maneuvers.

3.2.4.3 Additionally, these tests demonstrate that the Mode S transponder functions properly as installed and does not interfere with other aircraft electronic equipment. You don’t need to do as much detailed flight test when the Mode S transponder and antenna installation are identical or similar to that of a previously approved ATCRBS transponder installation. If you are upgrading a previously installed and certified transponder, you don’t necessarily need to follow all of the guidance in this section to approve the upgrade. You should accomplish a careful examination of the proposed transponder upgrade to determine which of the tests in this section are necessary and appropriate. Typical testing associated with the initial installation and certification of a new transponder may not be necessary when upgrading a previously approved transponder. For example, if you are considering a software upgrade that would add extended squitter functionality to a transponder in a previously approved installation, you won’t need detailed flights if appropriate ground testing adequately evaluates the added functionality.

CAUTION: When conducting flight testing of the transponder or TCAS system, you must prevent being a source of interference to ATC or other TCAS aircraft operating in the area. For example, using a fixed transponder to simulate an intruder aircraft can cause transmission of data which produce false targets for the ground ATC surveillance systems or airborne TCAS aircraft. These false indications of “intruder aircraft” could result in unnecessary ATC communications and possibly in TCAS induced aircraft maneuvers. Therefore, conduct such testing in coordination with ATC.

Note: The conduct of this test requires cooperation with ATC controllers. Coordination with ATC is important before the flight test for any necessary approval of the flight and agreement with the flight test procedures. During the flight test, the test crew will need to communicate with the controller monitoring the aircraft and reporting transponder performance data.

3.2.4.4 If the Mode S transponder uses a top mounted antenna in addition to a bottom mounted antenna installed at, or near, the same location used by a previously approved ATCRBS transponder antenna, conduct a comprehensive ground test and evaluation in accordance with Appendix B and perform a functional flight test. The transponder code, altitude reporting and “IDENT” features of the transponder should be exercised during normal maneuvering. The ATC controller should not observe any objectionable behavior.

3.2.4.5 If a Mode S transponder is installed in an aircraft which does not have a previously approved ATCRBS transponder installation, or that uses a bottom mounted antenna location which differs significantly from that used by a previously approved ATCRBS transponder antenna, conduct the following ground and flight tests:

Note: References to the radar facility are references to the radar that provides the data used by the ATC controller(s) during the flight test for monitoring the aircraft and reporting transponder performance data. In other words, these refer to where the radar antenna/interrogator is located, not the displays used by the controllers.

3.2.4.6 Conduct ground tests and evaluations per Appendix B.

3.2.4.7 Climb and Distance Coverage.

Begin at a distance of at least 10 nautical miles (NM) from, and an altitude of 2000 to 3000 feet above, the radar facility. Using a transponder code assigned by ATC, fly on a heading that will pass the aircraft over the radar facility. At a distance of 5 to 10 NM beyond the radar facility, fly the aircraft at its normal maximum climb attitude to within 90 percent of the certificated altitude for the aircraft, maintaining the aircraft heading within

5 degrees of the track from the radar facility. After reaching the maximum altitude for which the aircraft is certificated, fly level at the maximum altitude to 160 NM for turbojet and some turboprop powered airplanes (or 80 NM for most other aircraft) from the radar facility. (Distance from the radar facility is a function of the airplane’s maximum certificated altitude.) Communicate with the ATC controller to check for evidence of transponder dropout. During the flight, check the “IDENT” mode of the ATC transponder to assure that it is performing its intended function. There should be no unexpected dropouts (no return for two or more sweeps). Uncontrollable ringing that hinders use of the ground radar is unsatisfactory.

3.2.4.8 Long Range Reception.

At 90 percent of maximum certificated altitude, perform left and right 360-degree turns, at bank angles of 8 to 10 degrees. The aircraft should be at least 160 (or 80) NM from the radar facility. During these turns, request that the ATC controller monitor the radar displays. There should be no dropouts (no return for two or more sweeps).

3.2.4.9 High Angle Reception.

Perform two 360-degree turns, one to the right and one to the left, at bank angles of 8 to 10 degrees with the airplane at a distance of 50 to 70 NM from the radar facility and at an altitude of at least 35,000 feet or within 90 percent of the maximum altitude for which the aircraft is certificated. There should be no dropouts (no return for two or more sweeps). Switch the transponder to a new code assigned by the ATC controller. The aircraft secondary return on the ATC controller’s radar display should indicate a Mode A code change.

3.2.4.10 High Altitude Cruise.

Within 90 percent of the aircraft’s maximum certificated altitude or its maximum operating altitude beginning at a point 160 (or 80) NM from the radar facility, fly on a course that will pass over the radar facility. The ATC controller should report no unexpected transponder dropout or “ring around.”

3.2.4.11 Surveillance Approach.

Beginning at or above 90 percent of the certificated maximum altitude for the aircraft, perform a letdown and approach to a runway of an airport served by Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) having an ATCRBS facility. Make the approach at the maximum normal rate of descent. Normal approach and landing configuration for the aircraft should continue down to an altitude of 200 feet or less above the ground radar antenna elevation. Not more than one dropout should occur for any 10 sweeps during final

approach. Uncontrolled ringing that hinders use of the ground radar is unsatisfactory.

3.2.4.12 Holding and Orbiting Patterns.

3.2.4.12.1 At an altitude of 2000 feet above the radar antenna or minimum obstruction clearance altitude (whichever is greater) with landing flaps and gear extended, fly left and right 360-degree turns approximately 10 miles from the radar facility. There should be no signal dropouts.

3.2.4.12.2 At an altitude of 2000 feet above the radar antenna or minimum obstruction clearance altitude (whichever is greater), fly 45 degree sectors of left and right 10 mile orbital patterns around a radar facility with gear and landing flaps extended. There should be no signal dropouts.

3.2.4.13 Altitude Reporting.

Conduct a functional test of the altitude encoder by comparison with ATC displayed altitudes. Verify correspondence at several altitudes between ATC readings and the Captain’s altimeter, when set at or corrected to 29.92 inches of mercury (or equivalent).

3.2.4.14 Verify that a transponder failure and transponder in the standby mode are properly annunciated in accordance with sections 2.2.10 of this AC.

4.2.1 Evaluate the general arrangement and operation of controls,…

CHAPTER 4. FOLLOW-ON APPROVALS (STCs or Amended STC or Amended TC) - The Need for Tests and a Plan.

This section provides guidance for follow-on approvals of TCAS and Mode S transponders.

4.1 General

4.1.1 Provide a test plan including adequate aircraft ground testing and evaluations to verify that the design and installation performs its intended function when you install it in a different aircraft type under the expected operating conditions. There should be no adverse interactions between the TCAS II or Mode S transponder and existing aircraft systems, and the installation should not compromise prior approvals of present aircraft equipment. This test plan will generally require a combination of ground tests, basic flight tests, and flight tests involving planned encounters with a Mode C equipped aircraft, or the use of a suitably located fixed transponder. The test plan should contain, as a minimum, the elements of paragraph 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.4 and those in the next paragraphs.

4.1.2 You may need to conduct flight testing of TCAS II or Mode S transponder systems for follow-on approvals (previously approved TCAS II or Mode S transponder equipment installed in a different aircraft type or change to the defined configuration of a previously approved system installation) to verify that the design and installation performs its intended function under the expected operating conditions. Determine that there are no adverse interactions between the TCAS II or Mode S transponder and existing aircraft systems, and that the installation does not compromise prior approvals of present aircraft equipment.

CAUTION: When flight testing the transponder or TCAS system, you must prevent being a source of interference to ATC or other TCAS aircraft operating in the area. For example, using a fixed transponder to simulate an intruder aircraft can cause transmission of data which produce false targets for the ground ATC surveillance systems or airborne TCAS aircraft. False indications of “intruder aircraft” could result in unnecessary ATC communications and possibly in TCAS induced aircraft maneuvers. Conduct such testing in coordination with ATC.

4.2 Ground Tests and Evaluations.

4.2.1 Evaluate the general arrangement and operation of controls, displays, circuit breakers, annunciators, and placards of the TCAS II system. Conduct a human factors evaluation of the controls, displays and annunciators. Evaluate the TCAS controls and the controls of installed systems that interact with TCAS (for example, transponders) to determine that the control design and location prevents inadvertent actuation. Evaluate TCAS displays and annunciations to determine that they support flight crew awareness of TCAS status changes which could result from TCAS mode selections, intentional pilot actuation of other installed systems, or inadvertent pilot actions with TCAS or other installed systems. Evaluate TCAS displays to ensure all information is, at a minimum,

4.2.10 Verify proper connection of the air/ground inputs.

legible, unambiguous, and attention-getting (as applicable). In particular, where transponder functions are integrated with other system controls, ensure that unintended transponder mode switching, especially switching to STANDBY or OFF, is not possible. Pay close attention to line select keys, touch screens or cursor controlled trackballs as these can be susceptible to unintended mode selection resulting from their location in the flight deck (for example proximity to a foot rest or adjacent to a temporary stowage area).

4.2.2 Evaluate the TCAS II self-test features and failure mode displays and annunciators. For forward fit or new installations (as defined in the note to section 2.2.10), verify that a TCAS failure and TCAS in the standby mode are properly annunciated in accordance with sections 2.2.10 of this AC.

4.2.3 Verify proper interface of the pressure altitude source and radio altimeter with the TCAS II equipment.

4.2.4 Measure the performance of the directional antenna for 360 degrees coverage at 30 degree intervals, as specified under basic ground tests, paragraph 3.2.1.1.

4.2.5 Evaluate the TCAS II system installation for satisfactory identification, accessibility, and visibility during both day and night conditions.

4.2.6 Determine that any configuration discretes (changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed) associated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb RAs, operate properly.

4.2.7 Verify that the ICAO 24-bit aircraft address and maximum airspeed are correct. Verify that the transponder and data sources meet the requirements of the failure condition classifications associated with the features.

4.2.8 Verify that the windshear and GPWS/TAWS warnings and TCAS II voice alerts are compatible. Also, verify that the flight crew can clearly understand windshear and GPWS/TAWS warnings and that TCAS II automatically switches to the TA Only mode when TCAS II and windshear voice or GPWS/TAWS announcements simultaneously occur. The alert priorities should be windshear, GPWS/TAWS, and then TCAS II.

4.2.9 If connected, verify that the altitude alerter is providing correct data to TCAS and that the TCAS II logic correctly weakens or strengthens the displayed RA using the altitude alerter input.

4.2.10 Verify proper connection of the air/ground inputs.

CAUTION: When the aircraft is on the ground, the system must inhibit the Mode S transponder from replying to any Mode A, Mode C, Mode A/C/S all-call interrogations and Mode S-only all-call interrogations.

Note 1: You can usually implement this inhibit via an appropriate transponder pin connected through the weight-on-wheels switch, but you might also implement it

4.3.2 If we determine that you need to do certification flight-testing,…

through some other automatic means (for example, velocity/altitude algorithm, etc.). You must verify the inhibit implementation during ground testing.

Note 2: While on the ground the transponder normally should stop output of acquisition squitters (short squits), and should continue output of extended squitters (known as long squits or ADS-B) in the surface format and it should reply to any discretely addressed aircraft interrogations. You should also verify this during ground testing. DO-181E, paragraph 2.2.18.2.6, Acquisition Squitter Protocols, specifies the exact conditions for transmission of acquisition squitter.

4.2.11 For forward fit or new installations (as defined in the note to section 2.2.10), verify that a transponder failure and transponder in the standby mode are properly annunciated in accordance with sections 2.2.10 of this AC.

4.3 Flight Tests.

4.3.1 The certification policy for follow-on approvals (STC or amended STC) of TCAS II V7.0 or V7.1 units is that you may not need to do flight tests, if you perform the appropriate testing on the ground to certify that you correctly installed the V7.0 or V7.1 unit and that any new interfaces operate correctly with the TCAS II logic.

4.3.2 If we determine that you need to do certification flight-testing, demonstrate the following:

4.3.2.1 Verify proper operation of the traffic display by observing proximate traffic, at least one TA and at least one RA. Confirm that the appropriate aural alerts occur correctly with the TA and RA. You may generate the advisories by:

4.3.2.1.1 Planned encounters with an intruder aircraft operating a transponder with Mode C capability.

Note: Before any cooperative flight tests at any altitude involving the TCAS II equipped aircraft and another aircraft, fly both aircraft in close formation to assure matched altimetry readouts. You should fly these checks at the speeds and altitudes you will use for the tests.

4.3.2.1.2 Encounters with an operating Mode C transponder installed at a fixed ground location, which reports an appropriate test altitude.

CAUTION: When flight testing the transponder or TCAS system, you must prevent being a source of interference to ATC or other TCAS aircraft operating in the area. For example, using a fixed transponder to simulate an intruder aircraft can cause transmission of data which produce false targets for the ground ATC surveillance systems or airborne TCAS aircraft. These false indications of “intruder aircraft” could result in unnecessary ATC communications and possibly in TCAS induced aircraft maneuvers. Conduct such testing in coordination with ATC.

4.3.3 Evaluate the effective surveillance range of the traffic display,…

4.3.2.1.3 Encounters with aircraft targets of opportunity.

4.3.2.1.4 The use of suitable test equipment during ground tests.

CAUTION: When ground testing the transponder or TCAS system, you must take precautions to prevent being a source of interference to ATC or other TCAS aircraft operating in the area. Ground maintenance checks or ramp testing (such as altimetry or bearing accuracy testing) can cause transmission of data which produce false targets for the ground ATC surveillance systems or airborne TCAS aircraft. These false indications of “intruder aircraft” could result in unnecessary ATC communications and possibly in TCAS induced aircraft maneuvers. Conduct such testing in coordination with ATC and use antenna shielding (transmission absorption covers or caps) to prevent the system from transmitting test data that could generate false intruder information. Using high-powered, hangar-mounted transponders to conduct ramp testing is not an acceptable means to test either transponder or TCAS. As an alternative to the use of antenna shielding, radiated testing can be used provided that a) if in Air Mode, the Mode C code, Mode S altitude reporting downlink formats, and ADS-B altitude reports all respond with an altitude that is at least 600 feet below ground level or an altitude above 90,000 feet above ground level, and b) if aircraft is in a normal pre-dispatch configuration (in On Ground Mode and transponder set to "TRANSPONDER" mode), the Mode C code, Mode S altitude reporting downlink formats, and ADS-B altitude reports all respond with an altitude at ground level.

4.3.2.2 During all phases of flight, determine if there is any mutual interference with any other aircraft system.

4.3.2.3 Evaluate TCAS II aural messages for acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels (idle descent at low speed and high power at Vmo) with and without headsets, covering the outboard ear where appropriate. In turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew uses headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural messages should hold the same acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels. If the TCAS II TEST is used to simulate voice announcements, ensure that use of the TEST function does not change the audio level.

4.3.3 Evaluate the effective surveillance range of the traffic display, including target azimuth reasonableness and track stability. You may use a non-transport (low speed) Mode C equipped aircraft as a target or a fixed transponder or suitable test equipment for these tests.

CAUTION: When flight testing the transponder or TCAS system, you must prevent being a source of interference to ATC or other TCAS aircraft operating in the area. For example, using a fixed transponder to simulate an intruder aircraft can cause transmission of data which produce false targets for the ground ATC surveillance

4.5 Upgrading an Existing Mode S Transponder Installation

systems or airborne TCAS aircraft. These false indications of “intruder aircraft” could result in unnecessary ATC communications and possibly in TCAS induced aircraft maneuvers. Conduct such testing in coordination with ATC.

4.3.4 Evaluate the Mode S transponder air-to-ground ATCRBS function against an appropriate ground facility.

4.3.5 Determine that any configuration discretes associated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of aural annunciations and RAs, operate properly unless you previously demonstrated this during ground tests. (These include changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed.)

4.3.6 Evaluate TCAS II for noninterference during coupled autopilot and flight director approaches to the lowest minimums approved for the aircraft.

4.3.7 Evaluate all selectable modes of the TCAS II to determine that they perform their intended function.

4.3.8 Reevaluate any previously installed aircraft systems that have required changes as a result of the TCAS II installation (such as CMC, EFIS, EICAS FD, PFD, ND, IVSI, and interface).

4.4 Upgrading an Existing TCAS II Installation. If you are upgrading an existing approved TCAS II installation to a higher TCAS II version (i.e., V7.0 or V7.1), and the higher version installation is only a software change, then you don’t need to do any additional certification flight tests to obtain a follow-on STC or amended STC or an amended TC. The appropriate aircraft ground tests of paragraph 4.2 are sufficient to ensure that the higher version TCAS II software is operating properly. However, if the upgrade to a higher version TCAS II unit involves changes other than a software change (such as the addition of new interfaces), you may need to do flight tests in accordance with paragraph 4.3.2.

4.5 Upgrading an Existing Mode S Transponder Installation As stated in Section 3.2.4.3, typical testing associated with the initial installation and certification of a new transponder may not be necessary when upgrading a previously approved transponder. Examination of the proposed transponder upgrade should be accomplished to determine which tests are necessary and appropriate. For example, when upgrading an existing approved Mode S transponder installation to add ADS-B Out functionality and the upgrade is only a software change, if ground testing adequately evaluates the added functionality, then no additional certification flight tests are required to support a follow-on STC, amended STC, or amended TC.

5.2 TCAS V7.1 AFMS Example.

CHAPTER 5. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT

5.1 Content of an AFMS. The AFMS should provide the appropriate system limitations and procedures, and a comprehensive description of all normal modes of operation, including expected flight crew actions.

5.2 TCAS V7.1 AFMS Example. Refer to 0 for an example of the elements and extent of detail that a typical AFMS may show (specific performance data, inhibits and procedures may vary with system design and aircraft type).

APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE TCAS II V7.1 AFMS

Appendix A

APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE TCAS II V7.1 AFMS

INTRODUCTION.

You may, when appropriate, replace descriptive material and procedures in this Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) example by reference in the AFMS to the TCAS II equipment supplier’s pilot operating guide. However, the AFMS reference to this guide must specify date and revision level; and not be open ended, such as, “or later revision,” unless the pilot’s guide is specifically FAA approved. Also, the AFMS must define the specific configuration approved from the various options contained in the pilot’s guide; for example, which model control panel, whether the pilot initiated self-test is available in flight, range features, TA vertical display features, and so forth.

-EXAMPLE-

AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT

(Example for an aircraft equipped with IVSI/RA displays)

DESCRIPTION.

The TCAS II is an on-board collision avoidance and traffic situation display system with computer processing to identify and display intruding and threatening collision aircraft, and issue resolution advisories in the form of vertical maneuver guidance on the pilot and copilot’s instantaneous vertical speed indicators (IVSI). From the transponder replies, TCAS II determines relative altitude, range, and bearing of any ATCRBS or Mode S equipped aircraft with altitude reporting. From this, TCAS II will determine the level of advisory using standardized algorithms. The TCAS II will resolve multiple aircraft encounters. ATCRBS equipped aircraft that only reply with Mode A information will not provide altitude information; therefore, TCAS II will not issue resolution advisories for these aircraft but can issue traffic advisories. The TCAS II will not detect aircraft that are not equipped with transponders.

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