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Advisory Circular Current Issued Feb 16, 2023 AAS-300 106 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 150/5200-37A Safety Management Systems for Airports

This AC presents the concepts of a Safety Management System (SMS) and provides detailed guidance about developing and implementing SMS for an airport. For more information, see External SMS - SMS for Part 139 Airports.

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U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Advisory Circular

Subject: Safety Management Systems for Airports

Date: 2/16/2023 Initiated By: AAS-300

AC No: 150/5200-37A Change:

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Purpose. This Advisory Circular (AC) presents the concepts of a Safety Management System (SMS) and provides detailed guidance about developing and implementing SMS for an airport.

An SMS enhances safety, ensures compliance with applicable regulatory standards, and can be integrated into all aspects of airport operations, including business and management practices. This AC explains how SMS will help airports develop an explicit, pro-active, and engaged process for identifying and quantifying potential hazards and risks and for managing them in a systematically coherent, logical, and reasonable way.

Effect of Guidance. The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.

Cancellation. This AC cancels AC 150/5200-37, Safety Management Systems for Airports, dated February 28, 2007.

Audience. This AC applies to all civil airports, when adapted to the size, activity level, staff level, and resources of each facility. In addition, this AC explains certain regulatory requirements outlined in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 139, Certification of Airports for the development and implementation of SMS. Part 139 airports should refer to www.FAA.gov/airports/ for more information on SMS regulatory requirements.

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The AC focuses on airport operational safety in the airfield environment and the principles apply to all civil airports, when adapted to the size, activity level, staff level, and resources of each facility. Airport operators can apply these principles anywhere on their airports (airside or landside environments) to address safety concerns. Furthermore, while part 139 does not apply to voluntary SMS programs, this AC describes the general SMS framework and serves as a non-binding basis for the development and implementation of voluntary SMS programs for airports. This AC provides guidance to organizations on how to use the SMS principles included in part 139 as basis to develop and implement a voluntary SMS program. If the development of the SMS program is voluntary, this document also encourages organizations to develop and implement SMS as a part of their business processes in a way that is scalable to their unique operation, as there is not a one-size-fits-all SMS.

Principal Changes. This Advisory Circular has been revised to include the regulatory requirements in part 139, to update references, and provide additional examples regarding the development and implementation of SMS for airports.

Background. The United States is a member state of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In November 2005, ICAO amended Annex 14, Volume I (Aerodrome Design and Operations), to require member states to have certificated international airports establish SMS. In 2013, ICAO developed Annex 19, Safety Management, to transfer or duplicate the original safety provisions contained in 6 different Annexes, including Annex 14. In doing so, ICAO signaled the important role governments play in managing safety at the country level in coordination with individual service providers like airports. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) supports harmonization with international standards and has worked to make FAA aviation safety regulations consistent with ICAO standards and recommended practices. Part 139 establishes SMS requirements for certain U.S. airports and the FAA encourages airports not subject to the part 139 SMS requirements to implement an SMS voluntarily. The two-pronged approach supports harmonization with ICAO standard in a way that complements existing part 139 airport safety requirements and standards.

SMS encompasses the activities of every level of airport personnel – from the executive level to those who perform the many daily, routine tasks required to operate the airport. Applying a systematic, proactive, and well-defined safety program (as is inherent in an SMS) allows airports to strike a realistic and efficient balance between safety and service.

The forecast growth in air transportation requires new measures and greater effort from all aviation service providers – including airport operators – to achieve continuing improvements to aviation safety. The use of an SMS at an airport can help this effort by increasing the likelihood that the airport operator will detect and correct safety problems before they result in an accident or incident.

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7 Related Reading Material. Appendix A defines terms and acronyms used in this AC. Appendix B lists additional documents that will help airport operators understand SMS.

8 Feedback on this AC. If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the Advisory Circular Feedback form at the end of this AC.

John R. Dermody Director of Airport Safety and Standards

CONTENTS

Paragraph Page

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Chapter 1. Safety Management Systems (SMS) Overview … 1-1

1.1 Background … 1-1

1.2 What is SMS … 1-1

1.3 History … 1-2

1.4 Applications of SMS … 1-3

1.5 Format of this AC … 1-4

1.6 Scalability … 1-4

Chapter 2. Getting Started … 2-1

2.1 Introduction … 2-1

2.2 Documentation … 2-1

2.3 SMS Implementation Plans … 2-2

2.4 SMS Manual … 2-5

2.5 ACM Documentation … 2-5

2.6 Data Sharing and Reporting … 2-6

Chapter 3. Safety Policy … 3-1

3.1 Introduction … 3-1

3.2 Developing and Implementing the Safety Policy … 3-1

3.3 Establish and maintain a Safety Policy Statement … 3-7

Chapter 4. Safety Risk Management (SRM) … 4-1

4.1 Introduction … 4-1

4.2 Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management … 4-3

4.3 Scalability of SRM … 4-20

4.4 Integrated SRM Efforts … 4-20

4.5 The Risk Assessment and the SRM Panel … 4-21

4.6 Example #1 of SRM … 4-21

4.7 Example #2 of SRM … 4-23

Chapter 5. Safety Assurance … 5-1

5.1 Introduction … 5-1

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5.2 Developing and Implementing Safety Assurance … 5-3

Chapter 6. Safety Promotion … 6-1

6.1 Introduction … 6-1

6.2 Developing and Implementing Safety Promotion … 6-2

Appendix A. Definitions and Acronyms … A-1

Appendix B. Related Reading Material … B-1

Appendix C. Sample SMS Implementation Plan Template and Checklist … C-1

Appendix D. Sample SMS Manual … D-1

Appendix E. Sample Safety Reporting Dashboards … E-1

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FIGURES

Number Page

Figure 1-1. Four SMS Components … 1-2

Figure 1-2. Reason’s Accident Causation Model (Adapted) … 1-3

Figure 3-1. Safety Policy … 3-1

Figure 3-3. Sample Safety Responsibilities … 3-6

Figure 3-4. Example of Simple Safety Policy Statement … 3-8

Figure 3-5. Example of Complex Safety Policy Statement … 3-9

Figure 4-1. Elements of SRM … 4-2

Figure 4-2. Five Steps of SRM Hazard Assessment … 4-6

Figure 4-3. The 5M Model … 4-8

Figure 4-4. Sample 4x4 Predictive Risk Matrix with Likelihood and Severity Definition and

Two Levels of Risk: Acceptable and Unacceptable … 4-15

Figure 4-5. FAA Office of Airports’ Risk Matrix … 4-16

Figure 4-6. Sample 4x4 Hazard Assessment Form … 4-19

Figure 5-1. Safety Assurance … 5-1

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Figure 5-2. SRM/Safety Assurance Relationship … 5-3

Figure 5-3. Sample Confidential Hazard Reporting Form … 5-5

Figure 6-1. Safety Promotion … 6-2

Figure E-1. Sample Dashboard 1 (Courtesy of San Antonio Airport System) … E-1

Figure E-2. Sample Dashboard 2 (Courtesy of San Antonio Airport System) … E-2

Figure E-3. Sample Dashboard 3 (Courtesy of City of Atlanta) … E-3

TABLES

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Table 2-1. Examples of Existing Processes and Procedures … 2-3

Table 4-1. Example of Triggering Events … 4-4

Table 4-2. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions … 4-11

Table 4-3. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions … 4-12

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1.2 What is SMS. › 1.2.3 The safety policies and processes of an organization’s SMS are…

CHAPTER 1. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (SMS) OVERVIEW

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Background.

The FAA is committed to improving safety in air transportation. As the demand for air transportation increases, the impacts of additional air traffic and surface operations, changes in air traffic procedures, changes in aircraft fleet mix, and airport construction can increase risks associated with aircraft operations at, or around, airports. Enhanced airport safety management practices can help mitigate those risks.

Airport operators best understand their unique operating environments and are in the best position to address safety issues at their airports. SMS provides a powerful tool for airports to identify hazards and mitigation strategies, communicate safety issues, promote safety, and reduce the potential for accidents and incidents. Notwithstanding the development and implementation of SMS by an airport, the FAA will continue to conduct regular periodic inspections at airports certificated under part 139.

What is SMS.

SMS is defined in 14 CFR §139.5 as an “integrated collection of processes and procedures that ensures a formalized and proactive approach to system safety through risk management.” SMS is process management and is comprised of four basic components:

 Safety Policy;

 Safety Risk Management;

 Safety Assurance; and

 Safety Promotion.

1.2.2 Figure 1-1 describes the four SMS components and shows how they relate to each other. Safety Policy serves as the foundation of SMS; it documents an airport’s means of deploying SMS. Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety Assurance (SA) are the two operational components of SMS. SRM and SA determine how risks are identified and mitigated, and the effectiveness of any mitigations, respectively. Safety Promotion uses the SMS components to facilitate training and communication of safety related issues. Additional details on each of the four components are provided in Chapters 3 through 6.

1.2.3 The safety policies and processes of an organization’s SMS are meant to be continuously updated based on evolving conditions identified by the safety culture of the organization. The organization’s SMS should allow it to proactively recognize safety hazards in its operations and to continuously assess the effectiveness of implemented mitigations.

1.3 History. › 1.3.2 Over time, industry has recognized that failures, especially…

Figure 1-1. Four SMS Components

1.2.4 The four SMS components are sub-divided into elements. The elements are the subprocesses, policies, or procedures that support each of the four components. Note that Safety Promotion is the common link to the 3 other components and supports crosscommunication.

1.3 History.

1.3.1 SMS emerged as a recognized safety methodology over 30 years ago, as investigative inquiries related to accidents or incidents began to focus on prevention rather than reaction. The “reactive approach” often resulted in fixing one series of causal factors related to a single accident or incident, but did not focus on identifying or mitigating other root causes or issues that could have contributed to the accident or incident. The reactive approach focused on who had the accident or incident and what happened, but failed to adequately address how and why it happened.

1.3.2 Over time, industry has recognized that failures, especially human failures at the operational level, can trigger latent conditions that could breach a system’s safety defenses. Organizations now understand that by monitoring their internal processes they can identify and address latent conditions to make modifications, corrections, or implement other mitigations to prevent accidents or incidents from occurring.

1.4 Applications of SMS. › 1.4.1 SMS supports a pro-active approach to safety through a framework…

1.3.3 James Reason's "Accident Causation Model" shown in Figure 1-2, illustrates the "how" and "why" of incidents and accidents.1 The model helps identify the chain of events leading to an incident or accident. Reason used this model to transform how people thought about safety and accident investigation. Rather than focusing on an isolated event (the “who,” “what,” or “when”), Reason shifted the focus to gaps or weaknesses in organizational layers that can align to result in an incident or accident.

Figure 1-2. Reason’s Accident Causation Model (Adapted)

1.3.4 Reason’s model marked the beginning of safety management. It relied on collecting data, identifying hazards and trends, determining risk severity, mitigating risk to an acceptable level, and establishing a safety culture—the basic components of SMS.

1.4 Applications of SMS.

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1.4.1 SMS supports a pro-active approach to safety through a framework of tools and methodologies that address safety issues. It also helps an organization establish a safetyconscious environment and culture. SMS covers all personnel in all operational areas because observation, evaluation, and reporting are integral to achieving effective safetyrelated outcomes. In short, SMS, when managed and directed accurately, can achieve an improved level of safety and contributes to eliminating or mitigating the conditions that can lead to accidents or incidents. Having an SMS does not mean an airport will be accident-free, but when implemented, it contributes to improving safety at the airport and in the aviation ecosystem.

1 James Reason, Human Error, Cambridge University Press (1990).

Chapter 1. Safety Management Systems (SMS) Overview › 1.6 Scalability.

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Section 139.401(a) identifies certificate holders or applicants for an Airport Operating Certificate that must develop, implement, maintain, and adhere to an SMS. While the part 139 SMS requirements apply to the airfield environment (including airport movement and non-movement areas), airport operators can apply these principles anywhere on their airports - including the landside environment, to address safety concerns.

Some of the benefits derived from SMS include:2

 Reduced likelihood of accidents;

 Reduced costs related to accidents and incidents;

 Assurance that a systematic process is in place to monitor and address safety issues in a transparent and informed way;

 The potential for reduced insurance and liability costs;

 Competitive advantage and the possibility of more business opportunities;

 Improved regulatory compliance;

 Improved employee morale and performance;

 Identification of the best use of limited resources;

 Reduced reliance on a few key personnel;

 Improved control; and

 Consistency.

1.5 Format of this AC.

1.5.1 The AC contains six chapters. Chapter 2 explains how to begin developing an SMS and the required documentation. Chapters 3 through 6 address the four components of SMS: Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. Each chapter begins by defining the component and examining how it could be applied on the airport.

1.5.2 Appendices A and B list the Definitions and Acronyms used in this AC and include background reading material. Appendices C, D, and E include a sample Implementation Plan, SMS Manual, and Safety Dashboards.

1.6 Scalability.

2 Transportation Research Board. (2009). Airport Cooperative Research Program Report 1, Safety Management Systems for Airports, Volume 2: Guidebook [Adobe Digital Editions version]. Retrieved from http://www.trb.org/Publications/Blurbs/162491.aspx.

1.6 Scalability. › An SMS needs to be tailored to each airport taking into account factors…

An SMS needs to be tailored to each airport taking into account factors such as the airport size, resources, environment, physical layout, and management. (Ref 14 CFR section 139.401(c)). Medium and large airports may require more detailed processes to develop and implement SMS than small airports. For example, an airport manager may handle most of the SMS processes at a small airport with a single manager and minimal support staff. However, at medium and large airports, the complexity and departmentalization of duties on the airport may require that more personnel be involved with the SMS. Regardless of airport size, many airports will find their existing processes and procedures can serve as the foundation for portions of their SMS.

2.2 Documentation. › 2.2.2 Airports that are not required to develop and implement a Part…

CHAPTER 2. GETTING STARTED

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Introduction.

Shifting from a reactive to a proactive approach to safety management takes time and considerable effort. Therefore, an airport should methodically develop an SMS that utilizes existing policies and procedures as much as possible and document and communicate changes related to SMS development and deployment. Managers, employees, and tenants may resist change, so training and communication will be crucial to gaining initial participation and then sustaining the SMS.

Airports may find it helpful to appoint an individual or team to coordinate the development and deployment of SMS-related processes. This individual or team does not need to be the individual ultimately responsible for daily oversight of the SMS but should have credibility and authority throughout the airport and with its stakeholders. Similarly, if a team approach is used, the team should be comprised of individuals with a variety of backgrounds and authority throughout the airport to facilitate wide-spread buy-in and support for the SMS.

Regardless of the initial approach, it is essential that airports establish certain documentation requirements to build a solid foundation for SMS implementation and operation. SMS implementation parallels the practice of Quality Management with defining objectives, establishing controllable process, training the workforce, and obtaining continuous improvements.

Documentation.

Typical documentation required for SMS development and deployment include an SMS Implementation Plan and an SMS Manual. Under part 139, certain airport operators are required to submit an SMS Implementation Plan to the FAA for review and approval. These certificated airports must also document how they will comply with the part 139 SMS requirements either in a new section of its Airport Certification Manual (ACM) or in a stand-alone SMS Manual. If the certificate holder chooses to maintain a stand-alone SMS Manual, it must also incorporate the SMS Manual by reference into the ACM. Maintaining a separate SMS Manual allows the certificate holder to make changes without requiring FAA approval prior to implementation (Ref 14 CFR section 139.401(f)).

Airports that are not required to develop and implement a part 139 SMS and instead choose to voluntarily implement SMS may find it helpful to create an SMS Implementation Plan and an SMS Manual, or similar documents. The processes and procedures used in a voluntarily implemented SMS can be kept separate from the FAAapproved ACM. However, if the airport chooses to incorporate SMS processes or procedures directly into their FAA approved ACM, then the operator would be forced to comply with such processes and procedures because they would be enforceable by the FAA (Ref FAA Order 5280.5D, chapter 3).

2.3 SMS Implementation Plans. › 2.3.3 Table 2-1 includes examples of existing processes and procedures…

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The purpose of the FAA reviewing an Airport’s SMS is to ensure the certificate holder is following its own processes as documented in the SMS Manual and/or ACM. It is not to analyze the certificate holder’s decisions. The FAA’s review and approval of the SMS Implementation Plan ensures that a certificate holder is given feedback early and before it may make significant capital improvements as part of its SMS development and implementation.

Other chapters of this AC address documentation related to SMS requirements like Safety Risk Management, which are developed on an on-going basis.

SMS Implementation Plans.

The SMS Implementation Plan identifies a realistic strategy for developing the SMS through a framework and series of steps. For certificate holders regulated under part 139, the creation of an SMS Implementation Plan is accomplished early in the development of its SMS (Ref 14 CFR section 139.403(b)). Note: Airports may need to consider their current safety culture and account for further cultural development in their implementation plan.

The development of the Implementation Plan can be broken into 5 steps:

1. Assess the current safety organization and its resources. For a small airport, this may be a single individual; whereas at larger airports, this may be a department.

2. Inventory existing safety processes, review existing SMS programs in place by the airport and airport tenants (e.g., voluntary implemented programs), and understand the current safety culture of the organization. This is the current state or starting point.

3. Identify and mitigate the gaps in the airport’s program relative to the requirements of 14 CFR part 139. Understand that the term “goal” is often misinterpreted and implied as an end point; that once met, the task is complete. A successful SMS should be viewed as a continuous journey of refinement.

4. Conduct a GAP Analysis. Develop a map or strategy on how to achieve the part 139 SMS requirements using current identified processes. In other words, how to get to the future state from the current state. During the analysis, it is often revealed that current processes may already satisfy the requirement. The analysis may also show weaknesses in a process, or that the process does not exist at all.

5. Create the Implementation Plan and document how the organization will go from the current state to the required state and will meet all regulatory requirements in part 139. The organization should also assess its resources and determine what is needed. It is recommended that the level of detail included in the plan be sufficient to determine if progress is being made.

2.3.3 Table 2-1 includes examples of existing processes and procedures that can serve as the foundation for SMS components and elements.

Table 2-1. Examples of Existing Processes and Procedures

Existing Policy/Procedure/Practice

Adaptability to SMS

Policy Statement Safety Policy. Many airport governing bodies have policy statements. The preexisting statements may include safety-related initiatives or may be geared solely toward employee safety. Using this policy as a foundation or revising it to address operational safety (and not just employee safety) can help in the development of a Safety Policy Statement.

Daily Self-Inspections Safety Risk Management & Safety Assurance. Daily self-inspections performed to meet part 139 requirements or airportimposed requirements are good means of identifying safety hazards and ensuring continuous compliance.

Airport Committees Safety Promotion & Safety Risk Management. Many airports have preexisting airport committees made up of airport staff and managers or stakeholders like air carriers, fixed-base operators, and airport tenants. These committees can serve two roles under SMS. They can help communicate important safety issues and initiatives as part of Safety Promotion. Also, they can identify individuals needed for risk assessments as part of Safety Risk Management.

Airport Intranet or Internet Website

Safety Assurance & Safety Promotion. Airport internet or intranet websites provide excellent means for distributing safety information to employees and tenants as part of Safety Promotion. These sites can also house portals to the airport’s safety reporting system as part of Safety Assurance.

Training Safety Promotion & Safety Assurance. SMS training and safety awareness can be included in preexisting training programs, saving time and reducing implementation costs.

2.3.6 Appendix C of this AC includes a sample Implementation Plan that… › 2.3.6.1 An SMS Implementation Plan is not a mere checklist or table; it…

Existing Policy/Procedure/Practice

Adaptability to SMS

Recordkeeping Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance & Safety Promotion. Preexisting recordkeeping practices can serve as the foundation for documentation and tracking of Safety Risk Management findings for Safety Assurance and training/communication performed under Safety Promotion.

2.3.4 Part 139 certificate holders that are required to implement SMS, must submit an Implementation Plan to the FAA for approval (Ref 14 CFR section 139.403(a)) that contains the following:

1. A detailed proposal on how the certificate holder will meet the SMS requirements;

2. A schedule for implementing SMS components and elements prescribed. The schedule must include timelines for:

a. Developing the safety policy statement and when it will be made available to all employees and tenants;

b. Identifying and communicating the safety organizational structure;

c. Establishing a system for identifying operational safety issues;

d. Establishing a safety reporting system;

e. Developing, providing, and maintaining safety awareness orientation materials;

f. Providing SMS specific training to employees with responsibilities under the airport operator’s SMS; and

g. Developing, implementing, and maintaining formal means for communicating

important safety information.

3. A description of any existing programs, policies, or procedures that the certificate holder intends to use to meet the SMS requirements.

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2.3.6

Certificate holders should refer to subpart E of part 139 to familiarize themselves with all applicable Airport SMS requirements.

Appendix C of this AC includes a sample Implementation Plan that meets the minimum requirements of part 139. Airport operators are encouraged to use the sample as the baseline for their plan to expedite FAA review and approval.

2.3.6.1 An SMS Implementation Plan is not a mere checklist or table; it is the mechanism by which the airport explains its approach to implementation, discusses strategies or challenges concerning deployment, and identifies major milestones. The accompanying checklist should be tailored to the airport’s needs and unique circumstances.

Chapter 2. Getting Started › 2.5 ACM Documentation.

2.3.6.2 The sample Implementation Plan includes a “Status” column, allowing it to serve not only as a one-time plan, but also as an ongoing tool for communicating implementation status to management.

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SMS Manual.

An SMS Manual details the SMS elements and how they will be established and function. It is a document that may resemble a part 139 Airport Certification Manual (ACM). While the ACM describes how the airport operates, the SMS Manual describes the SMS functions and documents and delineates how the airport operator will implement the four SMS components. An airport operator may choose to develop an SMS Manual separately from the ACM, or may choose to integrate them.

Appendix D provides an example arrangement of an SMS Manual. Not all SMS Manuals will look alike. Manuals will vary in size, specificity, and scope. The airport operator should tailor the manual to meet its unique operational and governance needs.

This AC focuses on airport operational safety in the airfield environment (both movement and non-movement areas). However, airport operators can apply these principles anywhere on their airports (the airside or landside environments) to address safety. The purpose of addressing landside areas in SMS is to address conditions, events, incidents, or accidents that could potentially threaten, or harm, passengercarrying operations, and to reduce or eliminate the possibility of recurrence of accidents in air transportation.

The SMS Manual can discuss other areas where the airport operator choses to implement SMS, but the landside or terminal discussions should be kept separate from the airside applications. Airport governing bodies that oversee multiple airports may choose to develop one SMS Manual for the entire system instead of individual SMS Manuals for each airport. This method is acceptable as long as all included airports understand how the applicable manual applies to them.

SMS Manuals are intended to be living documents. The airport should review and update the SMS Manual as needed and communicate changes to all individuals with a need to know. While part 139 does not specify how often the SMS Manual is updated, 14 CFR section 139.401(f) requires the certificate holder to provide copies of any changes made to the SMS Manual to the FAA on an annual basis or upon FAA request. Only the information that has changed should be submitted for FAA acceptance.

ACM Documentation. If an airport operator that is not subject to the part 139 SMS requirements chooses to voluntarily implement SMS and to incorporate SMS processes or procedures directly into their FAA-approved ACM, then the operator would be forced to comply with such processes and procedures because they would be enforceable by the FAA. (Refer to 14 CFR 139.201-203 for the ACM requirements.) Therefore, the FAA recommends that

2.6 Data Sharing and Reporting. › 2.6.2 If an airport has a tenant that is required to maintain an SMS…

2.6

2.6.1

2.6.2

such airport operators keep voluntary SMS-related documentation such as SMS Manuals and Implementation Plans separate (e.g., not incorporated by reference) from their part 139 programs and to not incorporate such documents, processes, or procedures into their ACM.

Data Sharing and Reporting.

A successful SMS requires an open culture of communication. Some airport tenants may have an SMS of their own (e.g., one that is mandatory in accordance with FAA regulations or one that is voluntarily implemented to improve their operations in general). In order to maximize the effectiveness of hazard identification, airport operators and airport tenants and users should coordinate SMS efforts to the fullest extent possible and should understand how their SMS interacts with other SMS’s in the same environment (e.g., how the airport’s SMS can work in tandem with an air carrier’s SMS under part 5 and how collaboration amongst both SMS’s may improve safety).

If an airport has a tenant that is required to maintain an SMS subject to the requirements of Part 5, then the airport may develop a data sharing and reporting plan to address the reporting and sharing of hazard and safety data with the tenant. (Ref 14 CFR section 139.401(e)). Since a hazard to one party may be a hazard to another, the FAA encourages airports to enter into such. These data sharing and reporting agreements improve communications, share hazard identification reporting and information, and enhance the mitigations put in place to address safety. Such a data sharing relationship could also be used by the certificate holder to reduce duplicate requirements for providing safety training and safety awareness orientation to the tenants or their employees (Ref 14 CFR section 139.402(d)(1)). As referenced in Table 2.1, an option to enhance communication is the creation of an airport SMS committee that includes representatives from all stakeholders (e.g., airport, air carriers, airport tenants) that fosters communications streams, transparency, and agreements between tenants, users, and airport operators to address safety in the airport environment and of related operations. Further information regarding the confidentiality of data is discussed in Chapter 5, Safety Assurance.

3.2.1 Identify the Accountable Executive. › 3.2.1.1 The Accountable Executive is the person designated by the…

CHAPTER 3. SAFETY POLICY

3.1 Introduction.

3.1.1 Safety Policy, the first of the four SMS components, provides the foundation or framework for SMS. Safety Policy is the airport’s documented commitment to safety, which defines its safety objectives and the accountabilities and responsibilities of its employees in regards to safety. Airport management develops, documents, and communicates a Safety Policy that demonstrates its commitment to providing a safe and secure environment for the passengers, employees, and users of the airport’s services (Ref 14 CFR sections 139.402(a)(6) & (7), and 139.402(c)(1)).

3.1.2 Figure 3-1 shows the numerous elements that make up Safety Policy:

Figure 3-1. Safety Policy

3.2 Developing and Implementing the Safety Policy.

3.2.1 Identify the Accountable Executive.

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3.2.1.1 The Accountable Executive is the person designated by the airport to act on its behalf for the implementation and maintenance of the airport’s SMS. The support of a senior executive is essential; otherwise, there is little incentive for employees and tenants to actively participate in the airport’s SMS activities and initiatives. The Accountable Executive should

3.2.1 Identify the Accountable Executive. › 3.2.1.5 Smaller airport organizations may choose to identify only an…

have sufficient control over human and financial resources for the airport to ensure that sufficient personnel and adequate funding are available to develop and implement the SMS. A key point of SMS is ensuring that top management within the airport is aware of the safety issues and hazards identified on the airport. In many cases, the Accountable Executive will have minimal daily hands-on management of the SMS. However, at times this person may need to make decisions related to particular safety issues and hazards.

3.2.1.2 Part 139 certificate holders required to comply with 14 CFR section 139.402(a)(1) must identify their Accountable Executive. The term is defined in 14 CFR section 139.5 as:

“[The] individual designated by the certificate holder to act on its behalf for the implementation and maintenance of the Airport Safety Management System. The Accountable Executive has control of the certificate holder’s human and financial resources for operations conducted under an Airport Operating Certificate. The Accountable Executive has ultimate responsibility to the FAA, on behalf of the certificate holder, for the safety performance of operations conducted under the certificate holder’s Airport Operating Certificate.”

3.2.1.3 Airports that are governed by larger entities such as city councils, airport authorities, or governing boards may find it challenging to identify a single individual to act in the role of an Accountable Executive. However, an airport should identify a single individual in a senior executive leadership position within the airport management structure. Ideally, this individual would be one of the following: the Airport Director, the Airport Manager, or the Chief Executive Officer.

3.2.1.4 The airport’s Accountable Executive cannot delegate overall responsibility for SMS oversight. However, the individual can delegate responsibility for daily oversight and the administration of SMS-related processes or initiatives. While not required, many airports have found it helpful to identify an SMS Manager, SMS Coordinator, or SMS Administrator. The FAA discourages airport operators from labelling this supporting position as the Safety Manager because it could imply that managing safety is the responsibility of that division or manager alone and not of any other airport department. The ICAO Safety Management Manual (2013) and ACRP’s SMS for Airports Volume 2: Guidebook (2009) provide characteristics, job descriptions, and tasks for these supporting positions.

3.2.1.5 Smaller airport organizations may choose to identify only an Accountable Executive. Larger airports with more complex organizational structures may choose to identify an Accountable Executive and support staff, including an SMS Manager, for the daily implementation and oversight of the SMS. Either method is acceptable as long as the Accountable Executive is regularly apprised of:

3.2.2 Identify and communicate the safety organizational structure. › 3.2.2.5 Figure 3-2 provides a sample organizational chart for safety oversight.

 Pertinent safety information, including the airport’s performance toward its safety objectives (see Section 3.3.10 below);

 Critical safety information communicated to employees and tenants;

 The status of ongoing mitigations required under the airport’s SRM policies (see Chapter 4); and

 The status of SMS implementation.

3.2.1.6 The Accountable Executive should be identified by name and title in either the airport’s SMS Manual or ACM. The certificate holder should certify or confirm that the identified individual complies with the roles, responsibilities, and authority required under part 139 for an Accountable Executive.

3.2.2 Identify and communicate the safety organizational structure.

3.2.2.1 It is important to identify the positions and offices within the airport organization that have responsibility for, or play a role in, the safety of airport operations. This includes the “chain of command” and the means by which airport employees report their safety concerns, hazards, and other safety-related information.

3.2.2.2 Identifying the safety organizational structure begins with the Accountable Executive and flows from there through the organization. Typically, this structure includes airport operations departments as well as Maintenance and Public Safety. It may also include any Human Resources divisions responsible for employee safety issues.

3.2.2.3 At a small airport, with a flattened management structure and few employees, there may be a straight-line reporting to the Accountable Executive. At medium and large airports, there will usually be an expanded reporting structure, whereby department supervisors or line managers are first in line to receive and act on information about safety concerns, hazard reports, and other safety-related items.

3.2.2.4 Each manager that is accountable for safety and that has responsibilities for aspects of SMS should be identified, and each employee should know the point of contact for particular safety issues. The identification ensures that senior management is aware of the daily activities of the various departments and can play an active role in airport safety or the management or direction of SMS initiatives. An organizational chart can provide the simplest means of communicating the safety organizational structure.

3.2.2.5 Figure 3-2 provides a sample organizational chart for safety oversight.

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3.2.3 Identify the lines of safety responsibility and accountability. › 3.2.3.1 Once the airport identifies the positions and divisions with…

Figure 3-2. Sample Organizational Chart for Safety Oversight

3.2.2.6 A Safety Committee, which is different from an SMS Committee, is usually comprised of members of airport departments, tenant organizations, and airport stakeholders, and is often a group that would conduct the system analysis and would identify a hazard. An SMS Committee may include Safety Committee members, but has the additional responsibility of implementing SMS and is often chaired by the Accountable Executive or the SMS Manager. The composition of the two groups may often overlap. If the airport establishes a stand-alone SMS Committee to help promote SMS initiatives, make decisions, or perform other SMS activities, the organizational chart should include the SMS Committee. Depending on the complexity of the committee’s structure, the airport may find it useful to include a separate chart identifying committee members and showing how the committee interacts with airport management.

3.2.3 Identify the lines of safety responsibility and accountability.

3.2.3.1 Once the airport identifies the positions and divisions with roles in ensuring safe operations, it should ensure their responsibilities and accountabilities are clearly defined and documented. The airport should create descriptions for each position and division with safety oversight. For example, employees with airfield access play a role in safety; they report hazards and identify safety issues to the proper point of contact or the airport’s hazard reporting system. Additionally, airfield operations

3.2.3 Identify the lines of safety responsibility and accountability. › 3.2.3.5 Figure 3-3 depicts a sample excerpt from a Safety…

specialists or inspectors conducting daily self-inspections play a role; they identify safety issues through the course of their inspections and also contribute to safety oversight.

3.2.3.2 While the safety organizational structure may best be depicted in an organizational chart, safety responsibilities and accountabilities are best described in the SMS Manual. Once these descriptions are developed, the airport should make them available to all identified individuals so they understand their responsibilities under the SMS.

3.2.3.3 When describing responsibilities and accountabilities, the airport should only include those items related to safety and the implementation and oversight of SMS-related initiatives. General job descriptions are best kept in human resource documents, not the SMS Manual. However, if new positions are created to support SMS development and implementation, the airport may incorporate the job descriptions and tasks into this section because they specifically relate to safety oversight and SMS.

3.2.3.4 Part of the Safety Policy should address the airport’s safety issue reporting system or process. Fear of reprisal may inhibit the effectiveness of an SMS. Accordingly, the airport should consider under what circumstances an employee would or would not be subject to company discipline for conduct described in a report. A just reporting culture/system and/or process should be declared and supported from the highest levels of management.

3.2.3.5 Figure 3-3 depicts a sample excerpt from a Safety Responsibilities section of an SMS Manual. It includes descriptions for all positions/divisions identified in the organizational chart shown in Figure 3-2. It also contains a broad concluding statement that encompasses the responsibility of every individual with access to the movement and non-movement area for hazard reporting.

Figure 3-3. Sample Safety Responsibilities

Safety Responsibilities

Accountable Executive

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The Airport Manager is the Accountable Executive for SMS development and deployment. The Airport Manager will ensure that the necessary assets and financial support are available for successful SMS implementation and continuous safety improvement….

SMS Manager

The Operations manager is designated as the SMS manager for the airport and chair of the Safety Committee. The Operations Manager is responsible for the daily oversight and implementation of the SMS. The Operations Manager will ensure that incidents and accidents on the airport are investigated and the findings are reported to the SMS committee and …..

Safety Committee

The Safety Committee is chaired by the SMS Manager and is comprised of members from the airlines, FAA, TSA, corporate aviation, FBO, Maintenance Manager, and Risk Administrator. The Safety committee meets monthly and is charged with the following responsibilities:

-Review of all incidents and accidents that took place on the airport for the previous month.

-Review the results of all safety audits. Recommend actions.

-Identify participants for Risk Assessments requiring integrated analysis (e.g., a subject matter expert panel format).

-…..

Maintenance Manager

The Maintenance Manager is responsible for ensuring that all maintenance requests are completed in a timely manner and reporting of any ongoing maintenance issues that could impact safety or impact mitigations that are required under the SRM policies or decisions to the SMS Manager and Accountable Executive. The Maintenance Manager will also participate as a member of the Safety Committee, and in Risk Assessments…….

Airport Operations Inspectors

In carrying out their normal duties, the Airport Operations Inspectors will ensure that any hazards identified are properly reported. In cases where immediate action is required to ensure the safety of operations, the Airport Operations Inspector has the authority to…….

Risk Administrator

The Risk Administrator shall work with the SMS Manager to ensure that all employee related incidents and accidents with an impact on operational safety are reported and investigated. The Risk Administrator will participate as a member of the Safety Committee and participate in Risk Assessments…..

Every individual with access to the movement and non-movement areas of the airfield shall report any hazard found in those areas to the Airport’s Hazard Reporting System, or to one of the individuals identified in the Safety Responsibilities section above, or to responsible personnel within their organization’s SMS.

3.3 Establish and Maintain a Safety Policy Statement. › 3.3.6 It is not recommended to include the airport’s safety objectives…

3.3 Establish and Maintain a Safety Policy Statement.

3.3.1 The creation of the Safety Policy Statement is one of the initial stages of SMS development and documents the airport management’s commitment to operate its facility with the highest level of safety. The Safety Policy Statement is just one element of many that encompass the Safety Policy component (Ref 14 CFR section 139.402(a)(2)) and should not be confused with the overall Safety Policy component.

3.3.2 By developing, accepting, and giving visibility to the Safety Policy Statement early in SMS development, airport management and the Accountable Executive show their commitment to SMS and its development and implementation. This assures airport personnel that management is leading the effort to make safety a priority and assures the travelling public that airport management and airport personnel are striving to improve safety. The Accountable Executive should sign this statement to formally express airport management’s commitment to the SMS as well as its processes and initiatives. Note that the Safety Policy component as documented in the SMS Manual, outlines the methods and processes the airport will use to achieve the desired safety outcomes.

3.3.3 The Safety Policy Statement should be easily understood by managers, employees, and tenants and take into account the airport’s complexity and structure. When developing the Safety Policy Statement, airports should look to existing Policy Statements, Mission Statements, or other high-level concept documents as models. For example, many airports owned by municipalities may already have Safety Statements from their local governments. The airport may be able to build on or replace these preexisting documents but should consult its legal department before doing so.

3.3.4 Internal policies or regulations may prevent some airports from using the terms “Policy” or “Statement”. If so, it is acceptable to call the Safety Policy Statement by another name, as long as it includes the necessary commitments to SMS implementation and operations.

3.3.5 There is no prescribed length for a Safety Policy Statement but will typically range from one paragraph to one page in length. A good Safety Policy Statement would address at least the following items:

 A commitment to make airport safety the highest priority.

 The commitment of senior airport management to implement SMS.

 A commitment to continually improve safety on the airport.

 The encouragement of employees to report safety issues without fear of reprisal.

 A commitment to provide the necessary resources needed for safe operations.

 A commitment to comply with all regulatory requirements related to safety.

3.3.6 It is not recommended to include the airport’s safety objectives and goals (see Section 3.3.10 below) in the Safety Policy Statement. Objectives and goals may change

3.3 Establish and Maintain a Safety Policy Statement. › 3.3.8 Figure 3-5 provides an example of a more complex Safety Policy…

frequently over time, while the Safety Policy Statement should be consistent throughout the life of the SMS.

3.3.7 Figures 3-4 and 3-5 provide examples of Safety Policy Statements. Figure 3-4 shows a statement that would be appropriate for a small airport. It is simple, concise, and expresses the core principles of SMS.

Figure 3-4. Example of Simple Safety Policy Statement

3.3.8 Figure 3-5 provides an example of a more complex Safety Policy Statement that is better suited for airports where several departments have responsibilities for separate but interdependent functions. Without identifying each department, the statement clarifies that many types of airport personnel have safety-related roles. It also explains that an office charged with safety oversight is necessary to meet the wide-ranging responsibilities of the SMS.

Excelsior airport

1 Airport Boulevard Monterey, CA 90293

June 7, 20XX

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Excelsior Airport is committed to the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) that enables its management, employees, the airlines, tenants, and other business partners to operate in a safe environment. Safety is among the Airport’s highest priorities. The Airport is dedicated to creating an environment that minimizes exposure to hazards and risks, expects continuous safety improvement, and encourages confidential reporting of any safety related situation, incident, or accident. We will ensure that necessary policy direction and resources are available to enable the success of the SMS, compliance with standards and regulations, and enhanced operational safety.

John R. Smith

John R. Smith Excelsior Airport Manager

3.3 Establish and Maintain a Safety Policy Statement. › 3.3.9 Ensure the Safety Policy Statement is available to all employees.

Figure 3-5. Example of Complex Safety Policy Statement

3.3.9 Ensure the Safety Policy Statement is available to all employees. Making the safety policy statement available to all airport personnel and tenants confirms management’s intention to prioritize safety. The airport can issue the statement to each airport employee, make it available online, and/or post it in prominent locations throughout the airport. The airport should also give it to its tenants because their employees should understand their role in reporting hazards and contributing to airport safety. Mentioning the policy statement frequently and periodically adding excerpts of it to bulletins and other documents confirms airport management’s continuing commitment and reinforces its safety focus to the entire airport community.

xyz Authority

SUPERIOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

100 Lake Shore Blvd. Minocqua, WI 54548

April 1, 20XX

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Superior International Airport employees and tenants shall systematically integrate safety into management and work practices at all levels so that airport operations are accomplished safely. The application of an effective Safety Management System (SMS) is integral to all of our airport activities with the objective of achieving the highest levels of safety standards and performance. Safety is the responsibility of everyone and the participation of airport and tenant employees is paramount to the success of the SMS. Our commitment is to:

 Continuously promote a safety culture across all airport operations that recognizes the importance of safety in our daily activities and the value of an effective SMS. Encourage confidential hazard reporting by all employees and tenants.  Ensure all staff members are aware of their responsibilities and accountabilities in the execution of and participation in the SMS. Provide adequate and appropriate safety information and training.  Provide skilled and trained personnel and other resources necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the SMS.  Analyze and manage risk(s) associated with airport-related operations, incidents, or accidents.  Comply with local, State, and Federal legislative and regulatory requirements and standards. Continue to improve our safety performance. Jane L. Doster

Aviation Director,

Superior International Airport

3.3.10 Establish and maintain safety objectives. › 3.3.10.3 The airport should keep the following SMART points in mind…

3.3.10 Establish and maintain safety objectives.

3.3.10.1 Under the Safety Policy, the airport establishes and maintains safety objectives. These objectives will help focus employees and management when developing and implementing the various processes and procedures under SMS. Articulating objectives and sharing related metrics allow the airport, its stakeholders, and the FAA to verify achievements or progress toward the airport’s safety improvement. The airport should tie its safety objectives to its Safety Assurance activities (see Chapter 5). That is, when the airport conducts its evaluations to verify safety performance, it should do so with these objectives in mind.

3.3.10.2 Safety objectives should be specific to the airport but can be tied to national-level objectives set by the FAA, state aviation organizations, or industry groups (e.g., national effort to reduce the number of vehicle/pedestrian deviations). Additionally, airports may choose to develop more specific goals or targets related to these objectives. “Examples of Safety Objectives and Goals” illustrates the differences between an objective and a goal.

3.3.10.3 The airport should keep the following SMART points in mind when developing the airport’s safety objectives:

 Specific: The objective should be focused on one thing only.

 Measurable: It should be possible to measure whether the airport

meets the objective.

 Achievable: The objective should be within the airport’s capabilities.

 Relevant: The objective should be something of importance or

significance to safety.

 Timed: There should be a defined deadline for meeting the objective.

Examples of Safety Objectives and Goals

Safety Objective 1: Reduce the number of accidents on the airport by x% in x years.

Safety Objective 2: Reduce the number of foreign object debris (FOD) occurrences by x% in x months.

Safety Objective 3: Reduce the number of vehicle/pedestrian deviations by x% in x years.

 Goal 3.1: Increase the number

of driver training sessions by x% in x years.  Goal 3.2: Develop and promote

a driver training promotion program within x months.

3.3 Establish and Maintain a Safety Policy Statement. › 3.3.11 Establish methods and processes to meet safety objectives.

3.3.10.4 As discussed in Chapter 5, Safety Assurance, the airport should establish processes to report progress on the airport’s safety objectives on a regular basis. Once the initial objectives are met, the airport should develop new safety objectives and communicate them throughout the airport community.

3.3.11 Establish methods and processes to meet safety objectives. The Gap Analysis will disclose what processes currently comply with part 139 SMS requirements, and what areas need to be developed and instituted.

4.1 Introduction. › 4.1.3 When developing the SRM process, one of the first elements is…

CHAPTER 4. SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (SRM)

4.1 Introduction.

4.1.1 SRM is the second component of SMS and is considered a core operational component because of its related elements. SRM uses a set of standard processes to identify hazards formally in a proactive manner, analyze and assess their potential risks, and design appropriate risk mitigation strategies (Ref 14 CFR section 139.402(b)). Figure 4-1 depicts elements of SRM. When properly implemented, SRM processes also promote productive communication among stakeholders and a positive safety culture within and around the airport environment.

4.1.2 A comprehensive SMS using SRM provides management with a tool for identifying hazards and risks and prioritizing their resolution. While each airport’s SRM processes may be unique to the airport’s operations, physical geometry, history of incidents, and organizational structure, the airport should develop processes and procedures for hazard identification and analysis appropriate to the airport’s operating environment.

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4.1.3 When developing the SRM process, one of the first elements is hazard identification. An efficient Hazard Identification program would make great use of the various sources of information available, including other Safety Management Systems that may overlap. For example: an airline employee notices a breach in airport fencing – how is it reported? Or; an airport employee notices a systemic issue with cart parking and firefighting equipment access to aircraft – how is the information communicated? A method of cross-communication or Data Sharing and Reporting (DSR) amongst the separate Safety Management Systems should be included in the SRM process.

4.1 Introduction. › 4.1.4 The SRM component is sometimes used synonymously with one of its…

Figure 4-1. Elements of SRM

Describing the system Establish a system for identifying safety hazards

Identifying the hazards

Establish a Analyzing the risk of identified systematic process hazards and/or proposed to analyze hazards mitigations and their associated risks by: Assessing the level of risk associated with identified hazards Safety Risk Management

should, at a Mitigating the risks of identified minimum: hazards when appropriate Provide Regular Assessments to ensure mitigations are effective

Retain records for risk analysis of identified hazards Establish and maintain records that document the airport’s Safety Retain records for mitigations Risk Management implemented process outcomes

Retain records of Accountable Executive acceptance of risks and mitigation

4.1.4 The SRM component is sometimes used synonymously with one of its elements—the systematic process to analyze hazards and their associated risks (i.e., the “5-step process”). While a very important part of SRM, the 5-step process is not the only part of a comprehensive SRM program. For a detailed description regarding the 5-step process, Appendix B contains a link.

4.2.1 Establish a system for identifying safety issues. › 4.2.1.2 Safety issues can be identified through the following, amongst others

4.2 Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management.

4.2.1 Establish a system for identifying safety issues.

4.2.1.1 Identifying safety issues is an essential step in proactive risk management. While the airport may have processes in place that support the identification of safety issues, it should ensure these processes are documented and communicated for further assessment. The airport should implement identification processes and procedures that reflect the management structure and complexity of the airport environment. The process should also take into account other safety programs, if any, for data sharing of identified safety issues.

4.2.1.1.1 A hazard is any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite of an accident or incident. For example, a hazard can be a situation as minor as a water leakage in a non-movement area. A hazard can also be a major event or procedural concern such as construction equipment entering a runway safety area. The key to determining whether something is a hazard is that the condition or situation would contribute – directly or indirectly – to the occurrence of an accident or incident.

4.2.1.1.2 SMS should ensure that there are hazard identification and reporting processes in place to address the various levels of immediacy. The level of formal vigor for pursuing a safety issue should be communicated through the safety identification process. The more proactive the safety culture, the “less severe” a safety issue may be before it is pursued and mitigated. A safety issue is a concern of a condition that has an undesirable safety effect or outcome that may not rise to the level of a hazard. The system put in place under this requirement should identify conditions, or safety issues, or changes to the airport’s operations or geometry that could create hazards.

4.2.1.2 Safety issues can be identified through the following, amongst others:

 The airport’s hazard reporting system (see Chapter 5, Safety

Assurance);

 Airport self-inspections;

 Checklists;

 Maintenance activities;

 Manager/tenant meetings;

 Brainstorming;

 Data Sharing with other safety programs; or

4.2.1 Establish a system for identifying safety issues. › 4.2.1.4 In the course of identification of various hazards, there may…

 Data Analysis of Safety Performance Indicators.

4.2.1.3 The evaluation of certain activities or events, such as the following, may also help a person identify safety issues:

 Airport accidents or incidents;

 Airfield changes (including geometry, construction, conversion from

movement to non-movement areas, airfield procedures, and pavement marking modifications);

 Irregular operations or events;

 Winter weather operations;

 Tenant operational changes (including new servicing equipment and

aircraft using airport); or

 Ramp operations (including use of ramp for activities not originally

intended).

4.2.1.4 In the course of identification of various hazards, there may be some questions as to what level of analysis should be given. A Risk Assessment (RA) as identified in Section 4.5 may be beneficial. The following Table 4-1 list some examples that may trigger the need for an RA:

Table 4-1. Example of Triggering Events

Trigger Description

Construction Airfield improvement; airfield rehabilitation; airfield maintenance; construction of tower; terminal expansion; geometry changes

Standard Operating Procedures New standard operating procedures; modification of existing standard operating procedures

Airport Organization Significant changes to airport organizational structure or key personnel

Safety Reports Safety issues reported by pilots, employees, or tenants; safety issues resulting from daily inspections; accidents or incidents

Special Events VIP presence on the flight aprons

New Equipment or Software New passenger boarding bridge; new ramp equipment that requires special consideration; changes to information management systems

Safety Assurance Trends identified from safety performance indicators; safety evaluations

4.2.2 Establish a systematic process to analyze hazards and their… › 4.2.2.3 The 5-step hazard assessment process provides a framework and…

4.2.2 Establish a systematic process to analyze hazards and their associated risks.

4.2.2.1 Using the SRM process, airports can develop an approach appropriate to their operational environment. Any of the items listed above could potentially introduce new hazards in the airfield environment. Therefore, airport management should formally determine whether those hazards create a level of risk that the airport is willing to accept. For those hazards with unacceptable risk, the airport should ensure mitigations are in place or stop the operation. Unacceptable risk is subjective and is based on the risk-tolerance of the given organization. When establishing the SRM process the airport will use to analyze hazards, airport management should define what it considers acceptable and unacceptable risk.

4.2.2.2 It is important to understand that not all identified hazards require using the 5-step SRM Hazard Assessment process. The 5-step process can be used to triage hazards reported through the airport’s hazard reporting system (Refer to Section 4.3, Scalability of SRM, for more information).

4.2.2.3 The 5-step hazard assessment process provides a framework and guidance that serves all airports, from those whose operational environments are simple and uncomplicated to those whose are complex and extensive. The scalability of this effort is key to making it work because resources are involved. Figure 4-2 illustrates the 5-step process.

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4.2.2.5 In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual… › 4.2.2.5.1 Describe the system.

Figure 4-2. Five Steps of SRM Hazard Assessment

4.2.2.4 The airport should identify who conducts the 5-step process. Anyone operating on the airfield can identify hazards. However, individuals responsible for conducting or leading the 5-step hazard analysis process should have proper training and oversight to ensure that the process is completed correctly and consistently.

4.2.2.5 In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual completing the 5-step process, usually when more subject-matter expertise is required for adequate analysis. In these cases, the airport may want to ensure that individuals receive proper instruction on how to complete the process, the airport’s risk analysis tools, and the airport’s risk acceptance procedures. The airport’s SMS Manual should clearly explain how the airport will select individuals or organizations to participate in the 5-step process.

4.2.2.5.1 Describe the system.

1. The first step of the 5-step process is to describe the system. The system description depicts the operating environment in which the hazards will be identified. The description of the system sets the boundaries for hazard identification. Questions that help define this description could include the following:

a. What are the meteorological conditions (e.g., VMC or IMC?)

b. Are seasonal conditions involved and are they abnormal?

c. Are there known defects or deficiencies (e.g., paved area problems,

safety area problems, deteriorated marking, missing or deficient signs, or lighting deficiencies)?

d. Is time of day or night a factor?

e. Is traffic volume involved (peak activity or low activity)?

f. Do normal operations prevail or are there abnormal conditions like

construction or a closed runway or taxiway?

g. What type of infrastructure or media is involved (e.g., runway,

taxiway, apron, or drainage facility)?

2. Airports can choose from several models to help define their operational environments. For example, the 5M Model is used to deconstruct the proposed change or condition for analysis to distinguish elements that are part of, or impacted by, the proposed change or condition. These elements later help identify sources, causes, hazards, and current and proposed hazard mitigations. The 5M Model analyzes five elements for impacts: Mission, Man, Machine, Management, and Media (see Figure 4-3). These elements are defined as follows:

a. Mission – A clearly defined role of the SRM panel, describing, in

detail, the operation or change.

b. (hu)Man/Person – The person or human component.

c. Machine – The equipment used in the system, including hardware,

firmware, software, human-to-system interface, and avionics.

d. Management – The procedures and policies that govern the

system’s behavior.

e. Media – The environments in which the system is operated and

maintained (i.e., the airport).

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4.2.2.5 In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual… › 4.2.2.5.2 Identify the hazards.

Figure 4-3. The 5M Model

4.2.2.5.2 Identify the hazards.

1. The second step of the hazard assessment process identifies hazards in a systematic way based on the system described in the first step. A hazard is any condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an accident.

2. The term hazard is often misused, so it is important that the airport’s training program for those individuals conducting the 5-step process (see Chapter 6, Safety Promotion) clearly defines and provides examples of hazards. A simple example of a hazard is snow or ice on active runways. A hazard could also be a construction vehicle entering an active runway without clearance or a pilot’s loss of visibility on final approach due to dust from construction. Hazards should be considered with respect to the original system description. For example, a construction vehicle entering an active runway would only be reasonable if there is ongoing construction and the runway is in use. When identifying hazards, all possible sources of system failure should be considered. Depending on the nature and size of the system under

4.2.2.5 In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual… › 4.2.2.5.3 Analyze the risk of identified hazards.

consideration, as with the construction example, these sources could include:

a. Equipment (e.g., construction equipment operating in or near the

movement area);

b. The operating environment (e.g., weather conditions, season, or

time of day);

c. Maintenance procedures (e.g., nightly movement area inspections);

or

d. External services (e.g., ramp traffic by tenants or law enforcement

vehicles).

3. It is best to identify the cause and effect to verify whether the perceived hazard is actually a hazard. For example, if there is snow on an active runway, the cause would be accumulation of freezing precipitation and the likely effect would be limited braking action.

4. The use of a simple but well-defined hazard analysis tool ensures thorough assessment and documentation of SRM. There are many tools available, including the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Operational Safety Assessment, Comparative Safety Assessment, Fault-Hazard Analysis, What-If Analysis, Scenario Analysis, and the Fault Tree Analysis. Airports may find it useful to use the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, because this is the primary analysis tool used by FAA Airports Division for analyzing hazards.

4.2.2.5.3 Analyze the risk of identified hazards.

1. During the third step of hazard assessment, the airport analyzes the risk associated with each of the hazards identified in the previous step. For each hazard, the airport should consider the worst credible outcome (harm), which is the most unfavorable condition that is believable and possible given the system state described in step one.

2. It is important to remember that in identifying hazards, airports should strive for reasonable assessments that cite credible outcomes. Not all hazards could technically result in a catastrophic accident. The airport should strive for quantitative or real-life examples of outcomes based on the hazard. Using examples from airports of similar size and operations may help add credibility.

3. Using the previous example of snow on the active runway, the worst credible outcome based on the system description (e.g., daytime versus nighttime operations, or VMC versus IMC operations) is established. The worst credible outcome without consideration to the unique airport environment is likely a runway excursion. Whether that excursion results in significant damage or loss of life will be determined based on the system description. For example, at an airport that lacks standard safety areas or has non-frangible objects in the

safety areas, the end result of a runway excursion could be worse than at an airport with standard safety areas.

4. Based on the worst credible outcome of each hazard, the airport should determine the severity and likelihood of that outcome using qualitative and/or quantitative methods. To do this, the airport should have predefined Severity and Likelihood levels. These levels are typically unique to each organization, because they are management’s means of defining what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk. The airport should develop these levels commensurate with its operational needs and complexity.

5. Severity and Likelihood levels and definitions should reflect both quantitative and qualitative values. In some cases, the airport may have data to draw on to establish a quantitative value for things like likelihood. In others, it may have to rely on the subject-matter expertise of those individuals completing the analysis.

6. Again, the airport should develop its own definitions and categories based on its unique operating environment. However, many airports may find it useful to use a standard five-level or three-level system. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 depict two samples of five-level Severity and Likelihood definitions. Since an SMS is not unique to aviation, the airport operator could research numerous resources (e.g., available on the internet) to assist in the development of a risk matrix. Refer to Appendix B for additional resources for Airport SMS development information.

Table 4-2. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions

Severity

Negligible Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic

No first aid required injury/illness; no lost work time; none to very limited operational impact (less than 1 hour); none to minimal equipment loss (less than 1 day out of service); no environmental impact; none to minimal budget impact

Injury/illness (first aid required); little to no lost work time (less than 2 days); none to very limited operational impact (less than 4 hours); none to minimal equipment loss (less than 2 days out of service); contained with none to limited impact to environment; minimal budget impact

Injury/illness (1 to 5 persons); death (less than 2 persons); lost work time (less than 1 week); loss of total operations (less than 2 hours); loss of partial operations (less than1 day); equipment loss (less than 1week); noncontained (manageable/

mitigated within 1 day); moderate budget impact

Injury/illness (6 to 49 persons); death (less than 5 persons); lost work time (1 week to 1 month); loss of total operation (2 to 12 hours); partial loss of operation (48 hours or less); equipment loss (less than 30 days); noncontained, resulting in environmental impact (1 to 30 day); serious budget impact

Injury/illness (greater than 50 persons); death (greater than 5 persons); lost work time (greater than 1 month); loss of total operation (greater than 12 hours); loss of partial operations (greater than 48 hours); total loss of equipment; noncontained resulting in long-term environmental impact (greater than 30 days); grave budget impact

Likelihood

Extremely Improbable

Extremely Remote

Remote Probable Frequent

Almost impossible; possibly only once in 10 to 100 years

Conceivable but highly unlikely; possibly once in every 5 to less than 10 years

Possibly once a year or multiple times from 1 year to less than 5 years; unlikely but possible to occur

Likely to occur multiple times per year or once per month; regularly expected to occur in the system

Likely to occur once a day or multiple times per week; continuously expected to occur in the system

Table 4-3. Sample Severity and Likelihood Definitions

Severity

Category People Assets Reputation

Catastrophic Fatality Loss of an aircraft/or over $1 million in damage/or loss of critical system(s) for an extended period of time

An event or series of events resulting in the community not using the airport for an extended period of time

Hazardous Severe injury (requiring hospitalization)

Damage to an aircraft taking it out of service for an extended period of time/or damage in excess of $500,000/or disruption of critical services for extended period of time

An event or a series of events resulting in the community lessening the use of the airport causing negative financial or operational impacts

Major Minor injury (requiring medical treatment)

Damage to an aircraft that is repairable/or damage to equipment or facility that is reparable within a short period of time

An event or a series of events resulting in the community lessening the use of the airport for a short period of time

Minor Minor injury (not requiring medical treatment)

Minor damage to an aircraft, equipment, or facility not requiring it to be taken out of service

An event or a series of events resulting in the community questioning the reliability of the airport

No Safety Effect No injury No damage No impact

Likelihood

Category Definition

Frequent Occurs once every month or 3,000 aircraft operations or 25,000 enplanements

Probable Occurs once every year or 34,000 aircraft operations or 300,000 enplanements

Remote Occurs once every 5 years or 170,000 aircraft operations or 1,500,000 enplanements

Extremely Remote

Occurs once every 10 years or 340,000 aircraft operations or 3,000,000 enplanements

Extremely Improbable

Occurs once every 10+ years or 340,000+ aircraft operations or 3,000,000+ enplanements

7. Many of the FAA lines of business, including the Office of Airports and Air Traffic Organization, developed Severity and Likelihood

4.2.2.5 In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual… › 4.2.2.5.4 Assess the level of risk associated with identified hazards.

definitions applicable to their operating environment. Airports do not need to use the FAA definitions when developing their own, but FAA definitions are used when participating in FAA-led hazard assessments. They should ensure that airport participants on FAA-led panels understand any differences (see Section 4.4, Integrated SRM Efforts.).

8. Based on these definitions, the airport can determine a Severity and Likelihood of the worst credible effect for each hazard. Generally, Severity is established first for each worst credible outcome because it should be independent of likelihood. Next, the Likelihood, or the expression of how often an event is expected to occur, is established for the worst credible outcome.

4.2.2.5.4 Assess the level of risk associated with identified hazards.

1. In the fourth step of hazard assessment, the airport uses the Severity and Likelihood values assessed in the third step and compares it to the organization’s acceptable and unacceptable levels of safety risk. This is considered “initial risk” because it does not consider any potential mitigations. The subtle differences between analyzing risk and assessing risk is determining what all the data means once it is collected and “analyzed”.

2. As airport management develops the SMS Manual, it should define what acceptable and unacceptable risk is for the airport. As discussed above, SMS does not mean risk free. Some risk must be accepted or the airport would never operate.

3. The number of levels of risk in every operation is determined by the airport operator. The simplest system will have two levels: acceptable and unacceptable risk. FAA Airports Division typically uses a threelevel predictive risk matrix that includes high, medium, and low risk. The airport should document the risk level definitions in its hazard identification process. The airport should train individuals responsible for conducting the 5-step process on the meaning of these levels and ensure individuals who accept risk understand their responsibilities.

4. Use the scalable nature of SMS when determining your matrix structure. Consider a hazard's impact to the safety of the airport, the users, and the airport’s total operational environment to establish risk. For example, using a predictive risk matrix, the airport operator can determine whether the hazard presents a low, medium, or high risk of causing damage or compromising safety. A predictive risk matrix (see Figure 4-4) graphically depicts the various levels of Severity and Likelihood as they relate to the levels of risk. On a typical predictive risk matrix, Severity and Likelihood are placed on axes on a graph (i.e., the X- and Y-axes). The severity and likelihood assessed during the third step of hazard assessment can then be plotted on the risk

matrix grid for each of the hazards to be assessed. Figure 4-5 depicts FAA’s predictive risk matrix.

5. When developing a risk matrix, the airport should consider the following:

a. The boundaries for the matrix should be approved by the

Accountable Executive.

b. The matrix should fit the airport’s needs based on its size and

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complexity.

c. The matrix should be simple and easy to use and understand.

d. A person should not need extensive knowledge of quantitative risk

tools to be able to use it.

e. The airport should clearly define acceptable and unacceptable risk

levels and any procedures required based on those definitions.

6. The important part of this third step is to understand and accurately position on the matrix what kind of threat the hazard is to the safety of the airport, the users, and the airport’s total operational environment. The individuals making this determination should use common sense to ensure their judgment prioritizes safety but is not unreasonable.

7. When the Severity and Likelihood of a hazard’s effect are plotted on the risk matrix, the airport can see whether the hazard’s safety risk is acceptable to the organization. Generally, as the Severity and Likelihood increases, the risk increases. It is important to graph risk appropriately and pay attention not only to those hazards with severe risks, but also to those hazards that are likely to occur more frequently, even though their severity may be low.

Figure 4-4. Sample 4x4 Predictive Risk Matrix with Likelihood and Severity Definition and

Two Levels of Risk: Acceptable and Unacceptable

4.2.2.5 In some cases, the airport may want more than one individual… › 4.2.2.5.5 Mitigate the risks of identified hazards, when appropriate.

Figure 4-5. FAA Office of Airports’ Risk Matrix

Severity

Likelihood

Minimal

5

Minor

4

Major

3

Hazardous

2

Catastrophic

1

Frequent

A

Probable

B

Remote

C

Extremely

Remote

D

Extremely Improbable

E

*

High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

8. The individual or persons conducting the analysis should not pre-judge or try to manipulate the analysis to keep the hazard and its outcome from being “unacceptable” or “high risk.”

4.2.2.5.5 Mitigate the risks of identified hazards, when appropriate.

1. The fifth step is only used if the initial risk of the hazard’s outcome, as determined in step four, is unacceptable or if the airport requires mitigation of certain types of acceptable risk. For example, FAA Airports Division considers high risk unacceptable and requires mitigation. Medium risk is acceptable, but mitigation is preferred when possible.

2. Often there is required understanding and cooperation among the tenants, certificate holder, and other stakeholders as to the mitigation of a hazard. These parties would be identified during the mitigation

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* Unacceptable with Single Point and/or Common Cause Failures

phase of the SRM. Where there is a co-responsibility for a mitigation of an identified hazard, a simple understanding should suffice (i.e. nosmoking markings by the new flammable area). For some more complex mitigations, it may require a written agreement among the stakeholders explaining responsibilities and expectations.

3. There are a variety of risk mitigation strategies the airport can use to decrease the severity or likelihood of the hazard’s outcome. Some generic approaches include:

a. Avoidance – The operation or activity is cancelled or suspended

because the safety risks are intolerable or deemed unacceptable (e.g., cancelling rather than allowing construction during low visibility night operations).

b. Reduction – The frequency of the operation or activity is reduced,

or action is taken to reduce the magnitude of the consequences of the accepted risks; some safety risk is accepted (e.g., limiting construction to daytime hours during low-traffic operations).

c. Segregation of Exposure – Action is taken to isolate the impacts

of the hazard or redundancy is built in to protect against the impacts (e.g., conducting additional FOD sweeps before operations during periods of construction).

4. Mitigation measures should be appropriate, timely, and cost-effective. Further, an airport should consider mitigations for acceptable risk, not just unacceptable risk. As the James Reason model demonstrates, every serious event had precursors. Mitigation of less hazardous events when resources allow, will help develop a pro-active safety culture in hazard identification.

5. There are a variety of methods of mitigations to reduce Likelihood and Severity. The more severe the hazard effect, the greater the consequence per event. Therefore, to reduce the risk, addressing the likelihood can often be an effective mitigation. The following are ways to reduce the outcome’s likelihood:

a. Raising awareness (e.g., safety campaigns, notices to airmen

(NOTAMs), or signage).

b. Providing training (e.g., on-the-job training, recurrent training, or

licensing).

c. Establishing controls (e.g., avoid operations under certain

conditions, develop or modify standard operating procedures, or by installing safety equipment).

d. Eliminate the hazard (e.g., remove hazard from the airport).

6. Once a mitigation is established, the airport should have processes in place to assign responsibility for ensuring the mitigation is completed (sometimes called verification). Also, the individual or persons

4.2.3 Documentation. › 4.2.3.4 Other airports may find it easier to establish forms or…

responsible for the 5-step process should re-analyze the hazard based on the mitigation to establish the “residual risk”. Residual risk is the risk that remains after all risk mitigations have been implemented and their completion verified. If the residual risk of the hazard’s outcome still places it in an unacceptable risk level, then the airport should identify additional mitigations or stop the operation or change causing the hazard.

7. The airport’s Safety Assurance are the processes (see Chapter 5) to continuously evaluate if the mitigations put in place are effective. This often takes time as the hazard identified may not be present in order to evaluate if the controls are working. For example: new snow removal procedures, or if an airport put in place a mitigation to decrease the likelihood of a runway incursion. If the safety performance data was not of a significant duration, then any mitigation put in place may not reflect if the mitigation is effective.

4.2.3 Documentation.

4.2.3.1

4.2.3.2

4.2.3.3

4.2.3.4

The formalized, proactive identification and analysis of hazards, as is found under SRM, provides airport management with a tool to make decisions about safety, but only if the process and hazards are documented. Airport management should establish its documentation process and procedures early in SMS development and include them in the SMS Manual.

Documentation also allows meaningful analysis of operational and overall airport system safety. Documentation also provides historical information that can be used when making decisions in the future. Airport operators should become familiar with the part 139 requirements regarding record retention requirements.

Airports have a range of options to document SRM. Some larger airports or airports with more complex operations may choose to purchase or create software that guides individuals through the SRM process or even integrates hazard reporting, identification, analysis, and documentation. While this technological approach is not required, it may prove more timely and cost-beneficial for some airports.

Other airports may find it easier to establish forms or databases to track mitigations and document the 5-step process. Figure 4-6 depicts a sample hazard assessment form. The airport should establish record retention policies for these documents. However, the documents should be maintained for at least the life cycle of the operation, change, or mitigations. The airport may also want to consult with its legal department to determine the best means for using and retaining these documents.

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4.2 Developing and Implementing Safety Risk Management. › 4.2.4 Provide for regular assessment to ensure that mitigations are…

Figure 4-6. Sample 4x4 Hazard Assessment Form

4.2.4 Provide for regular assessment to ensure that mitigations are effective. Successful mitigations, which are tied to achieving safety objectives, are the incremental steps toward improving the level of safety at an airport. Consequently, the airport should review its mitigations periodically to evaluate their status and ensure their continued effectiveness or recognize a need to modify them in terms of meeting identified safety objectives. While part 139 does not specifically require an airport operator to regularly assess mitigations, the airport should include data collection and analysis specific to verifying mitigations as part of its Safety Assurance activities (see

4.4 Integrated SRM Efforts. › 4.4.1 Airports are not the only sector of the aviation industry using…

Chapter 5). If this analysis suggests mitigations are not working, the airport should have processes in place to trigger re-evaluation of the hazard and its mitigations for effectiveness. The airport should also use data from accident or incident investigations on the airport or at airports with similar operations (when this information is made available) to spot ineffective mitigations.

4.3 Scalability of SRM.

4.3.1 As with other components of SMS, the airport should establish SRM processes and procedures in a scalable manner. Hazard assessment processes should be understandable and timely and not disrupt the airport’s operations. Processes also should be effective in identifying and quickly assessing hazards so that unacceptable changes or operations are stopped quickly.

4.3.2 Larger airports could be well-served by establishing two types of hazard assessment: hazard triage and integrated SRM. Integrated SRM is discussed in the next section.

4.3.3 In hazard triage, the SMS Manager or other Operations staff is sufficiently trained and given autonomy to review identified safety issues or hazards and determine if immediate action should be taken. These individuals can conduct the 5-step process, typically using a form to direct and document their actions. The airport may find that data sharing and reporting with other tenants would expose a common hazard that they may have already addressed. For more complex issues, the triaged hazard could be forwarded to airport management, a safety committee, or other body identified in the SMS. The airport would then conduct a more formal SRM hazard assessment using subject matter experts representing impacted stakeholders such as other airport divisions, tenants, the FAA, or other airport users.

4.3.4 Smaller airports may choose to route all identified hazards through the Accountable Executive, SMS Manager, or Operations department. Again, the hazard assessment process should be streamlined to prevent assessments from getting bogged down. While smaller airports may choose to have an individual conduct much of their hazard assessments, they should ensure that findings and mitigations are discussed and communicated with applicable stakeholders.

4.4 Integrated SRM Efforts.

4.4.1 Airports are not the only sector of the aviation industry using SRM or SMS-related initiatives. Many fixed-base operators, aircraft manufacturers, air carriers, and training organizations are also actively developing and implementing proactive, risk management procedures for their organizations. Military tenants have similar programs, such as Operational Risk Management, active on their property. In many ways, airport management can use these developments to help shape and promote their SMS initiatives. Airport management should meet early in the airport’s SMS development with tenants, especially those with SMS, to develop procedures for sharing hazard information, conducting integrated hazard assessments, and verifying mitigations.

4.6 Example #1 of SRM. › 4.6.1 Describe the system.

4.4.2 Similarly, the FAA integrated SMS concepts, processes, and SRM into its operations. In some instances, the airport may choose to collaborate with the FAA in joint SRM efforts instead of conducting its own hazard assessment. In this case, the FAA Airports Division may take the lead on certain SRM activities when approval actions will be required, such as:

 FAA actions on airport development projects (e.g., Airport Layout Plan changes).

 FAA action on of modifications of airport design standards.

 FAA actions on Construction Safety Phasing Plans.

4.5 The Risk Assessment and the SRM Panel. A Safety Risk Management (SRM) Panel is a group of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and stakeholders assembled to formalize a proactive approach to system safety, and ensures that applicable hazards are identified and unacceptable risk is mitigated before change is made. An SRM panel provides a framework to ensure that once mitigation is implemented, the change will be tracked throughout its lifecycle. Not all safety issues will require a formal SRM process using a panel. Often a Risk Assessment (RA) – the assessment of the hazard data, is able to justify a mitigation directly. The SRM process is mainly for those issues complex enough that either by its identification, or mitigation, may impact more than one stakeholder. If the need for applying the RA process has been determined, the information collected and assessed needs to be documented. If an SRM panel is warranted, a summary of the data should be circulated among the identified stakeholders prior to the formal SRM panel meeting. In preparation for the meeting, an agenda, attendance list, issue information, meeting documentation, meeting ground rules, etc., should be conveyed. Although not required, some airports may hire experienced consultants/facilitators to facilitate the SRM panel.

4.6 Example #1 of SRM. East Coast Regional Airport in Sandbar, North Carolina, is operated by the Sandbar Airport Authority. The Authority holds a Class I AOC and is Index E. Sandbar is served by a regional carrier that operates 2 daily Beech 1900 roundtrip flights to its hub. Sandbar provides all the services and employees to turn-around the aircraft. The carrier recently notified the Authority that it plans to replace the Beech 1900’s with Bombardier CRJs. The change in aircraft operating at the airport triggers the airport’s SRM processes and the Operations Manager conducts a hazard assessment. The certificate holder should identify which stakeholders to include for the initial assessment, if necessary.

4.6.1 Describe the system. A system description is an integrated set of constituent elements that are combined in an operational or support environment to accomplish a defined objective. These elements include people, hardware, software, firmware, information, procedures, facilities, services, and other support facets of the conditions in which the hazard may be present. In this example, the system can be described as:

4.6 Example #1 of SRM. › 4.6.4 Assess the risks.

 The airport has two runways, Runway 12/30, which is a 7,000 foot paved, grooved,

and marked for an ILS approach, and Runway 9/27 which is a 3,500 foot rolled grass runway primarily used by experimental and general aviation aircraft.

 There is no active construction on airport at this time.

 The airport’s existing facilities including the runways and taxiways meet design

specifications for the CRJ. The airport has standard markings in the movement area. However, non-movement area markings are specific to the Beech 1900.

 Other than the regional carrier, the airport is used by general aviation aircraft.

 Apron dimensions and clearance from building and other facilities are within

requirements.

4.6.2 Identify the hazards. The Operations Manager bounds out the movement area from the analysis because the runway and taxiway meet design specifications for the CRJ. Based on the system description, the Operations Manager identifies three hazards

1. Incorrect aircraft parking at gate (caused by old markings),

2. Misalignment of aircraft on ramp (caused by old markings), and

3. Potential impact of CRJ on smaller airplanes on the apron.

4.6.3 Analyze the risk. Using the airport’s Severity and Likelihood definitions (see Figures 4-5 and 4-6), the Operations Manager examines the worst credible outcome of each hazard.

1. Potential for aircraft collision with servicing equipment and/or jetway bridge most likely during nighttime conditions. Based on existing controls, severity is Minor because aircraft is moving at extremely low speed. Based on an analysis of past incidents in the non-movement area, the Operations Manager categorizes the likelihood of this effect as Remote.

2. Potential for aircraft collision with other parked aircraft or vehicles during nighttime conditions. Based on existing controls, severity is Major because taxiing speeds could result in serious damage if aircraft impacts another aircraft or vehicle unexpectedly. Based on an analysis of past incidents in the non-movement area, the Operations Manager categorizes the likelihood of this effect as Probable.

4.6.4 Assess the risks. Using the airport’s risk matrix (see Figure 4-5), the Operations Manager determined the following results:

1. The risk associated with incorrect parking at gate results in Low Risk.

2. The risk associated with misalignment of the aircraft in the gate area results in High Risk.

4.7.2.1 Describe the system. › 4.7.2.1.3 A contract air traffic control tower operates 14 hours per…

4.6.5 Mitigate the risks. All High Risk hazards should be mitigated under the Authority’s Safety Policy. Therefore, the Operations Manager develops a risk mitigation strategy that includes short-term and long-term solutions. In the short term, the Authority will establish temporary parking restrictions for aircraft in the non-movement area to ensure clearance for the CRJ as it transits from the movement to the non-movement area. In the long term, the Authority will remove the old non-movement area markings and re-paint to accommodate the CRJ. These mitigations reduce the risk from High to Medium. Additionally, repainting eliminates both hazards, once complete.

4.7 Example #2 of SRM.

4.7.1 As the fixed-base operator (FBO) for Timmons Municipal Airport, Flying Flag Incorporated has provided all ramp and fuel services on the airport for years. Flying Flag’s responsibilities include servicing general aviation aircraft, the three weekly air carrier flights, and occasional charter flights. The FBO also maintains the on-airport fuel farm.

4.7.2 Recently, the owner of Flying Flag decided to close the FBO after his unsuccessful attempts to find someone to take over the business. The airport is reviewing proposals from two companies to replace Flying Flag but both are relatively new operations. The airport manager is concerned that a new FBO will lack experience in ramp and fuel operations. She decided to proactively identify the hazards associated with the new operator.

4.7.2.1 Describe the system.

4.7.2.1.1 The airport holds a Class I Airport Operating Certificate with Index A ARFF services. Air carrier flights only recently picked up and the airport operates on a very tight budget with a relatively small staff. Most services, field maintenance, and aircraft servicing and fueling are provided by the FBO.

4.7.2.1.2 The airport has two runways, 7,250 foot long runway for air carriers and one smaller general aviation runway. Although there are three air carrier flights a week with Beech 1900 aircraft, general aviation operations make up the bulk of Timmons traffic. During yearly events at the local race track and golf course, general aviation traffic increases dramatically and the airport relies on the FBO to also manage ramp and parking operations. These events increase traffic and parking to the point that the airport’s ramp is at capacity.

4.7.2.1.3 A contract air traffic control tower operates 14 hours per day from 0600 to 2000 hours, seven days a week. Air carrier flights operate during these times, except for the occasional charter flight. The airport published a

4.7.2 Recently, the owner of Flying Flag decided to close the FBO after… › 4.7.2.3 Analyze, Assess, and Mitigate the Risk.

prior permission request requirement (PPR) for air carrier flights outside of normal operating hours.

4.7.2.1.4 Other than the regional carrier, the airport is used by general aviation aircraft.

4.7.2.2 Identify the hazards. To help identify hazards, the airport manager decided to use a panel of subject matter experts that includes local pilots, the air carrier station manager, and members of the airport manager’s staff. The panel of experts identified three potential hazards generated by a change of FBO.

1. Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in ramp operations,

2. Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in parking/apron management and ground loading of passengers, and

3. Reduction in experience levels and potential confusion in fueling operations.

4.7.2.3 Analyze, Assess, and Mitigate the Risk. Using the airport’s own Severity and Likelihood definitions and Predictive Risk Matrix, the panel developed a Risk Assessment Worksheet to assist their analysis and determined the following:

Timmons Municipal Airport

Risk Assessment Worksheet

# Hazard Effects Severity Likelihood Initial Risk Mitigation Residual

Risk

1 Reduced experience and confusion in ramp operations

Collision of ground support equipment with aircraft.

Aircraft to aircraft collision.

FOD damage to aircraft

Minor

Major

Minor

Remote

Remote

Probable

Low

Medium

Medium

Redesign ramp driving training program and require new FBO personnel to complete.

Limit number of aircraft on ramp by SOP. Conduct survey of ramp needs and develop new ramp marking plan from that survey. Remark ramp as appropriate.

Perform FOD walks.

Develop FOD awareness training course and require new FBO personnel to attend.

Develop FOD awareness campaign under the direction of airport manager.

Develop FOD log and require FBO to use and maintain.

Low

Low

Low

2 Reduced experience and confusion in fueling operations

Fuel spills

Inadequate grounding/

Minor

Major

Probable

Extremely remote

Medium

Low

Require training of FBO personnel IAW FAA part 139 to be completed and verified before contract assignment. Require independent safety audit of fuel delivery procedures within 90 days of FBO beginning operations

Audit FBO

Medium

Low

Timmons Municipal Airport

Risk Assessment Worksheet

# Hazard Effects Severity Likelihood Initial Risk Mitigation Residual

Risk

bonding causes fire.

3 Reduced experience and confusion in passenger operations & loading

Passenger injury due to jetblast/propwash.

Passenger injury caused due to contact with turning propeller.

Major

Catastrophic

Remote

Extremely improbable

Medium

Low

Provide ramp agent awareness training

Mark ramp and provide cones for movement of personnel.

Define by SOP limits of passenger movement on ramp area.

Require FBO to provide passenger escort at all times.

By written SOP require parked aircraft with turning propeller to have turning prop on side opposite of ramp.

Low

Low

5.1 Introduction. › 5.1.2 Safety Assurance activities also:

CHAPTER 5. SAFETY ASSURANCE

5.1 Introduction.

5.1.1 Safety Assurance is the third component of SMS and serves as checks and balances for the SMS. Under Safety Assurance, the airport operator should establish processes and procedures to verify and monitor the effectiveness of the SMS. To do this, the airport should develop and implement a method for monitoring safety performance, establish and maintain a confidential hazard reporting system, and develop processes to report pertinent safety information to the Accountable Executive (see Figure 5-1). A key outcome of Safety Assurance is continuous improvement.

5.1.2 Safety Assurance activities also:

 Help the airport evaluate the continued effectiveness of implemented risk mitigation strategies under SRM.

 Support the identification of new hazards.

 Systematically provide confidence that the airport is meeting or exceeding its safety objectives through continuous improvement.

 Provide the foundation for data collection, which help airport management with decision making.

Figure 5-1. Safety Assurance

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