85 FR 79566 Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements
This rule streamlines and increases flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and removes obsolete requirements. It consolidates and revises multiple regulatory parts and applies a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The rule describes the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.
Vol. 85
Thursday,
No. 238
December 10, 2020
Part II
14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, et al.
Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 238 / Thursday, December 10, 2020 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, 440, 450, and 460
14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, 440, 450, and 460
[Docket No.: FAA-2019-0229; Amdt. No(s). 401-9; 404-7, 413-12, 414-4, 415-7, 417-6, 420-9, 431-7, 433-3, 435-5, 437-3, 440-5, 450-2, and 460-3] RIN 2120-AL17
Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements
Agency
AGENCY: FAA Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: This rule streamlines and increases flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, and removes obsolete requirements. It consolidates and revises multiple regulatory parts and applies a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. The rule describes the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license, the safety requirements, and the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license.
Dates
DATES:
Effective date: This rule is effective March 10, 2021, except for amendatory instructions 3, 11, 17, 20, 27, 44 and 54, concerning Sec. § 401.5, 413.1, and 413.23, the removal of parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, and instructions 68 and 73 amending Sec. § 440.3 and 460.45, respectively, which are effective March 10, 2026.
Compliance: Affected parties, however, are not required to comply with the information collection requirements in part 450 until the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approves the collection and assigns a control number under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The FAA will publish in the Federal Register a notice of the control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for these information collection requirements.
Addresses
ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking documents and other information related to this final rule, see "How To Obtain Additional Information" in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this action, contact Randy Repcheck, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8760; email [email protected].
Supplementary Information
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended and codified at 51 U.S.C. 50901-50923 (the Act), authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to oversee, license, and regulate commercial launch and reentry activities, and the operation of launch and reentry sites within the United States or as carried out by U.S. citizens. Section 50905 directs the Secretary to exercise this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition, § 50903 requires the Secretary to encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector. As codified at 49 CFR 1.83(b), the Secretary has delegated authority to carry out these functions to the FAA Administrator.
Authority for This Rulemaking
This rulemaking amends the FAA's launch and reentry requirements, consolidating and revising multiple regulatory parts to set forth a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. It also streamlines the commercial space regulations by, among other things, replacing many prescriptive regulations with performance-based rules, and giving industry greater flexibility to develop means of compliance that maximize their objectives while maintaining public safety.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
AC--Advisory Circular CEC--Conditional expected casualty EC--Expected casualty ELOS determination--Equivalent-level-of-safety determination ELV--Expendable launch vehicle FSA--Flight safety analysis FSS--Flight safety system RLV--Reusable launch vehicle
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
I. Overview II. Background III. Discussion of the Rule
A. Safety Framework
B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule
1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based Regulations, ELOS, Safety Case
2. Part 450 Subpart A--General Discussion
a. Pre-Application Consultation
b. Application Process
I. Overview II. Background III. Discussion of the Rule
c. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses (§ 450.1(b))
d. Definition and Scope of Launch (§ 450.3)
e. Safety Element Approval (Part 414)
f. Vehicle Operator License--Issuance, Duration, Additional License Terms and Conditions, Transfer, and Rights Not Conferred (Sec. § 450.5 Through 450.13)
3. Part 450 Subpart B--Requirements To Obtain a Vehicle Operator License
a. Incremental Review and Determinations (§ 450.33)
b. Means of Compliance (§ 450.35)
c. Use of Safety Element Approval (§ 450.39)
d. Policy Review (§ 450.41)
e. Payload Reviews (§ 450.43)
f. Safety Review and Approval (§ 450.45)
g. Environmental Review (§ 450.47)
4. Part 450 Subpart C--Safety Requirements
a. Neighboring Operations Personnel (§ 450.101(a) and (b))
b. High Consequence Event Protection (§ 450.101(c))
c. Critical Asset and Critical Payload Protection
d. Other Safety Criteria (§ 450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g))
e. System Safety Program (§ 450.103)
f. Hazard Control Strategies (§ 450.107)
g. Hazard Control Strategy Determination (§ 450.107(b))
h. Flight Abort (§ 450.108)
i. Flight Hazard Analysis (§ 450.109)
j. Physical Containment (§ 450.110)
k. Wind Weighting (§ 450.111)
l. Flight Safety Analysis (Sec. § 450.113 to 450.139)
m. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope (§ 450.113)
n. Flight Safety Analysis Methods (§ 450.115)
o. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight (§ 450.117)
p. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight (§ 450.119)
q. Debris Analysis (§ 450.121)
r. Population Exposure Analysis (§ 450.123)
s. Probability of Failure Analysis (§ 450.131)
t. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (§ 450.133)
u. Debris Risk Analysis (§ 450.135)
v. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis, or Distant Focus Overpressure (DFO) (§ 450.137)
w. Toxic Hazards (Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187)
x. Computing Systems (§ 450.141)
y. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and Documentation (§ 450.143)
z. Flight Safety Systems (Sec. § 450.143 and 450.145)
aa. Hybrid Vehicles
bb. Agreements and Airspace (§ 450.147)
cc. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications (§ 450.149)
dd. Work Shift and Rest Requirements (§ 450.151)
ee. Radio Frequency (§ 450.153)
ff. Readiness and Rehearsals (§ 450.155)
gg. Communications (§ 450.157)
hh. Pre-Flight Procedures (§ 450.159)
ii. Control of Hazard Areas (§ 450.161)
jj. Lightning Hazard Mitigation (§ 450.163)
kk. Flight Commit Criteria (§ 450.165)
ll. Tracking (§ 450.167)
mm. Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements (§ 450.169)
nn. Safety at End of Launch (§ 450.171)
oo. Mishap (Definition, Sec. § 450.173 and 450.175)
pp. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements and Practices (§ 450.177)
qq. Ground Safety (§ 450.179 to § 450.189)
5. Part 450 Subpart D--Terms and Conditions of a Vehicle Operator License
a. Public Safety Responsibility, Compliance With License, Financial Responsibility, Human Spaceflight Requirements (Sec. § 450.201 to 450.207)
b. Compliance Monitoring (§ 450.209)
c. Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application for Modification of License (§ 450.211)
d. Pre-Flight Reporting (§ 450.213)
e. Post-Flight Reporting (§ 450.215)
f. Registration of Space Objects (§ 450.217)
6. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 433, 437, and 440
7. Miscellaneous Comments
8. Responses to Regulatory Impact Analysis Comments IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs
B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use VI. How To Obtain Additional Information Rulemaking Documents Comments Submitted to the Docket Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
I. Overview
I. Overview
Overview of Final Rule
This rule amends 14 CFR parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 by consolidating, updating, and streamlining all launch and reentry regulations into a single part 450. After March 10, 2026, parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 will be removed. This rule also revises multiple regulatory parts to apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles. In addition, this rule replaces many prescriptive regulations with performance-based rules, giving industry greater flexibility to develop means of compliance that meet their objectives while maintaining public safety. Where possible, the FAA has adopted performance standards, and considered the prescriptive requirements for placement in advisory circulars (AC) that will identify possible means of compliance, but not the only means of compliance, with this rule. The goal of this approach is to afford the industry and the FAA the added flexibility of using new methods to better enable future innovative concepts and operations. While some of the provisions in this rule may increase the risk to public safety compared to the current regulations, such as the provisions that apply to neighboring operations personnel, the FAA has ensured that the increased risk is minimal and there is a corresponding public interest benefit.
Overview of Final Rule
Part 450 accommodates all vehicle operators, including hybrid vehicle operators. The revisions include more performance-based requirements, alternatives to flight abort and flight safety analysis (FSA) requirements based on demonstrated reliability, use of equivalent level of safety (ELOS) for the measurement of a high consequence event, and allowing application process alternatives as agreed to by the FAA.
Part 450 is divided into subparts A through D. Part 450 is organized by sections that have both safety requirements for what an operator must do to be safe and application requirements for what must be submitted in an application. By "applicant," the FAA intends to reference an applicant for either a vehicle operator license, an incremental approval, a payload determination, a policy approval, or an environmental determination. By "operator," the FAA intends to reference the holder of a license, which is consistent with the definition of "operator" in § 401.7.
This preamble will discuss in detail the safety framework encapsulated in part 450, part 450 requirements in sequential order, followed by corresponding and related changes to other parts, and cost implications for this rule. i. Subpart A
Subpart A includes a general discussion on the application process, licensing scope and duration, and compliance dates. Pre-application consultation, which may include discussion of any applicable flexibilities in the application process, scope of license, and means of compliance, is required by part 413.
Figure 1 illustrates the licensing process. The licensing process begins with pre-application consultation, which sets the stage for an applicant to submit a license application. The application evaluation consists of five major components: (1) A policy review, (2) a payload review, (3) a safety review, (4) a determination of maximum probable loss (MPL) for establishing financial responsibility requirements, and (5) an environmental review. The license specifies the range of activities the licensee may undertake along with any limitations. Requirements after a license is issued encompass the licensee's responsibility for public safety and compliance with its license, representations in the license application, and FAA regulations. An important component of this compliance is the FAA's authority to perform safety inspections.
In the final rule, the FAA does not make any changes to the existing pre-application consultation provision, except to update the term "safety approval" to the newly adopted "safety element approval." The FAA makes this change to delineate between the safety approval portion of a license application and a safety element approval that the FAA grants under Part 414. This distinction between terms will not affect industry.
During the pre-application consultation stage, an applicant will work with the FAA to develop an application and licensing process that best fits its proposed operation. This stage will focus on compliance planning and positioning the applicant to prepare an acceptable application, which will increase the efficiency of the licensing process. The length of pre-application consultation will vary based on the proposed operation. For example, pre-application consultations may be lengthy when involving new launch vehicles that are under development or with operators inexperienced with the FAA's regulations. Alternatively, pre-application consultation with experienced operators using proven vehicles from established sites may be considerably shorter.
During this stage, the FAA expects to discuss the following topics with an applicant: Entrance and exit criteria for pre-application consultation, the intended means of compliance to meet the regulatory requirements in part 450, the scope of the license, safety element approvals, incremental review, review period for license evaluation, compliance expectations, and time frames an operator is required to meet to satisfy part 450. Some of the topics allow for flexibility that can result in a more efficient licensing process for both the applicant and the FAA.
The rule allows an applicant and the FAA flexibility to establish the scope of the license. Determining the point at which launch begins will be discussed during pre-application consultation. The applicant will describe to the FAA its launch site and its intended concept of operations leading up to a launch, including any operations that are hazardous to the public. Once the FAA and the applicant have a mutual understanding of the applicant's intended concept of operations, the FAA will determine what constitutes hazardous pre-flight operations and thus the beginning of launch. The applicant will then scope its application materials based on this starting point.
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the FAA proposed to set the scope of activity authorized by a vehicle operator license by identifying the beginning and end of launch and reentry. The final rule provides flexibility to scale the beginning of launch to the operation. Specifically, the FAA will identify the beginning and end of launch on a case-by-case basis and in consultation with an applicant. The final rule does not adopt the proposed default that hazardous ground pre-flight operations commence when a launch vehicle or its major components arrive at a U.S. launch site. Instead, the final rule identifies certain activities that qualify as hazardous pre-flight operations, including, but not limited to, pressurizing or loading of propellants into the vehicle or launch system, operations involving a fueled launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to initiate flight, or any hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for flight. This rule also clarifies that hazardous pre-flight operations do not include the period between the end of the previous launch and launch vehicle reuse when the vehicle is in a safe and dormant state.
For the end of launch and reentry, the FAA replaces each use of "vehicle stage" in the proposed rule with "vehicle component" in the final rule. The FAA adopts this change in recognition that components other than vehicle stages may return to Earth. Also, the FAA now includes "impact or landing" in the end of launch and reentry sections in the scope of license requirements to accommodate increasing efforts to reuse components. ii. Subpart B
Subpart B contains the requirements to obtain a vehicle operator license. The topics include incremental review and determinations, means of compliance, policy review, payload review, safety review and approval, and environmental review. This rule retains the key components of a license application review: The policy review, payload review, safety review, MPL determination, and environmental review. This rule continues to allow operators to submit the payload, policy, environmental, and financial responsibility portions of its application independently of each other.
The final rule will also allow an applicant to submit an application for a safety review in modules using an incremental approach approved by the FAA. The safety review is typically the most complex part of the license application and usually involves submission of numerous documents. In this rule, the FAA has concluded that a structured approach agreed to during pre-application consultation will reduce regulatory uncertainty by allowing the FAA to affirm at an early stage of development that the proposed safety measure or methodology meets the FAA's requirements. An applicant must have its incremental review approach approved by the FAA prior to submitting its application so that the FAA can ensure that the modules can be reviewed independently and in a workable order under an agreed time frame.
The rule makes it easier for an applicant to seek a safety element approval in conjunction with its license application. A safety element approval is an FAA document containing the FAA determination a safety element, when used or employed within a defined envelope, parameter, or situation, will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property. A safety element includes a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, process, service, or any identified component thereof; and qualified and trained personnel, performing a process or function related to licensed activities or vehicles. An applicant may also leverage existing safety element approvals by citing a safety element approval in another license application, thus streamlining the subsequent licensing process.
After the final rule becomes effective on March 10, 2021, operators holding an active launch or reentry license, or who have an accepted launch or reentry license application within 90 days after the effective date, may choose to operate under parts 415 and 417 for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), part 431 for reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), or part 435 for reentry vehicles, until five years after the effective date of this rule.\1\ All operators, including those exercising this provision, must come into compliance with this regulation's requirements for critical asset protection and collision avoidance (COLA) analysis beginning from the effective date of this rule. Any operator may also choose to operate under part 450 on the effective date of this rule. Operators conducting operations under parts 415, 417, 431 or 435 may submit requests for license renewals such that their license remains valid for up to five years after the effective date of this rule. A license renewal issued after the effective date of this rule will be valid for no longer than five years after the effective date of this rule.\2\ All operators will need to comply with all parts of this rule five years after its effective date. Any operator may also choose to operate under part 450 on the effective date of this rule.
\1\ The FAA refers to these licenses as "legacy licenses" throughout this preamble. After that time, all operators must come into compliance with the new regulations.
\2\ Operators holding a part 431 mission operator license have a 2-year renewable period, operators holding a part 435 reentry operator license have a 2-year renewable period, and operators holding a part 415 launch operator license have a 5-year renewable period.
For an application for a license modification submitted after this rule becomes effective and within five years of the effective date, the FAA will determine the applicability of part 450 on a case-by-case basis. In determining whether to apply part 450 in evaluating a license modification under this scenario in consultation with the applicant, the FAA will consider the extent and complexity of the modification, whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts of the application, and if the application requires significant reevaluation.
The final rule allows most time frames to be determined during pre-application consultation, or during the application review process. An operator may propose alternative time frames for any of the requirements listed in the newly created Appendix A to part 404.
Compliance with the performance requirements in this rule may be demonstrated by using a means of compliance that is accepted by the FAA. Means of compliance may be government standards, industry consensus standards, or unique means of compliance developed by an individual applicant. During pre-application consultation, the FAA will work with applicants on compliance planning. The FAA will review the submitted means of compliance to determine whether they satisfy the regulatory safety standard.
For five requirements, an applicant must use a means of compliance the FAA has accepted in advance of submitting an application. Those requirements for which an applicant must use an accepted means of compliance in advance are identified in § 450.35 and include FSA methods, airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds for any toxic hazards for flight, highly reliable flight safety systems (FSS), lightning commit criteria, and airborne toxic concentration and duration thresholds toxic hazard mitigation for ground operations. For all other requirements, an applicant may include an accepted means of compliance or a means of compliance the FAA has not yet accepted as part of its application for the FAA to review during application evaluation. The FAA will publish any publicly available means of compliance that it accepts. In addition, an operator may request that the FAA publish the operator's unique means of compliance, once reviewed and accepted.
The FAA evaluates five major components in an application for a vehicle operator license. The FAA adopts the proposed requirements for the policy review without modification. For the FAA to conduct a policy review, an applicant must identify the launch or reentry vehicle and its proposed flight profile, and describe the vehicle by characteristics that include individual stages and their dimensions, the type and amounts of all propellants, and maximum thrust. The final rule clarifies that a payload review is not required when the proposed launch or reentry vehicle will not carry a payload or when the payload is owned or operated by the U.S. Government. The FAA will continue to conduct safety reviews to determine whether an applicant is capable of conducting a launch or reentry without jeopardizing public health and safety and safety of property as specified in Sec. § 415.103, 431.31(a), and 435.31. Finally, the FAA adopts with revisions the proposed requirements for environmental review. The revisions include clarification on the FAA requirements for an Environmental Assessment (EA) and the FAA's responsibility to determine whether a Categorical Exemption (CATEX) applies, in accordance with current regulations. The MPL calculation and financial responsibility requirements are discussed under Subpart D. iii. Subpart C
Subpart C addresses safety requirements. In the final rule, the FAA revises numerous sections under subpart C in response to public comments on the proposed rule, so that the rule is more performance-based. Subpart C includes regulations for key areas of concern to Federal launch or reentry sites that had not been covered in previous FAA regulations (e.g., the treatment of neighboring operations personnel and critical assets, including critical payloads). Throughout this document, the terms "Federal launch or reentry sites" and "Federal sites" replace the NPRM's use of "Federal launch range."
The FAA structured the rule to facilitate elimination of duplication of the requirements of Federal launch or reentry sites by incorporating critical asset protections, to avoid the need for Federal sites to impose this requirement. The rule also creates a path for the FAA to determine that a Federal launch or reentry site's ground safety processes, requirements, and oversight are not inconsistent with the Secretary's statutory authority over commercial space activities.
The safety criteria in § 450.101 (Safety Criteria) set the public and property safety criteria that must be met before an operator may initiate the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle.\3\ The quantitative safety criteria continue to be the linchpin requirement for flight safety, which is fundamental for all operators. There are quantitative risk criteria for collective risk, individual risk, and aircraft risk. The final rule applies collective and individual risk criteria to people on waterborne vessels, enabling risk management techniques that previously required a waiver. The rule carves out neighboring operations personnel on a launch or reentry site as a separate category of the public subject to different risk criteria. This rule also adds risk criteria for the protection of critical assets essential to the national interests of the United States, including a more stringent requirement for the protection of critical payloads. The final rule uses conditional risk management to ensure (1) mitigations, such as flight abort, will be implemented to protect against high consequence events, and (2) implementation of mitigations will produce reasonable conditional risks.
\3\ The FAA changes the title of § 450.101 from "public safety criteria" in the NPRM to "safety criteria" in the final rule. This is because the FAA changed the definition of "public" in new § 401.7 of the final rule. In the NPRM, "public" was defined to include "people and property that are not involved in supporting the launch or reentry and includes those people and property that may be located within the launch or reentry site, such as visitors, individuals providing goods or services not related to launch or reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and its personnel." In the final rule, the FAA removed references to property, limiting the scope of the term "public" to people. This was done to provide better clarity throughout part 450 regarding the protection of people, property, or both. Because § 450.101 includes criteria for both people and property, the FAA removes "public" from the title.
The rule allows for neighboring operations personnel to be protected as members of the public, but to a less stringent risk threshold as compared to other members of the public. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements on neighboring operations personnel in Sec. § 401.7, 440.3, 450.101(a) and (b), and 450.137 (Far-field Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis) paragraph (c)(6), but removes the phase "as determined by the Federal or licensed launch or reentry site operator" from the definition of "neighboring operations personnel" in § 401.7. Instead, the Federal or licensed site operator will determine those persons who are eligible for neighboring operations personnel status in coordination with the operators at the site and in accordance with definition in § 401.7. A site operator at a non-Federal site will have the option to designate certain personnel as neighboring operations personnel.
In the final rule, critical assets include property, facilities, or infrastructure necessary to maintain national security, or assured access to space for national priority missions. In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the proposed requirement for operators to calculate the risks to critical assets in preparing a flight hazard analysis, debris analysis, and debris risk analysis. The FAA anticipates that it will perform all critical asset and critical payload risk assessments for commercial space transportation operations involving non-Federal sites.
Under § 450.101(c) of the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require an operator to use flight abort as a hazard control strategy if the consequence of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response mode, in any one-second period of flight, is greater than 1 x 10-\3\ CEC for uncontrolled areas. The FAA amends the title of § 450.101(c) from "Flight Abort" in the NPRM to "High Consequence Event Protection" in the final rule, because the final rule allows an operator to use a method other than flight abort in certain situations in which the operator can show sufficient protection against high consequence events. The FAA retains the CEC requirement as a quantitative criterion that an applicant must use to measure high consequence events, but revises the final rule to allow ELOS for the CEC requirement. The final rule also allows options for how an applicant may protect against a low likelihood, high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase of flight, such as using flight abort in accordance with § 450.108 (Flight Abort) or demonstrating that CEC is below a certain threshold without using flight abort.
The FAA adopts with revisions the proposal that an operator must implement and document a system safety program throughout the operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system in § 450.103 (System Safety Program). The system safety program includes a safety organization, hazard management, configuration management and control, and post-flight data review. In the final rule, the FAA removes the proposed term "operational" to clarify that the regulation applies to hazards throughout the lifecycle of a launch or reentry system--not just to operational hazards. The FAA also does not adopt the proposed requirement in § 450.105 to conduct a preliminary safety assessment, because that requirement has been replaced with a requirement to conduct a functional hazard analysis under the Hazard Control Strategies section in the final rule.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed under the Hazard Control Strategies section (Sec. § 450.107 to 450.111) that, for each phase of a vehicle's flight, an operator would not need to conduct a flight hazard analysis for that phase of flight if the public safety and safety of property hazards identified in the preliminary safety assessment could be mitigated adequately to meet the requirements of proposed § 450.101 using physical containment, wind weighting, or flight abort. In the final rule, the FAA concludes that an operator must use one or more of the hazard control strategies defined in Sec. § 450.108 through 450.111 to meet the safety criteria. The FAA also adds a new paragraph to this section to address how an operator determines its hazard control strategy or strategies for any phase of flight during a launch or reentry.
The FAA adopts proposed § 450.108, which is a consolidation and revision of several proposed sections associated with flight abort requirements in the NPRM. As a result of this consolidation, the FAA removes the flight abort related requirements in Sec. § 450.123, 450.125, 450.127, and 450.129. The requirements in these sections have been revised to be performance-based standards included in § 450.108(c), which addresses flight safety limits objectives, and § 450.108(d), which addresses flight safety limits constraints.
Section 450.109 (Flight Hazard Analysis) details requirements for an operator using a flight hazard analysis as its hazard control strategy for one or more phases of flight. A flight hazard analysis must identify, describe, and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety and safety of property resulting from the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle, mitigate hazards as appropriate, and validate and verify the hazard mitigations. The FAA revises the final rule to reflect that performing a flight hazard analysis is included as a hazard control strategy to derive hazard controls for the flight, or phase of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle.
Regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated an operator must conduct an FSA to demonstrate quantitatively that a launch or reentry meets the safety criteria for debris, far-field overpressure, and toxic hazards. An operator may be required to conduct additional analyses to use flight abort or wind weighting hazard control strategies. The FAA anticipates that an operator will be required to conduct some FSA for at least some phases of flight, regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated. For example, an FSA must determine flight hazard areas for any vehicle with planned debris impacts capable of causing a casualty.
The FAA revises the FSA requirements in § 450.113 (Flight Safety Analysis Requirements--Scope), which establish the portions of flight for which an operator would be required to perform and document an FSA. An operator must perform and document an FSA for all phases of flight, unless otherwise agreed to by the FAA. The FAA may agree there is no need for an FSA for certain phases of flight based on demonstrated reliability for any launch or reentry vehicle, instead of just for hybrid vehicles as proposed in the NPRM. The FAA expands this exception because, conceivably, an operation involving a vehicle other than a hybrid could have an extensive and safe enough flight history to demonstrate compliance with the risk criteria in § 450.101 based on empirical data in lieu of the traditional risk analysis.
An FSA generally consists of a set of quantitative analyses used to determine flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, flight hazard areas, and other mitigation measures, and to demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria in § 450.101. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 15 sections associated with FSA requirements in Sec. § 450.113 to 450.141. The final rule moves requirements associated with flight safety limits to § 450.108 and condenses the remaining FSA requirements into 11 performance-based sections that cover the scope of the analyses, general methodology requirements, and specific sections on normal trajectories, malfunction trajectories, hazardous debris characterization, population exposure, probability of failure, flight hazard areas, debris risks, and far-field overpressure blast effects. The FAA moved some of the proposed FSA requirements such that an operator could generally perform the analyses in the order that they appear in the final rule, if they choose.
The FAA revises the FSA sections to be more performance-based than what was proposed in the NPRM. Specifically, the FAA revises the FSA requirements to identify their fundamental purpose, the essential constraints, and the objectives in each section. The FSA requirements in the final rule are consistent with current practice, but the rule articulates important, often misunderstood, aspects of flight analysis such as the creation of hazard areas and other operating constraints necessary to protect public health and safety and safety of property.
Sections 450.139 (Toxic Hazards for Flight) and 450.187 (Toxic Hazards Mitigation for Ground Operations) contain the requirements for toxic release analysis. In the final rule, the FAA adopts Sec. § 450.139 and 450.187 with some revisions. The FAA clarifies that operators are not required to perform a toxic release hazard analysis for kerosene-based fuels unless directed by the FAA. Also, the FAA revises the requirements for performing toxic containment.
In the NPRM, § 450.111 contained computing systems and software requirements. In the final rule, the FAA revises and relocates the requirements for computing systems and software to § 450.141 (Computing Systems and Software). In response to comments, the FAA revises the requirements of § 450.141 to be more performance-based, and levies requirements for computing system safety items in proportion to their criticality instead of the item's level of autonomy. The final rule also requires independent verification and validation for computing system safety items that meet the definition of "safety-critical" in § 401.7.
The requirements of § 450.143 (Safety-Critical System Design, Test, and Documentation) apply to all safety-critical systems except highly reliable FSS and safety-critical software items, which are regulated by the requirements in Sec. § 450.145 and 450.141 respectively. In the final rule, the FAA revises the reference to FSS requirements in § 450.143(a); amends § 450.143(b) to include other means of compliance and broader safe design concepts; and removes the term "vehicle" in § 450.143(c) because safety-critical systems can be located off-vehicle. In addition, the FAA amends the application requirements in § 450.143(f) to require that applicants describe the method used to validate predicted operating environments and any standards used for each safety-critical system.
Section 450.145 (Highly Reliable Flight Safety System) contains the requirements for certain FSS. The FAA revises § 450.145 to apply to a highly reliable FSS, which consists of any onboard portion and if used, any ground-based, space-based, or otherwise not onboard portion of the system. Conventional FSS with airborne flight termination receivers and ground-based command transmitter systems will have both airborne and ground-based subsystems. The final rule provides additional flexibility for operations where the CEC is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ and exempts the FSS for such operations from the requirements of § 450.145; however, the FSS for such operations must still meet the requirements of § 450.143. The FAA makes these changes to scope the FSS design, testing, and analysis more closely to potential consequence and risk. These changes will reduce burden on operators that have a lower potential for causing high consequence events. The FAA also removes the reliability threshold required of an FSS for operations where CEC is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\. The final rule provides that an FSS required for operations for which the CEC is between 1 x 10-\2\ and 1 x 10-\3\ must meet the requirements of § 450.143.
Section 450.147 (Agreements) requires a vehicle operator to have a written agreement with any entity that provides a service or use of property to meet a requirement in part 450. In the final rule, the FAA requires an operator to enter into multiple agreements if the operator works with multiple entities. Also, operators will continue to be required to enter into agreements with the appropriate entities for launches and reentries that cross airspace or impact water not under U.S. jurisdiction.
Section 450.153 contains the requirements for radio frequency. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that an operator would be required to identify each frequency, all allowable frequency tolerances, and each frequency's intended use, operating power, and source; and provide for the monitoring of frequency usage and enforcement of frequency allocations. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposed requirements with modifications to the performance-based objectives central to radio frequency management. Operators will be required to ensure that radio frequency does not adversely affect the performance of FSS or safety-critical systems, and to coordinate radio frequency with local and Federal authorities.
Section 450.157 contains the requirements for communications. In the NRPM, the FAA proposed that personnel that have authority to issue "hold/resume," "go/no go," and abort commands must monitor each common intercom channel during countdown and flight. The FAA does not adopt the proposal because it was overly prescriptive.
Section 450.161 (Control of Hazard Areas) contains the control of hazard areas. In the final rule, the FAA does not remove the requirement for an operator to verify that warnings have been issued when the operator relies on another party to publicize those warnings. Instead, the FAA clarifies that the requirement may be met by demonstrating due diligence pursuant to agreements that the operator has with that party and notifying the FAA of any deviations from the agreements by any party. The FAA also adds an application requirement for the applicant to give a description of how the applicant will provide for any publication of flight hazard areas.
In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the four mishap categories proposed in the NPRM. The FAA agrees with commenters that the regulatory requirements for the proposed mishap classes, from most severe (Class 1) to least severe (Class 4), were largely the same, and concludes that the mishap classes are not needed to achieve the objective of consolidating mishap-related terms and streamlining the requirements to report, respond to, and investigate mishaps. Instead, the FAA combines the substantive criteria of Mishap Classes 1-4 under the definition of "mishap." The revised definition in the final rule describes events that constitute a mishap. The requirements to report, respond to, and investigate mishaps are incumbent upon an operator regardless of a mishap's severity.
Section 450.173 (Mishap Plan--Reporting, Response, and Investigation Requirements) contains the requirements for the mishap plan. In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the proposed requirement for a licensee to cooperate with FAA and NTSB investigations contained in the NPRM. The FAA finds this requirement duplicative of § 450.13, which states that a vehicle operator license does not relieve a licensee of its obligations to comply with all applicable requirements of law or regulation that may apply to its activities. Also, the final rule standardizes criteria for mishap plans across all of 14 CFR Chapter III by making § 450.173 applicable to launch and reentry licensees, experimental permittees, and site operators.
The FAA proposed to give license applicants and licensees the option to pre-coordinate testing activities with the FAA. In the final rule, the FAA clarifies that § 450.175 (Test-induced Damage) will only apply to licensees or license applicants who choose to apply for the exception. The final rule also allows an operator to coordinate the possibility of test-induced damage prior to an operation and exclude damage meeting certain requirements from constituting a mishap, thereby reducing unnecessary reporting. v. Subpart D
Subpart D addresses the terms and conditions of a vehicle operator license. This includes compliance monitoring (§ 450.209), material changes and continuing accuracy (§ 450.211), pre-flight reporting (§ 450.213), post-flight reporting (§ 450.215), and registration of space objects (§ 450.217). In the final rule, the FAA adopts these sections as proposed with the exception of revisions to § 450.213 (Pre-flight Reporting) as described below.
The final rule makes few changes to the post-licensing requirements, for which the final rule standardizes requirements for all launches and reentries from Federal sites and commercial spaceports or exclusive use launch sites. In line with the previous requirements, operators will provide information and comply with reported collision avoidance closures. A Federal agency will continue to provide operators the appropriate launch or reentry closures, but the rule allows the possibility of some other entity's providing this service in the future. The final rule offers operators flexibility, in coordination with the FAA, to use different timelines for the submission of pre-flight and post-flight reports. The FAA revises § 450.213(d) to allow an operator the flexibility to identify an appropriate time frame in coordination with the FAA. The FAA also revises § 450.217(c) so that licensees will only need to notify the FAA that they removed an object from orbit if removal occurs during or immediately after licensed activities.
II. Background
II. Background
This rulemaking arose from work by the National Space Council that led to President Donald J. Trump's Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2) in May 2018, directing the U.S. Department of Transportation to streamline the regulations governing commercial space launch and reentry licensing. The goals of this streamlining include creating a single licensing regime for all types of commercial space flight launch and reentry operations, and replacing prescriptive requirements with performance-based criteria. The final rule is consistent with DOT's regulations under 49 CFR 5.5(e), which instruct that regulations should be technologically neutral, and, to the extent feasible, should specify performance objectives, rather than prescribing specific conduct that regulated entities must adopt.
On March 8, 2018, the FAA chartered the Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to provide a forum for a broad range of stakeholders from the aviation and space communities to discuss regulations to set forth procedures and requirements for commercial space transportation launch and reentry licensing. The FAA tasked the ARC with developing recommendations for a performance-based regulatory approach in which the regulations set forth the safety objectives to be achieved while providing the applicant flexibility to produce tailored and innovative means of compliance.
On April 30, 2018, the ARC submitted its final recommendation report to the FAA.\4\ The FAA addressed the recommendations in more detail throughout the NPRM. This final rule incorporates recommendations provided by the ARC.
\4\ Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements ARC, Recommendations Final Report (April 30, 2008). The ARC Report is available for reference in the docket (Docket FAA-2019-0229).
On March 26, 2019, the FAA posted on its website an NPRM titled "Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements" that would revise parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, and 440, and create a new part 450. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to streamline and increase flexibility in the FAA's commercial space launch and reentry regulations, remove obsolete requirements, consolidate and revise multiple regulatory parts, and apply a single set of licensing and safety regulations across several types of operations and vehicles.
On April 15, 2019, the FAA published this NPRM in the Federal Register (85 FR 15296). The initial comment period was 60-days from the date of publication, ending on June 14, 2019.
In the ensuing month, commenters submitted fifty-six requests for an extension of the comment period to a total of 120 days, or until August 13, 2019.
In response, on May 31, 2019, the FAA published an extension of the comment period on the NPRM (84 FR 25207), for an additional 45-days to July 30, 2019, to allow commenters more time to analyze the proposed rule.
On June 14, 2019, the FAA posted to the docket a response \5\ to MLA Space, LLC, which had requested that the FAA reconvene the ARC to engage in dialogue regarding the NPRM. In the response, the FAA stated its belief that engagement with industry in the form of an ARC, a public meeting, or through a special session of Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) would not be beneficial at that point in the rulemaking process. The FAA encouraged members of industry to submit any questions requesting clarification regarding the NPRM to the docket.
\5\ See FAA-2019-0229-0088.
On July 16, 2019, the FAA posted to the docket the first of its responses \6\ to commenters' questions requesting clarification. Also on July 16, 2019, the FAA posted a statement \7\ to the docket encouraging commenters to post any further requests for clarification in the docket as soon as possible. That statement reasserted the FAA's judgment that further engagement with industry through a public meeting to have clarifying dialogue regarding the NPRM would not be beneficial, but also offered to entertain meetings in the month of July 2019 with members of the public who wished to provide to the FAA their information bearing on the proposed rule.
\6\ See FAA-2019-0229-0106.
\7\ See FAA-2019-0229-0107.
Subsequently, the FAA met with Blue Origin,\8\ the Coalition for Deep Space Exploration,\9\ Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX),\10\ Virgin Galactic,\11\ and Virgin Orbit \12\ to receive their clarifying questions and a preview of their comments on the NPRM.\13\
\8\ See FAA-2019-0229-0127.
\9\ See FAA-2019-0229-0178.
\10\ See FAA-2019-0229-0129.
\11\ See FAA-2019-0229-0128.
\12\ See FAA-2019-0229-0126.
\13\ Since the information provided at these meetings is already captured in these commenters' clarifying questions or comments submitted to the docket, the FAA gave these commenters the option of not posting to the docket a summary of the meeting, as required by the FAA's Statement Regarding Requests for Public Meetings (see FAA-2019-0229-0107), as this would be a duplicative effort.
On July 22, 2019, the FAA published a second extension of the comment period to the NPRM (84 FR 35051). To provide commenters with sufficient time to review the FAA's clarifications in response to the commenter's questions, the FAA extended the comment period to August 19, 2019.\14\
\14\ See 84 FR 35051.
On August 16, 2019, the FAA posted its response to the docket \15\ to commenters' questions for clarification received by July 12, 2020, and July 29, 2019.
\15\ See FAA-2019-0229-0134 and FAA-2019-0229-0135.
On August 19, 2019, the comment period closed, with a total of 155 submissions from 85 commenters, and two submissions containing proprietary information. Of these comments, 62 requested an extension of the comment period, 10 requested to reconvene the ARC, 29 requested a public meeting, 18 requested a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM), 18 contained clarifying questions for parts of the NPRM, and 53 comments contained substantive feedback regarding the proposed rule. The FAA discusses the adjudication of these comments in more detail later in the preamble.
III. Discussion of the Rule
III. Discussion of the Rule
A. Safety Framework
General. The final rule relies on a safety framework that provides the flexibility needed to accommodate current and future launch and reentry operations. The safety framework encompasses both ground safety and flight safety. Acceptable safety for ground operations is achieved primarily through a process-based hazard analysis and certain prescribed hazard controls. Acceptable safety for flight operations is achieved through several elements discussed further in this preamble section. The FAA identifies specific safety criteria and requirements in § 450.101 that must be met before a launch or reentry can take place, including collective risk, individual risk, aircraft risk, risk to critical assets, protection against high consequence events, disposal of orbiting stages, risk to people and property on orbit, and notification of planned impacts.
A. Safety Framework
System Safety Program. All operators are required to have a system safety program that establishes system safety management principles for both ground safety and flight safety throughout the operational lifecycle of a launch or reentry system. The system safety program includes a safety organization, hazard management, configuration management and control, and post-flight data review.
Hazard Control Strategies. To address the wide variety of commercial launch and reentry systems and operations concepts, the final rule includes four hazard control strategies. An operator can use multiple hazard control strategies during flight because different strategies may be appropriate for different phases of flight. Different hazard control strategies may also be appropriate during any one phase of flight to protect different sets of people and property. The hazard control strategies are physical containment, wind weighting, flight abort, and flight hazard analysis.
• Physical containment would most likely be used for low energy test flights, when a launch vehicle does not have sufficient energy for any hazards associated with its flight to reach the public or critical assets.
• Wind weighting is traditionally used in the launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles, otherwise known as sounding rockets, where the operator adjusts launcher azimuth and elevation settings to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide impact locations for the launch vehicle or its components that will ensure compliance with the safety criteria in § 450.101.
• Flight abort is the traditional safety approach for expendable launch vehicles, and is a process to limit or restrict the hazards to public safety and the safety of property presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including any payload, while in flight by initiating and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle flight. With the exception of phases of flight with demonstrated reliability, flight abort is mandated as a hazard control strategy if the potential for a high consequence event is above a certain threshold.
• Flight hazard analysis is the traditional safety approach for reusable launch vehicles, and is the most flexible hazard control strategy because an operator derives specific hazard controls unique to its launch or reentry vehicle system and operations concept. Flight hazard analysis is mandated as a hazard control strategy if the other three hazard control strategies cannot mitigate the safety hazards sufficient to meet the safety criteria of § 450.101.
An operator determines the appropriate hazard control strategy by conducting a functional hazard analysis.
Flight Safety Analyses. Regardless of the hazard control strategy chosen or mandated, an operator is required to conduct several FSA. These include trajectory analyses for normal and malfunction flight, a debris analysis, a population exposure analysis, and a probability of failure analysis. These analyses provide input to a debris risk analysis, a far-field overpressure blast effects analysis, and a toxic hazard analysis that together demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria of § 450.101, and provide input to a flight hazard area analysis.
Derived Hazard Controls. With respect to flight operations, an operator would derive several hazard controls by conducting the FSA and, if necessary, a flight hazard analysis. Because hazard controls are derived from these analyses, they are not specifically addressed in part 450.
Prescribed Hazard Controls for Computing Systems and Software and Safety-Critical Hardware. Regardless of the hazard controls derived from a flight hazard analysis and FSA, the FAA requires many other hazard controls. The first set of hazard controls includes requirements for computing systems and software, safety-critical systems, and highly reliable FSS.
Other Prescribed Hazard Controls. The second set of hazard controls have historically been necessary to achieve acceptable flight safety. These include requirements for (1) written agreements, (2) safety-critical personnel qualifications, (3) work shift and rest requirements, (4) radio frequency management, (5) readiness, (6) communications, (7) pre-flight procedures, (8) control of hazard areas, (9) lightning hazard mitigation, (10) flight commit criteria, (11) tracking, (12) collision avoidance, (13) safety at the end of launch, and (14) mishap plans.
Ground Safety. With respect to the safety of ground operations, the safety framework includes (1) coordination with a site operator, (2) explosive siting, (3) a ground hazard analysis, (4) toxic hazard mitigations, and (5) prescribed hazard controls addressing visitors, countdown aborts, fire suppression, and emergency procedures. These together provide an acceptable set of public safety considerations for ground operations.
B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule
B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule
1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based Regulations, ELOS, Safety Case i. Prescriptive
The FAA sought in the NPRM to propose changes that would convert many of its prescriptive requirements to more performance-based requirements that would allow for different means of compliance. The FAA received several comments stating generally that the proposed rule was still too prescriptive. The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) and SpaceX commented that some of the proposed requirements would unnecessarily drive applicants to a burdensome equivalent level of safety (ELOS) process as a default. Blue Origin recommended broadly that the FAA remove all prescriptive portions of the proposed rule.\16\
1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based Regulations, ELOS, Safety Case i. Prescriptive
\16\ Blue Origin submitted to the rulemaking docket a letter to Admiral James Ellis, Jr, USN (ret.), Chairman, Users' Advisory Group, National Space Council, in which Blue Origin expressed concerns with the NPRM. The letter encouraged Adm. Ellis to communicate the concerns to the Administration and the members of the National Space Council and advise the Office of the Secretary of Transportation and FAA to engage further with industry through a public meeting to address concerns with the NPRM and then to issue a supplemental NPRM that achieves the goals of SPD-2. The FAA is construing the contents of the letter as comments on the proposals in the NPRM.
The FAA agrees that some of the requirements in proposed part 450 were unnecessarily prescriptive, particularly those for software and FSA. The FAA has modified those requirements to remove unnecessary prescriptiveness and provide additional flexibility while still preserving safety and providing regulatory clarity. For many of the requirements amended for this purpose in the final rule, the prescriptive parts of the proposal will be moved to a corresponding AC as guidance on means of compliance. Specific changes to the requirements are discussed later in this preamble.
Several commenters, including Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX, also stated that the FAA should base its new requirements on parts 431 and 435 and add details on how to comply through guidance. CSF also stated that the FAA ignored the draft regulatory text provided by the ARC, which used parts 431 and 435 as a basis for updated rules.
The FAA disagrees that parts 431 and 435 should be used as the sole basis for part 450. Part 431 depends on an operator to use the system safety process to derive hazard controls, which as reflected in part 450, is appropriate for some launch and reentry vehicle systems and operations. However, as also reflected in part 450, not all launch and reentry vehicle systems and operations require an operator to derive hazard controls through the system safety process. Specifically, physical containment, wind weighting, and, most importantly, flight abort are often sufficient. Part 450 incorporates the flexibility of part 431, but acknowledges the acceptability of other hazard control strategies. Part 450 also builds on the precedent set by part 431's limits on the foreseeable consequences of a failure in terms of conditional expected casualties and establishes a less stringent threshold.\17\ Furthermore, the FAA stated in the NPRM that it would not specifically address the ARC's proposed regulatory text because that regulatory text did not receive broad consensus within the ARC.
\17\ Section 431.43(d) sets a limit for foreseeable public consequences in terms of CEC, but only for an unproven RLV. Section 431.43(d) provides an unproven RLV may only be operated so that during any portion of flight, the expected number of casualties does not exceed 1 x 10-\4\ given a vehicle failure will occur at any time the instantaneous impact point is over a populated area. This is in greater detail in the high consequence event protection section of the preamble.
One individual commenter noted that streamlining was long overdue. Another individual commenter noted that the proposed rule is longer and more complicated than the rule it proposes to replace, and that past FAA approaches led to codifying Federal launch and reentry site requirements, which the Federal sites subsequently changed such that they no longer matched the FAA requirements.
In response, the FAA notes that the proposed regulation combined elements from parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. Part 450 is shorter than parts 415 and 417 and more performance-based. Although it is longer than parts 431 and 435, part 450 is more flexible and encompasses more types of launch and reentry operations. This final rule allows operators to use a means of compliance that will accommodate customized operations, changing technologies, and innovation. ii. Equivalent Level of Safety (§ 450.37)
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in § 450.37 (Equivalent Level of Safety) that for all requirements in part 450, except § 450.101, an applicant may clearly and convincingly demonstrate that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety (ELOS) to the requirement.
In the final rule, the FAA revises § 450.37 so that only some portions of § 450.101--specifically § 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g)--are excluded from eligibility for an ELOS approach. This change allows an applicant to propose an equivalent level of safety to the orbital debris requirement in § 450.101(e)(2) and the notification of planned impacts requirement in § 450.101(f). Most significantly, this change also allows an applicant to propose an equivalent level of safety to the use of a CEC of 1 x 10-\3\ as the measure of a high consequence event in § 450.101(c)(2). Section 450.101(c) is discussed more fully later in this preamble.
Virgin Galactic commented that ELOS determinations should be part of the license application process. The FAA agrees with the comment and incorporates ELOS determinations into the license application process. To exercise this option, an applicant must demonstrate, through technical rationale, that the proposed alternative provides a level of safety equivalent to the requirement it would replace. The FAA will evaluate the proposal during the application evaluation.
CSF stated that, if the FAA adopted the parts 431 and 435 framework, ELOS would be unnecessary because the ELOS process does not exist under those regulations.\18\ Blue Origin urged the FAA to consider the need for an ELOS option in this rule.
\18\ The FAA added equivalent level of safety provisions to parts 431 and 435 in a 2018 final rule. 83 FR 28528 (June 20, 2018).
In response to CSF's comments, the FAA acknowledges that, in theory, a performance-based regulation like part 450 could function without an ELOS provision, because, in concept, a performance-based rule allows many different means of compliance with the required safety standard. The FAA considered eliminating the ELOS provision from the final rule, but decided that eliminating the ELOS provision would remove a useful regulatory tool that provides flexibility. Unlike means of compliance, which demonstrate compliance with the regulation, ELOS allows an applicant to propose and demonstrate a method that ensures an ELOS to the requirement, but not necessarily compliance with the requirement itself. The FAA has chosen to retain the option of ELOS to allow operators to propose unique processes and procedures that this rule may not have contemplated.
Blue Origin stated that it supports the use of safety cases as a means to establish an ELOS under proposed § 450.37. A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensive, and valid case that a system is safe, for a given application in a particular setting. Regarding process, Blue Origin recommended requiring only one layer of external-to-applicant audit, and that the audit criteria be transparently developed with industry input to ensure understanding of the scope of compliance with the ELOS proposal process. Another individual commenter stated that the FAA should add a provision that would allow use of an alternate process for obtaining a license based on the use of a "safety case" methodology. This methodology would consist of voluntary audits of an applicant's safety and risk management program, followed by development of a safety case showing how the public would be protected during licensed activities.
The FAA finds that the proposed regulation is flexible in allowing an applicant to propose a means of compliance. It also affords the possibility of meeting most requirements by demonstrating an ELOS.\19\ An applicant may wish to use a safety case to demonstrate that it is has satisfied the ELOS standard; however, the FAA declines to add prescriptive audit requirements for its use. An applicant could, but is not required to, use a safety case to show that a certain method satisfies an ELOS to a regulatory requirement, excluding the requirements of § 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g). A safety case is not required to demonstrate ELOS. It is one way to provide rationale for ELOS. An applicant could use a safety case or other justification for ELOS.
\19\ ELOS is not applicable to § 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g).
Virgin Galactic recommended that safety cases be counted as an alternative to CEC in § 450.101(c). The Boeing Company (Boeing), Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin), Northrop Grumman Corporation (Northrop Grumman), and United Launch Alliance (ULA) sought clarification as to why § 450.37 would not apply to § 450.101. Similarly, Blue Origin, CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic commented that ELOS should be allowed for § 450.101(c).
The FAA agrees with allowing ELOS for § 450.101(c)(2). This allows an operator to make a safety case or provide some other justification for an ELOS determination for an alternative method to protect against a high consequence event, such as safeguards other than flight abort, or an alternative to CEC as a measurement of the potential for a high consequence event, such as a risk profile, both of which are described more in the preamble section discussing § 450.101(c). Section 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g) contain the core safety requirements to protect people and property on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. Any proposed non-compliance with these risk requirements will require a waiver and are not eligible for a demonstration of ELOS. By contrast, all other flight safety requirements in part 450 subpart C, which can be demonstrated through ELOS, support the achievement of these underlying risk criteria. To use an ELOS, an operator may demonstrate that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety to a requirement in accordance with § 450.37. A petition for waiver must be submitted at least 60 days in advance and address why granting the request for relief is in the public interest and will not jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States in accordance with § 404.5.
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA commented that the FAA should accept a Federal launch or reentry site's safety processes as providing an ELOS to the FAA's own safety standards without any additional safety requirements.
The FAA disagrees. FAA regulations apply to licensed launches and, in accordance with § 450.45(b) (Safety Review and Approval), the FAA will accept any safety-related launch or reentry service provided by a Federal launch or reentry site or other Federal entity by contract, if the FAA determines that the launch or reentry service satisfies part 450. Although it is possible for the FAA to find that a service provided by a Federal launch or reentry site does not satisfy a requirement in part 450 but does provide an ELOS, the FAA needs to make that determination on a case-by-case basis. iii. "As agreed to by the Administrator"
Throughout the NPRM, the FAA used the clause "as agreed to by the Administrator." The term was used in all time frame requirements, as well as in proposed Sec. § 450.3(a) and (b)(1), 450.33, 450.101(c), 450.113(a)(5), 450.107(b)(2), 450.107(d), 450.147(c), 450.173(g), 450.213(a), and 450.215(b). As stated in the proposal, this clause is used to mean that an operator may submit an alternative to the proposed requirement to the FAA for review. The FAA must agree to the operator's proposal for the operator to use the alternative.
CSF and SpaceX commented that it was unclear how the clause "as agreed to by the Administrator" differed from an ELOS determination. CSF and SpaceX requested that the FAA describe its expectations and capture any process associated with this option in guidance. CSF and SpaceX also recommended adding "unless otherwise agreed to by the Administrator" to the beginning of proposed § 450.101(c).
The clause "as agreed to by the Administrator" means that an operator may submit an alternative to a regulatory requirement. The FAA must agree to the operator's proposal for the operator to use this alternative. Unlike an ELOS determination, an applicant need not demonstrate that this alternative satisfies an ELOS to the requirement. Each use of the term "as agreed to by the Administrator" includes criteria or considerations by which the FAA will agree to a different approach than the regulatory requirement. An applicant should look to these criteria or considerations to determine what the FAA would expect from an applicant when providing an alternative proposal.
For most of the requirements in part 450, an applicant may demonstrate an equivalent level of safety if the applicant is unable to meet a requirement. In addition, an operator may request a waiver to any requirement. An ELOS may be submitted in a license application and must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that an alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety to the requirement. A petition for waiver must be submitted 60 days in advance and address why granting the request for relief is in the public interest and will not jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
For some requirements, the FAA anticipated the need for additional regulatory flexibility without the burden of providing an equivalent level of safety or applying for a separate waiver. For those requirements, the FAA has incorporated the clause "as agreed to by the Administrator" to mean that an operator may submit an alternative to the proposed requirement to the FAA for review. For each requirement where the FAA has provided additional flexibility by including the "as agreed to by the Administrator" clause, the FAA has also provided criteria that the Administrator will consider in determining whether to approve the alternative approach, including safety considerations when appropriate. For example, an alternative time frame will generally be accepted if it provides sufficient time for the FAA to review the submittal. These alternatives will typically be agreed to in pre-application consultation.
The FAA addresses the recommendation from CSF and SpaceX by including ELOS in § 450.101(c)(2). The use of ELOS and "agreed to by the Administrator" for § 450.101(c) is discussed in more detail in the preamble section addressing CEC. iv. Time frames
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to allow an operator to propose different time frames for certain regulatory sections if "agreed to by the Administrator". Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX disagreed with this approach and requested that the FAA remove any requirement to submit such a request in a specific time frame other than as soon as the operator understands that a different time frame is necessary. Virgin Galactic recommended that alternate time frames should be spelled out within an operator's license application documents and suggested alternative regulatory text.
The FAA disagrees with the approach to remove specific time frames because the time frames are designed to ensure the FAA has sufficient time to conduct its review and make the requisite public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy findings. The FAA notes that the time frames proposed in the NPRM and adopted in the final rule are default time frames. An applicant can propose and the FAA can accept an alternative time frame. The FAA expects alternative time frames to be proposed and accepted during pre-application consultation or during the application process so that the agreed to time frames are then reflected in the license once issued. Time frames can be adjusted after a license is issued through the license modification process, as opposed to the waiver process under the current regulations. However, in most cases, the FAA expects flexible time frames to be negotiated for all the launches or reentries under the license prior to the first licensed activity. v. Level of Rigor Based on Experience
An individual commenter stated startup launch operators should not operate under the same regimen as experienced operators. This individual stated that startup operators should be subject to strict and precise regulations. Similarly, another individual expressed concern that the proposed rule would apply performance-based requirements to launch vehicles with no prior launch history. SpinLaunch, Inc. (SpinLaunch) commented that the correct regulatory framework should consist of an applicant's demonstrating the necessary skills and knowledge to perform safe and accepted operations.
The FAA disagrees that startup launch operators should operate under a different regulatory regime than experienced operators, and that performance-based requirements should not apply to launch vehicles with no prior launch history. Performance-based requirements provide flexibility to all operators. Means of compliance located in ACs and other standards that have been identified as accepted means of compliance to part 450 provide detailed guidance to those new operators that have not yet established safety processes and procedures. In response to SpinLaunch's comment, the final rule is structured such that an applicant must demonstrate to the FAA the necessary skills and knowledge to perform safe operations in its launch or reentry license application. 2. Part 450 Subpart A--General Discussion a. Pre-Application Consultation
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to retain the requirement for pre-application consultation from § 413.5 (Pre-Application Consultation) because the various flexibilities proposed in this rule would benefit from pre-application discussions. These include incremental review, timelines, and the performance-based nature of the regulatory requirements. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the proposal with no changes to the existing pre-application consultation provision.
As proposed, this rule retains pre-application consultation for vehicle operators seeking a license. The FAA will also publish a pre-application consultation Advisory Circular, which will provide additional guidance but will not establish new regulatory requirements. Pre-application consultation will continue to focus on compliance planning and ensuring the applicant can prepare an acceptable application, which will increase the efficiency of the licensing process. The length of pre-application consultation will vary based on the proposed operation. For example, pre-application consultations may be longer when involving new launch vehicles that are under development or with operators inexperienced with FAA's regulations. Alternatively, pre-application consultations with operators who demonstrate knowledge of FAA regulations and/or use proven vehicles from established sites should be considerably shorter. The FAA expects to discuss the following topics with an applicant during pre-application consultation, to the extent they are relevant to the applicant's proposed operation: Entrance and exit criteria for pre-application consultation, the intended means of compliance to meet the regulatory requirements in part 450, the scope of the license, safety element approvals, incremental review, review period for license evaluation, compliance expectations, and time frames an operator is required to meet to satisfy part 450. Some of the topics allow for flexibility that can result in a more efficient licensing process for both the applicant and the FAA.
The FAA will continue to consider the following factors to determine if a prospective applicant is ready to begin pre-application consultation: Whether the concept of operations is realistic and whether the prospective applicant is able to provide a program schedule that includes definition of significant milestones and a funding source or sources. The regulatory requirements for a launch and reentry license are the same for all applicants; however, FAA expects it will take longer for less experienced operators to meet all of the requirements. As currently required, to exit pre-application consultation and begin the license evaluation period, an application must be complete enough in accordance with § 413.11 (Acceptance of an application). A complete enough application must include enough information for the FAA to start its review. The FAA will screen an application in its entirety or in modules to determine whether it is complete enough for the FAA to start its review. The components of a vehicle operator license application are listed in § 450.31 (General) and include a policy review, a payload review, a safety review that complies with Subpart C, an environmental review, and information necessary to satisfy the maximum probable loss analysis required by part 440.
For the five sections listed in § 450.35(a), an applicant must use a means of compliance that has been accepted by the Administrator prior to application acceptance. An applicant may propose another standard or a unique means of compliance for these five sections before submitting its application.\20\ Furthermore, many requirements throughout the final rule allow an operator to use an alternative method if that method has been agreed to by the Administrator. This allowance maximizes flexibility and will reduce the need for the applicant and the FAA to use process waivers. During pre-application consultation, the FAA anticipates that applicants will discuss the means of compliance they plan to use for the remaining sections of the rule, and any alternative means they plan to use for those sections that allow alternative means of compliance. While the FAA anticipates that this pre-application consultation will expedite license review times and aid both FAA and applicant, it is only required for the sections listed in § 450.35(a).
\20\ Further discussion on this topic is in the preamble section for performance-based regulations and means of compliance.
The final rule has built-in flexibilities for determining the beginning and end of launch such that the launch is scoped to an individual operator's unique circumstances. It is important that the applicant and the FAA come to a mutual understanding during pre-application consultation about the beginning and end of launch for the license. The beginning and end points of a launch operation define the extent of a number of requirements, including, but not limited to, indemnification and FAA oversight. Therefore, an applicant should define the beginning and end of its operation during pre-application consultation, and should coordinate with the FAA before finalizing and submitting its application.\21\ In this way, the applicant can ensure that the FAA will evaluate the complete scope of its proposed operation.
\21\ A discussion on what constitutes beginning and end of launch is in the preamble section discussing scope of launch.
If an applicant is planning to seek a safety element approval, the applicant must continue to consult with the FAA before submitting its application in accordance with § 414.9 (Pre-Application Consultation). Doing so will help ensure that the FAA and the applicant have a thorough understanding of how the applicant will comply with the regulatory requirements surrounding a safety element approval before submitting an application. During pre-application consultation, the FAA would expect an applicant to be able to discuss, at a minimum, the following information as outlined in § 414.15: (1) How the applicant will meet the applicable requirements of part 450; (2) the information required in § 414.13(b)(3), (c)(2), and (c)(3); and (3) the sections of the license application that support the application for a safety element approval.
If an applicant is proposing an incremental review of its application, the applicant must have its approach approved by the FAA prior to submitting its application, in accordance with § 450.33 (Incremental Review and Determinations). Incremental review is intended primarily to give additional flexibility to the applicant, by allowing the applicant to separate the safety review into sections so that those sections can be approved independently. In many ways, the incremental review process is similar to the independent payload review or a safety element approval process because it allows the applicant to comply with the safety approval portion of the regulation in modules or sections rather than all at once. An applicant considering the use of the incremental review process should indicate to the FAA during pre-application consultation which portions of its application will be evaluated under the incremental review process. See the Incremental Review section of this preamble for further discussion.
Finally, part 450 allows an operator to propose alternative time frames for certain requirements, which are listed in Appendix A to part 404. If an operator knows in advance of application submittal that it will propose an alternative time frame, the applicant should raise this proposal during pre-application consultation. The FAA would also be able to discuss during pre-application consultation the FAA's expected review period to make its determination on the proposed alternative time frame. Flexible time frames are discussed at length later in this preamble.
The FAA received several comments on the pre-application consultation process. An individual commenter stated that pre-application consultation may not provide substantial benefits for an existing program and suggested allowing the FAA to request a pre-application consultation process with a 30-day completion timeline for any "material changes" to existing programs deemed as posing a significant risk to the safety of the vehicle. The commenter also suggested the FAA could request this process at least 60 days before the integration of the launch vehicle. The commenter stated that past performance of space flights and aircraft should be taken into consideration for the level of rigor for the pre-application process.
The FAA will not attach a schedule to pre-application consultation but agrees with the commenter that a material change can be discussed as part of pre-application consultation. The FAA acknowledges that pre-application consultation should be minimal for experienced operators using proven vehicles from established sites. This type of abbreviated consultation period for experienced operators would be consistent with the pre-application process prior to issuance of this final rule. The FAA disagrees with a 30-day completion timeline for pre-application consultation for any material change to existing programs. The FAA also disagrees with the suggestion that the FAA request pre-application consultation at least 60 days before integration of the launch vehicle or that pre-application consultation be tied to the flight safety risk of the vehicle. These timelines and criteria may be inadequate in some cases to prepare a complete application properly; in others, they might result in unnecessary delays in addressing and implementing critical safety changes. In addition, the FAA will not tie pre-application consultation to risk to the vehicle because the FAA does not oversee risk to the vehicle but rather risk to the public.
Sierra Nevada noted that operators could work with the FAA to develop a program schedule and define anticipated data submissions during pre-application consultation. Sierra Nevada noted that this use of the consultation process was not specifically codified in the proposed regulations and recommended including it expressly in an AC.
The FAA agrees and will include guidance on application scheduling and data submissions in the pre-application consultation AC. The FAA considered including more robust requirements for pre-application consultation in the final rule, however, the FAA concluded that the current regulation both prepares the applicant to submit a complete application and the FAA to accept it, while also providing flexibility to the applicant to approach pre-application consultation in a manner that best fits the proposed operation. b. Application Process
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to clarify in § 413.1 (Scope of this Part) that the term "application" means either an application in its entirety or a portion of an application for incremental review. In § 413.21 (Denial of a License or Permit Application), the FAA proposed to remove "license" from paragraph (c) so the regulation applied to both license and permit applications. In part 414 (Safety Element Approvals), the FAA proposed to change the term "sufficiently complete" to "complete enough," as used in § 413.11 (Acceptance of an Application), because the two terms both described the point at which the FAA determined it had sufficient information to accept an application and begin its evaluation. Finally, the FAA proposed to amend § 413.7 (Application Submission) paragraph (a)(3) to allow an applicant the option to submit its application by email as a link to a secure server and remove the requirement that an application be in a format that cannot be altered. In the final rule, the FAA adopts these changes as proposed.
A joint set of comments submitted by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA expressed support for the proposal to allow the submission of an application using physical electronic storage.
In addition, the FAA received suggested changes to the generic application process. The American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) and the Denver International Airport commented on the need for further engagement with stakeholders during an operator's application process. These commenters said the FAA should provide an opportunity for affected stakeholders to provide input on an operator's application regarding issues such as impacts to the National Airspace System (NAS). Denver International Airport stated that stakeholders should be able to submit comments on license applications.
The FAA does not agree that an application should be open to a public input process. The FAA issues a license based on whether the applicant's proposal will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The FAA coordinates with government or private entities as necessary to make this determination. A broad public input process outside the environmental review process is unnecessary for the FAA to make its licensing determination. While commenters may seek the opportunity to raise issues such as non-safety impacts to the NAS or the economic impact to land adjacent to a launch, the FAA cannot consider such issues in the licensing determination.
The NPRM specifically sought comments on how the FAA could standardize and better implement the "complete enough" application standard. Sierra Nevada inquired whether the FAA will still conduct a complete enough review. Sierra Nevada concurred with the FAA's approach in conducting complete enough reviews but commented that the FAA should specify a timeline for these reviews. SpaceX commented that the FAA should aim to conduct its complete enough review within ten days of receipt of submission and apply that standard to submissions for continuing accuracy, renewals, and modifications. Furthermore, Sierra Nevada asserted that the review should be included in the FAA's statutory 180-day review period or a new, defined timeline. CSF and SpaceX recommended that the complete enough standard in current § 413.11 be expanded to apply to any application submission, including the initial license application, continuing accuracy submissions, and modification submissions. CSF and SpaceX suggested regulatory text changes to § 413.11 to this end. Both commenters also requested the FAA issue an AC that that explains how the agency makes the complete enough determination, including a checklist comprising regulatory sections that require submissions. Virgin Galactic recommended that what constitutes "complete enough" be agreed upon by both the applicant and the FAA during the pre-application consultation phase and provided several changes to the regulatory text.
The FAA will continue to use the complete enough standard to determine whether a license is sufficiently complete to begin review. The FAA endeavors to make these determinations within 14 calendar days of receiving an application. Limiting the FAA to ten days, as suggested by SpaceX, may not provide adequate time for review. The FAA begins the calculation of the 180-day statutory review period on the date that it receives the information needed to make the application complete enough, regardless of how long it takes to make that determination. The FAA does not base this calculation on the date it determines that the application is complete enough. The complete enough standard applies to any submission, including those for license modifications for consistency. The FAA has applied this standard to submissions for license modifications and, when necessary, requested additional information and clarifications to allow it to proceed with its evaluation. Section 450.211(c) states that an application to modify a license must be prepared and submitted in accordance with part 413.
Therefore, § 413.11 is applicable to an initial license application submission and license modification submissions and does not need to be modified to apply to any application submission. The FAA will work closely with applicants on a case-by-case basis to determine what changes may be made without invalidating the license. In accordance with § 450.211(c), the licensee must apply to the FAA for modification of the license once a license has been issued, except for the allowable changes identified by the FAA. An operator may propose an alternate method from part 413 to request a license modification. This alternate method could include an agreed-upon submittal schedule and FAA review period.
It should be noted that § 450.211 (Continuing Accuracy of License Application; Application for Modification of License) also covers license modification submissions related to continuing accuracy. The FAA will provide an AC that includes application checklists that an applicant can choose to use to help guide application submittal. However, additional information may be needed depending on the type of operation.
In response to Virgin Galactic's comments, the FAA agrees that dialogue as to what constitutes "complete enough" can be part of the pre-application consultation, but disagrees that any change in the regulatory text is required. One of the primary purposes of pre-application consultation is to provide the applicant guidance in preparing its license application. Although the FAA determines when an application is complete enough to begin its review, the FAA expects to develop collaboratively agreed upon criteria with an applicant for determining "complete enough" during pre-application consultation. By allowing applicants and the FAA to negotiate criteria for "complete-enough" during pre-application, the FAA anticipates applicants will be able to more predictably track their progress toward completing the application.
CSF and SpaceX also suggested that the FAA provide a substantive response to submittals within 30 days of receiving the application. CSF also suggested the FAA provide status updates to an applicant every two weeks.
The FAA already typically provides written response to submittals within 30 days, often much sooner. In some instances, however, the FAA requires more than 30 days to draft a response, especially for highly technical analyses. The FAA also provides a substantive response to an applicant in writing whenever additional information is required and, therefore, does not see a compelling rationale for a requirement to provide status updates on a predetermined schedule. However, FAA recognizes the concerns expressed by operators regarding extended delays between communications in certain circumstances. While the FAA does not believe establishing a specific time period for communication to applicants is a necessary component of its regulatory framework, it also recognizes the need for applicants to stay informed and anticipates communicating with applicants throughout the application process, including procedural changes to ensure applicants will be provided a status update within 14 days of receipt of an application. c. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses (§ 450.1(b))
In the NPRM, under proposed § 450.1(b) and subject to two exceptions, the FAA would permit an operator to conduct a launch or reentry pursuant to a license issued by the FAA under parts 415,\22\ 431, and 435 before the effective date of the new part 450 or an application accepted by the FAA before the effective date of part 450. Even though the operator could continue to conduct operations under the regulations in effect at the time of license or application as referenced above, the proposed requirements under Sec. § 450.169 for collision avoidance analysis (COLA) and 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) for critical asset protection would apply to all operators subject to the FAA's authority under 51 U.S.C. chapter 509 conducting launches after the effective date of the new regulations. The FAA would determine the applicability of part 450 to an application for a license modification submitted after the effective date of the part on a case-by-case basis based on the extent and complexity of the modification, whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts of the application, or if the application requires significant reevaluation.
\22\ The FAA notes that an operator operating under a license issued under part 415 would also be subject to the requirements of part 417.
The FAA adopts § 450.1 (Applicability) with revisions. The FAA does not adopt § 450.1(b) as proposed in the NPRM. While the FAA adopts the concept as proposed in § 450.1(b) in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, it also makes corresponding changes to Sec. § 413.23 and 415.3 to limit the duration of all licenses issued or renewed to no more than five years after the effective date of part 450. The FAA refers to these licenses as "legacy licenses" throughout this preamble. After that time, all operators must come into compliance with the new regulations. In the final rule, the FAA makes numerous revisions to certain regulations that apply to operators conducting operations under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. These revisions include amending § 401.5 title to read "Definitions as Applied to Parts 415, 417, 431, 435," adding new § 401.7 for definitions, updating § 413.1, and amending parts 415, 417, 431, 435, 440, and 460 to reference compliance with part 450.
The FAA notes that certain definitions in § 401.5 apply to parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. Therefore, because the FAA will allow operators that hold an approved license at the time this rule goes into effect, or an accepted license application within 90 days after the effective date of the final rule, to operate under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 for up to five years, this rule preserves § 401.5 without change. Section 401.5 will be removed five years after the effective date of the final rule.
The FAA adds § 401.7, which contains the definitions that apply to Chapter III other than parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, and which broadly captures those changes proposed in § 401.5 in the NPRM. The FAA notes that parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 and § 401.5 will be removed five years after the effective date of the final rule.
Part 413 explains how to apply for a license or experimental permit. In the final rule, the FAA amends the table in § 413.1(b) to identify that the requirements in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 apply only to applicants whose launch or reentry license has been approved or license application has been accepted by the FAA no later than 90 days after the effective date of the final rule. As previously mentioned, operators holding an approved launch or reentry license, or who have an accepted launch or reentry license application may choose to continue to operate under parts 415 and 417, part 431, and part 435, until five years after the effective date of this rule. The FAA also adds "Launch and Reentry License Requirements" as a subject in the table in § 413.1(b). Finally, the FAA adopts the provision that the FAA may grant a request to renew a license issued under parts 415, 417, 431 or with a non-standard duration in proposed § 450.1(b) and re-designates it as § 413.23(a)(2) in the final rule. Specifically, the FAA may grant a request to renew a under parts 415, 431, and 435 with a non-standard duration so as not to exceed five years after the effective date of this rulemaking. The FAA adds an applicability section to parts 415, 431, and 435. These parts apply to such licenses issued before the effective date of the final rule and licenses issued on or after the effective date of the final rule if the FAA accepted the application under § 413.11 no later than 90 days after the effective date. All operators must comply with the COLA and critical asset protection requirements in part 450.
In the final rule, the FAA adds the phrase "pursuant to a license issued under part 415 of this chapter" to the scope in § 417.1(a). The FAA also removes § 417.1(e), which addresses grandfathering that is no longer used from when part 417 was first established. For the same reason, the FAA also removes the grandfathering reference to paragraph (e) in § 417.1(f). As a result of this amendment, the FAA re-designates § 417.1(f) and (g) as § 417.1(e) and (f) in the final rule.
The FAA further revises Sec. § 417.11 and 431.73 in the final rule. The FAA adds a paragraph stating that the Administrator may determine that a modification to a license issued under these parts must comply with the requirements in part 450. The Administrator will base the determination on the extent and complexity of the modification, whether the applicant proposes to modify multiple parts of the application, or if the application requires significant evaluation.
The FAA revises § 440.3, which addresses definitions. In the final rule, § 440.3 references the definitions contained in Sec. § 401.5 and 401.7. The reference to § 401.5 will be removed from § 440.3 five years after the effective date of the final rule.
Finally, the FAA revises § 460.45 to identify which mishap definitions an operator should apply in the description of the safety record of the vehicle to each space flight participant. Specifically, § 460.45(d)(1) addresses licenses issued under part 450. For these licenses, the operator's safety record must cover events that meet paragraphs (1), (4), (5), and (8) of the definition of a "mishap" in § 401.7 that occurred during and after vehicle verification performed in accordance with § 460.17. Section 460.45(d)(2) addresses licenses issued under parts 415, 431, or 435. For these licenses, the operator's safety record must cover launch and reentry accidents and human space flight incidents as defined by § 401.5. Section 460.45(d)(1) will be re-designated to Sec. § 460.45(d) and 460.45(d)(2) will be removed from § 460.45 five years after the effective date of the final rule.
Several commenters asked for clarity on the FAA's approach in § 450.1(b) to legacy licenses issued under the current regulations. CSF objected to requiring renewals of licenses issued under the current regulations to meet the requirements of proposed part 450, as this would result in significant cost and regulatory burdens for the operator and the FAA.
As previously noted, the FAA does not adopt § 450.1(b) in the final rule. However, the FAA implements the concept as proposed in § 450.1(b) in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. In the final rule, the FAA establishes a five-year period after the effective date of this rule. Operators holding either an active license or an accepted license application no later than 90 days after the effective date of this rule may operate under the applicable regulatory provisions upon which the licensing determination was made. In addition, these operators may submit requests for license renewals within that five-year period and will be required to comply with the regulations under which the license determination was made.\23\ The FAA has revised Sec. § 413.23 and 415.3 to reflect that no license issued under parts 415, 431 or 435 will be renewed with an expiration date that extends beyond the five-year period. As such, applications for renewal submitted near the end of the five-year period will be valid only for a short time. All operators will need to comply with this rule in its entirety five years after its effective date.
\23\ As noted, all operators are also required to comply with the critical assets and COLA provisions of part 450 beginning from the effective date of this rule.
CSF noted that operators under current parts 431 and 435 would need to come into compliance with the proposed part 450. Similarly, Virgin Galactic requested that FAA allow currently licensed operators to be grandfathered into part 450 for vehicles that cannot meet certain part 450 requirements as long as the current public safety requirements are met. Virgin Galactic stated that, unlike ELV operators, RLV operators use their vehicles repeatedly, and the FAA has not shown why it is necessary for current operators to undergo new analyses and possible design changes. Virgin Galactic noted that the FAA's aviation regulations allow for "true" grandfathering. Virgin Galactic commented that if the FAA chooses not to allow for "true" grandfathering, it should work with each licensee during pre-application consultation to determine applicability of the new rule to modifications to current licenses.
The FAA notes that as the final rule is more performance-based than the rule as proposed in the NPRM, many of the current requirements would serve as a means of compliance to meet the new regulations. The FAA anticipates that there would be few, if any, additional requirements that will not be fulfilled by previously submitted information. The FAA will not allow operating under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 indefinitely because the current rule is more streamlined, performance-based, and up-to-date than the previous regulations. Therefore, the FAA will require all operators to come into compliance with the new rule five years after the effective date. The FAA will consult with existing licensees shortly after the final rule is published to assist operators with the transition to part 450 so they may take advantage of the significant number of new flexibilities.
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