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Final Rule Current Issued Jul 7, 2011 7 pages Copy saved Nov 17, 2026

76 FR 39763 Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Interaction of Systems and Structures, Electronic Flight Control System-Control Surface Awareness, High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection, Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage, and Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

These amended special conditions are issued to the Boeing

Official source ↗ Official PDF ↗

and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM362; Special Conditions No. 25-354A-SC]

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Interaction of

Systems and Structures, Electronic Flight Control System-Control

Surface Awareness, High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection,

Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage, and Design Roll

Maneuver Requirement

Agency

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Amended special conditions

SUMMARY: These amended special conditions are issued to the Boeing

Model 787-8 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design

features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the

airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These design

airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These design

features include limit engine torque loads for sudden engine stoppage.

Special Conditions No. 25-354-SC was issued on July 18, 2007,

addressing, in part, this condition. We have determined that more

clarification is needed on the limit engine torque loads for sudden

engine stoppage special conditions, and have therefore added a new

engine stoppage special conditions, and have therefore added a new

requirement. This additional requirement has been applied, via special

conditions, to other programs. Since applicable airworthiness

regulations, including those contained in Special Conditions No. 25-

354-SC, do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for

this particular design feature, these amended special conditions

this particular design feature, these amended special conditions

contain the additional safety standards which the Administrator finds

necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established

by the existing standards.

DATES: Effective Date: August 8, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Martin, FAA, Airframe and Cabin

Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft

Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-

3356, telephone (425-227-1178; facsimile (425-227-1320).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for

its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787-8

its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787-8

airplane will be an all-new, two-engine jet transport airplane with a

two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000 pounds,

with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers. Special Conditions

No. 25-354-SC was issued on July 17, 2007, to address interaction of

systems and structures, electronic flight control system control

systems and structures, electronic flight control system control

surface awareness, HIRF protection, limit engine torque loads for

sudden engine stoppage, and design roll maneuver requirements. Since

then, it was determined more clarification was needed on the limit

engine torque loads for sudden engine stoppage special conditions.

Discussion

Discussion

The limit engine torque loads for sudden engine stoppage special

conditions, issued as part of Special Conditions No. 25-354-SC,

distinguishes between the more common, less severe engine failure

events, and those rare events resulting from structural failures.

Paragraph (a) defines limit load conditions for the less severe events,

and paragraph (c) defines the ultimate load conditions for the more

and paragraph (c) defines the ultimate load conditions for the more

severe structural failure events.

Compliance with paragraph (a) includes, by definition, assessment

of deformation at limit load, as well as assessment of structural

integrity at ultimate load. However, since paragraph (c) is defined as

an ultimate load condition, it only requires assessment of structural

an ultimate load condition, it only requires assessment of structural

integrity at ultimate load, and does not require assessment of

deformation.

New paragraph (e), therefore, is added to the special condition to

require assessment of deformation for the structural failures defined

require assessment of deformation for the structural failures defined

in paragraph (c).

Type Certification Basis

Under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 21.17,

Boeing must show that Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes (hereafter referred

to as "the 787") meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as

amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-117, except Sec. § 25.809(a)

and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25-115. If the Administrator

and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25-115. If the Administrator

finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain

adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 787 because of a novel

or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under

provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.

or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness

regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or

appropriate safety standards for the Boeing Model 787-8 because of a

novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed

under the provisions of § 21.16.

novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which

they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended

later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar

novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also

apply to the other model under § 21.101.

novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special

conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements

of part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory

adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the "Noise

adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the "Noise

Control Act of 1972."

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, under

§ 11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under

§ 21.17(a)(2).

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which

they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended

they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended

later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar

novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also

apply to the other model under § 21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The 787 will incorporate a number of novel or unusual design

features. Because of rapid improvements in airplane technology, the

applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or

appropriate safety standards for these design features. These special

conditions for the 787 contain the additional safety standards that the

Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety

Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety

equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Most of these special conditions are identical or nearly identical

to those previously required for type certification of the Model 777

series airplanes.

to those previously required for type certification of the Model 777

Most of these special conditions were derived initially from

standardized requirements developed by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory

Committee (ARAC), comprised of representatives of the FAA, Europe's

Joint Aviation Authorities (now replaced by the European Aviation

Safety Agency), and industry. In the case of some of these

requirements, a draft notice of proposed rulemaking has been prepared

requirements, a draft notice of proposed rulemaking has been prepared

but no final rule has yet been promulgated.

Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or

unusual design features of the 787 in the near future.

1. Interaction of Systems and Structures

The 787 is equipped with systems that affect the airplane's

structural performance, either directly or as a result of failure or

structural performance, either directly or as a result of failure or

malfunction. That is, the airplane's systems affect how it responds in

maneuver and gust conditions, and thereby affect its structural

capability. These systems may also affect the aeroelastic stability of

the airplane. Such systems represent a novel and unusual feature when

compared to the technology envisioned in the current airworthiness

compared to the technology envisioned in the current airworthiness

standards. A special condition is needed to require consideration of

the effects of systems on the structural capability and aeroelastic

stability of the airplane, both in the normal and in the failed state.

This special condition requires that the airplane meet the

structural requirements of subparts C and D of 14 CFR part 25 when the

structural requirements of subparts C and D of 14 CFR part 25 when the

airplane systems are fully operative. The special condition also

requires that the airplane meet these requirements considering failure

conditions. In some cases, reduced margins are allowed for failure

conditions based on system reliability.

2. Electronic Flight Control System: Control Surface Awareness

2. Electronic Flight Control System: Control Surface Awareness

With a response-command type of flight control system and no direct

coupling from cockpit controller to control surface, such as on the

787, the pilot is not aware of the actual surface deflection position

during flight maneuvers. This feature of this design is novel and

unusual when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the

unusual when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the

airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These special

conditions are meant to contain the additional safety standards that

the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety

equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Some unusual flight conditions, arising from atmospheric conditions or

Some unusual flight conditions, arising from atmospheric conditions or

airplane or engine failures or both, may result in full or nearly full

surface deflection. Unless the flightcrew is made aware of excessive

deflection or impending control surface deflection limiting, piloted or

auto-flight system control of the airplane might be inadvertently

auto-flight system control of the airplane might be inadvertently

continued in a way that would cause loss of control or other unsafe

handling or performance situations.

These special conditions require that suitable annunciation be

provided to the flightcrew when a flight condition exists in which

nearly full control surface deflection occurs. Suitability of such an

nearly full control surface deflection occurs. Suitability of such an

annunciation must take into account that some pilot-demanded maneuvers,

such as a rapid roll, are necessarily associated with intended full or

nearly full control surface deflection. Simple alerting systems which

would function in both intended and unexpected control-limiting

would function in both intended and unexpected control-limiting

situations must be properly balanced between providing needed crew

awareness and avoiding nuisance warnings.

3. High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

The 787 will use electrical and electronic systems which perform

critical functions. These systems may be vulnerable to high-intensity

critical functions. These systems may be vulnerable to high-intensity

radiated fields (HIRF) external to the airplane. There is no specific

regulation that addresses requirements for protection of electrical and

electronic systems from HIRF. Increased power levels from radio

frequency transmitters and use of sensitive avionics/electronics and

electrical systems to command and control the airplane have made it

electrical systems to command and control the airplane have made it

necessary to provide adequate protection.

To ensure that a level of safety is achieved that is equivalent to

that intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, special

conditions are needed for the 787. These special conditions require

that avionics/electronics and electrical systems that perform critical

that avionics/electronics and electrical systems that perform critical

functions be designed and installed to preclude component damage and

interruption of function because of HIRF.

High-power radio frequency transmitters for radio, radar,

television, and satellite communications can adversely affect

television, and satellite communications can adversely affect

operations of airplane electrical and electronic systems. Therefore,

immunity of critical avionics/electronics and electrical systems to

HIRF must be established. Based on surveys and analysis of existing

HIRF emitters, adequate protection from HIRF exists if airplane system

immunity is demonstrated when exposed to the HIRF environments in

immunity is demonstrated when exposed to the HIRF environments in

either paragraph (a) OR (b) below:

(a) A minimum environment of 100 volts rms (root-mean-square) per

meter electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

(1) System elements and their associated wiring harnesses must be

exposed to this environment without benefit of airframe shielding.

(2) Demonstration of this level of protection is established

through system tests and analysis.

(b) An environment external to the airframe of the field strengths

shown in the table below for the frequency ranges indicated. Immunity

shown in the table below for the frequency ranges indicated. Immunity

to both peak and average field strength components from the table must

be demonstrated.

Field strength

(volts per meter)

Frequency -------------------

Peak Average

10 kHz-100 kHz … 50 50

100 kHz-500 kHz … 50 50

to both peak and average field strength components from the table must

500 kHz-2 MHz … 50 50

2 MHz-30 MHz … 100 100

30 MHz-70 MHz … 50 50

70 MHz-100 MHz … 50 50

100 MHz-200 MHz … 100 100

200 MHz-400 MHz … 100 100

400 MHz-700 MHz … 700 50

700 MHz-1 GHz … 700 100

1 GHz-2 GHz … 2000 200

2 GHz-4 GHz … 3000 200

4 GHz-6 GHz … 3000 200

6 GHz-8 GHz … 1000 200

8 GHz-12 GHz … 3000 300

12 GHz-18 GHz … 2000 200

18 GHz-40 GHz … 600 200

Field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square

(rms) values over the complete modulation period.

The environment levels identified above are the result of an FAA

review of existing studies on the subject of HIRF and of the work of

review of existing studies on the subject of HIRF and of the work of

the Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group of ARAC.

4. Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage

The 787 will have high-bypass engines with a chord-swept fan 112 inches in diameter. Engines of this size were not envisioned when Sec.

25.361, pertaining to loads imposed by engine seizure, was adopted in

25.361, pertaining to loads imposed by engine seizure, was adopted in

1965. Worst case engine seizure events become increasingly more severe

with increasing engine size because of the higher inertia of the

rotating components.

Section 25.361(b)(1) requires that for turbine engine

installations, the engine mounts and supporting structures must be

installations, the engine mounts and supporting structures must be

designed to withstand a "limit engine torque load imposed by sudden

engine stoppage due to malfunction or structural failure." Limit loads

are expected to occur about once in the lifetime of any airplane.

Section 25.305 requires that supporting structures be able to support

limit loads without detrimental permanent deformation, meaning that

limit loads without detrimental permanent deformation, meaning that

supporting structures should remain serviceable after a limit load

event.

Since adoption of § 25.361(b)(1), the size, configuration, and

failure modes of jet engines have changed considerably. Current engines

are much larger and are designed with large bypass fans. In the event

of a structural failure, these engines are capable of producing much

of a structural failure, these engines are capable of producing much

higher transient loads on the engine mounts and supporting structures.

As a result, modern high bypass engines are subject to certain

rare-but-severe engine seizure events. Service history shows that such

events occur far less frequently than limit load events. Although it is

important for the airplane to be able to support such rare loads safely

important for the airplane to be able to support such rare loads safely

without failure, it is unrealistic to expect that no permanent

deformation will occur.

Given this situation, ARAC has proposed a design standard for

today's large engines. For the commonly-occurring deceleration events,

the proposed standard requires engine mounts and structures to support

the proposed standard requires engine mounts and structures to support

maximum torques without detrimental permanent deformation. For the

rare-but-severe engine seizure events such as loss of any fan,

compressor, or turbine blade, the proposed standard requires engine

mounts and structures to support maximum torques without failure, but

mounts and structures to support maximum torques without failure, but

allows for some deformation in the structure.

The FAA concludes that modern large engines, including those on the

787, are novel and unusual compared to those envisioned when Sec.

25.361(b)(1) was adopted and thus warrant a special condition. This

special condition contains design criteria recommended by ARAC.

5. Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

5. Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

The 787 is equipped with an electronic flight control system that

provides control of the aircraft through pilot inputs to the flight

computer. Current part 25 airworthiness regulations account for

"control laws," for which aileron deflection is proportional to

control stick deflection. They do not address any nonlinearities \2\ or

control stick deflection. They do not address any nonlinearities \2\ or

other effects on aileron actuation that may be caused by electronic

flight controls. Therefore, the FAA considers the flight control system

to be a novel and unusual feature compared to those envisioned when

current regulations were adopted. Since this type of system may affect

current regulations were adopted. Since this type of system may affect

flight loads, and therefore the structural capability of the airplane,

special conditions are needed to address these effects.

\2\ A nonlinearity is a situation where output does not change

in the same proportion as input.

This special condition differs from current requirements in that it

requires that the roll maneuver result from defined movements of the

requires that the roll maneuver result from defined movements of the

cockpit roll control as opposed to defined aileron deflections. Also,

this special condition requires an additional load condition at design

maneuvering speed (VA), in which the cockpit roll control is

returned to neutral following the initial roll input.

maneuvering speed (VA), in which the cockpit roll control is

This special condition differs from similar special conditions

applied to previous designs. This special condition is limited to the

roll axis only, whereas previous special conditions also included pitch

and yaw axes. A special condition is no longer needed for the yaw axis

because § 25.351 was revised at Amendment 25-91 to take into

account effects of an electronic flight control system. No special

account effects of an electronic flight control system. No special

condition is needed for the pitch axis because the applicant's proposed

method for the pitch maneuver takes into account effects of an

electronic flight control system.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the

787. Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type

787. Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type

certificate to include another model on the same type certificate

incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special

conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features

of the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane. It is not a rule of general

of the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane. It is not a rule of general

applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Amended Special Conditions

The Amended Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuance to the authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the following amended special conditions (which adds

paragraph (e) to Special Condition No. 4) are issued as part of the

type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane regarding

type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane regarding

limit engine torque loads for sudden engine stoppage.

1. Interaction of Systems and Structures

The Boeing Model 787-8 airplane is equipped with systems which

affect the airplane's structural performance either directly or as a

result of failure or malfunction. The influence of these systems and

their failure conditions must be taken into account when showing

their failure conditions must be taken into account when showing

compliance with requirements of subparts C and D of part 25 of Title 14

of the Code of Federal Regulations. The following criteria must be used

for showing compliance with this special condition for airplanes

equipped with flight control systems, autopilots, stability

augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control

augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control

systems, fuel management systems, and other systems that either

directly or as a result of failure or malfunction affect structural

performance. If this special condition is used for other systems, it

may be necessary to adapt the criteria to the specific system.

performance. If this special condition is used for other systems, it

(a) The criteria defined here address only direct structural

consequences of system responses and performances. They cannot be

considered in isolation but should be included in the overall safety

evaluation of the airplane. They may in some instances duplicate

standards already established for this evaluation. These criteria are

only applicable to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe

only applicable to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe

flight and landing. Specific criteria defining acceptable limits on

handling characteristics or stability requirements when operating in

the system degraded or inoperative mode are not provided in this

special condition.

the system degraded or inoperative mode are not provided in this

(b) Depending on the specific characteristics of the airplane,

additional studies may be required that go beyond the criteria provided

in this special condition in order to demonstrate capability of the

airplane to meet other realistic conditions such as alternative gust conditions or maneuvers for an airplane equipped with

airplane to meet other realistic conditions such as alternative gust conditions or maneuvers for an airplane equipped with

a load alleviation system.

(c) The following definitions are applicable to this special

condition.

(1) Structural performance: Capability of the airplane to meet the

structural requirements of part 25.

(2) Flight limitations: Limitations that can be applied to the

airplane flight conditions following an in-flight failure occurrence

and that are included in the flight manual (speed limitations or

and that are included in the flight manual (speed limitations or

avoidance of severe weather conditions, for example).

(3) Operational limitations: Limitations, including flight

limitations, that can be applied to the airplane operating conditions

before dispatch (fuel, payload, and master minimum equipment list

before dispatch (fuel, payload, and master minimum equipment list

limitations, for example).

(4) Probabilistic terms: Terms (probable, improbable, extremely

improbable) used in this special condition which are the same as those

probabilistic terms used in § 25.1309.

(5) Failure condition: Term that is the same as that used in Sec.

25.1309. The term failure condition in this special condition, however,

applies only to system failure conditions that affect structural

applies only to system failure conditions that affect structural

performance of the airplane. Examples are system failure conditions

that induce loads, change the response of the airplane to inputs such

as gusts or pilot actions, or lower flutter margins.

Note: Although failure annunciation system reliability must be

included in probability calculations for paragraph (f) of this

included in probability calculations for paragraph (f) of this

special condition, there is no specific reliability requirement for

the annunciation system required in paragraph (g) of the special

condition.

(d) General. The following criteria will be used in determining the

influence of a system and its failure conditions on the airplane

influence of a system and its failure conditions on the airplane

structure.

(e) System fully operative. With the system fully operative, the

following apply:

(1) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating

configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in

subpart C of 14 CFR part 25 (or used in lieu of those specified in

subpart C), taking into account any special behavior of such a system

subpart C), taking into account any special behavior of such a system

or associated functions or any effect on the structural performance of

the airplane that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any

significant degree of nonlinearity in rate of displacement of control

surface or thresholds, or any other system nonlinearities, must be

surface or thresholds, or any other system nonlinearities, must be

accounted for in a realistic or conservative way when deriving limit

loads from limit conditions.

(2) The airplane must meet the strength requirements of part 25 for

static strength and residual strength, using the specified factors to

derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of

derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of

nonlinearities must be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure

the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the behavior

below limit conditions. However, conditions beyond limit conditions

need not be considered if the applicant demonstrates that the airplane

need not be considered if the applicant demonstrates that the airplane

has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit

conditions.

(3) The airplane must meet the aeroelastic stability requirements

of § 25.629.

(f) System in the failure condition. For any system failure

has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit

condition not shown to be extremely improbable, the following apply:

(1) Establishing loads at the time of failure. Starting from 1-g

level flight conditions, a realistic scenario, including pilot

corrective actions, must be established to determine loads occurring at

the time of failure and immediately after failure.

corrective actions, must be established to determine loads occurring at

(i) For static strength substantiation, these loads, multiplied by

an appropriate factor of safety related to probability of occurrence of

the failure, are ultimate loads to be considered for design. The factor

of safety (FS) is defined in Figure 1.

(ii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be

able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in

able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in

subparagraph (f)(1)(i) of these special conditions. For pressurized

cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating

differential pressure.

(iii) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the

speeds defined in § 25.629(b)(2). For failure conditions that

speeds defined in § 25.629(b)(2). For failure conditions that

result in speeds beyond design cruise speed or design cruise mach

number (VC/MC), freedom from aeroelastic

instability must be shown to increased speeds, so that the margins

intended by § 25.629(b)(2) are maintained.

(iv) Failures of the system that result in forced structural

vibrations (oscillatory failures) must not produce loads that could

vibrations (oscillatory failures) must not produce loads that could

result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.

(2) Establishing loads in the system failed state for the

continuation of the flight. For the continuation of flight of the

airplane in the system failed state and considering any appropriate

airplane in the system failed state and considering any appropriate

reconfiguration and flight limitations, the following apply:

(i) Loads derived from the following conditions (or used in lieu of

the following conditions) at speeds up to VC/MC,

or the speed limitation prescribed for the remainder of the flight, must be determined:

(A) The limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in Sec.

25.331 and § 25.345.

(B) The limit gust and turbulence conditions specified in Sec.

25.341 and § 25.345.

(C) The limit rolling conditions specified in § 25.349 and the

limit unsymmetrical conditions specified in § 25.367 and Sec.

25.427(b) and (c).

(D) The limit yaw maneuvering conditions specified in § 25.351.

(E) The limit ground loading conditions specified in § 25.473

and § 25.491.

(ii) For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure

must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this

must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this

special condition multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the

probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety is

defined in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Factor of Safety for Continuation of Flight

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) where:

Tj = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

Tj = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Note: If Pj is greater than 10-\3\ per flight hour

then a 1.5 factor of safety must be applied to all limit load

conditions specified in subpart C-Structure, of 14 CFR part 25.

then a 1.5 factor of safety must be applied to all limit load

(iii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be

able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph

(f)(2)(ii) of this special condition. For pressurized cabins, these

loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.

(iv) If the loads induced by the failure condition have a

significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance then the effects of

significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance then the effects of

these loads must be taken into account.

(v) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to a

speed determined from Figure 3. Flutter clearance speeds V' and V" may

be based on the speed limitation specified for the remainder of the

be based on the speed limitation specified for the remainder of the

flight using the margins defined by § 25.629(b).

Figure 3

Clearance Speed

V' = Clearance speed as defined by § 25.629(b)(2).

V" = Clearance speed as defined by § 25.629(b)(1).

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) where:

Tj = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Note: If Pj is greater than 10-\3\ per flight hour,

then the flutter clearance speed must not be less than V'.

(vi) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must also be shown up to

V' in Figure 3 above, for any probable system failure condition

combined with any damage required or selected for investigation by

combined with any damage required or selected for investigation by

§ 25.571(b).

(3) Consideration of certain failure conditions may be required by

other sections of 14 CFR part 25 regardless of calculated system

reliability. Where analysis shows the probability of these failure

conditions to be less than 10-\9\, criteria other than those

specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation

specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation

to show continued safe flight and landing.

(g) Failure indications. For system failure detection and

indication, the following apply.

(1) The system must be checked for failure conditions, not

extremely improbable, that degrade the structural capability of the

airplane below the level required by part 25 or significantly reduce

the reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably

the reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably

practicable, the flightcrew must be made aware of these failures before

flight. Certain elements of the control system, such as mechanical and

hydraulic components, may use special periodic inspections, and

electronic components may use daily checks, instead of detection and

indication systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. Such

indication systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. Such

certification maintenance inspections or daily checks must be limited

to components on which faults are not readily detectable by normal

detection and indication systems and where service history shows that

inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.

detection and indication systems and where service history shows that

(2) The existence of any failure condition, not extremely

improbable, during flight that could significantly affect the

structural capability of the airplane and for which the associated

reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by suitable flight

limitations, must be signaled to the flightcrew. For example, failure

conditions that result in a factor of safety between the airplane

conditions that result in a factor of safety between the airplane

strength and the loads of subpart C below 1.25, or flutter margins

below V", must be signaled to the crew during flight.

(h) Dispatch with known failure conditions. If the airplane is to

be dispatched in a known system failure condition that affects

structural performance, or affects the reliability of the remaining

structural performance, or affects the reliability of the remaining

system to maintain structural performance, then the provisions of this

special condition must be met, including the provisions of paragraph

(e) for the dispatched condition, and paragraph (f) for subsequent

failures. Expected operational limitations may be taken into account in

establishing Pj as the probability of failure occurrence for

establishing Pj as the probability of failure occurrence for

determining the safety margin in Figure 1. Flight limitations and

expected operational limitations may be taken into account in

establishing Qj as the combined probability of being in the dispatched

failure condition and the subsequent failure condition for the safety

margins in Figures 2 and 3. These limitations must be such that the

margins in Figures 2 and 3. These limitations must be such that the

probability of being in this combined failure state and then

subsequently encountering limit load conditions is extremely

improbable. No reduction in these safety margins is allowed if the

subsequent system failure rate is greater than 10-\3\ per

subsequent system failure rate is greater than 10-\3\ per

hour.

2. Electronic Flight Control System: Control Surface Awareness

In addition to compliance with Sec. § 25.143, 25.671, and

25.672, the following special condition applies.

(a) The system design must ensure that the flightcrew is made

suitably aware whenever the primary control means nears the limit of

control authority. This indication should direct the pilot to take

control authority. This indication should direct the pilot to take

appropriate action to avoid the unsafe condition in accordance with

appropriate airplane flight manual (AFM) instructions. Depending on the

application, suitable annunciations may include cockpit control

position, annunciator light, or surface position indicators.

application, suitable annunciations may include cockpit control

Furthermore, this requirement applies at limits of control authority,

not necessarily at limits of any individual surface travel.

(b) Suitability of such a display or alerting must take into

account that some pilot-demanded maneuvers are necessarily associated

with intended full performance, which may require full surface

deflection. Therefore, simple alerting systems, which would function in

deflection. Therefore, simple alerting systems, which would function in

both intended or unexpected control-limiting situations, must be

properly balanced between needed crew awareness and nuisance factors. A

monitoring system which might compare airplane motion, surface

deflection, and pilot demand could be useful for eliminating nuisance

deflection, and pilot demand could be useful for eliminating nuisance

alerting.

3. High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

(a) Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-intensity Radiated

Fields. Each electrical and electronic system which performs critical

functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation

and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical

functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to

functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to

high intensity radiated fields external to the airplane.

(b) For the purposes of these Special Conditions, the following

definition applies. Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would

contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent continued

contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent continued

safe flight and landing of the airplane.

4. Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage

In lieu of § 25.361(b) the Boeing Model 787-8 must comply with

the following special condition.

(a) For turbine engine installations, the engine mounts, pylons,

and adjacent supporting airframe structure must be designed to

withstand 1g level flight loads acting simultaneously with the maximum

withstand 1g level flight loads acting simultaneously with the maximum

limit torque loads imposed by each of the following:

(1) Sudden engine deceleration due to a malfunction which could

result in a temporary loss of power or thrust.

(2) The maximum acceleration of the engine.

(b) For auxiliary power unit installations, the power unit mounts

and adjacent supporting airframe structure must be designed to

and adjacent supporting airframe structure must be designed to

withstand 1g level flight loads acting simultaneously with the maximum

limit torque loads imposed by each of the following:

(1) Sudden auxiliary power unit deceleration due to malfunction or

structural failure.

(2) The maximum acceleration of the power unit.

withstand 1g level flight loads acting simultaneously with the maximum

(c) For engine supporting structure, an ultimate loading condition

must be considered that combines 1g flight loads with the transient

dynamic loads resulting from each of the following:

(1) Loss of any fan, compressor, or turbine blade.

(2) Where applicable to a specific engine design, any other engine

must be considered that combines 1g flight loads with the transient

structural failure that results in higher loads.

(d) The ultimate loads developed from the conditions specified in

paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) are to be multiplied by a factor of 1.0

when applied to engine mounts and pylons and multiplied by a factor of

1.25 when applied to adjacent supporting airframe structure.

when applied to engine mounts and pylons and multiplied by a factor of

(e) Any permanent deformation that results from the conditions

specified in paragraph (c) must not prevent continued safe flight and

landing.

5. Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

In lieu of compliance to § 25.349(a), the Boeing Model 787-8

must comply with the following special condition.

5. Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

The following conditions, speeds, and cockpit roll control motions

(except as the motions may be limited by pilot effort) must be

considered in combination with an airplane load factor of zero and of

two-thirds of the positive maneuvering factor used in design. In

determining the resulting control surface deflections, the torsional

determining the resulting control surface deflections, the torsional

flexibility of the wing must be considered in accordance with Sec.

25.301(b):

(a) Conditions corresponding to steady rolling velocities must be

investigated. In addition, conditions corresponding to maximum angular

acceleration must be investigated for airplanes with engines or other

weight concentrations outboard of the fuselage. For the angular

weight concentrations outboard of the fuselage. For the angular

acceleration conditions, zero rolling velocity may be assumed in the

absence of a rational time history investigation of the maneuver.

(b) At VA, sudden movement of the cockpit roll control

up to the limit is assumed. The position of the cockpit roll control

must be maintained until a steady roll rate is achieved and then must

must be maintained until a steady roll rate is achieved and then must

be returned suddenly to the neutral position.

(c) At VC, the cockpit roll control must be moved

suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than that

obtained in paragraph (b).

(d) At VD, the cockpit roll control must be moved

suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than one

suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than one

third of that obtained in paragraph (b).

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 23, 2011.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification

Service, ANM-100.