65 FR 560 Certification of Screening Companies
This document proposes to require that all companies that perform aviation security screening be certificated by the FAA and meet enhanced requirements. This proposal is in response to a recommendation by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and to a Congressional mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. The proposal is intended to improve the screening of passengers, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo and to provide standards for consistent high performance and increased screening company accountability.
This document is proposed. It may have been replaced. Check the official source before relying on it.
Part II
14 CFR Parts 108, 109, 111, 129, and 191
Certification of Screening Companies; Proposed Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Parts 108, 109, 111, 129, and 191
[Docket No. FAA-1999-6673; Notice No. 99-21] RIN 2120-AG84
Certification of Screening Companies
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
Action
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
SUMMARY: This document proposes to require that all companies that perform aviation security screening be certificated by the FAA and meet enhanced requirements. This proposal is in response to a recommendation by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and to a Congressional mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. The proposal is intended to improve the screening of passengers, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo and to provide standards for consistent high performance and increased screening company accountability.
Dates
DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 4, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Comments on this document should be mailed or delivered, in duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, Docket No. FAA-1999-6673, 400 Seventh Street SW., Room Plaza 401, Washington, DC 20590. Comments may be filed and examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except Federal holidays. Comments also may be sent electronically to the Dockets Management System (DMS) at the following Internet address: http://dms.dot.gov/ at any time. Commenters who wish to file comments electronically should follow the instructions on the DMS web site.
For Further Information Contact
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Shrum, Manager, Civil Aviation Security Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning (ACP-100), Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202)267-3946.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
Comments Invited
Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed action by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this document are also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the DOT Rules Docket address specified above.
All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date. All comments received on or before the closing date will be considered by the Administrator before taking action on this proposed rulemaking. Comments filed late will be considered as far as possible without incurring expense or delay. The proposals in this document may be changed in light of the comments received.
Comments received on this proposal will be available both before and after the closing date for comments in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. However, the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security has determined that the security programs required by parts 108, 109, and 129 contain sensitive security information. As such, the availability of information pertaining to these security programs is governed by 14 CFR part 191. Carriers, screening companies, and others who wish to comment on this document should be cautious not to include in their comments any information contained in any security program.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed, stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-6673." The postcard will be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.
To give the public an additional opportunity to comment on the NPRM, the FAA anticipates planning public meetings. If the FAA determines that it is appropriate to hold such meetings, a separate notice announcing the times, locations, and procedures for public meetings will be published in the Federal Register.
Availability of NPRMs
Availability of NPRMs
An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: (703) 321-3339) or the Government Printing Office (GPO)'s electronic bulletin board service (telephone: (202) 512-1661).
Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/ avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm, or the GPO's web page at http:// www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published rulemaking documents.
Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket number of this NPRM.
Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future rulemaking documents should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which describes the application procedure.
Outline of Preamble
Outline of Preamble
I. Introduction
A. Current Requirements. B. History. C. Aviation Security Screening. D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). E. Related Rulemakings.
II. The Proposal: Overview
A. Summary. B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening. C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies. D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues. E. New Part 111. F. Screening of Cargo. G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP). H. Screener Qualifications. I. Performance Measurements and Standards.
III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion
III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion
Subpart A--General
A. 111.1 Applicability. B. 111.3 Definitions. C. 111.5 Inspection authority. D. 111.7 Falsification. E. 111.9 Prohibition against interference with screening personnel.
Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications
Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications
F. 111.101 Performance of screening. G. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security programs. H. 111.109 Screening company certificate. I. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications J. 111.117 Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or indirect air carriers. K. 111.119 Business office.
Subpart C--Operations
Subpart C--Operations
L. 111.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance of cargo. M. 111.203 Use of screening equipment. N. 111.205 Employment standards for screening personnel. O. 111.207 Disclosure of sensitive security information. P. 111.209 Screening company management. Q. 111.211 Screening company instructor qualifications. R. 111.213 Training and knowledge of persons with screening-related duties. S. 111.215 Training tests: requirements. T. 111.217 Training tests: cheating and other unauthorized conduct. U. 111.219 Screener letter of completion of training. V. 111.221 Screener and supervisor training records. W. 111.223 Automated performance measurement and standards.
IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129
IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129
A. 108.201(h); 109.203(a); and 129.25(k) Certification requirement. B. 108.5 and 109.5 Inspection authority. C. 108.103(b); 109.103(b); and 129.25(c) Security program form, content, and availability. D. 109.105 and 129.25(e) Approvals and amendments of security programs. E. 108.201(i), (j), and (k); 109.203(b), (c), and (d); and 129.25(l), (m), and (n) Responsibilities of carriers and screening companies. F. 108.201(l) and 129.25(o) Public notification regarding additional security measures. G. 108.205; 109.207; and 129.26 Use of X-ray systems. H. 108.207 and 129.28 Use of explosives detection systems. I. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p) Monitoring of screener training tests. J. Additional proposed requirements to parts 108, 109, and 129.
V. Proposed Revisions to Part 191
V. Proposed Revisions to Part 191
A. Protection of sensitive security information (SSI). B. 191.1 Applicability and definitions. C. 191.5 Records and information protected by others. D. 191.7 Description of SSI.
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
VII. Compatibility With ICAO Standards
VIII. Regulatory Analyses
VIII. Regulatory Analyses
A. Regulatory evaluation summary. B. Initial regulatory flexibility determination. C. International trade impact statement. D. Unfunded mandates. E. Federalism implications.
I. Introduction
I.A. Current Requirements
The Administrator is required to prescribe regulations to protect passengers and property on aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air transportation against acts of criminal violence or aircraft piracy. Such protections include searches of persons and property that will be carried aboard an aircraft to ensure that they have no unlawful dangerous weapons, explosives, or other destructive substances (49 U.S.C. 44901-44903). Screening of all passengers and property that will be carried in a cabin of an aircraft in air transportation or intrastate air transportation must be done before the aircraft is boarded, using weapon-detecting facilities or procedures used or operated by employees or agents of the air carriers, intrastate air carriers, or foreign air carriers (49 U.S.C. 44901).
I.A. Current Requirements
Part 108 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules in §§ 108.9, 108.17, and 108.20 for air carrier screening operations. These rules, which are available to the general public, provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to be used. In addition, each air carrier required to conduct screening has a nonpublic security program (required under current §§ 108.5 and 108.7) that contains detailed requirements for screening of persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All air carriers subject to part 108 have adopted the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP). The ACSSP provides identical measures for air carriers. Individual air carriers may request alternate procedures in specific situations if the required level of security can be maintained.
Part 109 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), contains rules in § 109.3 for conducting security procedures by indirect air carriers. An indirect air carrier is any person or entity within the United States, not in possession of an FAA air carrier operating certificate, that undertakes to engage indirectly in the air transportation of property, and uses, for all or any part of such transportation, the services of a passenger air carrier. This does not include the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) or its representative while acting on behalf of the USPS. This definition does include freight forwarders and air couriers. Each indirect air carrier has a nonpublic security program (§ 109.5) that contains detailed requirements for screening cargo. All indirect air carriers adopt the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP). The IACSSP provides identical measures for indirect air carriers. IACSSP requirements are essentially the same as the requirements in the ACSSP for screening cargo.
Part 129 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules in §§ 129.25, 129.26, and 129.27 for foreign air carrier screening. Each foreign air carrier conducting screening has a nonpublic security program (§ 129.25) that contains detailed requirements for screening persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All foreign air carriers conducting operations in the United States are subject to part 129 and have adopted the Model Security Program (MSP) for their security programs in the United States. The MSP provides identical measures for foreign air carriers. MSP requirements applicable within the United States are essentially the same as the requirements in the ACSSP.
Throughout this notice, air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers are collectively referred to as "carriers."
There are several means by which a carrier can conduct screening. It can use its own employees. It can contract with another company to conduct the screening in accordance with the carrier's security program. It can contract with another carrier to conduct screening. In each case, the carrier is required to provide oversight to ensure that all FAA requirements are met.
I.B. History
I.B. History
Since 1985, at least 10 major international terrorist incidents involving aviation have occurred worldwide, including the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which killed 243 passengers, 16 crewmembers, and 11 people on the ground. While all of the attacks against U.S. civil aviation in this period have taken place abroad, the link between the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the January 1995 plot to bomb several U.S. airliners in the Far East suggests that civil aviation in the United States may have become a more attractive target for terrorist attacks. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was convicted (along with different sets of co-conspirators) for his roles in both plots as well as for the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight 434 in December 1994. Had Yousef's plot to bomb U.S. airliners succeeded, hundreds if not thousands of passengers would almost certainly have been killed.
These incidents have demonstrated the capabilities and intentions of international terrorists to attack the United States and its citizens as well as the ability of such terrorists to operate in the United States. The threat posed by foreign terrorists in the United States remains a serious concern, and the FAA believes that the threat will continue for the foreseeable future.
The threat of terrorist acts against aircraft has led to several actions by the United States Government to strengthen aviation security. These actions include two Presidential commissions, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, and several FAA rulemakings to improve security measures at airports. The action proposed in this notice therefore is part of a broad, continuing effort to increase aviation security.
Following the tragic crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, the President created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (the White House Commission). The White House Commission issued an initial report on September 9, 1996, with 20 specific recommendations for improving security. One recommendation was for the development of uniform performance standards for the selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and their employees. The final report, issued on February 12, 1997, reiterated this recommendation.
Before the crash of TWA flight 800, the FAA had become concerned as well that there was a need to reevaluate the overall level of civil aviation security. The FAA asked the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) to review the threat assessment of foreign terrorism within the United States, consider the warning and interdiction capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement, examine the vulnerabilities of the domestic civil aviation system, and consider the potential consequences of a successful attack. The ASAC, which consists of representatives from the FAA and other Federal agencies, the aviation industry, and public interest groups, formed a subgroup called the Baseline Working Group (BWG) on July 17, 1996, to evaluate the domestic aviation security "baseline" in light of the new threat environment. The BWG released its Domestic Security Baseline Final Report on December 12, 1996. The report presented multiple recommendations for improving aviation security through certifications of screeners and screening companies, rapid deployments of available technologies, and institutional and procedural changes in the U.S. aviation security system.
On October 9, 1996, the President signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264. Section 302 (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) states:
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is directed to certify companies providing security screening and to improve the training and testing of security screeners through development of uniform performance standards for providing security screening services.
I.C. Aviation Security Screening
I.C. Aviation Security Screening
Effective aviation security screening is critical to protecting passengers in air transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy. It is the front line of defense against potential acts of aviation terrorism. It is therefore imperative that airports, carriers, screening companies, and the FAA work together to strengthen continually the aviation security screening system.
The FAA first required domestic passenger screening in 1973 in response to increasing numbers of hijackings. The focus at that time was to detect weapons, such as handguns and knives, through the use of X-ray and metal detector technologies at security checkpoints. The introduction of screening greatly reduced hijackings in the United States. Since then, the greater challenge to security has been the prevention of aircraft bombings, a challenge that became particularly urgent in the 1980's as various terrorist elements succeeded in bringing down aircraft and causing mass casualties by means of on-board bombs. Some of the bombs used against aircraft have been crude devices, easily detectable by screeners utilizing X-ray machines, but the trend has been toward smaller improvised explosive devices (IED's) and plastic explosives that are more difficult to detect without explosives detection systems (EDS). The threat of IED's has also expanded the initial scope of screening from passengers and carry-on baggage only to include checked baggage and cargo.
The FAA has conducted extensive research regarding how the United States can best counter these evolving threats. The research has centered around both technologies and human factors issues; each is important to thorough, effective screening and poses unique challenges.
The traditional X-ray and metal detector technologies have been supplemented since the mid-1990's with several new advanced screening technologies. An advanced screening technology, as that term is used here, is any technology that is capable of automatic threat identification. These advanced screening technologies include explosives detection systems, explosive trace detectors (ETD), and advanced technology (AT) X-ray-based machines for automatic bulk explosives detection, some of which employ screener assist technologies. At this time EDS-type technologies certified by the FAA apply medical computed axial tomography (CAT) scan technology, but other types of technologies also may meet EDS criteria in the future. The EDS are used to screen checked baggage and have the ability to automatically detect threat types and quantities of bulk explosives at FAA-specified detection and false alarm rates, up to the initial system alarm and without human intervention. The AT systems also focus on detecting bulk explosives in checked baggage and have automatic alarm capabilities; however, AT systems do not meet the full EDS standards required by the FAA for all categories of explosives, amounts, detection rates, and false alarm rates. The AT's still have more sophisticated detection capabilities than the standard X-ray systems used for imaging only. The ETD's also detect explosives, but differ in that they are used to analyze and detect minute amounts of explosive residues or vapors, are much smaller in size and less costly than the EDS's and AT's, and are primarily used at screening checkpoints to screen items entering sterile areas.
The FAA currently is deploying several types of advanced screening technologies in the Nation's airports. Each advanced screening technology is capable of detecting specific items. The FAA believes that the most effective approach to screening at this time is to use a combination of these technologies at screening locations.
Some of the technologies being developed focus on the human element of screening. The FAA currently is developing and deploying computer based training (CBT) and threat image projection (TIP) systems that provide initial and recurrent training and monitor screener performance. The potential benefits of CBT are self-paced learning, enhanced opportunities for realistic practice, combined training and performance testing, and instruction that is uniform throughout the country. CBT currently is being used to train screeners in many of the Nation's busiest airports, and the FAA is evaluating its effectiveness at these locations. The FAA anticipates making CBT available for use by all of the carriers but does not anticipate requiring its use at this time. Some private companies also are developing CBT systems that may earn FAA acceptance and the FAA encourages this development.
TIP also has significant potential benefits and is a critical component of this proposed rule. TIP systems currently are being deployed and tested on both X-ray and explosives detection systems. The TIP systems use two different methods of projection--fictional threat image (FTI) and combined technology image (CTI). FTI superimposes a threat image from an extensive library of images onto the X-ray image of actual passenger baggage being screened. The image appears on the monitor as if a threat object actually exists within the passenger's bag. The screener can check whether the image is an actual threat image before requesting that the bag be screened further. The CTI is a prefabricated image of an entire threat bag and also can be electronically inserted onto a display monitor. For both types of images, screeners are immediately provided with feedback on their ability to detect each threat. TIP exposes screeners to threats on a regular basis to train them to become more adept at detecting threats and to enhance their vigilance. TIP allows the FAA to expose screeners to the latest potential threats and should allow the FAA and the industry to determine what elements make a screener more effective, such as training methods and experience levels. Future TIP data may affect requirements proposed in the security programs.
The FAA also is validating a series of screener selection tests to help screening companies identify applicants who may have natural aptitudes to be effective screeners. Currently, the cognitive skills and processes for optimal detection of threat objects are poorly understood. The FAA sees an immediate need to identify valid tests to select job applicants who should be able to become successful screeners. The FAA currently is administering several screener selection tests to groups of screener trainees as part of their CBT and then measuring their subsequent job performance using TIP. If valid selection tests are developed, the FAA may offer them to carriers and screening companies for optional use but does not anticipate requiring their use at this time.
The FAA will continue its human factors research. Although the new technologies described are highly effective in detecting explosives, the FAA realizes that each one is ultimately dependent on the human operator. Screeners are critical to the screening process. Future human factors research will focus on the attributes, skills, and abilities that make for an effective screener. Such elements may include an individual's cognitive ability, learned skills, education level, quality and amount of training, and experience (i.e., time on the job). Screener pay levels and the quality of supervision may also affect screener performance (i.e., threat detection rates). Analyzing TIP data will help the FAA to explore and confirm or refute many hypotheses regarding the factors that affect screener performance.
What is known currently is that each type of screening and screening technology is unique and requires different skills and abilities. For example, monitoring a walk-through metal detector requires a limited understanding of the technology involved and does not involve image interpretations. Conversely, operating an EDS is much more complex and requires operators to exercise independent judgment as they interpret and make decisions regarding images that are all distinctly different. The screening tasks described in these examples require different types of skills and abilities and require training designed to optimize performance for those particular tasks. The FAA's human factors research will attempt to isolate these skills and abilities and determine how they can best be recognized and developed. With regard to compensation, wages for screeners in the United States currently average $5.75 per hour and some screeners do not receive fringe benefits. Average annual screener turnover rates exceed 100 percent in many locations. Screeners repeatedly state that low wages and minimal benefits, along with infrequent supervisor feedback and frustrating working conditions, cause them to seek employment elsewhere.
Experience in other countries seems to indicate that higher compensation, more training, and frequent testing of their screeners may result in lower turnover rates and more effective screener performance. The FAA has reports from many sources that screening, particularly screening of checked baggage, is conducted more effectively in many other countries than it is in the United States. U.S. citizens traveling abroad also have expressed concern that screening in the United States appears to be less thorough than it is in other countries. While the FAA until recently did not have actual performance data from other countries to substantiate these views, it now has test results that are strongly indicative of better screener performance by some European authorities than by some U.S. screening operators. The test results were derived from joint testing of screeners that the FAA conducted with a European country. FAA special agents and government personnel from the European country tested screeners in each country using the same methods.
On average, screeners in the European country were able to detect more than twice as many test objects as screeners in the United States. Screeners in the European country receive significantly more training and higher salaries than screeners in the United States and receive comprehensive benefits. Screeners in the European country also have more screening experience on average than their United States counterparts. U.S. air carriers and screening companies may want to pursue any and all of these factors to achieve higher performance. The FAA will continue to conduct research and examine operational data to determine how these factors affect screener performance and retention, both domestically and in conjunction with foreign governments.
It is clear that the United States can improve upon practices in many of these human factors areas making its aviation screening operations as strong and effective as its other aviation operations and endeavors. Several issues related to human factors in screening, such as performance and the environment in which screeners work, are addressed in this NPRM. The FAA invites comments and supporting data regarding human factors issues such as the potential affects of increased wages, benefits, experience, and training on screener performance.
I.D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
I.D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
In response to the Congressional mandate and to the White House Commission report, the FAA published an ANPRM on March 17, 1997 (62 FR 12724), requesting comments on certification of companies providing security screening. The FAA received 20 comments from the public on the ANPRM, all of which were substantive.
Subsequent to the publication of the ANPRM, the FAA began field testing threat image projection systems and evaluating their potential for measuring screener performance. The FAA determined that the TIP systems would be integral to proposing requirements for performance measurements and standards. Therefore, the FAA published an ANPRM withdrawal notice on May 13, 1998 (63 FR 26706), to allow TIP to be adequately field tested and validated before the FAA proceeded with the rulemaking. Although the ANPRM was withdrawn, the FAA considered and incorporated many of the commenters' suggestions in this proposal. The following is a brief summary of the overall comments.
While commenters disagreed on several issues, including the level of oversight responsibility that air carriers should have over certificated screening companies, commenters generally agreed that national standards for security screening operations are needed. Approximately one-third of the commenters stated that certificating individual screeners would have a greater impact on improving security than certificating screening companies. Most of these commenters also stated that certificating individual screeners would improve screener professionalism and performance.
Approximately half of the commenters agreed that air carriers conducting screening operations should be subject to the same standards as certificated screening companies. A majority of commenters stated that the same screening operation requirements that apply to U.S. carriers should apply to foreign carriers providing services in this country. Several commenters disagreed with any proposal by the FAA to regulate joint-use checkpoints and checkpoint operational configurations. More detailed discussions of the issues raised by commenters are provided throughout the proposed rule section of this preamble.
I.E. Related Rulemakings
I.E. Related Rulemakings
On August 1, 1997, the FAA published two NPRM's. Notice No. 97-12 (62 FR 41730) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 108 to update the overall regulatory structure for air carrier security. Notice No. 97-13 (62 FR 41760) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 107 to update the overall regulatory structure for airport security. Notice No. 97-12 and notice No. 97-13 are the result of several years of work by the FAA, airports and air carriers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), a committee formed under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C., appendix II) in April 1989 by the Secretary of Transportation.
This document proposes to amend the proposed rule language of part 108 in Notice No. 97-12 rather than the current part 108. The numbering system for part 108 of this NPRM is based on the numbering system for Notice No. 97-12. The numbering systems for proposed part 111 and revised part 109 are also closely aligned with the Notice No. 97-12 numbering system for clarity and consistency.
II. The Proposal: Overview
II. The Proposal: Overview
This document has two objectives: to propose procedures for certification of screening companies; and to propose other requirements to improve screening, such as performance measurements and new training and FAA testing requirements for screeners. The FAA believes that this proposal would improve performance, improve the consistency and quality of screening, and meet the congressional mandate stated in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the intent of the White House Commission recommendations.
This overview contains a summary of the basic framework of the proposed rule for certification of screening companies. It also contains more detailed discussions of some of the approaches to regulating screening that are implemented in the proposals and the FAA's reasons for using these approaches.
II.A. Summary
II.A. Summary
The major proposals contained in part 111 and the changes and additions proposed to parts 108, 109, and 129 are as follows:
(1) The proposed rule would require certification of all screening companies that inspect persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon in the United States on behalf of air carriers, indirect air carriers, or foreign air carriers required to adopt and carry out FAA-approved security programs (proposed §§ 111.1 and 111.109(a)).
(2) The certification requirement would include all persons conducting screening within the United States under parts 108, 109, and 129. An air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier that performs screening for itself or for other carriers would have to obtain a screening company certificate (proposed §§ 108.201(h), 109.203(a), and 129.25(k)).
(3) The proposed rule would provide for provisional certificates for new screening companies and screening companies already performing screening at the time of publication of the final rule. Before the end of the provisional period, screening companies would apply for screening company certificates, that would be valid for 5 years (proposed § 111.109(d) and (e)).
(4) Responsibility for the performance of a screening company would be borne by the screening company and the relevant air carrier(s), indirect air carrier(s), or foreign air carrier(s). Carrier oversight would be required (proposed §§ 111.117; 108.103(b); 108.201(i) and (j); 109.103(b); 109.203(b) and (c); and 129.25(c), (l), and (m)).
(5) The proposed rule would require approvals of operations specifications that would include locations of screening sites; types of screening; equipment and methods used to screen; and screener training curricula (proposed §§ 111.113 and 111.115).
(6) The proposed rule would require that screening companies adopt and implement FAA-approved screening company security programs that would include procedures to perform screening functions, including operating equipment; screener testing standards and test administration requirements; threat image projection standards, operating requirements, and data collection methods; and performance standards (proposed §§ 111.103, 111.105, and 111.107).
(7) The proposed rule would set forth requirements for screening companies regarding the screening of persons and property and the use of screening equipment (proposed §§ 111.201 and 111.203).
(8) The proposed rule would add requirements for the use of X-ray systems to part 109 and for the use of explosives detection systems to part 129 (proposed §§ 109.207 and 129.28).
(9) The proposed rule would provide consolidated employment standards for all screening company personnel, including new training requirements for screeners regarding courteous and efficient screening and U.S. civil rights laws and for supervisors regarding leadership and management subjects (proposed § 111.205).
(10) The proposed rule would require that screening companies have qualified management and technical personnel (proposed § 111.209).
(11) The proposed rule would require that screening instructors meet minimum experience and training standards (proposed § 111.211).
(12) The proposed rule would specify training requirements for screening companies regarding training programs and knowledge of subject areas and would require that the training programs be submitted to the FAA for approval (proposed § 111.213).
(13) The proposed rule would require that all screening personnel pass computerized FAA knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation tests before and after their on-the-job training and at the conclusion of their recurrent training and that the tests be monitored by carrier personnel in accordance with the carriers' security programs. The proposed rule would also describe and prohibit specific instances of cheating and other unauthorized conduct (proposed §§ 111.215, 111.217, 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p)).
(14) The proposed rule would require that all carriers install threat image projection (TIP) systems on their X-ray systems and that all air carriers and foreign air carriers install TIP systems on their explosives detection systems unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator. Screening companies would be required to use the TIP systems as specified in their security programs, including collecting and analyzing the TIP data, and to meet the performance measurements and standards set forth in their security programs (proposed §§ 108.205 and 108.207; 129.26 and 129.28; 109.207; and 111.223).
(15) The proposed rule would prohibit interference with screening personnel in the course of their screening duties (proposed § 111.9).
In addition to the above proposed changes, the proposal would amend part 191 to extend SSI requirements to certificated screening companies and their employees.
The FAA is not proposing to require certifications for individual screeners, as some commenters to the ANPRM recommended. The FAA does not have the statutory authority under Title 49 or the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 to require such certification. Other requirements in this proposal would help to improve the professionalism of screeners; e.g., by providing for mobility of screener records (proposed § 111.221) and by requiring letters of completion to be issued to screeners and screener supervisors upon their successful completion of initial, recurrent, and specialized courses of training (proposed § 111.219).
The FAA has also decided not to specifically address joint-use screening locations in this rulemaking, although comments were invited with respect to this issue in the ANPRM. A joint-use screening location is a security location that is screening for multiple carriers. The FAA received several comments to the ANPRM that stated that an agreement should be required for all air carriers to sign with the managing air carrier of a screening location. However, other commenters stated that the concept of joint-use screening locations is an internal management tool of the air carriers that allows flexibility. These commenters believe that it is not appropriate for the FAA to place undue restraints on the management process for joint-use screening locations. After considering the ANPRM comments and reviewing representative samples of joint-use screening location agreements, the FAA has determined that rulemaking is not the best way to address these issues. They would be better addressed in future security program amendments and/or compliance and enforcement policies.
II.B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening
II.B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening
This proposal would require that all companies that perform screening be certificated under part 111, even if they are air carriers, foreign air carriers, or indirect air carriers. This approach is consistent with several comments to the ANPRM that stated that air carriers conducting screening should be subject to the same standards as certificated screening companies.
Certifying all screening companies, including carriers that perform screening, would:
• Provide uniform standards for all companies that intend to provide screening.
• Ensure that all companies that conduct screening benefit from the enhanced requirements imposed upon screening companies in part 111.
• Clearly differentiate between the roles of the air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers as carriers and as certificated screening companies.
• Clarify the relationships among air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers that contract with each other for screening services.
Some commenters to the ANPRM questioned the need to certificate air carriers for the purpose of screening since they are already certificated by the FAA. Air carriers currently are certificated to operate as air carriers under part 119. However, the certification process in part 119 does not include an evaluation of whether an applicant can adequately perform screening functions. The FAA has determined that to fulfill the congressional mandate, all who perform screening shall establish their ability to do so by qualifying for screening company certificates. Any air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier that does not choose to hold a screening company certificate could contract with a certificated screening company to perform its screening.
II.C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies
II.C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies
Currently, carriers have statutory and regulatory responsibilities to conduct screening properly. The FAA cannot propose to relieve carriers of these responsibilities. The responsibility of air carriers and foreign air carriers to ensure that screening is conducted on persons and property to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft is in the statute (49 U.S.C. 44901(a)) and cannot be changed by the FAA. As discussed previously, the requirement to certificate screening companies also is in the statute. Issues arise, then, concerning the relationships between the carriers and the screening companies and the proper roles for each. The FAA interprets these statutory provisions as leaving the ultimate responsibility for screening with the carriers and providing for concurrent carrier and screening company responsibilities for some tasks. This relationship is not unlike that between repair stations and air carriers. Repair stations are certificated under part 145 and are responsible for performing maintenance in accordance with regulations; however, the air carriers remain ultimately responsible for the airworthiness of their aircraft. The FAA recognizes that this relationship may be difficult to define, but proposes the following general guidance.
The FAA envisions that the carriers would continue to be responsible for providing proper screening equipment, such as X-ray machines and metal detectors. The carriers would also have primary responsibility to deal with the airport operators on issues regarding the locations of screening equipment in the airports. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the carriers would be responsible for overseeing the performance of the screening companies to ensure that they carry out their duties.
The screening companies would be responsible for inspecting persons and property for unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or dangerous weapons. They would be responsible for ensuring that they use the equipment properly, staff the screening locations adequately, train their screeners properly, and otherwise manage the screening locations so as to enable them to meet the standards for screening in their security programs.
II.D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues
II.D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues
As discussed previously, this proposed rule would not shift the responsibility for screening from air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers to screening companies. Rather, certificating screening companies is a way to assist carriers in ensuring that those who conduct screening are fully qualified to do so. Certification also would make screening companies directly accountable to the FAA for failures to carry out their screening duties. This rule would increase the level of responsibility required of screening companies while improving screening oversight by air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers.
The FAA envisions that screening companies would be primarily responsible for the day-to-day operation of the screening locations. Screening companies generally would be held accountable for screening location failures. The FAA intends to look to screening companies to maintain the highest standards and to continuously monitor and improve their capabilities.
The full range of actions would be available for use against screening companies that failed to comply with the regulations, their operations specifications, and their security program. These include counseling, administrative action (warning notices and letters of correction), civil penalties, and certificate actions (suspension or revocation of a certificate). In addition, if the screening company was unable to carry out its duties at a specific screening location, the FAA could amend its operations specifications (see § 111.111) to withdraw its authority to screen at that location.
If a company was removed from a location because of its failure to screen properly, the FAA would continue to monitor closely that location as another company came in to conduct screening. The FAA is concerned about situations in which incoming companies use the same equipment and hire the same employees from the unsatisfactory companies and make no real changes in the quality of screening. The FAA would consider requiring incoming companies to take additional corrective measures to ensure that the problems that affected the performance of the previous companies do not recur.
Carriers would continue to be responsible for the overall proper screening of persons and property. They would be directly accountable for failing to carry out duties specifically assigned to them, such as providing the proper screening equipment and carrying out specific oversight functions (such as Ground Security Coordinator duties and auditing functions). In addition, when a screening company failed to screen properly or otherwise failed to carry out its duties, the FAA would carefully evaluate all facts and circumstances to determine whether the carrier should be the subject of enforcement action. In general, repeated or systemic failures of a screening company to comply with the regulations or fundamental failures of the screeners to comply with security requirements might lead to the conclusion that the carrier has failed to conduct screening properly or to oversee the screening company's operations, even if the carrier had conducted the required audits and did not discover problems. The audits would be one tool for the carrier to use but would not limit its responsibility to ensure proper screening. Carriers would be expected to identify problems with the screening company and take corrective action in a timely manner.
If the FAA determines that a screening company is performing poorly, whether at a particular location or in its overall operations, the FAA could require the screening company and/or the responsible air carriers to implement additional security measures under this proposal to maintain system performance. Such additional measures would vary depending on the circumstances and might involve, for example, additional training for screeners, redundant screening of property, or increased management oversight. The measures could slow screening operations at affected locations but would help ensure that thorough, effective screening was being performed. If the additional measures proved ineffective or if the circumstances were extreme, amendments of the screening companies' operations specifications or suspensions or revocations of certificates could result.
The proposal would require that each air carrier or foreign air carrier required by the FAA to implement additional security measures to maintain system performance notify the public of the increased measures by posting signs at affected screening locations (see section IV.F.). The signs would be required to state that the additional security measures being implemented by the air carriers could slow screening operations at those locations, but that the measures are necessary to ensure the safety and security of flights. The proposal is intended to ensure that the traveling public is informed and to increase screening company and air carrier accountability for their operations. The specific language and specifications to be required for the signs would be included in the security programs.
II.E. New Part 111
II.E. New Part 111
The FAA proposes to create a new part 111, which would contain all the requirements for screening companies. Part 111 would require certification of all screening companies that perform screening for air carriers under part 108, indirect air carriers under part 109, and foreign air carriers under part 129.
The proposal would affect only the screening that is done by inspecting persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under parts 108, 109, and 129. These inspections currently are performed by a variety of methods such as manual searches, metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection systems, and advanced technology devices. The proposal would also amend certain requirements in parts 108, 109, and 129 to accommodate the proposed new part 111.
Forms of screening other than inspection, such as determining that a person is a law enforcement officer with authority to carry a weapon on board aircraft, would not be covered in part 111. These other forms of screening would not have to be done by a certificated screening company. These types of screening would continue to be the responsibility of the carriers. They could be performed, as they are now, by such methods as ticket agents checking the documentation of law enforcement officers flying armed, local law enforcement officers at the checkpoint checking the credentials of law enforcement officers entering the sterile area, or checkpoint security supervisors checking the law enforcement officer's credentials. The checkpoint security supervisors checking these credentials would be doing so as representatives of the carriers, rather than as part of their duties for the certificated screening companies.
II.F. Screening of Cargo
II.F. Screening of Cargo
Certain cargo carried on passenger air carriers must be screened. The FAA considered whether this screening should be done only by certificated screening companies and has decided to propose that it should be. If unauthorized explosives or incendiaries are introduced aboard passenger aircraft in cargo, it would be just as devastating as if introduced in checked or carry-on baggage or on passengers. The FAA believes that cargo also must be subjected to rigorous screening controls to avoid such a result.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes that inspections of cargo for unauthorized explosives and incendiaries be done only by certificated screening companies, similar to the proposal for persons, accessible property, and checked baggage. Under this proposal, air carriers and foreign air carriers carrying passengers would be required to ensure that cargo screening is conducted by certificated screening companies. Indirect air carriers that elect to perform required screening (instead of referring their cargo to air carriers or foreign air carriers for required screening) also would be required to hold screening company certificates or contract with certificated screening companies to perform the screening. The FAA believes that a comprehensive approach to certificating all screening companies, including companies that screen cargo, is vital to having a safe, secure, and effective aviation security system. The FAA requests public comments on the issues relating to certificating indirect air carriers in this NPRM.
II.G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP)
II.G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP)
In addition to the regulatory requirements, the proposed rule would establish a separate security program for screening companies that would accompany the requirements in proposed part 111. The Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP) would contain detailed and sensitive requirements relating to screening that currently are contained in the carrier security programs, as well as additional requirements related to proposals in part 111. The carriers as well as the screening companies would be required to ensure that their screening companies' security programs are carried out.
The FAA considered proposing that screening companies be required to comply with the standardized security programs for air carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Requiring screening companies to comply with the ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP would emphasize that the carriers are primarily responsible for ensuring that screening is properly carried out. It would also prevent having to relocate the screening-related language from the carrier security programs to the screening standard security program. However, the FAA recognizes that this system could result in confusion in some cases where screening companies might have to observe portions of three different security programs--the ACSSP, the MSP, and the IACSSP. Having a separate security program for screening companies would also more clearly delineate the responsibilities of screening companies and those of the carriers, which would continue to be responsible for proper screening. Both part 111 and the Screening Standard Security Program would state that the requirements also are applicable to carriers that conduct screening.
The FAA requests comments on consolidating all screening-related program requirements into one screening standard security program. The FAA has prepared a draft SSSP proposal to accompany the release of this NPRM. Commenters with a need to know, as specified in 14 CFR part 191, may request copies of the draft proposed SSSP from the Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
II.H. Screener Qualifications
II.H. Screener Qualifications
As discussed in section I.C., it is critical that screeners be highly qualified in order to counter the increasing sophistication of the threats. This proposal contains a number of provisions to promote improved qualifications of screeners. Most notable are the proposed requirements to include FAA testing standards for screening personnel, test administration requirements for carriers, and additional monitoring of screener performance made possible by TIP as discussed in section II.I.
Under this proposal, screeners would be required to pass knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation tests developed by the FAA before beginning on-the-job training. This would help to ensure that all screeners have uniform understanding of their tasks and a consistent high level of achievement. The FAA would provide the tests by amending the screening companies' security programs through notice and comment procedures and would expect the screening companies to train their personnel to pass those tests. Screening companies would have flexibility in designing their training programs and would submit them to the FAA for approval. The FAA is not proposing that training programs be designed in a specific manner, only that they thoroughly and effectively address all of the testing standard subjects. The proposal also would require that the carriers administer and monitor the tests to promote carrier involvement in the training process and to establish closer accountability for the administration of the training tests.
II.I. Performance Measurements and Standards
II.I. Performance Measurements and Standards
For the FAA, carriers, and screening companies to monitor the performance of screening companies and to track their level of performance, a consistent means of regularly measuring performance is needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening companies need to be able to monitor how well screeners are detecting threat objects and must be able to determine whether performance is decreasing and whether corrective measures are needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening companies need to be able to measure performance of a screening location to determine what factors lead to better or worse detection and what corrective measures are effective.
Factors that may lead to better or worse detection include the amount of passenger traffic, the type of training that the screeners receive, how often screener functions are rotated, and the conditions under which screeners are working. The FAA, carriers, and screening companies also need to determine which types of threat objects the screeners can readily detect and which types they have difficulty detecting. All of these factors can be analyzed along with other elements that may affect screening ability, such as education level, screening experience, and screener compensation levels. The analyses would be used by the FAA to work more effectively with screening companies and carriers to improve screening continuously. Further, it appears that regular testing of screeners promotes vigilance. Frequent testing can increase screeners' ability to recognize threats that they rarely, if ever, encounter in reality but must be ready to detect should the unlikely event occur.
In order to monitor screening performance and to examine the effects of all of these factors, the means of measuring performance must be consistent, reliable, cost effective, and frequent. The two options for conducting testing are anonymous testing by individuals and computer testing. The FAA and the carriers now rely on testing conducted by individuals. Carriers currently are required to test each screener periodically, as set forth in their security programs.
The FAA uses FAA employees to submit for screening items of baggage that contain test objects that will appear on the X-ray screens to be weapons or explosives. There are a number of limitations involved with this method, however. For instance, the FAA tests cannot be conducted frequently at many screening locations due to the large number of airports in the United States and their diverse locations. The FAA must arrange for different employees to travel to airports and have them change their appearance after each test to prevent the screeners from recognizing them as FAA testers. It is therefore very difficult, costly, and labor-intensive to obtain a large number of tests that accurately measure screeners' success rates and that provide a continuous measure of the success of screening locations, either overall or under specific conditions. Further, when screening personnel realize that the FAA is conducting tests, they sometimes alert other nearby screening locations to expect testing, which can skew the testing results. Because FAA testing is infrequent at many locations, it also can limit the number and variety of test objects that the screeners are exposed to. Also, because the tests are conducted by individuals, there is the possibility that different FAA employees will apply the test protocols differently, which also could skew the testing results.
To deal with these problems, the FAA has developed TIP, discussed previously in section I.C. This computer-based system is capable of introducing test objects to screeners on the X-ray and EDS systems at various rates set on the computers. The TIP program can be set to run the entire time that a screening location is in use. Test items can be easily added to or changed by simply loading new images or parameters into the computers, providing an efficient means to regularly expose screeners to the most recent and sophisticated threats. The success rates can easily be recorded and later analyzed by the FAA, carriers, and screening companies to monitor continuously how well the screening locations are operating.
The FAA has conducted validation testing of TIP. In addition, at one location one screening company conducted extensive testing of TIP and provided its data to the FAA for analysis. The FAA determined that the detailed results of the FAA and screening company testing should not be made available to the general public because they could be used to attempt to discover ways to defeat the screening system; therefore, the FAA has determined that this information is sensitive security information under 14 CFR part 191. Air carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers that have security programs under parts 108, 129, and 109, respectively, may obtain further information on these tests and the FAA's analysis by contacting the Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Screening companies that are screening for carriers may obtain copies of the testing results through their carriers. Comments on the data and analyses should be submitted to the Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning, rather than to the public docket, because of the sensitivity of the information.
Based on all of the data gathered to date, the FAA has determined that TIP is an effective and reliable means to measure screener performance. Accordingly, the proposed rule would require the use of threat image projection systems on all X-ray and explosives detection systems. TIP would be installed over a period of time as specified in the security programs. The specific TIP equipment requirements acceptable to the Administrator would be set forth in the carriers' security programs. The screening companies and carriers would be required to download the data or allow the FAA to download the data in accordance with standards that would be adopted in the security programs through notice and comment procedures. The screening companies and carriers would be able to download the data at any time to monitor their own performance.
The results of TIP would be used to monitor the performance of screening locations, screening companies, and individual screeners. TIP operational data would be analyzed to focus resources on most effectively improving screening to detect threats. TIP data can be used to determine such things as what working conditions lead to better performance, on which topics the screeners need further instruction, and what corrective action or training programs prove to be most successful. The FAA would look at the success rates of screeners detecting various kinds of test objects, the success rates at different times of day and during different traffic levels, and the other factors that may affect screening effectiveness.
TIP also serves as a continuous means of on-the-job training for screeners. Screeners report that being exposed to TIP images keeps them alert and interested, supplements their classroom training, and fosters healthy competition among them to continuously improve their detection rates. The use of TIP provides screeners with immediate feedback regarding their performance and indicates specific areas for improvement.
The FAA anticipates that in the future, TIP data may provide a basis not only to monitor the performance of screening locations but also to establish performance standards. Under such a system, the screening companies and carriers could be required to meet the standards set forth in their security programs for the detection of various threat objects. For instance, the FAA anticipates that it would analyze TIP data to determine the range of screening company detection rates in the United States. It might then set minimum detection percentages that each screening company would have to meet based on the higher detection rates within the range. The minimum detection percentages could be incrementally raised as overall screener performance in the United States rises. The performance standards might vary depending on such factors as the screening system being used and the type of threat object. Initially, however, the FAA could implement overall performance measurement requirements whereby the FAA would collect performance data from all TIP systems installed in the United States and then require corrective action of the screening companies with the lowest performance. These performance standards would be developed based on extensive additional data from TIP systems.
The FAA would propose to add these performance measurement and performance standard requirements as amendments to the security programs through notice and comment procedures. Including these requirements in the security programs would protect them as sensitive security information and allow for flexibility in changing the standards as screening company performance improves in the United States. The use of TIP systems to establish performance measurements and ultimately performance standards would allow the FAA to monitor closely the performance of screening companies.
If performance standards were adopted in the security programs, screening companies and carriers that the FAA determined were not performing to specified standards could be held accountable in any number of ways, as discussed in section II.D.
The FAA currently tests other forms of screening, such as walk-through metal detectors and handwands, similar to the way it currently tests X-ray screening. The FAA may in the future develop performance standards for other screening equipment and proposed amendments to the security programs would be issued.
III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion
III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion
Proposed part 111 would prescribe the requirements for screening company certifications and operations. Part 111 would apply to all screening companies, whether they are performing screening under part 108, 109, or 129. Carriers would be required to ensure that their screening operations, whether conducted by the carriers themselves or by screening companies with which the carriers contract, are conducted in accordance with part 111 requirements.
Subpart A would contain general information relating to applicability, definitions, inspection authority, falsification, and prohibition against interference with screening personnel and is described in paragraphs III.A. through III.E. Subpart B would prescribe requirements for security programs, screening company certificates, operations specifications, and carrier oversight and is described in paragraphs III.F. through III.K. Subpart C would prescribe requirements relating to screening operations such as the screening of persons and property, the use of screening equipment, employment standards, screening company manager and instructor qualifications, training and testing, and performance measurement and standards among others and is described in paragraphs III.L. through III.W. The following discussion provides details on each part 111 requirement.
Subpart A--General
Subpart A--General
III.A. § 111.1 Applicability
Proposed § 111.1 states that the part would prescribe the requirements for the certification and operation of screening companies. The requirements in proposed part 111 would apply to each screening company that screens for an air carrier under part 108, for an indirect air carrier under part 109, or for a foreign air carrier under part 129. The proposed requirements would also apply to the air carriers (including those air carriers voluntarily adopting aviation security programs), indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers that are responsible for conducting, and therefore overseeing, screening operations. Portions of proposed part 111 would also apply to two groups of individuals: all persons conducting screening within the United States under parts 111, 108, 109 and 129 and all persons who interact with screening personnel during screening. "Person" as defined in 14 CFR 1.1 means "an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or governmental entity."
III.A. § 111.1 Applicability
The certification requirements in the proposed rule would apply only to screening companies performing screening in the United States. The FAA does not propose at this time to certify screening companies that perform screening for air carriers at foreign airports. Screening in other countries is performed either by the host governments or by private sector screening companies, but under the authority and operational control of the host governments. However, where air carriers have operational control over screening outside of the United States they would be required under this proposal to carry out and comply with all relevant sections of part 111 to the extent allowable by local law, with the exception of those requirements related to screening company certification.
III.B. § 111.3 Definitions
III.B. § 111.3 Definitions
Proposed § 111.3 would define for the purpose of part 111 "carrier," "screening company," "screening company security program," and "screening location." The proposed definitions are needed to clarify the use of these terms in the proposed rule language.
The term "carrier" would be defined for the purposes of parts 108, 109, 111, and 129 to refer to an air carrier, an indirect air carrier, or a foreign air carrier.
The term "screening company" would be defined to mean an air carrier, indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other entity that inspects persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under part 111 and 108, 109, or 129, before their entry into a sterile area or carriage aboard an aircraft.
The term "screening company security program" would be defined to mean the security program approved by the Administrator under this part.
The term "screening location" would be defined to mean any site at which persons or property are inspected for the presence of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon. Examples of screening locations are checkpoints where persons and accessible property are screened, ticket counters and baggage makeup rooms where checked bags may be screened, and cargo areas where cargo may be screened.
Additional terms to be defined in the part 108 final rule would also apply to part 111, as would any other definitions contained in parts 109 and 129 of the chapter. Of particular relevance to this rule are the definitions for "cargo" and "checked baggage."
The term "cargo" would be defined in part 108 to mean property tendered for air transportation accounted for on an air waybill. All accompanied commercial courier consignments, whether or not accounted for on an air waybill, are also classified as cargo. Security programs further define the term cargo.
The term "checked baggage" would be defined in part 108 to mean property tendered by or on behalf of a passenger and accepted by an air carrier for transport, which will be inaccessible to passengers during flight. Accompanied commercial courier consignments are not classified as checked baggage.
III.C. § 111.5 Inspection Authority
III.C. § 111.5 Inspection Authority
This proposed section would clarify that a screening company shall allow FAA inspections and tests to determine its compliance with part 111, its security program, and its operations specifications. The screening company shall also allow FAA inspections and tests of equipment and procedures at screening locations that relate to carrier compliance with their regulations. This proposed section would also require screening companies to provide the FAA with evidence of compliance. Both of these proposed requirements are similar to those in proposed § 108.5 of Notice No. 97-12.
III.D. § 111.7 Falsification
III.D. § 111.7 Falsification
This proposed section would apply falsification requirements to screening companies that are similar to those that apply under current § 108.4. While the provisions of § 108.4 apply to matters involving screening, the inclusion of a falsification rule in part 111 would serve to emphasize the requirements. Under this rule, no person would be permitted to make or cause to be made any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any application for any security program, certificate, or operations specifications or any amendment thereto under part 111. No person would be permitted to make or cause to be made any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or report that would be kept, made, or used to show compliance with part 111 or to exercise any privileges under part 111. Also, any reproduction or alteration for fraudulent purpose of any report, record, security program, certificate, or operations specifications issued under part 111 would be subject to civil penalties under this proposed rule. There are also criminal statutes that might apply to such activities.
III.E. § 111.9 Prohibition Against Interference with Screening Personnel
III.E. § 111.9 Prohibition Against Interference with Screening Personnel
The proposed rule would include new requirements prohibiting any person from interfering with, assaulting, threatening, or intimidating screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties. The proposed rule is intended to prohibit interference that might distract or inhibit a screener from effectively performing his or her duties. This rule is necessary to emphasize the importance to safety and security of protecting screeners from undue distractions or attempts to intimidate. Previous instances of such distractions have included excessive verbal abuse of screeners by passengers and certain air carrier employees. Screeners encountering these situations are taken away from their normal duties to deal with the disruptive people, which may affect the screening of other people. The disruptive persons may be attempting to discourage the screeners from being as thorough as required. Screeners may also need to summon checkpoint screening supervisors and law enforcement officers, taking them away from other duties.
Checkpoint disruptions can be potentially dangerous in these situations. This proposal would help support screeners' efforts to be thorough and would help prevent persons from unduly interfering with the screening process. This proposed rule is similar to 14 CFR § 91.11, which prohibits interference with crewmembers aboard aircraft and which also is essential to passenger safety and security. Note that this proposed rule is not intended to prevent good-faith questions from persons seeking to understand the screening of their persons or property. But abusive, distractive behavior and attempts to prevent screeners from performing required screening would be subject to civil penalties under this proposed rule.
Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications
Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications
III.F. § 111.101 Performance of Screening
Proposed § 111.101 states that each screening company shall conduct screening and screener training in compliance with the requirements of part 111, its approved screening company security program (see section III.G.), its approved operations specifications, and applicable portions of security directives (SD) and emergency amendments (EA) to security programs. When a response to an imminent threat is required, the FAA issues SD's to air carriers under current § 108.18, and EA's to foreign air carriers and indirect air carriers under §§ 129.25 and 109.5, to require immediate action and response to the threat.
III.F. § 111.101 Performance of Screening
SD's and EA's may be issued to carriers to help them respond to threats that require quick responses. SD's and EA's typically involve a range of differing requirements, only a portion of which may pertain to how the screening companies shall perform their duties. Currently, carriers are required to provide to their screening companies any screening-related information from SD's and EA's and any other applicable information pertaining to threats. Carriers extract the screening-related requirements from the SD's and EA's and forward them to the screening companies.
It appears that the most efficient means for the FAA to issue the SD and EA requirements to screening companies would be to continue the practice of issuing them to the carriers, who then provide appropriate information to their screening companies. It would be inefficient for the FAA to attempt to issue two different SD or EA documents, one with the requirements solely applicable to screening companies and one with all of the requirements for the carriers. Moreover, this emphasizes the ultimate statutory and regulatory responsibilities of the carriers to perform aviation security screening and to ensure that screening companies carry out the requirements in the SD's and EA's.
III.G. §§ 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security Programs
III.G. §§ 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security Programs
As discussed in II.G., the FAA is proposing to establish a separate security program to accompany proposed part 111. The Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP) would contain requirements for screening persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo for air carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. This would consolidate all of the screening-related requirements into a single source that screening companies could use to carry out their duties. The ACSSP would continue to contain the nonpublic details regarding the air carriers' responsibility to conduct screening under part 108, as would the MSP for foreign air carriers and the IACSSP for indirect air carriers. However, much of the screening information to be contained in the Screening Standard Security Program would be relocated from the ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP.
Under the proposal, screening companies would be directly responsible for compliance with their security programs and might be subject to enforcement actions if they fail to comply. Screening companies would therefore have a strong interest in complying with the program requirements. Carriers would continue to have an interest in the screening requirements in the security programs, because they would remain responsible for their implementation and oversight by statute and in the case of air carriers and foreign air carriers would be transporting the persons and property being screened. As part of their oversight responsibilities, carriers would be required to have access to, understand, and make available to the FAA upon request copies of the security programs of the companies with which they contract.
Under the proposal, the sections pertaining to security program requirements are organized in the same format that is used in Notice No. 97-12 for part 108. Proposed § 111.103 would be titled "Security program: adoption and implementation" and would require that each screening company adopt and carry out an FAA-approved screening company security program that meets the requirements of proposed § 111.105. Proposed § 111.105 would be titled "Security program: form, content, and availability" and would provide specific requirements for security programs. Proposed § 111.107 would be titled "Security program: approval and amendments" and would describe the procedures for approvals of and amendments to security programs.
Proposed § 111.105 would be divided into three paragraphs. Paragraph (a) would state that a security program shall provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on flights provided by the air carriers and/or foreign air carriers for which a screening company screens against acts of criminal violence and air piracy and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous weapons. This same wording appears under proposed § 108.103 of Notice No. 97-12 for air carriers, as both parties are responsible for passenger safety. Paragraph (a) would also require that screening company screening performance coordinators (see section III.P.) acknowledge receipt of amendments to their programs in signed, written statements to the FAA within 72 hours. The security programs would have to contain the items listed under paragraph (b) of § 111.105 and be approved by the Administrator.
Proposed § 111.105(b) would list three items that a screening company's security program shall include at a minimum. The security program shall include the following: the procedures used to perform the screening functions specified in proposed § 111.201; the testing standards and training guidelines for screening personnel and instructors; and the performance standards and operating requirements for threat image projection systems. These requirements are further explained in the detailed discussions of the sections.
Proposed § 111.105(c) would describe logistical and availability requirements related to a security program. A screening company would be required to maintain at least one complete copy of its security program at its principal business office and at each airport served and to make a copy of the program available for inspection upon the request of an FAA special agent. All screening companies and applicants for screening company certificates, regardless of type, would be required to restrict the availability of information in their security programs to those persons with an operational need to know in accordance with § 191.5 and refer requests for such information by other persons to the Administrator. All of these requirements are similar to the requirements for air carriers under proposed § 108.105.
Proposed § 111.107 would be divided into four sections: "Approval of security program," "Amendment requested by a screening company," Amendment by the FAA," and "Emergency amendments." The proposed language is based on the language in proposed § 108.105 (Notice No. 97-12) with the exception of the following changes unique to screening companies.
Proposed § 111.107(a) would differ from proposed § 108.105 (Notice No. 97-12) in several ways due to the proposed application process for screening company certifications. The language would state that unless otherwise authorized by the Assistant Administrator, each screening company required to have a security program under this part would be required to submit a signed, written statement to the Assistant Administrator within 30 days of receiving the SSSP from the FAA indicating what its intentions are for adopting and carrying out a security program. A screening company could choose to adopt the SSSP as is or adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it. If a screening company chooses to adopt the SSSP without changing it, the granting of a screening company certificate by the Assistant Administrator would serve as FAA approval of the SSSP. If the screening company chooses to adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it, the Assistant Administrator would either approve the proposed security program within 30 days or give the screening company written notice to modify its program to comply with the applicable security program requirements. The remaining procedures for accepting a notice to modify or petition the notice would be the same as the procedures in proposed § 108.105 of Notice No. 97-12. In this case as well, the Assistant Administrator's granting a screening company certificate to the screening company would serve as FAA approval of the screening company's security program.
Under proposed § 111.107(b), once a screening company is employed by one or more carriers, it would be required to include in any application for amendment to its security program a statement that all carriers for which it screens have been advised of the proposed amendment and have no objection to it. The screening company would also be required to include the name and phone number for each individual who was advised at each carrier. This would ensure that screening companies would have the opportunity to apply to amend their security programs, and also would ensure that carriers would be aware of the applications and have no objections to them. Because carriers would retain primary responsibility for screening, it would be essential that they concur with any changes requested by screening companies that screen on their behalf.
Under proposed § 111.107(c) and (d), if the FAA were to seek to amend a portion of a security program that covers the activities of screening companies, it would provide to screening companies notice and opportunity to comment. Carriers would also be notified and provided opportunities to comment regarding proposed changes to the SSSP that apply to their operations. In the case of an emergency, there would be no prior notice or opportunity to comment.
III.H. § 111.109 Screening Company Certificate
III.H. § 111.109 Screening Company Certificate
Certificate required. Proposed § 111.109(a) states that a screening company may not perform required screening except under the authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a screening company certificate.
Section 302 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-264, 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) requires the Administrator to certificate companies providing security screening. The FAA proposes to certificate screening companies under 49 U.S.C. 44707, which provides for examinations and ratings of air agencies. Under that section, certain pilot schools (14 CFR part 141) and repair stations (14 CFR part 145) hold air agency certificates. That section also permits certifications of "other air agencies the Administrator decides are necessary in the public interest" (49 U.S.C. 44707(3)).
By certificating screening companies under section 44707 as air agencies, the companies would be under the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 44709. That section makes clear that the Administrator may re-inspect an air agency at any time. Section 44709 also contains the procedure by which the Administrator may amend, modify, suspend, or revoke a certificate. This procedure includes an air agency's right to appeal to the National Transportation Safety Board an order amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking its certificate. The Board's procedure for hearing such appeals, found at 49 CFR part 821, includes a hearing before an administrative law judge and an appeal to the full Board. A party may petition the U.S. Court of Appeals to review a decision of the Board. In this way, a screening company would receive full due process if the FAA were to take action against its certificate.
Application for a screening company certificate. Under proposed § 111.109(b), an application for a screening company certificate shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the Administrator. The FAA anticipates a two-phase application process as follows. A company interested in applying for certification as a screening company would write to the FAA to request application instructions. The application instructions would require the applicant to submit several items in writing in a standard format. This same application package would eventually become the screening company's operations specifications if the company is approved for certification. (See next preamble section for discussion of operations specifications.) The completed application package would be submitted to the FAA as part of phase one and would contain the following items: the name of the applicant's company; the company's address; incorporation and tax identification information; a letter of intent; an organization chart; a description of the company's ability to perform and comply with regulations; the name of the company's chief executive officer; the names, titles, qualifications, and references for the screening performance coordinators; and the company's procedures for safeguarding and distributing sensitive security information under part 191.
Upon receiving an application package, the FAA would review and verify all relevant information. This review might include verifying past employment and training references for the company's screening performance coordinator. Once the FAA completes its review, it would notify the applicant and provide the applicant with a copy of the Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP). The applicant would need the security program to complete phase two of the application process.
After obtaining a copy of the SSSP, the applicant would review it to determine whether the company wants to adopt the SSSP as is or amend it to incorporate additional company-specific information. The applicant would be instructed to inform the FAA of its decision regarding the SSSP in writing within 30 days of receipt of the SSSP. At that time or soon thereafter the applicant would prepare and submit to the FAA a copy of its training curriculum and any FAA-requested changes to its original application. (See later discussions regarding these requirements in this notice.) The FAA would provide guidance to the applicant in preparing these documents, as needed. The applicant would submit the documents as part of phase two, and the FAA would review them. If the FAA finds that the documents from phase two meet all requirements, they would be combined with the phase one documents and signed by the Administrator as the company's operations specifications. The Administrator would then issue the company a screening company certificate. If changes are needed, the FAA would request that the applicant make the specific amendments and resubmit them before the Administrator would issue a certificate.
Issuance and renewal-general. Under proposed § 111.109(c), an applicant would be entitled to a certificate if the applicant applies not less than 90 days before the applicant intends to begin screening or the applicant's certificate expires; the Administrator determines that the applicant has met the requirements of this part for the type of screening certificate requested; the issuance would not be contrary to public safety and security; and, unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, the applicant has not had a screening company certificate revoked within the past 12 months.
Under proposed § 111.109(c)(2), the applicant would have to be able to meet the requirements of this part, to include adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications for it to be issued a provisional screening company certificate. Proposed § 111.109(c)(3) would describe the requirements that a screening company would have to meet for issuance or renewal of its 5-year screening company certificate. Failure to meet the performance standards set forth in its security program would be grounds for denial of the screening company certificate. Under proposed § 111.109(c)(5), if the FAA revokes a screening company's certificate, the company would have to wait 1 year before a new certificate could be issued unless otherwise authorized by the FAA. This would ensure that the company that had proven unqualified to hold its certificate could not immediately seek a new certificate. This provision is similar to a provision in 49 U.S.C. 44703(c), which relates to airmen certificates.
Provisional Certificates. Under proposed paragraph (d), companies that do not hold screening company certificates would be able to apply for provisional screening company certificates. The FAA would issue a provisional certificate to an applicant if the Administrator finds that the applicant is able to meet the requirements of this part, to include adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications (proposed § 111.109(c)(2)). The applicant for the provisional screening certificate would be subject to FAA investigation and required to show that it has met the requirements of this part. Under proposed § 111.109(g)(1), a provisional screening company certificate would expire at the end of the 12th month after the month in which it was issued.
The purpose of the proposed provisional certificate would be to provide a probationary period for the FAA to monitor a company's screening performance. During that year, a new screening company would undergo rigorous scrutiny by the FAA, during which time the company would have to demonstrate that it has met the requirements for FAA certification. If before the end of the 12-month period the new screening company has met the requirements of this part, and had adopted and carried out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications, the company would be able to apply for and may be granted a certificate. In accordance with § 111.109(c)(1), the screening company would be required to apply for a screening certificate not less than 60 days before the expiration of the provisional certificate. Companies that cannot demonstrate that they are qualified during the year or that do not meet the performance standards specified in the security program would be denied certification.
The proposed requirements for using a provisional certificate are consistent with several comments to the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that stated that new companies should have to operate in a provisional status during which time the FAA would perform compliance and records audits.
Under proposed § 111.109(d)(2), the holder of a provisional certificate would not begin screening at a screening location without first giving the Administrator 7 days' notice, unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator. This notice would allow the FAA to monitor the startup of new company operations at each location. The FAA anticipates that this requirement for 7 days' notice would not result in any start-up delays should a new company replace a company whose operations are decertified at a location. The FAA anticipates that it usually would notify the responsible carriers in advance that they must replace their existing screening company with a different company if performance does not improve within a certain amount of time. This advance notification to the carriers would allow them ample time to make arrangements with a new company, if necessary, and to provide the required 7 days' notice to the FAA. If for some reason the FAA was unable to notify carriers in advance, it would have the authority to waive the 7 days' notice to keep the screening location in operation.
Screening company certificate. Under proposed § 111.109(e), the holder of a provisional screening company certificate could be issued a screening company certificate. The certificate would expire at the end of the 60th month after the month in which it is issued (proposed § 111.109(g)(2)). To issue or renew a screening company certificate, the Administrator would have to determine that the applicant has met the requirements of part 111, to include adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications, and has implemented applicable portions of the security directives (proposed § 111.109(c)(3)).
As part of its renewal procedures, the FAA would consider the company's performance under the performance standards that could be added to the company's security program. As discussed in section II.I., the FAA anticipates using threat image projection (TIP) data to measure a screening company's overall performance for X-ray and EDS machines and eventually amending the SSSP to include performance standards. This data would then be used to help evaluate whether a screening company certificate should be issued or renewed.
The FAA is proposing that a certificate be valid for 60 months. The screening company would be required to apply for a renewal at least 60 days before the expiration date in order to continue screening operations. The 60-month (5-year) renewal would allow the benefits of renewal without creating an undue burden on the screening company. As with carriers, the FAA would inspect screening companies regularly and would continually monitor operations and tests to determine that each screening company is in compliance with the regulations, its security program, and its operations specifications. This would result in consistent and close monitoring of screening operations. If significant deficiencies are found during the 5-year period, the FAA would take appropriate action to require correction of those deficiencies or if necessary would revoke the screening company's certificate. In addition, requiring a 5-year renewal of a screening company's certificate would create a more in-depth review than that conducted during periodic inspections. Before the FAA would renew a certificate, it would review the company's operations specifications (including the training curriculum), required records, the results of FAA inspections and any enforcement actions that were taken, performance data, and any other relevant information.
There are several precedents in the FAA regulations for periodic renewals of certificates and approvals. For example, exemptions from certain Federal Aviation Regulations are typically issued for 3 years, and Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) rarely are issued for longer than 5 years. The duration of pilot school certificates in part 145 is 24 months. Having a specific duration encourages a thorough review of any changes in the environment of a company, such as the addition of new equipment or an increase in the size of operations, as well as a review of past performance and an evaluation of what should be done to improve performance if necessary.
The FAA considered proposing a shorter duration for the screening company certificates but decided to propose the 60-month duration as a reasonable option for obtaining the most benefits with the least burden. The FAA invites comments on the costs and benefits of the proposed duration and of a shorter duration such as 2 or 3 years.
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