AC 450.115-1 High Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis
This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance and a comprehensive method for performing a high fidelity flight safety analysis in accordance with title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) § 450.115. AST drafted AC 450-113-1, Level of Fidelity, to help an operator determine the level of fidelity of the analysis required by § 450.115(b). In situations when a high fidelity flight safety analysis is needed, this AC provides guidance for performing that analysis in compliance with § 450.115(b). A high fidelity flight safety analysis may be required by § 450.115(b) for a particular phase or for all phases of flight.
This document is cancelled. Cancelled by 450.115-1A. Check the official source before relying on it.
U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration
Advisory Circular
Subject: High Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis Date: 10/15/2020 Initiated By: AST-1
AC No: 450.115-1
This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance and a comprehensive method for performing a high fidelity flight safety analysis in accordance with title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) § 450.115. A flight safety analysis is required for launch and reentry in accordance with § 450.113(a). AC 450.113-1, Level of Fidelity, provides guidance on when a high fidelity flight safety analysis is needed and how to determine the level of fidelity that is required. In situations when a high fidelity flight safety analysis is needed, this AC 450.115-1 provides guidance for performing that analysis in compliance with § 450.115(b). A high fidelity flight safety analysis may be required by § 450.115(b) for a particular phase or for all phases of flight. An operator’s flight safety analysis method must account for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures of safety-critical systems during nominal and non-nominal launch or reentry that could jeopardize public safety, in accordance with § 450.115(a). In accordance with § 450.115(b)(1), the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the public satisfies the safety criteria of § 450.101, including the use of mitigations, and account for all known sources of uncertainty, using a means of compliance accepted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The analysis must identify the dominant source of each type of public risk with a criterion in §§ 450.101(a) or 450.101(b) in terms of phase of flight, source of hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or explosive debris), and failure mode, in accordance with § 450.115(b)(2).
The FAA considers this AC an accepted means of compliance for complying with the regulatory requirements of § 450.115(b). It presents one, but not the only, acceptable means of compliance with the associated regulatory requirements. This AC assists with performing a high fidelity flight safety analysis. The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. The document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
If you have suggestions for improving this AC, you may use the form at the end of this AC.
Wayne R. Monteith Associate Administrator Commercial Space Transportation
WAYNE R MONTEITH
WAYNE R MONTEITH
Digitally signed by WAYNE R MONTEITH Date: 2021.01.14 10:47:02 -05'00'
Contents
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ii
1 Purpose … 1
2 Applicability … 2
3 Applicable Regulations and Related Documents … 2
4 Definition of Terms … 5
5 Overview … 6
6 Mission Definition and Hazard Identification … 8
6.1 Mission Description … 8
6.1 Mission Description … 8
6.2 Identifying Hazards and Hazard Producing Events … 13
6.3 Hazard Management to Minimize Public Risk … 14
7 Hazardous Debris Characterization … 15
7.1 Developing Hazardous Debris Lists for Range Safety Analyses … 15
7.2 Effect of Type of Vehicle Breakup on Hazardous Debris List … 19
7.2 Effect of Type of Vehicle Breakup on Hazardous Debris List … 19
7.3 Effect of Vehicle Structural Characteristics and Materials on Breakup Hazardous Debris List … 22
7.4 Effect of Energetics in the Vehicle on Breakup on Hazardous Debris List … 23
7.5 Steps for Developing Hazardous Debris Fragment Lists … 26
7.6 Hazardous Debris Containing Toxic Material … 30
8 Aerodynamic and Harmful Debris Characteristics … 30
8 Aerodynamic and Harmful Debris Characteristics … 30
8.1 Ballistic Coefficients … 30
8.2 Drag Coefficient Estimates for Continuum Flow … 31
8.3 Drag in Transitional and Free Molecular Flow Regimes … 32
8.4 Lift uncertainty … 33
8.5 Required Information in the Hazardous Debris Model … 34
8.6 Consideration for Grouping Hazardous Debris to a Hazardous Debris Group … 35
8.6 Consideration for Grouping Hazardous Debris to a Hazardous Debris Group … 35
8.7 Description of the Hazardous Debris Group … 35
9 Propagation of Hazardous debris to Impact … 39
9.1 Atmospheric Data for Propagation … 40
9.2 Failure and Planned Event State Vectors … 42
9.3 Statistical Trajectory Set … 46
9.4 Ballistic Trajectory Generation … 47
9.4 Ballistic Trajectory Generation … 47
9.5 Residual Thrust … 49
Contents (continued)
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9.6 Directed Lift … 50
9.7 Progressive Breakup and Breakup Fragment Shedding … 50
9.8 Hazardous Debris Demise … 51
10 Impact Probability Distribution … 51
10.1 Impact Probability … 51
10.2 Gaussian Distribution … 52
10.2 Gaussian Distribution … 52
10.3 Skewed Distribution … 52
10.4 Histogram Distribution … 53
10.5 3-dimensional Impact Probability … 54
11 Consequence Modeling … 54
11.1 Types of Consequences … 55
11.2 Inert Hazardous Debris … 57
11.3 Unsheltered People … 58
11.4 Casualty Areas … 61
11.5 Probability of Casualty Area … 63
11.5 Probability of Casualty Area … 63
11.6 Potential for Roof Penetration … 63
11.7 People in Waterborne Vessels (Ships) … 68
11.8 People in Aircraft … 70
11.9 Explosive Hazardous Debris … 72
11.10 Yield Models … 73
11.11 Liquid Propellant Yield … 74
11.12 Solid Propellant Yield … 75
11.13 Sympathetic Yields from Multiple Motors … 78
11.13 Sympathetic Yields from Multiple Motors … 78
11.14 Impacting Propellants for Unsheltered People … 79
11.15 Blast Wave Overpressure … 79
11.16 People in Structures … 82
11.17 Floor Fire … 85
11.18 Blast Wave Overpressure … 86
11.19 People in Waterborne Vessels (Ships) … 89
11.20 Toxic Emitters … 91
11.20 Toxic Emitters … 91
Contents (continued)
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11.21 Secondary Hazardous Debris Fragments … 91
11.22 Intact Impact Vehicle … 92
11.23 Intact Propellant Tank Secondary Hazardous Debris … 92
11.24 Inert Fragment Splatter … 93
12 Risk Computation … 93
12.1 How Risk is Expressed … 93
12.2 Risks to Population Centers and Protected Objects … 94
12.3 Probability of Hazardous Debris Generating Event … 95
12.3 Probability of Hazardous Debris Generating Event … 95
12.4 Probability of Impact … 95
12.5 Individual Risk … 97
12.6 Conditional Casualty Expectation … 97
12.7 Aggregate Risk … 98
12.8 Analysis … 99
13 Flight Hazard Area Definition … 100
13.1 Sources of Hazards … 100
13.2 Flight Hazard Areas … 101
13.3 Examples of Specific Flight Hazard Areas … 101
13.3 Examples of Specific Flight Hazard Areas … 101
13.4 Contour Grids and their Durations … 101
13.5 Development of NOTMARs … 102
13.6 Development of NOTAMs … 103
13.7 Development of Land Hazard Areas … 103
14 Satisfying Applicant Submission Requirements … 104
14.1 Nominal and Failure Trajectories … 104
14.2 Failure and Planned Event State Vectors … 105
14.2 Failure and Planned Event State Vectors … 105
14.3 Breakup and Jettisoned Hazardous Debris … 105
14.4 Probability of Failure … 106
14.5 Requirements for Flight Hazard Areas … 106
14.6 Hazardous Debris Propagation and Impact Distributions … 106
14.7 People and Assets … 107
14.8 Consequence and Risk … 107
14.8 Consequence and Risk … 107
Contents (continued)
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Figures
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Figure 1—Comparison of Various Skew-Normal Curves … 53
Figure 2—Probability of Casualty Curves for Non-Mission Essential, Vertical Impact to Head, Blunt Injury … 59
Figure 3—Probability of Casualty Curves for Non-Mission Essential, Sphere Impacting Chest, Blunt Injury … 59
Figure 4—Probability of Casualty Curves for Non-Mission Essential, Sphere Impacting Abdomen, Blunt Injury … 60
Figure 5—Probability of Casualty Curves for Non-Mission Essential Sphere Impacting Leg, Blunt Injury … 60
Figure 6—Illustration of a Wood Built-Up Roof … 63
Figure 7—Effective Casualty Areas of Hazardous Debris Hitting a Light Metal Roof (Class A)66
Figure 8—Effective Casualty Areas of Hazardous Debris Hitting a Wood Roof (Class B) … 66
Figure 9—Effective Casualty Areas of Hazardous Debris Hitting a Composite Roof (Class C) . 67
Figure 10—Effective Casualty Areas of Hazardous Debris Hitting a Concrete Reinforced with Steel Roof (Class D) … 67
Figure 11—Sample Aircraft Vulnerable Projected Areas … 72
Figure 12—Peak Overpressure vs. Scaled Distance from Blast Waves … 73
Figure 13—Impulse vs. Scaled Distance from Blast Waves … 74
Figure 14—Yield Curves for Liquid Propellants on Hard Surfaces … 75
Figure 15—HD 1.1 Propellant Yield Model … 76
Figure 16—Yield Curves for Motor Segment Side-On Impacts on Sand … 77
Figure 17—Yield Curves for Cube Chunks Impacting on Sand … 77
Figure 18—Yield Curves for 120ᵒ CAS Side-On Impacts on Sand … 78
Figure 19—Probability of Serious Injury to a Lung … 80
Figure 20—Probability of Serious GI Tract Injury … 81
Figure 21—Probability of Serious Larynx Injury … 81
Figure 22—Probability of Serious Eardrum Rupture … 82
Figure 23 –Wood Roof Effective Casualty Area Ratio as a Function of Roof Area and Yield ... 83
Figure 24—Steel Roof Effective Casualty Area Ratio as a Function of Roof Area and Yield .... 84
Contents (continued)
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Figure 25—Reinforced Concrete Roof Effective Casualty Area Ratio as a Function of Roof Area and Yield … 84
Figure 26—Normalized Casualty Areas vs. Heat Load … 86
Figure 27—Probability of Casualty for a Small Wood Structure, ~2500 ft2 … 87
Figure 28—Large Annealed Windows (~5’H x 6’W x 0.232”T), GAR = 14.5% … 88
Figure 29—Calculation of the Risk to a Population Center Due to the Impact of an Explosive Fragment … 97
Tables
Number Page
Table 1—Sub-Critical Drag Coefficients for Spheres … 31
Table 2—Drag Coefficients with L/D=4 for Randomly Tumbling Cylinder … 32
Table 3—Drag Coefficients for a Randomly Tumbling Rectangular Box … 32
Table 4- Example Values for Lift Uncertainty … 34
Table 5 – AIS Severity Levels … 56
Table 6 – Coefficients of Restitution … 62
Table 7 - Representative Building Classes … 65
Table 8 – Threshold Values for Significant Hull Damage … 69
Table 9 – Threshold Values for Ship Cabin and Deck Penetration … 70
Table 10 – Generic Window Types … 88
Table 11 – Water Impact Distances That Lead to Casualty … 90
Table 12 – Ship Explosive Effective Casualty Areas for People Below Deck … 90
1 PURPOSE. This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance and a comprehensive method for performing a high fidelity flight safety analysis in accordance with title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) § 450.115. AST drafted AC 450-113-1, Level of Fidelity, to help an operator determine the level of fidelity of the analysis required by § 450.115(b). In situations when a high fidelity flight safety analysis is needed, this AC provides guidance for performing that analysis in compliance with § 450.115(b). A high fidelity flight safety analysis may be required by § 450.115(b) for a particular phase or for all phases of flight.
1.1 Analysis Scope.
An operator’s flight safety analysis method must account for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures of safety-critical systems during nominal and non-nominal launch or reentry that could jeopardize public safety, in accordance with § 450.115(a). In accordance with § 450.115(b)(1), the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the public satisfies the safety criteria of § 450.101, including the use of mitigations, and account for all known sources of uncertainty, using a means of compliance accepted by the FAA Administrator. In accordance with § 450.115(b)(2), the analysis must identify the dominant source of each type of public risk with a criterion in §§ 450.101(a) or 450.101(b) in terms of phase of flight, source of hazard (such as toxic exposure, inert, or explosive debris), and failure mode. In accordance with § 450.101(g), for any analysis used to demonstrate compliance with § 450.115(b), an operator must use accurate data and scientific principles, and the analysis must be statistically valid. Also in accordance with § 450.101(g), the method must produce results consistent with or more conservative than the results available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.
1.2 Description of Methods.
To satisfy the requirements of § 450.115(c), an applicant must submit a description of the flight safety analysis methodology, including identification of:
The scientific principles and statistical methods used;
All assumptions and their justifications;
The rationale for the level of fidelity;
The evidence for validation and verification required by § 450.101(g);
The extent to which the benchmark conditions are comparable to the foreseeable
conditions of the intended operations; and
The extent to which risk mitigations were accounted for in the analyses.
1.3 Level of Imperatives.
This AC presents one, but not the only, acceptable means of compliance with the associated regulatory requirements. The FAA will consider other means of compliance
that an applicant may elect to present. Other means of regulatory compliance may be acceptable, but must be approved by the FAA Administrator in accordance with § 450.35(a)(1). In addition, an operator may tailor the provisions of this AC to meet its unique needs, provided the changes are accepted as a means of compliance by FAA. Throughout this document, the word “must” characterizes statements that directly follow from regulatory text and therefore reflect regulatory mandates. The word “should” describes a requirement if electing to use this means of compliance; variation from these requirements is possible, but must be justified and accepted by the FAA as an alternative means of compliance. The word “may” describes variations or alternatives allowed within the accepted means of compliance set forth in this AC. In general, these alternative approaches can be used only under certain situations that do not compromise safety.
2 APPLICABILITY.
2.1 The guidance in this AC is for launch and reentry vehicle applicants and operators required to comply with 14 CFR part 450. The guidance in this AC is for those seeking a launch or reentry vehicle operator license, a licensed operator seeking to renew or modify an existing vehicle operator license, and FAA commercial space transportation evaluators.
2.2 The material in this AC is advisory in nature and does not constitute a regulation. This guidance is not legally binding in its own right, and will not be relied upon by the FAA as a separate basis for affirmative enforcement action or other administrative penalty. Conformity with this guidance document (as distinct from existing statutes and regulations) is voluntary only, and nonconformity will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations. This AC describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations.
2.3 The material in this AC does not change or create any additional regulatory requirements, nor does it authorize changes to, or deviations from, existing regulatory requirements.
3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS.
3.1 Related Statute.
51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, Chapter 509.
3.2 Related Regulations. The following regulations from titles 14 and 49 of the CFR must be accounted for when showing compliance with 14 CFR § 450.115. The full text of these regulations can be downloaded from the U.S. Government Printing Office e-CFR. A paper copy can be ordered from the Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Attn: New Orders, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA, 15250-7954.
Section 401.7, Definitions.
Section 450.35, Means of Compliance.
Section 450.101, Safety Criteria.
Section 450.103, System Safety Program.
Section 450.108, Flight Abort.
Section 450.113, Flight Safety Analysis Requirements—Scope.
Section 450.117, Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight.
Section 450.119, Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight.
Section 450.121, Debris analysis.
Section 450.123, Population Exposure Analysis.
Section 450.131, Probability of Failure Analysis.
Section 450.133, Flight Hazard Area Analysis.
Section 450.135, Debris Risk Analysis.
Section 450.137 Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis.
Section 450.139 Toxic Hazards for Flight.
Section 450.161, Control of Hazard Areas.
Section 450.213, Pre-flight Reporting.
3.3 Related FAA Advisory Circulars. FAA Advisory Circulars (will be available through the FAA website, http://www.faa.gov).
AC 450.101-1, High Consequence Event Protection.
AC 450.108-1, Using Flight Abort Rule as a Hazard Control Strategy.
AC 450.110-1, Physical Containment Flight Safety Analysis.
AC 450.117-1, Normal and Malfunction Trajectory Analysis.
AC 450.123-1, Population Exposure Analysis.
AC 450.137-1, Distant Focusing Overpressure (DFO) Risk Analysis.
AC 450.139-1, Toxic Hazards Analysis and Thresholds.
3.4 Technical Reports Related to High Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis.
1. Allahdadi, Firooz A., Isabelle Rongier, Tommaso Sgobba, Paul D. Wilde (Eds.), Safety Design for Space Operations, Sponsored by The International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, published by Elsevier, Watham, MA, 2013.
2. Anderson, John D., Modern Compressible Flow: With Historical Perspective, McGraw-Hill Education, dated 2003.
3. Baker, W.E., et al., Workbook for estimating effects of accidental explosions in propellant ground handling and transport systems, NASA Contractor Report 3023, August 1978, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19790002055.
4. Baker, W.E., et al., Workbook for predicting pressure wave and fragment effects of exploding propellant tanks and gas storage vessels, NASA Contractor Report 134906, September 1977, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19760012208.
5. Bonson, S.P. Aerodynamic Characteristics for Debris from Space Shuttle External Tank, dated May 23, 2012. https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/3.57727.
6. Collins, Jon D., Randolph Nyman, and Isaac Lotatti, Estimation of Space Shuttle Orbiter Reentry Debris Casualty Area, AIAA Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference and Exhibit, August 2005, AIAA Paper 2005-6321. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2005-6321.
7. Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report Vol. 1, NASA, Washington, D.C. August, 2003.
8. Department of Defense World Geodetic System 1984, NIMA TR8350.2, Third Edition, Amendment 1, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, January 2000.
9. Eck, M. and M. Mukunda, On the nature of the fragment environment created by the range destruction or random failure of solid rocket motor casings. Fairchild Space, Report FSC-ESD-217-88-426, July 1988, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19920005979.
10. Hoerner, Sighard F., Fluid Dynamic Drag, Published by the Author, Midland Park, New Jersey, 1965.
11. Global Reference Atmospheric Model (GRAM) Suite: https://software.nasa.gov/software/MFS-33888-1.
12. Iqbal, Naeem, Mark Salley, and Sunil Weerakkody, Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs) Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the USNRC Fire Protection Inspection Program, NUREG-1805, Washington, DC, November 2004.
13. Julier, Simon J., and Jeffery K. Uhlmann, A General Method for Approximating Nonlinear Transformations of Probability Distributions, Technical report, RRG, Dept. of Eng. Science, University of Oxford, Nov 1996.
14. Kingery, C. N. and Bulmash, G., Airblast Parameters from TNT Spherical Air Burst and Hemispherical Surface Burst, ARBRL-TR-02555, Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1984.
15. Koppenwallner, G., The Drag of Simple Shaped Bodies in the Rarefied Hypersonic Flow Regime, AIAA 20th Thermophysics Conference Williamsburg, VA, 1985.
16. Kuo, Kenneth K. Fundamentals of Solid-Propellant Combustion, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, dated October, 1984.
17. Lambert, Jack D., Computational Methods in Ordinary Differential Equations, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1977.
18. Larson, Erik W.F, and George M. Lloyd, Application of Kernel Density Estimation to Impact Probability Density Determination for Risk Analysis, 48th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting Including the New Horizons Forum and Aerospace Exposition, Orlando Florida, January 2010.
19. Manning, Ted A. and Scott L. Lawrence, Fragment Acceleration Modeling for Pressurized Tank Burst, Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 54, No. 3, May-June 2017. https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/full/10.2514/1.A33765.
20. Pike J. A., Injury Scaling, Automotive Safety, Anatomy, Injury, Testing and Regulation, Published by Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., SAE, 1990.
21. Richardson, Erin, et al, Richardson, Erin, et al, Monte Carlo Approach to Modeling the Breakup of the Space Launch System EM-1 Core Stage with an Integrated Blast and Fragment Catalogue, dated December 8, 2014. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20150002599.
22. Risk Committee, Range Safety Group, Range Commanders Council, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, RCC 321-20 and RCC 321-20 Supplement, White Sands, NM 2020. https://www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Documents/321- 20_Common_Risk_Criteria_Test_Ranges/321- 20_Common_Risk_Criteria_Test_Ranges.pdf.
23. Snyder, M.W., Analysis of Video Imagery of the Reentry and Breakup of the STS-31 External Tank, dated August 6, 2002. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/576656.
24. Wilde, Paul D., and Chris Draper, Aircraft Protection Standards and Implementation Guidelines for Range Safety, 48th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting Including the New Horizons Forum and Aerospace Exposition, Orlando Florida, January 2010.
4 DEFINITION OF TERMS. For this AC, the following terms and definitions apply:
4.1 Event Scenario. A specific failure of a vehicle defined by its failure response mode and breakup list.
4.2 Fragment Class. A fragment or set of fragments with similar characteristics that is defined by a representative fragment and the number of fragments it represents.
4.3 Hazard. Any real or potential condition that could cause injury, illness, or death of people; or damage to or loss of equipment or property.
4.4 Hazardous Debris. Any object or substance capable of causing a casualty or loss of functionality to a critical asset. Hazardous debris includes inert debris and explosive debris such as an
intact vehicle, vehicle fragments, any detached vehicle component whether intact or in fragments, payload, and any planned jettison bodies.
4.5 Intact. A vehicle or any detached motor that is substantially intact during ballistic flight, even though there may be some missing pieces.
4.6 Malfunction Turn Failures. Events that can lead to the vehicle deviating outside of its normal trajectory bounds including all behavior ranging from gradual turns to rapid turns.
4.7 Mission. The launch or reentry vehicle description and its intended operation, the flight profile, the flight safety system, and the flight abort rules under which the operation will be conducted.
4.8 Monte Carlo Simulation. A simulation in which random statistical sampling techniques are employed to determine estimates for unknown values. Monte Carlo methods include computational algorithms that, for example, repeatedly sample from probability distributions that characterize input parameters (such as the weight, thrust, and drag of a vehicle) and perform physics-based simulations to obtain numerical results (such as a set of trajectories that characterize flight under normal or malfunction conditions).
4.9 Uncertainty. The absence of perfectly detailed knowledge of input to the risk analysis models, but not in the definition of the models. Uncertainty includes incertitude (the exact value is unknown) and variability (the value is changing). Uncertainty may also include other forms such as vagueness, ambiguity, and fuzziness (in the sense of border-line cases).
5 OVERVIEW. In accordance with § 450.115(a), an operator’s flight safety analysis method must account for all reasonably foreseeable events and failures of safety-critical systems during nominal and non-nominal launch or reentry that could jeopardize public safety. AC 450.113-1 can be used to determine the level of fidelity for flight safety analysis. Once an operator has determined that a high fidelity flight safety analysis is required, the method in paragraph 5.1 of this AC 450.115-1 can be used.
5.1 High-fidelity Flight Safety Analysis Method.
5.1.1 The first step in performing a high-fidelity flight safety analysis is to collect existing relevant input, and define and create input unique to the high-fidelity analysis. Input should include the following:
Mission information identified in paragraph 6.1 of this AC.
A probability of failure analysis that must be performed to comply with § 450.131;
see AC 450.131-1 Probability of Failure Analysis.
All vehicle normal and malfunction trajectories as specified in §§ 450.117 and
450.119; see AC 450.117-1 Normal and Malfunction Trajectory Analysis.
The flight abort rules required by § 450.108; see AC 450.108-1 Flight Abort Rule
Development.
The vehicle break-up limits that are required by § 450.121(d)(2).
5.1.2 The second step is to identify hazards and hazard producing events. The operator should apply the flight abort rules and vehicle break-up limits to the normal and malfunction trajectories to obtain a set of failure events, in accordance with the requirements of § 450.108(f). These failure events, and all planned events, should be specified by state vectors that are defined by mean time of failure, position and velocity at the failure event point, and the probability of the failure occurring. An operator should follow the hazard identification analysis of paragraph 6.2 of this AC.
5.1.3 The third step is to develop a debris list, in accordance with the debris analysis requirements of § 450.121(a) and (b), which has two parts:
1. Characterization of the hazardous debris resulting from a hazard producing event using chapter 7 of this AC.
2. Quantitative description of the hazardous debris in terms of aerodynamic and harmful characteristics using chapter 8 of this AC.
5.1.4 The fourth step is to perform a risk analysis that computes individual risk, collective risk, risk to aircraft, and risk to any critical assets. Computing risk can be an iterative process if the computed risk exceeds the risk thresholds of § 450.101 and then additional mitigations are identified. To compute risk, an operator should perform the following steps:
1. Propagate the hazardous debris to impact to comply with § 450.121(c) using the procedure in chapter 9 of this AC.
2. Calculate a probability of impact distribution in accordance with § 450.117(a)(1) using chapter 10 of this AC.
3. Determine the population exposure to hazards resulting from hazard producing events using the consequence modeling approach of chapter 11 of this AC.
4. Compute risk using chapter 12 of this AC.
5.1.5 The fifth step is to use the results of the risk analysis to define flight hazard areas using chapter 13 of this AC. The operator should provide information to construct:
Waterborne vessel hazard areas, i.e., Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs) in
accordance with § 450.133(b),
Land hazard areas in accordance with § 450.133(c), and
Airspace hazard volumes, i.e., Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), to comply with
§ 450.133(d) requirements.
5.1.6 The sixth step is to document all previous steps to comply with § 450.113(a).
6 MISSION DEFINITION AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION. For the flight safety analysis discussion, the term “mission” is defined to include the launch or reentry vehicle description, the flight profile, the flight safety system, and the flight abort rules under which the operation will be conducted. The hazard control strategy determination involves the description of all functional failures associated with reasonably foreseeable hazardous events that have the capability to create a hazard to the public, in accordance with the functional failure analysis required by § 450.107(b)(1). These hazardous events should be described in terms of the type of vehicle breakup. A discussion of types of vehicle breakups appears in paragraph 7.1 of this AC. When an operator uses flight hazard analysis as a hazard control strategy, a flight hazard analysis must identify, describe, and analyze all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety resulting from the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle, in accordance with § 450.109(b). The following subparagraphs address the factors and requirements for defining a mission, and the approach for identifying hazardous events that could create hazardous debris.
6.1 Mission Description. Prior to the start of a flight safety analysis, several aspects of the mission should be described a manner that conveys an understanding of the launch or reentry vehicle, its performance, and its potential modes of failure. The objective and details of the mission must be identified in accordance with §§ 450.41(e)(4), 450.117, and 450.213(b). The flight safety analysis is constrained by a set of flight abort rules, if an operator is using this hazard control strategy, when flight abort is used in accordance with § 450.108 as a hazard control strategy for the flight or phase of flight of a launch or reentry vehicle to meet the safety criteria of § 450.101. In accordance with § 450.108(f), the mission description must include all flight abort rules and the specific steps that will be followed to implement a flight abort.
6.1.1 Defining the Vehicle/System. Details of the vehicle configuration must be documented in accordance with § 450.45(e)(3), including all vehicle systems, such as structural, thermal, pneumatic, etc. In accordance with § 450.167, this also includes instrumentation used to track the position and velocity of the vehicle. Such instrumentation can include telemetry, GPS receivers, and transponders, as well as the associated tracking rates, and the accuracy of these data.
6.1.1.1 Vehicle Propellants. For each of the vehicle’s motors or stages, the type of solid or liquid propellant must be identified, in accordance with § 450.45(e)(3)(i) and should include the characteristics of these propellants. It may be appropriate to include propellant mass and density, rate of burning – at both operating pressures and ambient pressures, propellant shape within the motor for solid propellants, and previous flight history including potential variations in the thrust (average, maximum, and minimum) as part of the propellant identification required by § 450.45(e)(3)(i). The state of the vehicle and the accounting for all motors/stages should be specified by its mass properties as a function of flight time.
6.1.1.2 Sources of Hazardous Debris and Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction Flight. The actions of the guidance and control systems that affect a vehicle’s performance and responses must be quantified if those parameters meet the condition set in accordance with § 450.119(b)(3). This quantification should include details of the thrust vector control actions, attitude control thrusters, aerodynamic surfaces or fins. In accordance with § 450.119(a), the vehicle deviation capability in the event of a malfunction must be identified. This should be defined in terms of velocity turn data or malfunction turn trajectories, and should include turning capability over a range of thrust offsets and/or aerodynamic surface displacements, including the maximum values of these parameters. As applicable, turn data for failures such as nozzle burn through should be included, and solid rocket motor case burn through, or structural failure of an aerodynamic surface. For additional detail regarding trajectory analysis, refer to AC 450.117-1, Normal and Malfunction Trajectory Analysis.
6.1.1.3 Trajectory Analysis Reports for Malfunction Flight. Non-nominal flight may lead to vehicle breakup. In accordance with § 450.119(b), the analysis must include descriptions of how the vehicle can fail (failure modes) and vehicle response to these failures. This should account for the effects of aerodynamic heating on the material properties and document the structural limits of the vehicle for withstanding aerodynamic and inertial loads. A Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and/or a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) should be used to determine the potential vehicle failures and responses. These analyses should also be used to inform the failure probabilities estimated for each failure mode.
6.1.2 Defining the Mission Scenario. To perform a high-fidelity flight safety analysis, it is necessary to define a launch or reentry mission in sufficient detail to meet §§ 450.41(e)(4), 450.117, and 450.213(b). This includes the mission objectives, a description of the launch or reentry vehicle, a description of the intended vehicle flight profile and potential variations, and identification of the locations and regions that will be affected by a normal mission.
6.1.2.1 Launch and Reentry Mission Activities. Launch begins when hazardous pre-flight operations commence at a U.S. launch site that may pose a threat to the public. Hazardous pre-flight operations that may pose a threat to the public include pressurizing or loading of propellants into the vehicle, operations involving a fueled launch vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary to initiate flight, or any hazardous activity preparing the vehicle for flight. Hazardous pre-flight operations do not include the period between the end of the previous launch and launch vehicle reuse, when the vehicle is in a safe and dormant state, in accordance with § 450.3(b). A reentry mission includes activities conducted in Earth orbit or outer space to determine reentry readiness and that are critical to ensuring public health and safety and the safety of property during reentry flight. Reentry also includes activities necessary to return the reentry vehicle, or vehicle component, to a safe condition on the ground after impact or landing, in accordance with § 450.3(c).
6.1.2.2 Mission Objectives and Constraints. An applicant must define the primary mission objectives and constraints in accordance with § 450.213(b). This includes a thorough description of the payload or reentry vehicle; including the class and function, physical dimensions and weight, payload owner and operator, intended payload operations during its lifetime, amounts and types of hazardous and radioactive materials in the payload, and the explosive potential of materials in the payload. For an orbital mission, mission objectives should also include the range of intermediate and final orbits of each vehicle upper stage and payload, and estimated orbital lifetimes, including the parameters defining parking, transfer and final orbits, approximate transit times to final orbit, and designated reentry site(s) for each object to be deorbited.
6.1.2.3 Mission-specific Description.
In accordance with § 450.45(e)(3) must provide a written description of the vehicle or family of vehicles, which should include the model, type, configuration, and characteristics of the launch vehicle, or family of vehicles, proposed for launch or reentry. In accordance with § 450.45(e)(3), this written description includes, but is not limited to structural, thermal, pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, and avionics and guidance systems used in each vehicle, and all propellants. The description must include a table specifying the type and quantities of all hazardous materials on each vehicle and must include propellants, explosives, and toxic materials. For pressurized tanks and motors, it should include data specifying pressure versus flight time. For all periods of thrust, the description should include thrust versus flight time, with relevant uncertainties, and nozzle inlet, throat and exit areas. In accordance with § 450.45(e)(3) the vehicle description must include drawings that identify each stage, including strap-on motors; physical dimensions, which should
include enough lengths, widths, thicknesses, angles of curvature to produce a fully dimensioned outer-mold line and relevant material response to external loads; location of all safety-critical systems; location of all major vehicle control systems, propulsion systems, pressure vessels, and any other hardware that contains potential hazardous energy or hazardous material. In accordance with § 450.117(d)(2), the applicant must submit quantitative input data, including uncertainties, sufficient to model the vehicle’s normal flight in six degrees of freedom, which includes mass properties such as the nominal center of gravity and moments of inertia versus flight time with relevant uncertainties. In accordance with § 450.121(d)(2), the applicant must submit a description of the methods used to perform the vehicle impact and breakup analysis, which should include the vehicle’s structural limits. For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, the description should identify the location of the rocket’s center of pressure in relation to its center of gravity for the entire flight profile. For a guided launch vehicle, the description must include a complete set of relevant aerodynamic coefficients, including uncertainties, sufficient to describe a 6 degree-of-freedom simulation for normal flight in accordance with § 450.117(d)(2).
6.1.2.4 Intended Vehicle Flight Profile and Potential Variations. For each proposed vehicle flight profile, the flight azimuths, trajectories, associated ground tracks and instantaneous impact points must be defined for the duration of the licensed activity, including any contingency abort profiles, in accordance with § 450.41(e)(4). To comply with § 450.117(a), the trajectory data must include the nominal trajectory as well as sets of trajectories sufficient to characterize variability in accordance with § 450.117(a)(1) and uncertainty in accordance with § 450.117(a)(2) during normal flight. Variability should describe how the intended trajectory could vary due to conditions known prior to initiation of flight. Uncertainty should describe how the actual trajectory could differ from the intended trajectory due to random uncertainties in all parameters with a significant influence on the vehicle’s behavior throughout normal flight.
6.1.2.5 Trajectory Analysis Outputs and Abort Flight Profiles. The trajectory data should provide a fuel exhaustion trajectory that produces instantaneous impact points with the greatest range for any given time after liftoff for any stage that has the potential to impact the Earth. Vehicles using flight abort as a hazard control strategy require trajectory data or parameters that describe the limits of a useful mission in accordance with § 450.119(a)(3). Also, any contingency abort flight profiles should be defined. The trajectory analysis outputs required by § 450.117(d) should include the position, velocity, and vacuum instantaneous impact point for each second of flight, and the planned sequence of events or maneuvers during flight.
6.1.2.6 Flight Mission Limits. Under § 450.119(c)(4)(iii), the description must also provide the trajectory data that characterize the limits of a useful mission, i.e., one that can attain one or more mission objectives. This should include specification of the worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and a description of how the operator will evaluate the wind conditions and uncertainty in the wind conditions prior to initiating the operation.
6.1.2.7 Wind Weighting. For an unguided suborbital launch vehicle, under § 450.111(b), the wind weighting safety system must describe how the launcher azimuth and elevation settings will be wind weighted to correct for the effects of wind conditions at the time of flight to provide a safe impact location.
6.1.2.8 Affected Locations and Regions. The launch or reentry site should be defined, including any contingency abort locations. This includes the boundaries of the launch and landing (or impact) point locations for all mission hardware, including latitude and longitude, as well as identification of any facilities at the sites that will be used for pre- or post-flight ground operations. For all launch, reentry, or disposal sites, this should include all regions of sea, land, or air that contain, with 97 percent probability of containment, all hazardous debris resulting from normal flight events capable of causing a casualty, in accordance with §§ 450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and (d)(1). Also, all areas of land that could be overflown by a normal mission, including variations and uncertainty in the trajectory, must be depicted in accordance with § 450.108(g)(3) whenever flight abort is used as a hazard control strategy.
6.1.3 Defining Flight Safety Systems. In accordance with § 450.119(b)(4), a high-fidelity flight safety analysis must account for the potential for failure of a flight safety system (FSS), if any. An FSS may be required to control, contain, or mitigate hazards to satisfy the flight safety criteria of § 450.101. In accordance with § 450.101(c)(1), an operator can protect against a high consequence event in uncontrolled areas for each phase of flight by using flight abort as a hazard control strategy with an FSS that meets the requirements of § 450.108 if any reasonably foreseeable failure response mode could result in conditional expected casualties for uncontrolled areas, as defined in § 401.7, that exceed 1 x 10-2.
6.1.3.1 Mitigating Risk of a Flight Safety System. The FSS may need to be used for each stage of flight that poses a hazard in accordance with § 450.108(a), and its response should be correlated with the nature of the abort and the hazards to be mitigated. The FSS may result in termination of vehicle thrust by cutting the flow of propellants to the rocket engine, resulting in a landing or other non-destructive outcomes. This is usually the case for pilot initiation of the FSS. Alternately, it may be a destruct system that terminates thrust using
charges to cut open the propellant tanks and disperse liquid propellants or to depressurize solid propellant motors, which will likely result in the breakup of the vehicle and potentially yield an explosion.
6.1.3.2 Use of a Time Delay Analysis. The design of the FSS must include a time delay analysis, in accordance with § 450.108(d)(4). This analysis should establish the mean and uncertainty distribution for the elapsed time between the violation of a flight abort rule and the time when the flight safety system is capable of aborting flight for use in establishing flight safety limits. Considerations for the FSS design should include whether it is activated by remote command, e.g., a Missile Flight Control Officer (including a pilot), triggered by a premature separation system such as lanyard pull, or automatically triggered by an on-board autonomous flight safety system.
6.2 Identifying Hazards and Hazard Producing Events. In accordance with § 450.109(b), if an operator conducts a flight hazard analysis for this phase of flight, the mission scenario must identify reasonably foreseeable hazardous events. This should include evaluating the hazards from hazardous debris if an undesirable situation occurs during flight, and quantification of the subsequent risk to people and assets. Following the identification of the hazardous debris hazard producing events, a thorough review should be performed to confirm that all events have been identified and that these events are reasonable and foreseeable for the specific launch or reentry vehicle and mission plan.
6.2.1 Vehicle Impact and Breakup Analysis. The hazardous debris generating hazardous events must include the potential for structural breakup of the vehicle pursuant to § 450.121(b), which can include explosive events that occur during a malfunction due to aerodynamic, inertial, and heating loads acting on the vehicle. Destruct breakup of the vehicle resulting from activation of the flight safety system due to violation of a mission flight abort rule should also be considered under § 450.121(b). Potential events that could result in vehicle breakup while following a normal trajectory include: an explosion, rupture of a motor case or other pressure vessel, solid rocket motor burn-through, or structural failure due to loads (thrust, aerodynamic, inertial). Events that could lead to a vehicle deviating outside of its normal trajectory bounds are referred to as malfunction turn failures and include all behavior ranging from gradual turns to rapid turns resulting in a tumbling vehicle. They may also include gravity turns wherein the vehicle attitude is controlled to maintain a zero or near zero angle of attack.
6.2.2 Failed Motor Event Hazards. Potential hazards from failed motor events should be identified. This includes inadvertent separation between stages of a vehicle or of a strap-on solid rocket motor. This should be addressed during normal flight and during a vehicle malfunction. The analysis should consider if any motors can fail to ignite during staging or fail to shut down at the planned event times.
6.2.3 Planned Jettisoned Hazardous Debris. In accordance with § 450.109(b), if an operator is conducting a flight hazard analysis for this phase of flight, all reasonably foreseeable hazards to public safety for a planned mission must be identified. This can include planned jettisoned hazardous debris such as discarded stages, inter-stage hardware, hardware ejected prior to igniting a stage such as nozzle closures, support struts or rings, payload fairing pieces, and (for a sub-orbital launch) the payload. It can also include a planned intercept of the launch vehicle or vehicle payload with another launch vehicle or its payload.
6.3 Hazard Management to Minimize Public Risk. The ideal way to manage risk and minimize the hazards in the region of a launch or reentry is to conduct the operation in a remote area. In that case, hazards can be isolated and risks to the public can be minimized or possibly eliminated. However, complete containment of hazards generated by even a suborbital vehicle is usually not possible, because populated areas tend to encroach on even the most remote sites, and areas at risk become too large to accommodate reasonable surveillance and access control measures. In these situations, a flight safety system often becomes necessary in accordance with § 450.108(c)(6) to protect the public from the potential hazards associated with a launch or reentry activity. A flight safety system may be destructive or non-destructive. A traditional flight safety system designed to terminate a vehicle’s thrust and disperse its remaining propellants, resulting in falling vehicle breakup that results in inert fragments, is an example of a destructive system. Non-destructive flight safety systems include abort systems designed to render a vehicle non-propulsive, leading to potential recovery of an intact vehicle or its components. In either case, hazards to the public may still exist.
6.3.1 Risk Management of High Risk Areas. Risk management often includes the evacuation of people from high risk areas or the sheltering of people to minimize their exposure to the hazards. This includes the development of hazard areas (or corridors) from which pedestrian, motorized vehicle, train, waterborne vessel, and/or aircraft traffic are cleared.
6.3.2 Minimizing Risk using Timing and Scheduling of Mission. Another method often used to manage risk is to limit occurrence of a mission to a time when the risks are low. This includes restricting a mission to be initiated during favorable meteorological conditions during which dispersions of hazards will not reach populated areas, or the likelihood of causing casualties is sufficiently low to meet risk acceptance criteria. It also may include restrictions to specified times during the day or days of the week when population exposure is minimized.
6.3.3 Minimizing Risk by Modifying the Mission Profile. If the risk to the public or critical assets cannot be mitigated by containment of the hazards, or sheltering of people, the operator should modify the mission profile. Modifications to the mission profile can include:
Changing the launch azimuth to preclude or reduce the overflight of populated
areas,
Modification of the mission trajectory shaping (such as altitude as a function of
downrange location) to mitigate the potential spread of the hazard,
Adjusting the timing of planned debris events, such as jettisons,
Placing limits on the allowable dispersions of the vehicle from the intended
trajectory for which continued flight will be allowed (even if the vehicle has the potential to achieve a usable trajectory or provide the operator with useful data), or
Restricting launch during adverse wind conditions.
7 HAZARDOUS DEBRIS CHARACTERIZATION. In accordance with § 450.121(a), a flight safety analysis must include a debris analysis that characterizes the hazardous debris generated from normal and malfunctioning vehicle flight as a function of vehicle flight sequence. Normal flight-related hazardous debris events are due to planned jettisons such as spent stages, fairings, nozzle covers, and similar items. Vehicle breakup during on-trajectory normal flight can also occur due to aerodynamic forces, inertial forces, structural vibrations, thermal loads, and other effects that exceed the structural design limits of the vehicle. Malfunctioning vehicle flights that do not become orbital will result in vehicle breakup or intact impact. In this chapter, guidelines to develop hazardous debris lists or ‘hazardous debris catalogues’ for these vehicle breakup events are presented. The methods described here comply with §§ 450.121(b) and 450.121(d)(1), (2), and (5). In accordance with § 450.121(b), a debris analysis must account for:
Each reasonably foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup and intact impact;
Vehicle structural characteristics and materials; and
Energetic effects during break-up or at impact.
7.1 Developing Hazardous Debris Lists for Range Safety Analyses. Development of vehicle fragmentation characteristics given command destruct action, self-induced failure, or aerodynamic or aerothermal breakup is a statistically uncertain and semi-empirical process due to the myriad of potential outcomes. Vehicle designers understandably focus the majority of their engineering design time and expertise on optimizing nominal flight performance and vehicle loading within a normal range of thrust and angle of attack variations. When flight deviations become extreme to the point of vehicle mechanical failure, the mission is lost as far as the manufacturer and operator are concerned. However, the consequences of these potential failures are a primary concern for the protection of the public and for the assessment of associated risks. Hence, a quantitative description of the physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of hazardous debris are required by § 450.121(d)(5).
7.1.1 Characterizing Attributes of Hazardous Debris. Due to the uncertainties in break-up, manufacturers and operators are inclined to produce conservative debris lists rather than develop thousands of sets of high-fidelity
predictions. Explosive breakup and fragment accelerations are complex processes involving release of compressed gas energy, possible detonation of confined propellants, degree of propellant mixing, propellant deflagration combustion gas expansion, potential cryogenic liquid flashing, and impulse and drag effects on fragments. Accurate results from higher fidelity models pose the challenge of combining both flow dynamics and structural breakup integrated models. Higher fidelity models are inherently focused on narrow subsets of the solution space. Empirical data from test programs or observations from real-world failure events are essential data sets needed to validate or tune higher fidelity models or provide empirically defined initial conditions that are not explicitly modeled. Deterministic model simulations, field tests, and real-world failures constitute discrete samples of highly variable and uncertain processes. Ideally, a statistical modeling approach is desired to characterize the attributes of hazardous debris. Therefore, in accordance with § 450.101(g), the method must produce results consistent with or more conservative than the results available from previous mishaps, tests, or other valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods.
7.1.2 Debris Analysis Requirements. In accordance with § 450.121(b), a debris analysis must account for (1) each reasonably foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup and intact impact, (2) vehicle structural characteristics and materials, and (3) energetic effects during break-up or at impact. All models should be based on considerations of the loads and structural response that could be expected during flight, including the combined effects of:
Aerodynamic loads,
Thrust loads,
Effects of flight termination system action, such as ordnance,
Explosion of solid rocket propellant in flight or deflagrations from solid rocket
motors such as those that occur in a propellant burn-through,
Secondary liquid propellant mixing and fireball expansion loads,
Fracture mechanics, for example, from a failure of the pressurized liquid propellant
tanks, overpressure of a solid rocket motor or losing a nozzle in a solid rocket motor,
Breakup of rocket structural elements, such as interstages, avionics wafers, payload
attachments and fairings that do not act as a confinement surface for an energetic propellant, and
Fragmentation impact among structural elements during breakup.
Note: These processes generally occur as the mechanical failure progresses through high strain rates and non-linear plastic deformation of vehicle components. Vehicle manufactures possess the greatest amount of detailed information about the construction of their own launch vehicles. The analysis should bound the uncertainties involved. Debris catalogs are often a development that matures as knowledge of the vehicle matures. Initial assessments should err on the side of
conservatism towards public safety, and higher fidelity models should be applied if necessary to demonstrate compliance with the quantitative risk criteria in § 450.101.
7.1.3 Comparing to Hazardous Debris Data for Vehicle Failures. Actual failure events generally occur over broad ocean areas and most of the vehicle hazardous debris is seldom observed or recovered. When launch failures occur early in flight and the hazardous debris field is largely over land around the launch facility, (e.g., Titan 34D-9 at Vandenberg AFB), the ensuing accident investigation board generally focuses attention on investigation of the components that caused the launch failure (e.g., one solid rocket motor segment). The final accident report is often silent on the amount of total vehicle hazardous debris recovered. However, data does exist from some historic accidents and from some test campaigns. Debris catalog models must use results available from previous mishaps, tests – both for model accuracy and for assigning uncertainties around piece counts, sizes and imparted velocities in accordance with § 450.101(g). Small debris pieces generated during tests or accidents that may be hazardous to aircraft are of interest to debris list development but this class of fragment size may not have been collected or catalogued due to the difficulty in identifying and locating them or excessive time consumed attempting to collect them. Absence of such pieces in reported debris collections does not necessarily infer that these size classes were not generated, and, therefore the analysis should include uncertainties to account for ground rules applied in debris data collection campaigns.
7.1.4 Determining Population and Geographic Areas Affected by Hazardous Debris. Range safety analysts are also charged in accordance with § 450.133(a) through § 450.133(d) with attempting to evaluate post-vehicle failure hazardous debris impact hazards and risks to people and structures on the ground, and to ships or aircraft operating in the launch area or under the launch flight path. To perform such analyses, the analyst needs to give reasonable consideration, in accordance with § 450.121(a) through § 450.121(c), to the total amount of launch vehicle hazardous debris generated and to estimate the numbers, sizes, shapes, masses, demise characteristics, drag characteristics, lift characteristics, and explosive potential for each fragment category.
7.1.5 Required Vehicle Information to Develop Breakup Hazardous Debris Lists. Preparation of hazardous debris fragment lists resulting from failure-initiated vehicle destruction, planned jettison events, and intact impact events, should rely on several types of information. Ideally, empirical data defined from analysis of recovered hazardous debris is the most desirable. Such empirical data by itself is insufficient alone for the development of hazardous debris fragment lists because of the methods used to recover fragments after malfunctions usually only focus on the large, easily found pieces. The operator can use other information that could provide guidelines to assist in the development of hazardous debris fragment lists. Generally, this includes vehicle materials and methods of construction, and defining potential structural weaknesses. The following are typical sources of data that may be available:
7.1.5.1 Vehicle Structural Description. Descriptions of the vehicle and payload, including scaled diagrams that show the general arrangement and dimensions of components. Three-dimensional (3-dimensional) Computer Aided Design (CAD) drawings are typically prepared during the design and fabrication of space vehicles. These digital 3-dimensional drawings could provide most of the geometric and mass information needed for generating a hazardous debris list.
7.1.5.2 Propellant Tank(s), Engine(s) and/or Motor(s). Specifications of the engine and/or motor including case material (outer case, lining, insulation, thickness, density, strengths) should be provided, including descriptions of nozzles, steering mechanisms, propellant types and ingredients, propellant density, and propellant weights versus time in flight.
1. For solid motor propellant, the core radius (to outer edge of propellant), grain design, density, and internal pressure and web thickness versus time should be specified. For solid motor cases, lining and insulation, the thickness, density and material strengths, as well as the expected burst pressure should be specified.
2. For a liquid engines and associated tankage, the pumping and pressurization systems and associated stored energy, materials (thicknesses, densities, strengths), and pressurization, including expected operating pressures and burst pressures, should be specified.
3. For all tanks, engines, and motors, expected uncertainties around mass, dimensions, and material strengths should be specified.
7.1.5.3 Flight Termination and Other Destruct Systems. Descriptions of destruct systems (command, automatic, separation), which includes descriptions of components and activation mechanisms, exact locations of all charges (beginning point, length, gap, ending point), descriptions of delays in activation of charges, and a discussion of whether, and under what circumstances, a destruct might ignite a nonthrusting motor.
7.1.5.4 Trajectory Data. Trajectory data for a typical mission, which includes normal trajectories, malfunction trajectories, and event times (ignitions, steering programs, burnouts, jettisons). Trajectory data are used to obtain vehicle velocity, attitude or angle of attack, and altitude from which to calculate aerodynamic and inertial loads for use in estimating vehicle breakup. Event times are used to indicate vehicle configuration at each breakup time. Some vehicle breakup simulation models apply both internal and external pressure conditions to calculate fragment acceleration and maximum velocities. The external pressure is a function of vehicle
altitude, which can be obtained from the vehicle trajectory data. Additional detail regarding trajectory data is available in AC 450.117-1, Normal and Malfunction Trajectory Analysis.
7.1.5.5 Flight Abort Rules. Flight abort rules that define the allowable conditions for launch and activation of the flight safety system. These rules are detailed in AC 450.108-1, Using Flight Abort Rule as a Hazard Control Strategy.
7.1.5.6 Vehicle Material Properties and Design Limitations. Knowledge of the vehicle’s material properties, anticipated operating envelope, design limitations, and structural weak points (attachment points and points of transition between component geometries), and test results including the static and dynamic failure strengths of load-bearing components. Material properties should include, with associated uncertainties: density, yield and ultimate strengths, specific heat, thermal conductivity, and heat of fusion. Design limitations should include, with associated uncertainties: thicknesses, weld strengths, attachment types and materials, and margins of safety.
7.2 Effect of Type of Vehicle Breakup on Hazardous Debris List. In accordance with § 450.121(b)(1), a debris analysis must account for each reasonably foreseeable cause of vehicle breakup and intact impact. The type of breakup affects the hazardous debris list and imparted velocities of those hazardous debris. There can be many failure modes for a vehicle and there can be multiple potential breakup modes for a given failure mode. The hazardous debris list depends on the breakup mode and not the failure mode. Vehicles can breakup due to many factors. In accordance with § 450.121(d)(1), an applicant must provide a description of all scenarios that can lead to hazardous debris. Some of the common breakup categories observed for vehicles are given below. It should be noted that newer vehicles have many different types of failures and breakup modes. It is the responsibility of the applicant to consider all the relevant failure and breakup modes for their vehicle whether that mode is listed here or not.
7.2.1 Catastrophic Explosion of a Motor or Engine. An increase in chamber pressure inside a solid rocket motor that exceeds the ultimate strength of the motor casing can cause catastrophic explosions of that malfunctioning motor and generally lead to breakup of the vehicle. Liquid propellant engines may experience overpressure in the combustion chamber, turbopump failures, propellant leaks, or overheating that can result in an explosive event. The cause of the uncontrolled increase in internal pressures could be an internal anomaly or a malfunction in other parts of the vehicle. The main parameters that affect the hazardous debris list are (a) the location of the explosion, and (b) high net internal pressure (internal pressure— atmospheric pressure at that altitude) at the time of explosion. Typically, vehicle parts near the center of explosion break up into smaller pieces and have higher imparted speeds than hazardous debris away from the point of explosion. Solid rocket motor
failures that result when the motor case burst pressure is exceeded can have significantly higher chamber pressures than when the same motor is destroyed by flight termination system (FTS) ordnance. Therefore, imparted hazardous debris speeds in these cases are typically higher than that for FTS induced breakup hazardous debris. Debris generation computer models should distinguish between vehicle components that comprise a containment structure for an explosive or energetic source (e.g., common bulkhead propellant tank, pressure vessel, ignited solid rocket motor) and those that do not because different assumptions apply to breakup and imparted algorithms for those cases.
7.2.2 Flight Termination System (FTS) Initiated Breakups. When a vehicle malfunctions, the vehicle will either breakup inflight, impact the ground intact, or achieve orbital insertion. If unconstrained malfunction flight results in an unacceptable level of risk, then the vehicle may employ a flight abort system as a hazard control strategy and terminate powered flight in accordance with § 450.108(f)(2) to control risk. Thrust termination options include shutting down motors or inducing vehicle breakup using explosive charges. The breakup mechanism of the vehicle due to FTS destruct systems are different for liquid motors and solid propellant motors. The breakup hazardous debris characteristics also depend on the design and placement of the particular FTS system. FTS charges may be initiated automatically due to flight rules or manually by flight safety operators. It is also possible for them to be initiated during vehicle breakup due to other breakups such as aero breakup, aerothermal breakups, inertial and other structural breakups, and inadvertent stage separations. The breakup hazardous debris list and imparted speeds depend on the breakup mechanism and the time of flight. The aerodynamic forces, the amount of liquid propellant, the shape and thickness of the solid propellant casting, and the chamber pressure in currently burning solid rocket motors all affect the imparted speeds of the hazardous debris.
7.2.3 Aerodynamic Breakup. Space rockets are designed to withstand nominal acceleration loads along the axis of the rocket and some small angles of attack. Higher angles of attack exert large bending moments on the rocket body, and they can break, typically near weaker parts of the vehicle, like mid-body construction joints, and inter-stages. Many rockets have mechanisms to initiate destruct systems when a stage gets inadvertently separated. Therefore, many of these aerodynamic breakups may initiate FTS destruct charges and produce hazardous debris effectively the same as FTS type breakups. However, if there is no FSS, or FSS just cuts off thrust without inducing breakup, then the rocket may break due to further structural loadings and the hazardous debris list would be much different from that due to an explosive FTS.
7.2.4 Structural Breakups. Structural breakups can occur during normal trajectories as well as malfunction trajectories. Breakups on a normal trajectory are typically due to design or fabrication flaws. In this case, the vehicle breaks up due to excessive loads or vibrations experienced while traveling along the normal flight path. If the vehicle goes into a turn that results in a large angle of attack or results in a high rate of rotation during a
malfunction in the lower atmosphere, it is likely to break up due to aerodynamic forces that exceed the vehicle Q-Alpha load limit. At high altitudes, with low atmospheric pressures or in a vacuum, a high rotation rate can break up the vehicle if inertial forces exceed the structural limit of the vehicle. The breakup hazardous debris list from these events can be unique to the vehicle design and nature of the forces that drive the breakup sequence. Many breakup events that are initiated by a structural failure can be quickly followed by a catastrophic explosion in a motor or can lead to initiation of an FTS destruct system. If that is the case, then the hazardous debris list may be substantially similar to that developed for the FTS event.
7.2.5 Aerothermal Breakup. Aerodynamic heating can induce breakup of launch vehicles, stages, or reentry bodies, by virtue of both melting parts of the structure and weakening structural elements that are brought to high temperatures. Aerodynamic heating is proportional to velocity cubed, and therefore the heating rates are highly non-linear with respect to velocity. When objects reenter the Earth’s atmosphere either from an initial orbital condition, or from a loss of thrust or guidance failure during upper stage phases of flight approaching orbital velocity, reentry velocities are high enough to produce significant aerodynamic heating that may result in structural breakup and potential demise of fragments resulting from the breakup process. Atmospheric density and shape of the vehicle (i.e., stagnation radius) also affect aerodynamic heating rates and are factors that should be considered in an aerothermal breakup model.
An important and complicating factor that has significant effect on aerodynamic heating induced breakup is the design and integrity of thermal protective layers or systems used on a reentry body. A controlled reentry of a system with a properly designed thermal protection system will result in an intact vehicle surviving the reentry heating regime. A damaged thermal protection system can result in breakup of the vehicle even under controlled flight, as was the case for the Space Shuttle Columbia, which shed approximately 90,000 hazardous debris pieces during a several minute reentry breakup phase (see reference [6] in section 3.4 of this AC). Alternatively, there are aerothermal loads that can compromise a vehicle or a vehicle component that can result in a very different debris scenario – an example of which would be the jettisoned Space Shuttle External Tanks, which broke apart due to aerothermal loads and burst abruptly into substantially fewer pieces than the Orbiter reentry.
Reentry vehicles that contain residual liquid propellants may also experience an explosive event that further breaks up the reentry body.
7.2.6 Reentry Breakup Fragments by Material Type. Fragments released from an aerodynamic heating breakup process can be used to define hazardous debris classes and conservatively applied to ground risk calculations by ignoring any further reentry demise as the fragments fall to the ground from the release altitude. When risks from reentry aerothermal breakup are high, demise of fragments during free fall should be evaluated. Aluminum fragments are most likely to reach melt temperature and demise due to the low melting point of aluminum. Titanium, stainless steel, and carbon-carbon materials are more likely to survive reentry heating. Material properties of reentry fragments are needed to perform reentry demise calculations. Reentry demise of fragments released from the breakup of a complex or large reentry
body are often modeled as lumped mass objects with simple geometric shapes to support drag, stagnation radius, and heated area parameter allocations. Uncertainties and conditions under which lumped mass assumptions break down (larger objects, complex shapes, and multiple material types in one piece) should be evaluated. A hazardous debris risk analysis using aerothermal breakup defined fragments should recognize that demise during free fall can change the ballistic coefficient of the fragments, and therefore shift the ground impact point relative to an approach that ignores demise.
7.2.7 Partial Breakups and Shedding. It is possible for a vehicle to break up partially resulting in separated intact stages and boosters still thrusting or capable of residual thrusting. These large pieces should be propagated using proper trajectory propagation methods as described in AC 450.117-1, Normal and Malfunction Trajectory Analysis, until reaching ground or secondary breakup. This progressive breakup should continue until all the hazardous debris can be considered as lumped masses that can be propagated using methods described in chapter 6 of this AC. It is also possible that a vehicle could breakup incrementally and shed hazardous debris along the way. For this case, main vehicle trajectory should be computed using the methods similar to vehicle propagation algorithms used for the full vehicle with proper consideration for change in thrust, mass, and aerodynamic characteristics of the malfunctioning shedding vehicle. Unlike hazardous debris lists for instant breakups, in addition to other required information, the shedding location of each hazardous debris also should be defined in the hazardous debris list for this case.
7.2.8 Other Vehicle Breakup Modes. There are many types of space vehicles being designed and deployed and there will be new types of failure modes and breakup modes for these new vehicles. However, the principles used in developing hazardous debris lists for the above types of breakup modes are still valid for new vehicles.
7.3 Effect of Vehicle Structural Characteristics and Materials on Breakup Hazardous Debris List. In accordance with § 450.121(b)(2), a debris analysis must account for vehicle structural characteristics and materials. Vehicle structural characteristics and materials can have significant effect on the breakup hazardous debris characteristics. Two main factors that affect vehicle breakup are: (a) type of loads applied to the vehicle, and (b) strength of the vehicle subassemblies. This information should be properly accounted for in the method and techniques used for generating a hazardous debris list. Specifically, in a high fidelity debris modeling approach these factors should be modeled directly. When applying an empirical or statistical model, a structural expert should evaluate if the new vehicle design data falls within the design range from which the empirical model is derived.
7.3.1 Breakup Hazardous Debris List by Design Features. Some examples of structural characteristics that can affect breakup include connection between different stages of the vehicle. If a vehicle starts tumbling during a malfunction
turn, then the vehicle will start experiencing high bending moments that may lead to breakup at weak cross sections along the rocket. Often, interstages are less robust than motor bodies, especially solid rocket motors. Therefore, the strength and design of the load bearing elements at interstages will influence how a vehicle breaks up. Similarly, the strength and design of the connections between a main rocket body and strap on boosters will affect how easily the strap-ons become separated during a mishap. Therefore, an applicant should consider all unique design features of the vehicle when the hazardous debris list is generated.
7.3.2 Breakup Hazardous Debris List by Material Types. The type of materials used also affects the hazardous debris list. For example, composite materials used in modern space vehicles fracture differently from older metal structure designs. They also have different strengths, densities, and melting points. Therefore, it is important that the actual materials used to fabricate the vehicle be considered when developing the hazardous debris list.
7.4 Effect of Energetics in the Vehicle on Breakup on Hazardous Debris List. In accordance with § 450.121(b)(3), a debris analysis must account for energetic effects during break-up or at impact. Energetic effects are additional velocities resulting from explosions or sudden release of internal compressed gas.
7.4.1 Effect of Motor Type. Breakups of solid rocket motors are different from that of liquid propellant motors. Both types of motors can be in a single vehicle.
7.4.1.1 Solid Rocket Motors. Hazardous debris lists from breakup of solid rocket motors will be affected greatly based on whether the motor is burning and pressurized at the time of breakup or not. If it is burning at the time, then the amount of internal pressure and the thickness of the remaining propellant grain affect the hazardous debris size as well as imparted speed at breakup.
7.4.1.2 Liquid Propellant Motors. If there are liquid propellant motors in the vehicle, they have different effects on the hazardous debris list than that from solid propellant motors. For example, if the liquid propellants are stored in common bulkhead tanks with feed pipes that pass oxidizer through the interior of the fuel tank, or vice-versa, then this leads to greater initial mixing and greater explosive potential for the liquid propellants during breakup. If any of the liquid propellants are hypergolic, then estimating the explosive yield has more uncertainty. Mixing of hypergols is somewhat self-limiting because a reaction develops spontaneously on contact between the fuel and oxidizer liquid phases and that forces separation of fuel and oxidizer to limit the reaction. In addition, hypergols are toxic. Toxic fragments that contain these chemicals must be accounted for in accordance with
§ 450.139(c) since they can have an extended hazard area associated with release and atmospheric dispersion of the toxic chemical.
7.4.2 Intact Impact. If a jettison body such as a spent stage or a malfunctioning space vehicle does not break up due to environmental forces or an FTS destruct system, then it will land intact on the ground. A hazardous debris list for an intact impact case has only one fragment. However, it can pose higher risk at the impact location due to secondary breakup and explosion upon impact. Due to its size, an intact component could cause a collapse of a complete building and mass casualties. The debris analysis should provide for how the intact vehicle could break up upon impact taking into consideration the explosive effects from any propellants in the vehicle. How a vehicle breaks up upon impact causes a bigger or smaller explosion depending on the ground hardness and mixing of propellant and oxidizer, or if a solid propellant is used, how it breaks up and explodes. The explosive effects may be defined as a TNT equivalent in the hazardous debris list. See paragraph 11.10.2. Intact impact of large parts of a vehicle can lead to release of toxic propellants, and the hazardous debris list should provide sufficient information to perform toxic release hazard analysis in accordance with § 450.139.
7.4.3 Effect of Phase of Flight at Breakup. The configuration of a vehicle changes with the phase of a flight. For example, consider a space vehicle having a main solid propellant engine with attached solid propellant strap on boosters as the stage 1, a solid propellant stage 2, and a liquid propellant stage 3. Initially, only the main engine and the boosters may be thrusting. Breakup at this stage should reflect that fact (i.e., hazardous debris list for burning motors should reflect they are burning and hazardous debris list from stages 2 and 3 should reflect they are not burning). In the next phase of flight after strap-on boosters are spent and separated, breakup will reflect only hazardous debris from stage 1, stage 2, and stage 3 and other parts of the vehicle. In current practice, flight safety analysts prepare hazardous debris models for each part of the vehicle, (i.e., stage 1, strap-on boosters, stage 2, stage 3, and payload) and combine them to form the full vehicle hazardous debris list at a given phase of flight. When hazardous debris lists from different stages are combined, those lists also should be correspond to the correct burning status of those stages at that phase of flight.
7.4.4 Effect of Altitude of Breakup. Multiple analyses at various altitudes are typically required, ranging from the launch point, to apogee, and back to ground (if sub-orbital). Traditionally, higher altitudes cause higher explosion velocities due to the expansion of pressurized vehicle gases into the lower pressures of the ambient atmosphere. There is a greater pressure potential through which to accelerate hazardous debris until these pressures equalize.
7.4.4.1 Solid Propellant Motors. This velocity increase is particularly the case with solid propellant motors, where, the later flight time results in both lower ambient pressure and higher internal gas volume, as the solid propellant is depleted.
7.4.4.2 Liquid Propellant Motors. Liquid motors experience balancing effects where higher altitudes are offset by depleted propellant, but the unique trajectories, structures, and propellant loadings ultimately drive the expected effects of higher altitudes on the hazardous debris catalog.
Note: The subsequent FSA (i.e., using these hazardous debris catalogs) should be capable of capturing how equally-jettisoned hazardous debris will travel exponentially farther near exo-atmospheric conditions, due to both the relief from atmospheric drag and the curvature of the Earth (ultimately to include some hazardous debris approaching orbital trajectories).
7.4.5 Effect of Propellant Loading at Time of Breakup. As propellant depletes during ascent, gases that may either mitigate or exacerbate the hazardous debris catalog (particularly the explosion velocity) occupy the remaining volume of the motor. A solid propellant motor burns its propellant and replaces that volume with hot gas that is at the full pressure of the combustion chamber (typically about 1,000 psi). This phenomenon exacerbates the explosion velocity, producing higher-speed hazardous debris as the propellant is depleted. For example, in a space shuttle solid rocket booster (SRB) late in burn, rupture of that motor case could expand thousands of cubic feet of gas from 1000 psi to a low ambient pressure, accelerating fragments to near Mach-1 speeds on its way.
7.4.5.1 Accounting for Volume, Pressure of Compressed Gases. Any hazardous debris generating model that is applied should account for the volume and pressure of compressed gases inside a solid rocket motor chamber when computing fragment explosion velocities as the propellant loading factor decreases (i.e., propellant is consumed) during burn.
7.4.5.2 Accounting for Fracture Mechanics. A solid rocket motor breakup model should consider the fracture mechanics that apply to a sudden release of chamber pressure and the affect that has on the motor case and the remaining propellant web thickness. Several modeling approaches have been developed that estimate fragment velocities based on impulse and drag effects that evolve as internal compressed gases flow outward through gaps between solid rocket motor case and propellant fragments resulting from fragmentation of the motor. Examples are provided in references [7] and [9] in paragraph 3.4 of this AC.
7.4.5.3 Accounting for Acceleration of Fragments following Combustion. Liquid propellant motors generally replace their propellant (kerosene, hydrogen, methane, oxygen, or similar) with ullage (helium, nitrogen, or similar) as the propellant burns. Even though this ullage is often inert, it is still a pressurized gas—and a pressurized gas, in a rupturing tank, propels
fragments. Combustion during a rupture (which first requires adequate mixing of the fuel and oxygen) arguably occurs a fraction of a second after the fragments have departed (accelerated by merely the rupturing of the pressurized tanks), but some circumstances (particularly intact impact, and maybe other mid-air failure mechanisms) may mandate accounting for some further acceleration of fragments by a combustion or blast event; see references [3], [4], and [19] in paragraph 3.4 of this AC.
7.5 Steps for Developing Hazardous Debris Fragment Lists.
7.5.1 Explosive Breakups. The following is a step-by-step procedure that should be used for developing a hazardous debris fragment list for an explosive breakup mode. Structural breakups and other malfunctions frequently lead to explosive breakups.
1. Acquire dimensioned drawings (3-dimensional CAD drawings with mass and dimensional data) of the total vehicle and major subsystems such as stages, interstages, nozzles, liquid engine assemblies, solid rocket strap-on motors, avionics bay, avionics components, propulsion and attitude control system components (small nozzles, pressurized tanks, propellant tanks and plumbing components), payload adapter assembly, payload, and payload fairing.
2. Acquire photographs of actual hardware assemblies and subassemblies. Photographs give a general feel for the extensiveness of items such as wiring harnesses, plumbing lines, mounting brackets, and miscellaneous small hardware.
3. Acquire flight hardware mass properties. Mass properties data should include masses of both subsystem components and the higher assemblies. Placement of subsystem components in terms of a vehicle reference system helps determine distance of individual components from the center of the explosion. Some mass properties may include masses of components that are distributed across the assembly such as paint, screws, washers, and adhesives.
4. Estimate the center of explosion realistically to match the design of the system.
5. Partition the vehicle construction into the following types of fragments or fragment sources:
a. Liquid propellant tanks
b. Solid rocket motors including case and propellant
c. Skin and panel pieces (not part of liquid or solid propellant tanks)
d. Struts and frame pieces
e. Discrete components
f. Piping and wiring harness pieces
g. Miscellaneous small irregular shaped pieces
h. Distributed material (adds to mass in items 3 and 4)
6. For liquid propellant tanks that break up with the vehicle, apply a semi-empirical engineering model. The model should be verified using either first principle high fidelity numerical methods, such as a coupled finite element code or advanced multi-phase multi-physics code, or information from test or accident history to generate a list of tank wall fragments. For most common motor designs, semiempirical engineering tools are sufficient. For explosions in a tank with a common internal bulkhead and internal feed pipe, assume the explosion occurs inside the tank. If liquid propellants are housed in separate tanks without a common bulkhead, the center of explosion is considered to be external to the tanks in the inter-tank region.
7. For solid propellant motors that breakup with the vehicle, apply a physics-based algorithm or first principle high fidelity numerical method such as a finite element code to generate a list of motor case fragments and residual solid propellant fragments. Special consideration should be given to the aft motor segment and forward dome. The hazardous debris list and imparted speeds of the hazardous debris will depend on the net internal pressure and the remaining thickness of propellant grain. If using a finite element type code, the analysis should demonstrate that it can properly account for the variation in material strength properties with temperature, strain rate, pressure, and age of the propellant.
8. Use the vehicle drawings and descriptions to compute the surface area of one face of skin and panel type components. These will usually be associated with interstages, payload adapters, motor skirts, interior honeycomb or aluminum panels used to mount or isolate components, and trays to mount electronics (which may double as actively cooled heat sinks in some cases). For each type of skin or panel element, an operator should compute the mass per unit area. If hazardous debris fragment lists are to be applied to atmospheric reentry or hypersonic breakup where aerodynamic heating is a concern, material types should also be noted and may require additional final classifications of similar hazardous debris shapes and sizes by material type.
9. Estimate the number of fragments to assign to each skin and panel type assembly. This is recognized to entail significant uncertainty, since loading and fracture or failure mechanical analysis is rarely performed or available. Several guiding principles should be applied:
a. The sum of the surface areas of the fragments should match the total
un-fragmented surface area.
b. The mass of each fragment should be computed as the surface area of the
fragment times the mass per unit area, plus any prorated distributed mass to be added to these types of fragments (e.g., paints, adhesives, small fasteners, stiffening ribs, insulation, sound suppression foam, or other items that are deemed to be spread over large areas of other components).
c. Assume that a range of fragment sizes are likely to be produced somewhat
randomly from a statistical distribution. Historical events of large pressure vessels and combustion events of launch vehicles have suggested a log-normal distribution. The mean fragment length scale should be based on the length that would result in an ultimate strength exceedance from a 1D bending moment
using the average tank skin thickness and the expected pressure on the material at break-up. The mode fragment length should be based on the average thickness, including stringer or support sections. Data has also suggested about a 1:1 to 1:5 variation in ratio of length to width. The skin or panel drawings may suggest some intuitive breakdown for fragment shapes or sizes if there are holes cut in the structure or regions of relatively thin wall or weaker construction separated by stronger structural rings, plates, or frame elements. An example would be hemispherical domes, which tend to be built stronger and are of a shape that results in less stress concentrations. These shapes tend to stay intact and fail along weld lines. Careful consideration should be given to capture the smallest credible fragment size, particularly down to a ballistic coefficient of ~1 pounds per square foot (psf), and/or mass greater than 0.4g, as those fragments create a hazard for aircraft and suspend in the atmosphere for significant falltimes. Characterizing fragments down to a ballistic coefficient of 3.0 psf is generally considered of high importance, as those have historically been in the range of hazards to persons exposed on the ground.
d. For panel and skin components close to the center of an explosion, assign
relatively more small fragments and fewer large fragments. For panel or skin components farthest from the center of explosion only a relatively few large fragments should be considered unless the structure is very fragile.
e. Real fragments will have irregular shapes, but for risk analysis purposes simple
shapes such as flat or curved plates, or rectangular cubes with uncertainties around drag, size and mass parameters, will serve as a reasonable approximation. If a more complicated shape is certain to survive, then parameters should be derived accordingly. When selecting fragment sizes, the geometry of the main assembly should constrain maximum fragment dimensions (e.g., a fragment dimension should not be greater than the height, width, or circumference of the parent piece).
10. Identify strut and frame pieces from vendor drawings and photos. These items may be somewhat integrated into the skin and panel structures as stiffening ribs and rings. Generally, both the top and bottom of stages, interstages, and payload adapters will terminate in a structural ring that provides stiffness, load transfer capability, sufficient material for fasteners to mount skin panels, and lift points. Alternatively, some struts and frame items may be part of open structural support systems that do not directly incorporate skin panels. Some pressurization tanks are mounted with support struts between tanks.
11. Identify discrete components from drawings and photos. These are items such as avionics boxes, tanks, small thruster assemblies, or other items that appear to be compact and of relatively robust construction. Typically, these types of components are predominantly individual avionics items grouped together on side walls of the vehicle or avionics trays. The assumption that avionics boxes and batteries survive a vehicle explosion intact may underestimate the number of small pieces that could result if the boxes break up. Tanks used to store pressurized gases and liquid propellants are also included in the discrete component’s hazardous debris group. Discrete components that are securely attached to skin or panel constructed items
may break loose and retain the attached panel segment as part of a discrete component.
12. Identify piping and wiring harness items from drawings and photos. Estimate the total length of tubing and wiring used in various diameter categories and a mass per unit length for each category.
13. Identify components that can best be described as small irregular shaped pieces that do not fit into any of the previous categories. These tend to be items like heavier duty mounting brackets, housings for springs that are part of stage separation hardware, and small compressed gas orbital maneuvering thrusters. Fragment shapes assigned to such pieces tend to be “boxes” or “cylinders,” even though some bracket assemblies have numerous openings and are more like a small 3dimensional frame structure than a solid 3-dimensional structure.
14. Identify materials that are to be treated as distributed mass over other previously defined fragments. To conserve total vehicle mass within the fragment list and to recognize that actual fragments will be combinations of items represented as separate items in a parts list, items that cannot be identified with a specific discrete component should have their masses distributed among the other defined fragments. Items such as paint, insulation, and sound suppressing foam are typically applied to the skin and panel fragments and can be prorated to such fragments based on surface area calculations.
7.5.2 Aerothermal Breakups. Unlike an explosive event, aerothermal breakup will typically begin at a high altitude (e.g., 95km) and progressively shed an increasing number of fragments down to an altitude as low as 50km. This means fragments are shed from the body over time and space. If the reentry body is falling at a flight path angle that is nearly vertical, then the uncertainty in the hazardous debris impact location due to the shedding process is minimized, and the effect is mainly in the time differences of when hazardous debris pieces impact. This will be more important to predicting aircraft risk than ground risk. One approach that has been used with object oriented reentry breakup models is to estimate all reentry breakup hazardous debris to be generated at one time at an altitude of 78km. This is based on empirical observations that many different types of reentering satellites all seem to experience a major breakup event near the 78km altitude. Some reentry bodies contain propellant tanks that may have residual liquid propellant. Aerothermal heating may rupture these tanks due to heat transfer into the liquid and over pressurization of the tanks. In the case where a reentry explosion is predicted, the hazardous debris list development steps defined in paragraph 7.5.1 of this AC may be applied.
7.5.3 Small Hazardous Debris Hazardous to Aircraft. Some hazardous debris may only be hazardous to aircraft and people on an aircraft, but not to people on the ground, whether in open areas, or sheltered in buildings, vehicles, or ships. This is mainly due to the closing speed between the aircraft and fragments. Due to the high closing speeds, fragments can impart significant collision impact energy to an aircraft. Hazardous debris that damages an engine, penetrates the fuselage to
produce a loss of cabin pressure, or causes a fuel leak can lead to a plane crash killing all persons on board. The fragment list should contain all fragments capable of causing a casualty-producing event. Some aircraft vulnerability models consider dense fragments as small as 0.4g to be hazardous (see paragraph 11.8 of this AC). The closing speed is the relative velocity between the aircraft and the hazardous debris at impact. This is much higher than the impact speed of the same hazardous debris impacting a ground target for two reasons: (1) due to low air density at aircraft altitudes, terminal speed of hazardous debris is greater at aircraft cruise altitude than sea level, and (2) aircraft fly much faster than most debris terminal velocities, especially low ballistic coefficient debris.
7.6 Hazardous Debris Containing Toxic Material. Upon impact, a liquid tank may not explode but instead break open and leak, or may explode but only partially consume the liquid propellants. Some liquid propellants used for rocket propulsion or spacecraft maneuvering, such as hypergolic propellants, are toxic to people. The possibility for this type of event should be evaluated to determine if there is a potential toxic hazard to people on the ground. If this hazard is considered credible, a flight safety analysis should evaluate the probability of the spill occurring over locations in the affected region, and the amount of liquid that could spill in accordance with § 450.139(c). This topic is covered in AC 450.139-1 Toxic Hazards Analysis and Thresholds.
8 AERODYNAMIC AND HARMFUL DEBRIS CHARACTERISTICS.
8.1 Ballistic Coefficients. The equations of motion that propagate a fragment through the atmosphere apply force due to drag through the ballistic coefficient, 𝛽. This parameter indicates the relative importance of inertial and aerodynamic forces on a body in free fall. It is defined as:
𝛽= 𝑊 𝐶𝐷𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓
where 𝑊 is the fragment mass,1 𝐶𝐷 is the drag coefficient, and 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓 is the associated aerodynamic reference area. Values of 𝐶𝐷 and 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓 are obtained experimentally. The value of 𝐶𝐷 varies as a function of speed 𝑣, usually given in terms of the Mach number 𝑀= 𝑣/𝑐 where 𝑐 is the speed of sound. The ballistic coefficient is nearly constant at low speeds (𝑀≤0.3), and this is called the subsonic ballistic coefficient, 𝛽𝑠𝑢𝑏.
8.1.1 Flow Regimes. The earth’s atmosphere contains three aerodynamic regimes: continuum flow at low altitudes, free molecular flow (FMF) at high altitudes, and a transitional regime. These are identified through the Knudsen number 𝐾𝑛= 𝜆⁄ 𝐿 where 𝜆 is the molecular mean free path and L is the characteristic body length. Applying a constant ballistic 1 The ballistic coefficient is sometimes represented using weight instead of mass. This affects its usage in equations of motion, as the conversion factor is gravity. However, in English units, g = 1.0 lbf / lbm at sea level, so numerically, this factor may drop out.
coefficient derived for continuum flow (CF) to regions where free molecular conditions exist tends to underestimate the drag force. Therefore, accounting for drag force changes between the continuum and free molecular flow regimes typically reduces the size of the estimated impact dispersion areas. For larger debris, using a ballistic coefficient assuming continuum flow is usually an adequate model (except if the debris is traveling close to horizontally in the upper thermosphere or exosphere). However, for small debris, such as may be hazardous to aircraft, the effects of the flow regime can become important, especially if the debris spends significant time in the thermosphere or exosphere. The continuum flow regime is applicable where Kn ≤ 0.01, the transitional regime 0.01 < Kn < 10, and the FMF regime where Kn ≥ 10.
8.2 Drag Coefficient Estimates for Continuum Flow. Two values used in the calculation of the ballistic coefficient are the drag coefficient and aerodynamic reference area. These should be defined in a consistent manner for a given shape. If experimental values are not known for a given fragment, then reasonably good estimates for use in β can be made by considering the shape of the fragment. Different conventions can be used for reference area, but the drag coefficient should correspond to the referenced area. This section provides tabular data that may be useful in assigning drag to various shaped fragments which are tumbling. To apply the tables 1 through 3 of this AC, the fragment should be approximated either as a sphere, a square box, a rectangular box, or thick/thin plate. The estimates for Aref are then be given by the area projected onto the direction of the flow. Experimental results of CD for the four shapes are given in reference [10] of paragraph 3.4 of this AC. The tables show CD at a set of specific Mach values M. To get values for other speeds, use piecewise linear fits without extrapolation. The fragments are assumed to be tumbling during free-fall.
8.2.1 Drag Coefficient Estimates for Spherical Objects. For a sphere with diameter D,
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓= 𝜋𝐷2
4
Drag coefficients, as a function of Mach number, for subcritical flow are shown in Table 1. For supercritical flow, apply the ratio 0.14/0.47 to each drag coefficient in Table 1 to construct the associated table.
Table 1—Sub-Critical Drag Coefficients for Spheres
M 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 2 4 10
CD 0.47 0.5 0.52 0.64 0.73 0.82 1.05 1.0 0.93 0.92
8.2.2 Drag Coefficient Estimates for Cylindrical Objects.
For a cylinder of length L and diameter D, 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓=
𝜋𝐷2
4 . For all values of L and D, the drag coefficients at M=0.3 are computed by:
𝐶𝐷(𝑀= 0.3) = 0.65 𝐿
𝐷+ 0.46.
When L/D=4, the drag coefficients as a function of Mach number are shown in Table 2. For coefficients 𝐶𝐷 with other L/D ratios, apply the ratio 𝐶𝐷(𝑀= 0.3)/3.06 to each drag coefficient in Table 2 to construct the associated table.
Table 2—Drag Coefficients with L/D=4 for Randomly Tumbling Cylinder
M 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 2 4 5 10
CD at L/D=4 3.06 3.15 3.45 3.56 4.30 5.79 6.27 5.82 5.97 6.04
8.2.3 Drag Coefficient Estimates for Plate-Shaped Objects and Rectangular Boxes. The dimensions of a rectangular object have the order 𝐿1 > 𝐿2 > 𝐿3. For aspect ratios 𝐿2 > 5𝐿3 and
𝐿2 𝐿1 > 0.2 use the values shown in Table 3, otherwise the box is a
“Thin Plate” and presented in the next subparagraph. The reference area is given by:
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓=
4
𝜋(𝐿1𝐿2 + 𝐿1𝐿3 +
𝜋
2 𝐿2𝐿3).
Table 3—Drag Coefficients for a Randomly Tumbling Rectangular Box
M 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.4 2 3 4 6 10
CD 0.75 0.78 0.92 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.17
8.2.4 Drag Coefficient Estimates for Thin Plate Shaped Objects with High Aspect Ratios. The reference area for a thin plate is the same as for the general rectangular box, i.e. 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓=
4
𝜋(𝐿1𝐿2 + 𝐿1𝐿3 +
𝜋
2 𝐿2𝐿3). There are three cases to consider, where in each case apply the ratio 𝐶𝐷(𝑀= 0.3)/0.75 to each drag coefficient in Table 3 to construct the associated table.
For 𝐿2/𝐿1 ≤0.05, at M=0.3 the drag coefficient is computed by
𝐶𝐷(𝑀= 0.3) = 1.27 −6.35(𝐿2/𝐿1)
For 0.05 ≤𝐿2/𝐿1 ≤0.1, at M=0.3 the drag coefficient is computed by
𝐶𝐷(𝑀= 0.3) = 1.08 −2.54(𝐿2/𝐿1)
For 0.1 ≤𝐿2/𝐿1 ≤0.2, at M=0.3 the drag coefficient is computed by
𝐶𝐷(𝑀= 0.3) = 0.903 −0.76(𝐿2/𝐿1)
8.3 Drag in Transitional and Free Molecular Flow Regimes.
8.3.1 Reynolds Number. A key parameter in these regimes is the Reynolds number,
𝑅𝑒= 𝜌𝑣𝐿
µ
where µ is the absolute viscosity of the fluid. The Reynolds number is a dimensionless parameter that characterizes the ratio of inertial force and viscous drag force. There are two flow regimes: supercritical for Re >1 x 106, which corresponds to a smooth surface, and subcritical for Re <1 x 106 for a rough surface.
8.3.2 Drag in Free Molecular Flow Regime. The drag coefficient depends on the wall temperature and the accommodation coefficient for the surface. With the conservative assumptions provided in reference [15] of paragraph 3.4 of this AC, the drag coefficient for a sphere in FMF can be computed as a function of Reynolds number:
𝐶𝐷(𝐾𝑛≥10) = 0.92 + 1.7𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.1𝑅𝑒) 𝑆𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
and that for a stable thin plate by:
𝐶𝐷(𝐾𝑛≥10) = 1.83 + 1.12𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.3𝑅𝑒) 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒
while a tumbling thin plate is obtained by applying a factor 1.56.
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