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Advisory Circular Cancelled Issued Mar 5, 1986 ANM-110 11 pages Copy saved Nov 18, 2026

AC 25.571-1A Damage-Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure

This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means of compliance with the provisions of·Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR} dealing with the damage-tolerance alid fatigue evaluation requirements of aircraft structure.

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Advisory US.Oepatmeot· .otia1sportation

Federal Avlotlon Circular Admlnlstrotion

Subject: DAMAGE-TOLERANCE AAO FATIGUE Date: 3/5/86 ACNo: 25.571-lA EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE Initiated by: JINM-110 Otange:

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) sets forth an acceptable means of compliance with the provisions of·Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(FAR} dealing with the damage-tolerance alid fatigue evaluation requirements of aircraft structure.

2. CANCELLATION. Advisory Circular 25.571-1, dated 9/28/78, is cancelled.

3. OEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN THIS AC.

a. Damage tolerance means that the structure has been evaluated to ensure that should serious fatigue, corrosion, or accidental damage occur within the operational life of the airplane, the remaining structure can withstand

reasonable loads without failure or excessive structural deformation until the damage is detected.

b. Fail-safe n~ans that the structure has been evaluated to assure that catastrophic failure is not probable after fatigue failure or obvious partial

failure of a single, principal structural element.

c. Safe-life means that the structure has been evaluated to be able to withstand the repeated loads of variable magnitude expected during its service

life without detectable cracks.

d. Principa1 structural elements are those which contribute significantly to carrying flight, ground. and pressurization loads, and whose failure could result in catastrophic failure of the airplane.

e. Critical structural elements are those elements whose failure would result in catastroph1c failure of the airplane.

f. Primary structure is that structure which carries flight, ground, or pressure loads.

g. Secondary structure is that structur·e which carries only air or inertial loads generated on or within the secondary structur·e.

·h. Single load path is where the applied loads Me eventually distributed through asingfemember within an assembly, t11•· fc1ilure of which would r·esult in the los•; of the str·uctural integrity of tiH' co;;Jp(lfl~"nt involved.

AC 25.571-lA 3/5/86

i. Multitle load path is identified with redundant structures in which, (with the fai ure of individual elements) the applied loads would be safely distributed to other load carrying members.

j. Reliability refers to detail designs or methodologies which service history has demonstrated to be reliable.

k. Probability refers to a probability of occurrence of an event consistent with past successfUl experience.

4. BACKffiOUND.

a. During recent years. there have been significant state-of-the-art and industry-practice developments in the area of structural fatigue and fail-safe strength evaluation of transport category airplanes. Recognizing that these developments could warrant some revision of the existing fatigue requirements

in§§ 25.571 and 25.573 of Part 25 of the FAR, the FAA, on November 18, 1976; gave notice of its Transport Category Airplane Fatigue Regu~ a tory Review Program ·and invited interested persons to submit proposals to amend those requirements (41 FR 50956). The proposals and related discussions formed the basis for the revision of the structural fatigue evaluation standards of §§ 25.571 and 25.573 and the development of guidance material. To that end, § 25.571 was revised, § 25.573 was deleted (the scope of § 25.571 was expanded to cover the substance

of the deleted section), and guidance material (AC 25.571-1) containing

co~pliance provisions related to the proposed change was provided.

b. ~ince issuance of AC 25.571-1 on 9/28/78, additional guidance material, including discrete source damage, has been developed and is incorporated in this rev1 s1on.

5. INTRODUCTION.

a. The contents of this advisory circular are considered by the FAA in determining compliance with the damage-tolerance and fatigue requirements of § 25.571.

(1) Although a uniform approach to the evaluation required by§ 25.571 is desirable, it is recognized that in such a complex field new design features and methods of fabrication, new approaches to the evaluation, and new configura­

tions could necessitate variations and deviations from the procedures described in this advisory circular. Close adherence to the procedures contained in this advisory circular should be encouraged.

(2) Damage-tolerance design is required. unless it entails such complications that an effective damage-tolerant structure cannot be achieved within the limitations of geometry, ir:spectat>ility, or good design practice.

Under these circumstances, a design that complies with the fatigue evaluation

(safe-life) requir·ements is used. A typical example of structure that might not be conducive to damage-tolerance design is the LHJding gear and its attachments.

(3) Experience with the application of methods of futigue evaluation indicates that a tt-':>t background shoulrl exist in onj;or· to dchieve the desig1

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objective. Even under the damage-tolerance method discussed in paragraph 6 of this AC, it is the general practice within industry to conduct damage-tolerance tests for design information and guidance purposes. Damage location, growth, and detection data should also be considered in establishing a recommended inspection program.

b. Typical loading spectrum expected in service. The loading spectrum ··should be based on measured statistical data of the type derived from government and industry load history studies and~ where insufficient data are available, on a conservative estimate of the anticipated use of the airplane. The principal loads that should be considered in establishing a loading spectrum

are flight loads {gust and maneuver), ground loads (taxiing, landing impact, turning, engine runup, braking, thrust reversing, and towing), and pressurization loads. The development of the loading spectrum includes the definition of the expected flight plan which involves climb, cruise, descent-, flight times, operational speeds and altitudes, and the approximate time to be spent in each of the operating regimes. Operations for crew training and other pertinent factors, such as the dynamic stress characterist1cs of any flexible structure excite~ by turbulence, should also be considered. For pressurized cabins, the loading spectrum should include the repeated application of the normal operating different1al pressure, and the superimposed effects of flight loads and external aerodynamic pressures.

c. Components to be evaluated. In assessing the possibility of serious fatigue fa11ures, the design should be examined to determine probable points of 1 failure in service. In this examination, consideration should be given, as necessary, to the results of stress analyses, static tests, fatigue tests, strain gage surveys, tests of similar structural configurations, and service experience. Service experience has shown that special attention should be focused on the design details of important discontinuities, main attach fittings, tension joints, splices, and cutouts such as windows, doors, and other openings. Locations prone to accidental damage (such as that due to impact with ground servicing equipment near airplane doors) or to corrosion should also be considered.

d. Analyses and tests. Unless it is determined from the foregoing examinat1on that the normal operating stresses in specific regions of tne

structure are of such a low order that serious damage growth is extremely

improbable, repeated load analyses or tests should be conducted on structures representative of components or subcomponents of the wing, control surfaces, empennage, fuselage, landing gear, and their related primary attachments. Test specimens should include structure representative of attachment fittings, major joints, changes in section, cutouts, and discontinuities. Any method used in the analyses should be supported, as necessary, by test or service experience. Typical (ave-rage) values of material properties and other pa1·ameters may be

used in residual strength, crack growth, and damage detection anaiy5es for damage tolerance evaluations per paragraph 6 and discrete source damage per paragraph 8.

6. DAMAGE-TOLERANCE EVALUATION.

a. General. Th·~ damaq(~-tnler·ance >:vdluati(Jn df ·:,tructur•; is intended to ensure thai· should scr-iou·; f,Jtigue, c:,w:-,l,ltJn, r1r .:c• i.knt.J~ Lldi:Lilj~ O(cur h'iti1in

AC 25.571-lA 3/5/86

the operational life of the airplane, the rema1n1ng structure can withstand reasonable loads without failure or excessive structural deformation until the damage is detected. Included are the considerations historically associated with fail-safe design. The evaluation should encompass establishing the components which are to be designed as damage-tolerant, defining the loading conditions and extent of damage, conducting structural tests or analyses, or both, to substantiate that the design objective has been achieved, and establishing data for inspection programs to ensure detection of damage. Although this evaluation applies to either single or multiple load path

structure, the use of multiple load path structure should be given high priority in achieving damage tolerant design. Design features which should be considered in attaining a damage-tolerant structure include the following:

{I) Multiple load path construction and the use of crack stoppers to control the rate of crack growth, and to provide adequate residual static

strength;

{2) Materials and stress levels that, after initiation of cracks, provide a controlled slow rate of crack propagation combined with high residual strength;

(3} Arrangement of design details to ensure c sufficiently high probability that a failure in any critical structural element will be detected before the strength has been reduced below the level necessary to withstand the

loading conditions specified in§ 25.57l(b), so as to allow replacement or repair of the failed elements; and

(4) Provisions to limit the probability of concurrent multiple damage, particularly after long service, which couid conceivably contribute to a common fracture path. Examples of such multiple damage are:

(i) A number of small cracks which might coalesce to form a single 1on g crack;

(ii} Failures, or partial failures, in adjacent areas due to the redistribution of loading following a failure of a single element; and

(iii) Simultaneous failure, or partial failure, of multiple load path discrete elements, working at similar stress levels.

b. Normally, the damage tolerance assessment consists of a deterministic evaluation of the above design features. This paragraph provides guidelines for this approach. In certain speci fie in stances, however, damage-tolerant design might be more realistically assessed by a probabilistic evaluation employing methods such as risk analysis. They are routinely employed in fail-safe evaluations of airplane systems and have occasional Jy been used where structure and systems are interrelated. These methods can be of particular value for structure consisting of discrete isolated elements where damage tolerance depends on the ability of the structure to sustain redistributed 10ads after failures of discrete elements resulting from fatigue, corrosion, or accidental damage. Where considered appropriate on multiple load path structure, probabilistic analysis may be used if it can be shown that loss of

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the airplane is extremely improbable and the statistical data employed in the analysis is based on tests or operational experience, or both, of similar structure. ·

c. Identification of principal structural elements. Principal structural elements are those which contribute significantly to carrying flight, ground, and pressurization loads, and whose failure could result in catastrophic failure of the airplane. Typical examples of such elements are as follows:

( 1) Wing and empennage.

(i) Control surfaces, slats, flaps, and their mechanical systems and attachments {hinges, tracks, and fittings);

(ii) Integrally stiffened plates;

(iii) Primary fittings;

(iv) Principal splices;

(v} Skin or reinforcement around cutouts or discontinuities;

(vi) Skin-stringer combinations;

(vii) Spar caps; and

(viii) Spar webs.

(2) Fuselage.

(i) Circumferential frames and adjacent skin;

(ii) Door frames;

(iii) Pilot window posts;

(iv) Pressure bulkheads;

(v} Skin and any single frame or stiffener element around a cutout;

(vi) Skin or skin splices, or both, under circumferential loads;

(vii} Skin or skin splices, or both, under fore and aft loads;

{viii) Skin around a cutout~

( ix) Skin and stiffener combinations under fore and aft loads;

(x) Door skins, frames, and latches; and

(xi) Window frames.

AC 25.571-lA 3/5/86

( (3} Landing gear and their attachments.

\ (4) Engine mounts.

d. Extent of damaae. Each particular design should b~ assessed to establish appropriateamage criteria in relation to inspectability and damage extension characteristics. In any damage determination, including those involving multiple cracks, it is possible to establish the extent of damage in terms of detectability with the inspection techniques to be use<:t, the associated initially detectable crack size, the residual strength capabilities of the structure, and the likely damage-extension rate, considering the expected stress redistribution under the repeated loads expected in service and with the expected inspection frequency. Thus, an obvious partial failure could be considered to be the extent of the damage for residual strength assessment, provided a positive determination is made that the fatigue cracks will be detectable by the available inspection techniques at a sufficiently early stage of the crack development. In a pressurized fuselage, an obvious partial failure might be detectable through the inability of the cabin to maintain operating

pressure or controlled decompression after occurrence of the damage. The following are typical examples of partial failures which should be considered in the evaluation:

( 1) Oetec·table skin cracks emanating from the edge of structural openings or cutouts;

(2) A detectable circumferential or longitudinal skin crack in the ( basic fuselage structure;

(3) Complete severance of interior frame elements or stiffeners in addition to a detectable crack in the adjacent skin;

(4) A detectable failure of one element where dual construction is utilized in components such as spar caps, window posts, window or door frames, and skin structure;

(5) The presence of a detectable fatigue failure in at least the tension portion of the spar web or similar element; and

(6) The detectable failure of a primary attachment, including a control surface hinge and fitting.

e. Inaccessfble areas. Every reasonable effort should be made to ensure inspectability of all structural parts, and to qualify them under the damage tolerance provisions (reference § 25.611}.

f. Testing of principal structural elements. The nature and extent of residual strength tests on complete structures or on portions of the primary structure will depend upon applicable previous design, constructjon, tests, and service experience, in connection with similar structures. Simulated cracks should be as representative as possible of actual fatigue damage. Where it is not practical to produce actual fatigue cracks, damage can be sirnu1ated by cuts

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made with a fine saw, sharp blade, guillotine, or other suitable means. If sawcuts in primary structure are used to simulate sharp fatigue cracks, sufficient evidence should be available from ~lement tests to indicate equivalent residual strength. In those cases where bolt failure, or its equivalent, is to be simulated as part of a possible damage configuration in

joints or fittings, bolts can be removed to provide that part of the si mu1ation .

g. Identification of locations to be evaluated. The locations of damage to structure for damage-tolerance evaluation should be identified as follows:

(1) Determination of general damage locations. The location and modes of damage can be determined by analysis or by fatigue tests on complete

structures or subcomponents. However, tests might be necessary·when the basis fo.r analytical prediction is not reliable, such as for complex components. If less than the complete structure is tested, care should be taken to en~ure that the internal loads and boundary conditions are valid.

(i) If a determination is made by analysis, factors such as the following should be taken into account:

(A) Strain data on undamaged structure to establish points of high stress concentration, as well as the magnitude of the concentration;

static tests;

(B) Locations where permanent de fonnati on occurred in

fatigue anaiysis;

(C) and

Locations of potential fatigue damage identified by

(D) Design details which service experience of similarly designed compcnents indicates are prone to fatigue or other damage.

(ii l In addition, the areas of probable damage from sources such as severe corrosive environment should be determined from a review of the design and past service experience.

(2) Selection of critical damage areas. The process of actually locating where damage should be simulated in principal structural elements identified in paragraph 6c of this AC should take into account factors such as the following:

( i } Review analysis to locate areas of maximum stress and low margin of safety;

( i i) Select locations in an element where the stresses in adjacent elements would be the maximum witll the damage present;

(iii) Select partial fracture locations in an element where high stress concentrdtiuns are present in the n"'sidual stnJI.:ture; and

(iv) Select locations whrn' notection would b•? difficult.

AC 25.571-lA 3/5/86

h. Damage-tolerance analysis and tests.

(1) It should be determined by analysis, supported by test evidence, that:

(i) The structure, with the extent of damage established for residual strength evaluation, can withstand the specified design limit loads (considered as ultimate loads), and

(ii) The damage growth rate under the·repeated loads expected in service (between the time the damage becomes initially detectable and the time the extent of _d~II)age reaches the value for resi<lual strength evaluation) provides a practical basis for development of the inspection program and procedures described in paragraph 6i of this AC.

{2) The repeated loads should be as defined in the loading, temperature, and humidity spectra. The loading conditions should take into account the effects of structural flexibility and rate of loading where they are

significant.

(3} The damage tolerance characteristics can be shown analytically by reliable or conservative methods such as the following:

(i} By demonstrating quantitative relationships with structure already verified as damage tolerant;

f (ii) By demonstrating that the damage would be detected before it reaches the value for residual strength evaluation; or

{iiii By demonstrating that the repeated loads and limit load stresses do not exceed those of previously verified designs of similar configuration, materials, and inspectability.

(4) The maximum extent of immediately obvious damage from discrete sources should be determined and the remaining structure shown to have static strength for the maximum load (considered as ultimate load) expected during the completion of the flight. Nomally, this would be an analytical assessment. In the case of uncontained engine failures, the fragments and paths to be considered should be consistent with those used in showing compliance with § 25.903{d){1) of the FAR, and with typical damage experienced in service.

i. Inspection.

(1) Detection of damage before it becomes critical is the ultimate control in ensuring the damage tolerance characteristics of the structure. Therefore, the applicant should provide sufficient guidance information to assist operators in establishing the frequency, extent, and methods of

inspection of the critical structure. This kind of information must, under § 25.57l(a}(3} of the FAR, be included in the instructions for continued airworthiness required by § 25.1529 of the FAR.

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3/5/86 AC 25.571-lA

(2) Due to the inherent, complex interactions of the many parameters affecting damage tolerance such as operating practices, environmental effects,

load sequence on crack growth, and variations in inspection methods, related operational experience should· be taken into account in establishing inspection procedures.

( 3) A comparative analysis can be used to guide the changes from succes.sful past practice when necessary. Therefore, maintenance and inspection requirements should recognize the dependence on experience and should be specified in a document that provides for revision as a result of operational experience. such 'as the one containing the operator's FAA-approved structural

inspection program developed through the Maintenance Review Board (MRB} procedures for FAR Part 121 operators.

1. FATIGUE EVALUATION.

a. General. The evaluation of structure under the following fatigue (safe-life) strength evaluation methods is intended to ensure that catastrophic fatigue failure, as a result of the repeated loads of variable magnitude expected in service, is extremely improbable throughout the structure • s operational life. Under these methods, loading spectra should be established, the fatigue life of the structure for the spectra should be determined, and a scatter factor ·should be applied to the fatigue life to establish the safe-life for the structure. The evaluation should include the following; however~ in

some instances it might be necessary to correlate the loadings used in the analysis with flight load and strain surveys:

(1) Estimating or measuring the expected loading spectra for the structure;

(2) Conducting a structural analysis including consideration of the stress concentration effects;

(3) Fatigue testing of structure which cannot be related to a test background to establish response to the typical loading spectrum expected in

service;

(4) Determining reliable replacement times by interpreting the loading history, variable load analyses, fatigue test data, service experience, and

fatigue analyses; and

(5) Pr·oviding data for inspection and maintenance instructions and guidance information to the operators.

b. Scatter Factor for Safe-life Determination. In the interpretation of fatigue analyses and test data, the effect of variability should, under § 25.57l{c), be accounted for· by an appropriate scatter factor. Relating test results to the r·ecommended safe-life is extremely difficult since there are a number of considerations peculiar to each design and test that necessitate evaluation by the applicant. H1ese cor,siderations will depend on the number of representative test specimens, the matE'rial, th".: typ•:' nf specimen employed, ttlc type of repeated load test, the load levels, and environm·:ntal conditions.

AC 25.571-IA 3/5/86

c. Replacement times. Replacement times should be established for parts with established safe-lives and should, under§ 25.57l(a}{3), be jncluded in the

information prepared under § 25.1529. These replacement times can be extended if additional data indicates an extension is warranted. Important factors which should be considered for such extensions include, but are not limited to, the

following:

(1) Comparison of original evaluation with service experience.

(2} Recorded load and stress data. Recorded load and stress data entails instrumenting airplanes in service to obtain a representative sampling

of actual loads and stresses experienced. The data to be measured includes airspeed, altitude, and load factor versus time data; or airspeed, altitude, and strain. ranges versus time data; or similar data. The data, obtained by instrumenting airplanes in service, pr~pvides a basis for correlating the estimated loading spectrum with the actual service experience.

(3) Additional analyses and tests. If test data and analyses based on repeated load tests of additional specimens are obtained, a reevaluation of the established safe-life can be made.

(4) Tests of parts removed from service. Repeated load tests of replaced parts can be utilized to reevaluate the established safe-life. The tests should closely simulate service loading conditions. Repeated load testing of parts removed from service is especially useful wi1ere recorded load data obtained in service are available since the actual loading experienced by the part prior to replacement is known.

{5) Repair or rework of the structure. In some cases, repair or rework of the structure can gain further 1i fe.

d. Type design developments and changes. For design developments or design changes involving structural configurations similar to those of a design alr·eady

shown to comply with the applicable provisions of§ 25.57l(c), it might be possible to evaluate the variations in critical portions of the structure on a comparative basis. Typical examples would be redesign of the wing structure for

increased loads, and the introduction in pressurized cabins of cutouts having different locations or different shapes, or both. This evaluation should

involve analysis of the predicted stresses of the redesigned primary structure and correlation of the analysis with the analytical and test results used in showing compliance of the original design with § 25.57l(c).

e. Environmental effects such as temperature and humidity should be considered in the damage tolerance and fatigue analysis and should be demonstrated through suitable testing.

8. OI SCRETE SOURCE DAt·lAGE.

a. General. The purpose of this section is to establist1 FAA guidelines for the cons1stent selection of load conditions for residual strength substantiation

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.·' in showing compliance with§ 25.57l(e), Damage-tolerance (discrete source) evaluation. The intent of these guidelines is to define load conditioos that

will not be exceeded with a satisfactory level of confidence on the flight during which the specified incident of§ 25.571(e) occurs. In defining these load conditions~ consideration has been given to the expected damage to the airplane, the anticipated response of the pilot at the time of the incident, and

the actions of the pilot to avoid severe load environments for the remainder of the flight consistent with his knowledge that the airplane may be in a damaged state. With these considerations in mind, the following ultimate loading conditions should be used to establish residual strength of the damaged

structure.

b. The maximum extent of immediately obvious damage from discrete sources (§ 25. 571(e}) should be determined and the remaining structure shown, with an acceptable level of confidence, to have static strength for the maximum load

(considered as ultimate load) expected during completion of the flight.

c. The ultimate loading conditions should not be less than those developed from the following conditions:

{1) At the time of the incident:

{i) The maximum normal operating differential pressure, multiplied by a 1.1 factor, plus the expected external aerodynamic pressures during 1 g level flight, combined with 1 g flight loads.

{ii} The airplane, assumed to be in 1 g level flight, should be shown to be able to survive any maneuver or any other flight path deviation caused by the specified incident of§ 25.57l(e), taking i~to account any likely damage to the flight controls and pilot normal corrective action.

(2) Following the incident:

(i) Seventy percent {70%) limit flight maneuver loads and,

separately~ 40 percent of the limit gust velocity (vertical or lateral) at the specified speeds, each combined with the maximum appropriate cabin djfferential pressure (including the expected external aerodynamic pressure).

(ii) The airplane must be shown by analysis to be free from flutter up to Vo/~1o with any change in structur·al stiffness resulting from the incident.

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·---- y--1 Cv ,._~ L LEROY A. KErTH t-lanager·, Aircraft Certification Division, J\NI-1-100